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International Review 1970s: 1-19

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International Review no.1 - April 1975

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International Review no.1 - Preface

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This is the first issue of the International Review of the International Communist Current. The necessity for such a publication has been seen clearly by all the groups which make up our current during the course of long discussions which preceded and prepared the ground for the International Conference at the beginning of this year. By taking the decision to publish the Review in English, French and Spanish, the conference not only took a decisive step in the process of unifying our current, but has also blazed a trail for the regroupment of revolutionaries in general.

In this period of general crisis, pregnant with convulsions and social upheavals, one of the most urgent and arduous tasks facing revolutionaries is that of welding together the meagre revolutionary forces that are currently dispersed throughout the world. This task can only be undertaken by beginning straight away on an international level. This has always been a central pre-occupation of our current. Our Review is designed to help fulfill this need; by embarking upon its publication we intend to make it an instrument, a pole of attraction, for the international regroupment of revolutionaries.

The Review will be above all the expression of the theoretical endeavours of our current, since only this theoretical endeavour, based on a coherence of political positions and orientation, can serve as the basis for the regroupment and real intervention of revolutionaries.

While the Review will function as an organ of research and discussion indispensable for the clarification of the problems which face the workers' movement, we do not intend to make it into a review of marxology so dear to academics and professors. Rather the Review will be first and foremost a fighting weapon anchored solidly on the fundamental class frontiers, the revolutionary marxist positions, acquired through the historic struggle of the proletariat against all the species of leftism, confusionism, and 'modernism' (from Marcuse to Invariance and its heirs); tendencies which are so widespread today and which serve to seriously encumber the development of the class struggle and to obstruct the movement towards the reconstitution of the proletarian revolutionary party.

We do not claim to be the bearers of a Programme complete in all its details. We are perfectly well aware of our inadequacies which can only be overcome by the unceasing effort of revolutionaries to obtain greater coherence and a higher understanding within the development of the class struggle.

We also extend an invitation to all revolutionary groups who are not organizationally part of our current, but who display the same pre-occupations as us, to associate themselves with these efforts, by multiplying and strengthening contacts and correspondence, and by sending us critiques, texts, and discussion articles which the Review will publish to the best of its abilities.

Some people will consider that the publication of the Review is a precipitous action. It is nothing of the kind. We have nothing in common with those noisy activists whose activity is based on a voluntarism as frenzied as it is ephemeral. But it is no less important to vigorously reject any tendency towards the formation of petty study groups which content themselves with publishing from time to time little essays which have the purpose of satisfying their authors' egos rather than expressing a will to participate and intervene in the political struggle of the working class. An implacable struggle must be waged against this narrow localist spirit of family sects. Only those groups who understand and effectively assume the role of militant activity within the class can be considered revolutionary.

As for those who can do nothing but denigrate the notion of a militant, from the Situationists of yesterday to all today's varieties of Invariance, we can only oppose them with disdain and indifference. Everyone to their posts; some of us will enter the class struggle, the rest can remain on the outside. It is much better that way.

We will leave the disillusioned contestants of the decomposing petty-bourgeoisie to contemplate their navels. For we proletarian militants, the Review is an arm of criticism which will serve to prepare the passage to criticism by arms.

This first issue is entirely dedicated to the main discussion documents submitted to the International Conference. We have not been able to include all the texts in this issue, which even so is too voluminous. The discussions raised are far from being closed; they will be taken up again in future issues, which will appear every three months. For the moment it is impossible to ensure a more frequent publication. This will be partly compensated for by the pamphlets in various languages which we intend to publish.

A great step forward has been made.

We ask all revolutionaries to give us their active support.

The Editors,

International Communist Current

April, 1975


 

Report on the International Conference

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For several years, Revolution Internationale (France), Internationalism (USA), and World Revolution (UK) have organized international meetings and conferences in order to develop political discussion on the perspectives for the class-struggle, and to encourage a greater understanding of class positions today. This year, in addition to the groups already cited, two groups new to our current attended the international conference: Accion Proletaria (Spain) and Rivoluzione Internazionale (Italy) and we also welcomed a delegate from Internacionalismo, the group in our current in Venezuela. This conference was mainly oriented toward the necessity of organizing the intervention and will to act of revolutionaries into an international framework.

Evan though our current consisted only of one or two groups in different countries (at the end of the period of reaction and at the beginning of the new period which opened up in 1968), the nature of the proletarian struggle and the class positions that we defend forced us to an international political coherence. Today, confronted with the worsening crisis and the heightening of struggles, this fundamentally unified political orientation and the years of common work have enabled us to create an international organizational framework for our current, so that we can concentrate our efforts in several countries.
In the context of political confusions prevalent at this time, and in view of the weakness of revolutionary forces, we consider that it is very important to insist on the necessity, as in any period of heightening class struggle, to work towards a regrouprment of revolutionaries. For this reason, we invited groups whose political positions are moving towards those of the current: Pour Une Intervention Communiste (France), Revolutionary Workers Group (USA), Revolutionary Perspectives(UK), to participate at our conference. The confrontation of ideas between our current and these groups has helped to develop the analyses and orientations which the different groups defend faced with the political tasks of today.

The situation today

During the long years of the post-war reconstruction period, revolutionary marxists have said over and over again that the capitalist system, (having entered into its period of decadence since World War I), only 'prospered' provisionally thanks to the many palliatives of reconstruction: statist measures, arms economies etc; and that eventually the inherent contradictions of the system are going to clearly explode into an open crisis still deeper than that of 1929. Today the crisis is no longer a secret to anybody and the reality of the system's basic sickness has swept away the exalting bourgeoisie and the erudite ‘marxologues' such as Socialism ou Barbarie who believed we had seen ‘the end of crises', the ‘superseding’ of marxism, or as Marcuse thought, the ‘embourgeoicisement’ of the proletariat. Our current has for seven years been analysing all the characteristics of the crisis which is now accelerating so rapidly; in its general trend 1974 mark a qualitative and quantitative decline in the economic situation of capitalism (in the East and in the West) and has demonstrated the ephemeral and mistaken nature of the ‘mini-boom' of 1972. Inflation, unemployment, monetary crises and trade wars, the fall of stock market values as well as the rates of growth of the advanced economies, are signs of the general crisis of over-production and of the saturation of markets which undermine the world capitalist system at its roots.

Contrary to 1929 capitalism today has tried as much as possible to alleviate the effects of the crisis by means of statist structures. In spite of the intensification of inter-imperialist rivalries (as in the continual war in Indo¬china, the confrontations in the Middle East and Cyprus) and the reinforcing of the imperialist blocs, which lead towarls war (a coarse inherent in the economic crises of decadent capitalism), generalized war will not occur as long as the combativity of the working class continues to develop. At the conference the groups in our current elaborated the perspective, defended in our writings, recognizing that the struggle of the working class will intensify as it resists the crisis and that the class struggle will again pose the historic alternative, socialism or barbarism after fifty years of reflux.

The bourgeoisie has seen a period of upheaval and deep political crises. In such a situation its aim is to adopt a 'left' mask the better to mobilize the working class behind the national interest: in Great :Britain the bourgeoisie chooses the Labour Party and 'social contract' for this task; in Germany this lot falls to the social democratic parties, and in other places the Socialist Party (SP) and Communist Party (CP) make efforts to do the same thing, as is the case now in Portugal and France and shortly will be so in Italy and Spain. One of the most dangerous weapons the capitalist class has in this crisis is its capacity to disarm the working class by means of rekindling mystifications in the ‘left’ factions of the bourgeoisie. Economically every faction of the bourgeoisie will be led to advocate statification measures, in one way or another, in order to reinforce its national capital. But politically, especially in the area where the crisis has already struck hard, it is the ‘left’ parties which the bourgeoisie needs in order to be able to appeal to 'national unity’ and for unpaid labour on Sunday. These parties have their place in the capitalist sun (whether in the government or as a loyal opposition) owing to the fact that they still can, just as the unions do, claim to be able to contain the working class and its struggle.

Faced with this analysis, the PIC seems to us to under-estimate the weight of mystifications on the working class from the left when they put forward the motion that these mystifications no longer have any effect. On the contrary we believe that a more objective understanding of the situation will show that appeals for 'anti-fascism' and 'national unity' are still far from being exhausted at this time. Although the class manifests a growing combativity, one must not under-estimate the margin of maneuver for the enemy classy In countries like Spain and Portugal, where repression by the right has been so severe, the bourgeoisie can only hold on by running to the left, which will prove the more able mystifiers and executioners of workers in these countries and elsewhere.

Intervention of revolutionaries

The class struggle today arose as a resistance to deteriorating living standards produced by the crisis and imposed on the workers. That is why our current has rejected RWG’s analysis which states that ‘revendicative' struggles are totally dead end for the class. Nothing could be less true. In a period of crisis and mounting class struggle, the so-called 'revendicative’ struggles are an integral part of the whole process towards the maturation of consciousness in the working class, of its combativity and capacity for organization. Revolutionaries must analyze the development of these struggles and contribute to their generalization and to the development of a conscious¬ness that is more aware of the historic goals of the class. While rejecting Trotskyist manoeuvres, which trap the class in partial demand struggles and mystifications about decadent capitalism, revolutionaries must not at the same time reject the potential for going beyond the immediate demands which is implicit in working class struggles today.

The analysis of the crisis and its evolution determine to a large extent the perspectives which revolutionaries see for the class struggle. At the international conference, our current defended the thesis that the present deep crisis of the system will develop relatively slowly, although with sharp spasms, a jagged development in an ever deepening process. The class struggle manifests itself in a sporadic and episodic way revealing a period of maturation of consciousness through the major confrontations between the working class and the capitalist class. This analysis was not entirely shared by the other groups present at the conference. RP, basing their analysis on other economic explanations (rejecting the Luxemburgist theory), see the crisis as long and rather far away; for them, the class struggle is strictly determined by the given economic situation and as long as the catastrophic crisis is for tomorrow, an appeal for the generalization of struggles today is just voluntaristic. The PIC on the other hand, believes that we are already seeing the economic crisis reach its finale in the immediate danger of world war, (throwing out a ‘cry of alarm’ about the recent diplomatic events in the Middle East) or in class confrontations which could even today resolve the evolution of history. We have criticized these two cases of exaggeration while putting the accent on the fact that revolutionaries must be able to analyse a contingent situation within a general period without falling into an under or over-estimation which leads to agitating in a void, or remaining on the margin of reality at a time of crisis and of class struggle.

The time has not yet come for us to throw ourselves into the work of agitation and the attempts of the PIC who propose campaigns way beyond any practical capacity have not found a great echo. On the other hand, after giving the reports on activities of the different sections of our current and of other groups, the comrades of the current stated the necessity of enlarging our intervention and publication work in all countries in a more organized and systematic way. In particular by assuming collectively the responsibility for political intervention in countries where the current has not as yet an organized group and orienting itself towards the publication of newspapers in countries where it would be possible to do so.
It is useless for us to pose the question of intervention as an abstract concept: ‘for’ or ‘against’. The will to act is the basis of all revolu¬tionary groupings. The question is not one of fine words and of crying intervention at the top of one’s voice with no concern as to the actual objective situation, and neglecting the necessity even of providing the means to intervene through a revolutionary organization on an international scale. We must rather see that the scale of intervention by revolutionaries can vary according to the situation but all the cries for intervention cannot fill the void: the absence of a revolutionary organization. The question of the level of intervention is a problem of analysis and of appreciation of the moment while the question of organization is a principle of the workers' movement, the foundation stone without which any taking up of revolutionary positions remains pure verbiage. It is for this reason that we rejected the proposal by Accion Proletaria that we pose the question of intervention as a preliminary question to the necessity of organizing.
Revolutionary organization

Militant work is by definition collective work; it is not individuals who assume a personal responsibility within the class but rather groups based on a body of ideas who are called to take on the tasks of revolutionaries: to help clarify and generalize the consciousness of the class. At the international conference, as in our .magazines, we have insisted on the necessity of really understanding the reasons for the throwing up of groups from within the class and the responsibilities which follow from this. After fifty years of counter-revolution and the complete break with any organic continuity in the workers’ movement, the question of organization remains one of the most difficult for new elements to assimilate.
A revolutionary group is based fundamentally on class positions and the only justification for groups working separately would be through a divergence of principles, Far from idealizing or wanting to perpetuate the present dispersion of efforts, revolutionaries in our period of rising class struggle must be able to distinguish secondary questions of interpretation from an analysis of questions of principle - and try with all their strength make an effort to regroup around positions of principle while surmounting any tendencies which defend ‘their own little boutique of ideas’ and 'freedom' to remain isolated.
Since the debates in the First International, it has been understood in the marxist movement that revolutionary organizations must tend towards a centralization of efforts. Faced with the Bakuninists and with the false theories of petit-bourgeois federalism, marxists have defended the necessity of the international centralization of militant work. All we have done so far today is to have re-opened the debate while breaking from deviations about centralization such as those of Leninism (democratic centralism) and Bordigism (organic centralism). We insist on the necessity for a coherent organizational framework for revolutionary work against the diverse theories about ‘anti-group’ groups, against ‘libertarian’ and other anarchist formulations in vogue at the moment. RWG was rather sceptical about the effort to organize an international current; this group, aside from the secondary divergences which separate us, seems to be traumatised by the aberrations of the counter-revolution (especially Trotskyism) on the question of organization. While wanting to set up a counter weight against the counter-revolution some militants risk falling into an idealization of the present fragmentation and confusion in the revolutionary milieu and are never able to overcome the errors and the organizational fetishism of the past in a positive way.

If we look at the development of the proletarian movement in history, it can be said that the formation of the working class party follows periods of rising class struggle. Today in our epoch when the class struggle is developing through resistance to the economic crisis, the formation of the nuclei of the future party follows a path of slow maturation. The effort of our current to constitute itself as a pole of regroupment around class positions is a part of that process towards the formation of the party at a time of intense and generalized struggles. We do not claim to be a ‘party’, and we guard against over-estimating the weight of our efforts at organization at the present time. However, the party of tomorrow will not arise one beautiful day from nothing; on the contrary, experience shows us that political coherence serves as a pole of regroupment essential for the revolutionary elements of the proletariat in a time of decisive uprisings.

The regroupment of revolutionaries takes place around class lines and basic revolutionary perspectives; secondary political questions should not hamper a general process towards a concentration of forces faced with the demands of the situation at this time and in time to come. Those who are for regroupment ‘in theory’ and in words but leave its practical realization for some time in the future - (while raising secondary questions to the same level as class lines in order to justify their reticence and confusions) - only retard this process and put obstacles in the way of the development of consciousness. We think it is essential that today we take the first steps towards a larger international organization of revolutionaries, to translate our internationalism into organizational terms in order to strengthen our work. This is what the conference made its principal task. The international conference this year distinguishes itself from the others to the extent that we wanted to make ourselves more conscious of the necessary means to assure the continuity of work. The preceding conferences served as a base for the discussion on organization and the situation at the present time while strengthening political ties and the fundamental theories of our current.

We were not able to tackle the question of the period of transition, which is now being discussed in the current, through lack of time. But we thought it important to publish here the documents prepared for the conference on this subject. The reader can take it that this theoretical question is far from being settled either in the current or in the workers' movement in general. However, this debate, though incomplete, is of great interest for revolution¬aries who are trying to work out the basic lines for the orientation of the movement of tomorrow.

The conference ended its work with the formation of the International Communist Current (which comprises to Revolution Internationale, World Revolution, Internationalism, Internacionalismo, Accion Proletaria and Rivoluzione Internazionale); and through the decision to publish an international magazine in English, French and Spanish the positions of our current will be better diffused and developed.

J.A.
for the International Communist Current

*****

The texts we have published here are some of the documents presented at the international conference. The first three are reports prepared for the con¬ference, the others are contributions written for discussion. We did not have time to present the report, nor even to discuss the period of transition at the conference but we decided to publish these texts immediately in order to con¬tinue the open debate on this subject. Our current has not reached a homogene¬ous position on this complex question, and, in any case, we believe, contrary to other groups(such as Revolutionary Perspectives), that it is not up to revolutionaries to create class lines when the experience of the class itself has not yet settled them.

Even though certain revolutionary elements reveal themselves as being incapable of taking up their tasks at this time, they already are on the way to rushing into making absolute pronouncements on a question as complex as that of the period of transition. We think it is preferable to publish these texts so as to contribute to clarification, without claiming to resolve all the problems. We have also published a contribution from Revolutionary Perspectives on the period of transition - extracts chosen by them from a longer text - which shows their divergences with some of our comrades on this subject.

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Report on the question of the organization of our International Communist Current

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One of the aims of the January Conference will be to give ourselves the means to organize and centralize the activity of the different groups of the current at an international level.

This act is a conscious step towards the formation of a fully international organization.

In order to understand the significance of this, we must deal with three main questions:

I. Why an international political organization?

II. Why engage in such a process now?

III. What is the role of the ICC in the process which leads to the forma­tion of the world party of the proletariat?

I. Why an international political organization?

1. The political organization is an organ of the class, engendered by the class in order for it to fulfill a specific function: to help develop the consciousness of the class. The political organization does not bring this consciousness from ‘outside’; neither does it create the process of this appropriation of consciousness. It is on the contrary a product of this pro­cess just as it is an indispensable instrument of its development. From a certain standpoint one could say that the political organization is as neces­sary for the collective elaboration of the consciousness of the class, as written and oral expression is for the development of individual thought.

In the general functioning of the political organization of the proletariat, two main tasks can be distinguished:

a. Permanent analysis of social reality, aimed at making more precise the historic interests of the proletariat.(the appropriation of the lessons of the historic experience of the class and the defining of the proletarian position vis-a-vis each concrete situation). This is the task of constant elaboration of the communist programme, that is to say, the definition of the goals and the methods of the historic struggle of the working class.

b. Intervention within the class in order to aid in the conscious carrying out of its historic programme and so that it can appropriate for itself the means for its revolutionary task.

2. The working class is not the only class to exist internationally. The bourgeoisie and the various peasant strata are to be found in all countries. But the proletariat is the only class that can organize itself and act collectively at an international level because it is the only class which has no national interests. Its emancipation is only possible on a world scale.

That is why its political organization inevitably tends to be centralized and international. The proletariat creates its political organization in its own image.

Whether it is a question of political analysis or of intervention, the prole­tarian political organization is dealing with a world-wide reality. Its centralized and international character is not the result of any moral or ethical demand, but a necessary condition for its effectiveness and therefore for its very existence.

3. The international character of the proletarian political organization has been affirmed throughout the history of the workers' movement. Already in 1847, the Communist League, through its watchword, "Workers of the world, unite, the workers have no fatherland," proclaimed its international charac­ter. After 1864, political, organizations took the form of ‘Internationals’. Up until the triumph of the Stalinist counter-revolution and of ‘socialism in one country’ only the failure of the IInd International really broke this internationalist continuity.

The internationalism of the IInd International, which existed in the period of stability of the major industrial powers, inevitably suffered from the confinement of proletarian struggles to the framework of reforms: the horizon of the proletarian struggle objectively submitted to nationalist restric­tions. Thus the treason of the IInd International was not an isolated, unex­pected phenomenon. It was the worst outcome of thirty years of confinement of workers' struggles within national frameworks. In fact, right from its inception, the IInd International represented a regression in relation to the International Workingmen’s Association. Parliamentarism, trade unionism, the establishment of mass parties, in sum, the orientation of the workers' move­ment towards the reformist struggle, contributed to the fragmentation of the world workers' movement along national lines. The revolutionary task of the proletariat can only be conceived and realised on an international scale. Otherwise it is nothing but utopia. But from the very fact that capital is divided into nations, the .struggles for the acquisition of reforms (when they were possible) did not require an international arena to be successful. It was not world capital which decided to concede this or that amelioration to the proletariat of this or that nation. It was in each country and in a struggle against their own national bourgeoisie that the workers pressed home their demands.

Proletarian internationalism is not a pious hope, nor an abstract ideal, but a necessity imposed by the nature of the proletariat’s historic task.

That is why the first world war, by decisively demonstrating the historic unviability of the national framework and by putting the proletarian revolu­tion as the order of the day, had to .lead, after the collapse of the IInd International, to the most energetic re-affirmation of proletarian internatio­nalism within the workers’ movement. This was the task imposed on Zimmerwald and Kienthal, and which then demanded the constitution of a new International, the Communist International.

The IIIrd International was founded at the very beginning of the ‘era of the socialist revolution’ and its most important characteristic inevitably had to be its intransigent internationalism. Its demise came when it became unable to maintain this internationalism. This was the theory of socialism in one country.

Since then it has not been by chance that the word internationalist has been part of the name of many of the main organized reactions against the Stalinist counter-revolution. Capitalist decadence is synonymous with the necessity of the proletarian revolution and proletarian revolution is synonymous with internationalism.

4. If at all times proletarian political organizations have affirmed their international character, today this affirmation is more than ever the indis­pensable precondition for a proletarian organization.

It is because of this that we must understand the importance, the profound significance, of the internationalist effort of our current.

II. Why engage in such a process now?

1. When one looks at the development of our international current one can’t but be struck by the weakness of its numerical weight. In the past, even in particularly unfavourable circumstances, international organizations were in one way or another the end product, the crowning of various national activi­ties. With our current the process has been quite the opposite: international existence appeared much more as a point of departure for national activities than as a result of the latter. All the groups in the current were conceived as an integral part of the international current even before they published the first issue of their national journal.

One could pick out two main reasons for this state of affairs:

a. The organic rupture resulting from fifty years of counter-revolution which, because of the weakness it has caused in the revolutionary movement, has for­ced revolutionaries, right from the beginning of the resurgence of class struggles, to concentrate their weak forces in order to carry out their tasks.

b. The definite disappearance, after fifty years of capitalist decadence, of all illusions about the possibility of any real action on a national scale.

If the point of departure for our current was international activity it is thus because above all it is the concrete expression of a particular historic situation.

2. In fact with the creation of an international bureau we are not suddenly embarking upon the process of formation of the international organization. This process has existed since the beginning of the different groups of the current. All we are really doing is consciously recognizing this process by going beyond the stage of a certain passive, anarchic spontaneity with regard to the objective conditions for revolutionary work, to a stage of conscious organization which creates, by its own volition, the best conditions for the development of this process.

There is at the basis of all collective activity a degree of spontaneity (action which is unpremeditated as regards objective conditions). The develop­ment towards organization is itself a spontaneous product of this activity. But organization is nevertheless a supercession (not a negation) of spontan­eity. Just as in the collective activity of the whole class, so in the acti­vity of revolutionaries, organization creates the conditions for:

a. consciousness to arise out of the conditions which have been engendered by spontaneity.

b. the means to be provided for acting consciously and willingly upon the development of this process.

This is what we are doing in creating this international bureau and orienta­ting ourselves towards the creation of a full international organization.

3. The organic rupture which the revolutionary movement has suffered since the revolutionary wave of the twenties weighs heavily on revolutionaries today, not only because of the difficulties which they encounter in trying to reappro­priate the gains of past struggles but also because of the undue influence of petty-bourgeois student ideology within their ranks. The student movement, which was such a spectacular sign that capitalism was once again entering into crisis and into a new phase of proletarian struggle, inevitably served to infect the young revolutionary groups with its world-view. (It could hardly have been otherwise.)

One of the main manifestations of this weakness was concretized in the problems of organization. All the habits of the university milieu constituted an enor­mous burden which the revolutionary movement had to carry on its shoulders: the difficulty of conceiving theoretical work as a reflection of the real world divided into antagonistic classes, (which took the form of a jealous protection of ‘one’s own' little thoughts ‘in themselves’, in the same way as academics sit on their own college theses), a difficulty in grasping theoretical activity as a moment of general activity and an instrument of the latter, a difficulty in understanding the importance of practical will, of consciously organized activity, in sum, the inability to carry out, in all its depth and with all its implications, the old marxist motto “the philosophers have only interpreted the world, the point however is to change it.”

It is this incomprehension which expressed itself in the criticisms of our current made by elements such as the ‘Ex-Lutte Ouvriere Tendance’ in Revolution Internationale,

For these elements, our international current would be an artificial invention and the organizational effort to create it would be pure voluntarism. Arguments of this sort are based on two main ideas:

a. It would be ‘voluntarism’ because there exists a volition to ‘build’ an organization, whereas the latter can only be a natural product of an objective process independent of the will of the few individuals of the current.

b. It would be ‘artificial’ because the class struggle has not yet made that “qualitative leap” which will transform economic struggles into “revolutionary”, “communist” struggles.

Behind these pseudo-marxist ideas there lurks a total inability to grasp the essential foundation-stone of marxism: the will to act consciously for the revolutionary transformation of the world.

Against all idealist tendencies, marxism affirms the insufficiency of human will: man does not transform the world when he wants and how he wants. The concretization of all subjective volition depends on the existence of favour­able objective conditions, effectively independent of this volition. But nothing could be more alien to Marxism than to transform the insufficiency of will into a complete negation of will. That would be to confuse marxism with its principal philosophic antagonist - empiricist, fatalistic positivism. Marxism makes a critique of voluntarism in order to affirm all the more strongly the importance of will. In affirming the necessity of objective conditions for the concretization of human will, marxism underlines above all the necessary character of this will.

The idea that revolutionary organization builds itself voluntarily, consciously, with premeditation far from being a voluntarist idea is on the contrary one of the concrete results of all Marxist praxis.

Understanding the necessity of objective conditions for beginning the cons­truction of the revolutionary party does not mean that this organization is an automatic product of these conditions. This means in reality that it is necessary to understand' the importance of subjective will at the moment when these conditions are historically present.

Let us now examine this accusation of artificiality.

According to the anti-organizationists, the objective conditions which must subsist at the beginning of a process of building the party are none other than the openly revolutionary struggle of the proletariat - the destruction of the capitalist state, and even the installation of communist relations of production.

The revolutionary party is not a decorative organ whose task is to embellish the dish served up by the spontaneous outburst of revolutionary struggle. It is on the contrary a vital, powerful element of this struggle, an indispensable instrument of the class. If the Russian Revolution is the proof positive of the indispensable character of this instrument, the German Revolution is the negative proof of this. The inability of Luxemburg’s tendency to under­stand the necessity for beginning the construction of the party before the first outbreak of revolutionary struggle was to weigh heavily on the course of events in Germany.

To understand the party as an indispensable instrument for the revolutionary struggle is to understand the necessity to actively aid its construction as soon as the conditions for a revolutionary confrontation have ripened.

In fact, a failure to grasp the importance of the construction of the world political organization of the proletariat when the conditions for a revolu­tionary confrontation are ripening means an inability to understand the importance of the role of this organization.

There is no infallible index for measuring the rising wave of class struggle. In certain circumstances even a dimunition of hours lost through strikes can hide a maturation of revolutionary consciousness. Today, however, we do possess two indices which enable us to be certain that since 1968 we have been moving in a revolutionary direction:

a. The deepening and increasing acceleration of the crisis.

b. The existence of a level of combativity in the world working class which demonstrates the fact that just as the bourgeoisie can “less and less conti­nue to govern as before”, the proletariat “can and will less and less put up with lining as before”. That is to say that the conditions of a revolu­tionary situation are ripening irreversibly.

In these conditions, the work of building the political organization is not an artificial wish but an imperious necessity.

4. For revolutionaries today the danger is not to be in advance of the revolu­tionary process but to be caught up behind it.

III. What is the role of the International Current in the process which leads to the formation of the world party of the proletariat?

1. In order to understand the importance and the significance of what we are doing in setting up an international bureau, we must pose the problem of the relationship between our international current and any group which may arise defending class positions.

We have often asserted that it was the task of revolutionaries to constitute a pole of regroupment of the proletarian vanguard. Today we must understand that we must constitute the pivot, the ‘skeleton’ of the future world party of the proletariat.

2. From the theoretical point of view, the current’s platform, because it gathers together the essence of the historic experience of the proletariat, constitutes the rallying point in any group which situates itself on the terrain of the historic struggle of the proletariat.

Contrary to what the EX-L.O. Tendance asserted in one of its texts, there are not “several possible coherences” which can encompass class positions. In the last instance, theoretical coherence is not a question of syllogisms, or of pure logical reasoning. It is the expression of an objective, material coherence which is unique: that of the practice of the class.

It is because it synthesises this practical experience that our platform is the only possible framework for the activity of a revolutionary organization.

3. From the organizational point of view, could there exist a group which had the same positions as the international current but which did not integrate itself organizationally? Bordiga emphasized - quite rightly - that the party, far from being simply one programme was also one will. This will does not consist of pious vows or ‘sincere’ wishes. It’s persevering determination for revolutionary intervention. And as we have seen, this intervention is synony­mous with organization and thus with organizational experience.

There exist organizational gains just as there are theoretical gains, and the one conditions the other in a permanent way. Organized activity is not an immediate phenomenon, given right from the start, spontaneously. It is the result of an experience and a consciousness which is not to be confused with that of one or several ‘individuals’. It results uniquely from a collective praxis all the more rich because it is collective.

That is why at times when a great revolutionary organization was in existence a split was something which one hesitated about for a long time. The orga­nic continuity which links revolutionary organizations since 1847 is not a mere ‘tradition’ or a product of luck. It expresses, as a reflection of the continuity of the proletarian struggle, the necessity to conserve the organizational gains which the proletarian political organizations have bequeathed.

That is why the international organizations of the proletariat have always been constituted around a pivot, around a current which not only defended in a more coherent fashion the theoretical gains of the proletariat, but which also possessed a practical organizational experience which was ade­quate to the task of acting as a pillar of the new organization.

This role was played by the current of Marx and Engels for the Ist International, by Social Democracy for the IInd, and by the Bolshevik Party for the IIIrd.

If the workers movement had not gone through the 50 yr. break which separates the Communist International from today, it is without doubt the ‘left’ of the latter (German left, Italian left) which would have assumed the task this time. From the standpoint of political positions there is no doubt that the
next international will be a continuity of the ‘left’; but from the organizational point of view this pivot has still to be built.

Since the recent resurgence of the class struggle, our international current has taken on an organizational practice based on the proletariat’s class posi­tions. That is to say that its praxis has become, with all its weaknesses and errors, the heritage of the proletarian struggle. The current has thus recreated a new source of organic continuity, by being the only organization to have assured a continuity in its practice within the framework of class positions.

4. The international current which today is taking a step towards centrali­zation must therefore, and can effectively consider that its essential task is to constitute itself as this pivot, which is indispensable to the constitution of the next international, the world party of the proletariat.

Those who see in this affirmation pure megalomania are not being modest but irresponsible. The international current would commit suicide if it was incapable of fully taking responsibility for what it objectively is.

R. Victor

Revolution Internationale

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The International Situation: The crisis, the class struggle and the task facing our international tendency

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"A new epoch is born! The epoch of the dis­solution of capitalism of its inner disintegration. The epoch of the communist revolution of the proletariat."

(Platform of the Communist International, March, 1919)

Nearly fifty years after their being uttered, these ringing words have again gained the power to haunt world capitalism. Decadent capitalism, sweating muck and gore from every pore stands once again on the dock of humanity. The accusers? Mil­lions of proletarians slaughtered by capital over the last two generations, plus all those who perished from capitalism's in­ception; they all stand, stern and silent, behind the executioner - the international working class. The sentence? It has been passed since the first proletarians rose up against capitalist exploitation, it has existed in the attempts of Babeuf, Kangui and the Communist League to harangue the pro­letariat to a final onslaught, it existed in the work of the First, Second, and Third Internationals and in the heritage of the ultra-left. The accused has indeed been sentenced - its death penalty has been merely postponed; humanity itself can no longer tolerate any further delays!

The Crisis

The last few years have seen a vindication of the analysis our tendency began to make in 1967/68, both as to basis of the historic-crisis and to the present unfolding crisis. But, almost uncannily, the last twelve months have seen an irrefutable vindication of the perspectives presented by our American comrades at this conference a year ago. The perspectives outlined for our tendency by Internationalism included three basic alternatives open to capitalism in crisis, all of which were likely to be tried to a greater or lesser extent simultaneously. These were: the attempt to deflect the crisis onto another capitalist state, onto weaker sections of capital (including the petty-bourgeoisie and peasantry) and onto the proletariat.

We shall not go here into great detail about the specific manifestations of the crisis (which would demand a systematic nation­-by-nation account; the brilliant set of articles appearing in the last issue of Revolution Internationale are an example of how these questions should be dealt with by us). We wish here to pick out the main aspects of the present conjunctural crisis in a historical perspective integrally connected to the level of international class struggle.

With the saturation of markets which condemns world capitalism to cycles of ever-increasing barbarism, the perspective of the communist revolution is open to humanity in a material and objective way. But this has been so since the last sixty years, and the failure of the past communist attempts to overthrow capital has meant that capitalism's continuation has been pos­sible only through the cycles of crises, wars and reconstruction.

The greatest ‘boom' of capitalism, the reconstruction which re­sulted from the depths of destruction and self-cannibalization achieved by capitalism during 1939-45, lasted for more than twenty years. But the 'boom' in decadence is really the bloating of a corpse. Between 1948 and 1973, world industrial production increased by 3-1/2 times; the average annual rate of G.N.P. growth amounted to 5% (some, like Japan, doubled it). World inflation, however, was never checked and the UK prices are now roughly 7-1/2 times higher than in 1945. Moreover, the third world countries saw only an aggravation of their economic condition and this huge sector of world capital sunk every year into a worst state of debt, unemployment, militarism, despotism and poverty.

But since the late sixties, the crisis has beer manifesting itself through monetary dislocations, and the recent appearance galloping inflation (two digit figures for almost all industrialized countries). The monetary system developed after the 1944 Bretton Woods agreement, which was based on fixed exchange rates to the dollar linked to the gold standard, is now in shambles. The main druids of the IMF gather together today only to make sure that no epidemics follow from the inevitable deaths of the coming period. A hopeless task! No such net would ever resist the weight of a collapsing capitalist colossus. Inevitably leads to recession, to close downs, bankruptcies, lay-offs and profit squeezes. Both are inevitable aspects of the capitalist system of production today, and both are simply moments in the permanent onslaught which decadent capitalism unleashes against the working class. But the continuation of the inflationary spiral can only end the paralysis of the entire world market, an international slump which would have frightening consequences for the bourgeoisie.

Though 1972/73 seemed to mark a period of relative adjustment in the world economy, that period was merely a short lull achieved by the strongest capitalist powers (the US, Germany, Japan) at the expense of their weaker competitors. The intensification of covert trade wars, currency devaluation and the slow disintegration of customs unions in this period to be attempts, within the advanced capitalist sectors, to achieve some degree of equilibrium to a further international deterioration. 1974 and now 1975 are harbingers of a worsening, and more catastrophic relapse, announcing that the breathing spell achieved by some national capitals in the previous two years is over.

Nowadays, the world economy is in a deep recession. In 1974 there was hardly any growth and world trade has been slackening. The US G.N.P. is down on 1973 and is still falling; Britain is stagnant and Japan has had a 3% G.N.P. fall. In many countries there's a growing panic arising from the collapse of many small and medium size firms. In Britain, this is a chronic occurrence, hitting large companies as well, even multinationals (travel firms, shipbuilding companies, auto, etc). Key industries such as building and construction, cars and aircraft, electronics, textiles, machine tools and steel are facing increasing difficulties in the coming period. The rise in the oil price has added to the insoluble problems faced by recession-ridden capi­talism, adding a global $60 billion a year balance of payments deficit. Through the tottering mechanisms of the IMF, the druids of capital are madly attempting to ‘recycle' some of these profits accruing to the. oil-producing countries, as if these and similar ‘reflatioary' .measures would do anything except add a twist to the inflationary spiral. The debts of industrial companies have doubled since 1965, and since 1970 the rates of growth of all capitalist countries have steadily declined or shown glaringly to be nothing but artificial creations of deficit spending. The 1975 forecasts do not go beyond a paltry annual growth rate of 1,9% for the OECD countries including the US.

Though the situation is critical for world capitalism, various mechanisms of state intervention have helped alleviate the crisis by spreading out the worst immediate consequences (such as massive lay-offs); this is done by selective, sometimes massive, subsidies and deficit financing channeled through the banking system. These mechanisms are entirely unable to help realize the surplus value global-capital needs for its accumulation. The real source for such revenues originates from vicious austerity programmes (wage controls, reduction of social services, taxation, etc). All these procedures, which are but stop-gap measures, actually accelerate the crisis either by erupting onto the political arena (ie, class struggle) or by inevitably adding to inflationary surge which is nowadays irresistible. All the mec­hanisms of capitalism uses to ‘phase out' the crisis constitute the logical extension of the desperate struggle capitalism in decay has waged throughout this century against its own decomposition. As we .have said before, "... the underlying causes of the present crisis reside in the historical impasse in which the capitalist mode of production has found itself since the first world war: the great capitalist powers have completely divided up the world and there are no longer enough markets to allow the expansion of capital: henceforth in the absence of a victorious proletar­ian revolution, the system has only been able to survive thanks to the mechanism crisis, war, reconstruction, new crisis, etc." (‘Overproduction and Inflation', in RI 6, new series and WR 2).

When the present American Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, recently described the crisis of American agriculture, he admitted: "The only way we can have a fully producing agriculture in this country is to have a vigorous healthy export market. We simply can't consume at home all that American agriculture can produce." This faithful watch-dog was, in this case, barking honestly, and in unison with all his German, Japanese, British, Russian and French colleagues. Every national capital in the world is going all-out to penetrate each other's markets. Like Midas, saturated with gold but unable to devour even a bread crumb, the insatiable thirst for the realization of surplus value just cannot be quenched. So, for example, the Russian rulers have sought most-favored nation status to penetrate the US markets and to gain much needed US capital (technology, cre­dits, etc) so as to expand their own productive capacity and competitiveness on the world market. Equally those circles in American capital which most understand the plight of US capital seek desperately to penetrate the Russian markets. These attempts occur all the time, from all quarters, with an impressive cast of insatiable Midases - nay, that poor wretch was merely greedy slaveholder these capitalists are truly vampires! Having drained the blood of their victims to the marrow of the bone, they pounce on each other's victims just to discover that somebody else got there first!

The present conjunctural crisis partakes from an important factor inherent in decadent capitalism: the tendency towards state capitalism. The stock exchange crash/crisis of 1929 was sudden catastrophic collapse arising after years of stagnation and unsuccessful attempts by the advanced capitalisms at catching up even with the pre-1914 growth figures. The trend to­wards state capitalism, already present in 1929, was nonetheless still insufficiently attuned to serve as a temporary cushion for world crises.

After the second imperialist war, the tendency towards state capitalism received conscious and deliberate sanction by many capitalist governments and unofficial recognition by all. A perma­nent waste economy (armaments, etc), financed largely through inflationary spending, was seen and felt to be an answer to many of the problems of stagnation and over-production. The structur­al production of waste, or more precisely, the burning-up of surplus value, became an undeniable economic factor since 1945, and it is this factor which fundamentally accounts for the so-called ‘prosperity' of the postwar period. Those countries which were demolished by the war achieved ‘miraculous' recoveries (Germany, Italy, Japan), a fact that enabled the victors to re-divide and reconstruct a war-torn and pulverized world market. World capital was thus given a lease of life - at the cost of 55 million victims. Another, not so vital, loss was the complete debase­ment of the ‘marxism' of many Cardans who, believing in miracles proclaimed the ‘end' of economic crises. In fact, such a ‘loss' was a gain for bourgeois sociology, so all is well that ends well. But very few miracles seem to be surviving the first ripples of the impending crisis.

The tempo and scale of the present crisis confirms the analysis our tendency began to make nine years ago; the ‘boom' of the postwar years had ended, we said, and the world capitalist sys­tem had entered a long, drawn-out conjunctural crisis which still has some unfolding to do. The inter-related indicators we have been using to appraise the tempo of the crisis will be showing themselves up with increasing intensity and simultaneity:

1. Massive fall-off of international trade.

2. Trade wars (‘dumpings', etc) between national capitals

3. Adoption of protectionist measures and collapse of customs unions

4. Return to autarky

5. Decline of production

6. Massive growth in unemployment

7. Drop in workers' real wages and living standards

At given moments, the confluence of some of these indicators could trigger a massive slump in a given national capital such as Britain, Italy, Portugal, or Spain. This is a possibility that we don't dismiss. However, although such a collapse would give an irreparable blow to the world economy (British assets and investments abroad alone amount to £20 billion), the world capitalist system could still drag on as long as a modicum of production were maintained in some advanced countries such as the US, Germany, Japan and the Eastern European countries. All such events of course tend to engulf the whole system, and cri­ses are inevitably world crises today. But for the reasons we have sketched above, we have reason to believe that the crisis will be drawn-out - extremely convulsive and with jagged curves, but more like a snowballing effect than a steep sudden fall. Even the disintegration of national economy will not necessarily send all the bankrupt capitalist to hang themselves, as Rosa Luxemburg remarked in n slightly different context. For this to happen, the personification of national capital, the state, must he strangled by none other than the revolutionary proletariat.

Class Struggle

On the political level, the consequences of the crisis are far-reaching and explosive. As the crisis deepens, the world capitalist class will begin to fan the flames of war. The unending, virulent ‘small' wars of the last 25 years will continue and worsen (Vietnam, Cambodia, Cyprus, the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent, etc). In periods of crisis, however, when the chronic decomposition of the third world advances towards the centres of capitalism, the cry for war fuses with the two other battle cries of the bourgeoisie: austerity and export! This three-prong attack on the working class means that the bourgeoisie is trying to force the proletariat to pay for the crisis totally, in sweat and blood. Under such conditions, the standards of living of the working class, already brutally reduced by inflation, will plummet even further in the austerity and export drives of the bourgeoisie. The psychologically demoralizing prospect of .war also helps to fragment sections of the proletariat, and prepare them to accept a war economy, with all the consequences that carries for the future proletarian revolution. The bourgeoisie senses that the only real solution to its crisis is a defeated proletariat, a proletariat unable to resist the infernal cycles of decayed capitalism. Thus the systematic increa­se in the rate of exploitation, the huge escalation of unemploy­ment in the US, Britain, Germany, etc. Other ruthless measures are being tried, such as ‘voluntary' wage reductions, three-day weeks, whole weeks of layoffs, expulsion .of ‘foreign' workers, speed-ups, cuts in social services. Needless to say, all these measures find daily sanctification in the cesspools of the bourgeois media (press, TV, magazines, etc).

But in spite of their severity, these attacks are nothing com­pared to what the bourgeoisie can really dish out. There is no crime, no monstrosity, no lie and deceit the capitalists will shrink from in their campaign against their mortal enemy, the proletariat. If the bourgeoisie doesn't dare to massacre the world proletariat at this stage, it is because it is frightened and hesitant. The proletariat, that awakening giant, emerges from the reconstruction period an undefeated warrior, a class with nothing to lose and a world to win. It will take a lot of beating on a worldwide scale before the bourgeoisie can impose capitalism's ultimate solution to the crisis: a new world war.

This accounts for the hesitancy displayed by sections of the bourgeoisie in their dealings with the working class. Some, worried by the dangers of massive unemployment resulting from the growing recession, are attempting to ‘boost' consumer demand by reducing personal taxation (Ford's proposed $16 billion tax ­cut) or by trimming obsolete war production. But all these ‘reflationary' tricks end up aggravating inflationary pressures and thus in the end only accelerate the tendency towards slump. Faced with the decline in production which accompanies galloping inflation, and unable to reduce its falling rate of profit because of the non-existence of markets, the bourgeoisie will have to finally confront the proletariat in a death-struggle.

But the bourgeoisie also developed confidence in itself during the postwar ‘boom'. The self-satisfied platitudes of the Daniel Bells, Marcuses, Bookchins and Cardans about a ‘modern' crises-free capitalism have their roots in the material soil of the past period of growth and. reconstruction. Rallying around the state, the apparatus which directly supervised the reconstruction period and whose techniques of intervention have matured over sixty years of capitalist decay, the bourgeoisie may be losing the complacency of the reconstruction period, may sometim­es veer towards panic and despair, but it is not yet finally defeated. As long as the bourgeoisie can count on the mystifications of ‘national unity', its self-confidence can remain unbroken. The relations between classes in periods of crises tend to sharpen and assume an irreconcilable character. In such conditions, the actions of the state must appear to be ‘impartial' so as to better mystify the working class. State interventions during such moments, therefore, tend to alleviate the insoluble political and social contradictions confronted by the bourgeoisie. The state must give the impression that it is acting in the name of ‘everyone', bosses, petty-bourgeois and workers alike. It must appear to possess the noble attributes of an arbiter, and as such, obtain the legitimacy needed to crush the working class in order to maintain the existing relations of production.

The leftist factions of the capitalist class (Stalinists, Social Democrats, trade union and their Trotskyist/Maoist/anarchist ‘critical' pimps) are raising themselves to this task, that is, of custodians of the state. Only they can attempt to pose as representatives of the working class, of ‘the little guy', of ‘the poor'. Because an undefeated working class has to be cajoled into accepting wage-gouging and other such measures, the leftists alone can now appear as the most effective channel for the introduction of further state centralization, nationalizations and despotism, as the examples of Chile under Allende and Portugal today, show.

The tendency of capitalism in decay is towards crisis and war, and no force society except the proletariat can put an end to this murderous cycle of barbarism. At first sight, it would seem that the road to war is the only one .open in the immedi­ate sense to the bourgeoisie. The fact that the proletariat has no permanent mass organizations could imply that it is defenceless against the chauvinist storm preceding a new world war. But the bourgeoisie knows better. Through the medium of its trade unions, capitalism knows that the proletariat remains a revolutionary class in spite of the absence of mass prole­tarian organization. The trade unions have recognized this elementary fact long since and their whole function revolves around the need to destroy from within any autonomous workers' movement. In every self-mobilization of the proletariat lurks the hydra of revolution. Therein lies the chief obstacle to the bourgeoisie's criminal designs! Before the bourgeoisie can successfully mobilize for war, it needs a globally defeated working class. Until then it must tread carefully. In fact, the bourgeoisie is finding it very difficult now to mobilize the proletariat under the rantings of ‘austerity' and ‘let's all pull together'. Politically, the fascist anti-fascists haven't fared any better than the economic policemen of capital. Every new filthy ideology capitalism excretes on the working class immediately seems to find a stable repository in the atomized and frenetic hordes of the petty-bourgeoisie, not in the working class. It is not accidental that all the reactionary ideologies of zero-growth, xenophobia, sexual libbings and their counterparts (such as advocates of stronger marriages and ‘less sex'), plus the usual idiots spouting the Second Coming, are to be confined mainly to petty-bourgeois sects. Today, there's simply no way of rationally justifying to the proletariat the continuance of capitalist social relations.

The fact that the working class today has no permanent mass organizations has many .implications. Firstly, the working class is not encumbered by huge reformist organizations from its immediate past, as it was in1914-23. The lessons of today's period can thus be absorbed faster than they were during and immediately after the first world war. The consciousness that only .communist solutions can give any meaning to the struggles for wages and conditions can unfold sharply and clearly, since any economic ‘victory' is immediately eroded by the crisis. As Marx said, humanity doesn't pose itself tasks which it cannot solve. If the proletariat faces the crisis this century without permanent reformist organizations, this has inevitable positive corollaries.

As long as the crisis doesn't deepen in a way that would irresis­tibly provoke the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, as long as the proletariat as a whole doesn't pose its revolution on the immediate agenda, then all the temporary institutions thrown up by class struggle (strike committees, mass assemblies, etc) are inevitably integrated or recaptured by capital if they attempt to remain permanent. This is an inevitable objective process, and one of the features of capitalist decadence. If every strike committee, if every ‘workers' commission' and such like like tend to become capitalist organs today, the working class will sooner or later confront this fact. Already the workers in Barcelona and the north of Spain seem to be becoming deeply aware of this. In England, thousands of workers almost instinctively distrust any shop-steward dominated strike committee. In the US, the workers tolerate leftist and ‘radical' trade union leaders, but only imbeciles would call this toleration a permanent loyalty to trade-unionism, or a ‘consequence' of wages struggles. The workers struggle every day, and even more so in moments of cris­is, because as class the proletariat can never be integrated by capitalism, This is so because the global proletariat is an exploited class, the only productive class in capitalist society. As a result, the proletariat can only fight to assert itself against the intolerable conditions capital forces it to endure. It doesn't matter in the short term what the proletariat thinks of itself, what matters is what it is. And it is this latter objective being precedes the communist consciousness of the working class. Let the ex-leftist modernist scoff at this. For its part the proletariat has no other path to travel, no other way of learning, than that provided by the Golgotha of bourgeois society.

The proletariat needs the time offered by the protracted nature of the crisis to be able to struggle and understand its position in world society. This understanding cannot come suddenly for the class as a whole. The working class comes against the wall many times in the next period, and many times too it will recede, seemingly defeated. But in the end no wall can stand the continuous battering of the proletarian waves, even less when the wall is disintegrating its own accord. But just as the proletariat will make use of the protracted nature of the crisis, so will the bourgeoisie use all its cards to deflect, confuse and defeat the efforts of the working class. The destiny of humanity depends on the outcome of this final confrontation. But as the bourgeoisie will do everything under the sun (and the moon!) to weaken the proletariat's tendency towards world regroupment, so will the proletariat be able to establish direct continuity in its struggle, in spite of all the divisions and mystifications of the leftists, trade unions, governments, etc. No capitalist organization can withstand an almost continuous wave of strikes and proletarian self-activity without becoming demoralized. Thus the class as a whole will begin to re-appropriate the communist struggle and deepen its global consciousness in real confrontations. The time lags be­tween mass class actions will shorten, and growing memory and lessons will be placed at the disposal of the working class. This could not be otherwise since the only weapons in the prole­tariat's arsenal are its consciousness and its ability to org­anize itself autonomously.

The Task Facing our Tendency

The deepening of the crisis can only be welcomed by communists. On the conjunctural level, the possibility of the communist revolution appears once again as an expression of the historical decay of bourgeois society. Our tasks will of necessity, become enlarged .and more complex, and the process towards the formation of the party will be accelerated directly by our present activities. The essentially gradual development of the crisis in this period will also allow us time to regroup better, to temper and galvanize our forces internationally. The unmis­takable trend in communist groups today is to first and fore­most seek international regroupment of forces; ‘national' regroupments are not a formal ‘stage' prior to the international one. To formalize the sequence of regroupment into such a sterile and localistic scheme would mean to revert to old Social Democratic conceptions about ‘national sections' and similar leftist gradualism. Only globally can we carry out our pre­paratory work, deepen our overall theoretical understanding and defend our platform within the struggles of the working class.

Our tendency will begin to confront in a more systematic way an immense amount of actual organizational work, such as the contribution to the formation and strengthening of future communist groups. Integrally connected to this, our tendency will be able to intervene on a more cohesive and international plane in the many events which will erupt in the coming period. But our specific function is not to ‘technically organize' strikes or any similar actions of sectors of the class, but to patien­tly and vehemently point out in the clearest possible way the implications of autonomous class activities and the needs of the communist revolution. We exist to defend the programmatic acquisitions of the whole working class movement, and this task can only be deepened through a militant and committed activity whenever and whenever the working class mobilizes itself for its own interests, or when such interests are directly threatened by capitalist attacks.

The perspectives for our tendency presented by Revolution Internationale at the January 1974 conference are flawed in this main respect, in that the author was unable to stress our organizational needs and actually minimized their impor­tance. This can be attributed to our tendency's relative im­maturity at the time concerning the very concrete implications our activities carried, for the class as a whole and for us. Today we can see the question of regroupment and the party on much firmer grounds. To us a programmatic agreement means also an organizational commitment, a tendency towards action within the framework of world regroupment. Woe to those activists who want to ‘intervene' without a clear understanding of what global regroupment means! The building of an international communist tendency is the acid test for any such activists. This commitment must be proven in deeds and attitude, not in words alone. Our tendency has already encountered many such sectarians who, like the centrists of yesterday, are always ‘in principle' for communist regroupment (a nice sentiment indeed, just like being ‘in principle' for the Brotherhood of Man or for eternal justice!). But in practice such sectarians sabotage any principled and significant move towards regroupment, alluding to trivialities or secondary points of ‘difference'. Just as our tendency has no need for modernists who ascribe to the working class their own integration into capitalism, we have no need for confusionists who in practice advocate demoralization and parochialism. It is a measure of our development that this conference did not attract such people. The process of regroupment began in the early 70's by our tendency has already polarized many tendencies and groups which in their majority have decomposed organizationally and theoretically. Among these are included the rump groups coming from Socialism ou Barbarie, including dilettantes like Barrot and similar luminaries of modernism. Our tendency today has a long road to travel, and we can be sure that the road will become in many respects more arduous and difficult. But concerning the past period of essentially basic theoretical clarification, we can safely conclude that it is a period drawing to an end.

World Revolution,

For the International Communist Current

January, 1975.

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The Proletarian Revolution

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The Specific Nature of the Proletarian Revolution

The urgent necessity for communists to fight for maximum clarity and coherence concerning the revolutionary tasks of the proletariat derives from the unique nature of the proletarian revolution. Whereas the bourgeois revolution (England, France etc.) was fundamentally a political confirmation of the bourgeoisie's economic domination of society, which grew steadily and progressively out of declining feudal society, the proletariat has no economic power under capitalism, and in the period of capitalist decadence has no permanent organisations of its own. The only weapons available to the proletariat are its class consciousness and its ability to organise its own revolutionary activity; having wrested power from the bourgeoisie it has the immense task of consciously constructing a new social order.

Capitalist society, as all class societies, grew up independent of men's wills, as a long drawn out unconscious process, regulated by laws and forces not subject to human control. The bourgeois revolution merely swept away the feudal superstructure which prevented those laws from generalising themselves in an unfettered way. Today it is the very nature of those laws, their blind, anarchic, commodity character, which is threatening to lead human civilisation to ruin. But despite the apparently immutable character of these laws, they are, in the end, only the expression of a social relationship which men themselves have created. The proletarian revolution is a systematic onslaught against the social relationships which give rise to the remorseless laws of capital. It can only be a conscious onslaught, because it is precisely the unconscious and uncontrolled character of capital which the revolution is attempting to destroy; and the social system which the proletariat will construct on the ruins of capitalism is the first society in which mankind exerts a rational and conscious control over the productive forces, of the whole of human life-activity.

What forces the proletariat to confront and destroy the social relations of capital: wage-labour, generalized commodity production - is the fact that the latter have entered into violent conflict with the productive forces, both with the material needs of the proletariat and the productive forces of human society as a whole. The decadence of the social relations which dominate the proletariat implies that the primary task of the proletariat in this epoch is to destroy them and initiate new ones. Its task then is not to govern, reform or organize capital but to liquidate it forever. Decadence means that the productive forces simply cannot be developed in the interests of humanity as long as they remain under the dominion of capital, that real development can now only take place under communist relations of production. Historical materialism leaves no room for a transitional mode of production between capitalism and communism.

"What we have to deal with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges". (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme).

Here we have a transition period in which communism emerges with violent birth pangs out of capitalist society, a communism in constant struggle against the remnants of the old society and continually striving to "develop on its own foundations" towards the reign of freedom, the classless society.

The Revolutionary Civil War

But the movement towards the abolition of classes is a consciously directed one, and the consciousness which guides the movement towards its final goal is that of the only communist class, the proletariat. Communism is not simply an unconscious urge to negate commodity relations, which discovers as if by accident that these relations, are guarded by the capitalist state and that to realize communism the state must be smashed. Communism is a movement of the proletariat which throws up a political programme, a programme which clearly recognizes in advance that capitalist social relations are defended by the bourgeois state and which systematically advocates the destruction of bourgeois political power as a precondition for the communist transformation. Thus the proletarian revolution is opposite in pattern to the bourgeois revolution in that the social revolution undertaken by the proletariat can only take flight after the political conquest of power by the working class. Because capital is a world-wide relation, the communist revolution can only unfold on a world scale. The global nature of both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat implies that the seizure of power by the workers in one country initiates a world civil war against the bourgeoisie. Until this world civil war has been won, until the proletariat has conquered power on a world scale, we cannot really speak of a period of transition or a communist transformation. In the period of the world civil war, production, even when directed by the proletariat, is not primarily production for human needs (which is the hallmark of communist production). In this period, production, as every-thing else, is subordinated to the demands of the civil war, to the iron necessity to extend and deepen the international revolution. Even though the proletariat may dispense with many of the formal characteristics of capitalist relations while it is arming itself and feeding itself for the civil war, one cannot call an economy which is orientated towards war a communist mode of production pure and simple. As long as capitalism exists anywhere in the world its laws will continue to determine the real content of productive relations everywhere. Thus if the proletariat of one country rid themselves of the form of wage labour and begin to ration all they produce without any kind of monetary intermediary, the rhythm of production and distribution in that proletarian bastion still remains under the merciless domination of global capital, of the global law of value. At the least reflux of the revolutionary tide these formal measures would quickly be undermined and begin to revert back to capitalist wage relations in all their naked brutality, without at any time the workers having ceased being part of an exploited class. To pretend that it is possible to establish islands of communism while the bourgeoisie still holds power on a world scale, is to try to mystify the working class and to divert it from its fundamental task - the total elimination of bourgeois power.

This does not mean that in its struggle for political power the proletariat abstains from taking economic measures aimed at undermining the power of capital; still less does it mean that the proletariat can simply take hold of the capitalist economy and wield it for its own purposes. Just as the Paris Commune showed that the proletariat cannot take hold of the capitalist state machine and use it for its own ends, the Russian Revolution revealed the impossibility of the working class indefinitely maintaining power on top of a capitalist economy. In the final analysis this means that the working class must engage in a process of destroying global capital if it is to retain power anywhere, but this process begins straight away: the working class has to be aware that the struggle against capital takes place at all levels (even though not uniformly) because capital is a total social relation.

As soon as the proletariat takes power in one area it will be forced to begin the attack on capitalist relations of production, firstly to strike a blow at the global organisation of capital, secondly to facilitate its political direction of the area it controls, and thirdly, to lay the basis for the far more developed social transformation which will follow the civil war. The expropriation of the bourgeoisie in one area will have a profoundly disintegratory effect on the organisation of world capital if it takes place in an important centre of capitalism, and will therefore deepen the world-wide class struggle; the proletariat will have to make use of all the economic weapons it has at its disposal. With regard to the second reason (which is of no lesser importance), it is impossible to imagine the political unification and, hegemony of the proletariat if it does not begin a radical assault on all the divisions and complexities imposed by the capitalist division of labour. The political power of the workers will depend to no mean degree on their ability to simplify and rationalise the process of production and distribution, and this rationalisation is impossible in an economy totally dominated by commodity relations. One of the main impulses pushing the proletariat towards the production of use, values is that such a method of production is far more suited to the tasks facing the proletariat in a revolutionary crisis - tasks such as the general arming of the workers, the emergency rationing of supplies the central direction of the productive apparatus, and. so on. Finally, provided the revolution is victorious on a world scale, these crude measures of socialisation could, under certain specific conditions, establish a continuity with the real, positive reorganisation of production which takes place after that victory, in so far as they help to neutralize and undermine the domination of commodity relations, thus lessening the 'negative' tasks of the proletariat in the period of transition.

The depth and extent of these measures will depend on the balance of forces in any given situation, but we can foresee that they will go the furthest where capitalism has already advanced, in its brutal, decadent and blind way, the process of material socialisation. Thus the collectivisation of the means of production will surely be effected the quickest in those sectors where the proletariat is most concentrated - in the big factories, mines, docks, etc. The socialisation of consumption will likewise proceed most easily in those areas which are already partly socialised: transport, housing, gas, electricity and other services, could be supplied free of charge almost immediately, subject only to the total reserves controlled by the workers. The collectivisation of these services would make deep inroads on the wage system. As for the direct distribution of individual articles of consumption, the total suppression of monetary forms, it is difficult to say how far this process could proceed as long as the revolution remains in one region. But we can say that we are for the maximum possible assault on the wage form, and no doubt the revolutionary workers will not be well disposed towards paying themselves wages once they have seized power. To be more concrete, we are in favour of measures which tend to regulate labour and distribution in social, collective terms (measures such as rationing combined with a universal obligation to work subject to the demands of the workers' councils) - rather than measures which involve a calculation of each individual contribution to social labour. The system of labour-time vouchers, advocated by Marx in The Critique of the Gotha Programme and by communists after Marx, by which individuals are given goods in return for a definite amount of labour performed, has a number of disadvantages and dangers, precisely because it does not really go beyond the capitalist notion of labour as an 'exchange' between the individual, atomised worker and 'society'. The system of labour-time vouchers would tend to divide those proletarians who are able to work from those who are not (a situation which may well be intensified in a period of international revolutionary crisis), and would furthermore drive a wedge between proletarians and other strata, inhibiting the process of social integration. Such a system would demand an immense bureaucratic supervision of each workers' labour, and would most easily degenerate into a form of money-wages at a downturn of the revolution (these drawbacks apply both to the period of the civil war and to the transition period itself).

A system of rationing under the control of the workers' councils would more easily lend itself to democratic regulation of the total resources of a proletarian bastion and to the encouragement of feelings of solidarity among all members of the class. But we have no illusions that this or any other system will represent a 'guarantee' against the return of wage slavery in its, most naked form. At root, the subjection to time and scarcity and to the pressure of global commodity relations still exists - it is simply borne by the whole proletarian bastion, as a kind of collective wage. Any temporary system of distribution is open to the dangers of bureaucratisation and degeneration as long as commodity relations exist - and commodity relations (including labour power as a commodity) cannot entirely disappear until classes have ceased to exist, because the perpetuation of classes means the perpetuation of exchange. There can be no pretence that any such method of distribution, either in the early stages of the revolution or the period of transition itself, represents "to each according to his needs", which can only be achieved in the higher stage of communism.

The assault on the wage form goes hand in hand with the assault on the capitalist division of labour. First and foremost the divisions imposed by capital within the ranks of the proletariat itself must be ruthlessly criticized and opposed. Divisions between skilled and unskilled, men and women, between proletarian sectors, employed and unemployed, must be confronted within the mass organs of the class as the only way of cementing the fighting unity of the workers.

Similarly, the proletariat, right from the beginning, embarks upon a process of integrating other social strata into its ranks, beginning with those semi-proletarian strata who will have demonstrated their capacity to support the revolutionary movement of the workers: one can envisage a rapid integration of certain layers who have already shown an ability to fight collectively against their exploitation, for example, large sectors of nurses and of white collar employees.

But it must be re-emphasised that all these inroads on commodity relations and the capitalist division of labour are in fact only a means to an end, to which they must be strictly subordinated: to the extension of the world revolution. While it does not shirk from attacking commodity relations from the start, the proletariat must regard as a snare and a delusion the idea of creating exemplary models of communism this or that region. While beginning the integration of non-exploiting classes into its ranks, the proletariat must constantly be on its guard against diluting itself with strata who cannot as a whole share the communist goals of the working class and who, after having been ostensibly integrated into the proletariat, would constitute a dangerous fifth column in its ranks at the first signs of a recession in the world revolutionary wave. The unification of all the workers of the world must take precedence over all attempts to begin the creation of the human community. All these advances towards socialisation are really stop-gap measures, emergency contingencies. They may be part of an attack on commodity relations but they in no way represent the abolition of fundamental capitalist laws. The real, positive supercession of commodity relations can only be achieved after the world-wide destruction of the bourgeoisie, after the construction of the international proletarian dictatorship. Here the period of transition proper begins.

The Period of transition

We cannot discuss here at great length the tasks of the proletariat during this period. We can only outline them briefly in order to emphasise the immensity of the proletariat's project. While liberating the productive forces from the fetters of capital, while liquidating the system of wage labour, national frontiers and the world market, the proletariat will have to establish a world-wide system of production and distribution geared solely to the satisfaction of human needs; it will have to direct the new productive system towards the restoration and revival of a world ravaged by decades of capitalist decadence and also the revolutionary civil war. The feeding and clothing of the poverty-stricken, the elimination of pollution and waste production together with the wholesale reorganisation of the global industrial infrastructure, the battle against the innumerable psychological alienations left-over from capitalism in work and social life as a whole - these are merely the preliminary tasks. They are simply the preconditions for the construction of a new civilisation, a new culture, a new humanity, the marvels of which can scarcely be imagined this side of capitalism, and which can mainly be grappled with in negative terms: the elimination of the antimony between economy and society, between work and leisure, between individual and society man and nature, and so on. And all the while the proletariat is laying the foundations of this new way of life it must be progressively integrating the whole of humanity into the ranks of associated labour and so creating the classless human community - but not without guarding against abolishing itself too rapidly, without ensuring, that there is not the slightest possibility of a return, to generalised commodity relations and thus to capitalism. The transition period will be the background of a gigantic struggle to maintain an irreversible movement towards the human community and against all the vestiges of the old society.

Those who portray this period as presenting no problems to the proletariat, as a stage which can quickly be superseded, are deceiving both themselves and the working class as a whole. We do not know how long this period will last but we do know that it will pose problems of a kind and magnitude unknown in the whole of human history, that the proletariat's task has no precedent in any other epoch, and that to think that this task can be carried out overnight is at best utopian and at worst a reactionary mystification. All we can be sure of is that the period of transition will not allow the proletariat or the social transformation to stand still. Any let up in the constant revolutionising of the social fabric will signify an immediate danger of a return to capitalism, and thus ultimately to barbarism. At no time will the proletariat be able to rest on its laurels and wait for communism to arrive on its own; either the proletariat struggles towards the higher stage of communism in a constant state of movement which is it self based on a conscious generalisation of communist relations, or it will find itself once again an exploited class being mobilised for some final catastrophe. There is no third way.

The Form of the Proletarian Dictatorship

It is a truism that the precise organisational forms through which the proletariat will carry out the communist transformation cannot be spelled out in advance by revolutionaries. It is impossible to foresee all the various organisational arid practical problems which will confront the working class all over the world, problems which will only finally be resolved by the class itself in its revolutionary struggle. The creativity of the class will almost certainly go beyond its own past achievements and. supersede many of the speculative formulations which revolutionaries can put forward at the present time.

Nevertheless, revolutionaries can in no way avoid discussing the question of the form and structure of the proletarian dictatorship. To do so would be to deny the whole experience of the revolutionary working class in this epoch, experience which has given rise to certain lessons which the proletariat simply cannot afford to ignore. To dismiss these lessons, especially those of Russia, is to leave the way open for a repetition of past defeats. It is no accident that the capitalist 'left' (Stalinists, Trotskyists, etc), is incapable of either appraising the past mistakes of the workers' movement or of clearly spelling out its own 'programme' for what they call the revolution. Behind this ambivalence, this reluctance to 'draw up blueprints', there lurks a class standpoint utterly opposed to the revolutionary self-activity of the working class.

These 'practical', 'realistic' leftists often hide behind Marx's own reluctance to speculate on the organisational form of the proletarian dictatorship. But the reluctance evinced by Marx was a necessary reflection of his own epoch, a period in which the material preconditions for the communist revolution did not yet exist. Any statements made by Marx and Engels on the form of the dictatorship were determined by the maturity of the class, by the degree to which it could present itself as a force capable of taking the leadership of society. But in the ascendant period of capitalism, with the proletariat still small and unformed, the possibility of its seizing power was extremely limited, and. in any case it could not have maintaineed power in that epoch at all.

Nevertheless, there were enough experiences of proletarian uprisings in that era to allow Marx and Engels to make certain vital statements about the nature of the proletarian power. Because they based their analysis on the methods of historical materialism, they were able to learn from the living experiences of the class and were thus able to revise some fundamental conceptions they had formulated with regard to the seizure of power by the working class. Thus the experience of the 1848 insurrection in Paris, and even more the Paris Commune of 1871, led them to abandon the perspective elaborated in The Communist Manifesto that the proletariat should organise to take over the bourgeois state machine. Henceforth it was clear that the proletariat could only smash this machine and set up its own organs of power, which could alone serve its communist aims. In learning this lesson Marx and Engels were carrying out the fundamental communist task of basing a proletarian political programme solely on the historical lessons discovered by the working class, and this is til1 the only way of developing the communist programme today. But today we are living in the epoch of capitalist decadence and thus of the proletarian social revolution, and we can and must apply the experience of the class in this epoch, and particularly of its great revolutionary wave of 1917-1923, to the task of elaborating the organisational elements of that programme in a way that was impossible for Marx and Engels to do.

For while Engels described the Commune itself as the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat; while Marx called it the political form for the social emancipation of labour; while certain fundamental lessons were laid down for all time by the Commune (the need to smash the bourgeois state, to arm the workers, to ensure direct control over workers delegates, etc); the Commune cannot stand by itself as the model for the proletarian dictatorship today. The Commune was the expression of a young working class which was not only not fully a world class but which even in the urban centres of capitalism was still fragmented and not yet fully distinct from other urban classes such as the petit bourgeoisie. This fact was reflected clearly in the Commune. Despite its desire for the universal social republic, the Commune could not extend itself on a world scale. The membership of the Commune's central organs was made up of Jacobins and Proudhonists as well as Communists, and its electoral bases were the geographical wards of Paris and universal suffrage, not a distinctly proletarian or industrial system of election. Above all the Commune could not have initiated a socialist transformation because the productive forces had not developed to the point at which communism was both possible and immediately necessary. As the ascendant period of capitalism cane to a close, the global extension and concentration of industrial capitalism had already rendered many features of the Commune obsolete, but none of the revolutionaries of the 1890s and early 1900s were clear as to what would supersede the Commune as the model for the dictatorship and their utterances on this question were necessarily vague.

Once again, however, it was the concrete experience of the class itself which provided an answer to this problem. Thus in Russia in 1905 and again in 1917, and throughout the whole revolutionary wave which followed in other countries, the Soviet or Workers' Council appeared as fighting organs of the revolutionary class struggle. The councils, assemblies of elected and revocable delegates from industrial units, were first and foremost expressions of the collective organisation of the proletariat united on its own class terrain and thus were a higher form of proletarian power than the Commune had been. As soon as the world union of workers' councils presented itself as the immediate goal of the proletarian revolution the slogan all power to the Soviets marked a class line between revolutionary and bourgeois organisations. No revolutionary organisation could reject the Soviet power as the form of the proletarian dictatorship. Since then every insurrectionary movement of the class from China in 1927 to Hungary in 1956 and so on has exhibited a tendency to express itself through the council form of organisation, and despite all the weaknesses of these movements nothing has fundamentally altered. in the nature of the class ,to justify the conclusion that in the next revolutionary wave the councils will not arise again as the concrete form of the proletarian dictatorship.

Today we are assailed by a host of modernists and innovators (e.g. Invariance, Negation, Kommunismen), who argue that workers' councils simply reproduce the capitalist division of labour and are therefore unsuitable instruments of a communist revolution, which they define as ±he immediate overthrow of all the categories of capitalist society. The class standpoint of these tendencies betrays the undialectical and unmarxist nature of their conception of revolution. For them the working class is no more than a faction of capitalism which can only become part of the 'revolutionary subject' or the 'communist movement' by immediately negating itself into a universal 'humanity'; whereas the marxist vision of revolution can only be that the proletariat must assert itself as the only communist class prior to integrating the whole of humanity into associated labour and so ending its own separate existence as a class. The workers councils are adequate instruments for the self-assertion of the proletariat against the rest of society, as well as for the process of integrating other social strata into the ranks of the proletariat, for the creation of the human community. Only when that community has been definitively realized will the, workers councils finally disappear. Linked city by city and across the world, the workers' councils will be responsible for the military, economic, and ideological tasks of the civil war and for the direction of the communist transformation in the transition period. In this period the councils will be under-going a continual expansion of their social base as they integrate more and more of humanity into communist relations of production.

But the affirmation of the council form by revolutionaries today in no way precludes a thorough-going critique of previous council movements and of the proletarian political tendencies which were thrown up by, or drew their inspiration from these movements. This critique is absolutely indispensable if the working class is to avoid making the same mistakes that it made in the past; and it can only base itself on the bitter lessons which the proletariat has learned through its most militant struggles in this epoch.

The most important lessons can be summarised as follows:

1. Political power is exercised through the councils themselves and not through a party. In Russia and elsewhere in the past it was assumed that the proletarian dictatorship was exercised through the communist party, the latter constituting the 'government' when it had a majority in the soviets, just as in bourgeois parliaments. Furthermore delegates to the soviets were elected on party slates rather than operating as mandated delegates to carry out the decisions of workers assemblies (often delegates did not come from factories at all, but were representatives of parties, unions, etc). This in itself was an immediate concession to bourgeois forms of representation and parliamentarianism, tending to leave power in the hands of political experts rather than in the mass of workers themselves; but more important, the idea that the party exercised power rather than the class as a whole (an idea endemic to the workers' movement at the tine) became a direct vehicle of the counter-revolution and was used by the Bolshevik Party in decay to justify their attacks on the class after the failure of the revolutionary tide. By identifying the power of the party with the dictatorship of the proletariat the Bolsheviks were provided with an ideological mantle for what quickly became the dictatorship of capital in a new guise. The old Social Democratic idea of the party which represented and organised the class was decisively refuted by the Russian experience.

In the soviets of the future, the most important decisions, those concerned with the overall direction of the revolution, must be fully discussed and arrived ,at in the general assemblies of the class at the base, in the factories and. other workplaces, so that delegates to the soviets serve primarily to centralize and carry out the decisions of those assemblies. These delegates will often be members of the party or other fractions but they are elected as workers and not as representatives of any party. It may even be that at any given time the majority of delegates are members of the communist party but this in itself is not a danger providing the proletariat as a whole is actively participating in its class wide organs and retains an overall control of them. In the last analysis this can only be safeguarded by the radicalisation and energy of the workers themselves, by the success of the revolutionary transformation which is in their hands; but certain formal measures will have to be taken to inhibit the formation of a bureaucratic elite around the party or any other body. These, will include the constant revocability of delegates, maximum rotation of administrative tasks, equal access of delegates to use values as for all other workers, and in particular the complete separation of the party from the state functions of the councils. Thus, for example, it is the workers' councils which control the arms and which supervise repression against counter-revolutionary elements, and not some military wing or special commission of the party.

The communist party of the future will have no other weapons than its theoretical clarity and its active commitment to the communist programme. It cannot seek power for itself, but must fight within the general organs of the class for the implementation of the communist programme. It can in no way force the class as a whole to put this programme into action, or implement it itself, because communism can only be created by the conscious activity of the entire working class. The party can only seek to convince the class as a whole of the correctness of its analysis through the process of discussion and active education which will go on within the assemblies and councils of the class, and it will pitilessly denounce any self-professed revolutionary tendency which abrogates gates to itself the task of organising the class and of substituting itself as the revolutionary subject.

2. The councils are not organs of self-management. In any future revolutionary situation the demand to subordinate the councils to an omnipotent party-state which will lead and educate an amorphous mass of workers and centralise capital in its own hands will come from all the various heirs of the counter-revolution in Russia: Trotskyists, Stalinists, and others. Communists will have to stand by the rest of their class and fight these conceptions tooth and nail. But the proletariat's bitter experience of state capitalism in Russia and elsewhere, and of the reactionary nature of nationalise in general, may make the class as a whole less sympathetic to calls for nationalisation than in previous revolutionary moments. But the bourgeoisie will no doubt find other rallying cries to try to tie the workers to the bourgeois state and to capitalist relations of production; one of the most pernicious of these could be the slogan of workers' self management, which could find an echo in the various corporatist, localist, and syndicalist mystifications which exist in the class. The experience of the past has given many examples of this. In Italy and Germany during the first great revolutionary wave, there was a strong tendency for the workers to simply lock themselves up in the factories and to try to manage their own enterprises on a corporate basis, to restrict the council organisation to the level of each factory rather than creating organs specifically aimed at regrouping and centralising the revolutionary efforts of all workers. Today the idea of self-management is already presenting itself as a final resort of capitalism in crisis and emasculated workers' councils are being advocated by numerous left factions of capital from the social democrats to Trotskyists and sundry libertarians. The advantage of this slogan to the bourgeoisie is that it serves to induce the proletariat to participate actively in its own exploitation and slaughter without calling into question the power of the capitalist state or capitalist commodity relations. Thus the bourgeois Republic in Spain was able to co-opt a certain amount of self-management into the war-effort against France's rival capitalist faction. (Footnote 1 [8])

The isolation of the workers into councils composed of individual, productive units simply maintains the divisions imposed by the capitalist system and leads to certain defeat for the class. (See Cardan's Sur le Contenu du Socialisme, published by Solidarity as Workers' Councils and the Economics of a Self Managed Society for a perfect model of defeat.) Such methods of organisation divert the workers from attacking the primary target - the capitalist state - and allows the state to launch its offensive against a fragmented working class. They also serve to perpetuate the idea of autonomous enterprises and of socialism as free exchange between free collectives of workers whereas the. Real socialisation of production implies the world suppression of autonomous enterprises as such, and the subordination of the whole productive apparatus to the conscious direction of society, without the medium of exchange. (Footnote 2 [8])

But the mystification of self management need not end with the idea of self managing productive units. It can also be extended to a national model, in which workers councils come together to plan a democratic accumulation of national capital; and it can even be accommodated to the ideal of a self sufficient communist bastion which attempts to formally abolish wage labour and trade in one country - an illusion held by many council communists in the twenties and thirties, which is appearing again in a different form in the ideas of the innovators of marxism, who demand the immediate creation of the human community. All these ideologies are linked by a common rejection of the need for the proletariat to destroy the bourgeois state on a world scale before actual permanent socialisation can begin. Thus, against all these confusions it must be asserted that the workers' councils are first and foremost organs of political power, which must serve to unite the workers not simply to administer the economy but to conquer power on a world scale.

3. The workers' councils are not ends in themselves. The international conquest of power by the working class is simply the beginning of the social revolution. In. the period of transition the workers councils are the means through which the proletariat implements the communist transformation of society. If the councils become ends in themselves this can only signify a halt in the process of social revolution and the beginnings of a return to capitalism. Unless the councils serve as instruments for the positive abolition of wage slavery and commodity production they will become hollow shells through which a new bourgeoisie will exploit the working class.

Neither in the transition period nor in the revolutionary uprising itself can there be any guarantee that the working class will engage in a continuous process of revolution until the final triumph of communism. The mere will or foresight of revolutionary minorities is not enough to prevent the degeneration of the revolution which itself reflects a material change in the balance of class forces. Between the period in which the councils are revolutionary and the period in. which they have become appendages of capital there is a delicate balance in which it remains possible to reform the councils from within: but this is only a relatively brief possibility. If that possibility is lost then revolutionaries must leave the councils and advocate the formation of new councils directly opposed to the old - in other words a second revolution. In this respect we already have before us the example of the small communist fractions in Russia who refused to collaborate in the dead soviets of the early twenties and. who advocated the overthrow of the Bolshevik state (e.g. Miasnikov's Workers Group in 1923); or the German left communists who left the reformist factory organisation to the putrid machinations of the KPD and the Social Democratic Parties.

The Question of the State

The problem of the state in the period of transition and its relationship to, the proletariat is so complex that we must deal with the question separately, even though it is closely connected to the -lessons gained from previous revolutions about the form of the proletarian dictatorship and the role of the workers councils.

As long as classes exist, we cannot speak of the abolition of the state. The state continues to exist during the period of transition because there remain classes whose direct interests cannot be reconciled: on the one hand the communist proletariat and on the other hand other classes left over from capitalism who can have no material interests in the communisation of society, (peasants, urban petit bourgeoisie and professionals, etc). As Engels wrote in The Origins of the Family Private Property and the State:

"The state is therefore by no means a power forced on society from without...it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to expel. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly standing above society becomes necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of order; and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it, and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state."

It is important not to reduce the phenomenon of the state to a simple conspiracy of the ruling class to perpetuate its power. The state did not arise out of the mere will of any ruling class but was an emanation of class society in general and due to this it becomes an instrument of the ruling class.

"As the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but as it arose at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes it is, as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class and thus acquires new, means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed class" (ibid).

In the period of transition to communism the, state will, inevitably arise, in order to prevent the class antagonisms of this hybrid society from pulling it apart; class struggle will not end with the destruction of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat, as the strongest, the dominant class, will use the state to maintain its power and to defend the gains of the communist transformation which it is putting into effect. To be sure this state will be unlike any other state in history. For the first time the newly dominant class will not inherit the old state machine and take it over for its own purposes, but will smash, destroy, and annihilate the bourgeois state, and set about systematically constructing its own organs of power; and this is because the proletariat is the first exploited class in history to be a revolutionary class, and it can never be an exploiting class. Consequently, it uses the state not to exploit other classes but to defend a social transformation that will end exploitation for ever, which will abolish all social antagonisms, and so lead to the disappearance of the state. The proletariat cannot be an economically dominant class. Its domination is political only.

In the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and many others, the idea is often put forward that in the period of transition the "state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat", that the state is simply the armed proletariat "organized as the ruling class", and that this 'proletarian' state is therefore no longer a state in the old sense of the word. But a deeper study of the nature of the state, itself based on the most profound critiques of the state elaborated by Marx and Engels, and on the historical experience of the class, leads us to the conclusion that the state in the revolution as a whole is something other than just the armed proletariat, that the proletariat and the state are not identical.

Let us summarize our main reasons for making this assertion.

1. In the period of the insurrection itself, of the revolutionary civil war, the scenarios envisaged by Marx, Engels and Lenin, can be seen to have a certain validity. At this point the main task of the working class, of the proletarian dictatorship expressed through the workers councils, is indeed a statist one: the violent suppression of the enemy class, the bourgeoisie. At the beginning of the insurrection, when the mass of workers are sweeping forward, arms in hand, and at all times when the revolutionary onslaught against the bourgeoisie is on the upsurge, delegates to the workers councils and congresses of councils will function as simple instruments of the will of the class and there will be little or no conflict between the base assemblies of the workers and the central organs they elect. Here it will be very easy to identify the armed proletariat with the state. But even at this time it is dangerous to make this identification. The moment the revolutionary tide meets with serious obstacles or set-backs the workers delegates who have been mandated to deal with the outside world (whether peasants supplying food, or even capitalist states who are prepared to barter with the workers power) (Footnote 3 [9]) would be forced to advocate certain compromises, to ask the workers to work harder, or to reduce their rations - and so these delegates would begin to appear as agents external to the workers, as functionaries of a state in the old sense of something standing above and against the workers.

There is a delicate balance reached at this point, where the workers delegates and central organs stand half way between being negotiators between the workers and world capital - and becoming definite agents of world capital and thus of capitalist counter-revolution inside the proletarian bastion, as did the Bolsheviks in Russia. This balance can only be decided in favour of the workers by a further extension of the world revolution allowing a new breathing space to the beleaguered workers and to the partially socialized sector they have created.

The existence of formal measures alone cannot prevent this degeneration from taking place, because it is a direct result of the pressures of the world market; but it is still vital that the workers are prepared for such an eventuality so that they can do all they can to fight it. That is why it is important that the proletariat is not identified with the state, either with the apparatus it sets up to mediate with non-exploiting classes within the proletarian bastion, or with the central organs which are charged with relating to the world outside that bastion, or indeed with any institution, because while any institution thrown up by the working class can become integrated into capitalism, the working class can never be integrated, can never become counter-revolutionary.

To identify the proletariat with the state, as the Bolsheviks did, leads to the monstrous situation- at a moment of reflux or defeat in which the state as the incarnation of the class is permitted to do anything to maintain its power while the class as a whole remains defenceless. Thus Trotsky argued that the workers had no right to strike against their own state, and the massacre of the Kronstadt insurgents was justified on the grounds that any rebellion against the Workers State could only be counter-revolutionary. Clearly these developments in Russia did not take place simply because the workers were identified with the state, but flowed from a material retrogression in the world revolution. Nevertheless, that ideological identification served to disarm the workers in the fare of the degeneration of the revolution. In future the autonomy and initiative of the rank and file workers vis-a-vis any central organs must be defended and backed up by positive measures, such as the renunciation of all violent methods within the proletariat, the right of all workers to strike, the possession by the base assemblies of their own means of communication and propaganda (press, etc), and above all the retention of arms by the workers in their factories and neighbourhoods, so that they will be able to resist the incursions of any emergent bureaucracy should this become necessary.

We do not advocate these precautionary measures out of any lack of conviction in the proletariat's ability to spread the revolution and to socialize production, which are the only final guarantees against degeneration, but because the proletariat must be prepared for any eventuality and not deceived by false promises that all will be well. The proletarian revolution will have far less chance of surviving temporary set-backs if the workers are not prepared in advance to deal with them.

2. Contrary to some of the expectations of Marx, the socialist revolution will not unfold in a world in which the vast majority of the population are proletarians; if that were the case one could perhaps imagine the disappearance of the state almost immediately following the destruction of the bourgeoisie. But one of the main consequences of capitalist decadence is that capital has not been able to integrate the majority of mankind directly into capitalist social relations even though it has subjected all to the tyranny of capitalist laws. The proletariat is a minority of the population on a world scale. The enormous problems posed to the proletarian revolution by this fact cannot be charmed away by the invocations of situationists and other modernists by including in the ranks of the proletariat all those who feel themselves alienated or as having no control over their lives. There are material reasons why the working class alone is the communist class: its world-wide, associative nature, its location at the heart of capitalist value production, the historical consciousness deriving from its class struggle. It is the lack of these characteristics among other classes and strata which necessitates the dictatorship of the proletariat, the assertion by the proletariat of its communist goals in distinction from all other strata of society.

In the process of conquering power itself, the proletariat will be faced with a huge mass of non-proletarian, non-bourgeois strata, who may have a part to play in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, who may even support the proletariat, but who cannot by themselves, as classes, have any interest in communism and who might equally veer towards the counter-revolution, particularly at any sign of a set-back in the proletariat's march to power. The problem of dealing with these classes will be crucial to the success of the struggle against the capitalist class; but after the defeat of the bourgeoisie it is perhaps the most central of all the proletariats tasks; indeed it is the existence of these classes which provides the necessity for a period of transition between capitalism and communism.

The idea of dispensing with the transition period by immediately integrating all other strata into the proletariat is either a hopeless fantasy or a conscious attempt to undermine the autonomy of the working, class. The task is so huge that it simply could not be done in one fell swoop; any attempt to do so would not be the diso1ution of other classes into the proletariat, but the dissolution of the proletariat into the mythical 'people' of bourgeois radicalism. Such attempts would dilute the strength of the proletariat, to the extent that any autonomy of action would become impossible. The precondition for this autonomy is that the integration of other strata takes place on the proletariat's terms and subject to the material developments of the world revolution.

Similarly, the attempt to give these strata equal representation in the workers councils, without having first destroyed them as separate strata, in other words without having made them into workers, would completely undermine the political autonomy o1 the working class. Still less can the proletariat allow these strata and classes to set up parallel organs of power equal to the workers' councils.

At the same time the working class cannot simply repress these classes and deprive them of all means of social expression. The experience of Russia, in which the proletariat during the period of War Communism was forced into a virtual civil war against the peasantry, is eloquent testimony of the impossibility of the proletariat simply imposing its will by force of arms on the rest of society. Such a project would be a terrible waste of life and revolutionary energy, and would in all probability directly help to destroy the revolution. The only civil war that cannot be avoided is the one against the bourgeoisie. Violence against other classes should be resorted to only in the most extreme circumstances. Besides, while it is re-organizing production and distribution along communist lines, the proletariat must cater for the needs not only of itself but of society as a whole, which means that there will have to be suitable social institutions for expressing everyone's needs.

The proletariat, therefore, will have to allow the rest of the population (excluding the bourgeoisie) to organize themselves and to form bodies which can represent their needs in front of the workers' councils. However, the working class will not allow these other strata to organize specifically as classes with particular economic interests. Just as these other strata are integrated into associated labour as individuals, so the proletariat only permits them to express themselves as individuals in civil society. This implies that the representative organs through which they express themselves, unlike the workers' councils, are based on territorial units and forms of organisation. Thus, for example, in the countryside, village assemblies might send delegates to rural-district and. regional councils, and in the cities neighbourhood assemblies might send representatives to urban communal councils; and these organs will, at various local and regional levels, discuss the needs of the general population with the workers' councils' delegates. It is important to note that workers (as representatives of proletarian neighbourhoods) will be present in these bodies, and indeed measures should be taken to ensure that even within these bodies a working class domination is achieved. Thus the workers' councils may insist that working class delegates have preponderant voting rights, and that working class neighbourhoods have their own militia units as well as stressing that it is the working class communal delegates who do most of the liaison and discussion with the workers' councils.

The existence of these organs in regular relation to the workers' councils constantly creates statist forms in the sense given by Engels above, whatever we call this new apparatus. For this reason, the state in the transition period is linked to, but not identical with, the workers councils and the armed proletariat as a whole. For, as Engels shows, the state is not only an instrument of violence and repression (functions which will hopefully be minimal after the defeat of the bourgeoisie), it is also an instrument of mediation between classes, an instrument which serves to keep the class struggle within the bounds of the existing society. This in no way implies that the state can ever be 'neutral' or 'above classes' (though it may often appear to be). The mediation and conciliation that is effected through the state is always in the interest of the dominant class, it always serves to perpetuate that domination. The state in the period of transition must be used as an instrument of the working class. The proletariat does not share power with any other class or strata. It will have to appropriate for itself a monopoly of political-military power, which in concrete terms will necessitate a monopoly of arms by the workers, the workers' councils' power of decision over all recommendations of any joint negotiating bodies, maximal representation of workers' delegates on all state bodies, etc. The proletariat will have to be continually vigilant so as to ensure that this state, this organ which arises to keep the transitional society together, remains an instrument of the working class and does not become the representative of alien class interests, does not become an instrument of the other classes against the proletariat. For as long as classes exist, as long as there is exchange and a social division of labour, this state will not only remain, but like all other states will, constantly threaten to, in Engels words, "increasingly alienate itself" from society, to become a power standing above society, and thus above, the proletariat.

The only way the proletariat can really prevent this from happening is for it to engage in a continuing process of social transformation, to push forward more and more measures which tend to undermine the material roots of other classes and to integrate them into communist relations of production. But until such time as there are no longer any classes the proletariat can only dominate the organisms which arise in the transition period by clearly understanding their nature and function. We use the term 'state' to describe that apparatus which serves, during the transition period, to mediate between classes in a framework of political domination by the working class. The word itself is of lesser importance; what is important is not to confuse this apparatus with the workers' councils, with the autonomous organs of the class whose function and essence is not compromise or mediation but permanent social revolution.

This brings us to our final point. By its very nature the state is a conservative force, an inheritance, from the pre-history of class society. Its very function is to preserve social relations, to maintain the balance of forces between classes - in other words to stand still. But as we have said, the proletariat in the transition period cannot afford to stand still; whatever is not part of a movement towards communism is a step backwards towards capitalism. Left to itself the state will not 'wither away' but will attempt to preserve itself, indeed to increase its domination of social life. The state only withers away to the extent that the proletariat is able to carry forward the social transformation towards the integration of all classes into the human community. The positive creation of this community undermines the social basis of the state: the "irreconcilability of class antagonisms", a social illness which has its cure only in the abolition of classes.

The proletariat alone contains within itself the seeds of communist social relations; the proletariat alone is capable of undertaking the communist transformation. The state at best helps to guard the gains of this transformation (and at worst becomes an obstacle to it) but it cannot, as a state, undertake that transformation. It is the social movement of the whole proletariat in creative self activity which actually ends the domination of commodity fetishism and builds up a new social relationship between human beings.

The workers' movement from Marx and Engels to Lenin and even the left communists has been plagued with the confusion that the taking over of the means of production by the state has something to do with communism, that statification equals socialisation. As Engels wrote in Anti-Duhring:

"The proletariat seizes the, state power and transforms the means of production in the first instance into state property. But in doing this it puts an end to itself as proletariat, it puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms; it puts an end also to the state as state".

Despite other conflicting (and more profound) insights into the inability of the proletariat to use the state in the interests of freedom, both Marx and Engels could make such statements as the one above in the ascendant epoch of capitalism because at that time, in that era of 'private' capitalism's anarchic sway, of crises of overproduction within national boundaries, the organisation of production by the state, even a national state, could appear as an infinitely superior mode of economic organisation. The founders of scientific socialism never wholly escaped the idea that the socialist transformation could take place within a national economy or that statification was a bridge to socialism, or even equivalent to socialisation itself; these illusions and confusions permeated both the Social Democracy and the communist tendencies which broke away from it after 1914, and were only finally laid to rest within the communist movement by the experience of Russia, of the global overproduction crisis of capital, of the general tendency towards state capitalism in the era of decadence. But the confusions about statification being somehow 'socialist' still remains as a dead weight of mystification within the working class as a whole and has to be rigorously combated by communists.

Today, revo1utiona±ies can affirm that state property remains private property as far as the producers are concerned, that statification of the means of production puts an end neither to the proletariat, nor to class antagonisms, nor to the state, (Engels' statement notwithstanding). Neither nationalisation nor statification by the world-wide state of the transition period would be a step towards social property which in a sense is the abolition of property itself. In expropriating the bourgeoisie the proletariat does not institute private property of any kind, not even 'proletarian' property. There is no such thing as 'workers' ownership of the means of production or a 'proletarian economy'. The proletariat on seizing power socialises production: this means that the means of production and distribution tend to become the property of society as a whole. The proletariat guards this 'property' in the transition period in the interests of the human community of the future, whose foundations the proletariat is laying. It is not 'its own' property because by definition, the proletariat is a propertyless class. The process of socialisation of property realises itself to the extent that the proletariat is integrating the rest of society into its ranks and so becoming one with the communist human community, with a social humanity which will come into existence for the first tine. Once again the proletariat will use the state to regulate the achievements of this process, but the process itself occurs not only independently of the state hut actively leads to the disappearance of the state.

We communists do not 'advocate' the state, nor do we hold it up as the incarnation of all evil as the anarchists do. In analyzing the historical origins of the state we simply recognise the inevitability of statist forms arising in the transition period, and in recognizing this we help to prepare our class for its historic mission the construction of a society without classes and thus free forever from the scourge of the state.

CDW, World Revolution, (April 1975). Supplementary note on the question of the state

This text expresses the views of World Revolution as a whole, but it is not meant as a final statement or a solution to the problems of the transition period. Within the framework of certain class lines, the question of the state and the transition period must remain open for discussion between revolutionaries and can only be concretely solved by the revolutionary activity of the working class as a whole. It follows that within this framework different conceptions and definitions of the state can be accommodated inside a coherent revolutionary tendency.

The class lines concerning the question of the state are as follows:

  • The necessity to completely destroy the bourgeois state on a world scale.
  • The necessity of the proletarian dictatorship:
    • the proletariat is the only revolutionary class;
    • proletarian autonomy is a precondition of the communist revolution;
    • the proletariat ,does not share power with any, other class; it has a monopoly of political-military power.
  • Power is exercised by the proletariat as a whole organised in councils; not by a party.
  • All relations of force and all violence within the ranks of the proletariat must be rejected; the whole class must have the right to strike, to carry arms, to full freedom of expression, etc.
  • The world dictatorship of the proletariat must put into effect the social content of the communist revolution: the abolition of wage labour, commodity production, nations, and classes, and the construction of the world human community.
Footnotes

  • 1We should not however forget the bureaucratic and statist nature of most of the so-called collectivisation carried out under the auspices of the anarchist CNT, and the CNT's hostility to any independent movement of the class, as witnessed in the CNT's collaboration in the Republic's armed reclaiming of the Barcelona telephone exchange from the workers in 1937. In fact all attempts of the workers to 'manage' capital must end in the normal despotism of capitalist production at the level of the whole society and of each plant. So-called 'workers' capitalism' is impossible. Back [10]
  • 2This does not mean that the revolutionary workers will tolerate foremen and despotic regimes within the factory. During the revolutionary process factory committees elected by and responsible to the general assembly of the factory will take charge of the day-to-day running of the factory. Moreover, the overall production plans adhered to by the factory committees are decided by workers' councils composed of delegates from factory assemblies, and thus are decided upon by the class as a whole. As soon as the working class begins to take over the productive apparatus (and the seizure of the factories must be seen as a moment in the insurrection) it begins the struggle to subordinate the production process to human needs. This implies profound changes in the organisation of work, so that productive activity itself tends to become a part of consumption in the broadest sense. Certain measures in this direction will have to be taken almost immediately, such as the shortening of the working day (subject to the demands of the revolution), the rotation of tasks, and the elimination of hierarohica1 relations inside the factory through the equal participation of all workers, skilled and unskilled, manual and technical, men and women, in the factory assemblies and committees. Back [11]
  • 3We do not formalistically oppose any trade or compromises between the proletariat and other non-exploiting classes in the civil war, or even between the proletarian bastion and sections of the world bourgeoisie should this become unavoidable. But we must make the following points clear:
    • a. The proletariat must be able to distinguish between compromises imposed by a difficult situation, and, open capitulations amounting to class betrayals; and it must be aware of the extreme dangers inherent in all compromises, and take measures to counteract them. Any attempt to institutionalise or make permanent any deals with the bourgeoisie is a crossing of class lines, a betrayal of the civil war.
    • b. In an area controlled by the workers' councils a state will arise which has the task of mediating between the proletariat and other non-exploiting classes (of the All-Russian Congresses of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasant Soviets after 1917). But the proletariat cannot use this state to mediate with its irreconcilable class enemy, the bourgeoisie. Any tactical negotiations with sectors of the world bourgeoisie outside the proletarian bastion are directly and solely the task of the workers' councils, and must be strictly supervised by the whole working class through their general assemblies.
    • Back [12]

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1917 - Russian Revolution [13]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Proletarian revolution [14]
  • Revolutionary wave, 1917-1923 [15]
  • Dictatorship of the proletariat [16]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Communism [17]

The period of transition

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Part I Political

 

The State

First, a few qualifying remarks. Historically speaking the State has appeared as an organ of class rule though, as Engels wrote in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Moscow, 1968, p.65), it often appeared as standing above society, as a mediator between classes:

"The State was the official representative of society as a whole; the gathering together of it into a visible embodiment. But it was this only in so far as it vas the State of that class which itself represented for the time being, society as a whole."

Thus, as soon as the State becomes "the real representative of the whole of society" (our emphasis), as soon as there is no longer any social class to be held in subjection, then the State "renders itself unne­cessary".

However, it is an anarchist fallacy to suggest that out of the destruc­tion of the bourgeois State can communism appear automatically. The proletariat must first destroy the bourgeois State apparatus and set up its own form of class rule. In this respect alone the proletarian State will be no different from any other state in history. In other respects the dictatorship of the proletariat will be markedly different from other forms of State. Quantitatively speaking it will be the first State in his­tory to express the historical interests of a majority over a minority and qualitatively speaking the proletariat will as a class has no speci­fic form of property which they wish to defend. It is this last differ­ence which explains why the proletarian State is "no longer a State in the proper sense of the word". (Marxism and the State, Lenin, page 29). The proletarian State remains to oppress all elements who wish to res­urrect bourgeois property relations. At the moment of their dissolution and final defeat the dictatorship of the proletariat will have ceased to exist.

Thus, only the proletariat and its democratic organs, the soviets, can superintend this transformation. Nowhere, to our knowledge, in the writ­ings of Marx, Engels or Lenin, do they conceive of any other possibility. Indeed in The Critique of the Gotha Programme, and in State and Revolution they effectively deny that any alternative such as a "free people's State" or popular front is conceivable. True, Lenin (quite understandably though erroneously in the terms of' 1917) calls for an alliance between proletariat and peasantry (State and Revolution, pp. 46-47) but still concludes that the State must remain "the proletariat organized as the ruling class" (quoting the Communist Manifesto, p. 48). Nor has the experience of the proletariat in the last sixty years provided us with any reason to doubt this idea. Indeed, if anything, we have seen development which have thrown the balance even more in favour of the proletariat. Here one thinks of the peasantry, an analysis of which is wade in the next section.

The Peasantry

The question of the proletariat's relationship to the vital area of rural production has always been a particularly vexing one. The Russian Revolution (1917-21) is an example of the problem though its lessons must be placed in true historical perspective. Lenin was always looking over his shoulder at the huge masses of the Russian peasantry. In The State and Revolution, he suggests that an alliance of the peasants and workers will form the basis of the new society though under the dictatorship of the proletariat. But in fact Lenin and the Bolsheviks could not have established communist relations of production in Russia alone. The Russian workers, like any other sector of the world proletariat, needed the world revolution if they were to achieve their goal. Thus, the Land Decree of November 1917 was not a step towards communism but an attempt to capture the support of the muzhiks to aid the struggle for survival of the soviet regime. Only a perspective of world revolution could prevent this from being considered completely counter-revolutionary and with the failure of the world revolution this was fully revealed. Let us be clear on the lesson. If the same situation of any proletariat surrounded by huge mass of peasantry were to recur today the proletariat in that area would still be doomed without a world revolution. However, this need be no cause for despondency amongst revolutionaries.

With the modern techniques of capitalist food production, with the increased concentration of the bulk of the world's food production in the highly developed capitalist agriculture - with the consequent existence of a proletariat as in any other industry - in a global revolutionary situation there will be no strategic need to satisfy the land hunger of the peasant for the expropriation of the capitalist agricultural units will secure the basis of existence for the world proletariat. The rural proletariat of these areas will thus be simply part of the soviet structure like any other former wage workers under capitalism.

The question of an isolated proletarian revolution in a ‘lesser developed economy' in advance of the world revolution remains for us an unlikely ­occurrence. Our view sees the development of the crisis amongst several ‘advance' capitalist countries at approximately the same time. The proletariat in these areas will then able to assist the various proletarian salients in the lesser capitalist countries. Should one of these salients find itself in an isolated position, then we must be realistic and realize the possibilities. If the larger imperialist powers are not already experiencing a profound crisis then it will be crushed militarily. Further, in many areas the local peasantry (even if negotiations were successful) cannot produce enough of the basic food requirements of the urban areas; and we must recognize that the proletariat here will not be taking over an economy representing a significant power in the capitalist world market. Hence the further escalation of the world crisis as a result of their activity would be very remote. Thus, the world proletarian revolution may not arrive in time to save an isolated proletarian outbreak in such a country. If this means that we must conclude that the revolution can only be successful through the early collapse of the capitalist heartlands (USA, USSR, Europe) into the dictatorship of the proletariat then unfortunately we cannot shrink from it. The alternative of advocating ideological concessions to other strata in any country would lead to confusion for the world proletariat and ultimately to counter-revolution.

In the advanced capitalist countries the question of the peasantry scarcely exists for each capitalist farmer employs rural proletarians. In Britain, for example, there are 329,000 rural proletarians. With help from the soviets to which they would be affiliated they would carry out the expropriation of farmlands and begin the integration of agriculture into the socialist economy.

When a significant peasantry did exist the proletariat would obviously establish with them levels and goals of production within a framework laid down by the proletariat. But no concessions can be made to petty bourgeois forms of property. The proletariat on the other hand, would actively encourage the peasants to form their own organizations which would eventually become the basis for the collectivization of agricultural production. Here we must recognize that certain tasks of the per­iod of transition mat take longer than others and this could be one issue which ensures the maintenance of the vigilance of the dictatorship of the proletariat for at least a generation.

Part II (Economic)

The first part article on the period of transition has already dealt with the questions of the State and the political forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat; in that article only incidental comments were on the economic formulations of these forms. Now in this article we deal with their content, and only incidentally with the concrete political issues. This form of presentation is not because we feel they are two separated issues; on the contrary, as was made clear in part I, we are speaking about equally vital, interrelated aspects of a total transformation.

Economically, as well as politically, the so-called transition period is opened for the working class when one or more capitalist states are overthrown by the revolution, and is not closed until the inauguration of a global communist system of production and distribution according to needs; but as it nears communism it shares less and less residues of capitalism, but its duration is obviously no short period, but of at least a generation. Neither is it a static system, and its "defects inevitable in the first phase of communist society" (Marx) are generally overcome.

The idea that production in the proletarian bastion should be directed towards a communist ‘war economy' is confusionist. Although there is certainly armed struggle and even pitched battles during communist revolution, there is no possibility of the workers engaging and defeating capital in a global civil war; on this terrain the defeat of the proletariat would be short and the curtain-raiser for barbarism. This emphasizes all the more that the communist revolution must storm more or less simultaneously several capitalist states, including the militarily dominant imperialist powers, or else go down in defeat. Certainly workers in any one area must intervene to help adjacent communist uprisings, but the creation of the first steps of a communist economy are a more potent weapon and help than any amount of military support given by one group of workers to another.

Here the relationship of any one proletarian power to the still existent world market must be investigated, and the inseparability of the politics and economics of the transition period re-iterated. Communists must press in the mass organs of the class for the ending of all economic relationships between the isolated areas where the workers have taken power, and the bourgeois world market. Firstly this is because at a time of world crisis this move will deepen such a crisis by withdrawing markets and raw materials from still existing sections of the world bourgeoisie. The impact of the cessation of oil exports by a revolutionary Russia, or food exports by a Soviet America would be powerful impulses to the spread of the communist revolution, and help force the issue to the point of resolution on a world scale. Here economic tactics hasten the political progress of the revolution.

On the other hand only dreamers would imagine that the capitalists would accept to trade with a proletarian dictatorship without thus capitulating politically to world capital. For example, in return for trade would be demanded compensation for expropriations in the workers' bastions, taming of branches of the communist movement outside the revolutionary areas, diplomatic recognition and exchanges etc, in fact all that was seen in Russia in 1920 onwards when NEP and foreign trade went hand in glove with frontism, return to legality of the Communist Parties, suppression of the Russian proletariat as an element in the labour power of the world market, etc. the lesson of the Russian revolution is that the communist movement is a struggle for all or nothing, communism cannot be introduced by stealth or defended by compromises, or maneuvers to ‘gain time'. On this question the advocation of any other policy than that we have outlined is a class line which divides communists from those who today apologize for counter-revolution in the past, and its re-enactment in the future.

So far we have treated the question of the period of transition ‘internally' with regard to the areas where the bulk of the proletariat are concentrated and which constitute perhaps 30% of the world's population. During the course of revolutionary upheaval itself, any outbreaks which occur in the less developed areas of world capitalism must receive all material and political support from the rest of the proletariat, since the working class is an international class, and has the same interests and tasks world-wide. But we have no faith in the ‘communist' aspirations of the peasantry of these areas, in fact even where we see state capitalist agriculture in the third world, there will in all probability be a parcellation of land among the aspirant peasantry, with a return to subsistence or small commodity agriculture. And there are the additional dangers of deproletarianization of semi-proletarianized groups of workers (eg. in Africa). Any enclaves of power within these areas, created by industrial or plantation workers, must be integrated into the political and economic framework of communism, and serve as the toehold of communism within the areas of the small commodity producers.

In contradistinction to the situation in Russia in 1917-21, this sea of small producers poses no great danger to the efforts to socialize the economy; the working class will not be dependent on these areas for food production, in fact quite the reverse is the case. And these producers are in no wise able to organize themselves politically and militarily to the proletarian power, a fact resulting from their atomized class nature, and one which communists should accept gladly, not try to overcome by urging that they be ‘represented' in the State of the period of transition. But the workers must have a policy towards these sections, since they just abandoning them (apart from humanitarian consideration), would mean that a renewed cycle of primitive accumulation would start in these areas, and then within a period of time they would pose a militancy and political threat to the building of communism. These strata must be involved in the communist economy, without forcing them to collectivize, which is impossible given their huge numbers. Apart from the ideological weapon of propaganda for communism, and humanitarian aid to these areas, the main tactic which impels them into communism is economic, and another reason why the accounting of the social product must be in labour-time.

The Councils must insist that exchange, economic relations between the communized sector and the small commodity producers be taken out with the monetary framework and based on equivalent hours of labour; on this there can be no compromise. To example, if a tractor taken 100 hours of labour to produce, and a ton of jute 10 hours, then 10 tons of the latter are exchanged, or more strictly bartered for a tractor. This form of exchange will need peasant cooperative on the level of distribution, but these are not political organs. Given differences in productivity of labour such an exchange is actually very favourable to the peasants, and the form of exchange is flexible in that it allows the proletariat to further favour those peasant sectors who wish to collectivize, by for example exchanging the hypothetical tractor for only 7 tons of jute. This in turn helps these groups to raise their agricultural output and productivity, and is a clear validation of the superiority of communist agriculture. On these bases the integration of the small producers, politically and economically, into the proletariat and humanity, can take place.

Revolutionary Perspectives

January, 1975

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1917 - Russian Revolution [13]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Proletarian revolution [14]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Workers Organisation [18]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Period of Transition [19]

International Review no 2 July 1975

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Answer to Workers’ Voice

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In issue no 13 of Workers Voice a Statement was printed ‘severing relations’, as they put it, with our International Communist Current (ICC). This may seem odd to our readers and to revolutionary militants who share our political orientation, both because Workers Voice (WV) has evolved quite closely in discussion with our tendency over the past two years and also because the idea of ‘severing (diplomatic) relations’ among revolutionary groups is indeed bizarre.

The WV Statement reaffirms the essential class positions which are the basis for both our Current and WV. However, because of disagreement on l) the regroupment of revolutionaries today and 2) the question of the state in the future period of transition after the proletarian revolution, WV announces that they are breaking all ties with us.

Before going into their assertions in any detail, it must be said from the outset that WV has to take the full responsibility for deciding to ‘sever’ all contact discussion and even minimal communication with our groups. Our Current does not abandon discussion with groups in evolution - particularly if their basic political orientation follows along the same class lines we consider so important to defend and disseminate in the class. Ceasing all communication and ending discussion must be motivated by profound political and class lines. We do not discuss organisationally with Stalinists, Trotskyists, Maoists etc, because tahere is no sense in ‘discussing’ with the counter-revolution. But although our Current and WV have important political differences, it has never been our will or desire to cease discussion. We consider this a desertion of the duty of revolu­tionaries to clarify positions through the confrontation of ideas whenever possible.

How does WV motivate this step? On the question of regroupment of revolutionaries, WV agrees that “the issues/class lines for an international regroupment already exist”. Furthermore these class lines for regroupment are fundamentally those at the basis of our Current and WV. The problem for WV is that 1) the time isn’t right and our Current is hurrying regroupment (“.... the conditions do not yet exist in which any real meaningful regroupment on an international scale can take place”) and 2) our Current supposedly feels “that regroupment takes place only by others joining them on their terms.”

WV are rather timid defenders of regroupment - all they can offer on the positive side is the rather pale statement that they “are not against it in, principle”. But why be for it? Why not have each small revolutionary group (or at the extreme, each individual) doing its ‘own’ work in its ‘own’ corner of the globe, each one master in his own house, protecting his group from the “imperialist aggressions” of other groups? Why not have relations among comrades consist of flamboyant insults and petulant exclusions, as the situationists unfortunately popularized so well? Why has our Current consistently encouraged comrades to realize the importance of the problem of consolidating and concentrating revolutionary forces on the basis of clear programmatic agreement?

In a world where the crisis of capitalism is continuing its path towards economic chaos and deprivation for the working class; where the bourgeoisie is facing repeated and profound political crises in so many countries, using their ‘left’ mask of mystification and repression more and more; where working class resistance has expressed itself in powerful, if sporadic form all over the world; where class struggle is facing important battles in the future - revolutionary forces are extremely limited. Counter-revolution and the confusion of fifty years of darkness are taking and will take their toll on the workers’ movement. But WV seemingly thinks it has plenty of time to think about all this while essentially continuing to be what it always was, a local group, concerned with collecting international ‘contacts’ (but not with us) as long as nothing more substantial is implied. How can we avoid drawing this conclusion?

As for having to join “our” current “on our terms”, the only valid political reason to refuse to join with others is that the class positions defended are not the same (including positions on the need for organization of revolutionaries and the means to carry it out). This is the only possible interpretation for “on our own terms”. Our only “terms” in fact are solid and profound political and theoretical agreement. WV is afraid of “artificial coming together that signifies nothing” and admonishes us not to think of our limited efforts towards international unity as a party. We can only thank them for advice on something we have been defending for years. We do not consider our international current as a party even though we hope to be making a necessary contribution to the future formation of the party which will emerge as a process in our general period of the growth of class struggle and confrontation. The party or parties of the proletariat of today will be formed only when class struggle has generalized and intensified on an extensive scale. But this must not be interpreted to mean that prior to this period revolutionaries should remain isolated, in their own corner, inactive or unorganized and that what we do today has no influence on the organization and activity of tomorrow.

Without encouraging international discussion and joining our forces, if political agreement is reached, all the revolutionary programmes on paper would be just words in the air. The real issue may be that WV and our Current have quite profound differences on the necessity and means of organization of revolutionary groups today. These differ­ences could only be clarified (if not overcome) by discussion. In any case, disagreements on the pace or timeliness of putting internationalism into organizational practice do not constitute a principal reason for an end to all contact between revolutionary groups. But escaping the issues is always easier than sticking it out.

As for the second point - the question of the period of transition - the WV Statement reads, “Revolution Internationale (RI) believes that in the period of transition a state would exist independently of the class”. Embroidering a bit on this theme, they then say that this assertion warrants a total break with us because we have become blatantly counter-revolutionary.

This point must be cleared up straight away. Neither RI nor any of the groups in our International Communist Current nor anyone in our groups has ever said or printed such a statement. Saying that the state would exist independently of the class (the workers’ councils) would be destroying the entire meaning of the proletarian dictatorship and is therefore a non-marxist and unacceptable orientation. Anyone reading the first issue of our Current’s International Review (April, 1975) where we print several articles on the period of transition, will be able to see that our theoretical analyses have never defended this position. Fear of ridicule obviously does not hinder WV and others from making unfounded accusations.

The question of the unfolding of the period of transition is under discussion in all our groups and as our Review shows, we have by no means reached unanimity on this point. We do not feel that all these questions can be settled immediately and for all time by us or anyone, else before the full experience of the class has come into play. That WV could take such a drastic step as breaking all contact with us and denouncing us as counter-revolutionary on the basis of their garbled heresay version of what the blind man read and told the deaf man, is a measure of the weakness and lack of seriousness of revolutionary elements today facing such a difficult and complex problem as the period of transition.

If we are to deal with the question of the state in the period of transition, we must separate the marxist conception from that of anarchism. Contrary to anarchism’s ignorance of the economic laws of capitalism, and the evolution of history, marxists have affirmed that between capitalist society and full communism a period of transition will exist during which the struggle of the proletariat continues, against the vestiges of the law of value, to insure the definitive suppression of the bourgeoisie and to integrate the remaining non-exploitative strata and classes into new relation of production to carry forward the process of social transformation through the political domination of the proletariat. This process will end with the realization of a classless society but during the period of transition (that is, until this point is reached,) society will still be divided into classes. Out of this still divided society a state will inevitably appear. Unlike the anarchist idea that the state is the embodiment of all evil in itself and that it can be done away with by willing it to disappear, marxists assert that the state is an expression of social relations and can only be eliminated through the conscious transformation of the material basis of these social relations and divisions - through the realization of the working class programme.

Once the inevitability of the state in the period of transition is recognized, the question then becomes: how to deal with the state of the transitional period in the context of the proletarian dictatorship? Within the marxist current, the Bolsheviks offered a ‘solution’ to this question - the complete identification of the proletariat with the state; the creation of a ‘workers’ state, and the identification of the class with the party, the creation of a party bureaucracy to whom the state is ‘entrusted’. The historical experience of the Russian Revolution must lead us to reject this ‘solution’ to the problem of the state after the revolution.

Drawing on the lessons of the historical experience of the proletariat we hold that first of all, the state cannot be turned over to a party; the role of the party is not to take power in the name of the class; to substitute itself for the whole class. Secondly, it is the existence of classes in the transition period which defines the necessity of a state and not any needs of the workers to create a state. If the world were to be composed only of the proletariat after the revolution, there would be no state; there would be the “administration of things” but not the “government of men”. The question is therefore: if the state arises out of the existence of a society still divided into classes, does the proletariat identify its historical class goals of social transformation with the state apparatus?

The proletariat must not let the state exist independently of itself -­in fact, the state must be dominated by the interests of the proletariat, as far as possible. But the state is not the instrument of social transformation - the communist programme can only be preserved and carried forward by the specific international organs of the proletariat alone. In other terms: must the workers recognize an authority of the state over their decisions if they consider that it is not in their class interests? If the answer is yes, because the state is a ‘workers’ state, then Trotsky was correct to militarize labour and forbid strikes against the ‘workers’ government because they would be reactionary and unacceptable. If the state is the full and complete instrument for the realization of the communist programme, why were the Bolsheviks wrong to want to control and dominate the state against the workers if necessary?

For many of our comrades it seems important to stress the fact that the working class must maintain its own class organizations - regardless of what state forms may or may not be necessary; it is important that the workers guard against being blurred by non-integrated strata and resist any efforts to have them recognize any superior state authority over their decisions. Unlike WV we do not say, the state is the class and the class is the state, but rather that this semi-state, the scourge inherited from class society must be used by the proletariat but never identified with it nor allowed to dominate it.

For many of our comrades, completely identifying the state with the class is paving the way to Kronstadt. This question seems to escape WV completely and they end up in a false debate. We do not hold that the state must be independent from the working class but rather that the workers, while exercising their domination through the state, must maintain their international organization. The working class is the only class in the post-revolutionary society to organize itself as a class: the proletarian dictatorship. Individuals from other social strata will be represented in the state individually through a form of territorial soviets. The state must not have ultimate authority over the class no matter what the contingent situation (even though the state has final authority over all other sectors of the population) nor should the state be mystified into a ‘workers’ state’.

We do not pretend to have solved all the problems nor found the answer to these difficult questions but we reject the idea of prematurely cutting off debate with the absurd accusation of being counter­revolutionary - the judgment of history handed down by WV.

What is the class to conclude from the spectacle of two groups who share class positions - our Current and WV – ‘severing relations’ on issues which at best do not warrant an end to all contact and discu­ssion and at worst are a hodge-podge of suppositions and false accusations?

The last thing the workers’ movement needs is confusionism and these kinds of tactics. We hope WV will reconsider their hasty and unfounded decision. The positions and work of WV have been a positive contribution to the movement but if WV is to be the carrier of confusion and unfounded hostility, it is better for the workers’ struggle that they disappear as quickly as possible. If WV can no longer bear to discuss the issues in a principled manner or open their minds, if their hostility continues to serve as a smokescreen to hide their localism and small group patriotism, it would be better for the group to disappear and make way for expressions of the working class who are capable of evolving.

J.A.

For the International Communist Current

* For a further treatment of this question, see ‘Sectarianism Unlimited’ in World Revolution No 3.


Life of the ICC: 

  • Correspondance with other groups [20]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Workers Organisation [18]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Period of Transition [19]

Lessons of the German Revolution

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Lessons of the German Revolution

1. The formation of the German Communist Party (Spartakusbund)

When the German Communist Party was founded between 30 December, 19181. and 1 January, 1919, the revolutionary opposition to Social Democracy seemed to have found an autonomous, organized expression. But the German Party (appearing at the very moment when the proletariat was engaging in armed struggle in the streets and, for a short time, actu­ally taking power in some industrial centres), was to immediately reveal both the heterogeneous character of its origins as well as its inability to attain a global and complete understanding of the tasks which it was formed to accomplish.

Which were the forces which came together to form the Party? And what were the problems which immediately presented a stumbling block in the way of these forces?

We will examine the most interesting of these factors here because they will enable us to understand the errors of the Party and because they were to weigh so heavily on future developments.

The trajectory of events after 4 August, 1914 encompassed many diffi­culties and confusions. The history of the Spartakus group is clear proof of this. Its role as a brake on theoretical clarification and dev­elopment is very obvious.

At the time of the Spartakus League (Spartakusbund) all important deci­sions were characteristic of the positions of Rosa Luxemburg. (The group took the name Spartakus League in 1916; throughout 1915 the group had been called Internationale after its review which first appeared in April 1915.)

At Zimmerwald (5-8 September, 1915), the Germans were represented by the Internationale group; by Borchardt from Berlin who represented the small group around the review Lichtsrahlen (Shafts of Light) and by the centrist wing close to Kautsky. Only Borchardt supported the internationalist positions of Lenin, while the other Germans supported a motion couched in the following terms:

"Under no circumstances should the impression be given that this con­ference wants to provoke a split and to found a new International."

At Kienthal (24-30 April, 1916), the German opposition was represented by the Internationale group (Bertha Thalheimer and Ernst Meyer), by the Opposition in the Organization (the centrists around Hoffman), and by the Bremer Linksradikalen (Bremen left radicals) through Paul Frolich.

The hesitations of the Spartakists (Internationale) were not immediately overcome; once again, they were nearer to the positions of the centrists than to those of the left (Lenin-Frolich). E. Meyer stated: "We want to create the ideological base........of the new International, but we don't want to commit ourselves on the organizational level because everything is still in a state of flux."

This was the classical position of Luxemburg for whom the party was more necessary at the end of the revolution than during its initial prepara­tory stages. ("In a word, historically, the moment when we will have to take the lead is not at the beginning but at the end of the revolution.")

The most important factor on the international level was the appearance of the Bremer Linksradikalen.1 As early as 1910 the Social Democratic newspaper of Bremen, the Bremer BurEerzeit, was publishing weekly articles by Pannekoek and Radek, and it was under the influence of the Dutch Left that the Bremen Group formed itself around Knief, Paul Fro­lich, and others. At the end of 1915, the ISD (International Socialists of Germany) was formed, born from the union of the Bremen communists with the Berlin revolutionaries who published the review Lichtsrahlen. The Bremerlinke became independent from Social Democracy, in formal termo, in December 1916, but already in June of the same year it had begun the publication of Arbeiterpolitik2 which was the most impor­tant legal organ of the Left. Apart from the articles of Pannekoek and Radek, there appeared in it contributions from Zinoviev, Bukharin, Kamenev, Trotsky and Lenin. Arbeiterpolitik immediately displayed a more mature consciousness of the break with reformism. In their first issue they wrote that August 4th was "the natural end of a political movement whose decline had been underway for some time".

From Arbeiterpolitik there arose the tendencies who were to take the lead in raising the question of the party. The discussion between the Bremen Group and the Spartakists was difficult, because of the persistence of the latter to remain within Social Democracy.

On 1 January, 1916 at the national conference of the Internationale group, Knief criticized the absence of a clear perspective calling for a total break with the Social Democratic party and the formation of a revolutionary party on a radically new foundation.

While the Spartakist group Internationale adhered to the Socialdemocra­tische Arbeiter-gemeinschaft (Social Democratic Work Collective) in the Reichstag and was producing declarations such as:

"A struggle for the party but not against the party ..... a struggle for democracy in the party, for the rights of the rank and file, for the comrades of the party against the leaders who have forgotten their duties ..... Our watchword is neither split nor unity, new nor old party, but the reconquest of the party at the base by the rebellion of the rank and file ...... The decisive struggle for the party has begun." (Spartakus-Briefe, 30 March, 1916)

At the same time, in Arbeiterpolitik one could read:

"We consider that a split, both on the national and international lev­el, is not only inevitable but an indispensable precondition for the real reconstitution of the International, for the reawakening of the proletarian movement. We consider that it is inadmissible and dangerous to hold back from expressing this profound conviction in front of the labouring masses." (Arbeiterpolitik, no.4)

And Lenin in On The Junius Pamphlet (July 1 91 6 ) wrote:

"The greatest weakness in German revolutionary marxism is the absence of a tightly knit illegal organization ..... such an organization would be forced to define clearly its attitude towards opportunisms such as that of Kautsky. Only the International Socialists of Germany (ISD) have expressed a clear, unambiguous position on this question."

The Spartakists also continued to adhere to the USPD (Independent Democra­tic Party of Germany founded 6-8 April, 1917; a centrist party not sub­stantially different except in size from the Social Democracy itself but linked to the growing radicalization of the masses) the party of Haase, Ledebour, Kautsky, Hilferding and Bernstein. This adherence made the relationship between the Bremen Communists and the Sparta­kists even more difficult. In March 1917 one could still read in Arbeiterpolitik:

"The left radicals are facing a momentous decision. The greatest responsibility lies with the Internationale group, which despite the criticisms we have made of it we recognize as the most active and largest group to be the kernel of the future radical left party. Without them, we must say frankly, we - ourselves and the ISD - would be unable to construct a party capable of acting in the foreseeable future. It depends on the Internationale Group whether the struggle of the left radicals will be led in an orderly fashion under one flag, or whether the oppositions within the workers' movement which have appeared in the past and whose competition is a factor of clarification will waste great deal of time and energy only to end up in canfusion." (Our emphasis)

In the face of the adhesion of the Spartakus group to the USPD, the same paper said:

"The Internationale group is dead ..... a group of comrades have formed thrmselves into an action committee for the construction of a new party."

Indeed, in August 1917, a meeting of delegates from Bremen, Berlin, Frankfurt and other German towns was held in Berlin with the object of establishing the basis for a new party. Otto Ruhle with the Dresden group took part in this meeting.

In the Spartakus group itself there were a number of elements whose positions were very close to those of the Linksradikalen and who did not accept the organizational compromise of the ‘Zentrale' around Rosa Luxemburg. At first this was manifested in the opposition of the Spartakus groups in Duisburg, Frankfurt and Dresden, to the partici­pation in the Arbeiter-gemeinschaft. (The organ of the Duisburg group, Kampf, engaged in an animated debate against this participation.) Subse­quently, other groups, for example the important Chemnitz group around Heckert, voiced their opposition to adhesion to the USPD. These groups in practice shared the position expressed by Radek in Arbeiterpolitik:

"The idea of building a party with the centrists is a dangerous utopia. The left radicals, whether the circumstances have prepared them for it or not, must, if they want to fulfill their historic task, build their own party."

Liebknecht himself, more closely linked to the ferment within the class, expressed his own position in a prison text (1917) in which, seeking to grasp the living pulse of the revolution, he distinguished three social strata within the German Social Democracy. The first was composed of stipendary officials, the social base of the politics of the majority of the Social Democratic Party. The second was composed of:

"The most well-to-do and educated workers. For them the imminence of a serious conflict with the ruling class is not clear. They want to react and to struggle. They are the base of the Socialdemocratische Arbeiter-gemeinschaft."

Finally, the third category was composed of:

"The proletarian masses, the uneducated workers. The proletariat in the strict sense of the word. Only this stratum, because of its real condition, has nothing to lose. We support these masses: the proletariat."

All this shows two things:

1. That an important fraction of the Spartakus group was oriented in the same direction as the left radicals, and was coming into conflict with the minority centre represented by Luxemburg, Jogisches and Paul Levi.

2. The federalist, non-centralized character of the Spartakus group.

The Russian Revolution

The disagreements which arose between the Spartakists and the USPD majo­rity concerning this revolution, led Arbeiterpolitik to take up the dis­cussion with the Spartakists once again.3 The Bremen Communists never separated solidarity with the Russian Revolution from the need to form a communist party in Germany. Why, asked the Bremen Communists, had the revolution triumphed in Russia?

"Uniquely and solely because in Russia there is an autonomous party of left radicals which from the beginning has raised the flag of socialism and fought under the banner of social revolution."

"If at Gotha one could out of good will still find reasons for the attitude of the Internationale group, today all semblance of justi­fication for association with the Independents has vanished."

"Today the international situation makes the foundation of a radical left party an even more urgent necessity."

"For our part we are firmly committed to dedicating all our strength to creating in Germany no conditions for a Linksradikalen Partei. We therefore invite our friends of the Internationale group, in view of the weakness of the Independents over the last nine months and in view of the corrosive repercussions of the Gotha compromise (which can only prejudice the future of the radical movement in Germany)4, to break unambiguously and openly with the pseudo-socialist Independents and to found an autonomous radical left party." (Arbeiter­politik, 15 December, 1917) (Our emphasis)

In spite of everything, another year was to pass before the foundation of the party in Germany, and that a year in which social tensions were steadily growing: from the Berlin strikes of 17 April to the navy mutiny of the summer and the strike wave of January 1918 (Berlin, Ruhr, Kiel, Bremen, Hamburg, Dresden) which lasted for the whole summer and autumn.

Let us know examine some other minor groups characteristics of the German situation. We mentioned above that the ISD also regrouped the Berlin group around the review Lichstrahlen. The most important representative of this group was Borchardt. The ideas which he developed in the review were violently anti-Social Democratic, but already, because of their semi-anarchist orientation, represented a break with the Bremen Commu­nists. As Arbeiterpolitik observed: "In place of the party, be (Borchardt) poses a propagandist sect of an anarchist nature." Later on, the left communists were to consider him as a renegade and baptised him ‘Julien the Apostate'.

In Berlin, Werner Moller (already a participant in Lichstrahlen became the keenest collaborator with Arbeiterpolitik and later its representative. (He was brutally murdered in cold blood by Noske's men in January 1919).

In Berlin, the left current was very strong, with, among others, the Spartakists Karl Shroder and Friedrich Wendel, (later of the KAPD).

The Hamburg group occupies a particular place in the revolutionary oppo­sition to Social Democracy. It only joined the ISD in November 1918 when, at Knief''s proposal, the latter changed its name to the IKD (Internationale Kommunisten Deutschland) on 23 December 1918. The leaders in Hamburg were Heinrich Laufenberg and Fritz Wolffheim. What distinguished them from the Bremen Communists was a sharper polemic of a syndicalist and anarchist tone directed against leaders. Arbeiterpolitik on the other hand maintained a correct position when it wrote on 28 July 1918:

"The cause of the Linksradikalen, the cause of the future communist party of Germany into which will flow sooner or later all those who have remained faithful to the old ideals, does not hinge on great names. On the contrary, what is and must be the truly new factor if we are ever to attain socialism is that the anonymous mass takes its destiny into its own hands; that each comrade taken individually makes his own contribution without concerning himself about the ‘great names' that are alongside him." (Our emphasis)

The overtly syndicalist character of the Hamburg group's political orien­tation was derived in part from the activity undertaken by Wolffheim when he had been involved with the International Workers of the World in America.

But undoubtedly, the best expression of class struggle in Germany at this time was to be found among the Bremen Communists. In saying this one exposes all the question begging and errors of the Spartakus group (including its best theoretician, Rosa Luxemburg) on the problems of organiza­tion, the conception of the revolutionary process, and the role of the party. However, to point out the mistakes of Rosa Luxemburg in no way signifies a rejection of her heroic struggle; it does allow for an under­standing that in conjunction with the far-reaching insights she developed in her theoretical fight against Bernstein and Kautsky, she also defended positions which we cannot accept.

We have no gods to worship; on the contrary we must face up to the neces­sity of understanding the errors of the past in order to be able to avoid them ourselves; to know how to draw the useful but incomplete lessons (in this case, on the function and organizational tasks of revolu­tionaries) from the historical proletarian movement.

In order to be able to carry out our own tasks, we must also be able to understand the indissoluble link which exists between the activity of small groups when the counter-revolution has the upper hand and the example of the work of Bilan and Internationalisme is an eloquent testimony to this) and the action of the political group when the insurmount­able contradictions of capitalism push the class towards the revolutio­nary struggle. It is no longer a question of simply defending the positions, but (on the basis of a constant elaboration of these positions, on the basis of the programme of the class) of being capable of cementing the spontaneity of the class, of being an expression of the consciousness of the class, of helping to unify its forces for the decisive offensive, in other words, of building the party, an essential moment in the victory of the proletariat.

But parties, no less than revolutions, do not spring, fully formed, from nowhere. Let us explain. Organizational artificialities do not just serve any old cause; rather, more often, they have served the counter­revolution. To proclaim a ‘party', to build up one's organization as a party in a period of counter-revolution is an absurdity, a very grave error which signifies an inability to understand the essence of the prob­lem when there is no immediate revolutionary perspective. But it is no less grave an error to put this task aside or to put it off until it is too late. In the context of this study, it is this second error which is most interesting.

Those who say that all problems will be solved spontaneously are, in the final analysis, eulogizing unconscious spontaneity and not the passage from spontaneity to consciousness; they fail to understand, or are unwil­ling to understand, that this attainment of consciousness by the class in its struggle must also lead it to recognize the necessity of an ade­quate instrument for carrying out the assault on the state, the fortress of capital.

If the spontaneity of the class is a moment which we advocate, spontaneism - that is, the theorization of spontaneity - actually kills spontaneity, expresses itself in a series of stale formulae: a feverish attempt to ‘be where the workers are', an inability to judge when to be ‘against the cur­rent' in moments of relapse and reflux in order to be ‘with the current' in decisive moments later on. The deviations of Luxemburg on organizational questions also manifested themselves in her conception of the con­quest of power - and we would add that this was inevitable given the inti­mate connection between these two questions:

"For us the conquest of power will not be effected at one blow. It will be a progressive act, for we shall progressively occupy all the positions of the capitalist state, defending tooth and nail each one that we seize." (From ‘The Speech to the Founding Convention of the German Communist Party', in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, Pathfinder Press)

But, unfortunately, this was not the end of it. While Paul Frolich (representing the Bremen group) was issuing the following appeal from Hamburg in November I918: "It is the beginning of the German revolution, of the world revolution: long live the greatest action of the world revo­lution! Long live the German workers republic! Long live world-wide Bolshevism!" Rosa Luxemburg, a little over a month later, instead of ask­ing why such a massive attack by the proletariat had come to be defeated, was saying: "On November 9th, the workers and soldiers destroyed the old regime in Germany .,... On November 9th, the proletariat arose and threw off its shameful yoke. The Hohenzollerns were chased away by the workers and soldiers organized in councils." So she interpreted the passing of power from the gang of William II to that of Ebert-Scheidemann-Haase as a revolution, and not as a changing of the old guard against the revolu­tion.5

This inability to understand the historic role of Social Democracy was to cost Luxemburg her life, as it also did Liebknecht and thousands of prole­tarians. The KAPD (Communists Workers Party of Germany ), as did the Italian Left, saw clearly how to draw the lessons of this experience. (One of the KAPD's most fundamental points of opposition to the C.I. (Communisst International) and the KPD (German Communist Party) was its refusal to have any contact with the USPD. We will return to this later.) Bor­diga wrote on 6 February 1921 in Il Communista an article entitled ‘The Historic Function of Social Democracy' from which we will quote a few passages:

"Social Democracy has an historic function in the sense that there will probably be a period in the western countries in which the Social Democratic parties will be in the government, either on their own or in collaboration with the bourgeois parties. But, while the proletariat may not have the capacity to prevent this, such an intermediary stage does not represent a positive and neces­sary condition for the development of revolutionary forms and insti­tutions; instead of being a useful preparation for the latter, it will constitute a desperate attempt of the bourgeoisie to diminish and divert the offensive of the proletariat, in order to be able to ruthlessly massacre the workers under the banners of the white re­action later on, if the workers still have enough strength to dare to revolt against the legitimate, humanitarian, decent government of Social Demooracy."

"For us there can be no other revolutionary transfer of power than that from the ruling bourgeoisie to the proletariat, just as there can be no other form of proletarian power except the dictatorship of the Workers' Councils."

II. The faltering steps of the German Communist Party (Spartakusbund)

We began this study at the Founding Congress of the German Communist Party (30 December 1918/1 January) and then made a detour to examine its ori­gins. We will now continue from the initial point of departure.

At the Founding Congress two diametrically opposed positions became crys­tallized. On the one hand there were the minority around Luxemburg, Jogisches and Prefi Levi, which regrouped the most important personalities of the new party, and who, despite being in the minority, assumed the leadership of it, (The minority's scoffing attitude and its semi-refusal to allow expression to the preponderant positions of the Left - only Fro­lich was admitted to the Zentrale - were to lead, a few months later, to the farce of the Heidelberg Congress). On the other hand, were the great majority of the party: the passion and revolutionary potential which was expressed by the IKD and a good part of the Spartakists. The positions of the Left, with Liebknecht at their head, triumphed with an overwhelming majority: against participation in elections, for leaving the unions, for the insurrection,

But the majority, faced with the immediate tasks of preparing for an insurrectional offensive lacked a clear perspective and the military pro­blem also called for the centralized and leading role of the Party. A sort of federalism and regionalist independence dominated the scene. In Berlin, hardly anyone knew what was happening in the Ruhr, or in the centre or south of the country ann. vice versa. Rote Fahne, itself, recognized on 8 January 1919, that: "the non-existence of a centre charged with orga­nizing the working class cannot last ...... It is vital that the revolutionary workers set up directing organisms capable of guiding and utili­zing the combative energy of the masses." And note that this report speaks only about the situation in Berlin.

This disorganization was to increase and reached the level of paroxysm after the death of Luxemburg and Liebknecht. The Party, at the moment when it was forced into clandestinity and subjected to counter-revolutio­nary terror, found itself beheaded. The Soviet Republics which arose al­most everywhere in Germany: Bremen, Munich, Bavaria etc were defeated one by one, the proletarian fighters annihilated. The proletarian wave, the immense potentiality within the class, suffered a reflux. We can hardly refrain from citing the whole of the letter Lenin wrote in April 1919 to the Bavarian Soviet Republic. Needless to say the vast majority of the ‘concrete measures' recommended by Lenin were never taken.

Greetings to the Bavarian Soviet Republic

"We thank you for your message of greeting and in turn we heartily salute the Soviet Republic of Bavaria. We would immediately like you to inform us more often and more concretely about the measures you have taken in your struggle against the bourgeois executioners, Scheidemann and Co; if you have created soviets of workers and house­hold servants in the districts of the town; if you have armed the workers and disarmed the bourgeoisie; if you have made use of the warehouses of clothes and ether articles as widely and as immediately as possible, to help the workers and above all the day-labourers and small peasants; if you have expropriated the factories and goods of the Munich capitalists as well as the capitalist agricultural enter­prises in the surrounding area; if you have abolished the mortgages and rent of small peasants; if you have tripled the wages of day-labourers and workmen; if you have confiscated all the paper and printworks in order to publish leaflets and newspapers for the masses; if you have instituted the six-hour day with two or three hours dedicated to the study of the art of state administration; if you have crowded the bourgeoisie together in order to immediately install workers in the rich apartments; if you have taken over all the banks; if you have chosen hostages from among the bourgeoisie; if you have established a food ration which gives more to workers than to members of the bourgeoisie; if you have mobilized all the workers at once for defence and for ideological propaganda in the surrounding villages. The most rapid and widespread application of these measures as well as other similar measures, carried out on the initiative of the soviets of workers and day-labourers and, sepa­rately, of small peasants, must reinforce your position. It is vital to hit the bourgeoisie with an extortionary tax and to amelio­rate practically, immediately, and at all costs the situation of the workers, day-labourers and small peasants. Best wishes and hopes for your success," Lenin.

This lack of theoretical preparedness, this inability to rise to the situation, was to provoke a split in the German movement at the first sign of a reflux. On the other hand, there were those who began to look more towards Bolshevism, towards victorious Russia, in order to take up its propaganda, its strategic and tactical methods in an absurd attempt to apply them to Germany. The case of Radek is a typical example of this: formerly the spokesman for the Bremen Communists, the most intransigent wing of the movement, he was to become after the reflux of the struggle in the summer of 1919, one of the architects, along with Paul Levi of the Heidelberg Congress (October, 1919) where the gains of the Founding Congress of the Party were repudiated and replaced with the ‘tactical' use of elections, of work in the ultra-reformist unions and, in the end, of ‘open letters' and the united front.

Thus, the call for centralization made by this tendency is of doubtful value since they were taking an opposite course to that of the develop­ment of the spontaneous movement. On the other hand, the revolutionary wing which refused to make this artificial choice and whose methods and prognostications were far more fruitful were, once they constituted them­selves into an organized tendency, to confront a solid wall of growing difficulties.

Did the World Revolution Fail because of the Inadequacies of the Russian Revolution Or did the Russian Revolution Fail because of the Inadequacies of the World Revolution?

The answer to this problem is not a simple task and requires an under­standing of the social dynamic of these years. The Russian Revolution was a magnificent example for the western proletariat. The Third International founded in March 19196 is an example of the revolutionary will of the Bolsheviks and represented a real effort on their part to gain the support of the European communists. But the internal diffi­culties of the Russian Revolution, which skyrocketed at the end of the civil war, and which could have no solution within the Russian frame­work; the defeat of the first phase of the German revolution (January-March, 1919) and of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, convinced the Russian communists that the revolution in Europe was a long term perspective. According to them, it was now primarily a question of regaining the majority of workers for the coming period, of convincing the Social Democratic masses of the correctness of communist positions, etc. There was a tendency to recuperate the USPD, to regard them as the right wing of the workers' movement and not as a faction of the bourgeoisie - and a steady abandonment of the struggle against Social Democracy, of the attempt to relate to the most advanced layers of the class by insis­ting on the necessity of attacking and exposing Social Democracy on the basis of the combativity of these workers.

We could thus say that if the hesitations of the western communists were deadly throughout the first phase (1918-19), it was the Communist Inter­national itself which was to become an obstacle to the flowering - how­ever late - of an authentic proletarian vanguard in Europe when the sit­uation there was still revolutionary (and we are only speaking of the years 1920-21, after which one could speak for two more years of a prole­tarian reaction against the assaults of the bourgeoisie (cf Hamburg ‘23) and only then of the final defeat and massacre of the working class). If the passage from one situation to another took place gradually, we can still point to decisive moments of the decline: to the dissolution of the Amsterdam bureau by the Communist International and Lenin's text, Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder.

Let us return to the vicissitudes of the German Communist Party. On 17 August, 1919, a National Conference was held at Frankfurt. Levi's attack on the Left was a failure; but in October of the same year, it had more success. In a clandestine Congress which had only a sparse repre­sentation from the district sections, and against the wishes of many, a split was decided in practice by the change of the programmatic positions arrived at in January. Point 5 of the new programme of the Party read:

"The revolution, which wall not happen all at once but will be a long and persevering struggle of a class oppressed for centuries and thus not fully conscious of its mission and its strength, is subject to flux and reflux." (our emphasis)

And Levi, shortly afterwards, supported the view that the new revolutio­nary wave would come in .......1926! But the decision to expel the ‘leftists', the ‘adventurists', was not taken officially and was not re­solved until the Third Congress of the KPD in 1920. After Heidelberg, the Left attempted to form itself into a KPD(O) (the ‘O' stood for Oppo­sition), effectively ensuring that after the first few months of 1920 there were almost two KPD organizations: the KPD(S) (KPD-Spartakusbund) and the KPD(O). All this took place in a completely chaotic situation. The news which managed to get through to Moscow was infrequent and fragmentary. In Greetings to the Italian, French and German Communists dated 10 October, 1919, Lenin wrote:

"Of the German Communists we know fully that there is a communist press in many towns. It is inevitable that, in a movement which is' rapidly extending itself, which is subjected to vigorous perse­cution, dissension will arise. That is a growing pain. The diver­gences within the German Communists, as far as I can judge, can be reduced to the problem of ‘using legal channels', of using bour­geois parliaments, reactionary unions, the legal councils which have been perverted by the Scheidemannites and Kautskyists - to the prob­lem of participating in these institutions or boycotting them."

Lenin came down on the side of participation and gave his seal of appro­val to Levi's policies.

But the central problem, which was to manifest itself a few months later, was either to adopt illegal revolutionary struggle and military prepara­tion or legal activity in the unions and parliament. This was the basis of the confrontation between the two ‘lines' of the KPD. The centre of the Opposition was based for a while in Hamburg. But Laufenberg and Wolffheim quickly began to be discredited. It was they who began to ela­borate the theory of National Bolshevism, according to which the defence of Germany against the Entente was a revolutionary duty, even at the price of an alliance with the German bourgeoisie.7 From then on Bremen, which was already functioning as an ‘information centre', was to become the point of reference for Left Communism. The Bremen ‘informa­tion centre' struggled on two fronts up to the beginning of 1920: against the Party Zentrale and against Hamburg. Bremen did not try to split but tried to hold the results of the Heidelberg Congress up for discussion; but the Zentrale backed by Levi was opposed to all discus­sion and was aided in this by the struggle against the ‘National Bolshevism' of Hamburg. The attempted Kapp Putsch, by giving these divergences a ‘practical' content, put an end to all discussion.

Let us examine the proletarian response to this attempted putsch and the behaviour of the various organizations.

In the Ruhr the Reichswehr did not immediately clarify its posi­tion towards Kapp and given that all, from the ADGB (the German union, Allgemeiner Deutscher Gewerschafs Bund)8 and Social Demo­crats to the centrists and the KPD(S) called for a general strike, (although the KPD centre was somewhat hesitant in the first days), the situation would have had revolutionary possibilities, if the leadership of the unions and the parliamentary parties could have been broken; indeed, a number of zones like the Ruhr and central Germany had not undergone the massive proletarian defeats of the pre­ceding years, as had Berlin, Munich, Bremen, Hamburg etc.

In the Ruhr there was considerable tension between the Reichswehr and the workers, and such was the situation provoked by the Kapp Putsch, that it immediately led to the arming of the workers on strike. (The fact that many combative workers had managed to escape the domi­nation of the ADGB by joining the FAUD(S)9 was also important.) Because of the democratic, constitutionalist character of the general strike, the Independents and the innumerable Social Democrats were able only, in the first few days, to attempt to moderate the aggressiveness of the workers, although without success in the first high points of the struggle. The situation developed as follows: locally, in each town, independently of the unions, there were formed proletarian units who, took up arms against the soldiers of the Reichswehr. The insurgent towns united their forces and marched against the towns still in the hands of the army, in order to give support to the local workers.

While one part of the ‘Red Amy' of the Ruhr, (as it was called), pushed the Reichswehr out of the Ruhr by forming a front parallel to Lippe, other workers' units took over, one by one, the towns of Remscheid, Essen, Dusseldorf, Mulheim, Duisburg, Hamborn and Dinkslaken, and pushed the Reichswehr back along the Rhine as far as Wesell in a short period between 18 and 21 March.

On the 20 March, the ADGB, after the failure of the putsch, declared the general strike to be over and on 22 March the SDP and the USPD did the same.

On 24 March, representatives of the Social Democratic government, the SDP, the USPD, and part of the KPD came to an agreement at Biele­feld; proclaimed a cease-fire, the disarming of the workers and free­dom for workers who had committed ‘illegal' acts. A large part of the ‘Red Army' did not accept the agreement and carried on with the struggle.

On 30 March, the Social Democratic government and the Reichswehr issued an ultimatum to the workers: to either accept the agree­ment immediately, or else the Reichswehr (whose strength had at least quadrupled thanks to the arrival of the Freikorps from Bavaria, Berlin, Northern Germany and the Baltic) would begin a new offensive. Co-ordination between the various workers' units was from now on at a minimum because of the treachery of the Independents, the centrism of the KPD(S) and the syndicalists, and the rivalry between the three military centres of the ‘Red Army'. The Reichswehr and the numerous White troops opened a huge offen­sive on all fronts: on 4 April, Duisburg and Mulheim fell, followed by Dortmund on the 5th and Gelsenkirchen on the 6th.

A brutal White Terror then began; it took its victims not only from among the armed workers, but also from among their families who were massacred, and among the young workers who had helped the wounded fighters get away from the front.

The ‘Red Army' of the Ruhr was composed of between 80,000 and 120,000 workers; it managed to organize artillery and a small air-force. The development of the struggles had caused the formation of its three military centres:

Hagen: led by the USPD accepted the Bielefeld agreement without hesita­tion.

Essen: led by the KPD and the Left Independents was recognized as the Supreme Centre of the army of March 25th. When the Social Democratic government issued its ultimatum to the workers on 30 March, this centre took up the very ambiguous call for a return to the general strike (when the workers were already armed and fighting!).

Mulheim: led by the Left Communists and the revolutionary syndicalists followed completely the military ‘Centre' at Essen, but when the latter reacted in a centrist fashion to the Bielefeld agreement, the Mulheim Centre took up the slogan "struggle on till the end". The three leaderships of the USPD, KPD(S) and the FAUD(S) all took up the same ignoble position, and let it be known that they considered these strug­gles to be ‘adventurist'.

No national Zentrale took over the leadership of the struggles: the local proletarian movement displayed all its will towards centraliza­tion within the limits of its strength at the local level. Even in Central Germany the workers armed themselves and, under the leader­ship of the communist, M. Hoelz, a number of towns around Halle staged uprisings, but the movement was unable to go further, because the KPD(S), very strong at Chemnitz where it was the largest party, contented itself with arming the workers in agreement with the Social Democrats and the Independents, and with waiting for......... the return of Ebert to the Government.

Brandler, who led the workers' council of Chemnitz, saw his role as a local communist leader as consisting of preventing the outbreak of struggles between the Communists under Hoelz, who wanted to arm them­selves with the numerous weapons abandoned by the Reichswehr in Chemnitz and in the surrounding area, and the Social Democrats who were always at the ready for an attack against the revolutionaries - making several attempts to launch the Heimwehr (armed White groups of the local bourgeoisie) against them.

The centrism of the KPD(S) was fully revealed by the fact that, while the workers were in struggle, the Levi Zentrale issued on 26 March the slogan of ‘loyal opposition' in case of a ‘workers' government' composed of the Social Democrats and the Independents. Die Rote Fahne, the central organ of the KPD(S) (number 32, 1920) wrote:

"We understand loyal opposition in the following way: no preparation for the armed seizure of power, full freedom for the Party's agitation for its goal and its solutions."

The KPD thus officially abdicated its revolutionary goals, making the need for a revolutionary communist party in the German proletariat more urgent than ever.

It was thus as a natural historic result that the Left Communists, faced with the treason of the official section of the IIIrd Interna­tional, formed in the following month (April 1920) the KAPD, the Communist workers Party of Germany.

This long extract from The German Left and the Union Question in the Third International (a work through which an important part of the Bordiguist PCI (Parti Communiste Internationale) split in 1972) needs no comment.

In the course of these months, another important event occurred: the abandonment of the KPD(O) by the Bremerlinke and its return to the KPD(S) where it was to play an internal opposition role under Frolich and Karl Becker (we will see later the development of his position in the course of the following years and in particular in the Spring of 1921). We do not possess all the material to understand and to pass judgment on what was a very serious blow to Left Communism and a great success for the Levi leadership. What undoubtedly influenced the decision of the Bremen group was its feeling of loyalty to the CI (which gave its support to the KPD(S) while expressing strong reservations) and its clear opposition to the Hamburg group of Laufenberg and Wolffheim.

Up to now we have not spoken about the trade unions, councils, and ‘Workers' Associations' (Arbeiterunionen) which were central points of debate and of the divergences within the German movement. The comple­xity of the question forced us to deal with other problems before being able to approach the ‘union question' in the clearest possible way.This is what we shall attempt to do in our next text.

S.

 

1 Historians and historigraphy have used the term ‘linksradikalen' to describe groups like the Bremen and Hamburg groups, then subsequently the KAPD and the Unions (Workers' Associations). The term ‘ultralinke' was on the other hand used to describe the left opposition (Friesland-­Fischer-Maslow) within the KPD in the years that followed.

2 There was even a subscription for this publication among the naval shipyard workers in Bremen.

3 All sorts of divergences existed on the interpretation of the Russian events between the Bremen Communists and the Spartakists. We will mention only the question of the use of ‘revolutionary terror'. For the Bremen group, Knief criticized Luxemburg's position of refusing to utilize class terror in the revolutionary struggle.

 

4 The Spartakists joined the USPD at Gotha.

 

5 At the Fourth Congress of the Communist International (November 1920), Radek took up this position again, saying that it was necessary to thank Social Democracy for having "done us the favour of overthrowing the Kaiser".

 

6 It should be remembered that at the First Congress of the Communist International the representative of the KPD was mandated to vote against the foundation of the International. It was only the insistence of and pressure exerted by delegates which led Eberlein to abstain instead.

 

7 The position of ‘National-Bolshevism' was taken up again without raising any scandal by the KPD in 1923. Brandler and Thalheimer made declarations such as:

"In so far as it is engaging in a defensive struggle against imperia­lism, the German bourgeoisie plays, in the situation which is created by this, an objectively revolutionary role - but as a reactionary class, it cannot have recourse to the only methods which would allow it to resolve the problem.

In these circumstances, the precondition for the victory of the prole­tariat is the struggle against the French bourgeoisie and its capa­city to support the German bourgeoisie in this struggle, by taking over the organization and leadership of the defensive struggle sabo­taged by the bourgeoisie."

And in Imprekor, June 1923, the reader would find the following statement:

"National-Bolshevism in 1920 could only have been an alliance to save the generals who immediately after their victory would have crushed the Communist Party. Today, it signifies the fact that everyone is convinced that the only solution lies with the communists. Today we are the only possible solution. The rigorous insistence on the natio­nal element in Germany is a revolutionary act just as it is in the colonies." (our emphasis)

8 Prior to 19 June it was called Freien Gewerkshaften.

9 Freie Arbeiter Union Deutschlands Syndicalist - an anarcho­-syndicalist union organization founded on December 1919.

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1919 - German Revolution [21]

Revolution and counter-revolution in Italy (1919-1922)

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There is a whole theory which, beginning from a national framework, attempts to study modern Italy with reference to the imbalance, the uneven development between the industrial north and the Mezzogiorno, an area characterized by agricultural production based on a system of great landed estates and tenure, a region which at the beginning of the century produced an income less than a half of that of the northern provinces. This is the thesis of that notable pupil of B. Croce; that pro-interventionist of 1914; that revisionist who decreed that October had invalidated the analysis of Marx; in other words, A. Gramsci, now the darling of the ‘New Left'. Their hagiography tries to present him as the most powerful and original marxist thinker outside Russia.1

On this question, marxism is quite clear: if the southern land system, trapped in a semi-feudal straight jacket, constituted one of the main sources for emigration, while the reservoir of wealth in the alluvial plain of the Po was the object of particular care and attention on the part of capitalism this is fundamentally a result of conditions on the world market, and of the international division of labour which derives from it. To illustrate this we can say that the depopulation which resulted from emigration from the southern provinces corresponded to the world crisis and the agricultural depression at the end of the last century. The adoption of protectionism was one of the first acts of Italian capitalism, favouring the landowners of the plain of the Po and supplying the absentee proprietors with an assured income. The discovery of large numbers of sulphur beds in Louisiana led to the ruin of Sicily, which had for a long while been the sole producer of sulphur extracted from its sub-soil.2

Italian capitalism emerged at a time when the division of the world had already been practically completed. All that fell to this latecomer, deprived of a capitalist birthright, were the scraps which the major powers didn't want to be encumbered with - not because they were philanthropically inclined, but because they had to take into consideration a colonial budget which inevitably weighed heavily on the metropolitan centres of capital. But still Italy continued tirelessly to demand new sphere's of expansion in order to elevate herself/ to their level. In a conjunctural situation unfavourable to Italian imperialism were nurtured the seeds of nationalism which defined Italy as "the proletarian among nations". In this, Mao found his predecessors in the persons of Crispi, Corradini or Mussolini, another helmsman, who using the language of Dante, called himself ‘Duce'.

At a time of growing imperialist rivalry, Italy got down to building a war economy with the hope of using it for policies of territorial conquest. In this way Italy prepared for the conquest of a part of those zones rich in the main sources of raw materials so cruelly absent in the metropolitan economy itself. This also meant that the Italian workers, unlike their English, Belgian, French or Dutch class brothers, did not partici­pate in any way in the sharing out of imperialist booty.

The development of certain industries, in particular metallurgical, chemical, aeronautical, and naval construction industries, progressed successfully enough to impress even, the most blase experts of the older imperialist bastions. The Italian war effort, which also led to an extension of the railway from 8,200 kilometres in 1881 to 17,038 in 1905, won the unanimous acclaim of all the engineers, financiers, scribes and politicians who visited the peninsula at that time.

Owing much of its development to the influx of French capital invested in massive quantities in the Italian economy after 1902, and to aid supplied by Swiss and German banks, Italy built powerful hydro-electric centres in the north of the country. This enabled the state to make up for the insignificant extraction of coal in the Aosta Valley and to electrify the railway lines, which in turn allowed for the transporta­tion of cannon-fodder to the arena of military operations later on ... but in doing so, the state had to reckon with some formidable uprisings of soldiers and railwaymen's strikes, which were declared illegal. During the course of this brief period of economic recovery, the seat of political power passed out of the possession of the Sardinian and Genoan ship-owners and merchants - Commerce between Italy and the Ottoman Empire grew by 150% between 1896 and 1906 - into the hands of the industrialists of Lombardy and Piedmont.

The difficulty of finding unoccupied extra-capitalist territories thus led to the development of a vast war economy. In the first years of the century, military expenses continued to devour over a quarter of the budget. From May 1915 to October 1917, the monthly production of machine-guns rose from. 25 to 800, that of cannons from 80 to 500, that of shells from 10,000 to 85,000 per day. Although in May 1915, Italy had almost no trench-mortars, she was in possession of 2,400 on the eve of Caporetto. At the end of December 1914, Italy was able to line up one and half million men.

However, while Parliament was voting for orders of material from heavy industry and for defence credits, in the majority of industrial centres the mass of workers, either in blue-collars or in uniform, were taking to the streets to demand bread and work. Not one town escaped from being paralysed by the general strike; not one industrial centre escaped invasion by the mounting revolutionary wave. In Naples, the year 1914 began with a riot against rent increases; in March the cigar makers of state tobacco factories began a long strike which lasted two months. As brave as ever, the proletariat of Italy reacted with class violence to the murder of its fighters. On 7June, during the ‘Red Week', it seized control of Ancona where it immediately abolished taxation; it did not protest platonically against the disciplinary squads in the army by signing some kind of ‘Appeal of One Hundred', but by taking power for itself. In Bologna, in Ravenna, the ‘Red Republic' was proclaimed; the general strike spread to the whole peninsula,, irremediably dividing Italy into two camps. Salandra, called to power to mop up the colonial war in Libya, had to use 100,000 troops to restore order.

Let us pay.homage to the anarchist militants who gave their lives in this struggle, thus "rightly mocking the bourgeois pedants who calcu­lated the cost of this civil war in dead, wounded and money". (Marx)

The struggle against the war

Monarchical and democratic Italy had entered the war to reconquer the African countries lost after the total military disaster of Adowa against the Abyssinian armies in March 1896. She tried to establish her rights over Libya, rights which had been encroached upon by a series of Franco-English treaties, and also to gain sole posses­sions in the Red Sea area. The outbreak of World War I - fought to divide the world between the imperialist powers, - and not as a struggle for ‘liberty' as the social democratic lie would have it -appeared to the Italian ruling class as a means to annex for itself the irredentist regions under Austrian control: Trentino, the outlet of Trieste, Istia and Dalmatia - and, under French administration, Corsica and Tunisia. More than a million Italian-speaking residents were to re-discover the hospitality of the mother country.

The workers and peasants of Italy were only spared for one year the desolation and suffering of this conflagration, which Italy had to enter in order to avoid being forever relegated to second rank, a fate she had been trying to escape since her formation as a nation. The late entry of Italy into the world war expressed not only the difficulties the bourgeoisie found in getting the workers and peasants to swallow the interventionist bait, but also its own hesitation in choosing between the offers made by Austro-Germany and those made by the Allies, That is why Rome's diplomacy con­sisted of playing a double game of parallel underhand deals. To the Austrians, Italy laid claim not only to Trentino but also to the right to extend her frontiers to the western shores of the Isonzo, the power to take over Trieste and Carso, the Curzola islands at the centre of the Dalmatian coast, and finally, the establishment of Italian preponderance over Albania. The Entente was to be more generous: on entering the war on their side after a delay of one month, Italy was to receive the Upper Adige, Trentino, the Julian Alps, Trieste and Albania, plus assurances about the Turkish zone of Adalia, (Antalya) and the confirmation of her ccupation of the Dodecanese. England also consented to give Italy a loan of 50 million pounds (1.25 billion lira).

Thus Italy sold herself to the highest bidder - it was irrelevant whether this happened to be the Entente or Germany to which Italy had maintained links since 1882. As the game got serious, the Germans sent the Reichstag Social Democratic Deputy, Sudekum, - according to Lenin a social chauvinist entirely devoid of scruples - to persuade Italy to respect her political and economic commitments to the signatories of the Triple Alliance. For its part the French government gave the Socialist Deputy, Cochin, the job of buying through the good offices of Mussolini, Italy's military cooperation. .But Austria found Italy's demands excessive and hence unacceptable, which only illustrates that the Central Empires saw Italy as being only ‘relatively valuable'. Austria refused to cede any of the Habsburg territories, refused to allow Italy to occupy them, or to extend them beyond the southern part of Trentino. Thus, on 26 April 1915, Sonnino, signed the Pact of London, and 4 May, Italy denounced the Triple Alliance.

The trip made by Cachin and Jouhaux to ensure Italy's entrance into the fray was to prove profitable to French imperialism. French money was added to the subsidies which the pro-interventionist industrialists of FIAT, ANSALDO, and EDISON doled out to the newspaper, Popolo d'Italia. In the columns of this publication, Mussolini exalted "the war of liberation", which "must above all efface the ignoble myth that Italians do not fight; it must wipe out the shame of Lissa and Custozza, it must show the world that Italy is capable able of waging a war, a great war. We say it again, a great war." (Popolo d' Italia, 14 January 1915)3

Those who, in the interests of the bourgeoisie, wrote about the scenes of enthusiasm, ‘the glorious May days' among the Italian masses, were lying. At the same time such scribblers obscured the role of Social Democracy in a war fought for the economic and political domination of spheres of• investment for finance capital. In reality, there was no working class marching willingly to the slaughter with flowers in their rifles and the national anthem on their lips. Neither the proletarians nor the peasants, to whom the war had been sold as their own private affair, believed in the patriotic harangues directed at them by the offices of the state, or in the promises of a better future once the enemy had been vanquished.

At first contact with the rather less glorious realities of the war, defeatist sentiments revived, and young socialists and anarchists became devoted, body and soul, to the transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war. The only difference between the two was that the former knew that such a transformation was conditioned by the fact that capitalism had arrived at the final phase of its contradictions as a system of production, while the latter thought that they could accomplish this task by the strength of their will alone. But both of them carried out the elementary duties of socialism during the war - propaganda for the class struggle.

The years of hostilities were characterized by a ground-swell made up of strikes against the disastrous consequences of the war economy, of demonstrations of soldiers in garrison towns, and of uprisings of agricultural workers. Throughout the duration of the imperialist conflict, there was a ceaseless outbreak of serious social disturbances. The workers demanded an immediate peace and general demobilization so that they could go home. The army hesitated, and the soldiers deserted their posts in thousands. Towards the end of October 1917 the dawn of the civil war rose over the carnage of the Isonzo; the front disinte­grated in a battle zone of prime importance, The conclusive display of lack of ardour for the war on the part of the Italian soldiers was the collapse of the front at Caporetto. In successive waves, 350,000 men threw down their arms and backpacks, abandoning the battlefield in the face of the Austro-German advance, whose front line was making use of poison gas. The Italian reservists sent to stop the offensive and arrest deserters refused, in turn, to hold the line.

This defeat for the reactionary Italian bourgeoisie opened up wide perspectives for the eventual progress of the revolution. The Caporetto debacle shook the whole Italian governmental machine: the road to revolution had definitely been cleared. From the murdered breasts of hundreds of thousands of soldiers from the charnel-houses of Galicia, through rivers of blood to the trenches of the Isonzo, the cry of revolutionary defeatism was at last triumphant. Thousands of miles away, revolutionary workers, soldiers and sailors were seizing control of the Winter palace in Petrograd.

The break-down of the Italian army, the total disorder undergone by the organs of the state, opened up a profound political crisis, from which there could be no recovery. Italian dependence on the Entente grew more acute as Generalissimo Foch and the Supreme English General, Robertson, imposed profound changes on the Italian High Command.

After the disintegration of the Second Army, which left the enemy one day's march from Venice, the bourgeoisie combined exaltation of patriotic zeal win the King's solemn appeals to all men of law and order. At all costs the bourgeoisie had to form a united front against ‘Bolshevik subversion', because they understood that if the war machine stopped, "the mass of workers in the arms factories would be unemployed: hunger and cold would make them unite with the masses deserting from the army. There would be a revolt, then the revolution."4 For the central trade union, the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, Rigola declared, "When the enemy is trampling on our soil, we have but one duty - to resist!" They were indeed the allies of the whole bourgeois bloc and the bookkeepers of imperialism.

Up and down the peninsula, government propagandists poured out revenge­ful discourses in an attempt to stir up vindictiveness against the ‘Caporettist Poison', to revive the morale of the population, and to stimulate the sectional consciousness of the working class. The patriotic slogan, "Resist, Resist, Resist" cost the state more than 6 billion lira to disseminate. How to swell the morale of an army which was demonstrating its refusal to be butchered? Simple: reorganize the army with a pinch of democratization, regular leave and higher pay. Nitti, the Finance Minister at that time, set up the National Society of Servicemen with the aim of facilitating the acquisition of land by the peasants after their demobilization.

The internationalist militants convicted of high treason were subjected to ferocious reprisals, dragged in front of court-martials.-and sent to the front line. They had not just hoped for the defeat of their government, but had also prepared themselves for the new tasks of the hour: the reconstruction of an International. At that time the anarchists with Malatesta at their head knew that war was permanently gestating in the capitalist social organism; that it was the consequence of a regime based on the exploitation of labour power, that all wars from that point on would only be imperialist wars. And so both socialists and libertarians had to taste the chastisements of democracy. While they were being hunted down and martyred, several deputies of the Socialist Party had already begun to participate in the work of certain parliamentary commissions, making great strides towards their complete fusion with the kingdom, which they hoped to see climb to the highest rungs of the imperialist ladder.

Gorter quite rightly expressed the idea that the bourgeoisie, thanks to its own decomposition, was able to identify similar putrefaction, and could immediately grasp the profound corruption of Social Democracy. From the beginning of hostilities, the Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party), had, above all else, tried to avoid anything which might turn Italy away from neutrality. If necessary, they were prepared to use the general strike to ensure it! The Italian socialists' love of neutrality led them to meet the Swiss socialist delegation at Lugano in October 1914. That particular mountain gave birth to a mouse: a message of peace and concord was launched to the world; attempts were made to renew contacts with the neutralist minor­ities of the Socialist Parties; a fraternal caution (sic) was addressed to the comrades in the countries at war, to encourage the struggle for an armistice; it was decided to apply pressure to the belligerent governments to make them act peaceably. The whole of Italian maximalism, which held in its hands the destiny of the PSI was there. The neutralist position adopted by the PSI (which could not have been more ambiguous) it should be remembered, was shared by the industrial and commercial milieu led by Giolitti and the Vatican, as protector of the Austrian Catholic Empire.

The tactic of the PSI consisted solely in holding back the class struggle throughout the duration of the war under the cover of the hypocritical slogan, "Neither sabotage nor participation!", which in fact meant trampling upon the most fundamental principles of international class struggle. Just like the socialists of neutrality, Benedict XV issued his famous circular inviting the Powers to negotiate an honourable peace without annexations or indemnities. In a word, understanding with a justified fear that the war would give rise to the proletarian revolution, the PSI in its ambiguous struggle against the war was, quite simply, struggling against the revolution.

In spite of its efforts build the Sacred Union, the Italian bourgeoisie had not managed to smother the class struggle. During the summer of 1917, in the second year of total war, Turin was covered with barricades. On 21 August, because of the lack bread and pro­visions, (although the prefect had decided to distribute flour to the bakers), the workers of several factories stopped work to form a procession to the Labour Ministry; but they came up against the forces of order who had arms at the ready. From this moment on, pushed on by its own dynamic, the strike demonstrated that it was not just a ferment for the amelioration of living conditions. It quickly trans­formed itself into a frontal struggle, since, after fraternizing with the soldiers of the Alpine regiment, the poorly armed workers fought for five days against crack troops, withstanding machine gun batteries and tanks. So great was the Turin uprising that-calm - and a precarious one at that - was not restored until after a wave of repression which left fifty dead and 200 wounded.

Towards the end of 1916 in order to prevent the outbreak of wildcat strikes at a moment when war production had to function at its full output, the bourgeoisie had instituted Committees of Industrial Mobilization. Without any hesitation, the unions had agreed to collaborate in the construction of this state capitalist bulwark; municipalities with a ‘red' reputation, notably Bologna, Reggio D'Emilia, and Milan, undertook to humanize the war, and in a fine display of charity began to dress the wounds of war: aid and supplies were given to the families of soldiers, etc. The Internal Commissions, composed exclusively of workers under the supervision of their union branch, had the task of defusing tension on the shop floor. They became permanent institutions which, among other things, were granted the right to deal with problems of no less importance than those concerning the relationship between wages and output or the firing of workers. It was these openly collaborationist structures, set up in every factory after February 1919, which the Ordinorists (the milieu around Gramsci's New Order review), were to regard as a basis for ‘revolu­tionary praxis', the ‘embryonic soviets' of the proletarian dictator­ship, the means par excellence of the autonomous organization of the class at the point of production. As for the class, it had to fight and fight again this organ far the self-regulation of capital.

The majority socialists were not alone in following the nationalist policies of their bourgeoisie. The Sorelians and anarcho-syndicalists (or at least an important contingent) did the same; the militants (once so combative) who rallied round their bourgeoisie, could no longer be counted on. Didn't the veteran, A. Cipriani, declare that if it weren't for his seventy-five years, he would be in the trenches of ‘democracy' fighting ‘German militarist reaction'? It was the same scenario as that surrounding the capitulation of Social Democracy at the moment of its great historical test, the outbreak of the war; but repeated almost simultaneously on the other side of the Alps. Such a general collapse of the International led its defenders to say to Rosa Luxemburg that Social Democracy had put itself at the service of the bourgeoisie because from 4 August 1914 to the signing of the peace, "the class struggle could only profit the enemy". In Italy as well, these organizations were to ask the workers to refrain free striking, to put off the class struggle so as not to undermine the strength of the democratic state and in so doing compromise the chances for a quick peace. While such deceitful propositions were being made, the profits of Italian heavy industry were growing like mushrooms after the rain and the piles of corpses were forming mountains. Meanwhile, anarchist and Sorelian groups were raising the fasci for "the European Revolution against barbarism, against German militarism and treacherous Roman Catholic Austria".

Example after example could be given. The rallying of whole sections of Social Democracy around the bourgeoisie at the outbreak of war, and the ultra-chauvinist attitude of these organizations was a world­wide phenomenon with its roots found in the definite change in the period of capitalism and not, as the subjective explanation would have it, in the personal treachery of the leadership. Decades of development undergone by the PSI had not left the original programme undamaged. On a material level that organization had become all-powerful, with its control of 223 of 280.cmmunes in Emilia, its hundreds of trade unions, peasant leagues, co-operatives and labour exchanges. But this ‘earthly' power was to act as a dead weight on the proletariat: the extremely important historical mission of reformism had come to an end.

Obviously, the passing of Italian Social Democracy into the bourgeois camp did not suddenly happen from one day to the next. Already in 1912, when as a counter-part for abandoning designs on Morocco and Egypt, Italian imperialism was authorized by the Anglo-French to set its sights on Tripoli and prepare the conquest of the Dodocanese and of Rhodes, the Party, then twelve years old had been split over the colonial question. Considering that the establishment of 2 million Italians from the mainland in the desert zones of Tripoli and Cyrenaiea would provide an exceptional opportunity to release an important number of the unemployed, and also to regain hold of this ancient colony of Rome, the Socialist Deputies, Bissolati, Proceda and Bonomi - whom we shall meet again later on - declared themselves to be convinced partisans of Italian expansionism. In the Near East, the Balkans, and the Seychelles, Italy had to take charge of the relief of that ‘Sick Man of Europe' - Ottoman Turkey. This splendid bunch of politicians proclaimed from the heights of the parliamentary tribune and from the platforms of public meetings that the socialists could not simply abandon the monopoly on patriotism to the enemies of the Right, And with all the irony of history it was the future ‘Duce' who forced the expulsion from the Party of the war-mongering elements, the Freemasons, as "class enemies" for their immoderate attachment to the cause of reformist democracy and their sympathy for class collaboration.

Thus the Party had to amputate these gangrenous limbs and set up a new leadership capable of defending class positions on the colonial question. Against the partisans of colonial conquest, the Left insisted, "Not a man, not a penny, for the African adventures!". Alas, the expansionist tendencies within the workers' movement had deeper roots than could be appreciated by those who had brandished the hot knife in the hope of a quick recovery. When in July 1900 at Monza, the anarchist worker, Bresci, arose gun in hand to revenge the proletarian fighters of Milan of 1898, the socialist journals appeared with the usual ostentatious signs of mourning. But the socialists were weeping for Umberto Ist, the butcher king. Thus we could say that during World War I, the Italian Party signed a new truce with the House of Savoy, and by tacit agreement placed its cause, to put it bluntly, in the lap of the state. Thus, instead of calling for class struggle against militarism, for international solidarity, it maintained that in the wake of the necessary sacrifices imposed by the national cause, a long period of capitalist prosperity would open up allowing for an accompanying retinue of social reforms to be instituted. All that was required was a government based on the popular will the masses in order to leave all the vulgar tumult in the streets well behind, and proceed towards vast, very vast reforms.

More than ever before the state would subsidize insurance funds for industrial accidents, regulate conditions of employment for women and children, extend the weekly day rest to new strata of the working class, facilitate the participation of wage-earners in the profits of their enterprises. In this way, the measures of social legislation taken during 1905-1906, at the time of a brief economic stability in Italy, would be fortified and enlarged. The kingpin of the industrial and commercial bourgeoisie, Giolitti, lent his support to the soporific speeches of the Parliamentary Socialists, and affirmed the necessity to move "to the left, always further to the left".

However, at the end of the war, the Italian social situation hardly measured up to the idyllic picture painted by the bourgeoisie and its Social Democratic lackeys.

A Catastrophic Situation

The ending of hostilities on 4 November 1918 did not confer great new conquests on the imperialist powers. Once the war had finished, the Entente showed itself to be very stingy in doling out the compensations it had promised. Taking maximum advantage of the imprecision of Article 13 of the Fact of London, France refused to cede the whole of Dalmatia to Italy, preferring instead that Fiume, following the example of Danzig, be made a ‘free city' under the tutelage of the League of Nations. Moreover, England and France authorized the Greek troops of Venizelos to occupy Smyrna instead of the Italians and the possibility of Italy obtaining a mandate over ex-German Togoland was completely ruled out. Despite the acquisition of new frontiers to the north and east, the conquest of the Adriatic side of Istria and the port of Zadar along with a narrow hinterland around the town, plus a few small islands, the protectorate over Albania and Italian sovereignty over the Dodocanese, none of this solved the problem of outlets for the Italian economy.

The disappearance of her powerful Austrian rival - which had to cede to Italy practically the whole of its merchant fleet - and her replacement by a handful of buffer states, did not spare Italy from having to face up to the greatest historic crisis since the attainment of national unity.

For big capital, heavy industry had constituted an ever-growing sphere of accumulation: not only could Italy guarantee its production of weapons and projectiles, but also exported vehicles and aeroplanes to her allies. On the way it had encountered the ‘pacifist' hostility of the traditional industries which had preceded it in the genesis of Italian capitalism. It had to reconvert to peace time production when the hour of reconciliation dawned, when commercial competition replaced the open brutality of war. The solution which presented itself to the magnates of trusts, such as ANSALDO, BREDA, MONTECATINI, etc. was to pack up and go elsewhere, because it had become too difficult to valorize the enormous amounts of capital invested to the point of hypertrophy in the industries of ‘national defence'. The production of cast iron fell from 471,188 tons in 1917 to 61,381 in 1921 and during the same period steel production fell from 1,333,641 tons to 700,433. FIAT which had assembled 14,835 vehicles in 1920, only put together 10,321 one year later. In addition, the trade deficit increased by nearly 5% in relation to 1914; America reduced immigration from 800,000 in 1913 to less than 300,000 in 1921-1922; England cut its coal exports by one third.

As the vice of the crisis began to tighten visibly, the new government presided over by Nitti arose; its task was, above all else, to rebuild the ruins of war. The whole of Italian foreign trade had to be rebegun - a job beyond the real capacities of the country, since at that point the public debt had run to some 63 billion lira, two thirds of which was derived from war costs.

Through fiscal pressures, the creation of extra taxes and above all through wage-gouging, the state had made the labouring classes bear the weight of the war; the Italian taxation apparatus had become one of the most onerous in the world. Nitti's cabinet, which combined the same policies, took the following fiscal measures on 24 November 1919:

- an 18% tax on capital revenues

- a 15% tax on mixed capital and labour revenues

- taxes on wages staggered frem 9-12%

At the same time, he introduced new taxes aimed at curbing consump­tion. What made the situation worse for Italian capital was its lack of raw materials, and fuel. The rhythm of production broke down, the number of unemployed grew; the possibilities of emigration, through which 900,000 workers and peasants had been siphoned off in 1913, began to evaporate. The Italian bourgeoisie was unable to readapt the national economy to the new needs of the world market because their rivals were in a better position to impose rule over it. The public debt grew by one thousand million lira every month; as Nitti wrote in a letter to his electors in October 1919, it was one of the seven plagues of the country. Italy owed 14.5 thousand million lira to her allies.

The ‘mutilated victory' made it impossible to implement the policies of national reconciliation which the social-patriot Cachin had carried out with the subsidies of the French government. At the beginning of 1920, 320 people died in the aftermath of the strikes.

The struggle preceding the occupation

It is not really possible to understand the mass strikes which swept over Italy without locating them within the framework of the general crisis of capitalism which began in 1914, and also within the prole­tarian eruption which was the response to this crisis throughout most of Europe. Like their counter-parts in Russia, the upheavals in Italy were simply a moment in the world revolution which was born out of the misery and unspeakable horrors spawned by militarism. Hungry, bloodstained Italian workers rose up like a volcano for bread and for the chance to go home. Since 1913, their real wages had fallen by 27% and the war had cost the proletariat 651,000 dead and 500,000 mutilated.

First in Romany then in Luguria, in Tuscany and down to the toe of the Italian boot, the starving masses began to attack the food shops. At this point the trade unions clearly played out their role as the guard dogs of the system. Seized by panic, the shopkeepers, who had been hoping to be able raise prices by hoarding goods, entrusted the keys of their sacrosanct boutiques to the trade union bosses. In return, the latter assured them of a protection which the state was unable to provide, since at that moment it did not have at its disposal sufficient forces to intervene wherever the safeguarding of private property demanded it. The strikes became so powerful that the state was forced to import grain and to impose ‘political bread prices' supported by subsidies which cost it six thousand million a year. When in June 1920, Nitti's third ministry decided to get rid of these price restraints it immediately provoked so much trouble that he was forced to offer his resignation. The fear of a revolu­tionary upheaval was well-grounded that Parliament rejected proposals to increase the price of bread again and again. The bourgeoisie had to wait for the reflux of the revolutionary tide in 1921 before it could go on the offensive, and then it was the neutralist, the man of the ‘left', Giolotti, who tackled the job of getting rid of price restraints on bread.

In the countryside, occupations of landed estates began. These were essentially movements of demobilized soldiers, who had finally lost confidence in the state's promise to divide up the land.

In Italy, all the propositions about the agrarian question put forward by the reformers of the liberal era or by certain enlightened elements in the Catholic Church were really just frauds. The idea of creating agricultural associations to gather together all the little parcels of land into one communal co-operative -enterprise had sprung up among the philanthropists of the post-Risorgimento period. There had been a great deal of enthusiasm for this proposition, which aimed to tie the future of the peasants to a system of common cultivation, in which harvests would be shared out in proportion to the contribution of each peasant in land, cattle, and materials. The small farmers who suffered the most under the regime of landed property, put their hopes in the free associations pro posed in its turn by the Social Democracy.

In this way the cooperative associations got underway amid general enthusiasm, whether from the farmers who saw in them a remedy to their material poverty or from the socialists who saw them as transitional forms of production which had the potential of progres­sively leading towards the realization of socialism. They ought to have thought again when they saw the state itself setting up rural communes, and the Catholic clergy organizing agricultural co-operation in regional dioceses. But already the minimum programme of reforms to be obtained within capitalism had played out its role. By its own practice, limited to the particular national conditions of Italy, by its very manner of operating, Social Democracy became more and more the representative of capitalism. The solution to the agrarian problem was no longer seen to lie in the socialization of the land, ("the land belonging to no one, the fruits will go to everyone" (Babeuf)), but in the liberation of the sharecropper bent double working the parcel of land to which he dedicated all his energies. It could thus be resolved, according to Social Democracy, without the proletariat having triumphed in its historic struggle to organize the satisfaction of human needs on a basis free of commodity relations; there was for them, no need for the land and the instruments of labour to pass into the hands of society as a whole.

Under intensive cultivation, the plain of the Po yielded an output of grain of between 15 and 19 hundredweight per hectar of land, and sometimes even 27 to 30 hundredweight. Here the Socialist Party had organized the day-labourers into agricultural co-operatives. The watchword of the managers of these enterprises had been - increased productivity, in order to compete with the co-operatives of the Catholic Popular Party. In Bologna, Ravenna, and Reggio d' Emilia, where the co-operative movement began, the trade unions controlled the whole economic life of their provinces and - a great victory for the workers, this - decided the prices of the produce which they distributed through the medium of the co-operatives. In this fashion, the Italian working class was supposed to be able to peacefully expropriate the bourgeoisie by persuading it that its power was of no further use. This at least was the tactic of the Socialist leaders, who were proud of their ability to administer the concrete proof of the fact that their programme was no idle dream.

Referring to Owen and the Rochdale pioneers, Lenin said this about the co-operativa ideal: "They dreamed of realizing the socialist democratic control of the world without taking into account a vital factor: the class struggle, the conquest of political power by the working class, the overthrow of the rule of the exploiters". This was exactly the case with the Italian leaders who proposed to move towards new social relations by making them immediately practicable.

Co-operatives could not solve anything because socialism cannot dig itself in amid the relations of production of the old society and so become a new economic force. Throughout the whole territory of Italy, where competition made itself felt very keenly especially in grain and maize production, the agrarian struggle grew very intense. But as this hopeless struggle could not hold back the decline of the small producer and also met with violent state repression, the only way out was through emigration to the American metropolis and the coffee-producing regions of Brazil.

The preparations of the bourgeoisie for civil war

Hardly three months had passed since the formation of Parliament (16 November, 1919) when the Nitti ministry, which had in another connection launched the slogan "Produce more, consume less!", decided to set up an auxiliary police force, the Royal Guard. This new armed detachment, tens of thousands strong, was to be equipped from head to foot in order to uphold bourgeois ‘order' which was itself becoming more and more shaky, Even before fascism let loose the brown terror, hundreds of workers were to fall beneath the bullets of the Royal Guard. Needless to say, this ‘democratic' reinforcement of the state apparatus gave a great deal of satisfaction to the bourgeoisie. On 20 April, troops fired on strikers at Decima, leaving nine workers dead in the streets; the commemoration of the 1st of May was marked by fifteen death; on 26 June, there were five killed in an uprising at Ancona directed against the deployment of Italian troops to occupy Albania. Under the leadership of the anarchists, the revolt extended to the Marches and Romany. In Mantua, workers and soldiers invaded the railway station, tore up the rails to block the trains of the Royal Guard and also those carrying arms and munitions for the war against the Soviets, manhandled all the officers and attacked the prison which they burned down after liberating the inmates. In one year, from April 1919 to April 1920 the machine guns of ‘democracy' made mincemeat of 145 workers and wounded another 444 in all regions of Italy. But each time the dead were strewn on to the streets, the workers continued the struggle by proclaiming the general strike: among postal workers, railway workers, in Milan. All of which, were doubly disavowed by the PSI and the CGIL, whose representatives, elected by universal suffrage, were more occupied in leaving the inaugural sitting of the new Parliament shouting "Long live the Republic!". In the Puglia region, the agricultural day-labourers fought to obtain payment for time they had worked; there were six dead on the side of the day-labeurers and three among the land owners.

The fall of the Hohenzollern, the consecutive collapse of the Austro-German Empire, the world revolution flaring up in eastern and Central, Europe, added to the ferment of a more and more feverish Italy. Not only did the Italian proletariat concretize its solidarity with the Russian and Hungarian Soviets through the general strike; it was the only working class to sabotage in its own country the armed intervention of the Allied powers in favour of Kolchak.

The more the movement of proletarian struggle developed, the more the ruling class felt the need to arm itself. In March 1920, the industrialists regrouped themselves into a General Confederation of Industry and signed in Milan an agreement wherein each contracting party would commit all its forces to the liquidation of ‘Italian Bolshevism' and in. particular the militants who had kept to the one and only class position during the imperialist war: revolutionary defeatism. Not without reason, the defenders of ‘order' saw in them the kernel of the revolutionary party which was calling the proletariat to struggle against His Majesty's Government, to regroup under the banner of the civil war for the overthrow of the bourgeois democratic dictatorship. On 18 August, the General Confederation of Agriculture was set up on the same model, attracting to its programme all forms of large, middle, and small-scale agricultural exploitation, all those interested in putting an end to the occupations of the land. All of them wanted the heads of the ‘Caporettists', the ‘reds', who were seen to be paid agents of the enemy. Every means of preventing communst propaganda from getting on the road was to be used shamelessly. We will see the role of these organizations in the coming to power of fascism later on.

The factory occupations

In August 1920, the harbinger of what was to become the movement of factory occupations was obstructionism. This was generally applied in response to any lock-out by the bosses, as a consistent tactic which, according to the strategy of the Federazione Italiana Operai Metacheccanici was to replace the strike which had been used to the point of obsolescence. One of the favourite propaganda arguments of the delegates was to say that the crisis was much less serious than the bosses pretended. Since the national economy could withstand an increase in wages - because commodities had an outlet in the reconstituted market.- the workers had to force open the gates of the factories in order to keep production going. Not less than 280 metallurgical enterprises in Milan were occupied and put under workers' management, which gave the trade unionists the hope that the Socialists would soon be participating in government.

In this situation, the trade unionists were the most adept propagandists for the ‘gradualist economy'. According this idea, the workers would prove through their own sense of responsibility that they scrupulously respected the now ‘communal' property, that out of proletarian discipline they would agree to tighten their belts and get down to work. In order to be able to produce more cheaply -than under the employers' control, the working class had to arm itself with technical and administrative know-how, thus replacing the technicians who had left their workplaces on the orders of the old administration. In a certain way, the working class was called to govern a state which had to closely reflect the real economic structure of the country.

Immediately the Left began to struggle against this ideology of self-management, which instead of posing the problem at a central political level was imprisoning and emasculating the movement within each separate factory:

"We want to prevent the absorption by the working class of the idea that it is enough to develop the Councils solely to take hold of the factories and eliminate the capitalists. This would be an extremely dangerous illusion .... If the conquest political power has not taken place, the Royal Guard and the carabinieri will see to the dissipation of all such illusions, with all the mechanisms of oppression, all the forces which the bourgeoisie wields through its apparatus of political power." (A. Bordiga)

This vigorous and prophetic warning against the illusions of self-management came up against the propaganda of Ordino Nuovo which put all its emphasis on workers' control and on the technological education of the proletariat as a means of allowing the proletariat to manage the factories. In the factory the worker could attain a communist conception of the world, and from there go on to overthrow the bourgeois economic-political system and replace it with the Workers' Councils state. The Council system was superior to the trade union and party form because it made every worker in the enterprise, from the technician to the lowest underling, an ... elector to the Workers' Commissions (Report to the Executive Committee of the Communist International, July 1920); and what is more, this elector expressed himself not through a show of hands but through the petit-bourgeois form of the secret ballot. Faced with the grandeur of their task, ought not the workers suppress their egoistic impulses and accept new productive innovations, since these could serve to augment their productive capacity, and thus their importance to the nation? The workers had to stop blundering about as they had been doing for the last few years. Now they could achieve something tangible, now they had to run the factories under the broadest workers' democracy uniting all from the reformists to the anarchists. There really was no break in continuity when, shortly afterwards this group as the standard-bearer of the Stalinist counter-revolution was called upon to apply the measures of Bolshevization within the young Communist Party.

Once again the Left had to reaffirm its total opposition to these educational exercises so dear to the old parties of the Second International as well as to the young Ordino Nuovo; as for the PSI, it was busy advertising a ‘menage a trois' through its flag which simultaneously displayed the hammer, the sickle, and the book. It was also firmly set on parliamentarism since in the middle of a revolu­tionary explosion, the Socialist Party decided to participate in Parliamentary elections and advised the workers to participate in them en masse (16 November, 1919), convinced that the recently adopted method of proportional representation would ensure it a comfortable majority. And indeed with 1,840,000 votes behind them the Socialists gained 156 representatives in Parliament, and a few months later won 2,800 communes. Lenin was well pleased with the ‘excellent work' this represented in relation to the international ­situation, hoping that it would also serve as an example to the German Communists (letter to Serrati, 29 November, 1919). The Communist International saluted the result as a great success. What did the socialist mayors and deputies do to justify all this acclaim? They did what they had been doing before the war they set about the construction of public works, the constitution of trade unions and co-operatives - in short, they administered the affairs of the city. Thus Italy was to complete the national revolution left unfinished by the Risorgimento, but under the guiding hand of the Socialists. They wanted to have their cake and eat it - the Constituent Assembly and the Soviets, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the electoral struggle. As the Left said - at the hour of decision, the bourgeoisie was defending itself from the proletarian revolution by playing the card of democracy.

The very first factory occupation took place under the banner of the Italian tricolour. It happened in .the small town of Dalmine, at the initiative of a fascist-controlled union, the Italian Association of Labour, with the warm encouragement of Popolo d'Italia which wrote:

"The Dalmine experience has a very great value: it shows that the proletariat has the ability to directly manage the factory."

On reading these lines, followed by others no less revealing, political parties, trade unions, and leftists made use of similar phrases as those of their friendly enemy to salute workers' management. Mussolini visited the locality in person to encourage with his voice and gestures the workers' resistance to the ‘employers' abuses'. The workers at Gregorini-Franchi had continued for three days to ensure the proper functioning in all departments of the enterprise, as a response to the management's refusal to concede the five day week. For Mussolini, the working class was worthy of succeeding the bourgeoisie in the management of production since it had abandoned the traditional strike, which was so bad for the nation.

One year later, this first occupation was followed by more of a series of ephemeral attempts at workers' management: at Sestri-Ponente on the outskirts of Genoa on 18 February 1920; at the ANSALDO Shipyards in Viareggio the next day; at Ponte Canavese and Torre Pellice on 28 February; in the wood-processing factories of Asti on 2 March; in the Miani-Sivestri mechanics workshops in Naples on 24 March; in the Spadaccini enterprises in Sesto m 4 June; at the ILVA iron and steel trust in Naples, 10 June.

These regularly repeated occupation-strikes, brought with them an organizational form, the Workers' Council, which united the majority of the workers, independently of their political convictions, in the struggle against capitalism. However, because this movement never found enough strength to go beyond the confines of control of isolated factories towards a confrontation with the state, because its protagonists became intoxicated with ephemeral and artificial evidences of the immediacy of its success, it decayed on the spot. That is why the bourgeoisie was able to get its property back without firing a single shot. To get rid of the occupiers it used the FIOM which on several occasions had declared that its objective was simply workers' control over production, that it had no intention of going any further, that it would evacuate the factories once this right had been recognized by Parliament. The directors of the Banca Commerciale assured the FIOM of its benevolent neutrality; the prefect of Milan offered to smooth relations between industrialists and trade unionists; Mussolini visited the secretary of the FIOM, Buozzi, to tell him that the occupations had the full support of the fascists; the director of Corriere della Sera rushed to ‘comrade' Turatti to advise the Socialists to enter the government; the president of FIAT and AGNELLI expressed the desire to give the trade unions a greater role to play.

However, the numerous examples of feverish preparations in the use of arms, of the setting up of combat groups, shows that the most conscious fraction of the class had decided, not to go on running the factories as the CGIL was advising, but to fight with guns in their hands. At FIAT, Turin, the leaders stood in the way of the groups who had transformed lorries into armoured cars equipped with machine guns for a sortie into the town. Once the arms introduced into or built in the factories were discovered and seized by the police, the FIOM had a free hand to sign "its greatest concordat", the recognition of the Workers' Commissions. In the end, the time came to negotiate the defeat of the workers with the Confindustria. The CGIL accepted the reduction of working time for all categories of workers and employees. This was still presented as a great victory against ‘egoism', since poverty is nothing if it is shared out fairly among its victims, as a sign of solidarity among the workers! The result of the compromise was that all the workers found their wages considerably reduced.

Now that the fruit was ripe, the bourgeoisie was able to intervene with complete confidence. Instead of making the mistake of using open repression - which the Confindustria and the Confragricultura wanted - Giolitti acted as a man who knows what he is doing, as an adroit defender of the long term interests of capitalism. There were two choices in front of him: either to use the forces of repression to crack the whip over the metallurgical workers of Fiedmont, the typographical workers of Rome, the sailors and dockers of Trieste, up to and including the rather less stubborn school­teachers - or to wait for hunger to take its toll. And Giolitti kept his cool: ho counted on this, and on the work of the unions in undermining the struggle. Taking full advantage of his experience in the face of previous social disturbances, his tactic once again was to allow the movement to develop and then to recede on its own. Who could say that he would have had so much success if he'd had recourse t systematic repression?

The political balance sheet

The Factory Committees proved that the proletariat could neither assert itself on the economic terrain nor lay claim to society as a whole by beginning from the occupation of the factories, even though this might make some changes in property and administrative forms. The expropriation of the capitalists will only be accomplished by a proletarian revolution. Thus the proletariat must therefore constitute itself into a political party, not within the bourgeois horizon of the nation, but internationally. From the very beginning of its revolutionary activity, it must work towards the formation of the World Party, whose essential character is not measured by economic accomplishments, but by the proletariat's armed destruc­tion of the state*. When the problem is posed in this way, we are in a position to understand why the Paris Commune - which, due to the undeveloped level of the productive forces in capitalism's ascendancy, was able to decree very little in the way of social change - was a genuine proletarian revolution, 'the first in history.

Only the Left, which had begun its work as a fraction in the struggle against frontism (the policy of Socialists giving support to the Italian bourgeoisie), orientated itself towards the denunciation of the cult of electoralism - only the Left emerged from all this confusion with its head held high. Again and again it incited the Italian proletariat as a whole to go beyond the old leaders who were completely imbued with their dangerous methods of collaboration. Alone and against all the rest, it called upon the most conscious and combative elements of the proletariat to break out of the prison of the factory gates, to constitute themselves into a class-party, since it was precisely by para­lyzing itself on the fragmented terrain of the isolated factory that the Italian working class was digging its own grave. Against the numberous currents who held out the bright prospect of the class being able to seize control of the means of production and exchange without first destroying the bourgeois state apparatus, it insisted that:

"According to the genuinely communist conception, workers' control over production can only be realized after the smashing of bourgeois power if control of the functioning of each enterprise passes to the proletariat as a whole united in the Council-state. The communist management of production in all its branches and units of production will be carried out by the rational collective organs representing the interests of all the workers associated in the work of building Communism." (Theses of the Abstentionist Communist Fraction of the Italian Socialist Party, May 1920)

The Left (and this was its most urgent revolutionary task) had the courage to confront the prevalent taboo of the expropriatory general strike, and to place its emphasis on the political priority: the constitution of the proletariat into a party. While the striking workers were being cajoled into bending diligently over their work-benches, into learning the value of capital used in production, into finding ways of raising their output, the Left was posing the only real problem, without detours or democratic quibbles: "Are we going to take power or take the factories?". The enunciation of this simple truth made Gramsci and his team froth at the mouth. Your party is a sectarian, hierarchical conception of the revolution, whereas ours is a unitary, generous, and libertarian vision - such was the reposte of the worshippers of unity whose one morbid fear was a split in the Socialist Party. And the unity they revered was unity with Seratti's unitary maximalist majority which wanted to make Parliament and the Communes into active bases for revolutionary propaganda; unity with the reformists around Turatti, the adversary of the Turin councils and the Communist International; unity with the trade unionists purified of their extreme-right elements. Thus the name of the party's daily - Unita. Reassuring overtures were even made to the Catholic intellectuals organized in the Popular Party:

"In Italy, in Rome, there is the Vatican, the Pope. The liberal state had to find a system of equilibrium with the spiritual power of the Church; the workers' state will also have to find one."

The efforts of the Left towards the constitution of a purely communist party, beginning from the renunciation of electoral participation, were in the eyes of Gramsci, nothing but a "hallucinated particularism"; what he wanted was the revival of the PSI, which "from being a petit-bourgeois parliamentary party must become the party of the revolutionary proletariat". The ‘Nine Points' published in Ordino Nuovo under the heading ‘For a renovation of the PSI' corresponded to the wishes of the leader­ship of the Communist International: progressive purge of the right wing, yes - a split, no. Before Livorno Lenin had declared:

"To lead the revolution and to defend it, the Italian party must still make a certain move to the left (without tying its hands) and without forgetting that later circumstances could easily demand a few steps to the right."

The move to the left having been made at Livorno, the circumstances of the struggle against the reactionary offensive demanded "a few steps to the right"; at the IVth Congress of the Communist International the fusion of the Italian Communist Party and the PSI was drawn up.

R.C.

Revolution Internationale

Note *

When the author refers to the proletariat "constituting itself into a party" he is using this phrase in the way Marx used it: to describe the general process whereby the proletariat organizes itself around its historic programme. This does not mean that the proletariat and the actual communist party can every be identical, since the latter is a conscious fraction of the class, and cannot substitute itself for the class as a whole.

The footnotes to this text will appear in the third issue of this review which will contain the second part of this article.

 

1 See the introduction written by the Trostkyist, P. Broue, to Leonetti's book, Notes Sur Gramsci, EDI, Paris, 1974, p.7.

2 E. Malatesta, the hero of Benevento adventure of 1877, was one of the revolutionary elements conscious of the gravity of the situation: "If we let the moment pass, we will pay in tears of blood for the fear we have put into the bourgeoisie."

 

3 Lissa and Custoza were battles lost against the Austrians in the first war for Italian independence of 1866, which also marked the return of Venice to the Kingdom of Italy.

 

4 Letter of Lieutenant-General Oscar Raffi, commander of the army corps, to Giolitti, the day after Caporetto, 5 November, 1917.



Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary wave, 1917-1923 [15]

The epigones of “Councilism”

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Part I Spartacusbond haunted by Bolshevik ghosts

The Spartacusbond, a Dutch group from the Council Communist tradition, has recently published two issues of a Bulletin of International Discussion in English. It is certainly encouraging that the Spartacusbond make its ideas more available for those who cannot read Dutch and that they should be actively concerned about participating in international discussion and debate.

Both issues of the Spartacusbond International Discussion Bulletin have been devoted to a critique of our International Communist Current (ICC): the first issue was in answer to an article on international regroupment which appeared in Internationalism (USA), No 5; the second issue applauded Workers Voice's evolution away from our Current and criticized an article on the KAPD which appeared in Revolution Internationale, No 6 and Internationalism No 5.

The article on our international conference in 1974 from Internationalism No 5 stressed the need for a regroupment of revolutionaries in the period of heightened class struggle today. In the past, fifty years of counter-revolution, the defeat of the working class's revolutionary efforts, the mobilization for world war, and the lethargy of the years of reconstruction, had their effects on the revolutionary groups which tried to keep the flame of revolutionary theory alive as contribution to future struggle. The inevitable consequence of this long period of defeat and chaos was the atomization and isolation of revolutionary groups. But a necessity is not a virtue. The fragmentation and isolation of revolutionaries on an international scale is inevitable in defeat but today when the promise of revolution is once again alive in the struggles of the working class all over the world, this isolation of revolutionaries is no longer inevitable. On the contrary, our new period of class struggle has brought - and will bring - a new birth of consciousness in the working class which is already being expressed in the appearance of revolutionary groups and circles all over the world.

The purpose of the Internationalism article was to put forward the idea that:

* revolutionary groups must make the effort to understand and defend the principles of a revolutionary orientation today: they must base their activity on clear class positions.

* that this can only be achieved by understanding the historic dynamic of class struggle today and the lessons of past workers' struggles through international discussion and confrontation of ideas.

* that international discussion must take place within the framework of eventually UNITING our efforts if a clear principled basis is achieved, so that we may contribute to the development of class consciousness in the proletariat through active participation in the struggles of the class.

But where we write "regroupment of revolutionaries" the Spartacusbond sees only the Bolshevik party looming its head once again. "We wonder if the groups at the international conference really want to form a Bolshevik party." (Spartacusbond Bulletin, No l, p 3). For the Spartacusbond, apparently, any international organization has to be a party and any party has to be a Bolshevik one. This self-contained syllogism is in fact a condemnation of any revolutionary work today.... for fear that the demons of the past have not been exorcized.

First of all, it is surprising that Spartacusbond thinks it necessary to ask us whether we are heading towards a Bolshevik party or not. Surely if they have read our publications they must realize that the political platforms on which our activity is based in several countries are clear and unequivocal on the rejection of the Bolshevik conception of the party, both in its relation to the class and its internal structure. One of the basic premises of any possible revolutionary work today is the rejection of the Bolshevik conception of the party; without this basis no further discussion is possible. From its very beginnings, our Current has defended the idea that:

1. The Leninist conception of class consciousness coming from outside the class, from ‘intellectual' elements, is completely false. There can be no separation between being and consciousness, between the proletariat as an economic class and its historic goal of socialism, between the class and its struggles. Political organizations of revolutionaries are a manifestation of the class consciousness developing in the class; they are an emanation of the working class.

Consciousness is not limited to the party; .it exists in the whole class, but not in a homogeneous or simultaneous way. The aim of those who have come to consciousness faster than others in the class is to organize a way to contribute to the heightening of consciousness in the whole class. The party is not the sole repository of conscious­ness as the Bordigist ultra-Leninist conception would have it; it is simply an organized intervention which tends towards the greatest clarity and coherence of class 'perspectives so as to actively contribute to the process of developing consciousness in the class. This is by no means an absolute for all time but a constant effort to strengthen proletarian consciousness.

2. The Leninist conception, shared to one degree or another by all revolutionaries at the beginning of the great revolutionary wave of 1917-23, that the party has to take power ‘in the name of the class' must be rejected. The historical experience of the Russian Revolution shows that this conception leads only to state capitalism, not socialism.

The working class as a whole is the subject of revolution and no minority of the class or outside it can ‘bring' socialism to it, no matter how enlightened it may be or think it is. Socialism is only possible through organized, conscious self-activity of the working class, learning from its own practice and struggle.

The role of the party is not to ‘rule' over the workers in any way, shape or form; nor is it to assume state power. The party's role is to contribute to class consciousness; to the understanding of the general aims and historic purpose of the class struggle. The workers' councils are the instrument for the proletarian dictatorship and not the party.

3. Following Marx in rejecting the anarchist notion of ‘federalism' in revolutionary organization, our Current holds that the international centralization of revolutionary organizations does not mean any loss of democratic procedure within the framework of the political principles of the group. A political group is not a monolith on the Stalinist model and cannot possibly be if it is to express the real debates and discussions of the workers' movement. Comrades do not simply have the ‘right' but the duty to express and clarify all differences freely in the organization, within the framework of its political principles. The Bolsheviks built the party as a quasi-military apparatus because the goal was seen to be the taking of power by the party. This is NOT the goal of the proletarian party and therefore its internal structure must suit the needs of political clarification for which it was created.

These were and are, in short, the principles upon which all the groups in our Current are based. Wondering if we are not just going to become another Bolshevik party shows either that the Spartacusbond does not know our principles or that they feel that some ‘fatal destiny' will turn us into our opposite because despite everything we say or do the Spartacusbond sees the invisible stigmata of death upon us. We can only say that the Spartacusbond has no monopoly of sincere opposition to the Leninist conception of the party. Nor does everyone who rejects the Leninist conception of the party have to end up with the ideas of the Spartacusbond.

The real problem is that our Current is forming an international organi­zation. Not a party, because a party can only be formed in a period of intense and generalized class struggle. But we are building the political and organizational basis for an international regroupment. In rejecting the Leninist conception of organization, the Spartacusbond rejects ALL forms of international organization. "We dispute every idea of the necessity of a party in the workers' struggle" (Bulletin, No 2, p 3) and again: "their presentation (the ICC's) erodes the difference and opposition between party and class." (Bulletin, No 1, p 1) Leninists see the party as outside and above the class; the Spartacusbond accepts this definition as inevitable and true, and therefore rejects all parties. The reasoning is the same, only the conclusions are different.

Throughout the history of the working class movement political organi­zations have been formed, grouping those individuals who defend a given orientation in the class struggle. From Babeuf through the secret societies, the Communist League and the First International, the early years of the workers' movement were alive with political activity and debate. Gradually through the experience of struggle itself the perspective and role of these political organizations were tested against reality and many aspects were clarified or rejected. The conspiracies of sects, putschist notions were abandoned, and the role of the party as a contribution to the development of class consciousness became clearer with the positive and negative lessons of the Second and Third Internationals. Throughout this period, Marxists as well as Marx himself fought the Proudhonist refusal to organize politically as well as the anarchist resistance to centralization, stressing the need for revolutionaries to put forward a clear idea of the "final goals of the struggle and the means of attaining them."

It is fruitless to argue that growing consciousness in the working class did not express itself in the growth and unification of revolutionary groups. The Spartacusbond does not even attempt this. They simply state that TODAY these kinds of organizations have become not merely useless but a veritable hindrance to the working class movement.

Why? Has the development of class consciousness so essential to the proletarian struggle miraculously become a homogeneous and automatic process in the class? Is there no longer need for elements who see things more clearly at an earlier stage to join together to disseminate their analyses and perspectives? Clearly the answer to both these questions is NO. Even the Spartacusbond recognizes this. "There is no doubt that those who attain this insight (into the need for workers' councils) will feel the need to propagate their experiences in every field of the struggle. But as soon as they intend to start a party or an international which is considered to be the leader of the class, they will relapse into ideas and organizational patterns of the past." (Bulletin, No 2, p 3)

This is clearly a contradiction. If those who attain insights are inevitably going to want to organize to propagate their insights, are they making a positive contribution to the struggle or not? The answer seems to be that if they are simply a loose group of isolated individuals, they can say what they have to say without fear. But if they try to organize into an international organization and try to make their impact more widespread and effective, then according to the Spartacusbond, they are a hindrance to the class. As long as groups are inefficient, isolated and vague, the Spartacusbond is prepared to give them its seal of approval. But once they tend towards political and organizational coherence, groups supposedly become a positive evil. Why then does the Spartacusbond exist, we may ask? To organize themselves to tell others not to organize? An anti-group group? To the Spartacusbond once a group tries to exert any influence in favour of its ideas, it will inevitably become ‘leaders' (that is, on the Bolshevik model). If we follow this logic, our only hope is to condemn ourselves to self-imposed impotence.

The Spartacusbond claims to be part of the Dutch council communist tradition. Need we remind them that the council communists with Gorter tried to form a Fourth International in the early 20s? Does this mean that Gorter had become the Dutch disciple of Lenin? An unconscious Bolshevik? A similar effort was attempted by the Dutch council communist group (after the break with the Spartacusbond) in 1947. This group encouraged the initiative of the Belgian council communists who called for an international conference and the Dutch group actively participated in this conference of different groups of the left communist tradition in 1948. Is this not more in the real tradition of council communism than the Spartacusbond's non-participation then and condemnation of international regroupment today?

But the debate goes deeper. What is the role of revolutionaries? Is it simply to "propagate their experience" as individuals as the quote implies, or is it to distil the experience of all working class struggles in history, to enrich present-day struggles with the lessons of the past? But for the Spartacusbond, the past is wiped away in one anti-Leninist sweep. The Russian Revolution was merely a bourgeois revolution with the Bolsheviks as a state capitalist party "in its essence" from the beginning. The erroneous conceptions of the Bolsheviks were taken over from elements of the Social Democracy. Therefore the Second International must be wiped away as well. And we end up with a hodge-podge, incoherent, moralistic approach to history. Why even bother analyzing past struggles and defeats when it is so much more simple to read them out of existence?

The Russian Revolution, according to the Spartacusbond, was a bourgeois revolution. But in the "West" (Western Europe), revolution was on the agenda because of objective changes in the capitalist system (the period of decadence, the beginning of the cycle of crisis-war-reconstruction); and this brought forth revolutionary upheavals in Germany and elsewhere. The Spartacusbond realizes that a new period of struggle, revolutionary struggle, had begun at that time because they correctly maintain that unions were no longer adequate as organizations of working class struggle. So we are left with the absurd contradiction that capitalism was ripe for proletarian revolution in "Western Europe" but not in Russia where the bourgeoisie as a historical class was still capable of pushing forward its bourgeois revolution. Capitalism ceases to be a system which dominates the world and becomes a question of geographical regions: in one area the proletarian revolution is on the agenda; in another area we have the bourgeoisie just beginning its task. In one area workers are attempting to take power while in another area their fellow workers are fighting Russian ‘feudalism'. And the workers of Western Europe who are pushing forward struggles against the bourgeois order are, at the same time, so non-conscious that they join the Third International and mistake the "bourgeois" revolution in Russia for the avant-garde of their own revolution! This is a thoroughly incoherent logic, an Alice in Wonderland view of history. Either the revolutionary socialist programme is a world possibility or it is simply a utopian adventure for "Western" Europe. How the Spartacusbond explains the existence of workers' councils, the organization of the working class for the revolutionary assault on the capitalist order, in the midst of a "bourgeois" revolution in Russia, we shall leave to the contortions of their illogical argument. But the Russian Revolution remains a closed book to those who are so obsessed by defeat that they must simply refuse any proletarian character to the Russian experience. This inevitably leads to a rejection of any proletarian roots in the Third International. History becomes an enigma of everyone running around doing incomprehensible things. For the Spartacusbond any lessons of the past are useless because the major workers' struggles are "bourgeois"; proletarian history becomes a huge blank.

It is understandable that the Spartacusbond sees the revolutionary's contribution as simply propagating ‘their experience' in an immediatist way without a full historical dimension. They have a regrettable difficulty in coming to grips with the past as it really was. In an article on the KAPD printed in Internationalism, No 5, Hembe quotes Jan Appel's (Hempel) speech at the 3rd Congress of the Third International, to show that the KAPD was not anti-party as were certain later council communists. The KAPD opposed the Bolshevik policies in the Communist International and contested the whole idea of a party taking state power ‘in the name of the class'. But they did not reject the party as a necessary contribution to class consciousness.

"The proletariat needs a strongly formed, hard-core party. Each communist must be unimpeachable ... and he must be a leader on the spot. In the struggles into which he is thrown, he must be consistent and what enables him to do this is his programme. He acts in accordance with decisions made by the communist group. Here the strictest discipline reigns. Here one can change nothing or be excluded or sanctioned,....." Jan Appel

The Spartacusbond "wants to express (their) indignation about the fact that Internationalism is abusing Jan Appel's name in trying to re-harness the working class." (Bulletin, No 2, p 5)

First of all the Spartacusbond feels it necessary to prove that the KAPD is in ‘their' tradition and that our Current has no business quoting the KAPD to support our ideas. They are reduced to "doubting the correctness of the quote" which is a puerile tactic since none from the KAPD or Appel himself, either at the time or later on, or today, ever protested that these speeches were a falsification or a lie, The reader can refer to La Gauche Allemande (Supplement to Invariance No 2, Paris 1974) to discover whether Internationalism has correctly transcribed this quote from the interventions of the KAPD.

But the Spartacusbond goes further. "The fact is that he (Appel) left the Communist International and after that as a member of the KAPD went through the theoretical and practical struggle of the German working class." (Ibid., p 5) This quote implies that after making his speech Appel realized his error and joined the KAPD. In fact, Appel was speaking as a delegate of the KAPD to the Communist International and expressed the ideas of his organization which never renounced his speeches. Appel didn't wait until 1921 to be part of the struggles of the German working class; he was part of it from World War I onward. And he is still active in the revolutionary movement, in particular as a close associate of our Current, and has made valuable contributions to our international conferences. We would hardly have brought up this issue if the Spartacusbond had not deemed it necessary to parade their "indignation" and publicly accuse us of falsifying. It is certainly an accusation which can be easily turned against the accusers. But leaving aside polemics, it is revealing that those whose view of history is limited to an obsession with the Leninist party have difficulty in understanding the content of past experiences.

But what gives the Spartacusbond the right to claim our Current wishes to "re-harness the working class"? Aside from statements already referred to, the Spartacusbond berates us for trying to understand the positive contributions of the Bolsheviks. Our Current has indeed claimed that the clear and unequivocal positions of the Bolsheviks against the first imperialist world war were a clarion call to the working class and a rallying point for the international left which continued to defend an internationalist position against the war. The positions of the Bolshevik Party on this question and on the need to break with the Second international greatly influenced the German left communist movement, among others. The Bolshevik position against any compromise with the bourgeois democratic government of Kerensky and the call for "all power to the Soviets" are extremely positive contributions to revolutionary practice. Although we cannot go any deeper into the Russian experience here, we simply want to point out that these positions warrant the attention and study of revolutionaries and cannot simply be eliminated by the Spartacusbond's idea of the "essence" of Bolshevism or by pretending that this was all a Machia­vellian plot to fool the workers! Dealing with the Bolsheviks' positive contribution on these questions cannot in any way be interpreted as an apology for the Bolshevik position on the party or on other aspects of the class struggle. If the Bordigists make an apology for every sentence and word of Lenin, the Spartacusbond simply throws the baby out with the bath water and rejects everything the Bolsheviks may have said. Unfortunately for the Spartacusbond, real proletarian history cannot be reduced to the ‘all bad or all good' simplifications which they put forward.

We entirely agree with the .Sparatacusbond that workers' councils are the essential instrument of proletarian power, the class-wide organs revolutionary struggle and the construction of socialism. We also agree that parties are left-overs of a bourgeois society, a society divided into classes. Unfortunately the fact that the proletariat is an exploited class means that the power of "dominant ideas", bourgeois ideology, will retard and delay the simultaneous and homogeneous development of class consciousness in the working class. Therefore it is inevitable and necessary that those who can see the roots of the struggle more clearly will organize and try to propagate their ideas in the class. This aim cannot be served by remaining isolated and ineffective individuals or local groups, nor can revolutionary activity be limited to telling workers to "form workers' councils", or reduced to the ridiculous idea of telling other revolutionaries - "do not organize".

The working class does not need revolutionaries to prod them into forming workers' councils. In revolutionary periods, workers have done this without any advice on the mechanics of this operation. In the past, where the working class was inexperienced, revolutionaries played a significant role in encouraging the formation of the organizations of economic struggle, the unions. Today, the period is different and the form of workers' councils is much less the result of revolutionaries' agitation than a relatively spontaneous movement of the class in response to objective conditions. The task of the revolutionary organization is much more a question of clarifying the perspectives for struggle, of defending goals and offering a clear denunciation of the dangers of capitalist recuperation and partial struggles.

There is no opposition between the workers' councils and the party, between the whole and one of its parts. Each has a role to play in the life of the class.

The Spartacusbond's rejection of any role for an international revolutionary organization, not to mention a party, is not a continuation of the central ideas of the KAPD; it reflects the ideas of the Ruhle faction which left the KAPD, and these ideas were further developed in the thirties, during the period of defeat and demoralization. Despite the many contributions of council communism to a fuller understanding of the importance of workers' councils, the theories of some of its tendencies, notably the Spartacusbond remains unfinished and partial; in fact it remains locked in the Leninist trap. The only difference is that for the Leninists the party is everything,for the Spartacusbond the party is nothing.

"Of course there is no objection to international study and co-operation of groups which aim to stimulate the independent workers' struggle. But these groups cannot create a new international working class movement." (ibid., p 4).

Quote implies that as long as revolutionary groups ‘study' and ‘co-operate' they are part of the class. But if they want to push ‘co-operation' of local and national groups to the international level of a principled international organization with an active function in the class, then the Spartacusbond dooms their efforts. Each country for itself, each group for itself, - and above all do not come together internationally because regroupment will make you "leaders" and "Leninists". Apparently not only power corrupts, but also organization.

The fundamental incoherence of all this is perfectly clear. But more important, the influence of this fear and resistance to regroupment debilitates the workers movement and slows down the efforts of the new generation of revolutionaries to organize themselves in response to the needs of the contemporary class struggle.

J.A.

Part II "Councilism" come to the aid of third-worldism

Present-day ‘councilists' like those around the Dutch groups, Spartacusbond and Daad en Gedachte are distinguished mainly by their Menshevik confusionism, which rises to the most pathetic heights when the question of the Russian Revolution is posed.

The council communists who in the 1930's struggled militantly for clarification against the counter-revolution, and who wrote for International Council Correspondence and other communist journals, were by no means Mensheviks. Their traditions were wholly proletarian. In the demoralization and confusion caused by the utter defeat of the world revolution, they tried to understand the reasons for the downturn within a proletarian framework even though they defended certain erroneous conceptions. But confronted with the decline of the proletarian revolution, they too began to decline. How different it had been when they were one with the proletarian revolution in the upsurge, when they enthusiastically swam with the seemingly irresistible tidal wave of class struggle marking the period 1917-23. Menshevism never stood that test of events: it attacked the proletarian revolution from start to finish.

A "bourgeois revolution": A case of sour grapes

Just like the fox in the fable who walked away from the unreachable grapes muttering that they must be sour anyway, the present-day ‘councilists' treat the October Revolution as a bourgeois revolution. As we have said, the German and Dutch Left Communists who began to espouse a theory of the ‘bourgeois revolution' in the1930s in order to explain the Russian counter-revolution, were an authentic communist current. This was so in spite of their tentative but erroneous assertions as to the reasons for the relapse of the Russian Revolution. Today's ‘councilists', however, do not constitute such a revolutionary current. They are but its pale and impoverished residue, sharing (and contributing more confusion) to all the later defects of the German and Dutch Left Communists. What is more telling is that they do not share any of the original ardour, creativity and coherence which distinguished the German and Dutch Left: in sum, none of their virtues. The revolutionaries of the KAPD, and of the other groups which identified with their positions began already as communist militants who unhesitantly supported the October Revolution, because they correctly saw it as a moment in the unfolding world revolution. What they said after, when the world revolutionary wave was receding, is another thing. In demoralization and retreat, communist minorities inevitably become confused and make mistakes, especially when the whole class has suffered epochal defeats. But let us be plain about this fact: Spartacusbond and Daad en Gedachte and Co. pick up from amongst the debris, all the confusion and demoralization of what once was an authentic evolutionary fraction. Therein lies the whole difference.

An examination of a few statements made by Spartacusbond glaringly demonstrates their complete regression from any revolutionary position:

"The Third International, being promoted by the economically and politically backward structure of the - in reality bourgeois - revolutionary Russia (sic), was such an organizational structure of the past, at least for Western Europe." (Spartacusbond Bulletin, No 2, p 3).

And:

The decline of the revolution "was the result of the structure of Russia and the state-socialist ideas which existed in Bolshevism from the start and which could only result in state-capitalism." (Ibid., p3)

Cajo Brendel, a ‘councilist' contributor to Daad en Gedachte also believes that the October Revolution was ‘bourgeois':

"For some time the Russian (bourgeois) revolution seemed to have great consequences for similar bourgeois developments in Asia and Africa." (Cajo Brendel, Theses on the Chinese Revolution, Solidarity pamphlet 46, London 1974, p 3)

Observing the increasingly repugnant debasement of marxism and the needs of the world revolution perpetrated by Moscow and the Comintern, the German and Dutch Left Communists of the early 20's reacted in many confused ways. Some like Gorter and Pannekoek, began to say that what had happened in Russia was somehow ‘inevitable' owing to Russia's economic backwardness; Otto Ruhle and many others openly stated that Russia had gone through a ‘bourgeois revolution'. Even Lenin's Materialism and Empiriocriticism according to Pannekoek, philosophically expressed the economic level of arrested bourgeois development in Russia, and thus Bolshevism was more and more seen as a special ‘hybrid' type of bourgeois Jacobin movement, ‘forced' by history to establish state capitalism in Russia. Following this train of thought, but adding his own philistine garnishings, Brendel calls the Bolsheviks "political idealists" (Ibid., p 2) doomed to be "suddenly and horribly" awoken to the realities of state capitalism. Paul Mattick, who has become another ‘councilist' leftover, puts forward a similar idea: for the Bolsheviks to "remain in power under the actually ensuing conditions meant to accept the historical role of the bourgeoisie but with different social institutions and a different ideology." (Paul Mattick, ‘Workers Control' in The New Left, Boston, 1970, p 388). According to Mattick, the objective necessity of bourgeois revolution co-existed alongside a proletarian revolutionary wave (released by World War I) which he qualifies as "feeble". Thus everything that happened in Russia was inevitable because of the economic backwardness of Russia, Bolshevik state capitalist ideology and the feebleness of the world proletariat. The profundity lurking beneath the surface of these utterances could perhaps be summed up as: ‘All's bad that ends bad'.

Menshevism resurrected

Defending the Russian Revolution against the Menshevik and Kautskyite renegades, Luxemburg and the Western communists who supported the Bolshevik regime maintained that capitalism had in 1914 entered its long-awaited period of decline. Therefore the Russian Revolution was a link in the rising chain of proletarian communist revolutions. The imperialist war had given a mortal blow to the ascendant period of capitalist development. From then on the communist programme, the maximum programme, was on the immediate agenda of humanity. The working class was facing the alternative of socialism or barbarism in an ever-present epochal manner. The spiral of the war-reconstruction­crisis-war cycle had appeared in history with all its murderous effects, signifying that our epoch was also the epoch of the world proletarian revolution.

To speak of ‘bourgeois revolutions' under such conditions, or about ‘necessary capitalist stages' previous to the communist revolution when capitalism world-wide was showing the death agonies of decadence, was indeed the apex of Kautskyite cretinism. Kautsky and the Mensheviks opposed the October Revolution on the grounds that Russian economic development was too backward, allowing for only the creation of a bour geois republic. "Theoretically this doctrine ... follows from the ori­ginal ‘marxist' discovery that a socialist revolution is a national and, so to speak, a domestic affair in each modern country taken by itself", said Rosa Luxemburg (The Russian Revolution, in Rosa Luxemburg Speaks, New York, 1970, p0368). But marxists of her time understood that bour­geois development was impossible within the limits of bourgeois society. This applied to all countries, from Russia to Paraguay. The world­wide connections of capital, which make of all countries a single inte­grated organism, the world market allowed no room for the theories of ‘exceptionalism' so beloved by leftists of all hues and persuasions. Already in 1905-6, Parvus and Trotsky had begun to grasp this reality, after the experience of the 1905 Russian Revolution. Lenin and Luxem­burg went firmly over to this point of view in 1917, and realized that the Russian proletariat could only take power as a prelude to the world socialist revolution. It was not that the workers in Russia had to take power in order to ‘complete the bourgeois revolution' even in passing, but that the world-wide capitalist crisis permitted only an uninterrupted and immediate struggle towards socialism.

The arguments of Kautsky, Plekhanov, and Martov and of the various doctrinaires of national-capitalism, were completely refuted by the revolutionary wave of 1917-23. The fact that this wave was finally crushed in no way alters this conclusion. If the proletarian revolu­tion's failures in the period of decadence are always due to ‘econo­mic backwardness' then there's no hope for communism. Capitalist decay moans precisely that the productive forces are increasingly constrained and dammed up by capitalist relations of production. In other words, capitalism in decline can only stagnate and check the development of the productive capacities of humanity; it can only maintain economic backwardness as a whole.

The reasons for the defeat of the 1917-23 revolutionary wave are too complex to discuss here. It is enough to note that the glib answers of the Mensheviks about the ‘backwardness' of Russia only confuse the issue. The roots of proletarian defeats during the epoch of the proletarian revolution are to be found mainly at the level of proletarian consciousness which in turn helps explain subjective factors such as the clinging to old traditions and insufficient clarity as to the communist programme, which are factors which might at given moments paralyse the class as a whole and allow capital to regain the upper hand. The subjective problems of the class thus assume a socio-­material aspect which can at times become an objective obstacle. But the mechanic determinism of the Kautskyites has nothing to say about this process, which is more akin to an ‘organic' process rather than a mathematical one.

It was therefore a theoretical regression for those Left Communists who were later called ‘council communists' to resurrect the Menshevik arguments about the inevitable ‘bourgeois nature' of the Russian Revolution. In so doing, these militants went against even their own pasts, and against one of the greatest of working class experiences. Yes, it was true that the Russian Revolution was drowned in blood by the world counter-revolution expressing itself through the ‘workers' state' in Russia. It was even more painful to see the Bolsheviks themselves assuming in the main, the task of foremen, in this degeneration. But this doesn't refute the proletarian nature of October, whose defeat meant a monstrous debacle for the world class.

Only stupidity can then haughtily raise its diminutive brow and find a ‘bourgeois revolution' amidst the carnage. If ‘bourgeois revolutions' emanate from the bones and blood of millions of defeated class conscious proletarians, or to put it differently, if ‘bourgeois revolutions' are what workers would simply call counter-revolutions then indeed the likes of Noske, Scheidemann, Stalin, Mao, Ho, Castro and countless others are ‘bourgeois revolutionaries'. But only impudence and obtuseness can honestly compare Cromwell, Robespierre, Saint-Just, Garibaldi, Marat, or William Blake to those bloody abortions of capitalist decay.

But scribblers like Brendel excel in impudence. Their profound decla­mations concerning the history of the proletarian revolution contrasts strikingly with the shallowness of such remarks as:

"The Chinese Revolution had essentially (not in details) the same character as that in Russia in 1917. There may indeed be diffe­rences between Moscow and Peking, but China just like Russia is on its way to state-capitalism. Just as Moscow does, Peking pursues a foreign policy that has little to do with revolution elsewhere in Asia (not even middle-class revolution)." (Brendel, op.cit.p.2)

Thus revolutions equal counter-revolutions; Lenin and Trotsky are the same as Mao and Chou-En-Lai. The most reactionary aspect of this ‘revolutionary' sauce is that it implicitly denigrates and shrouds in confusion extremely vital and complex moments of the workers' move­ment. Brendel, the barrister of eternal capitalist development, thinks himself capable of passing judgment on what he paternalistically calls ‘political idealists'. The Bolsheviks he-compares to Mao, the heir of Stalin and self-styled demigod to 800 million human beings. With a quick washing of hands, our Pontius Pilate denies any historical responsibility for the course of the Russian Revolution. All that was to be, was. But "It is not Russia's unripeness which has been proved by the events of the war and the Russian Revolution", asserted Luxem­burg, "but the unripeness of the German proletariat for the fulfill­ment of its historic tasks". Brendel, of course, will have none of this. In his meanderings, he too, like Kautsky or the Mensheviks, stumbles into the cesspit the workers' movement has set aside for those forever ‘unripe' to understand the communist revolution.

Roles in search of actors

Brendel speaks easily about the occurrence of all kinds of revolutions - middle class, state capitalist, bourgeois, and even peasant. Every­thing gets a mention except the proletarian revolution, which remains for him a closed book with seven seals attached. According to him, the bourgeois revolution is inevitable in backward areas and the drama ensues in desperately searching for actors to carry it through. Thus: "In neither Russia nor China could capitalism triumph except in its Bolshevik form." (Ibid., p.11) But nowhere does his Menshevik conception come out more openly than here:

"In both Russia and China the revolutions had to solve the same poli­tical and economic tasks. They had to destroy feudalism and to free the productive forces in agriculture from the fetters in which exist­ing relations bound them. They also had to prepare a basis for industrial development. They had to destroy absolutism and replace it by a form of government and by a state machine that would allow solutions to the existing economic problems. The economic and political problems were those of a bourgeois revolution; that is, of a revolution that was to make capitalism the dominant mode of production." (Ibid., p.10)

The message is clear: the proletariat ‘had' to be fragmented into different national units which in turn have exceptional paths of develop­ment which are separate from that of the world market and the world eco­nomy. Each national capital is autarkic and accumulation can proceed quite well within a purely capitalist confine. The only limits to healthy accumulation would be the sudden revolt o the ‘order-takers' (a la Cardan/Solidarity) or an eventual ‘fall in the rate of profit' (a 1a Grassman/Mattick). The important thing here is the conception that Brendel has of the proletarian revolution: a bourgeois, nationally frag­mented, localistic conception. But then how can the world proletariat, assert itself as a unified class? How will this be possible if each proletariat faces fundamentally different national conditions? What will materially unify the rising class struggle for world socialism? Brendel and the other journalists of ‘councilism' are silent on this point saving all their strength presumably, for spouting incantations about workers' councils, or ‘workers' self-management'.

Brendel, himself, is devoid of any awareness concerning these questions. For example, the Chinese workers' struggles according to him were doomed; not because those struggles found themselves at the mercy of the world counter-revolution (already triumphant in Russia, Germany, Bulgaria, Italy, etc) but because of the workers "insignificance" in numbers! But we must allow Brendel to delineate his own course of thought:

"It is claimed by some that these uprisings were attempts by the Chinese proletariat to influence events in a revolutionary direc­tion. This could not have been the case. Twenty-two years after the massacres in these two towns the Chinese Ministry of Social Affairs announced that in China there were fourteen industrial towns and just over a million industrial workers in a population of between four and five hundred millions - ie industrial workers comprised less than 0.25% of the population. In 1927 this figure must have been still lower.

"With the proletariat insignificant as a class in 1949, it seems unlikely (sic) that they could have engaged in revolutionary class activity twenty-two years earlier. The Shanghai uprising of March 1927 was a popular uprising whose aim was to support Chiang Kai­shek's Northern Expedition. The workers only played a significant role in it because Shanghai was China's most industrialized town, where one-third of the Chinese proletariat happened to live. The uprising was ‘radical-democratic' rather than proletarian in nature and was bloodily quelled by Chiang Kai-shek because he scorned Jacobinism not because he feared the proletariat. The so-called ‘Canton Commune' was no more than an adventure provoked by the Chi­nese Bolsheviks in an attempt to bring off what they had already failed to achieve in Wu Han.

"The Canton uprising of December 1927 had no political perspective and expressed proletarian resistance no more than the KTT (Chinese Communist Party) expressed proletarian aspirations. Borodin, the government's Russian adviser, said that he had come to China to fight for an idea; it was for similar political ideas that the KTT sacrificed the workers of Canton. These workers never seriously challenged Chiang Kai-shek and the right-wing of the KMT; the only serious, systematic and sustained challenge came from the peasantry." (ibid., p.15)

The charge that the Chinese workers never ‘seriously challenged' Chinese capital is a complete misconstruction. Any self-action of the prole­tariat challenges capitalism even if at the beginning stages the workers aren't aware of their own final goals and potential strength. But capital is, and that is why Chiang, Stalin, Bukharin and Borodin helped strangle the Chinese revolutionary movement. What criteria does Brendel use to make this nonsensical claim, this assertion of a "non-existing" proletarian challenge? Did the February 1917 Petrograd Soviet, control­led by Mensheviks and liberals "challenge" Russian capital? Brendel's answer would be ‘no'. In fact, for him, the workers should never think of challenging capitalism since all they are bound to get is state capitalism, ‘Jacobinism', etc. The Chinese workers in Shanghai, Hankow and Canton, indeed rose by the thousands and created strike committees and armed detachments which by their very nature would have had to con­front not only Chiang but the Chinese Communist Party if the class were to politically survive and connect up to the world class struggle. But because there was no world revolution to connect to anymore, no perspec­tives were open to the Chinese proletariat's rising. The proletarian movement was definitely strangled by world political reaction in 1927, not by its ‘numerical' lack of strength. The proletariat's weight in the economy, and its international class character, are, with its consciousness, the only real basis for its struggle. Brendel's slanders against the proletariat have, however, a more ominous ring. He is against ‘adventures' but only as long as they are proletarian. When he talks about the peasantry, his true colours show. Thus it was the pea­santry that presented ".... the only serious, systematic and sustained challenge...." to the KMT. No adventures here, please!

The logic of his position flows forth, almost majestically:

"After twenty years of tentative attempts, the peasant masses at last discovered how to unite a revolutionary force. It was not the working class, still very weak, which brought about the downfall of Chiang Kai-shek but the peasant masses, organized under primitive democracy into guerilla armies. This demonstrates another fundamen­tal difference between the .Chinese and Russian revolutions. In the latter the workers were at the head of events at Petrograd, Moscow and Kronstadt, and the revolution progressed outward from the towns into the countryside. In China the opposite was the case. The revolution moved from rural to urban areas." (Ibid, p.16)

It is no longer a question of the proletarian revolution struggling against capitalism; no, now it's a question of ‘revolutions' in the abstract, of plays in search of authors and actors. The idea that the peasants were organized under ‘primitive democracy' into guerilla armies is nothing but a cynical Maoist apology, typical of writers like Edgar Snow.

"In China, just as in Russia, it was not the party which showed the way to the peasants - the peasants showed the way to the party." (Ibid., p.17)

The logic of this position is clear, even if not spelled out by this half-wit: if the peasant masses show the way to the bureaucracy, then it follows that the bureaucracy can be controlled from below. Thus communists should support that bureaucracy against other capitalist factions which do not allow such control (ie Chiang's). The marxist movement of the nineteenth century in the ascendant period of capitalism didn't hesitate doing this when it supported genuine national libera­tion struggles; it supported the struggle of the petty-bourgeois democrats or advanced capitalist factions against reactionary or absolu­tist ones. The ethical cant of Brendel and Co., however, does not permit such honest admissions. The truth is that the Chinese peasants were mobilized by Mao's Chinese Communist Party during and after the anti-Japanese war as cannon-fodder for the imperialists' carve-up. During World War II Mao's CCP was simply allied to the democratic imper­ialist faction fighting the fascist imperialisms. Brendel is not the type who would have opposed such a war. In China he would have sided with ‘the peasants' democratic guerilla armies' (sic!), • In other words, he would have died with the Allies, like all liberals and Stalinists did. Our Pontius has shown, however, that he doesn't like things spelt out quite like this; straight in the face. But the traditions of the workers' movement demand it, because this is the only way the prole­tariat can affirm its revolutionary programme against all confusionists and openly reactionary scribes.

We thus have seen how Menshevism (old or new style) inevitably leads to a capitulation to different capitalist factions. There is nothing neutral in the class struggle, and those philistines who warn that ‘not everything is black or white, greys exist too' ignore the fact that in order to appreciate gradations in colour one mist first determine what is black and what is white. Another expression of this reactionary confusion appears in the following extract taken from a pamphlet pub­lished by Solidarity, a group which has been influenced by ‘councilism' in its degenerated form:

"Just because the communist front organization, for whatever tactical and sectional reasons, is at times forced to struggle, even if only to ‘represent' itself as the ‘leader' of that struggle, the revolutionary must not desert that struggle. To do so is to opt out of a struggle the terms of which have been determined by the class. To opt out is tantamount to asserting that the terms of the struggle have been decided by the ‘party' and not the ‘class'. Such a deci­sion in these circumstances would be totally reactionary." (Bob Potter, Vietnam: Whose Victory? Solidarity Pamphlet 43, London 1973, p.29)

So, for the sophist, Potter, the ‘class' ‘determines' the terms of the struggle. Thus the partisans of Tito, the British 8th Army, the American Rangers in D-Day, could all be called expressions of the ‘class' ‘determining' its ‘anti-fascist' struggle in 1939-45, just like the ‘class' in Vietnam supposedly ‘determined' the struggle against Thieu and US imperialism. The apology is again a cheap Stalinist trick. In fact, it signifies the complete degeneration of these ideas, which under the pretense of supporting the class ‘from below' in fact capitulates to capitalist factions which are portrayed as expressions, however dis­torted, of the class itself.

In their 1970 introduction to Brendel's Theses, the Cardanites of Aberdeen Solidarity nicely showed the utter subordination of latter-day ‘councilism' to the leftist ideology of third-worldism.

"However, the struggles of the colonial peoples made a contribution to the revolutionary movement. That poorly-armed peasant populations could withstand the enormous forces of modern imperialism, sha­ttered the myth of the invincible military-technological-scientific power of the West. The struggle also revealed to millions of people the brutality and racism of capitalism and drove many, especially youth and students, to come out in struggle against their own regimes. But the support of the colonial peoples against imperialism, does not, however, imply support for this or that organization engaged in the struggle." (Aberdeen Solidarity Pamphlet 2, p. iii)

The last sentence is a non-sequitor given what precedes it and in any case is merely thrown in to appease some bad consciences.

These conceptions are an inevitable result of the years of sterility and confusion which finally devoured the councilist movement. Menshe­vism was indeed resurrected by councilism (and the Bordigists who speak about the ‘colonial revolution' fervently join in this particular seance.

According to Biblical legend, Jesus resurrected Lazarus, and if all evi­dence is true, nobody seems to have opposed the deed. The case would have been different had Jesus chosen instead to resurrect Herod, Xerxes or any bloodthirsty Sumerian despot. This sort of "savior" would have rapidly earned the justifiable scorn of his contemporaries. The deed of Sparatacusbond, Daad en Gedachte, etc, in resurrecting Menshevism twice over is no less foul for the workers' movement.

Nodens

 

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1917 - Russian Revolution [13]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary organisation [5]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Council Communism [22]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • German and Dutch Left [23]

International Review no.3 - October 1975

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Revolution and counter-revolution in Italy (part 2)

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The Comintern organizes the defeat

A relapse was taking place within the Third International. There was an attempt to ressusitate the old Social Democracy, to restore it to what it had been before the crash of 1914 - complete with its revolutionary and opportunist wings. It was no longer a question of separating the new international from the social-chauvinists and parliamentary socialists of the Second International, who had proven themselves the implacable enemies of the proletariat in its civil war against its exploiters; instead the Comintern saw fit to discard the primary lesson of the imperialist war and the world revolution; "the absolute necessity for a split with the social-chauvinists."1

At the IVth World Congress of the Comintern in 1922, the Italian Communist Party (1CP) presented its Action Programme which vigorously rejected the proposed organizational fusion with the Italian Socialist Party (ISP), that the Comintern had peremptorily declared should take place on February 15, 1923. The ICP's refusal to go along with this directive was based on its demonstrably correct thesis that the role of the Socialist Party was to divert an important sector of the working class from its revolutionary struggle for political power by means of skilful electoral and trade union propaganda.

In fact, the projected fusion was providing the Socialist Party - whose ‘Third Internationalists' fraction had declared its willing­ness to accept the conditions for adhesion to the Third International drawn up at the Second Congress - with the possibility of camoufla­ging its real function within the class struggle and thus regain, in the eyes of the workers, the prestige it had forfeited forever through its actions in previous events.

Against this betrayal of the very principles acquired in the heat of struggle against Social Democracy (a betrayal initiated by the Comintern with the aim of attracting the ‘maximalist' turncoats), the delegation of the Italian Communist Party asserted that it was necessary to win over to communism those militants who were caught up in the Socialist Party's apparatus, through intervention at the fore of all struggles engendered by the economic situation. Simi­larly, it was necessary to wrest from the other so-called workers' parties their best militants, in other words those who fought for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

This programme, correct in part, cancelled itself out in that it allowed for agitation within bourgeois organizations such as unions, co-operatives and friendly societies. The motions of the Communist Trade Union Committee, while denouncing the ‘Amsterdam betrayal' of the ‘Yellow International' could still remind the Italian General Federation of Labour of its ‘class duties'. None of this, however, prevented the latter from jumping on the capitalist bandwagon.

The fact that some communist militants did succeed in creating their own trade union cells closely linked to the life of the party, did not alter the harsh reality of the situation. They were not in a position to hold back the march of history, to prevent the trade unions from becoming encrusted in the very soil of capitalism, from wrapping themselves in the folds of the tri-colour.

As an experiment in the tactic of the Workers' United Front, which it had agreed to apply out of a sense of discipline and only on the level of immediate economic demands, the left participated in the national general strike on August 1922, in the belief that integrating the non-unionized workers the Labour Alliance would begin to take on the form of a workers' council. This served only to reinforce a number of prejudices already held by the workers of a country deeply affected by Sorelian illusions: trade union activity, the myth of the general strike, and democratic illusions. The call for a general strike issued by the Labour Alliance contained all the forms of bourgeois ideology. The Alliance invited the workers to struggle against the "dictatorial madmen" of fascism, all the while warning the workers of the danger entailed in using violence which would detract from the "solemnity of their demonstration"; it appealed for the reconquest of Liberty, "the most sacred possession of any civi­lized man".

It is useless to point out that for the Italian proletariat, already cruelly tried, this was an added defeat but unavoidable in such an unfavourable situation where in the class could only maintain itself in a defensive position with great difficulty. The number of strike days lost fell by 70 or 80% in relation to 1920.

In a series of incoherent turns, the Comintern one minute encouraged the ‘Third Internationalists' fraction of the old Socialist Party to split from the party and the next ordered them to stay in it and carry out fraction work. While the negotiations regarding fusion (which were to end in the creation of a party bearing the name Unified Communist Party of Italy) dragged on, the Comintern was pressing ahead with its indictment of ‘left-wing childishness'.

The opportunity for the manoeuvres for the Comintern to go unhindered arrived like manna from heaven in the form of fascism. In February 1923, after Mussolini had arrested Bordiga de Grieco and a number of other leaders who belonged to the left of the party, the Enlarged Executive of June 1923 was able to approve a provisional Executive Committee under Tasca and Graziadei: ‘trustworthy' men who would re­tain their functions in the Executive Committee after the freeing of the old leadership elected at Livorno and Rome.2

In Italy, as in France under Cachin, the International orientated itself towards the task of winning over the ‘masses' by supporting itself on the rotten edifice of Social Democracy. Obviously such tactics implied the removal of the communists who had founded its national sections by branding them as ‘left wing opportunists' because of their intransigent defence of principles.

What was being played out at this time was not a sordid game of power politics within the young communist parties, but a drama of colossal historic proportions: the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie or the dictatorship of the proletariat, fascism or communism. Alas, the final curtain was to fall on the historic scene to the disadvantage of the proletariat.

The new international line drawn up by Zinoviev characterizes the Social Democracy as the right wing of the workers' movement rather than as the left wing of the bourgeoisie. It scrubbed over the fact that Social Democracy at the head of the old organizations of the reformist period had, on 4 August 1914, gathered together all its forces into an anti-working class front committed to the salvation of bourgeois rule; that it had lent to the forces of reaction its Noskes, Scheidemans, Bohms and Peilds; that for the crushing of the Hungarian Soviet Republic it had provided Austria with a federal chancellor in the person of one K. Renner, who distinguished by rousing the peasantry against the workers. Thus, the Comintern ended up completely disorientating the working class, sowing the most terrible confusion in its ranks, with the tactic of the "Open Letter", of "forcing the reformists into a corner" of inviting them to form left wing electoral blocs, to fuse with the Communists, etc. Meanwhile, the bourgeoisie, taking advantage of a major respite in the class struggle, was able to bind up the wounds in its political apparatus.

Gramsci and anti-fascism

Shortly after the Enlarged Exutive had removed Bordiga from his position of leadership, Gramsci became the official representative of the Comintern within the Italian Party. In conformity with the directives of the International, he set about preparing the young Communist party for ‘anti-fascist resistance'. Thus the practice began of distinguishing between the fascist and anti-fascist wings of the bourgeoisie: the latter it was asserted, could be integrated into an ‘historic bloc', since according to Gramsci-ite theory the Italian proletariat could not become the ‘hegemonic' class unless it managed to create an alliance with non-monopolistic strata. (Lyon Theses, IlIrd Congress of the Italian Communist Party)

Following the murder of the Socialist Deputy, Matteori, by fascist henchmen in June 1924, the Communist and Socialist Parties resolutely decided to "withdraw to the Aventinno (ie leave parliament). Gramcis's circle within the party developed an analysis of the situation in Italy wherein it stressed the need for the party to regroup the maximum number of anti-capitalist workers around its factory cells to fight for the immediate objective of regaining basic civil liberties. While it was correct to affirm that the dictatorship of the prole­tariat was not on the immediate agenda, it was a fatal falsehood to claim that the re-establishment of bourgeois democracy would be beneficial to the next revolutionary offensive.

By leaving parliament, the Socialist and Communist, especially the right wing Gramsci-ites, hoped to be able to provoke the dismissal of Mussolini. It was as if they saw the presence of a representative of a totalitarian party in the Chamber of Deputies as a stain on the purity of bourgeois government.

It was, quite simply, a question of suppressing any reference to the dictatorship of the proletariat and replacing it with the transitional demand for a Constituent Assembly. The ‘United Front' line elaborated by Zinoviev was to lead to a ‘workers' government' like the one set up in Saxe-Thuringia in 1923, or at least to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. The Gramsci-Togliatti duumvirate eagerly buckled down to the job. Their analysis was as follows: the ‘Aventino' where an embryonic democratic state had been set up within the fascist state, was destined to serve as the constituent body of a federal republic of soviets with the aim of carrying out a strictly national policy: the completion of Italian unity. This leit-motif had pride of in Gramsci's analysis: for him the Italian Communist Party had to show that it alone was capable of finally resolving the problem of national unity, a task which had been left dangling in the air by three generations of bourgeois liberalism.

This falsehood was the great contribution of the man whom the epigones of self-management unhesitatingly refer to as "the most radical of the Italian revolutionaries". From the very start Gramsci attempted to translate the lessons of the Russian October into a strictly Italian language. This provincialization of the universal experience of the international proletariat; this refusal to see that the questions confronting the class could only be solved by the sword of world revo­lution - all this was part of Gramsci's effort to align himself with the defence of ‘Socialism in One Country', that spicy dish concocted by the great chef, Stalin.

The central theses defended by Gramsci were that fascism derived from the peculiarities of Italian history and of the economic structure of Italy, rather than from the international situation. All this was necessary in order for Gramsci to justify the Constituent Assembly as an intermediary stage between Italian capitalism and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Didn't Gramsci declare that "a class with an international character must to some extent nationalize itself"?

For Gramsci, there had to be a national Constituent Assembly where all the deputies from "all democratic classes of the country", elected by the whole people, would draw up the future Italian constitution. A Constituent Assembly where, in the company of men like don Sturzo, Secretary of the Italian Popular Party; of liberal figures like Salvemini and Gobeti; and all the Turattis, a ‘progressive' regime could be set in motion.

Speaking at the Vth World Congress of the Comintern, Bordiga demo­lished Gramsci's position which saw fascism as a feudalist reaction of the landpwning interests. Bordiga addressed an International about to take up the theory of ‘building socialism in the USSR', in the following terms:

"We must reject the illusion that a transitional government would be naive enough to allow a situation to occur in which, through legal means, parliamentary manoeuvres and more or less skilful expediency, we could lay siege to the bourgeoisie, ie legally deprive them of their whole technical and military apparatus, and quietly distribute arms to the workers. This is a truly infantile conception! Making' a revolution is not that simple!"

But Gramsci, in the name of anti-fascism, had begun a rapprochement with the Party of Action (de Guista e Liberta), and with the Sardinian Party with which, as an islander himself, he had long established ties. These dated back to October 1913 when Gramsci supported an anti-protectionist manifesto for Sardinia. In order to avoid the "serious errors" of those whom they accused of "an abstract and verbal extrem­ism", Gramsci-Togliatti erased from communist propaganda the only phrase which could accurately describe the situation: fascism or communism.

The origins and nature of fascism

Heaps of pseudo-scientific rubbish litter the desks of the historians, all describing the origins and peculiarity of the fascist ‘phenomenon'. Actually, the coming to power of fascism some fifty years ago hardly merits the title of a coup die-tat, an idea widely tossed about by Stalinism and its leftist apologists.

The National Fascist Party entered the bourgeois parliament thanks to the elections of May 1921, in other words by the most ‘legal' channels possible. It had the support of the great democrat, Giolitti, who, on 7 April, had dissolved the previous parliament. On his orders, administrative interference with and judicial pursuit of people under his protection ceased to take effect; the fascists could now act openly, sure of immunity in high places. And so Mussolini, sitting on the extreme right with 34 other fascist Deputies, came to make use of the parliamentary tribune. On 26 June 1921, he announced his break with the man who had guided his foot into the electoral stirrup, Giolitti, who nevertheless remained in close contact with the parliamentary group of the Fascist Party via the prefect of Milan, Luisgnoli. Moreover, this connivance was two-faced: Nitti was quite happy to receive, in broad daylight, a visit from Baron Avezzana, whom Mussolini had sent to him in the hope of forming a grand coalition.

As Trotsky once said, "The programme with which National Socialism came to power reminds one, alas, of one of those big Jewish shops in out-of-the-way provinces. There is nothing you can't find in it."3 The same applies to Italian fascism. At that time, fascism was an incredible pot-pourri, borrowing from left and right ideas absolutely traditional to Italy. Its programme included:

  • anti-clericalism, the demand for the confiscation of the goods of religious congregations. At the 1st Congress of the Fasci, in Florence on 9 October 1919, Marinetti had proposed the devatican­ization of the country in terms almost identical to those put forward by Cavour some 34 years before.

  • syndicalism, inspired by the ideas of Sorel, full of unbridled enthusiasm in praise of the ‘morality of the producer'. In light of the experience of the occupations, the fascists understood that it was necessary at all costs to associate the workers' unions with the technical and administrative functioning of industry.

  • the ideal of an enlightened Republic, its legitimacy based on universal suffrage, regional electoral lists and proportional representation. The fascists also stood for the right to vote and eligibility for women; and, true to fascism's cult of youth, it put forward the demand for the lowering of the voting age to 18, and of the age of eligibility of Deputies to 25.

  • anti-plutocratism, the threat of hitting big capital with a pro­gressive income tax (what was called ‘authentic partial expro­priation'), of revising all the contracts for war supplies and of confiscating 85% of profits acquired during the war.

The more a social programme is eclectic and rich in promise, the more numerous are its supporters. All kinds of people began to be drawn to fascism: nostalgic war veterans (the ‘arditti'), freemasons, futurists, anarcho-syndicalists.....All of them found a common denominator in a reactionary rejection of capitalism and its deca­dent parliamentary institutions. The hall of the San Sepolero, put at the fascists disposal by the Circle of Industrial and Commer­cial Interests, resounded with Mussolini's famous maxim: "We fascists have no pre-established doctrine; our doctrine is the deed." (23 March, 1919)

In the electoral sphere, fascism adopted the most varied and flexible tactics. In Rome it presented a candidate on the list of the National Alliance; in Verona and Padua it was for abstention; in Ferrare and Rovigo it joined the National Bloc; in Treviso it allied itself with the war veterans; in Milan it afforded itself the luxury of denoun­cing the demand for legal recognition of the workers' organizations, a hobby-horse so dear to leftist factions. The fascists said legal­ization would lead to the ‘strangulation' of those organizations!

Such was the nature of fascism in the early days, when whatever it may have been, it could hardly claim to be an independent political force with its own objectives. In particular, the fascists had to face up to one demand: the need to get rid of all propaganda which was embarrassing to the industrialists and which the ruling class found somewhat out of place in the propaganda of a party pledged to the re-establishment of social order. The ruling class had every reason to distrust a movement which, in order to attract the mass of workers and peasants, had been forced to make a spectacular show of contempt for social conformism. Fascism had to mature before it could meet the requirements of capital.

And so, this crude anti-clericalism, once so virulent in its atheistic outbursts, had its banners blessed in the nave of Milan Cathedral by Cardinal Ritti, the future Pope Pius XI4. From then on, not one fascist memorial, not one fascist rally, failed to receive the sprinkle of holy water. In 1929 the Lateran Pact was signed through which the regime recognized the Holy See's legal right to private property and granted it an indemnity of 750 million lira, plus the right to exact rent at 5% interest on capital of 100,000 lira. This appeased the Catholics and made them grateful to fascism for having reintroduced religious instruction into the curriculum of state schools. Now that Mussolini had shelved his anti-clerical passions, the Catholics dubbed him "the man of divine destiny". In all the churches of Italy, Te Deums were said for the successful completion of the task of national salvation to be carried out by fascism.

Likewise, this great republican movement rallied to the crown and the monarchy; on 9 May 1936 it offered the king and his descendants the title of Emperor of Ethiopia; and it gave representatives of the ruling dynasty official posts in the diplomatic corps.

This anarchistic, anti-party became the National Fascist Party with its pyramid of quadrumvires, hierarchs and podestats; showered honours upon state dignitaries; swelled the state bureaucracy with new mercenaries and parasites.

This anti-statism which in the beginning had proclaimed that the state was incapable of managing national affairs and public services, shortly declared that everything was part of the state. The cele­brated words:

"We've had enough of the state as railwayman, the state as postman, the state as insurance broker. We've had enough of the state exercising its functions at the expense of the Italian taxpayer and aggravating the exhaustion of our finances." (Speech of Udine at The Congress of Fasci at Fioul, 20 September, 1922)

gave way to:

"For the fascist, everything is in the state, and nothing human or spiritual exists or has any value outside the state." (The Italian Encyclopedia)

This pseudo-enemy of the wealthy, of war profiteers and of the shady deals which flourished so much in the Giolitti period, was soon decked out from head to toe by the captains of industry and agricul­ture, and this was long before the famous ‘March on Rome'. From the very beginning the propaganda of Popolo d'Italia was regularly subsi­dized by the big firms of the armaments and war-provisions industry: FIAT, ANSALDO, EDISON, who were interested in seeing Italy follow an interventionist policy. The patriotic cheques provided by Minister Guesde's emissary, M. Cachin, also helped the first issues of that Francophile journal to come out.

It is true that within the National fascist Party conflicts arose which sometime led to the formation of dissident groupings, This was, for a time at least, the case with certain provincial fascist cells, notably the one led by the triumvirum made up by Grandi and Baldo and partly also by the Confederation of Agriculture. This sort of thing easily led to the idea of an ‘agrarian' fascism'.

But fascism appeared from the beginning in the big, highly indust­rialized urban centres; only afterwards was it able to make its entry into the countryside in the form of a rural syndicalism -with a kind of plebeian emphasis. Its punitive expeditions always went from the towns to the villages: and the ‘squadrisiti' only became the masters of the villages after often bloody struggles. Actually, the internal struggles among the fascists expressed the contradic­tions between those petit-bourgeois anarchistic elements of fascism who had been ruined by the war and the factions which arose to fulfill the general interests of the ruling class for economic concentration carried out by the state.

Thus, those old ‘comrades' who showed themselves good for nothing except wallowing in the old glories or wielding the cudgel against all comers, were to taste in turn the paternal rod. You have to be cruel to be kind. And, having put on a left face, fascism now began to move to the right over the heads of those who did not understand that the movement would squander all the fruits of its victories if it lost its sense of proportion. And the ‘right' proportion for fascism was anything which guaranteed the profits of capital.

Behind all the leftist mythology lies the indisputable fact that fascism was not a preventative counter-revolution carried out with the conscious aim of crushing a proletariat on the verge of des­troying the capitalist system. In Italy it was not the Blackshirts who put an end to the revolution; it was the failure of the inter­national working class which led to the victory of fascism, not only in Italy, but also in Germany and Hungary. It was only after the failure of the factory occupations movement, in the autumn of 1920, that repression came down on the heads of the Italian workers; this repression was carried out by two factions; the legally constituted forces of the democratic state, and the fascist squadristi.

Only after the defeat of the working class did the fascists really get going, thanks to the largesse doled out to them by the employers and the facilities granted them by the public authorities. At the end of 1919, the fascists had been on the verge of the void, with only 30 cells and rather less than 1,000 members; but in the last months of 1920 their numbers multiplied many times over to include 3,200 ‘fasci' containing 300,000 members.

It was Mussolini, of course, who became the ‘chosen one' for the Confederation of Industry and the Confederation of Agriculture, the Bankers' Association, government deputies and such glorious national figures as General Diaz and Admiral Thaon di Revel. It was Mussolini whom big capital put in the driver's seat and not someone like d'Annunzio whose nationalist adventures were unanimously repudiated by the bourgeoisie during the Christmas period, 1920. The poet of the ‘Naval Odes', (‘Arm the prows and set sail towards the world'), was allowed only to compose lyrical hymns to the medi­ocre Italian conquests in Africa; he was given the job of keeping the flag of nationalism burning, but not of finishing off the massacre of the workers. This role fell to Mussolini, ex-atheist, ex-libertarian, ex-left wing intransigent, ex-director of Avanti.

For marxism, there is no ‘mystery' in fascism which cannot be understood and denounced in front of the working class.

The trade unions during the fascist period

In the last weeks of 1920 the fascist offensive against the organi­zations and associations under the control of the Socialist Party, doubled in intensity. Once again the witch-hunting of the ‘Bolsheviks' got underway with a vengeance; Socialist leaders were molested, and, if they resisted, were cowardly assassinated; the headquarters of the Socialist papers, the Labour Ministry, the buildings of the co­operatives and Peasant Leagues were burned down and pillaged. And all this happened with the direct connivance of the democratic state which protected the fascist gangs with its own rifles and machine guns.

Confident of the bourgeois state's support, fascism quickly assumed control of the essential cogs of that state. It simply took over, by force if necessary, the state institutions which had previously so faithfully served the policies of the imperialist bourgeoisie of Italy.

Fascism made a big show of the very real interest it had in the trade unions by signing the Pacification Pact on 2 August, 1921. On that day, representatives of the National Council of Fasci, the Socialist Party, the Parliamentary Fascist and Socialist groups, and the Italian General Federation of Labour, together with the President of the Chamber, De Nicola, met in Rome and agreed not to surrender the streets to "outbursts of violence, nor to excite extremist partisan feelings" (Article Two). The two sides also agreed to "reciprocally respect each other's economic organizations" (Article Four). Each side recognized in their adversary a living force in national life, a force to be reckoned with. Everybody agreed to try to avoid con­frontation.

By endorsing the Pacification Pact, all the political forces of the bourgeoisie, both the right and the left, showed that they understood the need to bury the working class, once and for all, by means of this pact for civil peace. Still not completely crushed the working class had fallen back to a defensive position; but the workers' resistance grew more and more difficult as the days went by. Inspite of these unfavourable conditions, the Italian proletariat continued to struggle every inch of the way against both the ‘legal' and ‘illegal' faces of reaction.

Turatti, while still putting his hopes on the formation of a coali­tion government supported by the ‘reformists' arrived at the following self-justification: "It takes courage to be a coward!" On 10 August the Socialist Party leadership - the same people whom the Comintern would later approach in order to ‘strengthen' the revolutionary move­ment - officially approved the Pacification Pact, The readers of the ‘anti-clerical' Avanti were then treated to an original serial called ‘The Life of Jesus', which, according to Pappini, was designed to make the pill of ‘pacification' easier to swallow.

The scenario of this ‘comedia del'arte'was played out in the follow­ing manner: the first actors openly used military force against a proletariat which was weakened and in retreat; the next exhorted the class to do nothing that might provoke the enemy, to undertake no illicit actions which might serve as a pretext for new and more violent attacks by the fascists. How many strikes were suspended by the Italian General Federation of Labour in agreement with stipulations imposed by the Socialist Party? It is impossible to keep count of them. In the face of a military offensive and attacks by the bosses in the form of lay-offs and wage cuts, the bourgeois left continued its work of sabotaging the workers' struggle. For example, the Italian Federation of Metallurgical Workers (FIOM) deemed lay-offs and wage cuts to be part of the natural order of life and consequently tailored its demands to fit the objective financial situation of each enterprise. (This was called the articulation tactic.)

Even the Alliance of Labour in which the Communist Party had had such high hopes ascribed to this programme for the salvation of the capitalist economy. It derailed strikes and moderated its agitation. All of these moves were recognized and vigorously denounced by the Communist Left.

What then was the proletariat to do? The answer given by the Social Democratic organizations was simple and obvious: regroup for the nth time on the electoral terrain, defeat the fascists via the ballot-box, and so facilitate the formation of an anti­fascist government containing a few Socialist leaders. Assured of a convincing victory, Mussolini himself` was in favour of such a ‘peaceful' confrontation:

"The spectre of elections is more than enough to befuddle the old parliamentarians, who are already campaigning for an alliance with us. With this bait, we will be able to do what we like with them. We were born yesterday, but we are still more intelligent than them." (Journal)

 

The march on Rome

Towards the end of October 1922, everything had been carefully pre­pared for Mussolini to come quietly to power under royal auspices. During the epic March on Rome (in railway coaches), which had been announced as early as the beginning of September at Blackshirt meetings and processions, the squadristi were met by official repre­sentatives of the state at the stations of Cremona, Merano, and Trento. In Trieste, Padua and Venice the authorities marched shoulder­to-shoulder with the fascists; in Rome the military quartermaster fed and housed the Blackshirts in the barracks.

Once installed in power, fascism demanded the loyal collaboration of the Italian General Federation of Labour. The powerful rail­waymen's union was the first to accept the fascist's call for a truce; its lead was soon followed by other union federations. And so, without having to resort to an armed insurrection, fascism was able to take over the main positions of the state apparatus. Mussolini as President of the Council also kept for himself the portfolios of Minister of the Interior and of Foreign Affairs; his close com­rades-in-arms were given the other important ministries - Justice, Finance, ‘Liberated' Territories.

Fascism was simply a change-over in the leadership of the bourgeois state. After the change-over, fascism was in a better position to make the workers taste the bile of intensified exploitation. In doing so, it used the whips and cudgels the Socialists had made with their own hands. The fascist state was therefore nothing but a form of organization resorted-to by the bourgeoisie in order to maintain capitalist accumulation in a situation in which parliamentary govern­ment was no longer feasible and had to give way to an overt dictator­ship.

The economy in the fascist period

All that fascism really did was to accelerate the objective process leading towards the fusion of the trade unions with the bourgeois state. For the trade unionists and social democrats no less than for the fascists, the class straggle was simply an obstacle in the way of those who wanted to find a solution to the problems of the national economy. Thus fascism put the trade unions at the service of the nation just as the latter had done on their own initiative during the post-war economic recession. The social gospel of solid­arity between the classes was preached by both the fascists and the trade unions.

Formally speaking, the economy during the fascist period was based on the corporate principle, according to which particular interests had to be subordinated to the general interest. In place of the class struggle, corporatism stood for the union of classes and a national bloc of all the sons of the fatherland. It tried to persuade the workers to exert themselves selflessly for the supreme interests of Italy. The Charter of Labour, adopted in 1921 recognized the state as the sole agency for the elaboration and application of labour policies; any factional struggle, any particularistic settlements outside the state were excluded. Henceforward, conditions of employment and payment were regulated through the collective contract established by the Charter.

 

Fascism stood for the construction of an Economic Parliament composed of members elected according to their trade. This is why it attracted into its ranks many of the leading Sorelian syndicalists. These people found in this ‘daring' project a vindication of their principles of apoliticism and of trade union independence from political parties.

 

Thus corporatism appeared at a time of world crisis as a form of direct state intervention in the economy, which at the same time sought to force the working class into submission and obedience. The non-­marxist, Gramsci, has to ask himself, "Is this the only way the pro­ductive forces of industry can be developed under the leadership of the traditional ruling classes?"5 It totally escaped the author of The (Russian) Revolution Against (Marx's) Capital, that capitalism was in decadence and that fascism was nothing but a mode of survival for capital.

 

The year 1926 marked the beginning of great economic battles which aimed at protecting the internal market of Italy through limiting the importation of food products and manufactured goods by developing industrial sectors which had previously proven unable to satisfy the needs of the internal market. The results of this reorganization were largely eclipsed by its negative side-effects; prices rose to a level above that of the world market. Thus, the mere resort to statist manipulations did not resolve any of the economic problems of a country poor in natural resources. In addition, the only rewards Italy had received from her participation in the imperialist war were a few territories which served neither as commercial outlets nor as a means of getting rid of her surplus work-force.

The strengthening of customs duties, draconian control over exchange rates, the granting of subsides, state orders, and, as a corollary, the freezing of wages - amounted to a continuation of policies which had grown up during the war. Under the pressure of economic necessity the state had to become a builder of factories, supplier of raw materials, planner of the market, sole buyer of production, sometimes even paying for it in advance, legislator, etc., etc. The state had become the centre of gravity of an enormous, impersonal productive apparatus, before which everyone, even those still attached to the principles of free enterprise, the creative spirit of the industri­alists, had to bow the knee. For these reasons the habits of ‘liberal' life, of ‘democratic' practice, were replaced by the activity of the state. This was the soil in which fascism could bloom.

If an enterprise fell under the dark shadow of bankruptcy, the state would step forward to buy back its assets. If one sector was to be developed more than another, the state would issue its imperious directives. If it was necessary to block the importation of grain, the state would oblige by making a unique kind of bread whose yeast content it would fix in advance. If the lira needed to be revalued, the state would give it parity with the franc despite the warnings of the financiers. The state stimulated the concentration of enterprises; it made concentration obligatory in the iron and steel industry; it was a landowner; it put blocks on immigration; it put colonists in places where it was trying "to create a new, organic, powerful system of demographic colonization which would bring with it all the benefits of civilization"6; finally, it monopolized foreign trade.

By the end of 1926, the most important part of the Italian economy was in the hands of state or quasi-state committees: Institute for Industrial Reconstruction, National Council of Research, Cotton Institute, National Cellolose Council, Italian General Oil Company. A number of these councils had the task of procuring substitute products for the Italian economy: synthetic wool, artificial silk and cotton.

This whole programme of economic autarky, which sent many intelligent men into ecstasy at the time, was in fact Italy's preparation for World War II.

Italian imperialism

The imperialist decadence of capitalism which ravages humanity is forced, by its own relentless logic, to give birth to crises and wars, explosions indicating the growing contradictions of the system. This situation necessitates a bourgeoisie armed to the teeth.

Fascist Italy could not abstain from arming herself without renoun­cing her imperialist ‘rights' on the world arena. And these ‘rights' added up to a thick catalogue of demands. So that Italy could enjoy her ancestral birthright, Mussolini wanted to transform her into a power to be reckoned with in the Mediterranean basin, a power stretching eastward to the Balkans and Anatolia.

The USA, Britain and France intensified their armaments programme while at the same time waving the olive branch. They looked for a redivision of the world at the same time as uttering unctuous phrases about the ‘security of nations' and ‘international arbitration' under the benign auspices of the League of Nations. But Fascist Italy did not hesitate to announce openly its intentions: the mobilization of "eight million bayonets" of "masses of planes and torpedos":

"The fundamental duty of Fascist Italy is precisely to prepare all her armed forces on land, sea, and air ... When, between 1935 and 1940, we will have reached a supreme moment in the history of Europe, we will be in a position to make our voice heard and to see our rights recognized at last." (Mussolini's Speech to the Chamber, 27 May 1927)

Imperialist herself, Italy knew the score when the other members of the League of Nations ‘solemnly' committed themselves to reducing their armaments under international control; when the American government tried to get all countries to condemn war as "... illegal and to commit themselves to the renunciation of war and the use of litigation in international affairs." (The Kellog Pact, 27 August 1927)

Fascism recognized perfectly well that the problems which most affect a nation's life are problems of power and not of justice; that they are settled through the clash of arms and not through some mythic grace, whatever the Wilsonian idealists might claim. The young fascist militia men could read in the first phrase of their ‘Ten Commandments': "A real fascist, in particular a militia man, must not believe in perpetual peace". In the newspapers, in the cinemas at university graduation ceremonies, at sports meetings, the same message was hammered home: after having won the battle of 1914-18, Italy must continue her forward march.

 

If the state was already at the centre of social life, this trend accelerated greatly with the development of the army, navy and airforce on the eve of World War II. Even if we take into account the devaluation of the lira, Italy was spending twice as much on war production than on the eve of the Ethiopian War.

 

The Duce had warned the whole nation of the inevitability of war, of the need for severe sacrifices by the proletariat. After Italy had transgressed the sacrosanct principles of the Geneva Convention by invading Abyssinia, the 51 ‘democratic' nations sanctioned a commercial embargo against Italy. This allowed Mussolini to intensify his own crusade against the nations who had taken the pledge of ‘security'. Since this hypocritical application of sanctions did not ban the sale of coal, steel, oil and iron (ie all the goods indispensable to the armaments economy), fascism was able to reply with the mobilization of the workers around its programme.7

(To be continued)

R.C.



Note: (Benjie)

I cannot find where to put the footnote number 11 (6). I cannot find any footnote 11 (6) above.

11. Military budget in millions of liras (same source as for note 10)

1933 ...... 4,822 1936 16,357

1934 ......5,590 1937 13,370

1935 ...... 12,624 1938 15,030



1 Lenin, ‘Imperialism and the Split in Socialism' in Against the Current, Bureau d'Editions, T 11, p,262.



2 The Trotsky who wrote "The Central Committees of the left of many parties were dethroned as abusively as they had been installed before the Vth Congress" in The Communist International After Lenin, should have paused to consider his role in the policies of this kind.



3 ‘What Is National Socialism?', Trotsky, 10 June, 1933. Supplements a la Quatrieme Internationale, T 111 of Ecrits.

4 Elected by the Conclave of 6 February, 1922, Pius XI soon got down to business. Apostolic Nonce in Poland during 1918-21, ie during the civil war and victorious offensive of the Red Army, he vowed his undying hatred for a proletariat which had laid sacriligious hands on the state created on 11 November, 1919 by Versailles, in order to drive a wedge between Soviet Russia and the German Revolution.



5 ‘Il materialismo storico e la filosofia di B. Croce'.

6 The plan of May 17, 1938. From the end of that year 20,000 peasants from Pouilles, Sicily and Sardinia were working in Lybia on 1,800 rural enterprises composing 54,000 hectares under cultivation. In Lybia, the total number of Italians reached 120,000; in Ethiopia, there were 93,550, and so on. ‘L'imperialisme colonial italien de 1870 a nos jours', JL Miege, SEDES, 1968, p.250.

 

7 "The Italian workers have thus been presented with a choice between Italian imperialism and English imperialism, which is trying to act under the cover of the League of Nations. It is not a class dilemma which confronts the Italian proletariat, a dilemma which it could surmount inspite of the terrible difficulties it faces today; rather, it is a dilemma between two imperialist powers, and it is in no way surprising that, prevented by the counter-revolutionary policies of the two parties (the ‘centrists' as the Italian left called the Stalinists at that time, and the Socialists) from finding its own path, the proletariat, forced to make a choice, should opt for Italian imperialism, because for them the defeat of Italy would mean that their own lives, and the lives of their families, would be in peril, and that they would face an even greater deterioration of their living standards." (‘One Month After the Application of Sanctions' in Bilan )



Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary wave, 1917-1923 [15]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Third International [24]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Fascism [25]

The degeneration of the Russian Revolution

  • 4287 reads

In the second issue of Forward (Spring 1974), the theoretical magazine of the Revolutionary Workers' Group (RWG*), there appears an international exchange between the International. Communist Current (lnternacionalismo: ‘Defence of the Proletarian Character of the October Revolution' and the RWG (‘Where lnternacionalismo goes wrong on the Russian Revolution). In their criticism of our article, the RWG raises important questions without being able to offer a framework for an overall understanding of the Russian experience.

Revolutionaries do not analyse history for its own sake, nor to dis­cover ‘what they would have done had they been there', but to learn along with the rest of the working class, the lessons from the expe­rience of the workers' movement so as to better define the path for future struggle.

The article from our Current, ‘In Defence of the Proletarian Character of the October Revolution', without any pretensions to being an exhaustive analysis on the complex question of the Russian Revolution, sought to clarify one essential point: that the Russian revolution was an experience of the proletariat and not a bourgeois revolution, that it was an integral part of the revolutionary wave that shook capitalism all over the world from 1917 to the early twenties. The Russian Revo­lution is not a ‘bourgeois action' that we can smugly ignore or fail to analyse; it would be disastrous for revolutionaries today in rejecting Stalinism, to reject the tragic history of their own class. The fixation of the Stalinists and Trotskyists, the carriers of counter­revolutionary ideology, on the so-called "material gains" of October and the ‘Workers' State' in order to justify the defence of Russian state capitalism or the demoralized rejection of all proletarian roots of the October revolution which is often espoused by the followers of the councilist tradition, are both unacceptable mystifications of the reality of revolutionary efforts.

With the recognition of the proletarian character of the October Revo­lution must come the realization that the Bolshevik party, which was in the forefront of the international left defending revolutionary class positions during the First World War and in 1917, was a prole­tarian party of the revolutionary wave. With the defeat of the inter­national working class uprisings, the isolated Russian bastion suffered a counter-revolution from within and the Bolshevik party, the leaders of the international communist left in 1919, degenerated into a party of the bourgeois camp.

Despite the unfortunately, often unreadable, translation of the Interna­cionalismo article in Forward, these central ideas do stand out. But Forward really does not want to discuss the problem of the proletarian nature of October with which they agree, but rather the counter­revolutionary nature of later events. They have chosen the wrong article on which to hang their analyses because the Internacionalismo article deals only peripherally with that question. No one article in our publications is sufficient to deal with all the problems of history. But it is with genuine surprise that we read: "For the Internacionalismo comrades as for the Trotskyists and Bordigists there exists an insurmountable wall between the ‘days of Lenin' and the ‘days of Stalin'. For them, the proletariat could not have fallen until Lenin was safely in his tomb and Stalin was clearly head of the RCP." (Forward, no 2, p.42). Indeed, we recognize that this touching article of faith is to be found among the various Trotskyist groups from which the Forward comrades sprang out but it is no part of our Current:

"The Bolshevik party leaders' lack of understanding of the role of the soviets (workers' councils) and their erroneous conception of how class consciousness develops contributed to the process of the degeneration of the Russian Revolution. This process eventu­ally transformed the Bolshevik party, which had been the authentic avant-garde of the Russian proletariat in 1917, into the active instrument of the counter-revolution ... From the very beginning of the revolution the Bolshevik party was oriented towards transforming the soviets into organs of the party-state." (Declaracion de Principios, Internacionalismo)

And elsewhere:

"The October Revolution fulfilled the first task of a proletarian revolution: the political objective. Because of the defeat of the international revolution and the impossibility of socialism in one country, it could not go on to a higher stage, that is, provoking process of economic transformation.....If the Bolshevik party played an active role in the revolutionary process leading to October, it also played an active role in the degeneration of the revolution and in the international defeats.....By identifying itself organically and ideologically with the state and by seeing its task as primarily the defence of the state, the Bolshevik party was to become - especially after the end of the civil war - increasingly the agent of the counter-revolution and state capitalism." (Plateforme, Revolution Internationale)

It should be clear, then, from these excerpts, that the path towards counter-revolution was process whose seeds were sown early on with the stifling of the power of the soviets, and with the suppression of the self-activity of the proletariat; a process which led to the massacre by the state of a section of the working class at Kronstadt - all during Lenin's lifetime.

Why then did this degeneration of the Russian Revolution take place? The answer cannot be found in the framework of one nation, in Russia alone. Just as the Russian Revolution was the first bastion of the international revolution in 1917, the first in a series of interna­tional proletarian uprisings, its degeneration into counter-revolution was also the expression of an international phenomenon - the activity of an international class, the proletariat.

In the past, bourgeois revolutions developed the nation-state as the logical framework for the development of capital, and bourgeois revo­lutions could occur with a hundred year or more interval between different countries. The proletarian revolution, on the contrary, is by its very essence an international revolution, which must go forward to incorporate the entire world or quickly perish.

The first imperialist world war, signaling the end of the period of capitalist ascendency, marked the absolute point of no return for the workers' movement of the nineteenth century and its immediate objectives. Popular discontent against the war became rapidly politicized into frontal attacks against the state in key countries in Europe. But the majority of the proletariat was unable to cast off the relics of the past (adherence to the policies of the Second International, which was now in the camp of its class enemy) and to fully understand the impli­cations of the new era. Neither the proletariat as whole nor its political organizations fully understood the needs of the proletarian struggle in the new age of "war and revolution", "socialism or barbarism". Despite the heroic struggles of the proletariat in this period, the tide of the revolution was drowned in the massacre of the working class in Europe. The fact that the Russian Revolution was the beacon for all the working class in that epoch did not alter the fact that its isolation was a serious danger. Even a temporary gap between revolutionary outbreaks can have its dangers, but by 1920 the gap was becoming
increasingly unbridgeable.

Within the all-important context of the international retreat and the isolation of the Russian Revolution the very grave errors of the Bolsheviks played their role. These errors must be related to the experience and struggle of the class itself. The error or positive features of a class organization do not fall from the sky or just happen to develop arbitrarily. In the broadest sense they are the reflection of the class consciousness of the proletariat as a whole. The Bolshevik party was forced to evolve both theoretically and politically by the upsurge of the Russian proletariat in 1917 and the promise of international events in Germany and elsewhere. The party also re­flected the isolation and decimation of the proletariat in the period of the growing victory of the counter-revolution. Whether we deal with the Bolsheviks or the Spartacists or any political organization as a whole, faced with the new tasks of the period of decadence following the First World War, their incomplete understanding provided the groundwork for grievous political errors.

But the party of the proletariat is not simply a passive reflection of consciousness; it is an active factor in the development and spreading of that consciousness, We can see for example that the clear expres­sion of class goals by the Bolsheviks in the period of the First World War ("turn the imperialist war into a civil war") and during the revo­lutionary period (opposition to the bourgeois democratic government, "all power to the Soviets", the formation of the Communist Internatio­nal on the basis of a revolutionary programme) contributed to the def­inition of the road to victory. However, in the context of the de­cline of the revolution wave, the positions the Bolsheviks took up (alliance with centrist factions internationally, unionism, parliamentarism, united front tactics, Kronstadt) contributed to the acceleration of the counter-revolutionary process on an internation1 level as well as specifically in Russia. Once the crucible of proletarian praxis was excluded by the victory of the counter-revolution in Europe, the errors of the Russian Revolution were cut off from any further evolution. The Bolshevik party became the very instrument of the counter-revolution.

Because there is no possibility of socialism in one country, the ques­tion of the degeneration of the Russian Revolution is above all a question of the international defeat of the working class. The counter-revolution triumphed in Europe before it fully penetrated the Russian context ‘from within'. This does not, let us repeat, ‘excuse' the errors of the Russian Revolution or the Bolshevik party: for that matter it does not ‘excuse' the failure of the German or Italian pro­letariat to make the revolution either. Marxists are not concernedwith ‘excusing' or not ‘excusing' history but with explaining why events happened and drawing the lessons for future proletarian struggle. This general international framework is missing from the analyses of the RWG pamphlet which discusses the Revolution and Counter-revolution in Russia almost exclusively in Russian terms. Although this may seem to be a helpful way to theoretically isolate a particular problem, it offers no framework for understanding why things happened in Russia and leads to turning round in a vacuum about the purely Russian phenomena which emerged. As Rosa Luxemburg wrote, "In Russia the problem could only be posed. It could not he solved in Russia."

Specific aspects of the degeneration of the revolution

In the confines of this article we will necessarily have to limit our­selves to a general over-view of the process of degeneration, leaving aside the details of various episodes.

The Russian Revolution was first and foremost seen as the avant-garde victory of the international struggle of the working class. In March 1919, the Bolsheviks called the First Congress of a new Communist International to mark the break with the traitorous Social Democracy and to join together the forces of revolution for the coming struggle. Unfortunately the workers' revolt in Germany had already been massacred in January 1919 and the tide of revolution was ebbing. Still, despite the almost total blockade of Russia and the distorted news reaching the Russian proletariat from the West, the revolution put its faith to the only hope for survival - the international unity of revolutio­nary forces under a clear programme of class goals:

"The soviet system assures the possibility of genuine proletarian democracy, democracy for the proletariat and within the proletariat, directed against the bourgeoisie. In this system the dominant place is given to the industrial proletariat and it is to this class that the role of ruling class belongs, because of its organization and its political consciousness and because its political hegemony will allow the semi-proletariat and poor peasants to gradually raise their consciousness."

"The indispensable pre-conditions for victorious struggle are: the break not only with the direct lackeys of capital and the executio­ners of the communist revolution - the right-wing social democrats - but also the break with the "Center" (Kautsky's Group) which at the critical moment abandoned the proletariat and joined the class enemy." (Platform of the Communist International, 1919)

This was the position in 1919 before the later alliances with centrists, which opened the party and the International to them and finally ended in the ‘united front'.

"Colonial slaves of Africa and Asia: the day of the proletarian dictatorship in Europe will dawn for you as the day of your deli­verance." (Manifesto of the Communist International, 1919)

Not the other way round as the ‘leftists' would have it today, fol­lowing the counter-revolutionary formulations on national liberation of the degenerating International.

"We ask all the workers of the world to unite under the banner of communism which is already the banner of the first proletarian victories, for all countries!" (Ibid)

Not socialism in one country.

"Under the banner or workers' councils, of the revolutionary struggle for power and the dictatorship of the proletariat, under the banner of the Third International, workers of the world, unite!" (Ibid)

These positions reflected the tremendous step forward the proletariat had made in the previous years. The positions put forward and defend by the Bolsheviks were often a clear departure from their previous programmes and were a clarion call to the whole class to recognize the new political needs of the revolutionary situation.

But by 1920 at the Second Congress of this same International, the Bolshevik leaders had made an about-face back to the ‘tactics' of the past. The hope of revolution was rapidly weakening and the Bolshevik party now defended the 21 Conditions for membership in the International, including: the recognition of national liberation struggles, of electoral participation. of infiltration of the unions; in short, a refurbishing of the Social Democratic programme, which was entirely inadequate for the new situation. The Russian party became the over­riding force and focus of the International and the Amsterdam Bureau was closed down. Above all, the Bolshevik leadership succeeded in isolating the left communists: the Italian left faction under Bordiga, the English comrades around Pankhurst and Pannekoek, Gorter and the KAPD (which was excluded at the Third Congress). The Bolsheviks and the dominant forces of the International were in favour of joining with the ambivalent, traitorous centrists they had denounced only two years ago. With their manoeuvres and slanders of the left the Bol­sheviks effectively scuttled any attempt at creating a principled basis for communist parties in England. France, Germany and elsewhere. By these actions the road was opened to the ‘united front' of the Fourth Congress in 1922, and finally the defence of the Russian home­land and ‘socialism in one country'.

Another point in the process of counter-revolution was the signing of the secret Treaty of Rapallo with German militarism, Whatever the analysis of the positive and negative points of the Treaty of Brest-­Litovsk, it was made in full daylight after lengthy debates among the Bolsheviks and was immediately announced to the world proletariat as an unavoidable step imposed by critical circumstances. But only four years later, the Treaty of Rapallo, (a secret military treaty with the German state), betrayed all that Bolshevism had stood for. The seeds of counter-revolution were sown with the speed characteristic of a revolutionary period when great changes are compressed into a few years or even months. Finally, all life left the body of the Communist International when the doctrine of ‘socialism in one country' was declared the international (sic) programme of the once so coura­geously defended International.

The whole violent history of the Communist International cannot be re­duced to a saga of machiavellian Bolsheviks who deliberately schemed to betray the working class either in Russia or internationally. His­tory cannot be explained by these childish notions. The working class, although it gave life to many who fought clearly for the interests of their fellow worker, did and eventually could not rise up to purify its own organizations because of the very defeat that sparked the political debasement of revolutionary principles.

Marx and Engels realized that a party or an International cannot last as an instrument of the class when a period of reaction sets in. This instrument of the class cannot remain as an organizational unity when there is no praxis of the class - it becomes permeated with the re­treat or defeat and eventually serves confusion or the counter-revolu­tion. That is why Marx disbanded the Communist League after the revolutionary wave of 1848 subsided and scuttled the First Internatio­nal (by sending it off to New York) when the defeat of the Paris Com­mune in 1871 signaled the end of a period. The Second International, despite its genuine contribution to the workers' movement, suffered a long process of corruption within the period of capitalist ascendency as it became more and more tied to reformism and a national focus for each party. The definitive passage to the bourgeois camp came with the 1914 war and the International's collaboration with the imperia­list war effort. During these times of working class crisis, the continuous task of elaborating theory and developing class conscious­ness fell to revolutionary fractions of the class, coming from the old organization and preparing the groundwork for a new one. The Third International was built on the promise of the revolutionary wave of the years after the First World War but the defeat of revolutionary efforts and the victory of the counter-revolution spelled its doom as a class instrument. The process of counter-revolution was com­pleted (although it began earlier) with the declaration of ‘socialism in one country' - the definitive end of the objective possibility of revolutionary fractions being able to remain in the International and the death knell of an entire an entire period.

Bourgeois ideology can seep into the proletarian struggle because of the force of the ruling class' ideological domination in society. But once an organization has definitively passed into the bourgeois camp, the path is closed for any possible ‘regeneration'. Just as no living fractions expressing proletarian class consciousness can arise from a bourgeois organization - which today includes the Stalinists, Trot­skyist and Maoist parties (although individuals may be able to make the break) - so the Communist International and all the communist par­ties which remained in it were irrevocably lost to the proletariat,

This process is easier to see with hindsight than it unfortunately was at the time, either for the class as a whole, or for many of its more political elements. We cannot write history by hoping to read back into the past what fifty years of distance has taught. The process of counter-revolution which claimed the Communist International has produ­ced terrible confusion in the workers' movement for the last fifty years or more. Even those who carried on the work of theoretical ela­boration in the dark years of the thirties and forties, the remnants of the left communist movement, were slow to see the full implications of the period of defeat. Let the arrogant ‘modernists'1 who ‘figured it all out' in 1974 or 1975 teach the shadows what history should have been like.

The Russian context

The international programme of the Bolsheviks, their role in the coun­ter-revolutionary process internationally, is practically ignored in the RWG pamphlet Revolution and Counter-revolution in Russia and is only fleetingly mentioned in the Forward text. For these comrades, the counter-revolution was essentially defined by the NEP (New Econo­mic Policy). The NEP was, for them, the "watershed in the history of the Soviet Union. It is the year that capitalism was restored, the political dictatorship defeated and the Soviet Union ceased to be a workers' state." (Revolution and Counter-revolution in Russia, p.7) First let it be said that whatever the events in the Russian context were, and whatever influence they may have had on proletarian consciousness elsewhere, an international revolution or an Interna­tional does not die because of a wrong economic policy in one coun­try. The reader of the RWG texts will look in vain for any coherent framework in which to analyse the NEP or the unfolding of events in Russia in general.

The degeneration of the revolution on Russian soil expressed itself in the gradual but deadly decline of the soviets and their reduction to a mere appendage of the Bolshevik state party. The self-activity of the proletariat, working class democracy within the soviet system, was the very basis of the victory of October. But as early as 1918 the signs were clear that the political power and expression of the workers' councils were being curtailed and eventually crushed by the state machine. This process of the decline of the soviets in Russia led to the massacre of a part of the working class at Kronstadt. Not so strangely, the RWG fixated on the NEP, does not even mention the Kronstadt slaughter in relation to the Russian state, There is no mention of Kronstadt in either of these two main texts on Russia just as there is not a word on Rapallo. It is perhaps understandable that the comrades of the RWG, fresh from Trotskyist dogma, did not, at the time that they wrote these articles, understand that Kronstadt was not the ‘counter-revolutionary mutiny' that Lenin and Trotsky said it was. It is less understandable, however, that they accuse our comrades in Internacionalismo of not being able to see "the dege­neration of the revolution in Lenin's lifetime!"

The fundamental error of the Bolshevih party in Russia was the concep­tion that power should be exercised by a minority of the class - the party. They believed that the party could bring socialism to the class and they did not see that the class as a whole, organized in worers' councils, is the subject of socialist transformation. This conception of the party taking state power was shared by the entire left, to one degree or another, including Rosa Luxemburg, up to the writings of the KAPD in 1921. The Russian experience of party-power, which the prole­tariat paid for in blood, marks the definitive class line on the ques­tion of a party or minority of the class taking power ‘in the name of the working class'. Henceforth it became the hallmark of revolutio­nary fractions of the class that the party and the state were not to be confused and, later on, that the role of political organizations of the class was to contribute to class consciousness and not to substi­tute themselves for the class as a whole.

The historical class interests of the working class as the destroyer of capitalism were not always absolutely clear from the outset, and could not have been, because proletarian political consciousness is constantly hindered by pressure from dominant bourgeois ideology, Thus Marx wrote the Communist Manifesto without seeing that the proletariat could not take over and use the bourgeois state machine. The living experience of the Paris Commune was needed to irrevocably prove that the proletariat must destroy the bourgeois state in order to exercise its dictatorship over society. In the same way, the question of the role of the party was debated in the workers' movement up to 1917 but the Russian experience marked the class line on this question. All those who today repeat or preach the repetition of Bolshevik errors are on the other side of the class line.

What the Russian state destroyed with the stifling of the soviets was no more or less than the very impetus of socialism itself. Without the organized, autonomous activity of the class as a whole, any hope of regeneration on the Russian scene was gradually eliminated. The economic policy of the Bolsheviks was debated, changed, modified but their political thrust in Russia, however, was unchanging, funda­mental process of digging the revolution's grave. The seriousness of this process can be seen by the fact that the Russian tragedy was played out within the context of international defeat.

The dictatorship of the proletariat

One of The first and primary lessons to be drawn from the entire revo­lutionary experience of the post-World War I period is that the prole­tarian struggle is above all an international struggle and that the dictatorship of the proletariat (in one area or world-wide) is first and foremost a political question.

The proletariat, unlike the bourgeoisie is an exploited, not an exploi­ting class and thus has no economic privileges upon which to base its class destiny. The bourgeois revolutions were essentially the political recognition of an economic fait accompli - that the capitalist class had become the economically dominant class in society over a period of years prior to the actual moment of revolution. The prole­tarian revolution undertakes an economic transformation of society from a political point of departure - the dictatorship of the proletariat, which has no economic privileges to defend, either in the old society or in the new and has only its organized force and class consciousness, its political power through the workers' councils with which to guide the transformation of society. The destruction of bourgeois power and the expropriation of the bourgeoisie must be a world-wide victory before genuine social transformation can he carried out under the aegis of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The fundamental economic law of capitalist society, the law of value, is a product of the entire capitalist world market and cannot, in any way, shape or form, be eliminated in one country (ever one of the highly developed countries) or in any group of countries - only on a world-wide basis. There is absolutely no getting away from this fact - not even by paying lip-service to it and then ignoring it to talk about the possibility of abolishing money or wage labour (the direct outgrowth of the law of value and the capitalist system as a whole), straight away in one country. The transformation of society follows and does not precede the taking of power by the workers' councils internationally, the only weapons the proletariat has to carry out that transformation are:

  1. Its armed, organized strength to carry the revolution to victory all over the world.
  2. The consciousness of its communist programme which is a political orientation for the economic transformation of society.

The victory of the proletariat does not rest on whether it can ‘manage' a factory or even all the factories in one country. Managing produc­tion while the capitalist system continues to exist dooms such ‘manage­ment' to the management of surplus value production and exchange. The first duty of any victorious proletariat in one country or area is not to figure out how to create a mythical ‘island of socialism', which is impossible, but to give all their aid to their only hope - the victory of the world revolution.

It is extremely important to get priorities straight here. The economic measures the proletariat will take in one country, in one area, are a secondary question. Even in the best of cases these measures are only stop-gaps tending in positive direction: any errors can be corrected if the revolution advances. But if the proletariat loses its political coherence, or its armed strength, or if the workers' coun­cils lose political control and their clear consciousness of where they are going, then there can be no hope of correcting any errors or of any socialist future.

There are many voices raised today to protest against this conception. Some of them claim that the political focus of proletarian struggle is jut old-hat reactionary nonsense. In fact, the conception of an objectively defined revolutionary class, the proletariat, is equally old-hat for them, and should give way to a new universal class of everyone who is ‘oppressed', psychologically tormented or philosophically inclined. ‘Communist relations', or according to one (now defunct) English group of the same name: ‘Communist practice' is immediately realizable as soon as ‘people' wish it. For them, the really important, thing is not of` course the proletariat taking power internationally and eliminating the capitalist class but the immediate institution of so-called ‘communist relations' through a spontaneous thrust of the ‘people'.

The purely abstract and mythical elements of this ‘theory' should not blind us to the fact that it can serve as the perfect cover for ‘self-management' ideology. As increasing working class discontent pro­duces mass movements as a reaction to the depths of capitalist crisis, one reaction of the bourgeoisie may be to tell the workers that their real interests are not to bother with ‘mere political matters' like destroying the bourgeois state but to take over their factories and run them ‘for themselves' in good order. The bourgeoisie will try to have the workers exhaust themselves in a futile effort to implement an economic programme of the self-management of exploitation while the capitalist class and its state will wait it out to pick up the pieces. This is what happened in Italy in 1920, when Ordino Nuovo and Gramsci exalted the economic possibilities of factory occupa­tions, while the left faction with Bordiga warned that although workers' councils have their roots in the factories, they must go forward to a frontal attack on the state and the entire system or die.

The comrades of the RWG do not reject political struggle. They limit themselves to saying that the political thrust and economic policy are equally important and crucial. In one sense they are simply repeating a marxist truism: that the proletariat does not fight for political power over the capitalist class just to assert some kind of power psychosis, but in order to lay the foundations for social transformation through class struggle and the organized self-activity of the only revolutionary class which can free itself and all humanity from exploitation forever. But the RWG comrades have no concrete idea of how the process of social transformation can take place. The revolution is a rapid assault on the capitalist state but the economic transformation of society is a world-wide process of great complexity. In order to successfully carry through this economic process, the political framework of the working class dictatorship must be clear. Furthermore, the taking of power by the proletariat is not tantamount to maintaining that socialism can be introduced by decree. Thus:

  1. The economic transformation can only follow a proletarian revolu­tion and not precede it (there can be no ‘socialist construction' with the capitalist class in power), nor is it simultaneous with working class power over society.
  2. The political power of the proletariat opens the road to socialist transformation but the primary bulwark of the forward march of the revolution is the unity and coherence of the class. Economically the class may make errors which must be corrected, but if they turn power over to another class or party, any economic transformation is by definition impossible.

From our affirmation that the political dictatorship of the proletariat is the framework and the pre-condition for social transformation, the simple-minded conclude: "It appears that Internacionalismo denies the necessity of an economic war on capitalism by the proletariat." (Forward, p.44).

Contrary to Forward's claim, everything is not immediately of equal importance and of equal gravity for the revolutionary struggle. In a country which has just had a victorious revolution, the workers' coun­cils may consider it necessary to work ten to twelve hours a day to produce arms and materials to send to their besieged brothers in ano­ther region. Is this socialism? Not to the extent that the basic tenets of socialism are production for human needs (not destruction) and the reduction of the work day. Is this therefore to be condemned as a counter-revolutionary proposition? Clearly not, as it is the wor­king class' primary duty and hope of salvation to aid the spread of the international revolution. Do not we have to admit that the econo­mic programme is subject to the conditions of the class struggle and that there is no way of creating a workers economic paradise in one country? Furthermore, we have to emphasize that a political weakening of the councils' power to decide policy and orient the struggle would be fatal.

Revolutionaries would be lying to their fellow workers if they held out rosy dreams of milk and honey and economic miracles instead of empha­sizing the deadly struggle and tremendous waste and destruction of civil war. They would be demoralizing the class by declaring that inevitable economic set-backs (in one country or even in several countries or sec­tors), means the end of the revolution. By immediately putting these questions on the same plane as the political solidarity, working class democracy and decision-making power of the proletariat, they would be of detracting from the central focus of class struggle and the only hope inaugurating a world-wide period of transition to socialism.

The RWG answers that after all, "everything can't be the same after the revolution as before," and points to the tragic conditions of workers in Russia in 1921. But they really don't tell us what conditions they are talking about. Is it that the mass working class organizations were excluded from effective participation in the ‘Workers' State'? That workers were repressed for striking in Petrograd? If so, that is the kernel of the degeneration of the revolution. Or is it simply that there was famine? Here again, it is futile for us to pretend that the dangers of famine and hardship simply won't exist after the revolution. Or is it that workers still had to work in factories and that wages were not abolished (in one country), or that exchange still existed? Although these practices are clearly not socialism they may indeed be unavoidable unless we pretend that eliminating the law of value is simply a question of snapping your fingers. As the RWG says, "a line has to be drawn somewhere." But where? By confusing the crucial importance of political coherence and the power of the class with economic set-backs, the problems of future struggle become simply a matter of wish-fulfillment.

Socialism or communist social relations (these terms are used interchangeably here), is essentially the complete elimination of all "blind economic laws", especially the law of value which rules capitalist production, in order to fulfill the needs of humanity. Socia­lism is the end of all classes (the integration of non-capitalist sectors into socialized production and the beginning of freely associated labour deciding its own needs), and an end to all exploitation, all need for a state (the expression of a class-divided society), and accumulation of capital with its concomitants of wage labour and the market economy. It is the end of the domination of dead labour over living labour. Thus socialism is not a question of creating new economic laws but of eliminating the roots of the old ones under the aegis of the proletarian communist programme. Capitalism is not merely the cigar-smoking villain but the entire present organi­zation of the world market, the present division of labour world-wide, production in private hands including the peasantry, under-development and misery, production for destruction, etc. All this is to be extir­pated and eliminated from human history forever. This requires a pro­cess of economic and social transformation of gigantic proportions taking at least a generation in world terms, if not more. And what is even more telling, no Marxist can foresee the details of the new situation which will face the proletariat after the world revolution. Marx always avoided ‘blueprints' for the future and the Russian experience can only indicate the broad general lines of an orientation for economic transformation. Revolutionaries will be deserting their task if their only contribution is to berate the Russian Revolution for not creating socialism in one country or to make up pipe dreams about how the political changes and the economic transformations are simul­taneous.

The real point about the economic programme of the revolution is that the broad outlines of where we are going must be clear, that the prole­tariat must know what measures tending towards the destruction of capitalist production relations (and thus the establishment of socialism) shou1d be implemented as soon as possible. It is one thing to say that in some conditions we may be forced to work long hours or not be able to abolish money right away in one area. It is another thing to state that socialism means working harder or even worse that natio­nalization and state capitalism are s step to socialism. Bolshe­viks are not so much to he condemned for going from the chaos of War Communism to the NEP (from one inadequate plan to another) but for the fact that they preached that nationalization and state capitalism were a help to the revolution or that ‘economic competition with the West' would prove the splendours of socialist productivity. A clear pro­gramme for economic transformation is an absolute necessity and we to­day with fifty years of hindsight can see more deeply into this ques­tion than the Bolsheviks or any political expression or any political expression of the proletariat at the time.

The working class needs a clear orientation for its political programme, the key to economic transformation, but it does not need false promises of an instant end to difficulties or mystification about how the law of value can be eliminated by decree.

The NEP

The RWG is not alone in placing the emphasis on the NEP. Many people just breaking from ‘leftism' and particularly its Trotsky­ist varieties, do the same. After all the meaningless garbage about a ‘Workers' State' today and collectivization in state hands ‘proving' that Russia is socialist today, they look "for the point between 1917 and today when a change must have taken place" in Russia. (Forward, p.44) It's the old "when did capitalism come back" query the Trot­skyists are always arrogantly throwing out.

The NEP was not an invention out of the heads of the Bolshevik leaders. On the contrary, the NEP, in large part, merely takes up the programme of the Kronstadt revolt. The Kronstadt revolt put forward a key political demand to save the life's blood of the revolution: the regeneration of the power of the workers' councils, working class democracy and an end to the Bolshevik dictatorship through the state. But economically, the Kronstadt workers, forced by famine into pil­fering tools to exchange individually with peasants for food, developed a ‘programme' of simply wanting to regularize exchange and putting it under workers' auspices - regularizing commerce so that starvation and economic stagnation would end. Trucks of food sent to the cities in Russia were stormed by the starving population and had to be accom­panied by armed guards. The situation was a catastrophe and Kronstadt, as well as the Bolsheviks, had nothing more to offer than a return to some sort of economic normalcy. That normalcy could only be capitalism.

The RWG attack on the NEP lacks the historical context in which the NEP was adopted. Furthermore, it confuses some essential points about the war on capitalism it claims to defend.

1. "If events dictated the restoration of capitalist property in Russia as they partially did ............ while the restoration of capitalism meant the restoration of the proleariat as a class-in-itself (?)" (Revolution and Counter-revolution in Russia, p.7 and p.17)

"One wonders what more would have to be conceded to capitalism in order to have the restoration of capitalism?" (Forward, no 2, p.46)

All this is striking proof that there is a fundamental confusion here. The NEP was not the "restoration of capitalism" because capitalism had never been eliminated in Russia. The RWG confuses the matter even fur­ther by adding elsewhere: "While the NEP was not the rebirth of capi­talist economic relations, it was the rebirth of normal, ie legal, capitalist economic relations." (Revolution and Counter-revolution in Russia, p.7) This is even more absurd. Whether capitalist relations are legal, ie recognized officially as existing, or not, is simply a juridical question. What ‘purity' can be gained by pretending reality doesn't exist? The NEP was not a watershed in the sense that it re­introduced (or recognized) the existence of capitalist economic forces - the fundamental laws of the capitalist economy dominated the system in Russia because they dominated the world market.2

This may lead some to say that they knew all along that Russia was capitalist and that there was thus no proletarian revolution. How­ever, we will never be able to identify a proletarian revolution if we insist on wanting to see it not as an initially political thrust eliminating the capitalist class but as a complete economic transformation overnight. One again, we return to the theme of ‘socialism in one country' which hang over the Russian experience like an ominous cloud. The NEP was a step towards state capitalism with the nationalization of the ‘commanding heights', but it was not a funda­mental reversal from ‘socialism' (or something other than capitalism) back to capitalism.

2. "It (the NEP) actually represented a principled retreat, a pro­grammatic crossing of class lines." (Ibid, p. 7)

This is the kernel of the argument although it naturally follows from the previous point. No one would be so foolish as to claim that the working class can never retreat. Although in an overall sense the revolution must advance or die, this can never be taken unilaterally to mean that we can advance in a straight line with no problems. The question is then: what is an unavoidable retreat and what is a compro­mise of principles? The Bolshevik programme, insofar as it embodied an apology and mystification of state capitalism, was an anti-proletarian programme; but the inability to abolish the law of value or exchange in one country is by no means "a crossing of class lines". Either these are clearly separated, or else one ends up defending the position that the proletariat could have gone on to integral socialism in Russia. This being impossible, revolutionaries would simply have to cover up the inability to forge ahead according to the programme by lying about what was actually happening.

Retreat on the economic level will certainly be unavoidable in many instances (despite the need for a clear orientation) but retreat in political terms is death for the proletariat. This is the fundamental difference between the NEP and the Kronstadt massacre, between the NEP and the Treaty of Rapallo, or the ‘united front' tactic.

"What would the comrades of Internacionalismo have done in the same situation? Would they have restored the market economy? Would they have decentralized industry in the hands of the managers? Would they have rehabilitated the ruble? In short, would they have carried out a ‘retreat' that was in fact a defeat? .... Would they have subordinated the interests of world proletarian revolution to the interests of Russian national capital?"(Forward,p.45)

The ‘what would you have done' approach to history is fruitless by definition since history cannot be changed or invested with our cons­ciousness (or lack of it) today. However, the RWG's naive questions show that they have not understood the difference between retreat and defeat.

The market economy? It was never destroyed internationally which is the only means of eliminating it, nor did anyone ‘restore' it in Russia - it always existed. The ruble? Again, this is an absurd question in terms of marxist writings on world capitalism and the role of money. Decentralization of industry? This political question pro­foundly compromised the power of the workers' councils and belongs to another domain entirely. Defending the interests of Russian capital? Clearly this was the death knell of the revolution itself.

The economic transformation "cannot be done by decree but the decree is the first step". If by decree the RWG means the programme of the working class then we have only to ‘decree' integral and immediate communism. And then what? How do we get there? Or do we say: a) let's throw in the towel completely or b) lie and pretend we can have socialism through little socialist republics?

The revolution in a country like Britain for example (by no means a backward, under-developed economy as Russia's in 1917) could last only a few weeks before being brought to death by slow starvation through blockade. What sense is there in talking about an ever-victorious economic war on capitalism in the midst of short-term starvation? The only policy to protect and defend a revolutionary bastion is an offen­sive struggle internationally and the only hope is the political solidarity of the class, its self-organization and the class struggle internationally.

Some measures for a transitional programme

The RWG with all their talk of the NEP does not offer any suggestions for a valid socialist orientation in the economy for tomorrow's struggle. In what direction should we head, as far as the circumstances of class struggle will allow?

  1. Immediate socialization of large capital concentrations and the main centres of proletarian activity.
  2. Planning of production and distribution by the workers' councils following the criterion of the maximum possible satisfaction of needs (of the workers and of the class struggle) and not for accumulation.
  3. Tendency towards the reduction of the working day.
  4. Substantial elevation of the workers' standard of living including the immediate organization of free transport, housing, medical ser­vices, all taken in charge by the workers' councils.
  5. Attempts as far as possible to eliminate wages and the money form even if this may take the form of rationing goods in short supply through workers' councils to society at large. This will be easier in areas in which the proletariat is highly concentrated and has many resources at its command.
  6. Organization of relations between socialized sectors and sectors where production remains individual (especially in the countryside) towards organized and collective exchange through co-operatives at first, (leading eventually to the elimination of all private produc­tion through the victory of the class struggle in the countryside), which would represent a step forward towards the decline of the market economy and individual exchanges.

These points should be taken merely as suggestions for an orientation for the future - a contribution to the debate within the class on these questions.

The Workers' Opposition

Because the RWG comrades do not understand the Russian situation, they are trapped within it. They try to offer an orientation for the fu­ture by choosing sides among the different factions that fought it out in Russia. Just as those who reject the past completely and pretend that revolutionary consciousness was born yesterday (with them of course), the RWG takes the seeming opposite side of the coin and answers his­tory in its own terms. This is not an enrichment of the lessons of the past, it is a desire to relive it and ‘make it better' rather than address themselves to what we can draw out today.

Thus the RWG writes: "It is our programme, the Workers' Opposition programme of the self-activity of the working class against bureau­cratism and capitalist restorationist tendencies." This is a fundamental misunderstanding of what the Workers' Opposition really meant in the context of the debates in Russia. The Workers' Opposition was one of the groups which fought against the evolution of events in the degeneration of the Russian Revolution. Far from rejecting their often courageous efforts, it is necessary to put their programme into perspective. The Workers' Opposition was not against ‘bureacratism' but against state bureaucracy and in favour of using the union bureaucracy. The unions were to manage capital in Russia and not the party-state machine. Although the Workers' Opposition may have wanted to defend proletarian class initiative, they could see it only in a trade union context. Genuine class life in the soviets in Russia was almost entirely eliminated by 1920-21 but this did not mean that unions and not workers' council were the instruments of working class dictatorship. This is the same kind of reasoning that led the Bolshe­viks to conclude that since the programme of the First Congress of the Third International could not easily be taken up because of the de­feats in Europe, it was therefore necessary to go back to aspects of the old Social Democratic programme (union infiltration, parliamentary participation, alliances with centrists, etc). Even if the soviets were crushed, independent class activity (not to mention revolutionary activity) in unions was over in the decadent period of capitalism. The entire trade union debate was based on a false premise on all sides: that unions could be substituted for class unity in workers' councils. In this sense the Kronstadt revolt in calling for the regeneration of soviets was much clearer on the question, even if equally doomed. The Workers' Opposition meanwhile agreed with and supported the mili­tary suppression of Kronstadt.

The fact that in Russia the debate revolved around how to ‘manage' the degeneration of a revolution has to be understood historically but it is the height of absurdity to adopt this programme as one's own today. Moreover, the RWG asserts:

"But we are sure of one thing: if the programme of the Workers' Opp­osition had been adapted, the programme of proletarian self-activity, the proletarian dictatorship in Russia would have gone down fighting capitalism rather than adapting to it (if it had gone down at all). And the chances are that it would have been saved by victory in the West. Had this programme of struggle been adopted there would have been no international retreat. The chances are, the International Left would have gained dominance in the Communist International." (Ibid, p.48-49)

This only proves that there is a residual conviction within the RWG that if Russia had done something better, all would have been diffe­rent. Russia is the pivot of everything. It also assumes, as we have seen, that if the economic measures were different, the political be­trayal would have been eliminated instead of vice-versa. But the his­torical absurdity of this hypothesis is most clearly expressed by this statement that "the chances are that the International Left would have gained dominance in the Communist International". The ‘Interna­tional Left' we presume they are talking about, did not understand the economic programme very well at the time; but the KAPD, for example, was based on the rejection of unionism and its bureaucracy. The Wor­kers' Opposition had little or nothing to say about Bolshevik strategy in the West and always rubber-stamped official Bolshevik policy on this question, including the 21 Conditions of the Second Congress of the Communist International (as did Ossinsky). The vision of the Workers' Opposition becoming the focal point of the International Left is a pure invention of the RWG because they do not know the history they talk about so glibly.

While the RWG condemns "crystial-ball gazing as not the task of revolu­tionaries". (Ibid, p.48) only a few lines previously they expound upon the infinite horizons the Workers' Opposition would have opened for the working class. One may say that in addition to avoiding crystal-ball gazing it would be better to know what one is talking about.

The lessons of October

Our purpose is not essentially a polemical one in this article al­though clearing away certain absurdities is undoubtedly helpful. Essentially the task of revolutionaries is to go forward from history to draw the points of orientation for tomorrow. The specific debate on when the Russian Revolution degenerated is much less important than: 1) seeing that this did occur; 2) identifying why it occurred; and 3) trying to contribute to class consciousness by synthesizing the nega­tive and positive lessons of this epoch.

In this sense we would like to contribute an over-view of the essential heritage of class positions that the experience o the post-war revo­lutionary wave has left us for today and tomorrow.

  1. The proletarian revolution is an international revolution and the primary duty of the working class in any country is to further the -world revolution.
  2. The proletariat is the only revolutionary class, the only subject of revolution and of social transformation. It is clear today that any ‘worker-peasant alliance' must be rejected.
  3. The proletariat as a whole, organized in workers' councils, consti­tutes the dictatorship of the proletariat. The role of the political party of the class is not to take state power or to rule ‘in the name of' the class but to contribute to the heightening and generalization of class consciousness within the class. No minority of the class can exert political power in its place.
  4. The proletariat must direct its armed power principally against the bourgeoisie. The policy of integrating non-proletarian, non-exploiting elements into socialized production must be the dominant mode of unifying society although proletarian violence against these sectors may sometimes be necessary; but violence must be excluded as a way of settling debate within the proletariat and its class orga­nizations. All efforts must be made, through proletarian democracy, to strengthen the solidarity and unity of the proletariat.
  5. State capitalism is the dominant, universal trend of capitalist organization in the period of capitalist decadence. State capitalist measures, including nationalizations, are in no way a proletarian pro­gramme for socialism, nor a policy that can ‘aid' the way towards socialism, nor a ‘progressive step'.
  6. The general lines of economic measures tending towards the elimina­tion of the law of value, socialization of industry and agriculture, and production for the needs of humanity, as mentioned above, represent a contribution to the elaboration of a new economic orientation for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

These points, sketchily outlined here, do not pretend to exhaust the complexity of revolutionary experience but can serve as general guide­lines for future elaboration.

There are many young groups, like RWG, developing today in our period of reawakening class struggle and it is important to be aware of the implications of their work and to encourage an exchange of ideas in the revolutionary milieu. But there is a danger that after so many years of counter-revolution these groups may be unable to deal with the heritage of the revolutionary past. As in the case of the RWG many groups think they are discovering history for the first time as though nothing else existed before them. This can lead to aberrations like fixating on the programme of the Workers' Opposition or other Russian left groups in a vacuum as though each day a new ‘piece of the puzzle' is discovered, without putting it in a broader context. Without being aware of (and critical of) the work of the left communist movement (KAPD, Dutch left, Pannekoek, Gorter, Workers' Dreadnought, the Italian left around Bordiga, the reviews, Bilan in the thirties and Internationalisme in the forties, Interna­tional Council Correspondence and Living Marxism as well as the Russian left communists, not just as individual pieces of a puzzle but in the overall terms of the development of revolutionary cons­ciousness in the class, our work today will be doomed to sterility and the arrogance of the dilettante. Those who are making the vital effort to break with ‘leftism' should be aware that the path is not unique to them and that they are not alone either in history or today.

Judith Allen

* Revolutionary Workers' Group, PO Box 60161, 172 W. Devon, Chicago, Illinois 60660, USA.


1 See ‘Modernism: From Leftism to the Void' in World Revolution no. 3.

2 The policies of War Communism in the countryside during the Civil War, much vaunted in comparison by the RWG, were not more non-capitalist than NEP. Furthermore, the outright expropriation of peasant grain, although an absolute essential measure for the Russian proletarian offensive at the time, hardly constitute an economic programme (pillage?). it can easily be seen that these temporary measures of force against peasant production could not continue indefinitely. Before, during and after War Communism, the primary basis of production in the countryside was private property. Although the RWG is perfectly correct in stressing the importance of the class struggle of agricultural labourers in the countryside, this struggle does not automatically and immediately disintegrate the peasantry or its system of production.

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1917 - Russian Revolution [13]

The economic, political and social origins of fascism

  • 6394 reads
Introduction

The article reproduced here was first published in November 1933 in issue number II of Masses, an eclectic monthly publication connected to the left of French Social Democracy. It was written by A. Lehmann, a member of the ‘communist workers' groups' in Germany, which had their origin in the KAPD. We are republishing it today so that our readers can gain some idea of the degree of clarification achieved by the communist left which split from the Third International, and of the considerable regression of those ‘councilist' and ‘Bordigist' tendencies which claim descent from the left communists today.

This article carries with it some of the weaknesses prevalent in the German left at that time in their understanding of fascism, weaknesses which led if to think that fascism was in the process of extending itself to all countries. Although the article defines the general conditions which gave rise to fascism (the period of capitalist decline, an acute economic crisis), it fails to grasp the particular conditions which made fascism appear in Italy and Germany and nowhere else (the brutal defeat of the working class after a powerful revolutionary movement, and a small share in the re-division of the imperialist cake). The Italian left in the same period, while less precise in its under­standing of the general conditions, was able to make a much clearer analysis of these particular conditions which allowed it to see ‘anti-fascism' as a major enemy of the proletariat (although after World War II it in turn took up the aberration of the ‘globalization of fascism'. In contrast, in this text there is no denunciation of anti-fascism.

Another weakness is in the analysis of the degeneration of the Russian Revolution and of the Third International. In this article these phenomena are presented essentially as consequences of the situation in Russia itself (backwardness, weight of the peasantry, etc), and not as a product of the retreat of the revolution on a world scale.

In spite of these weaknesses, the article contains a number of signifi­cant points which even today represent a much more valuable analysis than that of most of the groups who currently claim descent from the ‘ultra-left', points which can be summarized as follows:

* an understanding of the period opened up by World War 1 as that of the decline of the capitalist mode of production, which was linked to the disappearance of extra-capitalist markets;

* the impossibility of the bourgeoisie, in this period of decline, to grant any real reforms to the proletariat, leading to a considerable reinforcement of the state, to the integration of the trade unions, and to the end of all possibility of the proletariat making use of parliament in its struggle;

* transformation of the nature of crises: cyclical crises give way to the permanent crisis, the acute phases of which lead, in the absence of a proletarian response, to imperialist war;

* denunciation of all frontist and ‘anti-imperialist' policies;

* the proletarian character of the Russian Revolution and of the Third International - contrary to the ideas beginning to be developed at that time, particularly in the Dutch left;

* the capitalist nature of the regime then existing in Russia (even if the term is not explicitly used in the article) and the rejection of any policy of ‘defence of the USSR' by the proletariat;

* the necessarily world-wide character of the proletarian revolution;

* the necessity for the working class to equip itself with a party based on a clear and coherent programme, the most conscious fraction of the class, and by necessity a minority, which could not substitute itself for the class in the seizure of power, and which could only be created in a moment of rising revolutionary struggle and not in a period of defeat, as the voluntarists of Trotskyism and then of 'Bordigism' would have it.

These points form the axis around which the International Communist Current has constituted itself today. They demonstrate the continuity which exists between the revolutionary movement developing today and the movement in the past, marking the historic unity of the proletarian struggle throughout the terrible period of counter-revolution which we are now leaving behind.

A great number of ‘modernist' tendencies reject this continuity. These tendencies want to ‘innovate'. But today, in rejecting the past they also deprive themselves of any future - in the proletarian camp at least. For our part, we understand that we can only go beyond the gains of the communist left by beginning from these gains and not by rejecting them. That is why we resolutely claim a continuity with the communist left.

C.G.

 

Economic causes

In order to grasp the essential causes of fascism, it is necessary to consider the structural changes in capitalism which have taken place in recent decades. Up until the first years of the century capitalism was still developing in a progressive manner in which competition between private capitalists or shareholding companies acted as a motor force of economic progress. The more or less regular growth of productivity was fairly easily absorbed by the new markets opened up during the period of colonization by the imperialist powers. The form of political organization corresponding to this atomized structure of capitalism was bourgeois democracy which allowed the different capitalist strata to regulate their contradictory interests in the most appropriate way. The prosperous condition of capitalism allowed it to grant the workers certain political and material concessions, and created within the working class the preconditions for reformism and the illusion that parliament could serve as an instrument of progress for the working class.

The possibility of an ever-growing accumulation of capital, which had been manifested during this initial phase, came to an end as competition between national capitals became more and more intense due to the lack of new territories to be conquered for capitalist expansion. These rivalries caused by the restriction of markets led to the First World War. The same conditions also initiated the transformation of the structure of capitalism via the progressive concentration of capital under the domination of finance capital. The war and its consequences accelerated the process. Inflation in particular, by leading to the dispossession of the middle classes, allowed the development of monopoly capital on a huge scale: the organization of capital in vast trusts and cartels, horizontally and vertically, which began to go beyond even the national framework. The different strata of capitalism (financial, industrial, etc) lost their particular character and were absorbed into an increasingly uniform bloc of interests.

As the sphere of action of these trusts and cartels began to go beyond the framework of nation-states, capitalism was forced to influence the economic policies of the state in a more accelerated manner. The liaison between the organs of capitalist economic interest and the state apparatus thus grew closer, and the intermediary role of parlia­ment became superfluous.

In the context of this structure, capitalism no longer had any need for parliamentarism, which only survived at first as a facade for the dictatorship of monopoly capital. However, this parliamentarism was still useful to the bourgeoisie, since it gave the dictatorship of capital a political base from which it could keep alive reformist illusions in the proletarian masses. But the aggravation of the world crisis, the impossibility of obtaining new markets, gradually led the bourgeoisie to lose all interest in keeping up the parlia­mentary facade. The direct and open dictatorship of monopoly capital came to be a necessity for the bourgeoisie itself. The fascist system showed itself to be the form of government most suited to the needs of monopoly capital. Its economic organization is best able to offer a solution to the internal contradictions of the bourgeoisie, since its political content allows the bourgeoisie to find a new basis of support, replacing a reformism which has become less and less able to sustain the illusions of the masses.

Social causes

The inability of the bourgeoisie to maintain its political base in reformism derives from the intensification of class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Since the war reformism in Germany has been nothing but a sterile game. Everyday the German working class lost a little more of what remained of the ‘conquests' of reformism. The prestige of reformism in the eyes of the masses survived only because of its powerful bureaucratic organization. But the recent most violent attacks against the workers' living standards, which have plunged them into the most unbearable poverty, have rapidly undermined the influence of reformism in the working masses and laid bare the class antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Parallel to this process within the working class there was a process of radicalization among the different strata of the petit-bourgeoisie. The peasants were plunged into debt, reduced to poverty, and in some places, resorted to terrorist actions. The shop keepers felt the twin blows of the impoverishment of the masses and of the competition from the big stores and co-operatives. Intellectuals disorientated by uncertainty about what tomorrow might bring, students without a future, declassed ex-officers, all began to turn to adventurist ideas. White-collar workers - proletarianized and struck down by unemployment, redundant functionaries - also showed themselves to be ready to be mobilized by radical demagogy. A vague and utopian anti-capitalism grew up among these heterogeneous strata dispossessed by the grande bourgeoisie. Their anti-capitalism was reactionary in that it aimed at a return to a bygone stage of capitalism. Thus despite their radicalism they became a conservative factor and easily became the instrument of monopoly capitalism. In reality, for this radicalized, unconscious petit-bourgeois mass, incapable of playing an independent role in the economy and faced with the growing antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, it was a question of making a choice between one or the other. It had to choose between monopoly capital, which was responsible for its desperate situation, and the revolutionary subject of history, the proletariat. Hatred of the proletarian revolution which would put an end to classes, and the petite-bourgeoisie's attachment to its privileges (privileges which were now only a memory), threw the radicalized middle classes into the arms of monopoly capital, thus supplying the latter with a sufficiently large social base for it to dispense with reformism, now on the verge of collapse.

Political roots

The synthesis of these two contradictory aspects of fascism: dependence on monopoly capital and mobilization of the petit-bourgeois masses, expressed itself on the political plane in the development of the National Socialist Party. This party owed its development to a frenzied demagogy and to the subsidies of heavy industry. On the ideological level, this party gave vent to the despair of the petit-bourgeois masses via a radical and revolutionary phraseology, even going as far as to advocate certain forms of expropriation (eg banks, Jews, big stores); its liaison with monopoly capital was expressed, in its propaganda for class collaboration, for hierarchical corporative organization against the class struggle and Marxism.

The inconsistency of the ideological content of Nazi demagogy is shown clearly in its racist propaganda. The discontent of the masses was deflected against the Treaty of Versailles, capitalism's scapegoat, and against the Jews who were seen as the representatives of international capital AND promoters of the class struggle. This tissue of incoherent stupidities could only take root in the winds of the petite-bourgeoisie, whose secondary role in the economy makes it incapable of understanding anything about the economic facts and historical events into which it has been thrown.

The radicalized peasants and petite-bourgeoisie always formed the great mass of the National Socialist Party. It was only when its subordination to monopoly capital became clearer that the bourgeoisie itself came to reinforce the cadres of the Nazi Party and supplied it with officers and leaders. But until Hitler came to power, the Nazi Party found it impossible to make any serious encroachments into the working class, as witnessed in the elections to the works councils. The Nazis always had great difficulty in penetrating the unemployment registration bureaux (Stempelstelle); only a few hundred thousand mercenaries could be recruited for the S.A. and the S.S from among the unemployed white-collar workers and the lumpen-proletariat, even though there were millions of unemployed without any means of subsistence.

But if the working class did not allow itself to be significantly contaminated by fascist demagogy it was nonetheless incapable of preventing the development of the National Socialist Party. It did not manage to undo the formation of a bloc of reactionary classes. The big workers' parties tried without success to make use of this or that apparent divergence between monopoly capital and the National Socialists. Above all, the proletariat did not understand that the real contradiction was not between democracy and fascism, but between fascism and the proletarian revolution. It was thus the lack of the revolutionary capacity on the part of the proletariat which permitted the political development of fascism and the rise of Hitler.

To see how this was possible, we must examine in detail the ideological and tactical content of the main tendencies in the workers' movement.



The Tendencies and Organizations of the Working Class

 

Reformism

 

Reformism developed within the working class during the ascendant phase of capitalism. Its roots lay in the possibility for the bourgeoisie to rapidly develop the productive apparatus, a growth in production which in general found easy outlets in new markets. The result of this for the working class was a rapid development in its numbers and power. The bourgeoisie needed to assure the increased growth of a docile and satisfied working class and this could be easily obtained by ceding to the working class a small part of the ever-growing profits derived from imperialism. But even when the bourgeoisie was no longer able to accord any more concessions to the working class and actually had to deprive the working class of all the advantages it had won in a previous epoch, reformism still retained an important influence in the working class and was able to play the role of providing capitalism with a political base. This was the case for the trade union and political organs of reformism, which having developed during the years of prosperity continued to exist so long as they could fulfill the interests of capitalism. The principal method of the political organization (Social Democracy) was parliamentarism. Its activities had the aims of convincing the workers that they must wait peacefully for any improve­ment in their lot, which would be decided by parliament in the proper democratic way. Every time Social Democracy took the most active part in the massacre of the revolutionary workers it justified its betrayals by presenting itself as the defender of democracy. The trade union organization orientated itself towards discussing contract rates with the employers and in the last resort going to the state for arbitration. It prevented strikes whenever it could and, in the case of spontaneous strikes, tried to get the workers back to work by using all kinds of manoeuvres. The innumerable trade union bureaucrats, well paid and embourgeoisified, ruled over the workers through their control over various forms of assistance (sick pay, unemployment benefits, etc). Participation in these institutions and in the various trade union benefits maintained the docility of the workers and the power of the bureaucrats, despite their persistent and ever more cynical betrayals.

Parallel to development of the trade union bureaucracy, a special bureaucracy charged with the application of social legislation - assistance, unemployment, benefits, etc - grew up in the state apparatus. This kind of organism, and its functions should be seen as an auxiliary form of reformism, whose origin lay in the conjuction of parliamentary and trade union reformism - a state orientated reformism which contri­buted equally to maintaining order, obedience and illusions within the working class.

Thus reformism persisted in its organizational form even though it had lost its economic basis. Reformist ideology survived in the working class, but gradually it weakened under the pressure of the growing exploitation and poverty of the proletariat. When the proletariat was reduced to struggling for its most basic interests, it became clear to the bourgeoisie that it could no longer maintain a practical organi­zational form for class collaboration on the basis of reformist ideology. The practical organizational form had to be maintained at all cost, but the ideology had to be change; thus the bourgeoisie resolutely replaced reformism with fascism. First of all the trade unions were integrated purely and simply. There could be no question of resistance on the part of the bureaucrats because the organizational reality of class collaboration was kept up; the only thing that was thrown out, like a worn out glove, was the ideology of reformism. The replacement of reformism with fascism thus proceeded very smoothly, and if the bourgeoisie had no need of any new agents it was able to retain the services of the old clowns who asked for nothing more.

These developments proved that the trade unions were of no use to the working class, and that this was not the result of bad leadership but of the very structure and aims of the trade unions as representative organs of the corporative interests within capitalism; such organs have thus necessarily become part of the normal functioning of capitalism and cannot be used for revolutionary ends.

 

Bolshevism

 

The development of the Russian Revolution since October 1917 has been conditioned by contradiction between a very concentrated but numerically small proletariat and an immense backward peasantry. Russian industry was in general very modern technically, but its economic structure suffered from a number of weaknesses because it had been organized by foreign capital for the purposes of war or export. After the downfall of Tsarism the bourgeoisie was unable to hold onto the power which had fallen into its hands because it could find no support among the peasantry who wanted peace and land.

An audacious and conscious proletariat seized state power in October 1917, but it confronted enormous difficulties of organization in the face of a backward, already satisfied peasantry twenty times its size. The collectivization of enterprises was carried forward by the workers at great speed but attempts at a communist distribution of products came up against the passive and active resistance of the huge peasant mass. The NEP was a retreat by a proletariat forced to compromise by the peasantry; but the proletariat still remained master of the commanding heights of the economy. However, in this regime of compro­mise between collectivized industry and a fragmented agriculture, the hidden but real rivalry between the proletariat and the peasantry gave rise to an unheard of development of the state apparatus, to bureaucratic specialization and to the suppression of the power of the Soviets. The success of the planned economy accelerated this process of crystallization of a bureaucracy which gradually managed to rule without any controls over it, to impose coercive economic measures, both on the proletariat (re-establishment of piece work and the authority of management) and on the peasantry forced concentration of peasant enterprises), and also measures of political domination (replacement of popular tribunals with the decisions of the special political police, the GPU).

A parallel process took place within the Communist Party, the directing organ, which following a succession of crises, became the exclusive expression of the class interests of the bureaucracy. With the dis­appearance of the political power of the Workers' Soviets the dictatorship of the proletariat no longer existed, and had been replaced with the dictatorship of the bureaucracy as a class in formation.

The Third International and the Communist Parties in all countries suffered structurally from the repercussions of this transformation of the Russian regime; with the German party in particular, bureaucratization and the absence of internal democracy reached an extreme point. The influence of the working masses could not make itself felt in the policies of the K.P.D, Its strategy and tactics were imposed upon it according to the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy. Up until the NEP, Soviet foreign policy had been orientated towards the world revolution, despite errors which for example in the case of Radek, were to have disastrous consequences on the German Revolution. Today the theory of ‘Socialism in one country' puts all its weight on the construction of the industrial apparatus in Russia (this industrial construction having been baptized as ‘socialism'), and consequently accords the greatest importance to stabilization and policies of peace in foreign relations. With the disappearance of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia the world proletariat no longer had any interest in considering the developments of the situation in Russia as the axis of the world revolution.

The class interests of the bureaucracy engendered the theory of the ‘leadership party' which is the negation of the possibility of working class politics independent of other classes, in particular the middle classes, and it is therefore at the roots of opportunism. At the same time, the utilization of the world proletariat for the changing needs of Soviet diplomacy created a growing gulf between the masses and the K.P.D.

The essential consequence, which crystallizes the whole activity of the Soviet bureaucracy, has been the degeneration of the class character of the revolutionary movement. Instead of spreading class ideology, the K.P.D., for opportunistic and diplomatic reasons, promulgated a nationalist ideology (the slogan of social and national liberation, the theory that the German nation was oppressed by imperialism). The K.P.D. believed that by resorting to this manoeuvre it would cause disarray within the petit-bourgeois ranks of National Socialism. In reality it only caused confusion and disarray among the proletariat; it was able to do nothing to oppose the rise of fascism, while the coming to power of fascism won over to the ranks of National Socialism militants of the K.P.D. who had been deceived by its own nationalist slogans.

The incoherence of Bolshevik manoeuvres (united fronts now with the fascists, now with the Social Democrats), bureaucratic pretensions towards establishing a dictatorship over the masses, the absence of a proletarian ideology - all this condemned the K.P.D. to impotence. After having gone from ‘success' to ‘success' on the electoral arena, the K.P.D. found itself completely isolated from the masses when it did want to act (eg the Nazi demonstration in front of Liebknecht's house). However, it is not even possible to know whether it really wanted to act and to what purpose.

The roots of this incapacity are the same as with Social Democracy. In both cases they are a result of the penetration of bureaucratic ideology into the organization - the ideologies of parliamentarism (in the slogan ‘to stop Hitler, vote for Thaelmann'); trade unionism (attempts to conquer the unions) and opportunism which consisted of manoeuvres between classes and different strata of the working class.

Small Bolshevik groupings

The theory of the ‘leadership party' and the practice of parliamentary, trade unionist, and opportunist manoeuvres are also to be found in the various Bolshevik opposition groups. The K.P.O.1 (Brandler), the Trotskyists and the S.A.P.2 have the same basic ideology, differing only in subtle details which are in any case changing all the time. For all these groupings, the tactic to be used against fascism is unity in action between reformism and Bolshevism. This tactic has not been applied, but the working class can expect to gain nothing from the unity of treason and impotence.

Perspectives for the worker's movement The lessons of revolutionary experience

Perspectives can only be based on experience - revolutionary experience which is already rich in lessons. From the Paris Commune to the October Revolution passing through the Revolution of 1905, experience has contradicted the tactics and strategy of Bolshevism; it has shown that the working class, in a given objective situation, is capable of acting independently as a class, and that in these situations it spontaneously creates organs for the expression and exercise of its will as a class: workers' councils or soviets. It is necessary to see how these organs were born and developed in Germany. The first workers' actions, which arose in 1917 against the will of the trade union bureaucrats who had been integrated into the war regime, engendered the ‘Revolutionary Shopstewards' (Revolutionare Betriebsobleute).

The Workers' Councils of 1918 were the direct descendants of this movement. The military collapse of Germany prematurely gave rise to unheard-of possibilities for the development of these councils, but they lacked a sufficient political clarity. The clearest awareness of revolutionary needs, represented in the Spartacus group, was still not sufficiently developed for the council movement to rid itself of certain anarchist illusions and also from habits inherited from the long period of reformism. The failure of the council movement in 1919 was to a large extent a result of insufficient awareness of the necessity for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the unstable situation of capitalism which lasted until 1923, the necessity for the workers to have revolutionary organizations based on production became clear, and almost everywhere in Germany the factory organizations grew up, formed more or less spontaneously against the counter-revolutionary trade unions and forming at this point a very important political current. The revolutionary efforts of the workers were ended in 1923 by the brutal action of the Reichwehr, crushing workers already demoralized by the doubly absurd tactic of the Communist Party, which proposed a united front to the fascists at Reventlow against French imperialism, and, at the same time, was participating in the parliamentary government of Saxony with the Social Democrats.

After 1924, the temporary stabilization of capitalism and the absence of revolutionary perspectives led to the disappearance of radical currents, gave a new lease of life to reformism supported by the state apparatus and inaugurated the period of parliamentary ‘success' for Bolshevism. This apparent consolidation of reformism and the illusory success of Bolshevism did not prevent, with the development of the crisis after 1929, the growth of the fascist movement and the deterioration of the living standards of the working class, which was suffering increasingly the blows of an unemployment which seemed to have no solution. At the same time, the masses showed a certain distrust of the existing parties, a certain effervescence tending towards the united front of the class; but on the whole there was still an attitude of waiting for the big organizations to act effectively. The coming to power of fascism without any resistance shattered the illusions of the workers.

Towards the organization of the proletariat

Thus the pressure of economic conditions led the bourgeoisie to destroy organizations which had in fact been the only ones able to block and paralyze any revolutionary movement of the class. This dialectical aspect of the rise of fascism has led us to see beyond the unfolding of the terror and the dispersion of the old workers' movement to the possibilities of progress and the basis for a new movement. The destruc­tion of the old organizations opens up new perspectives for a new class movement. The proletariat finds itself unencumbered with the self-proclaimed proletarian parties which are effectively reactionary, with the paralyzing illusions of political and trade union reformism and of parliamentarism. The illusions of Bolshevism have also been shaken; the majority of revolutionary workers no longer believe that its every action has to be led by a party of professional revolutionaries standing above the working class; they no longer have any confidence in the Bolshevik methods of bluff and agitation which lead only to sterile actions.

The practice of illegal struggle has led the workers to develop new forms of political work. The revolutionary workers in the factories and among the unemployed are forming small groups which provocateurs are unable to penetrate, The distribution of leaflets full of agitational slogans and of bluff has been replaced by the elaboration of discussion material and by proletarian political education. The bureaucrats of the Communist Party are no longer able to impose their point of view without discussion.

However, this work of regroupment and self-education is still proceeding in a sporadic fashion and without enough political clarity. It is vital that the greatest possible programmatic clarity is the point of departure for all political work. The most conscious revolutionary elements, already grouped together in nuclei formed by tenacious preparatory work, will assist this process of clarification and regroupment among the groups which have been born out of the debris of the old organizations, but which are still looking for a new ideology. These communist workers' nuclei have developed during the period of deepening crisis. Through these nuclei the synthesis of the experience of the illegal struggle of the radical workers in the various revolution­ary attempts since 1917 has been realized; and it has been realized with all the revolutionary ardour of the young, for whom the development of events has illuminated the necessity to break with the methods of reformism and Bolshevism. In their ideological clarity they bear the lessons of the past, and in their will to struggle the hopes of the working class reside.

During the period preceding the fascist terror, dominated by reformist and Bolshevik illusions, these nuclei were numerically weak in relation to the big mass organizations, but they were steeled in illegal propa­gandist activity and they were solidly right across Germany. Free of the sectarianism into which the remains of the radical organi­zations fell after 1923, they carried on their activity of ideological propaganda among the most advanced elements of the working class. Thanks to their experience in illegal work they continued their activities without any interruptions in spite of the terror and suffered only a few losses. Under the regime of terror, they grew considerably, while the barely reconstituted mass organizations got nowhere. At this time, the quantity of material distributed in Germany by the communist workers' nuclei is comparable to that at any other organization.

These nuclei, which must be the ideological armament of the proletariat, will have to integrate new elements step by step while avoiding the dilution of the clarity of their principles. Every nucleus must be firm and clear within itself so that hidden contradictions do not surface later on.

In the present phase of capitalism, the tactics of communists are determined by whether the situation is pre-revolutionary or revolutionary. In the present pre-revolutionary situation, the task at hand is the creation of the foundations of a revolutionary communist party. The communist nuclei in formation must act on the working class to accelerate the development of conditions for revolutionary struggle: the struggle for the clarification of class consciousness, destruction of the old conservative reformist (or Bolshevik) ideology, comprehension of the necessity for the class to organize itself in councils and propaganda for revolutionary methods of struggle. This action within the class can only become effective through permanent participation in the practice of the proletariat's struggle to survive on all fronts, because the workers can only really learn through direct experience.

In a revolutionary situation the goal is the destruction of bourgeois power by class action, the conquest of the means of production, the building of the power of the workers' councils on the economic and political terrain, and the beginning of the socialist reconstruction of society in general. All these goals call only be realized during the revolution through the closest possible liaison between the proletarian class and the revolutionary party, which is only the clearest and most active part of the class.

The aim of the party's work cannot be to raise itself above the class like a Bolshevik Central Committee commanding the revolution from on high. The revolutionary party can only be a lever in the development of the proletariat's own activity.

The present forces of left communism must be conscious of the fact that they cannot constitute the revolutionary party just at any time, but that the basis of this party can only be formed through a new task of reconstruction within the revolutionary struggle of the masses; that while "the revolution cannot triumph without a great revolutionary party" the inverse is also true - in a situation which is merely ‘becoming revolutionary' this party cannot anchor itself and develop itself in the working class as a whole.

The fundamental question for the revolutionary tactic of a communist nucleus in the class is not how to gather together, as quickly as possible, the maximum strength behind the organization to defeat the enemy - all thanks to the superior intelligence of the organization's leadership. No, the fundamental question is: how, at each stage of the practical struggle, can the consciousness, organization and capacity for action of the proletarian class be pushed forward, in such a way that the class as a whole can, reciprocally with the revolutionary communist party, carry out its historic task.

The task of revolutionary communist nuclei is therefore a double one: on the one hand, ideological clarification as the foundation of the development of the revolutionary party; on the other hand, the prepa­ration of the bases of the factory organizations through the gathering together of the revolutionary workers with the most developed awareness. As capitalist exploitation grows more and more acute it will force the workers to defend their very existence and to enter into struggle even in the most difficult conditions. For lack of any other organization, the workers in struggle will create organs for the direction of the struggle like, for instance, the action committees. The role of the factory nuclei will be to participate in these movements, to clarify them by giving a political content and to work for their extension to the national and international arena.

To the extent that these struggles extend, the working class will enter into the struggle for political power. These organs of struggle, having become permanent, will take on a special character: they will become organs for the conquest of power by the proletariat and finally the sole organs of the proletarian dictatorship. These councils - organs emanating directly from the factories and the organization of the unemployed, revocable at all times - will have a double role: the political councils will have to complete the crushing of the bourgeoisie and the strengthening of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the economic councils will take charge of the social transformation of production.

The perspectives of capitalism

These principles of organization and these perspectives for the develop­ment of the activity of the class are based not only on the historic experience of the working class, but also on the perspectives of capitalism.

The perspectives of capitalism are dominated by the deepening and broaden­ing out of the crisis throughout the world. It is now clear to everyone that the present crisis is something quite different from the cyclical crises which used to be part of the normal functioning of capitalism. It is clear that the current crisis is a crisis of the system itself, or rather a stage in the decay of capitalism. The attempts made to surmount the crisis were accompanied at the beginning by enthusiasm on the part of the bourgeoisie but they fell apart a few months later - as is the case now with the schemes of Roosevelt. Capitalism can no longer do anything but modify the existing division of markets, that is, replace the sector hardest hit by the crisis with one hitherto less affected; but it cannot create any new outlets. The attempt at a new division of markets in the end only results in the extension of the disasters of the crisis to all countries and all branches of the economy, in the subjection of the workers of the whole world to an equally aggravated exploitation, and in the extension of fascism to new countries.

The attempt at a new division of markets leads to violent international contradictions all over the world. National capitalisms clash against each other through frenzied customs and monetary policies. Antagonisms become more and more acute and the points of friction, the sources of conflict, become more and more widespread. This deterioration of international political relations reacts in its turn on the economic conditions which have engendered it in the first place and make these conditions even more insurmountable. The result is that fascism can find no stable economic base. That is why, to divert the attention of the masses away from their own growing misery, it stirs up new international difficulties.

Thus the impossibility of capitalism surmounting its economic diffi­culties and the sharpening of contradictions on an international level open the way to fascism in all countries and, at the same time, exclude the possibility of fascism stabilizing itself. The solution to this dialectical contradiction can only lie in the proletarian revolution. However, a solution may be sought by the bourgeoisie in a new world war if the proletariat does not take the initiative towards decisive action. But the world war itself is not a solution and the dilemma which will be remorselessly posed is the one foreseen by Marx: Communism or Barbarism.

Revolutionary perspectives must therefore be envisaged on a world scale. The cyclical fluctuations of the conjunctural crisis, taking place within the framework of the permanent crisis of degenerate capitalism, will lead in the years to come, to a more brutal and unbearable deterioration of living standards for the working class.

The necessity for the working class to defend its most basic interests will inevitably produce the conditions for a new epoch of struggles on a world scale.

Faced with a world-wide development of fascism, we must not consider the situation of the German workers as something special, demanding mainly solidarity actions of a more or less utopian nature. The fundamental question being posed for the international proletariat is the following, how best to use the political end organizational lessons of the German experience so that, in the next epoch of struggle, the class enemy will find itself confronted with a world proletariat armed ideologically and organizationally in the best possible way.

The response is clear and flows from what has been said concerning activity in Germany. The same ideological and organizational lessons must from now on be applied throughout the world by revolutionary communists who have understood the lessons of the recent experience of shameful betrayal by reformism and of the downfall of Bolshevism. Clear-sighted revolutionary nuclei must form themselves and resolutely address themselves to the task of ideological clarification and of the renewed organization of the working class.

These new organizations must establish international links in order to lay the basis for the formation of the Fourth International through the same process of the transformation of nuclei into the party which must take place in the revolutionary conjuncture.

To raise the slogan now for the constitution of the Fourth International is as inconsequential as demanding the immediate constitution of a new ‘real party of the working class'. In reality, this slogan of the S.A.P. and the Trotskyists can only end up in the provisional reconstitution of Bolshevism, in a ‘Three-and-a-half International' which will be a shameful appendage of the Third International and destined to end in the same fiasco.

The proletariat has other things to do than to set up historical caricatures. Its task is to defeat the bourgeoisie and realize communism. It is up to us to prepare the weapons which will allow it to triumph.

A. Lehmann

1 Kommunistiche Partei Opposition.

2 Sozialistische Arbeiterpartei (Socialist Workers Party).

 

General and theoretical questions: 

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The lessons of Kronstadt

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  1. Preface (1997) [26]

  2. Preface (1975) [27]

  3. Part 1: Understanding the Kronstadt Revolt [28]

  4. Part 2: The Lessons of Kronstadt [29]

Preface (1997)

The press of the ICC has recently carried a large number of articles to coincide with the 80th anniversary of the Russian revolution. The central theme running through these articles has been to defend the October revolution against the bourgeoisie's monstrous campaigns about the 'death of communism' following the collapse of the eastern bloc in 1989. We are reprinting this article on the Kronstadt uprising of 1921, first published in 1975, in International Review no. 3 , for the same fundamental reason. The ruling class has always tried to make maximum use out of the Kronstadt tragedy to support its 'argument' that the October insurrection was no more than a minority putsch by the Bolshevik party, and that Stalinism was its inevitable result. The Bolsheviks' suppression of the Kronstadt revolt is presented as definitive proof of this thesis.

In this argument, the bourgeoisie has always been echoed by the anarchists, who see the failure of the Russian revolution as confirmation of their 'principled' opposition to the idea both of the revolutionary party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and who set themselves up as the true heirs of the Kronstadt rebels. .And just as the bourgeoisie as a whole is anxious to equate Stalinism with marxism, so the libertarians are equally concerned to make it seem that the only alternative to their view of Kronstadt is the Stalinist/Trotskyist one - ie, the fake marxist version - which openly justifies the repression of the revolt, which is portrayed as the result of a White Guard plot.

The pamphlet 'Beyond Kronstadt' by the milieu around Radical Chains and Aufheben is a recent example of this mystification. As the comrades of the Communist Workers Organisation pointed out in Revolutionary Perspectives 8, this milieu tries to convey the impression that prior to the original genius of Radical Chains, the only possible interpretations of the degeneration of the Russian revolution have been provided by Trotskyism or anarchism, and thus completely obscures the immense contribution to understanding this process made by the international communist left. Particularly important in the effort to draw the real lessons of Kronstadt was the work of Italian Left around the review Bilan in the 1930s. While never losing sight of the fact that the fundamental cause of the degeneration of the Russian revolution was its international isolation, Bilan also recognised that the mistakes of the organised workers' movement were an important contributory factor in this degeneration. In particular, they pointed to the dangerous consequences of identifying the proletarian party with the transitional state, and the necessity for the class as a whole to maintain a strict independence from the state organs that inevitably arise after the workers' conquest of political power. Lacking the historical basis to draw these lessons itself, the Bolshevik party became entangled in a state machine that was the focal point of the capitalist counter-revolution.

The article that follows is part of the ICC's effort to assimilate and deepen the analyses of the communist left. Certain formulations and approaches contained within it - particularly concerning Trotsky and the early Left Opposition - reflect the immaturity that then existed within the ICC on such questions. But in the main it carried out the essential task: drawing the lessons of the Kronstadt events from a standpoint of resolute solidarity with the October revolution and the Bolshevik party that was at its head. In republishing it, we are not only highlighting the lessons themselves, but also reaffirming that the communist left is the only political tradition that has been capable of drawing them.

ICC, December 1997

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Preface (1975)

This article is an attempt to analyse the Kronstadt events and the lessons to be drawn from them by the workers' movement today and tomorrow, written by a comrade of the International Communist Current. The analysis is situated within the general orientation of our Current. The essential points for understanding what these events have bequeathed to us are contained in the article and can he briefly resumed here:

1. The proletarian revolution is, by its own historic nature, an international revolution. If it is limited to the context of one country or even several countries it comes up against absolutely insurmountable difficulties and is inevitably fated to perish after a more or less brief period.

2. Contrary to other revolutions in history, the proletarian revolution demands the direct, constant and active participation of the whole class. This means that at no time can the class, without immediately opening up a tendency towards degeneration, tolerate the 'delegation' of power to a party, nor the substitution of a specialised body or fraction of the class, no matter how revolutionary, for the class as a whole.

3. The working class is the only revolutionary class not only within capitalist society but also throughout the period of transition, as long as classes exist in society on a world scale. This is why the total autonomy of the proletariat in relation to other classes and social strata remains the fundamental precondition for the proletariat to exercise its hegemony and class dictatorship with the aim of creating a communist society.

4. The autonomy of the proletariat means that under no pretext can the unitary and political organs of the class be subordinated to statist institutions, since this can only lead to the dissolution of the proletariat's class organs and to the abdication of the communist programme, of which the proletariat is the unique subject.

5. The forward progression of the proletarian revolution is not guaranteed by this or that partial economic measure no matter how important it may be. Only the whole of its programme, the total political vision and action of the proletariat constitutes this guarantee, and included within this totality are the immediately possible economic measures which are part of the overall orientation of the communist programme.

6. Revolutionary violence is a weapon of the proletariat in the face of and against other classes. Under no circumstances can violence serve as a criterion or an instrument within the class because it is not a means for the development of consciousness. This development of consciousness can only he acquired by the proletariat through its own experience and through the constant critical examination of experience. This is why the use of violence within the class, whatever its motivation and immediate justification, can only obstruct the self-activity of the masses and end up as the most serious obstacle to the development of consciousness, which is an indispensable precondition for the triumph of communism.

The Kronstadt uprising of 1921 is an acid test that separates those whose class position enables them to grasp the processes and evolution of the proletarian revolution from those to whom the revolution remains a closed book. It crystallizes in a very dramatic way some of the most important lessons of the whole Russian Revolution, lessons that the proletariat cannot afford to ignore as it prepares for its next great revolutionary upsurge against capital.

The Editors,

International Communist Current

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Part 1: Understanding the Kronsdtadt Revolt

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

A marxist approach to the problem of Kronstadt can only depart from the affirmation that the October 1917 revolution in Russia was a proletarian revolution, a moment in the unfolding world proletarian revolution which was the response of the international working class to the imperialist war of 1914-18. This war in turn marked the definitive entry of world capitalism into its era of irreversible historical decline, thus making the proletarian revolution a material necessity in all countries. It must also be affirmed that the Bolshevik Party, which put itself at the head of the October insurrection, was a proletarian, communist party, a vital force in the international left after the betrayal of the Second International in 1914, which continued the defence of the class positions of the proletariat during the World War and the subsequent period.

Against those who describe the October insurrection as a mere 'coup d'état', a putsch carried out by a conspiratorial elite, we insist that the insurrection was the culmination of a long process of class struggle and of maturation in working class consciousness; that it represented a conscious seizure of political power by the working class organized in its soviets, factory committees, and Red Guards. The insurrection was part of a process of the liquidation of the bourgeois state and of the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship: and as the Bolsheviks passionately insisted, its main significance was that it was to mark the first decisive moment in the world proletarian revolution, the international civil war against the bourgeoisie. The idea that the insurrection was undertaken to build 'socialism' in Russia alone was far from the minds of the Bolsheviks at that time, despite a number of confusions and errors concerning the immediate economic programme of the revolution, errors which they held in conjunction with the entire workers' movement of the era.

THE DICTATORSHIP WEAKENS

It is only against this background that we can hope to understand the subsequent degeneration of the Russian Revolution. Since this problem is being dealt with in another text of our Current in this review ('The Degeneration of the Russian Revolution'), we shall restrict selves to a few general remarks here. The revolution initiated in October 1917 failed to extend itself internationally despite the many attempted uprisings of the class throughout Europe. Russia herself was torn by a long and bloody civil war that devastated the economy and fragmented the industrial working class, the backbone of the Soviet power. In this context of isolation and internal chaos, the ideological errors of the Bolsheviks, almost as soon as they had taken power, began to assume a material weight against the political hegemony of the working class. (This was however an uneven process. The Bolsheviks who were resorting to more and more bureaucratic measures inside Russia during 1918-20 could still help found the Communist International in 1919, with the sole and express purpose of accelerating the world proletarian revolution.)

The delegation of power to a party, the elimination of the factory committees, the gradual subordination of the soviets to the state apparatus, the disbanding of the workers' militias, the growth of a militaristic approach to difficulties as a result of the tensions of the civil war period, the creation of bureaucratic commissions, were all extremely significant manifestations of the process of the degeneration of the revolution in Russia.

These developments were not the only signs of a weakening of the political power of the working class in Russia prior to 1921, but they are certainly the most significant. Although some of them date back even before the period of War Communism began, it is the civil war period which sees the most unhindered evolution of this process. Since the Kronstadt rebellion was in many ways a reaction to the rigours of War Communism, it is necessary to be quite clear about what this period actually signified for the Russian proletariat.

THE NATURE OF WAR COMMUNISM

As pointed out in the text 'The Degeneration of the Russian Revolution', we can no longer harbour the illusions of the Left Communists of the period, for many of whom War Communism represented a 'trite' socialist policy as against the 'capitalist restoration' instituted by the NEP. The near-disappearance of money and wages and the requisitioning of grain from the peasants did not represent an abolition of capitalist social relations but were simply unavoidable emergency measures imposed by the capitalist blockade against the Soviet Republic and by the demands of the civil war. As far as the real political power of the working class was concerned, we have seen that this period was marked by a progressive weakening of the organs of proletarian dictatorship and by a steady growth in bureaucratic tendencies and institutions. Over and over again the leadership of the Party-State argued that working class self-organisation was fine in principle but that right now everything had to he subordinated to the military struggle. A doctrine of 'efficiency' began to undermine essential principles of proletarian democracy. Under the cover of this doctrine the state began to institute a militarisation of labour, which subjected the workers to extremely harsh methods of supervision and exploitation. "In January 1920 the Council of Peoples' Commissars, largely at Trotsky's instigation, decreed a general labour obligation for all able bodied adults and, at the same time, authorized the assignment of idle military personnel to civilian work." (Paul Averich, Kronstadt 1921, Princeton 1970, p.26-7). At the same time labour discipline in the factories was enforced by the presence of Red Army troops. Having emasculated the factory committees, the way was now clear for the state to introduce one-man management and the 'Taylor' system of exploitation at the point of production, the same system which Lenin himself had denounced as "the enslavement of man to the machine". For Trotsky "the militarisation of labour ... is the indispensable basic method for the organization of our labour forces", (Report to the Third All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions, Moscow, 1920). The fact that the state was now a 'Workers' State' meant for him that the workers could have no objection to subordinating themselves to it completely.

The harsh conditions of work in the factories were not compensated for by high wages or easy access to 'use values'. On the contrary, the devastation of the economy by war and the blockade, brought the entire country to the verge of starvation, and the workers had to make do with the most meagre rations, often extremely irregularly given out. Vast sectors of industry ceased to function altogether and thousands of workers were forced to forage and fend for themselves in order to survive at all. The natural response of many was simply to leave the towns and eke out some kind of existence in the countryside; thousands attempted to survive by trading privately with the peasants, often swapping items stolen from the factories for food. Since the regime of War Communism forbade private trade, charging the state with requisitioning and distribution of essential goods, many people only survived through the black market which sprang up everywhere. To counter the black market, the government set up armed roadblocks to check all travellers to and from the towns, while the activities of the Cheka in enforcing the decrees of the government became more and more vigorous. This 'Extraordinary Commission' set up in 1918 to fight counter-revolution was behaving in a more or less unrestrained manner, using ruthless methods that won it widespread hatred among all sectors of the population.

Neither did the summary treatment handed out to the peasants gain the universal approval of the workers. The close familial and personal relations between many sectors of the Russian working class and the peasantry tended to make the workers sympathetic to the complaints of the peasants about the high-handed methods which were often used by the armed detachments sent to requisition grain, especially when the detachments took more than the surplus product of the peasant and left him without the means for his own subsistence. In response to these methods the peasants frequently hid or destroyed their crops, thus aggravating the poverty and scarcity of the whole country. The general unpopularity of these measures of economic coercion was to be clearly expressed in the programme of the Kronstadt rebels, as we shall see.

If revolutionaries like Trotsky tended to make a virtue out of the necessities imposed by this period and to glory in the militarisation of social and economic life, others, and Lenin himself was one, were more prudent. Lenin did not hide the fact that the Soviets were no longer functioning as organs of direct proletarian rule, and during the 1921 debate with Trotsky on the trade union question he supported the idea that the workers must defend themselves even against 'their' state, particularly since the Soviet Republic was for Lenin not simply a 'proletarian state' but a "workers' and peasants' state" with profound "bureaucratic deformations". The Workers' Opposition and other left groups, of course, went further in their denunciation of these bureaucratic deformations that the state had undergone in the 1918-21 period. But the majority of the Bolsheviks firmly and sincerely believed that as long as they, the party of the proletariat, controlled the state machine, the dictatorship of the proletariat still existed, even if the working masses themselves seemed to be temporarily absent from the political stage. From this fundamentally false position, disastrous consequences inevitably followed.

THE CRISIS OF 1921

While the civil war lasted, the Soviet state retained the support of the majority of the population since it was identified with the struggle against the old land-owning and capitalist classes. The extreme hardships of the civil war were shouldered with relative willingness by the workers and small peasants. But after the defeat of the imperialist armies, many began to hope that living conditions would be less harsh, that the regime would relax its tight grip on social and economic life.

The Bolshevik leadership, however, faced with the wholesale devastation left over by the war was reluctant to allow any let-up in centralized state control. Some left Bolsheviks, such as Ossinsky, insisted on the retention, indeed the reinforcement, of War Communism, especially in the countryside. He put forward a plan for "compulsory mass organisation of production", (N. Ossinsky. Goshdarstvennoe Regulirovanie Krestianskogo Khoziastva, Moscow 1920, p.8-9), under government direction, the formation of local 'sowing committees' to extend collectivised production, and of common seed banks into which the peasants would be required to pool their seed-grain, the government itself determining the overall distribution of this grain. All these measures, he foresaw, would lead to a genuinely 'socialist' economy in Russia.

Other Bolsheviks, such as Lenin, began to see the need for some relaxation, especially towards the peasants, but on the whole 'the party stood firm in defence of the methods of War Communism. As a result, the patience of the peasants at last began to wear out. During the winter of 1920-21, a whole series of peasant uprisings swept the country. In Tambov province, the middle Volga area, the Ukraine, western Siberia and many other regions, peasants formed themselves into crudely armed bands to fight against the food detachments and the Cheka. Often their ranks were swelled by recently demobilized Red Army men who brought a certain military know-how to their actions. In some regions, huge insurgent armies were formed, half guerrilla forces and half bandit-gangs. In Tambov, for example, the guerrilla army of A.S. Antonov numbered up to 50,000 men. These forces had little ideological motive save for the traditional peasant resentment against the city, against centralised government, in favour of the traditional dreams of the rural petit-bourgeoisie for independence and self-sufficiency. Having already confronted the peasant army of Makhno in the Ukraine, the Bolsheviks were haunted by the possibility of a generalized peasant Jacquerie against the Soviet power. It is not therefore altogether surprising that they should have assimilated the Kronstadt revolt with this threat from the peasantry. This is surely one of the reasons for the ruthlessness with which the Kronstadt uprising was suppressed.

But in between the wave of peasant rebellions and the uprising in Kronstadt, a series of events occurred which gives the action of the Kronstadt rebels a very different character from that ascribed to it by the Bolshevik leadership. In the middle of February 1921, spontaneous factory meetings, strikes and demonstrations took place in Moscow, demanding higher rations, an end to the methods of 'forced labour' instituted by War Communism, and a return to 'free trade' with the countryside. Troops and officer cadets had to be called in to restore order.

Almost immediately afterwards, a far bigger series of wildcat strikes swept through Petrograd. Beginning at the Trubochny metal factory, the strike rapidly spread out to include many of the largest industrial enterprises in the city. At factory meetings and demonstrations, resolutions were passed demanding increases in food and clothing rations, since most of the workers were both hungry and freezing. Alongside these economic demands, more political demands appeared also: the workers wanted an end to travel restrictions in and out of the city, release of working class prisoners, freedom of speech, etc. The Soviet authorities in the town, with Zinoviev at their head, responded by denouncing the strikes as playing into the hands of the counter-revolution, and they put the city under direct military rule, forbidding street meetings and imposing an 11pm. curfew. Undoubtedly some counter-revolutionary elements like the Mensheviks and the Social Revolutionaries did intervene in these events with their own fraudulent schemes for 'salvation', but the Petrograd strike movement was essentially a spontaneous proletarian response to intolerable living conditions. The Bolshevik authorities, however, could not bear to admit that the workers could be striking against the 'Workers' State', and characterized the strikers as idlers, self-seekers, and provocateurs. They also sought to break the strike by means of lockouts, deprivation of rations, and the arrest of prominent speakers and 'ringleaders' by the local Cheka. These repressive measures were combined with concessions: Zinoviev announced the dismantling of the roadblocks around the city, the purchase of coal from abroad to ease the fuel shortage and plans to end grain-requisitions. This combination of repression and conciliation led most of the already weak and exhausted workers to abandon their struggle in the hope of better things to come.

But the most important outcome of the Petrograd strike movement was the effect it was to have on the nearby fortress-town of Kronstadt. The Kronstadt garrison, one of the main bastions of the October Revolution, had already been engaged in a fight against bureaucratisation before the Petrograd strikes. During 1920 and 1921 the rank and file of the Red Fleet in the Baltic had been fighting against the disciplinarian tendencies of the officers and the bureaucratic actions of the POUBALT (the Political Section of the Baltic Fleet, the party organ which dominated the soviet structure of the navy). Motions were passed at sailors' meetings in February 1921, declaring "P0UBALT has not only separated itself from the masses but also from the active functionaries. It has become transformed into a bureaucratic organ, enjoying no authority among the sailors". (Ida Mett, The Kronstadt Commune, Solidarity pamphlet, no.27, p.3)

Thus when news came of the Petrograd strikes and of the declaration of martial law by the Petrograd authorities, the sailors were already in a state of ferment. On 28 February they sent a delegation to the factories of Petrograd to discover what was going on. On the same day the crew of the battleship Petropavlovsk met to discuss the situation and passed the following resolution:

"Having heard the report of the representatives sent by the general meeting of ships crews to Petrograd to investigate the situation there, we resolve:

1. In view of the fact that the present Soviets do not express the will of the workers and peasants, immediately to hold new elections by secret ballot, with freedom to carry on agitation beforehand for all workers and peasants;

2. To give freedom of speech and press to workers and peasants, to anarchists and left socialist parties;

3. To secure freedom of assembly for trade unions and peasant organizations;

4. To call a non-party conference of the workers, Red Army soldiers and sailors of Petrograd, Kronstadt, and Petrograd province, no later than 10 March 1921;

5. To liberate all political prisoners of socialist parties, as well as all workers, peasants, soldiers and sailors imprisoned in connection with the labour and peasant movements;

6. To elect a commission to review the cases of those being held in prisons and concentration camps;

7. To abolish all political departments because no party should be given special privileges in the propagation of its ideas or receive the financial support of the state for such purposes. Instead, there should be established cultural and educational commissions, locally elected and financed by the state;

8. To remove immediately all roadblock detachments;

9. To equalise the rations of all working people, with the exception of those employed in trades detrimental to health;

10. To abolish Communist fighting detachments in all branches of the Army, as well as the Communist guards kept on duty in factories and mills. Should the guards be found necessary they are to be appointed in the Army from the ranks and in the factories and mills at the discretion of the workers;

11. To give the peasants full freedom of action in regard to the land, and also the right to keep cattle, on condition that the peasants manage with their own means, that is without employing hired labour;

12. To request all branches of the Army, as well as our comrades the military cadets (kursanty), to endorse our resolution;

13. To demand that the press give all our resolutions wide publicity;

14. To appoint an itinerant bureau of control;

15. To permit free handicrafts production by one's own labour.

Petrichenko, Chairman of the Squadron Meeting
Pererelkin, Secretary"

(Averich, op cit, p.73-4)

This resolution quickly became the programme of the Kronstadt revolt. On 1 March a mass assembly of 16,000 took place in the garrison, officially convened as a meeting of the First and Second Battleship Sections, and attended by Kalinin, President of the All-Russian Executive of Soviets, and Kouzmin, political commissar to the Baltic Fleet. Although Kalinin was welcomed to the assembly with music and flags, he and Kouzmin soon found themselves completely isolated at the meeting. The whole assembly adopted the Petropavlovsk resolution, with the exception of Kalinin and Kouzmin, who spoke against the initiatives of the Kronstadters in a most provocative tone and were met with jeers and catcalls.

The next day, 2 March, was the day the Kronstadt Soviet was due to he re-elected. The mass assembly of 1 March therefore called a meeting of delegates from ships, Red Army units, factories and elsewhere to discuss the reconstitution of the Soviet. 300 delegates therefore met on 2 March at the House of Culture. The Petropavlovsk resolution was again endorsed and plans for new Soviet elections set in motion, with a view towards "the peaceful reconstruction of the Soviet regime", (Mett, op cit, p.13). In the meantime the delegates set up a Provisional Revolutionary Committee (PRC) charged with the administration of the town and organising defence against any government intervention. This latter task was seen to be especially pressing because of rumours of immediate attack by Bolshevik detachments and because of the violent threats of Kalinin and Kouzmin. These two proved so intractable that they were arrested along with two other officials. This act marked a decisive step towards open mutiny, and was interpreted as such by the government.

The PRC quickly assumed its functions. It began to publish its own Izvestia, and the first issue declared:

"The Communist Party, master of the State, has detached itself from the masses. It has shown itself incapable of getting the country out of its mess. Countless incidents have recently occurred in Petrograd and Moscow that clearly show that the party has lost the confidence of the working masses. The party is ignoring working class demands, because it believes that these demands are the result of counter-revolutionary activity. In this the party is making a profound mistake." (Izvestia of the Provisional Revolutionary Committee, 3 March, 1921)

THE CLASS NATURE OF THE KRONSTADT REVOLT

The immediate response of the Bolshevik government to the rebellion was to denounce it as part of a counter-revolutionary conspiracy against the Soviet power. Moscow radio called it a "White Guard plot" and claimed to have evidence that the whole thing had been organized by émigré circles in Paris and by spies for the Entente. Although these fabrications are still repeated today, this interpretation of events has been discredited even by semi-Trotskyist historians like Deutscher, who admit that these accusations have no foundation in realty. Certainly, all the jackals of the counter-revolution from the White Guards to the Social Revolutionaries attempted to capitalise on the rebellion and offered it their support. But apart from accepting the offer of 'humanitarian' aid via the émigré-controlled Russian Red Cross, the PRC rejected the advances made to them by the forces of reaction. They affirmed that they were not fighting for the return of autocracy or of the Constituent Assembly, but for a regeneration of Soviet power free from bureaucratic domination. "The Soviets and not the Constituent Assembly are the bulwark of the toilers," declared the Izvestia of Kronstadt (Pravda o Kronshtadte, Prague 192l, p.32) "In Kronstadt power is in the hands of the sailors, the red soldiers, and the revolutionary workers. It is not in the hands a White Guards commanded by General Kozlovsky, as Moscow Radio lyingly asserts." (Appeal of the PRC, Mett op cit, p.22-3)

Since the idea of a pure White guard plot, has been revealed to be a fiction more sophisticated apologetics for the subsequent repression of Kronstadt have been put forward by those who uncritically identify with the degeneration of Bolshevism. Most of the arguments follow the justification given by Trotsky in later years. In 'Hue and Cry over Kronstadt', (New international, April 1938), Trotsky presented the following argument. True, Kronstadt in 1917 was one of the bastions of the proletarian revolution; but during the civil war the revolutionary proletarian elements of the garrison were dispersed and replaced by peasant elements dominated by reactionary petit-bourgeois ideology. These elements simply could not put up with the rigours of the proletarian dictatorship and the civil war, so they staged a revolt to undermine the dictatorship and secure for themselves privileged rations. "...the Kronstadt uprising was nothing but armed reaction of the petite-bourgeoisie against the hardships of social revolution and the severity of proletarian dictatorship." He goes on to say that the Petrograd workers, who in contrast to the dandies of Kronstadt bore these hardships without complaint, were "repelled" by the rebel lion, feeling that "the Kronstadt mutineers stood on the opposite side of the barricades" and do they 'supported the Soviet power."

We do not want to spend too much time examining these arguments; we have already cited enough facts to discredit them. The claim that the Kronstadt rebels demanded privileged rations for themselves can be dismissed simply by recalling point nine of the Petropavlovsk resolution, demanding equal rationing for all. Similarly the picture painted of the Petrograd workers tamely supporting the repression is rudely shattered by the reality of the wave of strikes which preceded the revolt. Although this is movement had largely subsided by the time the Kronstadt revolt broke out, important sections of the Petrograd proletariat continued to actively support the rebels. On 7 March, the day the government bombardment of Kronstadt began, workers at the arsenal factory held a mass meeting that elected a commission charged with agitating for a general strike in support of the rebellion. Strikes continued Pouhlov, Battisky, Oboukhov, and other major enterprises.

On the other hand we would not deny that there were petit-bourgeois elements in the ideology and programme of the rebels (free exchange, "freedom of action" for the peasants etc.) as well as in the personnel of the fleet army. But all proletarian uprisings are accompanied by a whole number of petit bourgeois and reactionary elements that do not change the fundamentally working class character of the movement. This was certainly the case with the October insurrectionary itself which had the support and active participation of peasant elements in the armed forces and in the countryside. The fact that the Kronstadt rebels still had a largely working class kernel can be gauged from the make-up of the delegate assembly of 2 March, which was strongly composed of proletarians from the factories and naval units of the garrison, and from the personnel of' the PRC elected by this assembly, which was made up of workers and long service sailors who had beer engaged in the revolutionary movement since at least l9l7. (See Mett, op cit, p.15 for a breakdown of the members of this committee.) But these facts are less important than the general context of the revolt: it occurred within a movement of working class struggle against the bureaucratisation of the regime, identified with that struggle, and saw itself as a moment in its generalisation. "Let the toilers of the whole world know that we the defenders of Soviet power are guarding the conquests of the Social Revolution. We shall win or perish beneath the ruins of Kronstadt, fighting for the just cause of the proletarian masses." (Pravda o Kronshtadte, p.82)

Despite the fact that those ideologists of the petit bourgeoisie, the anarchists, claim Kronstadt as their revolt, and despite the fact that anarchist influences were undoubtedly present in the rebels' programme and phraseology, the demands of the rebels were not simply anarchist. They did not call for an abstract abolition of the state, but for the regeneration of Soviet power. Neither did they want to abolish 'parties' as such. Though many of the rebels left the Bolshevik party at that time, and although the rebels issued many confusing statements about 'Communist tyranny', they did not call for 'Soviets without Communists' as has often been asserted. Their slogans were freedom of agitation for different working class groups and "power to the Soviets, not the parties". Despite all the ambiguities inherent in these slogans, they express an instinctive rejection of the idea of the party substituting itself for the class, which was one of the main contributing factors in the degeneration of Bolshevism.

This is one of the main features of the rebellion. It did not present a clear, coherent political analysis of the degeneration of the revolution. Such coherent analyses should find expression in the communist minorities of the class, even though at specific junctures these minorities might lag behind the spontaneous consciousness of the class as a whole. In the case of the Russian Revolution, it was to take decades of painful reflection in the international left communist movement before a coherent understanding of the degeneration could be achieved. What the Kronstadt uprising did represent was an elemental proletarian response to the degeneration, one of the last mass expressions of the Russian working class in that period. In Moscow, Petrograd and Kronstadt the workers were sending out a desperate S.O.S. in defence of the declining Russian Revolution.

KRONSTADT AND THE NEP

A great deal of fruitless debate has taken place about the relationship between the demands of the rebels and the New Economic Policy (NEP). For the unrepentant Stalinists of the British and Irish Communist Organization (B & ICO) the rebellion had to he crushed because their economic programme of barter and free exchange was a petit-bourgeois reaction against the process of 'building Socialism' in the USSR - 'Socialism' of course meaning the fullest possible state capitalist centralisation. But at the same time, the B & ICO defends the NEP as a step on the road to socialism! (See Problems of Communism, no 3, the theoretical journal of the B & ICO.) At the opposite end of the spectrum of confusion, the anarchist Murray Bookchin in his introduction to the Canadian edition of The Kronstadt Commune (Black Rose Books, Montreal, 1971) paints a picture of the libertarian paradise that would have come to pass in Russia if only the economic programme of the rebels had been put into effect: "A victory by the Kronstadt sailors might have opened a new perspective for Russia - a hybrid social development comprising workers' control of the factories with an open market in agricultural goods, based on a small scale peasant economy arid voluntary agrarian communes."

Bookchin then adds, mysteriously, that such an extremely revolutionary society could only have survived together with a successful revolutionary movement in the West, though why such a shopkeepers' dream of self-management should have constituted a threat to world capital is anyone's guess.

In any case, all this debate is of little interest 'for communists.' Given the failure of the 19l7-23 revolutionary wave, no economic policy, whether War Communism, attempts at autarky, the NEP or the Kronstadt programme, could have saved the revolution. As it happened many of the purely economic demands put forward by the rebels were more or less included in the NEP. As economic programmes both are inadequate and it would he absurd for revolutionaries today to advocate free trade or barter as economic measures suitable for a proletarian bastion. even though at critical junctures it may be impossible to eliminate them. The essential difference between the Kronstadt programme and the NEP was this: that while the latter was to he introduced from above by the burgeoning state bureaucracy in cooperation with the remaining private managers and capitalists, and without any re-establishment of proletarian democracy, the Kronstadt insurgents put as a precondition for any further advance in the revolution the restoration of genuine Soviet power and an end to the Bolshevik party-dictatorship.

This is the nub of the problem. It is useless to discuss today which economic policies were 'more socialist' at that time. Socialism could not have been built in Russia alone. The Kronstadt rebels perhaps understood this less than the more clear-headed Bolsheviks. The insurgents, for example talked about the establishment of 'free socialism' in Russia, without emphasizing the necessity for a world extension of the revolution before socialism could be inaugurated. "Revolutionary Kronstadt is fighting for a different kind of socialism, for a Soviet Republic of the toilers, in which the producer himself will be the sole master and can dispose of his products as he sees fit." (Pravda o Kronshtadte, pp.92, 173-4)

Lenin's sober assessment of the possibilities for 'socialist' progress in Russia at that time, though leading him to reactionary conclusions, was in fact a closer approximation to reality than the Kronstadters' hopes for a self-managed commune in Russia.

But Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership, imprisoned by the state apparatus, failed to see what the Kronstadt insurgents were saying despite all their confusions and badly formulated ideas: the revolution can go nowhere at all if the workers are not in command. The fundamental precondition for the defence and extension of the revolution in Russia was all power to the Soviets - in other words, the reconquest of political hegemony by the working masses themselves. As pointed out in the text 'The Degeneration of the Russian Revolution', this question of political power is by far the most important one. The proletariat in power may make economic advances and suffer economic retreats without the revolution being lost. But once the political power of the class is undermined, no number of economic measures can salvage the revolution. It is because the Kronstadt rebels were fighting for the reconquest of this indipensab1e proletarian political power that revolutionaries today must recognise in the Kronstadt struggle a defence of fundamental class positions.

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT

The Bolshevik leadership reacted with extreme hostility to the Kronstadt rebellion. We have already mentioned the provocative behaviour of Kouzmin and Kalinin in the garrison itself, the lies spread by Moscow Radio that this was an attempted White Guard counter-revolution. The intransigent attitude taken up by the Bolshevik government quickly eliminated any possibility of compromise or discussion. The peremptory warning to the garrison issued by Trotsky demanded only unconditional surrender and made no offer of concessions to the rebels' demands. The call to Kronstadt issued by Zinoviev and the Petrograd Defence Committee (the organ which bad put the city under martial law after the strike wave) is well known for its crudity, threatening to "shoot you like partridges" if the rebels persisted. Zinoviev also organized the seizure of rebels' families as hostages, using as an excuse the arrest of Bolshevik officials by the PRC (none of whom were harmed). These actions were denounced as shameful by the rebels, who refused to descend to the same level.

During the actual military assault on the fortress, the Red Army units sent in to crush the rebellion were constantly on the verge of total demoralization. Some even began fraternizing with the rebels. To ensure the 'loyalty' of the army prominent Bolshevik leaders were dispatched from the Tenth Party Congress then in session to lead the assault, among them members of the Workers' Opposition, who were anxious to avoid being identified with the uprising; at the same time the guns of the Cheka were trained on the soldiers' backs to make doubly sure that disaffection did not spread.

When the fortress finally fell, hundreds of insurgents were massacred on the spot or quickly condemned to death by the Cheka. Others were sent to concentration camps. The repression was pitilessly systematic. In order to wipe out all trace of the uprising, the garrison was put under military control, the Soviet was dissolved, and a purge of all dissident elements began. Even the soldiers who had taken part in the suppression of the revolt were rapidly dispersed to various units to prevent the 'germs' of Kronstadt spreading. Similar measures were taken with 'unreliable' units in the navy.

The development of events in Russia after the revolt makes nonsense of the claims that the suppression of the rebellion was a 'tragic necessity' to defend the revolution. The Bolsheviks believed they were defending the revolution from the threat of White Guard reaction in this crucial frontier seaport. But whatever the Bolsheviks thought they were doing, in fact, by attacking the rebels they were attacking the only real defence the revolution can have: working class autonomy and direct proletarian power. In doing so they made themselves the very agents of the counter-revolution from within, and these acts served to pave the way for the final triumph of the bourgeois counter-revolution in the form of Stalinism.

The extreme ruthlessness with which the government suppressed the uprising has led some revolutionaries to conclude that the Bolshevik Party was clearly and openly capitalist in 1921, just like the Stalinists and Trotskyists today. We do not want to get involved in a long discussion about when the Party finally and irredeemably passed over to the bourgeoisie and in any case we reject the methodology which attempts to limit an understanding of historical processes into a rigid formula of fixed dates.

But to say that the Bolshevik Party was 'nothing but' capitalist in 1921 is to say, in effect, that we have nothing to learn about the Kronstadt events, except the date of the revolution's demise. Capitalists, after all, always crush workers' uprisings and we don't have to 'learn' this over and over again. Kronstadt can only teach us anything new if we recognise it as a chapter within proletarian history, as a tragedy within the proletarian camp. The real problem revolutionaries must face today is how did a proletarian party come to act as the Bolsheviks did at Kronstadt in 1921, and how can we ensure that such an event never occurs again? In sum, what are the lessons of Kronstadt?

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Part 2: The Lessons of Kronstadt

The Kronstadt revolt highlights in a particularly dramatic way many of the fundamental lessons of the whole Russian Revolution, which for the working class are the only 'gains' that survive the October Revolution today.

1. THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION IS INTERNATIONAL OR NOTHING

The proletarian revolution can only be successful on a world scale. It is impossible to 'abolish capitalism' or 'to build socialism' in one country. The revolution cannot be saved be save by programmes of economic reorganisation, but only by the extension of proletarian political power across the globe. Without this extension, the degeneration of the revolution is inevitable, not matter how many changes in the economy are brought about. If the revolution remains isolated, proletarian political power will be crushed either by external invasion or by internal violence, as at Kronstadt.

2. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT IS NOT THE DICTATORSHIP OF A PARTY

The tragedy of the Russian Revolution, and in particular of the Kronstadt massacre, was that the party of the proletariat, the Bolsheviks, saw its role as the taking of state power, and the defence of that power even against the working class as a whole. Thus while the state became independent from the class and stood against it at Kronstadt, the Bolsheviks saw their place as being in the state fighting against the class, and not in the class fighting against the bureaucratisation of the state.

Today revolutionaries must assert as a fundamental principle that the role of the party is not to take power in the name of the class. Only the working class as a whole, organised in its factory committees, militias and workers' councils, can take political power and undertake the communist transformation of society. The party is to be an active factor in the development of proletarian consciousness, but it cannot create communism 'on behalf' of the class. Such pretensions can only lead, as they did in Russia, to the dictatorship of the party over the class, to the suppression of proletarian self-activity under the excuse that 'the party knows best'.

At the same time, the identification of the party with the state, while a natural state of affairs for bourgeois parties, can only lead to the corruption and perversion of proletarian parties. A party of the proletariat has to constitute the most radical and forward-looking fraction of the class which is itself the most dynamic class in history; to burden the party with the administration of the affairs of state, which by definition can only have a conservative function, is to negate the whole function of the party and to hamstring its revolutionary creativity. The steady bureaucratisation of the Bolshevik Party, its growing inability to separate the interests of the revolutionary class from the interests of the Soviet state, its degeneration into a ruthless administrative machine - all this is the price paid by the party itself for its mistaken notions about the party exercising state power

3. NO RELATIONS OF FORCE WITHIN THE WORKING CLASS

Synonymous with the principle that no minority, however enlightened, can hold power over the working class, is the principle that there can be no relations of force or violence within the working class itself. Proletarian democracy is not a luxury that can be dispensed with in the name of 'efficiency' but is the only guarantee of the health of the revolution and of the possibility of the class learning through its own experience. Even if sections of the class are manifestly wrong, the 'correct line' cannot be forced onto them by another section, whether a majority or a minority. Only a total freedom of discussion in the autonomous organs of the class (assemblies, councils, party, etc) can resolve conflicts and problems in the class. This also implies that the whole class must have access to the means of communication (press, radio, T.V. etc) and that the whole class must retain the right to strike and to challenge directives issued by central organs.

Even if Kronstadt sailors had been in the wrong, the ruthless measures taken by the Bolshevik government would have been totally unjustifiable. Such actions can only destroy the solidarity and cohesion in the class and lead to demoralisation and despair. Revolutionary violence is a weapon that the proletariat is forced to use in its struggle against the capitalist class. Its use against other non-exploiting classes must be kept to a minimum as far as possible; but within the proletariat, it can have NO place

4. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT IS NOT THE STATE.

At the time of the Russian Revolution there was a basic confusion in the workers' movement which identified the dictatorship of the proletariat with the actual state which emerged after the overthrow of the Tsarist regime, the Russian Federal Soviet Republic, whose most important body was the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. The dictatorship of the proletariat, while functioning through specific working class organs such as the factory assemblies and workers' councils, is not an institution but a state of affairs, a real movement of the class as a whole. The goal of the proletarian dictatorship is not that of a state as understood in Marxist terms. The state is that superstructural organisation arising out of class society whose function is to preserve the dominant social relations, the status quo between classes. The proletarian dictatorship, on the other hand, has the sole aim of transforming social relations and abolishing classes.

At the same time, Marxists have always affirmed the inevitability of the state in the period of transition to communism, after the destruction of bourgeois political power. Thus the Russian Soviet state, like the Paris Commune, was an inevitable product of class society that existed in Russia after 1917.

Some revolutionaries hold the view that the only state that can exist after the destruction of bourgeois power is the workers' councils themselves. It is true that the workers' councils have to assume a function that has always been one of the main characteristics of the state: the exercising of a monopoly of violence. But to call the workers' councils the state because of this is to reduce the role of the state to that of a simple organ of violence and nothing else. Thus the bourgeois state today would, according to such a conception, consist only of the police and army, and not of parliament, municipalities, trade unions, and innumerable other institutions that maintain capitalist order without immediate use of repressive force. These bodies are organs of state because they serve to hold together the existing social order, to maintain class antagonisms within an acceptable framework. The workers' councils, in contrast, are the active negation of this statist function, in that they are above all organs of radical social transformation, not organs of the status quo.

But more than this, it is wishful thinking to expect that the only social institutions that will exist in the transition period will be the workers' councils alone. A revolution does not follow the clockwork conceptions of many revolutionaries. The immense social upheaval of the revolution gives rise to all kinds of institutions, not only from the working class at the point of production, but from the entire population which has been oppressed by the capitalist class. In Russia, soviets and other popular organs sprang up not only from the factories but everywhere - in the army, the navy, in the villages, in the residential areas of towns. It was not simply that "the Bolsheviks began to construct a state that had a separate existence from the mass organisations of the class" (Workers' Voice no 14). It is true that the Bolsheviks did actively contribute to the bureaucratisation of the of this state, through departing form the elective principle and setting up innumerable commissions outside the soviets; but the Bolsheviks themselves did not create the 'Soviet State'. It was something that emerged out of the very soil of Russian society after the October; it arose because that society had to give birth to an institution capable of holding its profound class antagonisms in check. To say that only the workers' councils can exist after the revolution is to advocate a permanent civil war not only between the working class and the bourgeoisie (which is indeed inevitable), but also between the working class and all other classes and categories. In Russia this would have meant a war between the workers' Soviets and the popular organs of the soldiers and peasants. This would clearly have been a terrible waste of energy and a diversion from the primordial task of the revolution: the extension of the world revolution against the capitalist class (Note 1 [31]). But if this Soviet state was to some degree an inevitable product of the post-insurrectional society, we can point out a number of grave defects in its structure and functioning after the October insurrection, quite apart from the fact that it was controlled by a party.

a) In the actual functioning of the state, there was a continual departure from the basic principles established through the experience of the Commune in 1871 and reaffirmed by Lenin in his State and Revolution in 1917: all functionaries elected and revocable at any time, remuneration of state functionaries the same as that of a worker, permanent armament of the proletariat. More and more commissions and offices emerged, completely unaccountable to the working class as a whole (Economic Councils, Cheka etc). Elections were constantly being postponed, set aside, or rigged. Privileges for state officials gradually became commonplace. The workers' militias were dissolved into the Red Army, which was itself neither under the control of the workers' Soviets, nor of the rank and file soldiers.

b) The workers' councils, factory committees and other proletarian organs were made into one part of the state apparatus among other parts (although the workers were given preferential voting rights). Instead of being granted an autonomy from and hegemony over all other social institutions, these organs tended more and more to be not only incorporated into the general state apparatus, but subordinated to it. Proletarian power, instead of being expressed through the specific organs of the class, was identified with the state apparatus. Moreover, the glib assumption that this was a 'proletarian', a 'socialist' state led the Bolsheviks to assure that the workers could have no rights or interests separate from those of the state. Consequently, any resistance to the state on the part of workers could only be counter-revolutionary. This profoundly erroneous conception was the heart of the Bolsheviks' reaction to the Petrograd strikes ad the Kronstadt uprising.

In the future, the principles of the Commune, of working class autonomy, must not be asserted on paper only, but must be fought for and defended as a fundamental precondition for proletarian power over the state. At no time can the proletariat's vigilance over the state apparatus be relaxed, because the Russian experience and the Kronstadt events in particular have shown that the counter-revolution can indeed expresses itself through the post-insurrectional state, and not simply through 'external' bourgeois aggression.

As a consequence, in order to ensure that the Commune-state remains an instrument of proletarian rule, the working class cannot identify its dictatorship with this ambiguous and untrustworthy apparatus, but only in its own autonomous class organs. These organs must tirelessly supervise the working of the state at all levels, demanding a maximum representation of delegates from workers' councils in the general Soviet congresses; the permanent and independent unification of the working class through its councils, and the workers' councils power of decision over all recommendations of the state. Above all the workers must prevent the state from interfering politically or militarily in its own class organs; but on the other hand the working class must maintain the capacity to exert its dictatorship over and against the state, by violence if need be. This means that the working class must guarantee its class autonomy by the general arming of the proletariat. If, during the civil war period, its becomes necessary to create a 'red army' out of the general population this force must be completely subordinated politically to the workers' councils, and dissolved as soon as the bourgeoisie has been militarily defeated. And at no time can the proletarian militias in the factories be dissolved.

The identification of the party with the state, and the state with the class, found their logical outcome at Kronstadt, when the party took the side of the state against the class. By 1921 the isolation of the Russian Revolution had made the state, by definition the guardian of the status quo, the 'guardian' of the stabilisation of capital and the taming of the workers. Despite all the good intentions of the Bolshevik leadership, who continued to hope for the saving dawn of the world revolution for several years more, their entanglement with this state machine was forcing them to act as obstacles to the world revolution and dragging them towards the final triumph of the Stalinist counter-revolution. Some of them actually began to see that it was not the party that controlled the state, but the state which controlled the party. As Lenin himself said:

"The machine is getting out of the hands of those who are wielding it: one could say that there is someone in the saddle guiding this machine, but that the latter is following a direction other than that which was wanted, is being guided by a hidden hand... God alone knows to whom it belongs, perhaps to a speculator or a private capitalist, or both together. The fact is that the machine is not going in the direction desired by those who are supposed to be running it, and sometimes it foes in the opposite direction altogether" (Political Report of the Central Committee to the Party, 1922)

The last years of Lenin's life saw him struggling hopelessly against the emergent bureaucracy with pathetic schemes like the one for a 'Workers' and Peasants' Inspection', through which the bureaucracy would be 'supervised' through a new bureaucratic commission! What he could not admit, what he could not see, was that this so-called proletarian state had become a bourgeois machine pure and simple, an apparatus for the regulation of capitalist social relations, and could therefore only be fundamentally impervious to working class needs or reforms. The triumph of Stalinism was simply the cynical recognition of this fact, the final and definitive adaptation of the party to its role as overseer of the capitalist state. This was the real meaning of the declaration of 'Socialism in One Country' in 1926.

The Kronstadt uprising had posed the party with a monumental historic choice: either continue to manage this bourgeois machine, and thus end up as a party of capital -or separate itself from the state and stand by the whole working class in its struggle against this machine, this personification of capital. By taking the former path, the Bolsheviks probably signed their death warrant as a party of the proletariat, and added impetus to the counter-revolutionary process that openly declared itself in 1926. After 1921, only those Bolsheviks fractions that began to understand the need to identify directly with the workers' struggle against the state could remain revolutionary, and were able to participate in the international struggle of the Left Communists against he degenerating Third International. Thus for example, the Workers' Group of Miasnikov played an active role in the wave of wildcat strikes that swept Russia in August and September of 1923. This was in profound contrast to the Left Opposition led by Trotsky, whose struggle against the Stalinist faction was always fought from within the bureaucracy, and did not attempt to relate to the workers' struggle against what the Trotskyists defined as a 'workers' state' and a workers' economy. Their initial inability to disengage themselves from the party-state machine prefigured the subsequent evolution of Trotskyism as a 'critical' appendage of the Stalinist counter-revolution.

But historical choices' are rarely clear-cut at the time they have to be made. Men make their history within the definite objective conditions and "the traditions of the past generations weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living" (Marx). This nightmarish weight of the past was shouldered by the Bolsheviks, and only the revolutionary triumph of the western proletariat could have made it possible for the weight to have been removed, for the Bolsheviks or at least substantial elements of the party to have realised their mistakes and to have been regenerated by the inexhaustible creativity of the international proletarian movement. The traditions of Social Democracy, the backwardness of Russia, and above all the burdens of state power in the context of a declining revolutionary wave - all these factors were to push the Bolsheviks towards taking up a position on the wrong side of the class line at Kronstadt.

But it was not only the Bolshevik leadership that was unable to understand what was happening at Kronstadt. As we have seen, the Workers' Opposition in the party rushed to disassociate themselves from the rising and lead the assault on the garrison. Even when the Russian ultra-left had gone beyond the timid protests of the Workers' Opposition and entered into clandestine activity, it failed to draw the lessons of the rising and made little reference to it in its criticisms of the regime. The KAPD (Communist Workers' Party of Germany) at the Third Congress of the Comintern did recognise the proletarian character of the uprising, though denied that it had declared itself on the side of the rebels; and before long even this partial understanding was lost as the German Left began to repudiate the proletarian character of the Russian Revolution. By 1924, Gorter was characterising the Kronstadt rising as a revolt of the peasantry that forced the Bolsheviks to scrap the communist programme and 'restore capitalism' via the NEP. (Gorter, in 'The World Revolution'. Workers' Dreadnought. 9 February to 10 May, 1924).

In sum, few communists then understood the profound significance of the rising or drew the essential lessons from it. All this is testimony to the fact that the proletariat does not learn the basic lessons of the class struggle in one fell swoop but only through a painful accumulation of experience, of bloody struggle and of intense theoretical reflection.

It is not the task of revolutionaries today to make abstract moral judgements on the past workers' movement, but to see themselves as a product of that movement - a product, to be sure, capable of making a ruthless critique of all the errors of the movement, but a product nonetheless. Otherwise the criticisms of the past by revolutionaries today can have no grounding in the real struggles of the working class. Only by seeing the protagonists who faced each other at Kronstadt as tragic actors in our own history can communists today claim the right to denounce the action of the Bolsheviks and declare our solidarity with the rebel's defence of class positions. Only by understanding the Kronstadt events as part of the historical movement of the class can we hope to appropriate the lessons of this experience and apply them to the present and future practice of the proletariat. Only thus can we hope to ensure that there will be no more Kronstadts

CDW,
August. 1975

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FOOTNOTES
  1. This does not mean that we endorse the idea, held both by the Bolsheviks and the Kronstadt rebels, of a 'workers' and peasants' power. The working class in the next revolutionary wave must affirm that it is the only revolutionary class. It must therefore ensure that it is the only class to organise as a class in the transition period, dissolving any institution that claims to defend the specific interests of any other class. The rest of the non-exploiting population will be permitted to organise itself within the limits of the proletarian dictatorship, and will be represented in the state only as 'citizens' through territorially elected soviets. The granting of civil rights and a franchise to these strata no more endows them with political power as a class than the bourgeoisie gives power to the working class by allowing it to vote in municipal and parliamentary elections. Back [32]

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History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1917 - Russian Revolution [13]

1976 - 4 to 7

  • 5108 reads

  

International Review no. 4 February 1976

  • 3094 reads

Theses on the situation in Spain

  • 2849 reads
Introduction

Since these theses were written important political events have taken place in Spain which, without undermining the general perspectives outlined in the theses, make it necessary to bring them up to date.

The theses say that one of the causes of “the inability of the Spanish bourgeoisie to acquire the political means for containing and con­fronting the proletariat - apart from bloody repression” resides in “a quasi-religious paralysis in front of the personage of Franco, who, as long as he is alive, constitutes the only raison d’etre for the completely anachronistic forces which back him”. The agony and death of Franco, by eliminating one of the causes of the paralysis of the Spanish bourgeoisie, has unfreezed the situation. As a result there has been a complete disarray amongst those anachronistic forces, mentioned in the theses, who derive their strength partly from the army and more especially from the police. These elements have, during the ‘interreg­num’, tried to stand in the way of any possibility of ‘democratization’, by engaging in a systematic campaign of repression, in particular by putting Marcelino Camacho, the Stalinist leader of the workers’ com­missions, back in prison a few days after his release. But all this has been the swan-song of the ‘ultras’. They have allowed their hands to be tied by the fact that Arias Navarro has remained at the head of the government and they have had to listen, without protest, to a solemn warning issued by the Minister of the Interior, Fraga Iribarne, the new ‘strong man’ of the regime, to the effect that: “those who attribute to themselves the role of guardians of their own affairs and their own leaders, roles which no one has accorded to them, had better understand what I am saying: we will have no friends or enemies other than those of the state...” (20 December)

The death of Franco will thus add a certain nuance to the perspective outlined in our thesis which states that, “In spite of the fact that the world bourgeoisie....has taken the Spanish situation in hand, it is unlikely that the changeover in Spain can still take place in an atmosphere of calm”. Today the Spanish bourgeoisie has been strengthened by the support of the whole world bourgeoisie, especially that of America. (A recent expression of this support was the fact that so many of the Heads of State who attended Juan Carlos coronation ‘missed’ Franco’s funeral.) After two fruitless attempts at the end of the sixties and at the beginning of 1974, the bourgeoisie of Spain has finally managed to set in motion the delicate process of ‘opening out’ (‘apertura’), a process which must allow it to move towards ‘real democracy’. And whether in the government or in the opposition, the main factions of the bourgeoisie will do all they can, in a concerted manner, to make the transition a peaceful one (of the tete-a-tete dinner on 15 December between Fraga Iribarne and Tierno Galvan, one of the leaders of the Democratic Junta).

Thus the present government’s policy of ‘small steps towards democracy has a dual objective:

* to ensure a sufficient continuity in the structures of the state to avoid disorganization and convulsions of the kind that have taken place in Portugal

* to divert the discontent and combativity of the proletariat towards ‘deepening’ and accelerating the process of democratization.

As far as the opposition is concerned, its unification has been based on the need to divert working class struggle; the head of the PSOE, Felipe Gonzalez, was not afraid to declare: “The country wants demo­cracy without violence; that is why we are prepared to compromise ... we must try to be realistic.” (L'Expansion, December, 1975) There is no lack of themes for the left to use in its efforts to derail the combativity of the class, and they will probably all be used one after another: amnesty, freedom of the press, the ‘right’ to strike, uni­versal suffrage, a constitutional referendum, etc.

And when all these themes have been used up, there is always the spectre of the ‘return to fascism’. In Spain as everywhere else the left in power will not hesitate to denounce workers in struggle as ‘agents of fascism’, of the ‘reaction’, or the ‘right’, etc., in order to be able to repress them all the more easily. It is in this sense that these theses remain entirely relevant to the current situation.

29 December, 1975

With a growth rate of more than 10% during the sixties, the Spanish economy was, after Japan’s, one of the main beneficiaries of post-war reconstruction. This spectacular progress was to make it one of the most modern and concentrated economies in Europe, although it still retained a number of archaic sectors - agriculture, commerce, handicrafts and mall industry. Tied to the rigid political structure of Francoism, the persistence of these archaic sectors has caused tension and furthered contradictions brought about as a result of the effects of the world economic crisis.

The prodigal son of European capitalism, Spanish capital is today beginning to look like one of its impoverished parents. With an 8% fall in industrial production, inflation at 20% and unemployment doubling, Spain has in this last year plunged full-tilt into the crisis. The start of the large-scale movement home of Spanish migrant workers from other more developed European countries which are also feeling the effects of the economic crisis, and the fall-off in tourism, have contributed in a very concrete way to the aggravation of the economic situation in Spain.

Having paid for the boom in its’ national economy through ferocious exploitation, the Spanish proletariat, with its powerful tradition of combativity and solidarity, has launched itself into a number of hard and resolute struggles since the first onslaughts of the crisis in the late sixties. These struggles reached their culmination in the winter of 1974-5, when whole industrial concentrations and even provinces engaged in often violent struggles which, despite the systematic repression that it has had to deal with, have put the Spanish proletariat at the forefront of the global strike movement. The considerable deterioration of working class living standards since last winter, which is a result of the deepen­ing crisis, opens up a perspective of major confrontations between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in this country.

The Spanish bourgeoisie is in a particularly unfavourable situation to deal with this upsurge:

* the present regime is hated by the working population who see in it a symbol of their defeat in 1936-39 and the repression which followed. It has no capacity for mystification and for diverting workers’ struggles ‘from within’.

* this regime is completely rotten, senile, and incapable of reforming itself to deal with the new situation; in particular, after several attempts, it has shown itself to be incapable of ensuring an ‘institutional’ transition to democracy, despite the fact that a growing sector of the bourgeoisie is demanding such a change as the only way of channeling the class struggle. The blind violence with which the Franco regime struck at the leftist militants of the FRAP and ETA is an expression of the deadly impasse in which the regime finds itself today. Its imminent demise makes it act like a wild animal at bay.

The inability of the Spanish bourgeoisie to acquire the political means for containing and confronting the proletariat - apart from bloody repression - has a number of causes:

-- the paralysis of the bourgeoisie when confronted with the urgent measures which the situation demands, a paralysis brought about by its fear of arousing the proletariat. In other words, the proletarian menace has become so strong that the bourgeoisie is unable to take measures against it.

-- a quasi-religious paralysis in front of the personage of Franco, who, as long as he is alive, constitutes the only raison d’etre for the completely anachronistic forces which back him.

-- the relative weakness of the democratic political parties, a weakness linked to the still partially-backward character of the Spanish economy and to the thirty-six years of illegality with which they have had to contend.

In contrast to Portugal, the army in Spain cannot serve as a force for political transformation in that it:

-- does not constitute the only social force organized within a capitalism that is relatively developed and powerful.

-- is not a colonial army confronted with a situation that would allow it to become aware of the real interests of the national capital.

-- recruits its officers from the social strata closest to the regime, since its role is limited to the maintenance of internal order.

-- constitutes the regime’s most reliable bulwark, and the maintenance of its preponderant weight within the state and the privileges of' its present military personnel depend on the survival of the regime.

In this sense the dissident movements which have grown up in the Spanish army, even if they are used by the bourgeoisie to nurture the myth of a democratic army - which is their only function anyway - are doomed to play a secondary political role and have no chance of playing a similar role to the junior officers’ movement in Portugal.

It is for these same reasons that the classical democratic parties, in particular those regrouped around the ‘Democratic Junta’, will, despite their relative weakness, be called upon to play a more important role than they have done in Portugal; and so as a consequence of this will the classical forms for containing and mystifying the working class: the trade unions and elections. Because of this the card of the extreme left will probably be used much later on than in Portugal; for the moment, the leftists in Spain are destined to act as the touts of the traditional ‘left’.

Another difference between Spain and Portugal resides in the position of the two countries in the international balance of forces, particularly in the field of class struggle. Because of the concentration of its industry and its working class, because of the proletariat’s combativity, and because of Spain’s geographical position that much closer to the nerve centres of European capitalism, the importance of the situation in Spain is much greater than it is in Portugal.

Portugal’s main value is to serve as a laboratory for the various experi­ments of the bourgeoisie in the face of the crisis and the class struggle. But like Russia in 1917, Spain today is a ‘weak link’ in the capitalist system, and its importance therefore is much more than ‘exemplary’. Events there can have a decisive weight and effect upon the development of the class struggle in the rest of Europe.

The fundamental importance of the Spanish situation in terms of interna­tional class confrontation, in addition to the inability of the Spanish bourgeoisie to face up to the objective necessity of defending its own interests, (an incapacity manifested in particular by the executions of 27 September), have led the world bourgeoisie to take over the task of ‘regularizing’ the Spanish situation.

History demonstrates that the only time different national bourgeoisies can set aside their economic and imperialist rivalries is if their very existence is called into question by the class struggle.

This explains why the different national factions of the bourgeoisie, strengthened by past experience, are now in the process of taking preventa­tive measures in relation to Spain, putting pressure on the regime (eg, the recent decision of the EEC), and orchestrating whole campaigns denouncing the present political set up in Spain.

As well as being used to channel the discontent of the European workers and to divert their struggles, the recent anti-fascist campaigns have been used to indicate to the Spanish bourgeoisie that the bourgeoisie of other countries is prepared to support only its democratic factions, since they alone are capable of fulfilling the political needs of capital in Spain and by extension the rest of Europe.

In these grand manoeuvres of capital, it is not surprising to find, along­side the Pope, the traditional left and Gaullists like Alexander Sanguinetti, those eternal protagonists of anti-working class causes, the leftists, among whom the anarchists are making as much noise as their meagre resources allow.

More tragic than this is the fact that certain elements of the petty-bourgeoisie and even of the proletariat have in despair put themselves at the mercy of the counter-revolutionary strategies of the FRAP, ETA, or other nationalist movements, who use them as instruments of terrorism. Terrorism constitutes one way of diverting class struggle along with providing an excuse for bloody repression and new martyrs for the repulsive propaganda machines of the left and extreme left; propaganda all the more disgusting since its aim is nothing more than the introduction of new governmental bureaucrats whose essential task will be to massacre the Spanish workers.

In spite of the fact that the world bourgeoisie (including American capitalists acting through their intermediaries in Germany and Holland) has taken the Spanish situation in hand, it is unlikely that the change­over in government in Spain can still take place in an atmosphere of calm. Thus the democratic parties, especially the Democratic Junta, will probably come to power in a ‘hot’ climate, probably as a result of big workers’ struggles. In such a situation, it is equally probable that a great deal of violence will be used against the tenants of the old regime, and that this will be taken in charge by the left and leftists. Once again in the name of anti-fascism they will try to shift the working class on to bourgeois terrain and divert it from its own struggles.

As in 1936, because of the impending violence and the historic situation it is emerging from, Spain is once again destined to serve as one of the main themes for the diversion of the struggles of the European proletariat. The current anti-fascist campaigns, whose principal function at the moment is to help the Spanish bourgeoisie to rid itself of a regime which isn’t equipped to fulfill the needs of capital, are part of the preparations of the bourgeoisie for reinforcing a myth it will use to the maximum when class confrontation really hots up: the myth of the ‘fascist’ menace.

The difference with the campaigns of 1936 - that the present anti-fascist campaign has the function first and foremost of obstructing an ascendant movement of proletarian struggle, in order to repress it all the better when the time comes to do so; whereas the campaigns of the thirties took place after the defeat of the world proletariat and had the task of mobilizing the class for an imperialist war. In 1936, in the face of a completely disorientated working class, fascism had a real presence and this made the regimentation of the working class all the more effective. Today the ‘fascist danger’ has to be constructed artificially and a proletariat in the process of gaining consciousness is much less likely to be fooled by it; but the relative success, in much less propitious circumstances, of the anti-fascist mystification in Portugal shows that capital will not fail to make use of it in Spain.

Within this perspective, revolutionaries must give priority to the clearest and most systematic denunciation of the anti-fascist menace. They must denounce the left, which is putting itself forward as the future executioner of the proletariat, and in particular, its extreme leftist watchdogs who are trying and will go on trying to outdo the left in anti­fascist hysteria. Revolutionaries must make no concessions to any anti-­fascist campaigns; they must clearly assert the counter-revolutionary role of all political tendencies which, even in a critical manner, participate in these campaigns today and in the future.

19 October, 1975

Geographical: 

  • Spain [33]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Anti-fascism/racism [34]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Fascism [25]

‘Bilan’ – Lessons of Spain 1936

  • 4725 reads
Introduction

For a long time we have been working on the project of reproducing the work of Bilan, the publication of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left, which was published during what was perhaps the blackest period in the history of the workers’ movement: the period leading from Hitler’s triumph in Germany to the second, imperialist world war. But until now our wish to do so was not, in itself, enough to surmount the difficulties and problems posed by our lack of means and scarce resources.

Bilan, a small review of the 30s, was totally unknown to the general public and hardly better known by the militants of the extreme left. Not having behind it prestigious names like Pannekoek, Trotsky or Rosa Luxemburg, Bilan was not a commercial proposition and did not arouse the interest either of the big publishing houses or the self-styled ‘left wing’ pub­lishers. Neither was it of any interest to the student movement of the 60s, which submerged itself in ‘contestation’ and anti-authoritarian politics and, in the process, drew its sustenance from Marcuse; discovered the ‘sexual revolution’ with Reich; worshipped idols like Castro and Che Guevara; and wallowed in black, anti-racist racism and mystifications about ‘national liberation’, Third Worldism, and, support for the ‘libera­ting’ war in Vietnam. Indeed, as far as the SDS of Germany, the USA, and elsewhere were concerned, with their contempt for a working class they saw as being totally integrated into capitalism, what could they look for and find in Bilan except ‘old-fashioned marxist ideas’ like the class struggle and the proletariat, historical subject of the communist revolution? Che’s beard and Reich’s sex were much more attractive notions to the rebellious children of the decomposing petite-bourgeoisie than the prosaic class struggle of the workers and the writings of Bilan, which were entirely given over to that struggle. More astonishing and less understandable, superficially at least, is the complete silence displayed by the International Communist Party (Bordigist), on the subject of Bilan. If before the second world war, Bilan and the Italian fraction claimed their origins in Italian Left Communism of which they were the continuation, it seems that the ICP (Bordigist), founded in Italy after the war, does not care to remember what happened to the Italian Left in exile, after it was excluded from the Party and the Communist International. It is so proud of this exiled left fraction that, like a good bourgeois family which produces a bastard, it prefers to talk about it as little as possible. During the thirty years this party has existed, and despite its numerous publications, the number of articles republished from Bilan could be counted on the fingers of a one-armed man. Why? Why this embarrassed silence? By merely leafing through the pages of Bilan, it becomes obvious that vital principles separate it from the ICP. The ‘stammerings’ (as Bilan said of itself) of the Italian Left in exile, tried to be, and were, a critical examination of the erroneous positions and incomplete or incorrect analyses of the Third International, a living critique done in the harsh light of the experience and defeats of the proletariat, thus constituting an important contribution to the understanding, forward-­movement and enrichment of communist thought. But the ‘finished’ and ‘invariant’ work of the ICP attempts only to ‘preserve’ the past. In reality it has found itself regressing purely and simply to the worst errors of the Third International (on questions such as trade unionism, parliament, national liberation, the identification of the dictator­ship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the party, etc), errors which the ICP not only integrally takes as its own but exaggerates to the point of absurdity.

While the one sought to go forward, the other marches resolutely back­wards. Over the years the distance separating the two has accentuated, not diminished. This is the only reason for the ICP’s bad faith and lack of interest in republishing the writings of Bilan. But there is no reason for despair. We are convinced that with the growth of class struggle and revolutionary activity, Bilan will be re-established in its rightful place in the workers’ movement and among militants who want to know more about the history and development of revolutionary thought. The little that we have published from Bilan has led many of our readers to write to us insisting on the importance of publishing more. We fully share this conviction and in order to answer this demand, while waiting for a complete re-edition of Bilan, the International Review will, from now on, under­take the publication of a greater number of articles and extracts from that review. As far as possible we shall try to group articles according to their subject, in order to give readers a more complete idea of the orientation, the clarity and political positions fought for by the Communist Left and Bilan.

******************************************

In all, forty-six issues of Bilan appeared (1478 pages. The first issue came out in November l933, the last in Jaruary 1939. Beginning as the Theoretical Bulletin of the Left Fraction of the Communist Party of Italy, it ceased publication to be replaced by the review, Octobre, the magazine of the International Bureau of the Left Communist Fractions. Excluded from the Communist Party and the Communist International at the Lyon Congress in 1926, the Italian Left Fraction reconstituted itself at the beginning of 1929 and published the journal, Prometeo, in Italian and an information bulletin in French, which was actually less a news bulletin than a theoretical publication.

Deeply involved in the international communist movement, the Italian Left in exile was to play an active part in this movement, especially in France and Belgium; participating with all its might in the struggle against the degeneration and treason of the Third International and its parties which were totally dominated by Stalinism. As a consequence it was in close contact with all the left currents and groups who one by one were ejected from what had once been the Communist International. Its struggles were conducted amid the terrible disarray and immense confusion produced by the profound defeat of the greatest revolutionary upsurge of the prole­tariat and the demoralization which followed its crushing.

A short-lived attempt at rapprochement with Trotsky’s Left Opposition indicated the fundamentally different orientation which separated these two currents. While Trotskyism saw itself simply as an opposition fighting for the ‘reform’ of the Communist Parties and thus was always ready to renounce its autonomous, organizational existence and re-integrate itself into the Party, the Italian Left saw that a difference of pro­grammatic principles existed which could only be resolved through the constitution of independent communist organizations: the fractions fighting for the total destruction of the counter-revolutionary Stalinist current. The discussion arising from the situation in Germany, its perspectives, and the position revolutionaries should take towards it, was finally to render impossible any joint work. Faced with the threat of Hitlerian fascism, Trotsky advocated a broad ‘Workers United Front’ between the Stalinists and the Social Democracy. In the ‘United Front’ between the counter-revolutionaries of yesterday and the counter-revolutionaries of today, Trotsky saw the force that would bar the way to fascism; he thus completely erased the fundamental problem of the class nature of these organizations, and ignored the fact that the struggle against fascism has no meaning for the proletariat if it is separated from the general class struggle against the bourgeoisie and the capitalist system. Conjuring up some brilliant images, Trotsky said that a United Front could even be made between the “Devil and his grandmother”, thus demonstrating no less brilliantly, that he had completely lost sight of the class terrain of the struggle of the proletariat. Dazzled by his own verbal virtuosity, Trotsky, under the name of Gourev (probably to show that he oould quite easily be mistaken1) even went as far as saying that “The communist revolution could even be victorious under the leadership of Thaelman.”(sic!) From this point on it became evident that the perspec­tive appropriated by Trotsky from the counter-revolution could only lead to further shameless renunciations of communist positions, culminating in Trotskyism’s participation in the second imperialist war, in the name, of course, of the ‘defence of the USSR’.

The path followed by the Italian Left was in diametrical opposition to all this. The disaster that the triumph of fascism represented for the proletariat had been made possible and inevitable by the successive catastrophic defeats the class had suffered at the hands of first Social Democracy and then Stalinism. It was this defeat which opened the way to the capitalist solution to the historic crisis of the system: a new imperialist world war. The only alternative revolutionaries could offer to this perspective was to strive to regroup the proletariat on its own class terrain by their own intransigent defence of the fundamental principles of communism. In order to do this revolutionaries had to recognize that the principal task facing them was to subject to an exhaustive, critical examination the recent experiences of the working class, which had begun with the great revolutionary wave that had interrupted the first world war and had raised mighty hopes in the working class that the hour of its final emancipation had come. To understand the reason for the defeat, study its causes, make a ‘balance sheet’ (‘bilan’) of the gains and errors, draw the lessons of the experience, and on this basis elaborate the new programmatic political positions - all this was indispensable to enable the class to take up the fight again tomorrow, better armed and more capable of confronting its historic task: the communist revolution. It was this formidable project that Bilan, as its name suggests, resolved to tackle; the magnitude of which caused Bilan to invite all the communist forces who had survived the debacle of the counter­revolution to join with it in order that the task might be accomplished.

Few groups responded to the appeal, but then few groups had managed to resist the terrible, crushing advance of this period of reaction and preparation for World War II; and these groups were whittled down year by year. Nevertheless Bilan, kept going by the devotion of a few dozen members and sympathizers, had always, within a strict framework of class frontiers, opened its pages to thoughts and ideas which differed from its own. Nothing was more alien to it than sectarianism or the search for the ephemeral successes of localism; that is why one often found in the pages of Bilan articles of discussion and clarification written by comrades of the Dutch and German Left and the Belgian Communist League. Bilan never had the stupid pretension of having found the final answers to all the problems of the revolution. It was aware that it was often only groping towards an answer; it knew that ‘final’ answers could only be the result of the living experience of the class struggle, of confrontation and discussion within the communist movement. On many questions the answers Bilan gave remained unsatisfactory, but it is impossible to doubt the seriousness, the sincerity, the profundity of this effort and above all the validity of its method, the correctness of its orientation and the firmness of its revolutionary principles. It’s not simply a question of paying homage to this small group, which was able to keep the flag of revolution aloft in the midst of the storm of the counter-revolution; our task is to reappropriate what Bilan has left to us, to continue on their path a continuity which is not stagnation, but a process of going forward on the basis of the lessons and example made by Bilan.

It is no accident that we have chosen for this first publication a series of articles relating to the events in Spain, More than an analysis of the Spanish situation in itself, the study of these events had a more general importance and provided the key to an understanding of the evolution of the world situation, of the class forces involved, of the different political formations within them and their effective strength, their orientation and political options. Above all, it offered a direct vision of the immense tragedy into which the international proletariat, and in the first instance the Spanish working class, had been propelled.

Once again, today, Spain is at the centre of the rapidly developing international situation. While it is absolutely right and necessary to clearly establish the difference between the events in Spain in the 1930s (which took place in the wake of a long series proletarian defeats forming part of an inexorable process whereby the proletariat was dragged into the imperialist war and the present period (which is one of re-awakening class struggle, of rising oombativity on the part of the workers), it is no less important to underline what the two periods have in common. And that is the decisive role Spain will once more play in the evolution of the world proletarian struggle. As a result of particular historical circumstances, Spain finds itself for the second time at the turning point of two periods. 1936 saw the last gasp of the proletariat stifled; this massacre was the culminating point in a long series of defeats suffered by the class world-wide and was to throw open the way to world war. Today, events in Spain presage immense social upheavals in the rest of Europe. Thus Spain is once again a focal point, a point of departure in the class struggle which will probably have the same decisive importance for the coming period as it did in the 1930s. Spain will again be a highly significant test of the balance of class forces. World capitalism, and in particular the ‘European Community’, will intervene in force in the situation there, giving all their support to the forces of ‘democratic’ order, which are alone capable of erecting a barrier before the surging tide of working class struggle. The strategy of capital will be to put forward its left wing, led by the various political forces who base their activity in the working class: Communist Party, Socialist Party, and the other :leftists. The battalions of the left are already being feverishly prepared for this task.

In the days to come the Spanish proletariat will once again find itself up against the same forces who in 1936 succeeded so masterfully in first diverting the class and then bleeding it white. The leftists will use to the utmost the experience they gained in 1936 as a weapon to attack the proletariat, a weapon which, since then, they have had many opportunities to perfect. Their greatest deceit is to preach hypocritically to the workers that they should ‘forget the past’ in the name of national reconciliation. In other words, the workers should forget the lessons learned from the bloody experience of the class struggle.

The history of class struggle is strewn with defeats. Defeat is the painful school through which the proletariat must inevitably pass. In a particular sense and up to a certain point, it is only through defeat that the proletariat can ultimately be victorious. It is through defeat that the class becomes conscious of itself, of its goals, of the road which leads to them. In this way the proletariat learns to correct its errors, to recognize false prophets, avoid dead-ends, to organize itself more effectively, and to weigh up more precisely the balance of forces at a given moment. Because it is a class deprived of any other power within society, its experience is its only real trump-card and this experience is built to a great extent on lessons learned through defeat.

On the eve of the great battles which the proletariat in Spain is about to wage, battles whose consequences will weigh heavily on the struggles of the world proletariat, we can prepare ourselves in no better way than by re-examining, re-investigating the great experience of that bloody defeat euphemistically known as ‘the Spanish Civil War’.

Bilan was bitterly aware of the ever-increasing state of isolation with which it had to contend, and which it rightly saw as one of the mani­festations of the tragic defeat of the proletariat. The isolation grew in proportion to the degree that the hysteria of war seeped into the bodies and brains of the workers. Like all great and decisive events, the war in Spain left no room for flexible attitudes. The choice was glaringly clear: with capitalism and for the war, or with the proletariat against the war. The isolation to which Bilan was condemned was the unavoidable price it paid for its loyalty to the principles of communism, and this was to its merit and its honour, at a time when so many left communist groups allowed themselves to fall into the traps laid by the class enemy.

In contrast to Bilan we today can have the firm conviction that by renewing the same class positions we no longer have to swim against the stream, but will find ourselves being carried along by the new wave of the communist revolution, and able to make our own contribution to its growth.

M.C.

Revolution Internationale

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From the first months of its existence the Spanish Republic showed that when it came to massacring workers it had nothing to learn from the fascist regimes. Probably the only difference is that fascism quite clearly massacres workers as workers and as revolutionaries, whereas (‘democracy’ massacres them while simultaneously slandering them with accusations of being ‘provocateurs’, ‘agents of reaction’, of the monarchy or of fascism. Right from the beginning Bilan made this point quite clear, in contrast to all those who attempted to mobilize the workers ‘in defence of the Republic’.

M. C.

The massacre of workers in Spain

How many were there? It is impossible to give even an approximate figure for the number of victims crushed in this orgy of blood, this worthy ceremony for the opening of the Cortes of the ‘Spanish Workers’ Republic’. The agrarian and monarchist Right, the Republican Left, the radical Left, the Socialist Party, the Catalan Left, all grouped together in an admirable united front, are satisfied with this victory of ‘order’. Now that the Spanish workers have abandoned their ‘bad leaders’ - in this case the anarchists of the Iberian Anarchist Federation - everyone from Macia, ‘Liberator of Catalonia’, to Maura; and from Lerroux to Prieto can pay such opportune homage to the “wisdom of the Spanish workers”. Of course it was never a question of a workers’ movement being crushed by machine guns and cannon; no, no, it was, quite simply, a sort of purifica­tion rite performed by the bourgeoisie in the interest of the workers. Once the ulcer has been cut out, wisdom, that innate wisdom, can re-emerge and the workers can rush to thank the executioners who saved them from the anarchists.

Now it is high time to draw up a balance sheet of the victims of the Republic of Azana-Caballero, and of the new Cortes; much more than a thousand theoretical controversies, this task will enable us to grasp the significance of the Republic and of the so-called ‘democratic revolution’ of 1931. This record will make the monarchy’s work seem pale in comparison and will show to the proletariat that it cannot defend any form of bourgeois organization, that there are no ‘lesser evils’ for the workers, and that, as long as the day of the insurrectionary struggle has not yet dawned, all the proletariat can do is to defend the class positions that it has conquered, and prevent them from being confused with the organiza­tional forms of the government of its enemy, however democratic they may be. The Spanish workers have once again undergone this experience, like the workers of the ‘democratic paradises’ or the fascist countries.

‘An anarchist movement!’ That is what this uprising, now drowned. in blood, has been called. Obviously, the organizations of the bourgeois left, the Socialists as well as the liberal, Macia, will say that among these anarchist ‘leaders’ were monarchist ‘provocateurs’: thus their Republican ‘conscience’ can remain unsullied. But the proletariat knows its own. It knows that the police have not been cutting down provocateurs, but its bravest sons who rose in revolt against the oppression of Republican capitalism.

(Bilan, no.2, December 1933)

As the massacres perpetuated by the Republic in the name of ‘the defence of democracy’ grew more and more massive, Bilan posed in extremely clear terms the question of the meaning of the so-called democratic regimes. Is democracy a step on the way to the revolution, as the Left and Leftists claim in their appeals to the workers to support and defend it; or is it really nothing but a weapon of capital which at a given moment is the most appropriate one to be adopted to divert the proletariat so as to be able to crush it all the more effectively later on? Two million deaths and forty years of Francoism have provided a tragic but definitive answer to this question, which absolutely confirms the calls for alarm and vigilance which Bilan issued prior to the events of 1936.

M. C.

The crushing of the Spanish workers

There are two criteria for understanding these events; two opposing vantage points the working class has to understand. Only thus can we analyze the recent sacrifices of thousands of workers in the Iberian Peninsula; shot, machine-gunned and bombarded by the ‘Spanish Workers’ Republic’.

Either the Republic and democratic liberties are nothing but a powerful diversion which capital utilizes when it is unable to resort to violence and terror to crush the proletariat, or the Republic and democratic liberties represent a lesser evil and even, a favourable precondition for the victorious advance of the proletariat, thereby imposing on the workers a duty to support democracy in order to facilitate their ultimate offensive in their fight for emancipation from all the chains of capitalism.

The terrible carnage of these last days in Spain must obliterate all the idiocy which presents the Republic as a ‘proletarian conquest’ which the workers must defend but only, of course, under ‘certain conditions’ and especially ‘only to the extent’ that democracy is not what it is; or on condition that it ‘becomes’ what it cannot become; or finally ‘if’, far from having the meaning and objectives that it really has, it sees fit to become an organ of working class power. This 1ittle game became equally difficult to play in the period preceding the Civil War in Spain when capitalism made a show of strength against the proletariat. Indeed, from the foundation of the Spanish Republic in April 1931 up to December 1931 - the ‘swing to the left’ and the formation of the Azana-Caballero-Lerroux government, followed by the subsequent ejection in December 1931 of its right wing represented by Lerroux - none of this provided more favourable conditions for the growth of revolutionary consciousness within the proletariat or for the growth of forms of organization suitable for the direction of revolutionary struggle. It is not a question here of seeing what the republican, radical. socialist government ought to be doing for the good of the communist revolution; but what we do have to ask is whether or not this movement of capitalism to the left or the extreme left, this unanimous chorus appealing for the defence of the Republic and comprising everyone from the Socialists to the syndicalists, has created the conditions for the development of the class struggle for the onward march of the revolutionary proletariat? Or else whether this movement to the left was dictated by the necessity for capitalism to throw the workers, already intoxicated by their own revolutionary enthusiasm, into confusion and. thus prevent them from channeling this enthusiasm into a truly revolutionary struggle? In other words, was the road the bourgeoisie was free to take in October 1934 too big a gamble in 1931? At that moment could the workers have been victorious, since capitalism was in no position to recruit an army for the purposes of savage repression?

Similarly the Catalan and Basque separatist movements have been seen as an open breech in the forces of capitalist domination, a breech which, it is said, should be widened as much as possible in order that the prole­tarian revolution can go forward. Was not the real potential of separatism revealed in the constitution of a Catalan Republic which lasted only for a few hours? (The Republic came to an ignominious end under the heel of General Batet - whom President Companys had called to the defence of Catalonia when proclaiming its independence.) And, in the Asturias, weren’t the forces of the army, police and the air force hurled for weeks against the miners and other workers, who were deprived of any guidance in their heroic struggle? Didn’t the upsurges of Basque separatism do nothing more than give warning of the suffering which was to come? Is it not true that the Basque separatists allowed the struggle in the Asturias to be crushed? Crushed, what is more, by the forces of government terror, led by a separatist, who tomorrow will no doubt once again swear his allegiance to the Republic and regional autonomy.

From 1930 to 1934 there has been a harsh logic in the development of events. In 1930 Berenguer was called in by King Alfonso XIII, who hoped to be able to repeat the manoeuvres of 1923 when he managed to contain the consequences of the Moroccan disasters within the framework of monarchical legality. In 1923 Primo de Rivera was substituted for the ministers who were seen to be responsible for the Moroccan disaster; and this change of government made it possible to hold off an attack by the masses. Naturally, the masses paid the price of this manoeuvre by having to suffer seven years of an agrarian, clerical dictatorship. But in 1930 the economic situation had been totally transformed by the appearance of the crisis and it was no longer sufficient to resort to simple govern­mental manoeuvres. In February 1931 the conditions for a proletarian movement were already ripe, and there was a threat of a railway strike: thus the need arose for a big theatrical display - offering the masses the heads of Berenguer and the king. At the instigation of the monarchist, Guerra, and in agreement with the Republican, Zamora, the king’s departure was organized even before the workers had walked out of the factories. The leftward movement of the government continued until the end of 1931, and this was the only way that the bourgeoisie could place obstacles in the path of the masses to prevent them from forging the weapon necessary for their victory: the proletarian party. Since it was impossible to suppress class conflicts, all capitalism could do was to make sure that these conflicts only ended up in confusion. And the Republic served this aim. At the beginning of 1932, the left wing government made its first move, and launched a violent attack on the general strike which had been proclaimed by the syndicalists. At this point, the forces of the bourgeoisie were concentrated around its left wing, and a reactionary like Maura was able to make a plebiscite for the Azana-Caballero government through the Republican Cortes.

The e1an of the masses, which had been a product of economic conditions, was diverted onto the path of the Republic and of democracy, and was then broken by the reactionary violence of the radical-socialist government. From this resulted an opposite movement within the bourgeoisie towards its right wing: in August 1932 we saw the first skirmish with the right, Sanjurjo’s revolt aimed at the concentration of the right wing forces. A few months afterwards, in December 1933, the workers were again plunged into a bloodbath during another strike launched by the syndicalists at the very time when, elections were providing the opportunity for the Spanish Republic to move right. As a result, in 1934 a frontal attack aimed at annihilating all the forces and organizations of the Spanish proletariat took place. And as a sad, cruel epilogue to the errors of the syndicalists, we saw the anarchist Confederation of Labour abstains from action in the face of the carnage, on the grounds that it could not get mixed up in political movements…….

Left or right? Republic or monarchy? Support for the Left and the Republic against the right and the monarchy in order to further the cause of the proletarian revolution - these are the alternatives put forward by the different currents operating inside the working class and the solution they defend. But the real alternative is the one between capitalism and the proletariat, between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie which aims to crush the workers, and the dictatorship of the proletariat which aims to set up a bastion of the world revolution dedicated to the abolition of states and classes.

Although the Spanish economy was able to take advantage of the benefits of neutrality during the war, its structure is such that it has only been able to put up a very weak resistance to the effects of the economic crisis. Its industrial sector is too limited in relation to what is very much an agrarian economy still dominated by non-industrialized forms and forces of production. It is because of this economic foundation that the industrial regions have provided the arena for the separatist movements which have no real future and which can only have a reactionary character; under their rule capitalism would continue to extract surplus value from the workers and surplus labour from the peasants, by expropriating the banking organizations who presently control this operation for the big magnates. Such an economic basis puts the Spanish workers in a very similar situation to that of the Russian workers: faced by the capitalist class which can only enforce its rule through a dictatorship of blood and iron, the workers must smash this ferocious oppression, but they can only do so by means of a victorious insurrection

And the Spanish tragedy, like its counterpart in Austria, has unfolded before the helpless passivity of the world proletariat, immobilized by the counter-revolutionary acts of the centrists and socialist. A simple overture by the Communist International towards the Social Democratic International would even be rejected on the grounds that the right moment had passed. As if after Hitler’s victory when the right moment had also passed, the Social Democratic International didn’t propose a joint action with the Communist International! But the decay and corruption of organizations which still dare to call themselves working class is so great, that all that these traitors of yesterday and today would do on the very graves of the workers, would be, any case, to agree on some manoeuvre which would allow them to continue with their betrayals. And they will continue until the day when the workers succeed in overthrowing, along with the class that oppresses them, all the forces which have betrayed them. Thousands of Spanish workers have not died in vain, because the blood spilled by the Spanish Republic will be the seed of a new struggle for the communist revolution, a struggle which will cast down all the obstacles which the enemy class ceaselessly puts in the way of the proletariat’s march to freedom.

(Bilan, no. 2, October 1934)

The bloody savagery of the Republic did not stop short at mass slaughter: it also resorted to individual executions to ‘serve as an example’. The resonant appeal for international class solidarity which Bilan issued as far as its weak voice would carry, was easily smothered by the din created by those who sang the ‘virtues’ of the Republic and democracy, in defence of which the workers would be massacred in their millions in the ‘anti-­fascist’ war.

It is hardly necessary to point out that, when it came to saving the lives of workers who were going to be shot one by one by the Republic, neither the democratic governments, nor the parties of the left, nor the defenders of the ‘rights of man’, nor the Pope himself, raised a single protesting voice. And Bilan never dreamed of appealing to them and their humanitarian feelings.

M.C.

Appeal for international working class solidarity

The guns are silent now in Spain, Thousands of proletarians have been pitilessly massacred. Here is another trophy which the bourgeoisie can display alongside the February massacres in Austria and the decapitations in Germany.

The world proletariat lies drawn and quartered on the ground, and its blood has been sullied by the boots of bourgeois tyranny which has imposed order with shrapnel and cannon-fire. From East to West the bestial terror of the ruling classes reigns supreme over the carnage, whose sole purpose was to strangle the revolutionary struggle of the workers.

We want to pay homage first of all to the Asturias fighters. They fought to the death, sacrificing women and children for their class, for the revolution, but, without any guidance, they were defeated. They, like the miners of Oviedo will now understand the meaning of the ‘peaceful construction of socialism’ in Russia. For those who have been bombed to shreds and torn by the bayonets of the Moroccan Legions, the seventeenth anniversary of the USSR will have a particular meaning. In mourning its dead the Spanish proletariat will also see that it can only count on its own struggle, the struggle of the world proletariat, which Russia has now abandoned.

After its orgy of blood in the Asturias, the bourgeoisie now wants to carry out the murder of rebel workers through its military courts, in order to intimidate those who dare to take up arms to emancipate themselves.

November 7: Jose Larredo Corrales and Guerra Pardo have therefore been shot as an example to others: one at Gijon, the other at Leon. Others will follow if the international solidarity of the proletariat does not vigorously assert itself.

(Bilan no. 13, December 1934)

The next piece is a short account of the ‘noble’ role played in Spain by the Socialists of the right and the left, from Prieto to Caballero. One lesson among others that the workers must never forget.

M.C.

What happens when there is no proletarian party……….with respect to the events in Spain

.... After the war, encouraged by the economic recovery which took place in all countries, including neutral Spain, the Social Demo­cracy supported no less directly the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, and collaborated with it. When the dictatorship fell, Social Democracy appeared as the only force organized on a national scale (the Republican groups - both the old ones and those recently hatched - having only a local existence), and it gained an influence far in excess of its real strength: 114 deputies were elected to the Constituent Assembly. This fact allowed it to put itself forward as the principal agency for the safeguarding of capitalist order at dangerous moments and for consolidating that order when the counter-offensive against the proletariat could be under­taken.

During the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, established in 1923, and under Berenguer’s transitional government which succeeded it in January 1930, the two ‘historical’ parties of the bourgeoisie began to fragment and this opened the door to the parties which claimed to represent the middle classes: various republican grou­pings which were not greatly distinguishable from one another and which were concentrated around the Radical Party of Lerroux and the Radical Socialist Party which was created by the left wing of the Radical Party.

Among other things this period was characterized by the San Sebas­tian Pact in August 1930, concluded by the various Catalan parties and the anti-monarchist parties (Socialist, Radical Socialists, Radicals, the Republican Right) and which attempted to deal with the thorny problem of the autonomy of the Catalan and Basque pro­vinces; this led to the premature adventure of December 1930, involving the uprising of the Jaca garrison and the proclamation of the Republic in Madrid.

Capitalism possesses a remarkable flexibility which allows it to adapt to the most difficult situations; the monarchist bourgeoisie soon saw that it would be better in the short term to peacefully cede power to the ‘friendly hands’ of the Socialists and Republi­cans rather than to risk provoking a resistance that would threaten their class interests. Moreover all the political disagreements that were to come to light within the Republican camp would operate to their advantage later on. Overnight the bourgeoisie changed from monarchism to Republicanism: when the municipal elections of 12 April gave the anti-monarchist opposition parties a majority - they won 46 out of 50 provincial capitals - a peaceful change of poli­tical window-dressing took place and Alfonso XIII abdicated. His place was taken by a provisional government made up of the Repu­blicans and Socialists who had signed the December 1930 manifesto.

In the first coalition government the Socialists held the Minist­ries of Labour, Justice and Finance - these last two having been taken in exchange for the Ministries of Education and Public works.

For over thirty months of coalition government, the Socialists endorsed and covered up all the heinous crimes of the ‘liberal’ bourgeoisie: the repression of workers’ and peasants’ movements including the massacres at Arnedo and Casas Vierjas, the law for the defence of the Republic, the law on public order, the reactionary law on associations and the mystification of the agrarian law.

The main historical function of the Social Democracy is to maintain demo­cratic illusions within the working class, thus preventing their radicalization and in the end smothering their revolutionary elan.

It’s worth saying here that there has been too much talk of a ‘revolu­tion’ in Spain, particularly when it was a question of a simple manoeu­vre by the bourgeoisie and this talk exaggerated the possibilities for a ‘proletarian revolution’. Above all the lack of a class party and the negative influence of anarcho-syndicalism had undermined any chance of success.

When Social Democracy got a kick in the arse, that is to say when capitalism felt strong enough to be able to dispense with its good services, the Socialists who had intensified their verbal demagogy in proportion to their loss of influence within the government, gave birth to a ‘Left’ which did all it could to keep the flags of treason flying within the working class. And so Largo Caballero, the Minister at the time of Casas Vierjas, threatened the bourgeoisie with the proletarian dictator­ship and a soviet regime…….

There really is an iron law which makes Social Democracy concentrate the proletariat around democratic slogans, then. go over to, a ‘leftist’ oppo­sitional stance, in order to get ready to betray the class the day after, while the parties of the middle class join the forces of reaction prepa­ring to attack. And this whole pattern of events unfolds with an implacable speed and logic.

Thus in Spain, in order to pave the way for new elections, the coali­tion government was succeeded by a Radical transitional government, which, after the November 1933 elections which were such a debacle for the Socialists, gave way to a right-wing Radical government led by Ler­roux himself. But the bourgeoisie did not yet feel able to mount a violent offensive and Samper took the place of Lerroux. But already the positions of command were in the hands of the open partisans of reac­tion.

The facts are well-known: in response to the reconstitution of a Lerroux government in which the most important Ministries,- Justice, Agriculture, and Labour - were held by the Catholic populists (thus by the most reac­tionary party in the Iberian Peninsula), the Socialists proclaimed a general strike for 5 October. It was to be a ‘legal’ strike aimed at causing the fall of Lerroux and replacing him with the old Republican-Socialist coalition.

As in Italy in 1922, when the strike called by the Labour Alliance was aimed against the ‘fascist menace’ of Mr Mussolini and sought to put in his place a ‘better government’ under Turati-Modigliani, in Spain the Social Democracy was also fighting against the ‘fascist menace’ and for the reconstitution of a Republican-Socialist coalition govern­ment. But this latter phase - to which must be added the joke of the proclamation of the Catalan State - was short-lived, and gave way to a second phase characterized by a working class struggle unaffected by the separatist deviations which had appeared particularly in Catalonia and the Basque provinces; a struggle which developed above all in the coal fields of the Asturias, where a working class unity around the bitter struggle for power took place.

The government ended up sending an army of 30,000 men against ‘Red Astu­rias’, equipped with ultra-modern destructive power: bombers, assault tanks, etc. Only the most reliable troops were sent to quell the rebel­lion: the Foreign Legion, made up of the dregs of society, and the Moroc­can sharpshooters were the ones used to deal with the insurrection. To­day we know that this was no idle precaution: at Alicante the sailors themselves attacked the arsenal; at Oviedo 900 soldiers, although besie­ged, refused to fire on the workers who were marching to attack the bar­racks. In addition to this, certain garrisons in the province of Leon where bitter struggles were taking place had to be transported with the utmost urgency to more tranquil regions.

But in the end, isolated while the rest of Spain didn’t budge, the heroes of the Asturias were crushed, though not vanquished - because even today there are still groups o f rebels in the mountains carrying on the struggle.

(Bilan no.14, January 1935)

This long article, in which Bilan attempted to make a detailed analysis of the evolution of capitalism in Spain, is of considerable interest. Though the backwardness of capitalist development in Spain explains the particularities of that country, we cannot analyse the events in Spain on the basis of these particularities, but only from the historical period of capitalism, of the general crisis of the system which is rava­ging the whole world; this is also the only way we can hope to under­stand the present situation and the social upheavals which are brewing today.

The underlying basis of these events is not a bourgeois democratic revo­lution directed against so-called feudalism, but the struggle between capitalism in open crisis and the proletariat. Bilan categorically re­jected the references some people made to Marx and Engels, misusing their writings to justify the position that the workers should support the democratic Republic in Spain. If one compares the writings of Bilan on this point with the positions defended today by Proletaire, the paper of the ICP, concerning the so-called ‘bourgeois democratic re­volutions’ in the underdeveloped countries, one is struck by the enor­mous regression represented by the latter’s positions. Proletaire ignores the historical era and only looks at geographic areas. Hence it continues to talk about the democratic-bourgeois revolution in the underdeveloped countries, where it distinguishes between ‘progressive’ classes struggling against ‘reactionary’ classes. This is the way Proletaire analysed the war between North and South Vietnam, as well as the struggle between Pinochet and Allende; regarding Allende, the main reproach it directed towards him concerned his indecision and Pro1etaire in its great wisdom recommended that he should follow the example of firmness provided by the Jacobins.

The Bordigists’ arguments about Chile and other underdeveloped count­ries would have been equally valid for Spain in 1936, when it too was an underdeveloped country. This is how Bilan counteracted in advance arguments of this kind:

“But October 1917 exists to show us that the continuation of the work of Marx does not consist in repeating in a profoundly differ­ent situation, the positions our mentors defended in their era. In Spain, as in all other countries, the democratic forces of the bour­geois Left have shown themselves to be not a step towards the final victory of the proletariat, but the last bastion of the counter­revolution.”

The following article was written at the end of July 1936, the very time of the Franco uprising and the workers’ response to it. Bilan still lacked a good deal of information on the development of events. But it saw straight away the dangers of the mobilization of the proleta­riat behind the defence of the Republic, and, it warned the workers of Spain and other countries of that danger.

We should emphasize the concern displayed in this article by Bilan (faced with the events in Spain which were a prelude to the world imper­ialist war) regarding the regroupment of the scattered revolutionary nuclei of that period. If the regroupment of revolutionaries was recognized to be necessary to withstand the effects of a period of prole­tarian retreat, it is an imperious necessity in a period of mounting class struggle. It is absolutely necessary to insist on this point to better counter the confusions of those groups, who, having failed to comprehend this need, prefer instead to maintain their isolation in the name of ‘their’ autonomy and ‘their’ freedom of movement.

M.C.

In Spain: the bourgeoisie against the proletariat The structure of Spanish capitalism (extract)

Especially before the advent of the Republic in April 1931, the eco­nomic structure of Spanish society, because of its extremely backward characteristics, could give the impression that the bourgeoisie had not yet won power and therefore what is confronting us today is a revolu­tion of the same type as the bourgeois revolutions of last century but with one important difference in its ultimate perspective: since we are in a new historic situation in which capitalism no longer has a progressive role to play but has entered into its period of decline, the proletariat’s task is to circumvent the capitalist stage and set up instead its own class dictatorship. But in fact none of this is the case because Spain is one of the oldest bourgeois nations, and if it has not gone through a sequence of historic events analogous to those which led capitalism to power in other countries, this is solely a result of the exceptionally favourable conditions in which the Spanish bourgeoisie arose. Since it possessed an immense colonial empire, Spanish capitalism was able to evolve without huge internal upheavals and in fact was able to avoid them precisely because the basis of its domination was not - as it was for other capitalisms - a radical change in the foundations of the feudal economy, resulting in the establish­ment of large scale industries in the cities and the liberation of the peasants from serfdom. On the contrary, that basis was established by adapting the old feudal system to the demands of a capitalism which possessed immense territorial outlets for investment, and could thus hold back from industrializing its home economy. It is worthwhile poin­ting out that the old colonies were lost to the Spanish bourgeoisie the very moment they began to go through the whirlwind of industrial transformation. The nobility and the clergy as well as owning the big landed properties, also possessed shares in banking and industrial concerns and the Madrid Tramway Company; similarly some of the mines of the Asturias, subcontracted to foreign capital, were controlled prior to 1931 by the Jesuits.

This archaic social structure was profoundly affected by the war which intensified the industrialization of Spain, especially in Catalonia where a powerful manufacturing industry developed. But this development only took place in certain ‘islands’ - the North, Barcelona, Madrid; the rest of Spain remained almost in the same condition as before. However, the necessity to find a dictatorial solution to social unrest was felt very quickly and Primo de Rivera took power in 1923, backed mainly by the industrial circles in Barcelona under the leadership of Cambo. This was at a time when Alfonso XIII was rather more inclined to see the Moroccan enterprise through to the end in spite of the rude defeat his troops had suffered there. The Primo de Rivera experience, although in no way comparable to Italian or German fascism, is also explained by the necessity to prevent the proletariat from intervening autonomously in social struggles, and it was under Primo de Rivera’s government that various institutions of labour arbitration developed: Largo Caballero, who today is being called the Spanish Lenin was then an official; the Socialist organizations were allowed to exist, and even the anarchist CNT (National Confederation of Labour) managed to survive in that period. (It’s easy enough to insult great men when they are dead, and for some people it isn’t enough that Stalin should be hailed as Lenin successor.)

In 1930, when Primo de Rivera fell like a rotten fruit, the Spanish bourgeoisie believed that it could carry on with the same system, and his place was taken by a general; only this time, there was a different political direction. It was no longer just a question of solving social issues with the aid of state intervention, but of trying to channel the working masses toward a liberal democratic regime. The world economic crisis had broken out and a military-type authoritarianism was no longer any use in keeping the resulting social turmoil within manageable limits.

These factors allow us to arrive at a brief definition of the Spanish social structure. We are dealing with a capitalist regime where any repetition of the events which accompanied the victory of the bourgeoisie in other countries is to be ruled out: far from repeating the work of the Jacobins in 1793, or the bourgeoisie of 1848 on its way to the Cavaignacs of June, the Azanas and Caballeros are much more orientated towards playing the role of the Noskes, with however a profound difference resulting from the particularities of the Spanish situation. Spanish capitalism has entered the world economic crisis not only without any room for manoeuvre, on a world market which is less and less able to absorb agricultural exports, but also with an economic scaffolding which is one of the least capable of resisting the hammer of the economic crisis. As a result there was absolutely no way of avoiding the outburst of powerful social movements; and, as with the fall of Primo de Rivera, which seemed to have been provoked by the collapse of the Barcelona exhibition, it was again an element of secondary importance, historically speaking, which presaged the great events which were brewing: in October 1930 the Pact of San Sebastian was drawn up laying the foundations of the Republic under the guiding hand of the monarchist, Zamora; and on 14 April, 1931 through the mediation of Romanones, Alfonso XIII abdicated following the communal elections, which led to the proclamation of the Republic. In a like manner the events which followed in 1931, 1932 and 1933 permit us to better explain social reality and the significance of the advent of the Republic. This latter event from the point of view of the social movement and its onward progress, represented a completely subsidiary element and could in no way be compared to the establishment of bourgeois republics last century; on the contrary, it represented nothing but a new form of bourgeois domination, a new attempt by Spanish capitalism to deal with the problems which confronted it.

Never has there been a more ferocious repression against the workers’ movement than the one unleashed in 1931 and 1932 under the left wing governments in which the Socialists participated. It is obvious that the fundamental cause of this repression resided in the powerful growth of working class struggle; but those who couple the upsurge of the workers’ movement with the taking of power of left wing governments should pause to reflect upon the events which followed the proclamation of the Republic and which proved conclusively that such governments are nothing but the most ‘appropriate’ form (to use the formulation put forward by Salengro in the French Senate, when he said that the government would use all the ‘appropriate’ methods to bring the factory occupations to an end) for the defence of the interests of the bourgeoisie. There is thus no direct relationship between the Republic and the workers’ movement, but only a bloody opposition between them as events has proved.

When we look at such a backward social structure, which can be compared to that of Tsarist Russia, the following question arises: how is it that, against such a chequered social canvas, in the presence of a bourgeoisie so incapable of solving the alarming problems posed by the economic crisis just as it was in Russia, how is it that, in such a favourable social milieu, no marxist nuclei with the power and scope of the Russian Bolsheviks, have been formed? It seems to us that the answer to this question is to be found in the fact that the Russian bourgeoisie was still moving along an ascendant path, while the Spanish bourgeoisie, which sprang up centuries ago, is in a state of putrefying decay. This difference in the positions occupied by the two bourgeoisies also reflects a difference in the positions of the two proletariats; and the fact that the Spanish proletariat has been unable, in the course of huge struggles, to give rise to the class party so indispensable to its victory seems to us to be a result of the backward condition of this country which capitalism has condemned to remain in the rearguard of the present social and political evolution.

The anachronistic nature of Spanish capitalism, it’s extremely backward structure, the impossibility of the bourgeoisie of this country finding any solution to the complex and involved problems of its economic structure - all this explains for us the powerful movements which have emerged over the last five years in Spain, the fact that the proletariat has found it impossible to create its own party, and the fact that its movements have appeared as fruitless upheavals rather than events which could lead to the only result worthy of the heroism the Spanish workers have shown: the communist revolution. In the light of all this we can well interpret the words of Marx in 1854, when he said that a revolution which could happen in three days in another European country would require nine years in Spain.

The birth of the Spanish republic

Marx, writing about the events of 1808-1814, and Engels about those of 1873, advocated the same tactics for Spain that they had elsewhere applied to Germany. They advised socialists of other countries to take up a position of ‘innoculating’ the bourgeois revolution with the virus of proletarian struggle in order to propel the situation towards its final goal: the victory of the working class. But October 1917 exists to show us that the continuation of the work of Marx does not consist in repeating, in a profoundly different situation, the positions our mentors defended in their era. In Spain, as in all other countries, the democratic forces of the bourgeois left have shown themselves to be not a step towards the final victory of the proletariat, but the last bastion of the counter-­revolution. In 1854 Marx wrote that the Central Junta could have brought about changes in the Spanish social structure. If these changes were not realized at that time this could be put down to wrong tactics, but the Republic of 1931 had an entirely different function from that of the Junta of 1808: the latter had a progressive character, while the Republic represented a weapon of the most savage reaction against the workers’ movement. The same applies to Engel position with respect to the Republic of 1873 where he foresaw the possibility of a parliamentary workers’ group acting effectively both to aid the victory of Pi y Margall against the right and also to push the left towards taking up the demands of the workers. Within the Constituent Cortes of 1931 and the others which followed there was no lack of a ‘workers’ group, but since it was rooted in a very different social terrain, a terrain upon which the Republic showed its real nature as a bloody expression of anti-working class repression, the ‘workers’ group could only be a tool in the bands of the bourgeoisie.

In this epoch, the regroupment of the working class cannot be achieved on the basis of a dual programme agitating for partial demands while making propaganda for the ultimate goals of the movement. There is no possibility of linking the partial conquests of the working class to a Republic which could conceivably evolve towards a progressive transformation of Spanish society and so would become favourable to the interests of the masses. The years 1931, 32, 33 saw the government moving further and further left, going from the Azania-Caballero-Lerroux bloc to the exclusion of the Radicals; and at the same time the strike movement of workers and peasants was being subjected to the bloodiest repression. Indeed, the left turn of the government was a signal for an even stronger anti-working class repression.

Engels rightly criticized Bakunin and the Alleanzistes of the day, who were advocating an immediate struggle for the liberation of the workers on the basis of the extension of the movement of partial demands. The marxist viewpoint is against putting forward the slogan of insurrection when conditions for it do not exist, just as it is against raising the slogan of the struggle for the Republic or for its reform at a time when histo­rical analysis has shown that this Republic has become an essential instrument for the subjugation of the proletariat; and that the proleta­riat, again because of the development of the historic situation, now finds itself in a position to put forward one demand only: the dictatorship of the proletariat, through insurrection and destruction of the capitalist state.

This analysis can be confirmed by reviewing briefly the events of 1931 32, 33, 34. This is indispensable if we are to be able to examine the current situation and to indicate the position which the proletariat both in Spain and internationally will have to take up, if the heroic acts of the Iberian workers are going to lead to the victory of the communist revolution.

We have already shown that the proclamation of the Republic was simply a signal for much more important events, events which were to hurl all the Spanish workers and peasants into the arena of class struggle. Let us begin by noting that capitalism rushed to give Alfonso XIII a one way ticket out of the country in order to prevent a railway strike, a move­ment which, because it would have paralyzed economic life, would have had profound repercussions on the national situation. It is quite obvious that the Spanish bourgeoisie was in no way aware of the situations which would develop over the years 1931-2 and 1933, but in attempting to foresee the course of events it did have recourse to a change in the form of its regime from the monarchy to the Republic. Capitalism is doomed never to be able to clearly foresee the pattern of future events: this is an expression of the contradictory basis of its power. It can only do one thing: fights against its class enemy and in any given situation find the solution which seems to defend its privileges the best. When in April 1931 the proclamation of the Republic appeared a necessity, the Spanish bourgeoisie did not hesitate to resort to it; and this was a good move at that time, because, in the face of all the social movements which followed, it would have been extremely risky to have opposed them with brutal, head-on methods. A balance was needed and this was provided by the left wing governments supported by the Socialists, who were numerically the strongest group of loyal and sincere ‘Republicans’.

Immediately after the foundation of the new regime, a wave of strikes swept the country, notably the telephone strike and. the strikes in Andalusia, followed by others in Bilbao, Barcelona (building workers), Valencia, Manresa, etc. During the course of these events the following happened: the government under Zamora’s presidency moved more and more towards savage repression; the Minister of the Interior, Maura, who had slaughtered thirty peasants in Seville, replied. to questions by saying that “nothing happened”; and on 20 October of the same year, the ‘Law for the Defence of the Republic’ was voted in order to prohibit strikes, impose on all labour disputes compulsory arbitration through Parity Commissions, and outlaw all union organizations which did not give ten days warning before a strike. At the same time the Socialist UGT (General Union of Workers) openly organized the sabotage of the movements called by the anarcho-syndicalist CNT, when it was not actually advocating armed struggle against the workers organized by the CNT. And it must be said that the policy of the Socialists met with a certain amount of success since, except for a few rare instances where the workers of the two unions made common cause, the UGT managed to keep its members at work. If these methods did not always lead to the defeat of the workers’ movements, it made them much more difficult, and, when the Civil Guard intervened, much more bloody.

On the other side of the barricade were the unions of the CNT around which the workers’ struggles polarized. But the political positions of the anarchists in no way corresponded to the needs of the situation and although its militants often displayed great courage, the leaders, from a political point of view, never succeeded in formulating an overall plan for reconstituting the unity of the working class in order to lead it to victory over the bosses. The constant succession of aimless strikes ended up exhausting the masses, who found it impossible to gain real improvements in their living standards; this led some to have recourse to desperate adventures like the ones in Catalonia and Andalusia where Free Communes were proclaimed for the organization of a libertarian society. It should be said that these extreme movements did not even win the solidarity and support of the CNT leadership; this was also what happened with the delegate from the Free Commune of Figola who “came to Barcelona to canvas the support of the proletariat of the city: he returned somber and saddened; he had been unable to obtain any promises of support for the Figola movement”. (Revolution Proletarianne, February 1932, reported by Lazarevitch). We do not intend to criticize the CNT for not once again proclaiming the general strike, We only refer to this episode in order to demonstrate that the policies of the anarcho­syndicalist leaders could only serve to bottle up the general movemet of the Spanish workers, certain sections of whom were led to engage in desperate acts, cruelly repressed with the unconditional support of the Socialists. The sequence of events of 1931, 32, 33 thus give us a left wing movement supporting itself on the UGT, while the only position of defence the working class could take up was to entrust itself to the CNT. This essential point about the role of the CNT, which is in no way peculiar to the brief period we are discussing, must lead communists to ask whether, in contrast to other countries where the communist movement found its roots in the socialist parties and trade unions which had emerged from the struggle against, and break with, the anarchists, it is not the case that in Spain the trade union movement that can move towards communism will find its source in the CNT unions as well as in the UGT.

The anarchists, lacking an overall plan for the great class combats that were now unfolding, were in a state of total confusion on the po­litical level. Although they were hostile to the Republic, to ‘all’ parties, they did not fight against the separatist movements of the bourgeois extreme left. This obviously led the masses to put their trust in these movements which engaged in deeds of indisputable bra­very, but which could have nothing in common with the interests of the working class.

As we have said, the government’s slide to the left coincided with the extension of the strike movement but the repression became even more savage and they even began deporting anarchist militants. Already in August 1932 the bourgeoisie began to manoeuvre in the opposite direc­tion: Sanjurjo attempted to make a coup in Madrid and Seville, and prior to this the June auxiliary elections in Madrid had been a great success for the son of Primo de Riliera. With the failure of Sanjurjo’s attempted coup, the Republic was saved; and in Barcelona, Valencia and Cadiz in January 1933; in Malaga, Bilbao and Saragossa in May, the wor­kers, thanks to the bullets of the Civil Guard, would soon discover the price of being unable to direct their struggle against the bourgeois left as well as against the right.

On 8 September 1933, Azana resigned and after an interregnum of twenty-three days under the Lerroux government, Martinez Barrios dissolved the Cortes in apparent violation of Article 75 of the Constitution. This Barrios, who was given the job of effecting the passage from left to right in 1933, had the same job at the beginning of the current series of events, but this time he has been unable to succeed in this task. And so ended the first phase of the Spanish Republic. This leads us to clarify a point which relates to recent events. We are often told that the Republic, as well as other governments of the Left, should be seen as a fruit of the class struggle, an imperfect fruit it is true but still an expression of re-awakening working class struggle. At the same time the bourgeoisie, in the face of a rising class struggle, can do nothing except entrust its destiny to a government of the Left. In reality, the people of the Left who defend these ideas are deceiving themselves in two ways: firstly when they put their trust in a bourgeoi­sie which will get rid of them at the first opportune moment, secondly when they believe that the workers will be satisfied with mere verbiage and renounce the struggle for their own class interests. For us poli­tical events can never be explained by examining the desires of this or that bourgeois formation: a given institution, in this case the Republic, must be analyzed according to the role it plays in the class struggle.

Now, the Republic has appeared as the specific form for anti-working class repression, the form which best corresponds to the interests of capitalism, because as well as being able to resort to bloody repression it can count on the support of the UGT and the Socialist Party. One might object that capitalism could have had recourse to another form of government and that if it has not done this it is solely because the pressure of the workers’ struggle has forced it to move towards the Left. This kind of hypothetical discussion is of little interest to us and seems somewhat inconclusive, but what seems to us essential is that capitalism must be fought against whatever governmental form it makes use of, whether that of the Right or the Left. Only the autono­mous, independent struggle of the proletariat on its own class basis can allow it to get out of the dilemma between the left and right wings of the bourgeoisie, to avoid aiding the Right when struggling against the Left and, conversely, to avoid supporting the Left when struggling against the Right. The Spanish Republic is what it is, not what one might want it to be. Its function of brutally opposing the workers’ interests shows that it is rooted solely in the bourgeois camp; it is an insult to the workers who have fallen victim to the bullets of the Republic to say that they were the ones who made the victory of the Republic possible.

Before undertaking an examination of the current situation, which we will begin by dealing with the agrarian question, we must say a few words on the events of 1934, on the Asturias insurrection. We lack the space here to go into this colossally important event in any detail; we will simply indicate its basic meaning. After the right wing elec­toral victory and the violent repression of the 1933 November strike, the situation evolved slowly but surely towards the predominance of the CEDA (Spanish Confederation of the Independent Right), and the return of the forces that had been pushed aside when the Republic was set up. The Socialists made a sudden left turn and renewed their contacts with the workers, even leading strikes. In October 1934, a general strike was proclaimed as a response to the constitution of the Lerroux government with its four CEDA representatives. The leaders of the strike obviously did not expect it to spread the way it did among the most tried and tested section of the Spanish working class, the Asturias miners. Condemned to starvation wages and seeing their leaders initiating the struggle, the miners believe that at last the hour had come when, in contrast to 1932 when the UGT had sabotaged their actions, it would finally be possible to do something about their miserable living conditions. Unfortunately the insurrection remained isolated and was violently crushed. Throughout the year 1935, the working class was subjected to continuous repression, both through legal channels and through extreme forms of persecution.

At the end of 1935 likes the end of 1933, the insoluble problems of the Spanish situation reached a new point: the demonstration in Madrid glorifying Azana marked the beginning of a new stage and in February 1936 came the electoral victory of the Popular Front.

The agrarian problem

We have attempted to show that the proclamation of the Republic in 1931 cannot be fitted into the two classical schemas by which we have explained events in other countries. In no way did it represent a phase in the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the feudal structure of an agrarian economy since capitalism has been in existence for centuries in Spain, and it grew up precisely by adapting itself to this economic structure, living a parasitical life thanks to the colonial territories under its control. Neither was it a form, through which the bourgeoisie resisted a revolutionary attack by the proletariat, since the latter - owing to the extreme state of decadence of Spanish capital - has found it impossible in the midst of an extremely heterogeneous social milieu to engender its own class party, the only historic agent capable of leading the revolution to victory. The Republic of 1931 was an expres­sion of the formidable social upheavals which burst out immediately after it was set up; but because of the isolation of the Spanish pro­letariat internationally, these convulsions were doomed tragically to end up in an impasse. The same is true for the victory of the Popular Front in February 1936. But before dealing with current events, we must briefly discuss the agrarian and economic questions, which will enable us to say that the Left and the extreme Left, no less than the Right and the extreme Right, find it impossible to offer any solution to these problems. The noisy suggestions for political reform coming from various quarters can only serve to cover over capitalism’s inability to change the economic basis of Spanish society. The pro­letariat is the only class capable of changing the foundations of the Spanish economy; outside of that change no solution is possible.

Both from the agrarian and industrial point of view, Spain can broadly be divided into two parts: the first, the smaller of the two, is composed of forms of cultivation and industry similar to those that have provided the basis for capitalist domination in other countries. The second part, on the other hand, is composed of huge tracts of partially uncultivated land in which the peasants and agricultural workers are condemned to an extremely miserable existence. The peasants of the east coast are subjected to heavy taxation by a central power which can only survive by depriving these smallholders of any chance of getting a reasonable price for their products, which have to be exported as cheaply as possible in order to compete internationally. The smallholders find themselves with no option but to sell their goods as best they can, since they have an immediate need for capital in order to continue cultivating the land. As for the big landowners, they also have a hostile attitude towards a centralizing state which compared to the large financial contributions they have to make to it, does not give them any real advantages in exchange. It is from these elements that the separatist movements arise; these movements have also extended to other parts of Spain, to the central plateau, where the big landowners squeeze out of the enslaved peasants rents which are immediately put into the big banks and are never used for reclaiming land or buying agricultural machinery without which it is quite impossible to make these landholdings profitable. Carving up these huge properties would farther complicate this problem since mechanized cultivation cannot be carried out on the basis of small plots of land; it requires large expanses of land and centralized management. We have already said that the big landowners have nothing to do with their landed property except exact their rent, while leaning on a hierarchy of tenant and sub-tenant farmers which makes the exploitation of the peasants and agricultural workers all the more intolerable. These big landowners never dream of investing their capital in the land and they obviously look askance at any government intervention which might diminish their power and ‘expropriate’ the least productive landholdings. The transformation of the agrarian economy can only take place through industrialization, and only the proletariat can carry out this task.

When we look at industry we are dealing with very similar phenomena. The Asturias coalmines are very unproductive and the workers there are forced to work under starvation conditions analogous to those of the workers of Andalusia and Estremadura, while the rich iron ore mines which are partially controlled by foreign capital produce solely for export. As far as the industrial transformation of Catalonia is con­cerned, it is likewise not directed towards the internal market, which, because of the extremely low buying power of the masses, is unable to absorb its products. It thus works almost exclusively for the world market. Of course, the basic essentials for the resolution of these economic problems already exist in Spain. The country has sufficient resources to be able to cultivate the land in an effective way. But this transformation can only take place if the whole social structure is overturned, if this parasitical capitalism is extirpated and replaced by the conscious direction of the proletariat aiming at the construction of a communist society.

When the Republic was set up, just as after the victory of the Popular Front, a great deal of noise was made about the Agrarian Reform, but these measures only took effect at a political level (expropriation and redistribution of land). However, since the solution to the prob­lem can only lie in the industrialization of agriculture, these projects were doomed to disappear as soon as the masses began to struggle in earnest, even though their movement was incapable of winning any real improvements. Certainly there is a difference between the economic programmes of the Right and the Left. The first is fighting for the rigid preservation of the specific social structure of Spain, the second for changes in the juridical and political manifestations of this structure. But since neither is able to get to the heart of the problem, it was inevitable that the masses, after e period of desperate struggle would feel that there was no solution and would go through a period of demoralization. This was easily exploited by the Right, which is least able to maintain capitalist exploitation without disruption; whereas the Left make things complicated by spreading the belief that under its guidance the struggle has real possibilities, that reforms can be won if only the big landowners can be opposed. But the latter will remain unassailable as long as the basic structure of the Spanish economy remains unchanged. The Republic of 1931 played the same role as the Popular Front in 1936, and it is not surprising that by 1934 the social situation was ripe for a victory of the agrarian Right and that in 1936 Franco had been able to find a favourable echo in the countryside.

Origins of the present situation

In April 1936 the first skirmish took place. During the demonstrations marking the anniversary of the Republic, a ‘revolt’ broke out (to use the terminology of the Popular Front), Following this, rigorous measures were decreed by the government: Azana declared that “the government has taken a whole series of measures; fascists who were in positions of command have been transferred or replaced. The Right has been seized by panic, but it will not dare to come out into the open again”. (See l’Humanite, 26 April 1936). In the subsequent debate in the Cortes, the spokesman for the centrists, in complete agreement with his Socialist confederates, gave a vote of confidence in the government, which had committed itself to the suppression of ‘sedition’ And l’Humanite praised the government for its courageous struggle. The promises of agrarian reform were then made more concrete: discussions began around Article 44 of the Constitution which provides for nationalization without compensa­tion. Azana declared that we should not stop at the distribution of communal estates, that it was necessary to envisage the sharing out of the ‘baldios’, the lands lying fallow which the big landowners reserved solely for hunting. He even said that we should not exclude the possibility of distributing the big cultivated estates to the peasants. Meanwhile the leftward movement within the Socialist Party gathered pace: on 23 April the Madrid Assembly pronounced itself in favour of the dictator ship of the proletariat and a split seemed inevitable. Two and a half months passed after the April events. The masses who had been hoping for an improvement in their lot were demoralized once again and the Right now judged that the s moment had come. Those self-same right wing elements who would not “dare to come out in the open again” went onto the offensive, using as a pretext the murder of the monarchist leader Sotelo, who had been killed as a reprisal for the assassination of Lieutenant Castillo. At this point we don’t want to try to analyse in any detail the subse­quent events. (Information concerning these events could not be more contradictory.) Our aim is rather to explain them, to show their real meaning in order to define the class positions around which the Spanish and international proletariat must regroup itself if it is to prevent the sad impasse in which the masses now find themselves from once more leading to demoralization in their ranks. If this happens capitalism will use the present bloodletting as another step towards the mobilization of the workers of all countries for a new world war. Since our main aim will be the clarification of political positions, we shall have to postpone a more detailed analysis of events to a later date.

The meaning of the Spanish conflict

The idea that, because capitalism dominates society today, it is possible for it to establish a social discipline that allows it a total control over all events, is very far from any political or historical reality. Capitalist society is by definition filled with contradictions which give rise not only to basic class antagonisms, but also to friction between the various intermediary strata, between these strata and the bourgeoisie, and finally to rivalry between capitalist groups and individuals. Certainly the bourgeoisie would like to reign in an atmos­phere of social peace, but such tranquility is rendered impossible by the nature of capitalism itself. Thus the bourgeoisie is forced to accommodate itself to every situation and to learn not how to avoid any manifestation of social conflict, but how to canalize all such conflict in a direction which does not threaten their power, and which prevents the proletariat from mounting an offensive that would destroy their system. But it should not be thought that these opposition currents within the bourgeois camp can undermine or threaten the basis of capitalism. In spite of appearances, we will not find the real origins of the struggle between the militarists and the Popular Front in the opposition between their political programmes or between the bourgeois social strata that they represent. Moreover, it would be quite difficult to see the Azana front, which includes even the anarcho-­syndicalists, as a coalition of industrialists, and the Franco bloc as the simple representative of the big landowners, exploiting the peasants’ dissatisfaction with the Popular Front in order to strengthen their hold over Andalusia and Estremadura, regions which witnessed powerful uprisings under the Republic.

Social events are determined by antagonisms linked to the conflict between the evolution of the productive forces and the existing form of social organization. What is being played out in Spain today is the historic antithesis between a bourgeois regime incapable of solving the economic and political problems which confront it and a proletarian regime which cannot come to the surface owing to the absence of a class party. Bourgeois factions, Left and Right, express the upheavals of a capitalist society which finds itself in an impasse, but the struggle between these two tendencies cannot be confined within the class boun­daries of the bourgeoisie. It encompasses the proletariat because the proletariat alone holds the key to historical development. The real conflict is not between Azana and Franco, but between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Whichever one of these is beaten, the real loser will be the proletariat who will pay the cost of the victory of either Azana or Franco. Far from remaining indifferent to the present events simply because the struggle is one between two factions of the bourg­eoisie, the duty of the proletariat is to intervene directly in the situation because it alone is the object of these ideological battles, and it alone will be the victim of the present struggle.

In his study of the Spanish Revolution Trotsky shows the particular character of the Spanish army in which the different kinds of military specializations correspond to various political positions: the artillery, for example, has always been higher up the social ladder. This profoundly correct observation of Trotsky’s allows us to understand that if the army in Spain maintains a particular position - and is not above the struggle between the different political parties of the bourgeoisie - this is a result of the social structure of Spain where capitalism was not able to destroy feudalism with violence but chose to identify itself with the surviving vestiges of feudalism. There is nothing surprising in the fact that generals occupy centre stage in today’s social upheavals and that they are able to play a political role of considerable impor­tance. We make this observation in order to show that military sedition has not emerged out of internal army affairs and cannot be brought to an end by a quick pronunciamiento. It is not something which, if it is not .immediately successful, will be doomed to certain failure; rather it expresses a social struggle whose components we discussed when we looked at the social activity of the Popular Front government and the disappointments it brought to the peasants and the workers.

Just as at the time of the proclamation of the Republic which was a signal for the outbreak of formidable class struggle, the present struggle between the Popular Front and the generals simply camouflages a much more important social struggle. That struggle has been ripening in the sub-soil of a society dislocated by the dual anachronism of a capitalism unable to bring the slightest solution to the problems it faces, and a proletariat unable to build its class party and raise the flag of revolution in a social milieu bristling with contradictions which cannot be resolved in themselves.

The working class, which was hurled into epic struggles in the years 1931-33, is once again at the threshold of new uprisings which will be all the more powerful since the economic crisis has aggravated all the fundamental problems unresolved by either the left or right wing governments which followed each other in 1934-35,or by the Popular Front government. There was of course the legalized reaction which lasted throughout 1935, after the defeat of the Asturia insurrection, but this repression did not succeed in removing the proletariat from the social scene: the working class has once again been thrown into the arena by the impact of accentuated economic problems which have proved to be insoluble. In our opinion, it is here that the explanation of present events is to be found. It should be said at once that the first reaction of the Popular Front government to the Morocco mutiny was to manoeuvre towards a compromise with Franco. The resignation of Quiroga, President of Council was the first gesture made to the Right: to Quiroga had been attributed a phrase which was interpreted as giving encouragement to the punitive action against the monarchist, Sotelo.

Immediately afterward it was Barrios (same man who had undertaken at the end of 1933 the rightward passage of the previously left wing regime and presided over the elections which subsequently gave a victory to the Right) who tried to constitute a government - again, the same Barrios who, after the assassination of Sotelo declared the situation had become impossible because the regular corps of the Civil Guard might organize outrages. The attempted compromise failed, but this did not mean that the government immediately went on to arm the workers. As soon as his Cabinet was set up, Giral tried to divert the masses with vague anti-fascist proclamations and the enlistment offices were only set up when it had already become clear that the workers in the industrial towns had mounted a vigorous resistance and had gone over to armed struggle, Once this had become unavoidable, the bourgeoisie saw that it could only defend its interests by legalizing the arming of the workers which was the only possible method of politically disarming the masses. Once the workers had been incorporated into the state, there was a considerable lessening of the danger that they would take advantage of that illegal instrument par excellence, armed force, and go over to that illegal struggle par excellence - the assault on the social citadel of capitalism, the state.

One might suppose that the arming of the workers is an act containing, some innate virtue from the political point of view and that, once they’ve got arms, the workers could get rid of their traitorous leaders and go on to a higher form of struggle. This is not the case. The workers whom the Popular Front have incorporated into the bourgeois state, because they are fighting under the leadership and for the victory of a bourgeois faction, are by that very fact deprived of the possibility of struggling on the basis of class positions. Here we are not dealing with a struggle begun under the leadership of a bour­geois formation, but capable of taking on a proletarian character because it is based on fundamental class demands. What we are dealing with is this: the workers have taken up a cause which not only is not their cause, but which is fundamentally opposed to their interests. There is no need to refute the vulgar arguments about the possible responsibilities of the workers or about the demonic abilities of the traitors. For us, the workers are discovering the impossibility of seeing the way to victory without a minority of the class forming the party. And this has happened because of the way capitalism has exploited, brutalized, and prevented them from achieving a consciousness of social reality and the road that leads to victory. The masses in their entirety can attain a perfectly conscious understanding of their role, but this can only happen in particular circumstances arising out of a historical situation, ie, during a revolution, when the maturation of consciousness makes victory possible under the leadership of the class party. The workers have never fought willingly for the traitors, for the Popular Front; they still believe that they are fighting for the defence of their own interests. It is only the particularities of the situation which have allowed the traitors to force into the hands of the masses a flag which is not their own the flag, the flag of the bourgeoisie.

The development of events so far seems to exclude the possibility of the Spanish workers affirming themselves along class lines. We will quite probably see the kind of heroic exploits that took place in 1932; they may be even more heroic, but unfortunately they will simply be part of a bloody social upheaval which has no chance of reaching the level of an insurrectional movement. At the time of writing there is no documentation at all on these events, but what allows us to put forward the political positions we do is the fact that there is an enormous disproportion between the arming of huge numbers of workers and the rare episodes of class struggle that have taken place. Very recently we have been able to read the appeals made by the Socialists and anarcho-syndicalists - appeals that seemed to have been listened to – asking the workers to go back to work in order to ensure the victory of the government.

These considerations allow us to assert that, even during the second phase of events when it will be a question of physically disarming the workers, a revolutionary perspective will not unfortunately be opened up. If the government wins it will be easy to root out the pockets of resistance formed by workers who don’t want to give up their aims; to massacre them like the Zamora and Azana-Caballero govern­ments did in 1931-32 when the class as a whole was caught up in the intoxication of the anti-fascist victory. In the event of a right wing victory, news now coming out of the zones presently occupied by the generals shows quite clearly how they will go about massacring the revolutionary workers.

The positions we have put forward may lead some to accuse us of pessi­mism. The question of optimism or pessimism is of no interest for marxists unless it is based on class criteria. Thus for the proletariat, the greatest pessimist is he who quibbles most about the revolutionary perspectives opening up under the leadership of the Popular Front, because he is displaying the darkest pessimism with regard to the proletarian programme and the historic role of the workers. On the other hand the greatest optimist is he who bases himself solely on the politics of the working class and expresses not only distrust, but a ruthless opposition towards the traitors, even when they hide behind the scarlet mask of the ‘general armament of the proletariat’, It is well-known that Marx, even though an analysis of the epoch had led him to oppose insurrections in 1870 (see letter to Kugelmann), raised the flag for the defence of the Commune against all its democratic detractors and its republican and reactionary butchers. The proletarian struggle does not follow the pre-established schema of the academics, but is a result of the contradictory course of historical evolution. The present events in Spain, however wasteful they may appear to armchair revolu­tionaries, are nevertheless a step along the road towards the emancipa­tion of the world proletariat. It will not be in vain that the heroic workers have fallen; it will not be in vain that the Spanish women and young girls have dedicated themselves to urging the workers to “storm the heavens” (Marx), making a vital contribution to the class struggle beside which all the proclamations of feminism pale into insignificance.

But apart from these considerations about the ultimate repercussions of current events, it is necessary to show on what basis the proletariat can move towards victory, and on what terrain the proletarian groupings who seek to act as the nuclei of the class party must struggle from now on. The dilemma for or against the Popular Front, however seductive it may seem in the present circumstances; the fear of a right wing victory which would lead to the extermination of the workers, however justified it may be for militants who have experienced the ferocious repression of fascism: none of this must make us forget that the proletariat cannot pose the problem in these terms, because capitalism is the only arbiter in the choice of its governmental personnel. The only way forward for the workers is to regroup on a class basis: to fight for partial demands, for the defence of conquests already made, while at the same time preparing for the moment when the development of events will make it possible to put forward the only real governmental solution: the dictatorship of the proletariat. In other words, to raise the slogan of insurrection when the conditions for it have ripened. Such an approach to the problem could certainly weaken the stability and the possibilities for success of the Popular Front government; but the right wing victory which would result from it would lead nowhere, because the proletariat would have at last constituted itself as a class and would be in a position to smash the forces of capitalist reaction once and for all. The proletariat would not then allow a repeat of what happened in Italy and more parti­cularly in Germany, when the Socialists and centrists prepared the way for bloody repression by the Right. This position obviously has nothing in common with that which the centrists in Bulgaria defended in 1924 when they remained indifferent in the face of a struggle between two bourgeois factions. We have explained that the essence of this conflict is not the struggle between Franco and Azana but between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and we conclude from this that the proletariat must intervene with all its strength in the present situation - but only on its own class terrain.

From the international point of view, the demonstrations of solidarity by workers of other countries can only link up with the struggle of the Spanish proletariat if they break with the Popular Front, which is calling for the intervention of the democratic armies in order to thwart the manoeuvres of the fascists. Such appeals are an excellent way of mobi­lizing the masses for war. These demonstrations of solidarity can only lead somewhere if they are directed against the respective bourgeoisies of each country. Our fraction is attempting such work among Italian emigres.

Finally, the bloody alarms issuing from Spain, where the workers are dying in the struggle for communism even if they find themselves under the banners of the Popular Front, are another warning to left communists in different countries of the need to constitute an international centre so that, after a profound discussion of the experiences of recent years, the basic premises for a new Revolutionary International can be laid down. Will this tragic lesson, learned at the cost of the lives of many Spanish workers, be the last one before the outbreak of a new world war? But even if capitalism can delay that fateful day there is no excuse for the inertia displayed by the various left communist groups in response to the initiatives of our fraction to begin the work of political clari­fication needed to lay the iron basis for an organization capable of leading the struggle of the working class towards the triumphs of the world revolution.

(Bilan, no. 33, July-August 1936)



Extract from the Bulletin of the Ligue des Communistes Internationalistes de Belgique (The International Communist League of Belgium)

The ‘Communists’ are making a bourgeois revolution! They want a great, prosperous, happy Spain. The bourgeoisie also wants it and the fascists wouldn’t say no to such a programme. As for a democratic Spain, that’s another kettle of fish. It is precisely democratic Spain - in so far as a capitalist country can still be democratic - that has developed the antagonisms between capital and labour that have led to the present Civil War. By talking about democracy, the ‘Communists’ hope to be able to stay silent about the class conflicts that are rending Spanish society. It is no less probable that the Spanish syndicalists and anarchists have an even clearer vision of the struggle now unfolding. For a long time the CNT and FAI (Iberian Anarchists Federation) have supported the petit-bourgeois government of the Catalonian Generalidad. They offer no programme for social transformation.

(Bilan, no. 33, July-August 1936)



* The Bilan texts have been translated from French.

1 The verb, gourer, in French means to be deceived or mistaken.

Geographical: 

  • Spain [33]

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1936 - Spain [35]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • The "united front" [36]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Anti-fascism/racism [34]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Italian Left [37]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Fascism [25]

Theses on the situation in Portugal

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The theses and their introduction were written on 21 September, 1975, while points 6-8 of the last part of the theses date from 1 November. Since that date important events have taken place in Portugal which seems, at first glance, to totally contradict the perspective outlined in the thesis. Indeed since 25 November, following the mutiny of the para­chutists at Tancos (who had recent1y been converted to ‘leftist’ poli­tics), the government has vigorously taken the situation in hand and has totally eliminated from the wheels of state the faction which is put forward in the thesis as being the best adapted for taking over the defence of the national capital - that is, the COPCON/Carvalho faction. The pushing aside of Carvalho, Fabiao, Coutinho, the arrest of Dimis de Almeida, etc, signify that the extreme left has now lost what was its main strength: the control of the forces of repression and intervention. Although the Sixth Government remains practically un­changed, it is the right which now governs in Portugal to the extent that in the country it is the army really exercises power.

The fact that it was members of the extreme right - such as the comman­dos of Amadora and the National Republican Guard who ‘re-established order’ on 26 November and who have taken charge of the repression since then indicates the true colours of the present political power. The return in force of the Spinolist officers to the posts left vacant by leftists who have resigned or been put in prison and the freeing of a number of important agents of the ex-PIDE, confirm this trend.

Therefore what this present trend clearly demonstrates is the validity of the essential idea of the theses: “The Portuguese experience represents a setback for the political mechanism of classical democracy as a means of managing society, and as a means of integrating the working class”. (thesis no 4) In fact ‘democracy’ as represented essentially through the SP and the PPD - who dominate both the Constituent Assembly and the Azevedo government - can only ensure its survival with the assistance of the extreme right; and this deprives it of any possibility of mystifying the class and of any chance of controlling it except through open repression.

In Portugal the economic and political crisis is so catastrophic that there is no ‘middle of the road’ way of dealing with it. In order to force the working class to accept the terrible sacrifices which alone can stave off total bankruptcy, only extreme solutions can be envisaged: immediate, open repression by the extreme right a la Pinochet which is advocated by Spinola and, the commando leader Jaime Neves, or else the ‘leftist’ brand of containing the class, as outlined in the COPCON document of August, 1975.

For the moment, it is the first solution which seems to have won out. But Portugal is not Chile. Portugal is not a ‘far-off’', ‘exotic’ country where tens of thousands of workers can be massacred with no problems: on the one hand the proletariat in Portugal is more powerful than the proletariat in Chile; and on the other hand the European bourgeoisie is not ready to accept a premature civil war that would reveal the true stakes of the class struggle today. It is for this reason that the political solution which prevails in Portugal at the mo­ment cannot last very long - although a gross error on the part of the bourgeoisie is always possible. With the reawakening of the proletarian struggle which has been paralyzed since the summer by the smokescreen of a leftist alternative, but which cannot fail to develop in the face of the austerity measures now being imposed, we will once again see the Portuguese bourgeoisie making use of its most ‘radical’ forms of govern­ment, which are the only ones capable of derailing the combativity of the workers.

3 January, 1976

Introduction

Since 21 September 1975 when the theses were written, the analysis contained in them has been confirmed by the course of events in Portugal.

* The inability of the Azevedo government to control the economic, social, political and military crisis has confirmed what was stressed in the theses: the increasing ineffectiveness of traditional forms of management of the bourgeois state and of the traditional means of integration and mystification of the working class. However, that inability has made it all the more urgent for the bourgeoisie to find a solution based upon the most left-wing faction of the army, in particular the supporters of COPC ON, and the use of different method of mystification of the working class, such as workers’ commissions and tenants committees.

* The fact that the sixth provisional government’s only success was to obtain aid from the EEC and the USA, despite the fact that its domestic policy was even more incapable of stabilizing the situation than that of the fifth government, confirms that the crisis of last summer was principally and temporarily, the result of problems of foreign policy. The choice of the principal protagonist in the attack against the pro-CP faction of the army, Melo Antunes, as Minister of Foreign Affairs tends to confirm this interpretation.

A new element which has emerged since then, and which falls within the perspective of these theses, is the appearance of the S.U.V. (Soldiers United Will Win) and soldiers committees. Although these are an expression of the decomposition of the entire social structure, they are in no way a revolutionary manifestation of the working class, unlike the soldiers’ committees of 1917-19. On the contrary, these organs are essentially instruments of democratization in the army, in order to make it more effective in its repression of the working class.

1. Events in Portugal provide a glaring illustration of the fact that in the period of' capitalist decadence there is no room for any real economic development in underdeveloped countries, even the strongest of them. A great colonial power, Portugal has not been achieved economic ‘take-off’ in the twentieth century, despite her large share of the imperialist cake. Thus on the eve of 25 April 1974 she had the distinction of being at one and the same time the poorest country in Europe, apart from Yugoslavia, and the last to hang on to her colonial possessions.

As a consequence of her economic weakness, Portugal granted independence to her colonies very slowly, which was in turn a severe handicap for Portuguese capital (because of the cost of arms expenditure, the cost of colonial administration, the four-year call-up of potentially productive workers, and political emigration) to the extent that in 1974 Portugal had most of the characteristics of a ‘Third World’ country:

- Annual income per head: $1250 (Compared with $1790 for Greece and $4900 for France.)

- An important agricultural sector employing 29% of the working population (France: 12%, U. K.: 3%).

- The archaic structure of the agricultural sector, which is basically composed of ‘latifundia’ and tiny smallholdings (less than 1% of agricultural holdings cover 39% of cultivated land; 92% cover 33% of cultivated land). In both cases output is extremely low.

- Modern industry is intensely concentrated in two areas, around Oporto and around Lisbon and Setubal. It exists side by side with archaic and uncompetitive small-scale industry (32,000 enterprises employ less than 100 people while only 156 employ more than 500).

2. The open crisis of capitalism which began around 1965-7 struck the Portuguese economy with its full force after 1973 because of:

- the structural weakness of the economy, which was becoming less and less competitive;

- the ever more crippling burden of the colonial wars;

- the unemployment which developed among emigrant workers, who on their return to Portugal, deprived the Portuguese economy of the foreign currency they had been sending home.

At the same time that the crisis was expressing itself in the highest rate of inflation in Europe, the class struggle which had died down after the wave of 1968-70 intensified again at an increasing rate until the beginning of 1974 (viz. struggles at Timex, Lisnave, TAP, etc.).

3. The coup of April 25th represented an attempt on the part of more enlightened sections of the bourgeoisie to put the national economy back in order, which could only be achieved:

- by the liquidation of colonial debts;

- by putting a check on the working class.

Only the army could be the executor of this policy, as practically the only organized force in the country (apart from the only legal party, the Salazarists). Furthermore the army:

- was directly confronted with the hopelessness of achieving a military solution in the colonies;

- had no particular connection with the specific capitalist interests associated with the regimes of Salazar and Caetano, and was thus able to see the interests of the entire national capital in a global context.

Although the first effects of the coup were compatible with the interests of ,the large private capitalists (Champlimaud, CUF, etc.), of which Spinola was the principal representative within the junta, the objective needs of a national economy embroiled in a catastrophic crisis led the army to take more and more state capitalist measure.

In any case, the army identified more readily with state capitalism, because:

- it was not directly linked to private property, especially since the colonial wars had necessitated the call-up of large numbers of the intellectual petty-bourgeoisie;

- its centralized, hierarchical and monolithic structure closely resembles that of state capitalism.

July 74, September 74 and March 75 marked a series of crises and attempted coups by anachronistic factions of the bourgeoisie.

But even if at first they expressed the resistance of the anachronistic bourgeois factions, all these crises finally led t he same conclusion, namely:

- the diffusion of a working class offensive (the strikes of May-June, August-September, and particularly the TAP movement of February March) by diverting the focus of discontent onto ‘fascists’ and ‘reactionaries’, whose importance was totally exaggerated.

- the reinforcement of economic and political state capitalist measures (reinforcement of the ‘left-wing’ of the AFM and the elimination of the ‘right-wing’ factions like that of Spinola; and nationalizations presented as ‘great victories’; agrarian reform, etc.)

Through these different crises the army took control of the state more and more openly, and the pro-CP faction of the army strengthened its position. The convergence of the positions of the army and the CP is explained by the fact that the CP is one of the most dynamic state capitalist tendencies, and also that at first it was one of the best weapons with which to attack the working class. This convergence was also an expression of an attempt made by Portuguese capital to free itself to some extent from the influence of the United States and the western bloc, through establishing relations with the Soviet bloc. Although the PCP like all Stalinist parties is above all a party representing the national interest, it is nevertheless the case that the world is divided up into imperialist blocs, and each nation must orientate itself towards one of these blocs. In this context, the PCP represents an attempt to steer Portuguese capital into the Russian orbit, or at least out of the American orbit.

4. Of all the objectives set by the coup of April 25th, only that of decolonialization was attained. And even here, the result was not particularly beneficial for Portuguese capital, since this basically came down to a withdrawal of Portuguese influence in favour of the great imperialist powers (especially in Angola, the richest colony). It led to the repatriation of half a million colonial residents who couldn’t possibly be integrated into the struggling home economy. In fact, despite the battery of state capitalist measures and bursts of ‘anti­fascist’ and ‘revolutionary’ demagogy from the government, the working class has not really been kept under control, nor enrolled in the ‘battle for production’, the constant war-cry of the Stalinists and their Intersyndical.

For Portuguese capital the basic problems posed by the coup of April 25th remain:

* How to revitalize the national economy.

* How to contain the working class.

The only possible solution, whatever the detours and hesitations on the way, lies in the increasing statification of the economy, and an ever increasing concentration of political and economic power. Only such a policy will be capable of preserving some sort of order in the economy - which like the whole of Portuguese society is in a state of anarchy, verging on disintegration - while at the same time being presented as ‘revolutionary actions’ to the proletariat the main enemy of capital.

Now more than ever the time is right for state capitalism in Portugal - which with the rest of the world is embroiled in ever increasing social and economic convulsions - and only those political groups which represent the most dynamic expression of this tendency have any future. Those which still cling to anachronistic forms of capitalism, or less developed forms of state capitalism, like the SP and the PDP, which are essentially based in the propertied petty-bourgeoisie, can only recede from the fore­front of the political stage, along with the anachronistic political forms which they stand for (constituent elections, democratic parties).

In Portugal, as in most of the ‘Third World’, the army represents the chief executive power of state capitalism and the factions within the army which will play an increasingly important role is that which is the most concentrated, the most operational, and at the same time the clearest: that is, COPCON. Grouped around COPCON are the two other main state capitalist tendencies, the CP and the leftists, who one way or another are destined to play an important role as part of the state capitalist apparatus - since they represent the most important means for controlling the working class.

The Portuguese experience represents a setback for the political mechanism of classical democracy as a means of managing society and as a means of integrating the working class. It is as much a setback for parliamentary elections as a means of mystification as it is for the parties in their function as managers of the state. The army comes to represent the real power of the state and the parties become mere appendages of the army, following the army line. In the same way the unions show themselves to be more and more incapable of integrating a working class which has not been subjected to years of ‘democratic’ and union mystifications. In order to replace the old techniques as they become progressively more ineffective, the only solution for Portuguese state capitalism lies in direct enlistment of the class by the army in ‘grass-roots’ organizations such as ‘workers’ commissions’ and tenants’ and community organizations, whose function is to take responsibility for local administration and factory management. In place of the traditional parliamentary democracy, state capitalism increasingly substitutes ‘non-party’ forms of participation by the working class, which basically means participating in their own exploitation and oppression. As such, ‘self-management’ and ‘workers’ control’ will have an important role to play in Portugal, and this is exactly what is envisaged in the document put out by COPCON in August 75. These non-parliamentary forms are an objective necessity and hence power will necessarily be removed from the hands of SP and PDP. This means a strengthening of the tendency towards a state capitalism based on the integration of the working class through ‘grass-roots’ organs and a lesser dependence on traditional unionism. The ‘critical support’ of the leftists for the CP threatens to become the ‘critical support’ of the CP for the leftists.

5. On the basis of the above analysis it seems impossible to understand the present situation in Portugal. If one sees that the CP is better adapted to satisfy the real needs of the Portuguese economy than the SP, then it is hard to understand its retreat before the latter following the recent extended crisis. It would be easier to understand if the new government was more ‘left-wing’ than its predecessor instead of more ‘social-democratic’. This is not the case.

In fact it is in the long term that capitalism’s objective needs find expression in its economic and political forms. Capital will be forced to resort to the necessary forms of economic management and of mystification and integration of the working class, as well as to the political forces and organizations which are to be the executors or vehicles of these policies. But only in the term are these tendencies destined to emerge out of a whole series of seemingly contradictory convulsions. There are several reasons for this:

- Unlike the proletariat for whom control of society can only be a fully conscious activity, class prejudices prevent the bourgeoisie from reaching a real understanding of its political actions. Thus it is often forced to adopt the most suitable positions for the defence of its class interests only by way of manoeuvres and conflicts between its different factions which may have a greater or lesser awareness of the total class interest.

- There are ‘no holds barred’ in bourgeois politics. Today’s allies may be the adversaries of tomorrow. Strange alliances which seem to be ‘unnatural’ may be formed to deal with the needs of the moment, only to dissolve with the disappearance of those needs.

The depth of the present crisis is expressed throughout the world in the contradictory nature of the measures taken by the bourgeoisie in its attempts to overcome or shorten the crisis. This is true both with respect to economies where the inescapable alternative is between recession and inflation, and with respect to the different political ‘solutions’. Thus the contradiction between the necessity to use the leftists in an attempt to paralyse the working class offensive at the outset and the need to hold on to their ‘last card’; and the contradiction between the need on the one hand to strengthen the imperialist blocs - a need imposed by the heightening of inter-imperialist tensions as the crisis deepens - and on the other hand the growing need for an ‘anti-imperialist’ policy of ‘national unity’ capable of luring the class into support for the national capital. The bourgeoisie has to attend to its most urgent problems, and thus adopts a certain measure one day only to retract it the next day when other problems created by the measure itself become even more urgent. This is wily the deeper the crisis becomes, the more erratic and contradictory the political course taken by the country seems to be.

In order to understand this summer’s crisis and its ‘solution’, one has to take many different considerations into account - not only the long term interests of Portuguese capital, but also the more immediate needs.

In fact the real origin of the crisis lies not only in internal political conditions but equally in external conditions although it was the events at Republica which provided the detonator. Certainly the more the class struggle becomes a decisive factor in the determination of national policy, the more the latter develops in response to needs which arise internally. However, this does not mean:

* that the national needs arising from the international situation disappear;

* that they will not come to the forefront during a momentary lull in the class struggle as in July 1975.

At the beginning of July the faction of the AFM which was closest to the CP, led by Vasco Goncalves, was in an extremely powerful position, having a majority in the ‘real’ government - The Revolutionary Council - as well as in the civilian government. It had control over all means of communi­cation and propaganda (especially through the 5th Division), and control of the unions (the Intersyndical). But this did not correspond to the needs of Portuguese capital on two counts:

* the power of the CP and its Intersyndicil was diminishing.

* Portugal had to abandon any idea of disengagement from the western bloc, either militarily or economically. Attempts to establish trade with Eastern Europe have come to nothing since the latter, with its own economy in a weak state, had little to offer Portugal. Thus the conditions attached to aid from the EEC, Kissinger’s public statements and the response of the USSR showed that Portugal’s place was within NATO and the western economy.

Even if the CP continues in part to represent the needs of state capitalism, it must necessarily lose its place at the centre of power in favour of another more ‘left-wing’ faction, less committed to a pro-Russian policy. Thus we have seen a struggle whose length and bitterness, as well as the disorder which it provoked throughout the country, have resulted in a shift in the balance of power between the three opposing forces: the remaining representatives of traditional capitalism, standing for ‘democracy’ and a pro-American orientation, who regrouped around the SP and the PDP and to some extent round the Antunes faction in the army; the Goncalves faction, with a pro-Russian orientation, which is based in the CP; and the COPCON faction which is supported by the leftists, with a ‘realistic’ foreign policy. (Their slogan is: “Against all imperialism, for national indepen­dence”.)

The crucial struggle has taken place within the army which is where the real power lies. And the Antunes faction, by calling for a pro-European orientatton has scored a victory over the Goncalves faction. The success of the Antunes document is the result of a coalition of all those forces hostile to Goncalves for whatever reason, i.e. on the basis of both internal and foreign policy. The momentary success of the Antunes faction, which has been brought about by particular circumstances, has given it a powerful position in the AFM, in which it has become the dominant force at the expense of the CP/Goncalves faction (the latter however still retains some of its former power.) The COPCON/Carvalho faction has remained neutral, and remains the clearest about the real needs of Portuguese capital.

In fact, the ‘victory’ of the SP and the PDP is merely an expression of the immediate needs of Portuguese capital with regard to foreign policy, and of a shift in the balance of power within the CP faction. It cannot hide the following facts:

- that the struggle in the army is still decisive. The army retains all real power, despite recurrent talk of ‘restoring’ the constitution.

- that there is no alternative path than toward state capitalism.

- that the problems posed by foreign policy which were at the centre of much of the recent conflict (cf Antunes’ document) will not retain such central importance after a resurgence of class struggle.

- that the present government has practically no weapons with which to mystify the working class.

In fact, the COPCON/Carvalho faction, at once the strongest militarily and the clearest politically, has merely made use of ‘democratic’ factions in order to weaken the CP. As far as possible it has avoided doing the job itself (with the exception of the occupation by COPCON of units of the 5th Division, and the letter from Carvalho to Goncalves ‘amicably’ urging him to resign). Such caution is explained by the fact that the Carvalho faction will need the support of the CP to be able to govern effectively and cannot put this necessary alliance at risk by attacking the CP too openly.

While expressing ‘very critical support’ for the present government, the Carvalho faction can let the government and the political forces which dominate it (Antunes, the SP and PDP) assume responsibility for the drastic austerity measures which Portuguese capital must urgently take. Thus the power of these forces can only be eroded in favour of that of the Carvalho faction .

Consequently the present government will not remain in office for long and fairly soon the solution foreseen by COPCON and the leftists will be the order of the day: a military government using a ‘popular national assembly’ of representatives of various ‘grass-roots’ organisations whose function will be to contain the working class.

6. Because Portugal is situated on the edge of Europe and because it is of relatively minor economic importance, Portugal is not destined to play a fundamental role in the coming class confrontations. Nevertheless, at the moment, economic and political problems have been posed more acutely there than anywhere else in Europe on account of Portugal’s inherent social instability. To this extent Portugal is a testing ground for the different weapons to be used by the bourgeoisie against the world prole­tariat and, thus, provides a very rich field of analysis for the developing consciousness of the working class. These are the essential lessons of the events in Portugal:

* State capitalist measures remain the only possible response of capitalism to the present crisis, both to prevent complete disintegration of the economy and to mystify the working class. The present situation confirms capitalism’s need to develop a means of containing the working class within a political structure with which the class can identify as much as possible. This is the only means capitalism has of enforcing its ‘discipline’.

* The mystifications of ‘anti-fascism’ remain capitalism’s most effective weapon and it will use such mystifications wherever possible. The role of revolutionaries is to mercilessly denounce such mystifications and all who propagate them.

* The present situation in Portugal has made clear that where they are not already fully developed, the traditional means for integrating the working class are quickly transcended as the class struggle deepens. This phenomenon has already been witnessed historically in Russia in 1917. But the present impotence of such institutions in Portugal indicates that such a phenomenon has a general significance for the class struggle and was not merely the product of specifically Russian conditions. For fifty years these institutions have existed not on the basis of the historic function for which they were created, but purely and simply as a means of mystification; however, they are now unable to completely fulfill the latter function. The parties associated with these out-model forms of mystification, that is the SP and the CP, have themselves been weakened. Having performed their essential tasks for capital in the period of deepest counter-revolution, they are not necessarily well-equipped to cope with the new resurgence of working class struggle.

* Faced with the diminishing effectiveness of traditional forms of mystification and learning itself from the Portuguese example, world capitalism will increasingly attempt to take over forms of struggle which the working class itself has developed, and turn them into weapons to be used against the workers. This represents no more than a return to a tactic decadent capitalism has already found most useful: the recuperation of working class forms of struggle and working class organizations which it dare not attack frontally. This was the fate of the unions years ago. Later, workers’ councils, thrown up by the revolutionary wave of 1917-23, suffered the same fate. With the resurgence of the class struggle these methods will again be made use of on a wide scale by the bourgeoisie and revolutionaries themselves must be careful not to be deluded by fake ‘workers’ councils’ or ‘soviets’.

* No doubt the world bourgeoisie, taking its cues from the current situation in Portugal, will adopt on a wide scale the policy of co-option of ‘workers’ councils’ and use them as instruments of ‘self-management’ and ‘workers control’. This policy has the following advantages for capitalism in:

- that it seems to be a more ‘left wing’ variety of state capitalism.

- that it provides a means to prop up a host of failing sectors of capitalism, which are themselves the inevitable product of the crisis.

Thus, in place of the traditional parliamentary and syndicalist forms of participation through which society is indirectly ‘controlled’, workers will be called upon more and more to participate directly in their own exploitation and oppression.

* On a more general level, it is obvious that the autonomous activity of the class can only manifest itself in factory organizations and workers’ councils, and that only these can survive as organs in the service of the class. These organized bodies are not simply ‘forms’ of no impor­tance in themselves as the Bordigists claim. However, contrary to what the councilists think, the mere existence of workers’ councils and factory committees does not automatically make them a form of activity which coincides with the interests of the class. In 1918, the experiences of the German workers’ councils, among others, have already indicated this. The situation in Portugal tends to confirm this today - not with respect to those commissions which are simply created by the leftists, but to those which arose spontaneously in the course of class struggle. It is, therefore, not enough for revolutionaries to complacently eulogize these autonomous organs, but it remains their fundamental task to defend communist positions within them, so that such factory committees and workers’ councils can develop into real expressions of working class struggle.

* From the above it is clear that the various ‘anti-fascist’ and ‘anti-­imperialist’ leftist factions, which are less tied to the traditional forms of integration of working class struggle into capitalism than the official left wing parties, are destined to play a fundamental role in discrediting these parties when they are not powerful enough to supplant them altogether.

Here again the role of revolutionaries will be to denounce all these tendencies as forcefully as possible and to clearly demonstrate to the working class the repugnant function such groups will continue to perform for capitalism.

The resort to ‘grass-roots’ and other ‘popular’ forms of organization as a means to integrate the working class struggle, in addition to the 1eftists rise to prominence, will progressively pose in turn for capitalism the problem that these methods of mystification will lose effectiveness the more capitalism has recourse to them. This will then open up the possibility of the proletariat gaining a clearer under­standing of its real class interests. The exhaustion of the traditional means of mystification is already well-advanced in Portugal today; in future this will become a generalized tendency operating at varying rates throughout the world. As a result of this, the perspective for the autonomous organization of the class, struggling for its historic interests and in so doing directly confronting the bourgeoisie, arises. This fact must be fully understood by revolutionaries so that, both with respect to organization and intervention, they are able to fulfill the responsibilities such a perspective places upon them.

Historic events: 

  • Portugal 1975 [38]

Geographical: 

  • Portugal [39]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • "Self-management" [40]

Address to revolutionaries

  • 2469 reads

(Issued at the founding conference of the group Internationalisme, Belgian section of the International Communist Current)

After several months of discussion leading to an agreement about class frontiers, about the fundamental political positions which have come out of the proletarian struggle, three groups - Revolutionnaire Raden Socialisten (Antwerp), Vrije Raden Socialisten (Ghent) and Journal des Lutte de Classe (Brusselles) - decided to dissolve themselves as separate groups to form a single organization in Belgium called Internationalisme.

In the present period of acute crisis, which will lead either to the proletarian revolution or the prolongation of capitalist barbarism into a third world war, the task of revolutionaries is to aid the constitution of a centralized organization at an international level in order to help generalize communist struggles and revolutionary consciousness within the working class.

The conference considering that:

- the destruction of capitalism as a transitory mode of production is the work of the proletariat itself, the only class which is both able and compelled to overthrow capitalism

- in this task the proletariat has no other weapons but its consciousness and its ability to organize

- the political organization of the proletariat contributes to the development of consciousness within the class and the workers’ councils – the expression of its unity - are the instruments for the seizure of power and the wielding of its dictatorship

- the destruction of capitalism is not a local or a national problem but involves all the countries of the world because capitalism is a world system and the proletariat a world class; this demands the theoretical and practical co-operation of the most advanced revolutionary forces

CALLS on all revolutionaries and revolutionary groups who agree on the basic class frontiers to regroup themselves around a coherent revolutionary pole organized on a world scale. It is towards the constitution of this pole that the greatest efforts of the groups who make up the International Communist Current are dedicated. Thus we call on all revolutionaries who understand their responsibilities to their class to unite their efforts with, and around the ICC, and to organize themselves in order to make it an indispensable weapon for the triumph of the communist revolution.

Long live the world revolution!

Life of the ICC: 

  • Congress Reports [41]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • International Communist Current [6]

Greetings to Internationalisme

  • 2417 reads

The International Communist Current greets the formation of a unified group in Belgium and the integration of this group into the ICC. The ICC sees these developments as an outgrowth of the deepening international crisis felt more and more strongly each day by revolutionaries who are trying to regroup their forces nationally and internationally so as to be able to assume their responsibilities more fully in the international struggle of the proletariat.

The formation of the section in Belgium is particularly significant for several reasons:

* the importance of this highly industrialized country whose proletariat has a long tradition in the struggle of the class

* the central geographic location of Belgium at the crossroads of Europe

* the inclusion of the important Flemish working class sector of the country whose language will enable the ICC to extend its work towards Holland, Scandinavia and Germany.

The ICC is convinced of the important role that the section in Belgium will play in the overall framework of the Current’s work.

The ICC considers that revolutionaries should give particular attention to the experience of the unification process of the groups in Belgium. The attitude of the Belgian militants during this entire process was based on a genuine revolutionary will and an awareness of the need for an organized regroupment of revolutionary forces on the basis of fundamental revolutionary principles.

The entire ICC should carefully consider this rich and positive experience when following through its work towards the international regroupment of revolutionaries This experience is an illustration of the need to over­come localistic tendencies, to go beyond the false alternatives of sterile monolithism or empirical eclecticism which come from the long period of counter-revolution and which weigh heavily on revolutionary elements today.

Resolution adopted by the ICC

November, 1975

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • International Communist Current [6]

International correspondence: 1. Letter to ‘Diversion’ (Argentina)

  • 2353 reads
Introduction

The following letter was written to a group in Argentina which is based on the conceptions of the Situationist International. In criticizing some of the articles and documents sent to us by this group from the first issue of their forthcoming magazine, Diversion, we have been led to deal with what has been called ‘Situationism’.

Situationism was the most radical expression of the student movement which shook the main western countries at the end of the sixties as a reaction to the first signs of the world economic crisis.

By calling for the “end of the university”, the radical destruction of the bourgeois state with its unions, Stalinist, Trotskyist and other such ‘workers’ parties’, by calling for the “international power of the workers’ councils”, situationism marked a break with university leftism which wanted the ‘modernization’ of the university, a ‘democratic government’ formed by the ‘workers’ parties’ of capital and a ‘revolution’ which to them meant a state capitalist regime.

But the Situationist International did not live beyond the moment which brought it to the heights of glory. With the end of ‘student protest’, the Situationist International dissolved into a series of splits and mutual exclusions over the issues which defined their specific tendency: the problems of petty bourgeois intellectual who is sincerely against capitalist society but incapable of seeing humanity’s problems except through the problems of his own isolated individual-ness…….the problems of the ‘misery of everyday life’. Like the utopian socialists of the 19th century with whom they were so anxious to claim a link, the situationists were unable to recognize the working class as the only revolutionary force in society; they ended up burning themselves out in the petty, self-centred dead-end of the search for self ‘disalienation’.

However, because of their positions against the unions, parliamentarism, frontism, nationalism and state capitalism presented as socialism, situationism is still capable of sowing illusions among certain small groups who are trying to become an active factor in the communist revolution. But situationism, this theory of the rebellious petty bourgeoisie, because of its lack of' understanding of the basis of Marxism – economic determinism and the rejection of any possibility of revolutionary activity except through the historical struggle of the working class -- is today, just as it was seven years ago, a reactionary impasse for any effort towards revolutionary activity.

This is what we wanted to make clear in this letter to Diversion.

Maria Teresa’s and Daniel’s letter starts by saying: “the struggle that we have begun against the old world, making moments which aren’t dead, enters a new phase. The spectacular commodity society fragments itself and loses strength in this historic period. Diversion appears and becomes stronger all the time.”

Gradually, your reader realizes that he doesn’t actually understand what is being said. Therefore he carefully continues to read the rest, to the end, looking for some clues. But on reaching the last paragraph the only conclusion that he can arrive at is, that if he doesn’t get the point, it’s a result of the incoherence and lack of clarity of the ideas themselves.

Let’s look at the letter section by section.

The subject of history

In the last paragraph we read about “the consistent pursuit of the realization of the international power of the workers’ councils.” And, in the first line you mention: “the struggle that we have begun against the old world” (our emphasis). Who is “we”? If you think that “the international power of the workers’ councils” is a present historic goal, a moment in the struggle against the old world, you would logically think that the real subject of this struggle can only be the working class. (Unless, as for Leninists of all descriptions, what is meant is that such international power will be given to the working class by another class or by a group of individuals. We assume this is not what you mean.)

But then, it would be reasonable to ask why is it that the working class is not mention in the rest of the text? Why is there no mention of the past century and a half of workers’ struggles? Why is there no mention, not even the slightest hint, of all the experiences acquired at such cost by the working class throughout its struggle against the old world, the capitalist world?

If you’re really convinced that the working class is the subject of history in present-day society, the phrase “the struggle that we have begun against the old world” can only be understood as: “the struggle that the working class has begun against the old world for more than a century and a half”.

Reading on, however, we can’t understand the following phrase: “the making of moments which aren’t dead.” Do you believe that the struggle waged by the working class since its birth as a class constitutes a “making of moments which aren't dead”? Perhaps what you mean by “moments which aren’t dead” are 'moments of “real life”; in other words, moments in which human beings, or for us, workers, can develop their capacities in a harmonious and infinite way.

But, only hopeless reformists can believe that this is possible “momentar­ily” and within this society. First, to think that you can “make” or construct anything worthwhile within this society is the basic lie of all reformists. The reality defended by revolutionaries is that the working class must begin by destroying this society so that humanity can begin to construct something human. The proletarian revolution has the specificity of being the first revolution in history that is the task of an exploited class. In other words, contrary to what happened in the past, there’s no possibility for the development of the new society from within the old one (as was the case for feudalism developing within slave society or for the bourgeoisie from within the feudal realm). In capitalism there’s no possibility of a political or economic compromise between the ruling class and the revolutionary class, since the revolution is not a confrontation between two exploiting classes, but one between an exploiting class and an exploited class.

Thus, you are defending a perfectly reformist and unfortunately banal conception when you assert: “The falsity of separating manual and mental labour must be exposed within ourselves. Our experience has shown us that on the way to our becoming human we must develop ALL our abilities; we must be equally able to solder a pipe or fix a kitchen as we are able to master other languages or cure with traditional medicines (Indian massage, herbs, acupuncture, etc).”

The division between manual and mental labour is neither right nor wrong. It’s a necessity in present society, just as its dissolution will be in the future society. The elimination of such a division isn’t an individual problem because its existence isn’t either, and never was. When we elimin­ate this problem, we will do it on a global scale because that’s the only way to do it. It’s elimination corresponds to an objective need and hence is possible. It’s a sad and barren illusion to believe that by “soldering pipes” in between reading philosophy books we will have eliminated the division between manual and mental labour! The proletariat doesn’t struggle to create illusory individual moments during which this division may disappear. On the contrary it struggles for the creation of the real and concrete material conditions (its political dictatorship exercised through the international workers’ councils), which will allow it to begin to lay the foundations of a new society in which this division could and should disappear; not momentarily, but definitely.

Secondly, what constitutes the motor force of class action and therefore of the working class, is not specifically a “critique of everyday life”, or the search for “undead moments”. In present society, as well as in all previous societies, everyday life always has been inhuman, not only for the exploited classes but for all men. It’s true that all men look, in the final analysis, for ways of bettering and rendering human their everyday life; it’s also true that the proletarian revolution will bring the greatest change to everyday life in human history, to the bourgeoisie as much as to the workers. (Individuals who today are bourgeois will become much more human and happier in the future society.) But, why does the bourgeoisie struggle for the preservation of present society, and the proletariat for its destruction? From the standpoint of “everyday life” this reality is totally incomprehensible. Furthermore, if the fight against the alienation of everyday life is logically taken to be the motor force of revolutionary struggle, we would have to reach these conclusions:

1. Revolution is not an activity of classes of people defined by their economic situation in the process of production, but rather it is a question which more or less alienated individuals pose for themselves. (It’s not an accident that in your texts, as in those of the International Situationists, “classes” are almost never mentioned.)

2. The most revolutionary individuals would be the petty-bourgeois intellectuals because their lives are most “unreal” and their personal worries are most closely concerned with ideas of boredom and meaninglessness. (Being a social group without a real position in the productive process, they are the most prone to existential anxieties characteristic of a class wit neither a historic future nor past.)

It is also not a coincidence that you write that “the possibility of realizing humanity’s history resides in the insoluble link of the struggles of those groups which want to be revolutionary and the unending movement (in present-day prehistory) of the wrathful declassed: it resides in the sum total of their talents and wills combatting the dominant spectacle.”

If you want to believe, as anarchists do, that human history is the result of the “sum total of the talents and wills” of individuals who “want” this or that, and of the “declassed”, that’s up to you. But then why do you speak of the “international power of the workers’ councils”? The power of workers’ councils presupposes the workers organized as a class. To say that this power is the path towards a society without classes means that the achievement of human history resides in the struggle of the working class.

The framework provided by a critique of “everyday life” may appear seductive insofar as it seems to offer a global critique of all existing states (Russia, China, or the US) without necessitating the dry task of demon­strating economically and scientifically that they are all forms of capitalism in greater or lesser evolution towards the most decadent form of the system: state capitalism. But in reality the critique of everyday life finally engulfs everything (all classes, all historic epochs) and in so doing it ends up in engulfing nothing, since it is an empty phrase merely hiding the essential (the class struggle), and must lead its proponents to waste their time in writing treatises about the “perfectly, self-made, free man”.

Thirdly, “the path to becoming human” that you talk about, and that all individuals (regardless of their class origins) should search for, cannot be an individual path of “self-purification” or “individual self-un­alienation”. To be human is to consider oneself human, that is as an integral part of humanity and therefore it consists, above all, in considering human history as your own, in integrating yourself as a conscious and active factor in the historic march of humanity.

In this moment, in this last stage of “humanity’s prehistory”, “the kingdom and dominion of necessity”, the “history of humanity continues to be the history of class struggle” and thus, to be human means to be an active factor in the struggle of a class the revolutionary class: the struggle of the working class for the defence of its specific interests which today become one with the interests of humanity as a whole.

Ideas aren’t the product of other ideas - they stem from men’s social practice. In a class society revolutionary ideas are and can only be the product of the historical practice of the revolutionary class.

When you speak in your text about what a revolutionary organization should be (almost the whole text is dedicated to this problem), and what convictions revolutionaries should uphold, there’s no mention of the historical practice of the revolutionary class. Therefore the text is purely ideological (in the worst sense of the word). Instead of starting with the historical practice of the class prior to discussing the revolutionary organization, which is one of its instruments, so that you can understand what revolu­tionaries should be and how they should act in accordance with their organization’s real and global function; you do the exact opposite. Instead of following a really materialist analytic sequence you approach the question in an idealist fashion. (What Marx criticized in his Theses on Feuerbach, calling it “intuitive” or “vulgar” materialism.) Such a standpoint solely begins with the individual, considered separately from social practice, that is, outside classes.

Thus, while the world working class is awakening after fifty years of triumphant counter-revolution, stronger than ever throughout the four corners of the planet, but hampered nonetheless by half a century of Stalinist, Social Democratic, and trade union inspired confusion, along with nationalism and all the other poisonous lies distilled by capital; as the class confronts the arduous task of re-appropriating its historical revolutionary experience, you waste three-quarters of your first publication and your own time on recipes for “self-unalienation” - pipe welding, Indian herbs, and other “diversions” of your everyday triviality.

It is especially important to denounce all those who attempt to identify state capitalism with socialism, all those for whom “the revolution” does not imply a radical change in all human relations. However, to base our critique of them on the latter aspect is of secondary importance and introduces confusion since it deviates attention from the essential thing, the class struggle. The European Social Democrats, especially the French, understand this: their favourite slogans over the past few years have been: “Transform life” and “Self-managed Socialism”. This is not just pure demagogy. The first slogan dilutes the proletariat in an indistinguishable soup - the “people”. In other words, the proletariat is submerged among all other classes because ‘life-style’ politics pose problems and their solutions at an individual level. The second slogan seeks to lock up the working class within its factories, urging it to play at “managing its own exploitation”, its own misery, as capital continues to hold the reigns of central power before a self-divided, self-castrated class. The exper­ience of 1920 in Italy where the working class allowed itself to be imprisoned within the factories playing at self-exploitation, while Giolitti (who didn’t even interrupt his holidays) and his government with the support of the trade unions and the assistance of the police, peacefully took over whole cities, is a clear example of the meaning and danger of the entire self-management critique, and with it the critique of everyday life.

The only subject of history in the present epoch is the proletariat, the working class. Therefore, every ideology and every conception that does not adopt as its central axis the revolutionary struggle of the working class places itself outside history, beyond the real terrain of revolution. It is on account of this that these ideologies can so easily become counter­revolutionary instruments.

The present historical period

Let us return to your first paragraph since the essential weaknesses of the text can be found condensed there. You assert that “The struggle ... against the old world ... enters a new phase. The spectacular commodity society fragments and weakens itself in this historical period .... DIVERSION appears and becomes stronger all the time.”

In leaving aside the question of diversion, which you define as “the transcendence of the separation between play and everyday life” since a critique of that concept has already been sketched earlier in this letter, we will also not deal with your calling capitalism “a spectacular commodity society”. We think that the concept of “spectacle”, as defined by the International Situationists, is confusing enough, and the concept of a “spectacular commodity society” rather than making more precise the historical specificity of present-day society (in other words what distinguishes it from all other social forms in history) doesn’t do anything but dilute it.

Ignoring these two points, we are in total agreement with the idea that the historical struggle of the working class today enters a “new phase” and that capitalist society “divides itself and weakens its forces”. However, this doesn’t go beyond, today, the banal confirmations that even appear on the front page of Time magazine. The important thing to know is first, why this is happening, and why today? And secondly what does this “new phase” of revolutionary struggle consist of? These questions are either not answered by your texts or they are answered incorrectly. Concerning the first question: “Why capitalist society fragments and weakens its forces?” - generally, the only answer that you provide is to be found in the comic strip title, “Dialectics of the state, dialectics of putre­faction”. The “superhero” of the comic says, “It is enough to have the least regression- a speck of sand in the system - for the crisis to explode, or better stated, for the immediate reality of the system to be unmasked. And on the slightest pretext: economic recession, police brutality, football hooliganism, settlement of debts - social violence will regain its course.”

What is “social violence”? Is it the exploitation and daily oppression of capitalism? The revolutionary struggle of the proletariat? Terrorism of desperate individuals or that of factions of the bourgeoisie struggling for power? Let’s suppose that you do mean the struggle of the revolutionary proletariat against the old order (so that the following phrase in the comic strip gains some sense): “The moment has not come ...to consciously enlist oneself in work favouring the evolution of the world revolution.”(?) Given that you are talking about the class struggle, the notion contained in the comic strip is historically false.

For many decades, the pretexts that you talk about have occurred either dozens of times (economic recessions), or thousands of times (football hooliganism), or millions of times (the settlement of debts); yet no revolutionary struggle has “regained its course”. Where do you get the idea that it is enough to have a slight relapse for the permanent crisis in which society finds itself to explode? What world are you talking about? the world of science fiction, the comic strip, or the one we’re living in today?

For one individual taken in isolation, an awareness of the crisis which society has endured for more than fifty years can be provoked by anything: rebellion against parents, love problems, religious crises, reading, etc…... But it is absurd to confuse such a personal world with the real, social world individual life is determined by social life, but the life of society is not, as idealism would have it, the product of the sum total of individual lives.

The proletarian revolution has already erupted more than once in history. And those who don’t have a total ignorance of it, know that what makes it erupt as a definite movement, is a sufficiently profound economic crisis, a necessary but not sufficient condition for revolution. Only the economic crisis forces all classes (groups of men defined not by their ideas, nor by their colour of skin, nor by their traditions, but above all by their position in the social process of production), and particularly the proletariat, to attempt to struggle according to their specific interests. The economic crisis is proof of the need for society to be reorganized differently, since the economy remains even today the skeleton of society.

Secondly, a sufficient condition for revolution is that the class struggle at the beginning of a period of crisis does not find itself in a situation of historical defeat, as happened between 1929 and 1946, when the world working class was under the heel of the triumphant counter-revolution, from Moscow to Madrid, Canton to Berlin and Turin. These are general conditions that can be deduced from a century and a half of the historical experience of workers’ struggles. These are the conditions for the open eruption of the proletarian revolution - but these are not conditions for victory in themselves. Victory depends on a thousand other factors that are part of the development of the balance of class forces between the proletariat and capital. However, this is not the subject under discussion at the moment.

One should, in any case, make clear that the conditions for the explosion which will allow the proletarian revolution “to regain its course” have nothing to do with the “slight pretexts” that you talk about. According to your conception of social revolution, the strength of revolution is always, eternally present, ready to demolish the old world in the name of the new - a conception not unlike that of the primitive Christians who longed so much for a communist world.

On what do you base your idea of the necessity for, and the possibility of, the world proletarian revolution? On the wide-scale existence of injustice? Too much alienation in everyday life? May 68 in France, the hot autumn of 69 in Italy, December 70 in Poland, the struggles at El Ferrol, Pamplona or Valladolid in Spain, the generalized wild cat strikes in England in 72, the struggles in Cordoba and Mendoza in Argentina, etc - do you honestly believe that they were produced by a sudden rebirth globally of the idea of “justice” in itself? Do you believe that it is a mere accident that workers’ struggles developed throughout the world just as the capitalist economy began to enter a new crisis (second half of the 60s)? The waning of prosperity produced by the reconstruction period following World War II was aggressively announced by the “reconstructed” countries, which had ceased to be markets for American commodities, and were beginning to demand export markets for their own.

Today, capitalism once more completes the cycle in which it has lived since World War I: crisis, war, reconstruction, crisis .... Faced with the crisis, decadent capitalism flounders and will increasingly flounder. Humanity today has only two ways out: the proletarian solution, a revolution which will destroy the capitalist system and establish socialism, thus bringing to an end the prehistory of humanity; or the capitalist solution, if the proletariat is defeated, consisting of a third world war which would give way again to the cycle of reconstruction containing a perspective of a new crisis posing once again the same problem.

If today, one can say that the alternative is once more “socialism or barbarism”, it is not because some eternal principle of “justice” guides the course of human progress and can be opposed to capitalism. History has not only taught us but confirms today that the economic crisis of the capitalist system imposes the barbarism of imperialist war and generalized destruction while at the same time bringing to the forefront the reaction of one of the exploited classes, the working class. Because the working class is exploited and is the collective producer class it carries within itself in its opposition and resistance to capitalist exploitation and oppression the socialist solution - the new society.

Only by beginning from this perspective can present world events be understood, and it is only from within this framework that one can seriously pose an international revolutionary perspective.

In fact, the point of this discussion with you is essentially to establish whether or not you are marxists. The Situationist International, which inherited to a great extent the traditions of Socialism or Barbarism, was not. However, it never dared to answer openly. More often it amused itself by replying with jokes, “pseudo-hoodwinkings for pseudo-initiates”, such as “Marx was the founder of the SI in 1864”, or “Just like Marx, we’re not marxists.”

Just like Socialism or Barbarism, the SI forms part of the payment that the revolutionary movement has had to make to the Stalinist counter-revolution and to the worst swindle in history, which claims that marxism is the theory of State capitalism.

Today we have to re-appropriate the experience of our class - and marxism forms an essential and integral part of that experience. But in order to do so, it is first necessary to abandon certain peurile attitudes, particularly the one that seeks to define what is revolutionary by symmetrically opposing it to that which is counter-revolutionary.

Proletarian theory, revolutionary conceptions, is not symmetrically opposed to the counter-revolution. Revolutionary conceptions are the result of the historical practice of the revolutionary class.

To break with the revolutionary tradition of militancy because Stalinism created a militancy that answered its counter-revolutionary needs; to break with the idea of the party because all present parties are bourgeois; to break with the experience of the Russian proletariat in 1917, and with the Bolshevik Party because the latter ended up in the counter-revolution in Russia - indeed, these attitudes are symmetrical to the counter-revolution.

The struggle of the working class is distinguished from that of other exploited classes because the proletariat is the only class that can affirm itself positively, in that it provides a solution, a real future in historical terms. Other strata in society (small petty traders, small peasants, etc) can only arrive at - in the best of cases - a purely negative rebellion; they are against the evolution of capitalism but cannot put forward an alternative social evolution. In this sense only the proletariat can generate a true conception of the world which is truly autonomous from the dominant ideology. Only the proletariat can truly negate capitalism, since it is the only class- which can transcend it.

We must place ourselves within this perspective and not within a simple one to one opposition to the counter-revolution.

As for the second question: the struggle of the proletariat is entering a new phase. What is the new phase? Your answer is once again to be found in the comic strip. Your superhero says, “If the proletariat doesn’t dissolve itself quickly, thereby ending class society, ending this society of survival, ending the system of the spectacular commodity, ending any sort of political domination; if the proletariat doesn’t create generalized self-management and social harmony by means of the inter-action of autonomous assemblies, we run the risk that the evil necessity of survival will bring back the conditioned reflex of death.”

“If the proletariat doesn’t dissolve itself quickly” - what are we to make of that? It is true that the disappearance of a society divided into classes would bring about the dissolution of the proletariat. But this is not the beginning of the revolutionary struggle. On the contrary, it is its final consequence. To eliminate classes implies not only the des­truction of the power of the bourgeoisie but also the elimination of all that remains of the capitalist economy and in particular, commodity production, which in turn implies the elimination on a global scale, of all exchange. This particularly implies a society of abundance in all parts of the world, something which will only be possible after a certain period of time during which the producers themselves will control the means of production.

The period of transition between capitalism and communism is none other than that period during which the condition of the proletariat is extended to include the whole world population. This will not be accomplished by the self-dissolution of the proletariat into the other social strata, but on the contrary, by the integration of the latter into the ranks of the proletariat. The proletariat will cease to exist, not because the prole­tarians of today decide overnight not to be proletarians any more, but because the whole population is integrated into the working class. The process of proletarian dissolution is thus the same as the process of its generalization: when the whole world population is the proletariat, only then is the proletariat dissolved.

This process is a conscious political and economic process. And its goal is the end of all politics and economics.

In order to dissolve classes the proletariat must begin by creating the concrete means to do so, and the first of these means is nothing less than its taking political power and exercising its dictatorship. For this reason, in order to ultimately negate itse1f, the proletariat must begin by first affirming itself as a class, as an autonomous force with regard to the rest of the social strata in society, as it is the only truly revolutionary force. The phase which the proletarian struggle is entering today, is not, therefore, one consisting of “the rapid dissolution of the proletariat”, but rather one in which the proletariat is becoming conscious of its own class interests, of the need to act like a united world class, autonomous from the rest of society. Within the proletariat there is an increased consciousness of the fact that today it constitutes the class that carries on its shoulders the future of humanity.

From the standpoint of organization, the present phase of the proletarian movement consists in the workers learning to organize themselves in their own assemblies and co-ordinating them by means of councils of elected and revocable delegates (elected and revocable on the widest possible scale), outside of and against the trade unions. Concerning “generalized self-management”, we have already mentioned the dangers of this type of ideology. If there is any task for revolutionaries today, it is that of denouncing all the lies that the bourgeoisie, world-wide, is currently attempting to use against the proletariat. Lies used to make the proletariat accept the management of a bankrupt system, the better to divide the class by caging the workers in the factories. Lies, which above all deviate the consciousness of the proletariat from its political goal, the taking of power, and its historical struggle.

Every criticism carries within it the danger of caricaturing the idea that is being criticized. We hope that in this letter we have not done so. If we have, it results from the necessity to carefully scrutinize what is being analysed, not because we wished to raise red herrings in order to be rid of you. Natur­ally, like anybody else, we too dislike wasting our time.

Also, we hope that any polemical tone that may have inadvertently, but perhaps inevitably, entered this letter will not constitute an obstacle to further discussion. We await your answer - the sooner the better.

The years we are living in today are of the type Marx used to say encompass whole epochs - as you say in your letter, “to be revolutionary is to tread in the path of reality”.

Communist greetings,

R. Victor for the ICC

(This letter is translated from the Spanish.)



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International correspondence: 2 Letter to Arbetarmakt (Workers' power league/Sweden)

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Introduction

The following text is a letter adressed to the swedish group, Arbetarmakt, (workers power league) in the context of our Current's long-standing effort towards international discussion and contact.

Arbetarmakt recently published a text in English summarising the political orientation defended in its swedish newspaper. This text reflects a curious mixture of positive aspects of the “councilist tradition and certain marked “Third-Worldism”. Such a mixture is not as surprising as it seem among those who claim to be followers of the Dutch left today as we have shown in a previous article directed against the conceptions of Daad en Gedachte. (See Councilism comes to the aid of Third-Worldism in International Review no 2)

However the orientation text of Arbetarmakt presents a definite interest to the extent that it is expresses an effort towards political clarification which is going on in this group as it is in many others today. We hoped to contribute to this process by our letter.

Although we have not yet received a reply we feel that our letter will be of general interest to our readers in that it deals questions such as “national liberation”, state capitalism, etc and so we are publishing it here.

The “Presentation” text of Arbetarmakt was written to define the political orientation which your defends in class struggle. It makes important points about the meaning of workers councils, the experience of the working classs in history, about the need to denounce the left of capital and the so-called “socialist” regimes. You stand for the self-activity of the working class, against the “Leninist” idea of the party while seeing the neec for the organisation of revolutionaries in our time heightened class struggle. With all this our Current is in most profound agreement as you can see from our publications.

We would however, like to comment on some aspects of your platform which we feel need further clarification.

Your document seems to offer no explanation or mention of the economic crises which is plaguing rhe capitalist world today, east and west. The capitalist system, like all previous forms of social organisation based on exploitation, it is not an eternal system. It is being torn apart by the contradiction between the development of the productive forces and the narrow limit of the socail relations which the capitalist laws have imposed. Throughout the major part of the 20th century, capitalism has repeated the horrenduos cycle of crisis-war-reconstruction-crisis demonstrating its historical bankruptcy as a system. The continued functioning of capitalism in decline, in the absence of a victorious proletarian revolution, can only mean the repetition of this cycle with increasing autarky, the permanent war economy, deeper and deeper crisis and the threat of the exacerbation of inter-imperialist conflict leading to another world war. The only choice that decadent capitalism has offer is: socialism or continued barbarism.

During the years of apparent ‘prosperity’ based on the reconstruction of war-shattered economies, some political tendencies took this apparent ‘boom’ for the reality of the capitalist system which had supposedly escaped the workings of its own economic laws. Cardan, for example, wrote of a “crisis-free” capitalism and rejected marxism as an inappropriate, “outmoded” theory. Marcuse wrote of the integration of the working class into capital and the need to find a ‘new’ revolutionary subject in the marginal strata. The analysis of the ‘consumer society’ became ‘fashionable’ and with the talk of ‘boredom with the spectacular society’ somehow provoking revolution, the working class, the only class capable of becoming the grave-diggers of capitalism was shunted aside.

But by the late 60’s something had changed. The symptoms of the permanent crisis of the system re-emerged with the end of the reconstruction period. Today there can be no doubt about the crisis: galloping inflation, monetary crisis, unemployment, threatening economic disorganization. It is this objective situation which has determined the resistance of the working class to the degradation of its condition from Italy in 1969 to Poland in 1971, in South America, all over Europe from Scandinavia to Spain and Portugal. The motor force of the crisis has once again begun a process of developing class consciousness in the working class and the .re-emergence of revolutionary groupings within the class.

We feel it is not enough to simply talk about the revolutionary aspirations of the working class without seeing them in the context of the concrete possibility and historical necessity of revolutionary transformation in the period of capitalist decline. Otherwise we can so easily fall into danger­ously simplistic notions about how the crisis is just the result of the machinations of individual capitalists, the RocKefeller conspiracy, the ‘Arab sheiks’ or any other variations which do not deal with the international aspects of an entire system in crisis. Revolutionaries may have differing analyses of the workings of the law of value in theoretical terms, but the fact of economic crisis cannot be denied and must be dealt with coherently. This dimension is lacking in your text.

The need to deal with manifestations of the crisis is crucial to developing a coherent revolutionary orientation - an analysis and contribution to class struggle, which is not an eclectic collection of different isolated points but an. effort towards a coherent explicit expression of the dynamic inherent in class struggle. And this analysis must have a historical dimension - including the lessons of previous class struggle and the contribution of revolutionary marxism.

Political coherence and the effort to evaluate the lessons of the past are particularly important in relation to the question of proletarian internation­alism and national liberation struggles. In the 19th century capitalism was a progressive social force against the remaining fetters of feudalism and the solidification of nation states was the framework for this growth of capital. Insofar as capitalism represented a historically progressive mode of production, the proletariat fought alongside the bourgeoisie against reactionary elements. This did not mean, however, that the class struggle against capitalist exploitation was suspended. On the contrary, the proletariat built its class organizations and fought in class struggles. But because revolution was not an immediate historical possibility, marxists and the workers’ movement supported the formation of new nations insofar as this process helped the development of the productive forces and thereby hastened the day when capitalism as a system would complete its historical tasks.

This was the major criterion of Marx and Engels when they supported movements in Poland for example and when they opposed the formation of a new southern nation in the US Civil War. Nowhere in Marxism of this time do we find anything about an abstract right of ‘self-determination’ nor of new nations being ‘a first step towards socialism’ -- formulations so dear to the Third Worldist movements of today.

With the beginning of the decadence of capitalism, the revolutionary programme became the only adequate, possible response to the decomposition of capitalist society. The bourgeoisie had ceased to be a progressive class for the develop­ment of the productive forces and only socialism could get humanity out of the mire of barbarism and destruction. Bourgeois revolutions became a thing of the past in the context of the general incapacity of the system to deal with its own internal contradictions.

The Bolshevik Party stood firmly for an internationalist position during World War 1 and actively participated in the Russian Revolution which was one of the greatest experiences of the working class; but it did not, however, fully understand the implications of this new period. Particularly after Second Congress of the Third International in 1920, they imposed their notion of the revolutionary potential of struggles for national autonomy on the workers’ movement as a whole. In fact, this question was so difficult to understand that even in the councilist tradition there were hesitations and ambiguities on the subject of national liberation. These ambiguities are expressed even more blatantly in many groups which claim to be continuing council communism today.

Despite your desire to reject the roots of Leninism on certain questions related to revolutionary theory, you merely accept and continue their tradition in this domain. Our Current recognizes the many contributions of the Bolshevik Party but Lenin’s theory of national self-determination has not, in any way, stood the test of' time. What have the last fifty years shown us about national liberation struggles? After all, we are no longer speculating about ‘possibilities’ - we have years of actual experience to deal with.

Imperialism rules supreme in our period capitalist decadence, the imperia­lism of all countries, large or small. All countries vie for a share of the world market already carved up and inadequate to the needs of expanded production. Of course the larger, more powerful capitalist complexes are best armed for this constant struggle. In this context, national autonomy is a utopia. No country can free itself from one bloc without the ‘aid’ of another under whose military and economic sphere it then inevitably falls.

National liberation struggles are the arena for local wars and for confron­tations between the large Imperialist blocs. In your desire to fight against imperialism you do not seem to recognize that imperialism isn’t a ‘policy’ of one country or another. It is the generalized way of life for all nations in capitalist barbarism. In seeing imperialism as merely the barbarism of one particular country, support is implied, if not explicitly given, to other imperialist blocs. Where, we may ask, is the ‘ideological’, ‘anti-capitalist’ content of the struggles that saw American and Chinese imperialism supporting Pakistan and Russian imperialism supporting the Bangladesh movement, each for their own interests - just as the local bourgeoisie saw its own interests in this struggle and the population of these areas were used as cannon fodder, then to be left to starvation? Or Chinese and French imperialism which supported the Biafra efforts in order to get their toe-hold while Russian Imperialism supported the Nigerian federal government. Or today as Chinese and American imperialism supports the Marcos regime in the Philippines while the Russian imperialist interests try their hand at supporting the Muslim rebels. Or in Angola where Russian imperialism supports the Popular Movement and US and Chinese interests are behind Holden Roberto and the National Front. The situation in Angola makes even the most abstracted ‘national liberationist’ stop and think.1 Just as revolutionaries in the past have called for the transformation of imperialist war into class war, revolutionaries today must denounce these localized, imperialist wars and call for class war.

You talk about national liberation struggles bringing a “better life for people”, but how can there be a “better life” under capitalism except by destroying it. Or do different faces make different exploiters? The development of the productive forces on a world scale is impossible today - the gap between developing and underdeveloped countries is constantly widening and the misery of the ‘Third World’, aggravated by war, famine, economic chaos, or intensely exploitative state capitalist regimes, has reached unequalled depths. Capitalism was capable of creating a world market (by destroying pre-capitalist, economic-social systems) but it is incapable of integrating new masses into the productive process as the shanty-towns of the unemployed in ‘Third World’ cities show. In certain areas, with economic dependence on imperialist powers and unparalleled exploitation and regimentation of the labour force, some countries (eg Cuba, China) have been able to develop massive arms economies and a highly labour-intensive exploitation at low productivity rates, which are tragic testi­mony to the misery of working class life there and to the inability to develop within the framework of the capitalist system today under all its guises. Backyard blast furnaces in China are hardly a development of the productive forces; they are merely one manifestation of the over-all irrationality of autarkic efforts at national development in a period of capitalist decline.

What do these new regimes, paid for with the blood of workers and the population in general, mean for the class struggle? ‘Independence’ is really subservience to another imperialist power and ‘liberation’ govern­ments are forced to move towards state capitalism as the only way to defend their relatively weak, national capital. This means an intensification of exploitation up to and including the militarization of labour and the forbidding of strikes. Frelimo announces that ‘laziness’ will be punished - thereby making a mockery of the “better life” the working class is ‘supposed’ to be enjoying. It is particularly ironic to see groups in the US and Europe who write about workers sabotaging production lines in Detroit or Turin but feel so very differently about sweated labour if it is extracted in the name of ‘national liberation’ elsewhere, which costs them nothing. The succeeding ‘ieft’ governments in Portugal all announce that owing to the economic crisis, everyone must work hard for the homeland and avoid agitation and strikes. The army was sent in to break strikes2 just as was the case in Chile. But do the leftists call for class struggle against exploitation in these situations? Oh no - that would be ‘unfair’! To the interests of Portuguese capital and the nation which is having such a hard time. But the working class has no homeland and these leftists do their job only for the interests of capital and ‘critical support’ for one government or another.

The Polish workers’ revolt showed the world that crisis is a reality in state capitalist regimes and that the working class would fight to destroy the myth and reality of the ‘workers’ paradise’ - not just to be channeled into anti-Russian, nationalist sentiment but against its own bourgeoisie. In the same way, the strikes of iron workers in Venezuela’s nationalized industries, the strikes in Peru, Colombia, Egypt, the striking Chilean copper miners who were met with Allende’s machine guns, have drawn the class line on the question of ‘national unity’ and ‘national movements’. Where do revolutionaries stand: with the workers’ class struggle in these countries or with the bourgeoisie’s attempts to mobilize nationalism and self-serving ‘anti-imperialism’, so as to create the conditions for more efficient exploitation? The need to express and fight for our solidarity with our class brothers all over the world does not pass through the Frelimo, the Vietnamese ‘liberation’ army, the Palestinian ‘liberation’ front or the IRA any more than it does through the Alliance for Progress, NATO or Zionism. It can only be expressed through solidarity with workers’ struggles and the class interests of the proletariat in all countries. The socialist revolutionary programme is the only way out of massacres in the ‘Third World’. Socialism can never be created in one country, either a backward or a developed country, alone. But the class struggles of workers in the ‘Third World’ are echoed in the class struggles in Europe and the developed countries and this is the revolutionary hope of the future.

When you write “long live proletarian internationalism” and then call for support for national movements in the ‘Third World’, it is the same thing as calling for the ”union sacree”, “national unity”, an end to strikes, support for the Communist Party and the leftists in any European country. Nationalism is the road to class defeat wherever and whatever its ideological cloak.

‘Third Worldism’ has been very popular among the leftists in the developed countries because it is such an easy way to relieve ‘guilt’ and is, there­fore, so emotionally satisfying. When the European and American working class was not very active, it seemed as though the only ‘hope’ was to look elsewhere - to the ‘people’ and not the working class. But today when the crisis is a reality everywhere and when class struggle is awakening after years of counter-revolution, it is certainly time to re-evaluate the impli­cations of this position. The smug satisfaction which comes from talking of a “better life” in Vietnam or Cambodia over a generation of graves resulting from inter-imperialist struggles is a mockery of revolutionary thought.

We feel that the question of ‘national liberation’ today is one of the crucial points we would like to discuss with your group. (Perhaps the recent article on this question in Internationalism no. 7 will give you a fuller idea of our position.) We regret not being able to read more of your publications at this time but we look forward to receiving other translations of your texts in English or other languages.

The question of imperialism today is related to your statement on the nature of the Russian, Chinese and East European regimes. It is very difficult to elaborate a revolutionary perspective if your analysis does not define the capitalist system as a whole. You write, “not all parts of the world are dominated by the capitalist system”. According to your statements, the world is divided into capitalist and non-capitalist “bureaucratic” regimes. How is it possible then to defend and explain a revolutionary programme for two, supposedly completely different, social systems? You write, “the class struggle continues” - but what are the classes? What is the material basis of this so-called, non-capitalist bureaucracy and where are its objective contradictions?

You state that Russia and China are “planned economies” but planning in itself is not a definition of a social system. Centralized, state, economic planning to one degree or another is in force in France, England, Spain; in fact in all countries today, including the US and Canada. Nationalization and planning have everywhere become integral parts of decadent capitalism and these efforts will increase as the crisis itself grows deeper everywhere.

Even following the logic of your own arguments and statements, the nature of Russian and Chinese “bureaucratism” becomes clear if we are not blinded by outward appearances. What is the system you describe - which creates a proletariat, has a ruling class which controls the means of production, where salaries are given, where expanded national production for accumulation is the goal, a system which competes on the world market? This is capitalism and the operation of the law of value.

The Russian, Chinese, and Eastern European regimes are expressions of the tendency towards state capitalism which today dominates to one degree or another the capitalist system in all countries. Russia or China is more extreme examples of the need for concentration of national capital in the hands of the state. But the bureaucracy in Russia or China has the same role in production as the traditional ‘private’ bourgeoisie: they are the functionaries of capital. The juridical form that capitalism may take, whether it is in individual or state hands, is only a secondary question. The primary question is the role of a social class in relation to the means of production.

Russia, China or the other more extreme examples of state capitalist organization are imperialist because of the very nature of global capital­ism in our period. Your analysis leaves this point dangerously vague and readers may infer these countries can indeed lead ‘anti-imperialist’ struggles as the Stalinists, Trotskyists and Maoists claim. Just like the theories of the workers’ state’ or the ‘degenerated workers’ state’ and the like, your rather vaguely defined theory of ‘another system’' leaves the door open to dangerous mystifications. Although you call for prole­tarian revolution in these strange ‘other’ systems, the very definition of the proletariat itself is undermined by an inconsistent analysis. The conclusions may be right but the logic is missing.

There have been many theories which have tried to explain Russia and China without reference to state capitalism. We can point particularly to the writings of Chaulieu/Cardan in Socialisme ou Barbarie which proclaimed that Russia, and China later on, were a ‘third system’, neither socialist nor capitalist. This theory led him to (abandon the proletariat as the international revolutionary class3 and to adopt the idea of ‘order-takers’ and ‘order-givers’ as the fundamental division of the ‘new’, ‘crisis-free’ society whose material roots remained a mystery. More fundamentally, the idea of a third system implies the rejection of the basic marxist insight that only socialism - the end of all property relations and the end of the law of value, commodity production and wage labour - can answer the contradictions inherent in capitalism,

In rejecting all the conjectures on the subject of Russia and China which have dominated in the period of counter-revolution and in defending the conception of state capitalism, our Current stresses the fact that since the First World War, statification is a general tendency in decadent capitalism. Whatever it’s ideological label - Stalinism, fascism or ‘democracy’ - state capitalist measures in one degree or another are the basic trend in all countries. With the deepening of the crisis, the bourgeoisie of all colours and stripes will accelerate this trend and it is important that revolutionaries try to clarify this in the developed countries as well as in the underdeveloped ones. The bourgeoisie will attempt to co-opt proletarian struggles through nationalizations, self-management schemes, new New Deals or Popular Fronts in defence of national capital through intensified statification and ‘pacification’ of the working class. We cannot go into all the details of our analysis here but you may be interested to read our pamphlets on decadence and the crisis and our articles on state capitalism.4

In general, if we had to sum up a major part of the work of our Current, it would be to emphasize that the only revolutionary class in capitalism, east or west, is the proletariat. With the crisis today and the reawake­ning of international class struggle, talk of marginal elements or fringe movements become dangerous diversions for class struggle. The theories of the ‘consumer society’ you mention in your text also seem like empty absurdities today when the problem for the working class is increasingly inflation, unemployment and maintaining a minimal standard of living. With almost 10% unemployment in the US and 12% in Denmark for example, not to mention the decline in real wages which galloping inflation represents, how can we give credence to the idea that capitalist society exists to make the working class ‘consume’?

The working class is the only subject of revolution in capitalist society and only through its self-activity, the development of its revolutionary consciousness and class organization in workers councils, can socialism eventually become a living reality. In this sense, our Current has always defended the position that the revolutionary party of the working class cannot substitute itself for the class as a whole. We reject the Leninist idea that the party must assume state power ‘in the name of the class’. The political organizations of the class exist to contribute to the heigh­tening and generalization of class consciousness, to defend “the fundamental goals and means of achieving them”.

We do not quite understand your reference to the need for the ‘autonomy’ of the class in relation to its political organizations. Although these organizations cannot assume the tasks of the class as a whole, they are an emanation of the class to fulfill a vital role of contributing to the clarification of class consciousness in struggle. When we speak of the autonomy of the working class, it is not an autonomy which would separate the whole from a part of that whole, but rather the autonomy of the working class in relation to all other classes. The refusal to join ‘popular fronts’, ‘anti-fascist’ or ‘national liberation fronts’ with elements of the bour­geoisie, the refusal to dilute proletarian class interests in a vague amalgam of the ‘people’ - this is the autonomy of the proletarian movement which is essential for the process of revolution.

Although we reject the Leninist party, we do not agree in rejecting all need for the organization of revolutionaries. Like your group, we do see the need for an international regroupment of revolutionaries today based on a clear, coherent political platform. We are trying to contribute to this goal by the unity of our sections in different countries. At the present level of class struggle, we feel that the contribution of organized revolutionaries can be an important factor for today and for the future formation of a proletarian international political party on a clear programmatic basis.

We do not claim to have discovered all the ‘answers’ nor to have found an exclusive ‘eternal truth’. We try to base our intervention on the heritage of left communism and the fullest possible analysis of the lessons of class struggle.

We are deeply concerned about contributing to international debate and the clarification of ideas which must go on among revolutionaries in the class. We hope to be able to read more of your publications and analyses soon and that this letter will be taken as a contribution further correspondence between our groups.

J.A. for the ICC

August, 1975

1 See Angola, Ethiopia: Inter-Imperialist Struggle in Africa, Internationalism/World Revolution pamphlet no. 3

2 The TAP airline strike.

3 See Cardan under the name Coudray in Mai 1968: La Breche, Paris, 1968.

4 The Decadence of Capitalism and The Convulsions of World Capital, World Revolution/Internationalism pamphlets Nos 1 & 2.

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International Review no. 5 May 1976

  • 1622 reads

Report on the international situation

  • 2039 reads

 

THE ECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM

The tenuous economic equilibrium of world capital has been shattered beyond repair during the past year. The Third World has sunk even further into impoverishment and decay as the prices of the raw materials on which these economies are dependent has collapsed. To take but one example, the index of the world price of metals compiled by The Economist had fallen from 245.8 in May 1974 to 111.8 in September 1975 - a drop which has taken the index practically to the levels prevailing in 1970. Even those apparent latter day eldorados, the oil producing states like Iran and Saudi Arabia, have had to drastically cut back their once ambitious development projects.

In the capitalist metropoles, the crisis has rapidly outgrown its earlier manifestations as a monetary crisis even while the repercussions of the disruption of the international monetary system and galloping inflation grow in intensity. Now the crisis manifests itself in the process of production of material values itself. The statement that we are now fully and openly in the midst of a general crisis of over-production is today incontrovertible.

In the United States 31% of manufacturing capacity now lies idle; in Japan more than a fifth of the industrial capacity is idle. With an annual capacity of 12 million cars, the European automobile industry will produce no more than 8 million in 1975. The following table shows the extent and the breadth of the collapse of industrial production, which has been unprecedented since the world crisis of the 1930s.

PRODUCTION – PERCENT CHANGE FROM SECOND QUARTER 1974 TO SECOND QUARTER 1975

Country

Total industrial production

Iron and Steel

Chemicals

Textiles, clothing and leather

Canada

-5.9

-9.3

-0.9

-10.8

United States

-12.3

-22.3

-13.5

-16.2

Japan

-13.4

-14.7

-13.0

-9.2

Australia

-10.9

-

-12.2

-21.8

Austria

-9.2

-12.9

-9.5

-15.1

Belgium

-12.4

-25.1

-17.5

-16.2

Luxemburg

-23.2

-

-23.5

-

Netherlands

-7.6

-

-17.0

-17.0

France

11.6

-19.9

-18.3

-11.7

West Germany

-10.7

-20.6

-16.5

-7.1

Italy

-14.2

-12.4

-13.3

-10.4

Great Britain

-5.6

-21.7

-12.3

-9.3

Spain

-10.6

-6.0

-13.0

-10.8

Switzerland

-17.0

-

-19.3

-14.2

Source: OECD - Industrial Production, 1975 - 3.

The decline in production is now being felt in the Eastern bloc too, where the Russian planners had to admit in December that output had grown by only 4% in 1975 instead of the planned 6.5%. This latter figure was itself a target which had been drastically revised downwards two years ago when the bureaucrats discovered that they had to 'plan' for the destructive effects of a crisis which makes a mockery of all attempts at capitalist planning.

The slackening in the growth of world trade which followed the collapse of the inflationary 'boom' of 1972-73, has in 1975 produced the first decrease in the volume of world trade since the end of the second imperialist world war. Profits, the most sensitive measure of the health of the capitalist economy, have fallen even further than the catastrophic declines in production and world trade. In Japan, corporate earnings fell 47% during the first six months of 1975; were it not for the substantial sums transferred to reserves during the boom years and now showing up in corporate balance sheets, profits would be down by a staggering 70%! Twenty-five per cent of all companies listed on the Tokyo stock exchange have been operating at a loss this year. In Germany, the big chemical trusts which sparked the 'economic miracle' have seen their once huge profits dissolve: Bayer's half year profits fell by two-thirds, BASF's by half. In Britain, a number of the largest companies have had to be bailed out by the state in order to avoid being shut down or forced into bankruptcy: Burmah Oil, Ferranti, Alfred Herbert, British Leyland, Chrysler UK, as well as the whole of the shipbuilding industry. The Treasury estimates that the rate of return on capital employed in British industry has fallen from 11% in 1964 to 4% in 1974. In Italy, practically all of the big industrial groups (state and ‘private') are losing money while being suffocated by the huge interest payments on the loans contracted in the past year in order to keep them afloat. The Governor of the Central Bank has recommended that part of industry's debts to the banks be converted into shares, a measure which would constitute moratorium on interest payments as the only way to rescue Italian industry.

In the United States, which was the architect of the provisional economic equilibrium established after World War II as well as the main beneficiary of the redivision of world markets affected by the imperialist carnage, profits in all basic industries have collapsed like a house of cards under the impact of the crisis.

Industry

Profits for first 9 months of 1975: percent change from 1974

Appliances

-41%

Automobiles

-33%

Building materials

-25%

Chemicals

-18%

Electrical/electronics

-13%

Metals/mining

-47%

Fuel (oil & coal)

-30%

Paper

-26%

Railroads

-41%

Retailing (food)

-46%

Steel

-29%

Textiles/apparel

-35%

Tyre/rubber

-15%

Trucking

-27%

(Source: Business Week, 17 November 1975

THE CLASS EQUILIBRIUM

The breakdown of the economic equilibrium, so painstakingly reconstructed in the aftermath of the inter-imperialist butchery of 1939-45, has already severely disrupted the fragile class equilibrium which rested upon it and which could not survive its demise. With the sharp decline in production, world trade and profits, capital has moved to rid itself of that part of the labour force which has become superfluous. Throughout the world a huge and rapidly growing army of the unemployed attests to the only future decadent; capitalism has in store for the proletariat: impoverishment! The massive growth of unemployment over the past year has already sounded a warning to the bourgeoisie, whose most intelligent representatives see in this embittered mass of proletarians one of the elements which threatens to coalesce into the army of the world revolution.

OFFICIAL UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS

 

COUNTRY

AUGUST 1974

AUGUST 1975

Canada

522,000

736,000

United States

4,925,000

7,794,000

Japan

769,000

966,000

Australia

126,000

299,000

Belgium

105,000

191,000

Netherlands

140,000

207,000

Denmark

49,000

103,000

France

464,000

864,000

West Germany

694,000

1,343,000

Italy

556,000

653,000

Great Britain

626,000

1,025,000

Spain

153,000

231,000

Source: OECD - Main economic indicators, October 1975.

The official statistics, however, give but a pale indication of the true extent of unemployment in the leading capitalist nations. In the US, as even bourgeois politicians and economists attest, a more accurate computation of the number of unemployed would show that there are now more than 10 million workers deprived of their livelihood by the crisis. A study by the Bank of England which tried to unify computations by adjusting the differences in the methods of calculation used by various governments found that in France there were already 1,150,000 unemployed in April (Financial Times, 20 June 1975), a figure which has certainly risen considerably since then. In Germany, the official figures do not take into account the pool of more than 300,000 immigrant workers deported since March 1974 or the one million or so workers who are partially unemployed. Japanese unemployment statistics ignore factors such as seasonal workers who have been laid-off, workers who have been pressured into 'voluntarily' quitting or in part-time employment only, and imposed holidays which hide temporary shut-down of plants. A more realistic picture of the true number of unemployed in Japan would be at least two million. On the basis of reasonably accurate estimates of those out of work in Western Europe, North America, Australasia and Japan, there is at the least a growing army of 21 million unemployed today.

The enormous growth in the number of unemployed is but one sign of the deterioration of the standard of living of the working class. On the one hand, an ever increasing part of the proletariat faces the prospect of being thrown on the scrap heap by the bourgeoisie which seeks to lay-off workers as markets contract, hoping to re-establish higher rates of profit by squeezing ever more surplus value out of ever fewer workers. On the other hand, those workers not ejected from the process of production and whom the crisis condemns to an unremitting intensification of exploitation in the factories, have seen their real wages drastically cut by the prodigious rise in consumer prices. In many countries, despite the growth of unemployment, consumer prices (food, rent, clothing) are rising even faster than in 1974:

Rise in consumer prices: percent changes over the past 12 months

Canada

+11.1%

Australia

+16.9%

Italy

+15.3%

Spain

+17.4%

Great Britain

+26.9%

(Source: Main Economic Indicators, OECD, October 1975)

Throughout Western Europe, North America, Australasia and Japan, consumer prices have risen an average of 11% between August 1974 and August 1975.

The proletariat in the Eastern bloc has also begun to feel the full impact of the world crisis. In Yugoslavia, there are more than half a million workers unemployed, while consumer prices have risen 30% over the past year. In Russia and the rest of the Eastern bloc even if unemployment can still be hidden, nothing can hide from the workers the palpable rise in the rate of exploitation which their capitalist masters are imposing. In addition to this, the proletariat is subjected to a devastating and continual rise in the price of consumer goods while at the same time suffering massive and growing shortages of the basic necessities. In December, Polish workers were told that a "flexible pricing policy" will replace the price freeze on basic foodstuffs. Some food prices have been frozen since the 1970-71 workers' insurrection, though the only effect of these price freezes has long since been to produce acute shortages of many necessary items. The effects of capitalist planning in Poland, which permits the shipment of scarce food items overseas, can also be seen in the sphere of housing where the waiting list for apartments is now more than 1.5 million families long! Also in December, Hungary announced the third large round of price increases this year on a wide range of food and consumer goods.

Under the blows of the deepening world crisis, with its growing impoverishment of the proletariat, the class equilibrium - which had already begun to crack with the onset of the crisis at the end of the 60s - has dissolved. Over the past year the class struggle has grown in intensity and scope, confirming our Current's analysis that the perspective opened up by the crisis is one of class war, proletarian revolution.

In Peru, the February 1975 riots and street fighting in Lima to which the leftist military junta responded with savage repression leading to the death of hundreds, the arrest of several thousand demonstrators,
and the declaration of a State of Emergency, was the climax after a massive wave of class struggle: in August 1974, 15,000 miners struck in the state-owned Centromin-Peru; in September, strikes at the metallurgical plants spread to the copper mines, textile plants and Volvo and Pirelli factories; in December, 25,000 copper miners struck. In Venezuela in the winter of 1975 the miners at the recently nationalized iron mines launched a bitter strike. In Argentina throughout the spring and summer, tens of thousands of workers were on strike from Villa Constitucion to Cordoba, from Rosario to Buenos Aires. The wave of factory occupations and the armed defence of working class neighbourhoods in the face of brutal repression by the army and police are indicative of the growing combativity of the proletariat in response to the crisis.

In China, 1975 has seen a wave of class struggle in response to austerity measures, to which the state has reacted by sending troops into the affected areas in order to break the strikes and "restore production". In September, it was reported that 10,000 troops had been sent to Hangchow to restore production in 13 factories. The widespread use of the army in coal mines, steel mills and many other industries is indicative of the scope of the Chinese proletariat's response to both the deterioration of its standard of living and conditions of work which the state has tried to impose.

In Eastern Europe, 1975 has also brought new evidence of the proletariat's resistance to the onslaughts of the crisis of world capital. Strikes, work slowdowns, protest actions, and sabotage have increased throughout the region. In Poland, the state has struck back: in November heavy penalties for absenteeism were introduced and it was announced that a whole series of other disciplinary measures would be forthcoming. With memories of the 1970 insurrection still fresh in their minds, party leaders and trade union officials have been touring the factories trying to convince the workers that the 'gains' of the past few years could be jeopardized by 'barren discontent'.

In Western Europe, 1975 brought a dramatic upturn in the scale and intensity of strikes, thus ending the relative lull of 1973-74 which had followed the wave of strikes begun in 1968. Throughout this past winter and spring hundreds of thousands of Spanish workers engaged in mass strikes. In January and February the strike wave spread from Pamplona and Barcelona in the north through the Madrid region to Andalusia in the south. In March, the industrial suburbs of Bilbao were the scene of bitter strikes, while in April the wave momentarily peaked with the strike of 3,000 workers at the Fasa Renault plant at Valladolid. In Italy, the end of April saw the wildcat strike by the conductors on the Milan transit system (ATM), which was directed against the unions as well as the employers. In France, during the spring the working class responded to lay-offs and plant shutdowns in the auto industry, steel, metallurgy, newspapers, transportation and public utilities, with a wave of strikes which the unions only provisionally managed to contain but with growing difficulty. In April, more than fifty factories were occupied, while the number of strikers grew by a hundred thousand a day!

In the United States, a wildcat by West Virginia coal miners this summer directed against the collusion of unions and mine owners spread in only a few days to encompass 80,000 of the 125,000 bituminous coal miners in the country. The combined efforts of the union, the mine owners, the courts and the police were necessary to put an end to the month long strike which completely paralyzed the coal industry.

Throughout the past year the class struggle has continued to grow, spreading from country to country, affecting ever more sectors of industry and encompassing greater and greater numbers of workers. However, despite their scope and intensity which attest to the combativity of an undefeated generation of workers, these struggles have only breached but not yet broken the corporatist, national and trade union ramparts which constitute capital's last bastion against the gathering proletarian storm. A calm has now momentarily settled over the class battlefield as the proletariat assimilates the lessons of its recent struggles and as the bourgeoisie prepares to confront the working class. This calm before the new upheavals which are even now germinating deep within the framework of decaying bourgeois society coincides with talk of an economic recovery.

RECOVERY: REALITY OR MYTH

London's prestigious weekly, The Economist, has pointed to an upturn in production beginning last spring in Japan and over the summer in the United States and West Germany, as the harbinger of a recovery from the worst slump since the crisis of the 1930s:

"The six largest industrial nations - America, Japan, Germany, France, Britain and Italy - between them account for 80% of industrial countries' output. As they meet for the summit-in-a-slump at Rambouillet, all can see some swallows in their sky - and hope that they signal the start of spring." (The Economist, 15 November 1975)

And so The Economist optimistically predicts a rise in real GNP for all six during 1976, and in the case of the US and Japan a hefty rise of 6%. In the United States leading circles of the bourgeoisie speak even more confidently:

"No doubt about it anymore: the recovery in business is vigorous, more vigorous than even the optimists expected." (Business Week, 3 November 1975)

A not inconsiderable segment of the bourgeoisie therefore publicly shares the sentiment of France's Prime Minister Chirac that "we can begin to see the end of the tunnel".

Marxists have never asserted that in a general crisis of over-production - which together with periods of imperialist world war and then reconstruction make up the barbarous cycle of decadent capitalism – output continually falls in a straight downward line. A crisis of over-production will always be punctuated by short weak spurts of rising output or even by a conjunctural upturn for a particular national capital. However, only the bourgeoisie could mistake such a pause in the decline of production for the signs of a recovery. The proletariat - has learned the bitter lesson that in the epoch of capitalist decline the only 'recovery' from a general crisis of over-production that bourgeois society can experience is through the carnage of a new world war.

While the overall control of each national economy, which the capitalist state has increasingly assumed since the world crisis of the 1930s, cannot eliminate the anarchy of production which is the stigmata of the capitalist system, the general tendency towards state capitalism has made it possible to 'phase in’ the crisis. However, if the apparatus of state capitalism makes it possible to avert a total collapse of production by recourse to reflationary programmes, the inevitable result of reflation with its massive budget deficits, is a further weakening of the competitive position of the national capital on the world market and a pronounced tendency towards hyper-inflation. Such a situation will then require a drastic
deflation to avert a collapse, which will in turn quickly produce a liquidity crisis, a spate of bankruptcies and a new breakdown of production. Moreover, just as deflation and the resulting industrial collapse today only slows down but does not halt the galloping inflation, so reflationary programmes only slow the decline in output without reversing it and producing even an inflationary boom. Long before reflation could eliminate idle industrial capacity it would produce hyper-inflation and collapse. Long before deflation could halt galloping inflation it would produce a general collapse of the system through asphyxiation. The world economy is today condemned to oscillate between increasingly severe bouts of hyper-inflation and depression - no matter what 'plan' the capitalist state adopts.

The recovery which the bourgeoisie today tries to convince itself is real, is condemned to be stillborn. The signs of apparent recovery are due to two factors. First, a temporary halt to the drastic inventory reduction which industry undertook more than a year ago in the face of super-saturated markets, and the subsequent upswing in production as industry rebuilt its depleted stocks. Second, the tax cuts and public spending increases which the several leading capitalist states carried out in a desperate effort to prop-up production and prevent even more massive unemployment (with the social upheavals which would be its inevitable result).

Neither of these factors provides the basis for a real recovery. The inventory rebuilding will shortly run its course as stocks are brought into line with the realities of a contracting world market, and without some new impetus a further round of inventory liquidation will begin. The unprecedented budget deficits necessary to finance the various reflationary programmes have already reached the point where they will provoke a hyper-inflation unless they are quickly reduced.

ESTIMATED BUDGET DEFICITS FOR THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR

 

$ billion

% of GNP

Great Britain

19-28

10-15%

United States

Over 90

Over 6%

West Germany

28-32

7-8%

France

Over 9

Over 3%

Japan

33

8%

(Source: The Economist, 4 October 1975)

The coming year will be characterized by a systematic effort in the leading capitalist countries to significantly reduce bloated budget deficits by slashing public spending and by a new lurch into deflation. Thus, the 'recovery' will necessarily run afoul of the impending curbs on public spending. With no conceivable increase in global effective demand, with industry throughout the world slashing its capital spending and with the 'planned economies' all planning to slow down industrial growth, the spurious nature of the much ballyhooed recovery will become evident.

THE BOURGEOISIE RESPONDS TO THE CRISIS

In order to compete on a saturated world market each national faction of capital must try to reduce the price of its commodities in order to grab its competitor's markets. However, in the face of collapsing profits this cannot be done through investments in new plant and machinery which would raise the productivity of labour and so make it possible to undercut one's competitors. Moreover, the costs of production consisting of the constant capital which is utilized are relatively inflexible and resistant to cuts; if the cost of raw materials (circulating capital) does tend to fall somewhat the burden of idle plants and machines (fixed capital) grows at an ever-increasing rate. There is only one way in which each national capital can attempt to make its commodities more competitive: by making the proletariat absorb the brunt of the crisis.

The massive assault on the working class which the bourgeoisie is presently unleashing takes two forms. First a deterioration in the working conditions of the proletariat in order to raise the rate of profit without any new investments in constant capital: huge reductions in the labour force on the one hand, and speed-up and longer hours for those workers who remain on the other. In the midst of an open crisis, decadent capitalism reverts to the barbarous methods for the extraction of surplus value characteristic of its infancy: absolute surplus value. It is the only characteristic of its youthful visage which capital in its death throes can recapture.

Second, a sharp reduction in the proletariat's standard of living, a direct attack on the wages of workers. Wages, which represent the equivalent of the cost of producing and reproducing the workers' labour power (and of making it possible for the worker to raise a family, a new generation of proletarians), are under the prevailing conditions of state capitalism 'paid' to the workers in two forms. One part is paid directly to the worker by his employer in the form of his pay cheque; the other part is given to the worker by both his employer and the state in the form of 'social services'. The draconian austerity measures (wage freezes, incomes policies, cuts in social services) which the bourgeoisie everywhere is now trying to impose have as their object the ruthless slashing of the workers' wages in both its forms.

However, confronted by an undefeated and combative working class the bourgeoisie must proceed with the greatest of care; it dare not yet try to impose its will on the working class through violent repression lest it provoke the class war for which it is still unprepared. Thus, the bourgeoisie must first try to divert the proletariat from its class terrain, to mystify it, to fragment it and to dissolve it among the 'people’, (that most odious word in the bourgeois lexicon!). What the bourgeoisie must try to impose at all costs is national unity. This means that the left will be brought in to 'manage' the crisis, to impose the austerity measures on the working class, to convince the workers that the state is 'their' state and that they must make the necessary sacrifices on its behalf. We will see the, flowering of nationalist, anti-fascist, and anti-imperialist ideologies in the, highest circles of the capitalist state apparatus. Any opposition to the state will be pictured as objectively aiding the ever lurking 'fascist threat' which must be crushed by the 'democratic people' mobilized behind their 'popular state'. Class conscious and militant workers and revolutionaries will be denounced by all the organs of propaganda as 'fascist agents' and ‘tools of reaction'. Before each national faction of the bourgeoisie can hope to attenuate the devastating effects of the world crisis and try to patch up the shattered economic equilibrium, it must first restore the class equilibrium. It is this which constitutes the political objective of state capitalism. Thus, the economic crisis of dying capitalism has today, pushed to the centre stage the acute political crisis of its ruling class.

THE CLASS STRUGGLE

Because of the extremely convulsive nature of the crisis, which escapes the control of even the behemoth capitalist state, and because of the growing sacrifices which that state must exact, the possibility of restoring even a tenuous class equilibrium dims and the outbreak of new and more powerful waves of class struggle becomes practically certain.

Whenever the next wave of mass strikes erupts, the workers - if they are to prevent their struggle from being led into a dead-end - will immediately have to break the stranglehold that the unions have with increasing difficulty maintained over the class struggle. The break with the unions will assume a concrete expression through the formation of general assemblies in the factories which will have control of the struggle, and the creation of elected and revocable strike committees. However, it is clear that if even the most militant and combative strike is to avoid being isolated and then crushed, it must quickly overcome the local and corporate character which the very structure of the capitalist system tries to impress on it at birth. What is necessary is the GENERALIZATION of the struggle: its extension to other factories, to other branches of industry and to other cities. This process will be accompanied by the constitution of coordinating committees, consisting of delegates from the various factories which will be the embryos from which the workers councils will be formed.

The experience of the past sixty years has amply demonstrated that even the most generalized wave of mass strikes in which the workers have occupied the factories in the leading industrial cities (Germany 1918-19, Italy 1920, Spain 1936), is doomed to defeat if the POLITICIZATION of the struggle, the attack on the bourgeois state does not occur. Until they completely smash the bourgeois state, the workers can never be the masters of the productive process. It is with the politicization of the struggle that the workers' councils, the politico-military and not simply economic - organs of the proletariat, make their appearance.

With just the first hint of the development of an autonomous workers movement, as struggles begin to break out of the union straightjacket and to generalize, the left political apparatus of capital also comes forward speaking of the need for the 'politicization' of the burgeoning struggles. When the proletariat marches through the streets, 20,000 strong, demonstrating against unemployment, lay-offs and compulsory overtime, as did the workers of Lisbon in February 1975; when the workers occupy their workplace, denounce the unions and send delegates to other factories to co-ordinate the struggle, as did the workers at Portugal's TAP airline a little over a year ago, the left terrified by even the beginnings of real class struggle advocates official strikes and work stoppages to demonstrate the proletariat's hatred for 'fascism' and its commitment to the 'democratic state'. When the left urges the transformation of economic struggles into political struggles it is really advocating the transformation of proletarian struggles into struggles to defend the capitalist state and preserve the bourgeois order! The struggle for higher wages, against lay-offs, etc, is an indisputably proletarian struggle, the very basis and soil from which a revolutionary struggle arises. The anti-fascist strike or democratic strike, advocated by the left, is just as indisputably an anti-working class strike, a strike directed against both the historical and immediate class interests of the proletariat. In their appeals for anti-fascist and democratic strikes, the Stalinists, Maoists, Trotskyists, anarchists and left socialists, once again reveal that they are the rightful and legitimate heirs of the Social Democracy of 1914: the enthusiastic tools and active agents of the tottering bourgeois order, the executioners of the proletariat.

Confronted by an autonomous class movement which it cannot simply side-track, the bourgeoisie can at first react in only one way: attempt at all costs to divert the proletariat from a direct attack on the capitalist state. Any temporary concessions in the economic sphere can and will be made so long as the bourgeois state apparatus is left intact: factories will continue to operate, at however big a loss and even be turned over to the workers; wage increases will be granted. At the same time, the government will move further to the left - like the chameleon, taking on a protective red colouring when in danger.

If in the face of a mounting wave of mass strikes the bourgeoisie appears to give way, devoting all its energy to the preservation of its state apparatus, its strategy is to wait for the proletariat's rage to spend itself and be consumed by the frustrations and responsibilities of factory management in a capitalist society - and then to act to re-establish its direct authority and control at the point of production itself. However, the combativity of the workers is not the only factor that will affect the bourgeoisie's response to the coming wave of mass strikes. The very depth of the crisis robs the bourgeoisie of any real margin of manoeuvre: if on the one hand concessions have to be made, then equally the catastrophic nature of the crisis demands that they be just as quickly withdrawn. The capitalist state will have to promptly act to restore order in the factories and win the 'battle of production', lest the waning strength of the national capital be completely drained and its competitiveness on the world market irremediably damaged.

In its effort to restore production on a profitable basis and impose its will on the proletariat after a wave of mass strikes has temporarily subsided, the bourgeoisie can have recourse to either mystification or violent repression. Extreme caution in the face of a still undefeated working class will dictate that the bourgeoisie utilize mystifications: organs of 'popular democracy', self-management, base committees, etc. However, the nature of the sacrifices that the capitalist state must impose and the very combativity of the workers in the face of the crisis are such that even the leftist mystifications which the bourgeoisie finds most effective today are rapidly losing their power to influence and mobilize the class. Thus, if the attempt to restore the economic equilibrium by putting a gun to the head of the proletariat will completely destroy the last shreds of class equilibrium and precipitate the all-out class war, the bourgeoisie's inability to restore the class equilibrium through mystification will completely destroy any possibility of even temporarily patching up the economic equilibrium. Such is the dilemma facing the capitalist state on the eve of a new proletarian offensive.

THE INTERNATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM

The crisis, which has so devastatingly shattered the economic and class equilibrium of world capital, has also severely dislocated its international equilibrium. In the face of economic collapse, every national faction of capital is confronted with the necessity to cut imports to the bone and encourage exports; in other words to export or die! Yet, faced with a super-saturated world market one national capital can only improve its trade balance at the expense of its rivals since it is obvious that all countries cannot import less and export more at the same time. The concrete manifestations of the breakdown of the provisional international equilibrium established after World War II include the pronounced tendencies toward trade wars, autarky, economic nationalism, protectionism and dumping which have become part of the daily life of capital since the late 1960s. To these must be added the very significant tendency for localized inter-imperialist confrontations to move from the peripheries of the capitalist world (Indo-China, Kashmir, Bengal) towards its vital centres (The Middle East, the Mediterranean basin, the regions of Africa astride the major trade routes linking Europe with Asia and the Americas).

As the crisis deepens over the next few years, and as the trade wars become more bitter and the localized conflicts even more fierce, the necessity for yet another forcible redivision of world markets, for the violent elimination of competitors, will impose itself with an implacable logic on each of the imperialist blocs. For more than sixty years marxism has insisted that the bourgeoisie ultimately has only one answer to the crisis: imperialist world war! There is no question here of a theory of a conspiracy by war-mongering generals, but of the recognition of an ineluctable tendency to which the whole of rotting bourgeois society - pacifist and jingoist - must inevitably bow:

"In the decadent phase of imperialism, capitalism can only guide the contradictions of its system in one direction: war …… Whichever way it turns, whatever means it tries to use to get over the crisis, capitalism is pushed irresistibly towards its destiny of wa ….. Humanity can only escape such an outcome through the proletarian revolution.” (Mitchell, Bilan, 1934)

However, quite apart from the fact that the crisis has not yet reached a depth where the bourgeoisie would be constrained to unleash a new world conflagration, there is a far more compelling reason why we insist today it is not imperialist world war but class war, proletarian revolution, which is on the agenda. In order to launch a world war, capital must have a proletariat sufficiently crushed and mystified so that it will make the ultimate sacrifices in the interests of 'national defence'. Today, however, a militant and combative proletariat confronts the bourgeoisie and bars the way to war. Before capital could impose its 'solution' to the crisis, it would have to first defeat and crush the proletariat. Whether the present crisis is to end in the bourgeois solution of world war or the proletarian solution of communist revolution, will be decided by the outcome of the decisive class battles which lie ahead.

While world war is not on the agenda today and while the bourgeoisie is preoccupied with the class struggle, nonetheless as the crisis inexorably deepens inter-imperialist antagonisms grow sharper. In order to have a clear idea of the way in which international tensions will become more acute over the
coming year we must look at both the equilibrium
within the Russian and American blocs, as well as the equilibrium between the imperialist blocs.

Recent events may appear to indicate the disintegration of the two big imperialist blocs, the destruction of their unity and cohesion. The tendency towards trade wars, the growth of economic nationalism and even the general tendency for capital to be centralized in the hands of each national state, all seem like so many harbingers of the dissolution of the big imperialist blocs. Certainly events such as the decision of Canada's Saskatchewan province to nationalize the predominantly American-owned potash industry, Canadian limitations on the export of oil to the US, Venezuela's nationalization of oil and iron ore (also largely American-owned), and Britain's recourse to import controls, attest to genuine nationalist and autarkic tendencies among the nations which constitute the American bloc. Similar tendencies are apparent in the relationship of Romania and the Indo-Chinese states to Russia.

Such tendencies which would, if they became predominant, lead to the fragmentation of the imperialist blocs are, however, counteracted by the far more powerful and profound tendency towards the strengthening of each imperialist bloc on the basis of the increasingly unchallengeable domination of a continental state capitalism: Russia and the United States. Thus within each bloc all of the lesser powers, despite their efforts to pursue an aggressively nationalistic policy, are compelled by their very weakness on the world market to adapt their policies to the needs of the dominant imperialist power. In the final analysis the economic nationalism and autarkic tendencies of the smaller countries are condemned to be little more than ideological window-dressing used to drum up popular support for the extremely harsh austerity measures that the stranglehold of American or Russian capital imposes on their client states.

Both American and Russian capital responded to the first blows of the crisis by successfully deflecting its worst effects onto their weaker satellites. Thus the famous 'oil crisis' provoked by the price increases which accompanied the Yom Kippur war, was a smoke-screen hiding the reality of a massive transfer of wealth from Western Europe and Japan to the United States by way of Iran and the Arab producer states. Militarily and financially dependent on the US, and incapable of taking independent action in the Middle East, Europe and Japan had to accede to an arrangement whereby billions of additional dollars flow into the treasuries of the OPEC countries and are then 'administered' by Wall Street or used to pay for American military equipment, capital goods and agricultural products, thus strengthening the American trade balance. Besides this considerable transfer of wealth to the US, European and Japanese goods have become less competitive on the world market as their prices have had to reflect the huge increases in the price of imported oil on which their economies are totally dependent. American capital has been the beneficiary of this additional 'handicap' to which her competitors are subject.

The extent to which the equilibrium within the American bloc has shifted to reflect the growing and unchallenged command of the US is observable in the comparative trade balances of the countries within the bloc. The US went from a trade deficit of $5.3 billion in 1974 to a trade surplus of $11 billion in 1975. The excess $15 billion in additional exports in 1975 over 1974, which could only barely attenuate the effects of the crisis in the US, came for the most part directly or indirectly at the expense of America's client states. Britain's acceptance at Rambouillet of America's diktat on import controls, France's bowing to the US on gold policy, West Germany's toleration of an over-valued currency at a time of falling exports and Tokyo's acquiescence to American 'recommendations' on foreign investments in Japan, all further indicate the indefensible character of the theory of the disintegration of the American bloc.

Within the Eastern bloc the equilibrium has also shifted, reflecting Russia's incontestable sway over her 'partners'. Over the past two years Russia has imposed staggering increases in the price of oil and other raw materials on her client states, while recently demanding that they also provide extra capital for mammoth investment projects in Siberia.

The utter powerlessness of the weaker states to resist the demands of the continental state capitalisms which dominate the world is today manifest. Indeed, even where a country does succeed in asserting its 'independence' and withdrawing from one imperialist bloc, it is condemned by the very structure of decaying capitalism to immediately fall under the domination of the rival imperialist bloc. This has been the fate of Egypt which has extricated itself from the hegemony of Moscow only to fall under the sway of Washington. Moreover, what is involved here is in no way a disintegration of the imperialist blocs, but rather a manifestation of the bitter inter-imperialist rivalries between the blocs!

Nonetheless, the fact that Russia and the US have actually strengthened: their control over their respective blocs during the past two years, has only momentarily made it possible for them to moderate some of the worst effects of the crisis. However much the US and Russia count on each of their blocs continuing to absorb, ever greater masses of their commodities, their prospects for success on the export front are exceedingly dim. The lesser powers of the American bloc, already crippled by the crisis, will not be able to continue to absorb American goods at the present rate over the coming year. In 1976, as effective demand ebbs in Europe and as attempts to prevent a complete economic breakdown lead to frantic efforts to slash imports, the American trade balance will sharply deteriorate. Similarly, the Russian planners who are desperately trying to expand their foreign trade by 13.6% this year - most of it to their East European 'allies' - will also run up against the contraction of effective demand, and in this domain as in so many others they will undoubtedly fail to reach their goals.

Just as over the past year or two the equilibrium within each bloc has shifted in favour of the dominant imperialist power, so the equilibrium between the blocs has also shifted - in favour of the American and at the expense of the Russian bloc! It is not in areas of relatively marginal importance such as Vietnam, but in areas which, by their proximity to the industrial centres of world capital, their wealth of raw materials, their markets, and their strategic location dominating the world's trade routes, are vital, to the imperialist blocs, that the dramatic shift in the balance of power can be clearly seen.

Thus, the significant gains which Russian imperialism had made in the Middle East during the sixties have been reversed over the past two years. The counter-attack of American imperialism in this crucial region has already brought Egypt and the Sudan back into the American orbit. During the past year a solid Teheran-Jeddah-Amman-Cairo-Washington axis has been forged which, together with her Israeli client state assures American domination of the Middle East. The huge arms sales to Iran, the shipment of new weaponry to Israel, and the project for an Arab arms industry linked to the American bloc, which was initiated by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, constitute significant moments in the ongoing military build-up which the US has successfully undertaken in this region. The fruits of this bellicose policy are already apparent in the winding down of the Russian sponsored Dhofari rebellion against the pro-western Sultan of Oman, which was crushed with the aid of Iranian troops and sophisticated Anglo-American weaponry.

In response to this shift in the international equilibrium in favour of the American bloc, Russian imperialism has launched a concerted drive to oust the US from a number of strong points close to the very nerve centres of world capital. In Yugoslavia, Russian backed anti-Tito 'Kominformist' and Croat nationalist groups have considerably increased their activity over the past few months. A Russian initiative in Yugoslavia, with its naval facilities on the Adriatic Sea and its proximity to Italy, is shaping up. The American bloc has acted to counter any Russian thrust in the Balkans through the Greek regime's project for a Balkan pact that would be based on the anti-Russian, Albanian, Yugoslav, Greek and Turkish regimes, and which would seek to further erode Russian influence in Romania.

Russian imperialism is also attempting to recapture lost ground in the Middle East through its intervention in Lebanon; military aid is being channelled through Iraq - Moscow's one remaining strong point on the Arabian peninsula - to the United Forces under Ibrahim Koleilat, who are engaged in a bloody struggle for control of this important area of the Mediterranean littoral.

The US, while supplying the opposing Phalangist forces, is trying - through the Arab League, Egypt, Syria and the PLO - to restore the status quo in Lebanon. Failing that, and in the event of a complete break-down of the pro-western Lebanese state, the US could intervene to retain the strategic points either through an Israeli invasion or a partition of Lebanon in which a Christian state, totally dependent on the American bloc, would emerge.

American and Russian imperialism also confront each other around the horn of Africa and the vital Babel-Mandeb straits which dominate the access to the Red Sea, and through which trade between Europe and Asia will flow as the Suez Canal re-opens. While the Russians are desperately trying to break the American control of this region through their support of the Eritrean Liberation Front and by their huge military build-up in Somalia, the Americans may react in anyone of three ways as the struggle in that part of the world intensifies: support the military regime in Ethiopia, if it seems capable of controlling the situation and shows itself to be a faithful watchdog of American imperialism; create an Afar client state out of Ethiopia's Wollo province and the French Territory of the Afars and Issas to guard the important trade routes; or come to terms with the 'moderate' wing of the ELF and with the backing of its Arab 'friends', Egypt and the Sudan, support the creation of an Eritrean state which would guarantee American domination of the region. On the other side of Africa, Morocco and Algeria are on the verge of war over the phosphate-rich former Spanish colony of the Sahara. While Moroccan troops assert their control over the region, the Algerian-backed Front Polisario has launched a bitter guerrilla war against King Hassan's army; at the same time the bulk of the Algerian army has been concentrated on the Sahara frontier, and both Algeria and Libya have repeatedly warned that Morocco's annexation of the Sahara is unacceptable to them. Behind Morocco and Algeria stand the two great imperialist blocs, whose armaments and supplies can alone make a war possible. Beyond the question of raw materials it is the strategic location of the former Spanish colony which is of primary concern to the US and Russia. The US hopes to check Russian naval ambitions in the Atlantic through the Sahara's incorporation into its Moroccan client state; an 'independent' Sahara on the other hand, which would be dependent on Algerian and Russian support, might provide the Russian navy with its first base on the Atlantic Ocean.

Russia's need for such a base becomes apparent as her war fleet steams through the Atlantic towards Angola - where a powerful American task force is also being concentrated. It is in Angola that the inter-imperialist butchery presently reaches its greatest heights: the rival 'liberation fronts', amply supplied with the most modern tools of mass death by their Russian and American masters have turned the country into a veritable slaughter-house. In Angola, Russia through the MP LA and a Cuban expeditionary force, and the US through the FNLA, UNITA and contingents of South African troops, are fighting over Angola's rich storehouse of raw materials (oil, iron ore, diamonds etc), control of the transport of copper and uranium from Zaire and Zambia which passes through Angolan ports, and domination of the trade routes which link Europe with South Africa and which span the South Atlantic between Europe and South America.

China, a minor imperialist power vainly trying to construct a bloc of her own, is condemned by her weakness to seek the support of one of the two big imperialist blocs. If for the moment China is allied with the US against Russia, and is strenuously trying to counter Moscow's expansionary thrust throughout South-Asia and the Far East, a shift of alliances as circumstances dictate cannot be precluded.

In all of the growing inter-imperialist struggles, the two blocs confront each other through their local client states and the many national 'liberation fronts' which each bloc arms, supplies, finances and ultimately controls. The bourgeoisies of the continental state capitalisms cannot yet confront each other directly, because it is the confrontation with the proletariat which is today on the agenda.

CLASS WAR

The break-down of economic, class and international equilibrium of world capital in the face of the general crisis of over-production has brought the decaying bourgeois order to the verge of generalized class war. Today Portugal and Spain have become the decisive arenas in which the proletariat and the bourgeoisie measure their strength and prepare for the gigantic struggles to come; it is on the basis of the lessons drawn from the events now unfolding in the Iberian Peninsula that the working class and its communist vanguard will arm itself for the impending violent struggle for the destruction of the capitalist state and the establishment of the dictatorship of the workers' councils.

In Portugal, in the face of a wave of mass strikes the bourgeoisie succeeded in diverting the working class from a direct assault on the capitalist state, through the nationalist, democratic, and anti-fascist mystifications which accompanied the move of the successive governments to the left during 1974-75. However, the Fifth Government, in which the Stalinists and Copcon played the dominant role, completely failed to win the 'battle of production', to restore order and discipline in the factories and to impose the necessary sacrifices on the proletariat. Nonetheless, the momentary fragmentation and demoralization which the mystifications of democracy, national unity and anti-fascism had brought about within the class, was sufficient to produce a temporary lull in the class struggle - and it was to this lull that the Sixth Government corresponded. The combination of impending economic collapse and an undefeated working class, however, will soon unleash a new strike wave. In the face of the bourgeoisie's further move to the left in response to a new upsurge of class struggle, it is imperative that revolutionaries mercilessly denounce the programmes for popular democracy, self-management, base and neighbourhood committees with which the ruling class will attempt to stem the violent thrust of the proletariat and create the basis for its later counter-attack.

Now, even more than Portugal, it is Spain which has become the testing ground for the contending classes. An advanced industrial country which, by its history of proletarian militancy and its proximity to France and Italy, may ignite the revolutionary flame throughout Europe, Spain has become the preoccupation of the bourgeoisie which is desperately trying to ready its arsenal of mystifications before the powder-keg explodes.

The wave of strikes which have now brought Madrid to a virtual standstill indicates the magnitude of the explosion with which capital will soon have to contend. The preparation of revolutionaries for active intervention in the struggle of their class on this crucial battlefield demands a thorough understanding of the march to the left which the Spanish bourgeoisie - at the urging of its European and American mentors - is now undertaking. It is on the class battlefields that the analyses, perspectives and practical orientation for struggle which emerge from this Congress of the International Communist Current will be tested in the coming year.

Mac Intosh

December 1975-January 1976

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International Situation

The First Congress of the ICC

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This issue of The International Review is dedicated entirely to the publication of document s from the First Congress of the International Communist Current. Our purpose in publishing these documents is to publicly crystallize what we mean by an international regroupment of revolutionaries and to inspire reflection on the part of militants everywhere.

What is the function of a revolutionary organization? On what basis is it constituted? What is its analysis of the present period and the perspectives for struggle? These are the questions which have preoccupied revolutionaries since the beginning of proletarian struggle and they were at the heart of the discussions at the First Congress of the ICC.

Indeed, these questions highlight the whole difficulty revolutionaries have in this epoch: on the one hand to define the class positions acquired through the historic experiences of the class struggle, and on the other hand to know how to act and within what kind of organizational framework. When today, after fifty years of counter-revolution, the reappearance of the permanent crisis of the system has brought forward revolutionary elements, these elements inevitably experience the effects of the organic break with all the organizations and currents created by the workers' movement in the past. Today, no living organizational link exists with the Left Communists of the twenties; thirties and forties, who had attempted to preserve and advance revolutionary theory during the years of defeat and world war. Because this link was broken most of the revolutionary nuclei being formed today emerge in an isolated, geographically-dispersed way, their formation often determined by local and immediate events. They have the greatest difficulty in situating themselves in a coherent, political and historic context and understanding what they represent and the social forces from which they emerge. This break of fifty years has created a morass of confusion and difficulties: how to understand the connection between local and conjunctural effects of the crisis and the permanent world crisis of capitalism since the First World War? How to understand that the struggle today is only a reappropriation and continuation of the historic struggle of the proletariat? How to work towards a regroupment of revolutionaries on the basis of class positions?

The ICC is far from being the only organization trying to give answers to these questions; since the end of the 1960s there has been a revitalization in the class which has everywhere brought forth small revolutionary groupings, an expression of the process of developing consciousness. But if these small groupings do not quickly situate themselves on a class terrain, if they do not situate their activity within a coherent, international framework, they are in danger of exhausting themselves in confusion and isolation. Especially now when the class struggle is maturing slowly within an economic crisis, (that is, when there isn't a situation such as a world war to politicize the workers' movement quickly and internationally) revolutionaries must be prepared for the long arduous task of regrouping forces to defend a general political orientation – towards which the class struggle is heading - through the vicissitudes of the struggle and conjunctural manifestations of the crisis. Above all two pitfalls must be avoided: immediatism and 'modernism'.

Immediatism is a particular danger today when the class struggle is developing in jagged bursts with moments of intense struggle followed by periods of temporary calm. In such a situation revolutionaries must not get carried away by the immediate impact of social convulsions. They must be able to contribute to a general perspective for the long-term evolution of the struggle. They must understand that after fifty years of defeats, the working class is not going to rush headlong to make history. There will inevitably be a period during which the workers will have to rid themselves, little by little, of the mystifications of the left of capital which will use all its forces to enlist the class behind it.

But immediatism only sees the struggle from day-to-day and loses itself in an activist impatience typical of those coming out of leftism. Immediatists see the development of rising class struggle in a mechanistic, linear way. Their perspective is based on the flux and reflux of local struggles and they cannot give a global perspective. The student movement, 'March 22', the American and German SDS, and all the petit-bourgeois dross - are left demoralized when the class struggle temporarily dies down. From a great triumphalism about the 'campaign' of the day they retreat into pessimism. An activism out of all proportion to the reality of the situation not only wears out the militants but makes a mockery of real revolutionary work; it also prevents revolutionary elements from accomplishing the task of consolidation and regroupment of forces on the basis of political coherence and continuity.

The second pitfall, modernism, is very often simply the other side of the coin to a feverish activism. It is the expression of emptiness, of a turning in on oneself, the theorization of demoralization which follows once the proletariat as the revolutionary class is abandoned. Such was the case with Invariance and other 'modernists' who fled from reality into the rarefied planes of marginal 'philosophy'. It is this very same flight from the reality of the long and tortuous struggle of the working class which can in other circumstances produce acts of desperate terrorism.

For the working class confusion on these two points, immediatism and modernism, are an enormous waste of revolutionary energies. Most of the small groupings that emerged after 1968 have been lost and instead of throwing light on the path for the class to take, they have either disappeared or have been transformed into fetters on the development of consciousness. It is to prevent revolutionary elements from having to deal with these confusions on their own and from having to keep on repeating the errors of the past that we must work towards discussion and international regroupment of revolutionaries. We know that revolutionary ideas arise from the very soil of the class struggle, but how difficult is the process towards the formation of a revolutionary organization today!

We are not revolutionaries because we have 'some good ideas', but because by working in a collective way we know how to carry out the tasks of a revolutionary organization within the class. The organization of revolutionaries, the instrument of reflection and international collective activity, requires conscious will on the part of militants. There is a danger of revolutionaries seeing their efforts limited to one town or country, dispersed and isolated, and thus being incapable either now or in the future of taking on their responsibilities. This is why we insist so much on the necessity for regroupment.

The ICC has also had to struggle against these activist and modernist tendencies - elements in Pour Une Intervention Communiste and Une Tendance Communiste came from within our ranks in France. There are no guarantees, nor is there an absolute 'immunization' against confusion and the penetration of bourgeois ideas; but the ICC has made every effort to overcome its weaknesses and to orient its work in a spirit of perseverance and continuity against an immediatist triumphalism and the pessimism of the sceptics. In this sense the First Congress of our Current this year crowns and affirms the patient and methodical work of the past seven years towards the formation of an international organization of revolutionaries on a class platform.

Those of our readers who have been following us for some time can judge better how far the ICC has come since the first meetings for international discussion in 1971, since the proposition for an international network of correspondence, and since the reports of the international conferences held in France and England published in our press. Last year on the initiative of Revolution Internationale (France); Internacionalismo (Venezuela), Internationalism (USA), World Revolution (GB), Rivoluzione Internazionale (Italy), and Accion Proletaria (Spain), all of whom defend the same general political orientation, came to an international, conference which was to lay down the basis for the constitution of an international organization. We based our regroupment on the analysis of the general crisis into which world capital has plunged, which will lead to a confrontation between capital and the proletariat. In this situation revolutionaries can only aid in the development and generalization of consciousness by organizing themselves internationally.

When the ICC decided to take this path (for texts of the conference in 1975 see Number 1 of the International Review), criticisms were made against us by some political groups. For the PlC in France, for example, the regroupment of revolutionaries in a united international organization is just empty talk on our part; they see the question of intervention by revolutionaries in an immediatist and disproportionate way without understanding that intervention implies an international organizational framework capable of taking on a global task. Workers' Voice and Revolutionary Perspectives in Britain agreed that revolutionaries must regroup themselves internationally, but not now. For RP we have to wait for some mythical day when the crisis was a more burning reality. For the RWG (USA), on the other hand, the question of organization was simply a 'bureaucratic' preoccupation on the Trotskyist model.

We believe that events since the 1975 conference have borne out the analyses we have elaborated. Thus we can assert some proven facts on the question of organization: the PlC continues to agitate in a sectarian void, watching the ICC's interventions easily surpass their isolated capacities; RP and WV have carried out an incomplete regroupment (the Communist Workers' Group), limited to a purely local terrain in Britain, and they now attribute all manner of confused ideas to the ICC which they charge with being 'counter-revolutionary'. They have now jealously withdrawn into a state of isolation. The RWG, incapable of integrating itself into coherent and organized work, has ended up dissolving itself. It is possible, as some people say, that the fact that the ICC has continued to develop for seven years is not in itself proof of anything; but it must be true to say that to disappear in confusion brings no positive contribution to the important problems facing the movement today. The ICC is not puffing itself up with the pride of a small. The point is to defend and to make concrete the necessity for regroupment on the basis of revolutionary positions. It is this ORIENTATION which we defend and it is to work for this with all the revolutionary forces, to encourage all revolutionaries to share this concern that we want to make an effective contribution to the revolutionary movement.

In 1976, a year after the decision to constitute an organized International Current, the ICC called its First Congress to make an examination and balance sheet of the work done and to complete the work of constituting the ICC. The Congress could assert that in a year more that thirty-five publications in five languages had been put out, a new section, in Belgium had joined, and it had centralized its interventions and activities on an international level. The discussion at the Congress centred on four main topics:

First the adoption of an international political platform which affirms the class positions. We can never insist enough on the fact that a revolutionary organization can only be constituted on the basis of coherent political principles. Against attempts to form 'revolutionary' groups on the basis of a pot-pourri of contradictory and contingent positions, the ICC defends the necessity for a historic coherence, a platform based on the acquisitions of the past class struggle.

We recognize that a revolutionary platform is never completed, even more so today when the class, is moving. But we are convinced that the class positions contained in this platform are definitive in relation to the lessons of the past, and that these positions, consequently, represent the only point of reference for going forward to the future and to new problems. The platform affirms the fundamental positions of the ICC but it is not a detailed explanation of every aspect. It is conceived of as the basis for action and intervention in the class in our period of rising class struggle. This platform, printed in this issue of the International Review, re-affirms positions defended in the orientation texts of all the groups which now constitute the ICC, but for the first time we have an international platform for the whole organization, which will now be the basis for anyone joining the ICC in any part of the world.

The second topic of the Congress was the discussion on the role and function of a revolutionary organization. First of all we reject the Leninist conception of organization according to which the task of revolutionaries is to constitute mass parties whose function is to take power. Equally, we reject the idea of the 'spontaneists' who deny any organizational role for revolutionaries. The organization is inevitably a minority within the class whose sole function is the development and generalization of class consciousness.

Before everything else we stress that revolutionary work can only be done within an international framework. Against the practice of the IInd International which conceived the international organization as simply a federation of national parties, we think it is essential to create one united, organized body which reflects the historic unity of the proletariat.

Our work remains a collective and centralized activity on an international level. Thus, the annual Congress is the general assembly of the ICC, the place where decisions are taken on the general perspectives for the whole Current. All the points mentioned here are more precisely formulated in the internal statutes of the international organization.

The ICC also voted for a Manifesto, the emanation of the Congress, which gives a broad outline of the class struggle of the past fifty years and emphasized all that is at stake in the class confrontations which are now brewing. This document, published in several languages in the press of our local sections, presents the perspectives of the ICC as it faces the historic possibilities opening up before the class.

Lastly, on the basis of past acquisitions and our analysis of the present period, the Congress made a more precise examination of the evolution of the crisis at this conjuncture and of the international situation in 1975-6.

We therefore publish these text and the Platform of the ICC, submitting them for the reflection and criticism of militants engaged in the struggle for the communist revolution. 

J.A.


 


 

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The Platform of the ICC

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After the longest and deepest period of counter-revolution that it has ever known, the proletariat is once again discovering the path of the class struggle. This struggle - a consequence both of the acute crisis of the system which has been developing since the middle of the 1960s, and of the emergence of new generations of workers who feel the weight of past defeats much less than their predecessors - is already the most widespread that the class has ever engaged in. Since the 1968 events in France, the workers' struggles from Italy to Argentina, from Britain to Poland, from Sweden to Egypt, from China to Portugal, from America to India, from Japan to Spain, have become a nightmare for the capitalist class.

The reappearance of the proletariat on the stage of history has definitively refuted all those ideologies produced or made possible by the counter-revolution which attempted to deny the revolutionary nature of the proletariat. The present resurgence of the class struggle has concretely demonstrated that the proletariat is the only revolutionary class of our time.

A revolutionary class is a class whose domination over society is in accordance with the creation and extension of the new relations of production made necessary by the development of the productive forces and the decay of the old relations of production. Like the modes of production which preceded it, capitalism corresponds to a particular stage in the development of society. It was once a progressive form of social development, but having become world-wide, it has created the conditions for its own disappearance. Because of its specific place in the productive process, because of its nature as the collective producer class of capitalism deprived of the ownership of the means of production which it sets in motion - thus having no interests which bind it to the preservation of capitalist society - the working class is the only class which can, objectively and subjectively, establish the new mode of production which must come after capitalism: communism. The present resurgence of the proletarian struggle indicates that once again the perspective of communism is not only a historic necessity, but a real possibility.

However, the proletariat still has to make an immense effort to provide itself with the means to overthrow capitalism. As products of this effort and as active factors in it, the revolutionary currents and elements which have appeared since the beginning of this reawakening of the class, bear an enormous responsibility for the development and outcome of the struggle. In order to take up this responsibility, they must organize themselves on the basis of the class positions which have been definitively laid down by the historical experience of the proletariat and which must guide all their activity and intervention within the class.

It is through its own practical and theoretical experience that the proletariat becomes aware of the means and ends of its historic struggle for the overthrow of capitalism and the establishment of communism. Since the beginning of capitalism the whole activity of the, proletariat has been a constant effort to become conscious of its interests as a class and to free itself from the grip of the ideas of the ruling class - the mystifications of bourgeois ideology. This effort expressed itself in a political continuity which extends throughout the workers' movement from the first secret societies to the left fractions which detached themselves from the Third International. Despite all the aberrations and expressions of the pressure of bourgeois ideology which can be found in their positions and in their activities, the different organizations of the class are irreplaceable links in the chain of historical continuity of the proletarian struggle. The fact that they succumbed to defeat or to internal degeneration in no way detracts from their fundamental contribution to that struggle. Thus the organization of revolutionaries which is being reconstituted today expresses the general reawakening of class struggle (after a half-century of counter-revolution and dislocation with the past workers' movement) and absolutely must renew the historical continuity with the workers' movement of the past, so that the present and future battles of the class will be armed with all the lessons of past experiences, and so that all the partial defeats strewn along the proletariat's path will not have been in vain but will serve as signposts to its final victory.

The International Communist Current affirms its continuity with the contributions made by the Communist League, The First, Second and Third Internationals, and the left fractions which detached themselves from the latter, in particular the German, Dutch, and Italian Left. It is these essential contributions which allow us to integrate all the class positions into the coherent general vision which has been formulated in this platform.

1. THE THEORY OF THE COMMUNIST REVOLUTION

Marxism is the fundamental theoretical acquisition of the proletarian struggle. It is on the basis of marxism that all the lessons of proletarian struggle can be integrated into a coherent whole.

By explaining the unfolding of history through the development of class struggle, that is to say struggle based on the defence of economic interests within a framework laid down by the development of the productive forces, and by recognizing the proletariat as the subject of the revolution which will abolish capitalism, marxism is the only conception of the world which really expresses the viewpoint of that class. Thus, far from being an abstract speculation about the world it is first and foremost a weapon of struggle for the working class.

And because the working class is the first and only class whose emancipation necessarily entails the emancipation of the whole of humanity, a class whose domination over society will lead not to a new form of exploitation but to the abolition of all exploitation, marxism alone is capable of grasping social reality in an objective and scientific manner, without prejudices or mystifications of any sort.

Consequently, although it is not a fixed doctrine but on the contrary undergoes constant elaboration in a direct and living relationship with the class struggle, and although it benefited from prior theoretical achievements of the working class, Marxism has been from its very inception the only framework from which and within which revolutionary theory can develop.

2. THE NATURE OF THE PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION

Every social revolution is the act through which the class bearing with it new relations of production establishes its political domination over society. The proletarian revolution does not escape this definition but its conditions and its content differ fundamentally from past revolutions.

These previous revolutions, because they were hinged between two modes of production based on scarcity, merely substituted the domination of one exploiting class for that of another exploiting class. This fact was expressed by the replacement of one form of property by another form of property, one type of privilege by another type of privilege. In contrast to this the goal of the proletarian revolution is to replace relations of production based on scarcity with relations of production based on abundance. This is why it signifies the end of all forms of property, privilege, and exploitation. These differences confer on the proletarian revolution the following characteristics, which the proletariat must understand if its revolution is to be successful:

a. It is the first revolution to have a world-wide character; it cannot achieve its aims without generalizing itself to all countries. This is because in order to abolish private property, the proletariat must abolish all its sectional, regional and national expressions. The generalization of capitalist domination across the whole world has made this both necessary and possible.

b. For the first time in history, the revolutionary class is at the same time the exploited class in the old system and, because of this, it cannot draw upon any economic power in the process of conquering political power. Exactly the opposite is the case: in direct contrast to what happened in the past, the seizure of political power by the proletariat necessarily precedes the period of transition during which the domination of the old relations of production is destroyed and gives way to new social relations.

c. The fact that, for the first time, a class in society is at the same time an exploited class and a revolutionary class also implies that its struggle as an exploited class cannot at no point be separated from or opposed to its struggle as a revolutionary class. As marxism has from the beginning asserted against Proudhonism and other petty-bourgeois theories, the development of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat is conditioned by the deepening and generalization of its struggle as an exploited class.

3. THE DECADENCE OF CAPITALISM

For the proletarian revolution to go beyond being a mere hope or historical potentiality or perspective and become a concrete possibility, it had to become an objective necessity for the development of humanity. This has in fact been the historic situation since the First World War: this war marked the end of the ascendant phase of the capitalist mode of production, a phase which began in the sixteenth century and reached its zenith at the end of the nineteenth century. The new phase which followed was that of the decadence of capitalism.

As in all previous societies, the first phase of capitalism expressed the historically necessary character of its productive relations, that is to say their indispensable role in the expansion of society's productive forces. The second phase, on the other hand, expressed the transformation of these relations into a greater and greater fetter on the development of the productive forces.

The decadence of capitalism is the product of the development of the internal contradictions inherent in the relations of capitalist production which can be summarized in the following way. Although commodities have existed in nearly all societies, the capitalist economy is the first to be fundamentally based on the production of commodities. Thus the existence of an ever-increasing market is one of the essential conditions for the development of capitalism. In particular the realization of the surplus value which comes from the exploitation of the working class is indispensable for the accumulation of capital which is the essential motor-force of the system. Contrary to what the idolizers of capital claim, capitalist production does not create automatically and at will the markets necessary for its growth. Capitalism developed in a non-capitalist world, and it was in this world that it found the outlets for its development. But by generalizing its relations of production across the whole planet and by unifying the world market, capitalism reached a point where the outlets which had allowed it to grow so powerfully in the nineteenth century became saturated. Moreover, the growing difficulty encountered by capital in finding a market for the realization of surplus value accentuates the fall in the rate of profit, which results from the constant widening of the ratio between the value of the means of production and the value of the labour power which sets them in motion. From being a mere tendency, the fall in the rate of profit has become more and more concrete; this has become an added fetter on the process of capital accumulation and thus on the operation of the entire system.

Having unified and universalized the commodity exchange, and in so doing allowing humanity to make an immense leap forward, capitalism has thus put on the agenda the disappearance of relations of production based on exchange. But as long as the proletariat has not undertaken the task of making them disappear, these relations of production maintain their existence and entangle humanity in a more and more monstrous series of contradictions.

The crisis of over-production, a characteristic expression of the contradictions of the capitalist mode of production but one which in the past when the system was still healthy, constituted an essential spur for the expansion of the market, has today become a permanent crisis. The underutilization of capital's productive apparatus has become permanent and capital has become incapable of extending its social domination if only to keep pace with population growth. The only thing that capitalism can extend across the world today is absolute human misery which already is the lot of many backward countries.

In these conditions competition between capitalist nations has become more and more implacable. Since 1914 imperialism, which has become the means of survival for every nation no matter how large or small, has plunged humanity into a hellish cycle of crisis-war- reconstruction- new crisis …, a cycle characterized by immense armaments production which has increasingly become the only sphere where capitalism applies scientific methods and a fuller utilization of the productive forces. In the period of capitalist decadence humanity is condemned to live through a permanent round of self-mutilation and destruction.

The physical poverty which grinds down the underdeveloped countries is echoed in the more advanced countries by an unprecedented dehumanization of social relationships which is the result of the fact that capitalism is absolutely incapable of offering any future to humanity, other than one made up of more and more murderous wars and a more and more systematic, rational, and scientific exploitation. As in all other decadent societies this has led to a growing decomposition of social institutions, of the dominant ideology, of moral values, of art forms and all the other cultural manifestations of capitalism. The development of ideologies like fascism and Stalinism express the triumph of barbarism in the
absence of a revolutionary alternative.

4. STATE CAPITALISM

In all periods of decadence, confronted with the exacerbation of the system's contradictions, the state has to take responsibility for the cohesion of the social organism, for the preservation of the dominant relations of production. It thus tends to strengthen itself to the point of incorporating within its own structures the whole social life. The bloated growth of the imperial administration and the absolute monarchy were the manifestations of this phenomenon in the decadence of Roman slave society and in feudalism respectively.

In the decadence of capitalism the general tendency towards state capitalism is one of the dominant characteristics of social life. In this period each national capital, because it cannot expand in an unfettered way and confronted with acute imperialist rivalries, is forced to organize itself as efficiently as possible, so that externally it can compete economically and militarily with its rivals and internally deal with the increasing aggravation of social contradictions. The only power in society which is capable of fulfilling these tasks is the state. Only the state can:

- take charge of the national, economy in an overall centralized manner and mitigate the internal competition which weakens the economy, in order to strengthen its capacity to maintain a united face against the competition on the world market.

- develop the military force necessary for the defence of its interests in the face of growing international conflict.

- finally, owing to an increasingly heavy repressive and bureaucratic apparatus, reinforce the internal cohesion of a society threatened with collapse through the growing decomposition of its economic foundations; only the state can impose through an all-pervasive violence the preservation of a social structure which is increasingly incapable of spontaneously regulating human relations and which is more and more questioned the more it becomes an absurdity for the survival of society itself.

On the economic level this tendency towards state capitalism, though never fully realized, is expressed by the state taking over the key points of the productive apparatus. This does not mean the disappearance of the law of value, or competition, or the anarchy of production which are the fundamental characteristics of the capitalist economy. These characteristics continue to apply on a world scale where the laws of the market still reign and still determine the conditions of production within each national economy however statified it may be.

If the laws of value and of competition seem to be 'violated', it is only so that they may have a more powerful effect on a global scale. If the anarchy of production seems to subside in the face of state planning, it reappears more brutally on a world scale, particularly during the acute crises of the system which state capitalism is incapable of preventing. Far from representing a 'rationalization' of capitalism, state capitalism is nothing but an expression of its decay.

Statification of capital takes place either in a gradual manner through the fusion of 'private and state capital as is generally the case in the most developed countries, or through sudden leaps in the form of massive and total nationalizations, in general in places where private capital is at its weakest.

In practice, although the tendency towards state capitalism manifests itself in all countries in the world, it is more rapid and more obvious when and where the effects of decadence make themselves felt in the most brutal manner; historically during periods of open crisis or of war, geographically in the weakest economies. But state capitalism is not a specific phenomenon of the backward countries. On the contrary, although the degree of formal statification is often higher in the backward capitals, the state's real control over economic life is generally much more effective in the more developed countries owing to the high level of capital concentration in these nations.

On the political and social level, whether in its most extreme totalitarian forms such as fascism or Stalinism or in forms which hide behind the mask of democracy, the tendency towards state capitalism expresses itself in the increasingly powerful, omnipresent, and systematic control over the whole of social life exerted by the state apparatus, and in particular the executive. On a much greater scale than in the decadence of Rome or feudalism, the state under decadent capitalism has become a monstrous, cold, impersonal machine which has devoured the very substance of civil society.

5. THE SO-CALLED 'SOCIALIST' COUNTRIES

By concentrating capital in the hands of the state, state capitalism has created the illusion that private ownership of the means of production has disappeared and that the bourgeoisie has been eliminated. The Stalinist theory of 'socialism in one country', the whole lie of the 'socialist' or 'communist' countries, or of countries ‘on the road' to socialism, all have their origins in this mystification.

The changes brought about by the tendency to state capitalism are not to be found on the level of the basic relations of production, but only on the level of the juridical forms of property. They do not eliminate the private ownership of the means of production, but only the juridical aspect of individual ownership. The means of production remain 'private' property as far as the workers are concerned; the workers are deprived of any control over the means of production. The means of production are only 'collectivized' for the bureaucracy which owns and manages them in a collective manner.

The state bureaucracy which takes on the specific economic function of extracting surplus labour from the proletariat and of accumulating national capital constitutes a class. But it is not a new class. The role it plays shows that it is nothing but the same old bourgeoisie in its stratified form. Concerning its privileges as a class, what is specific to the state bureaucracy is primarily the fact that it obtains its privileges not through revenues arising out of the individual ownership of capital, but through 'running costs', bonuses, and fixed forms of payment given to it according to the function its members fulfil – a form of remuneration which simply has the appearance of 'wages' and which is often tens or hundreds of times higher than the wages given to the working class.

The centralization and planning of capitalist production by the state and its bureaucracy far from being a step towards the elimination of exploitation is simply a way of intensifying exploitation, of making it more efficient.

On the economic level, Russia, even during, the short time that the proletariat held political power there, has never been able to eliminate capitalism. If state capitalism appeared there so quickly in a highly developed form, it was because the economic disorganization which resulted from Russia's defeat in World War I, then the chaos of the Civil War, made Russia's survival as a national capital within a decadent world system all the more difficult.

The triumph of the counter-revolution in Russia expressed itself as a reorganization of the national economy which used the most developed forms of state capitalism and cynically presented them as the 'continuation of October' and the 'building of socialism'. 'The example was followed elsewhere: China, Eastern Europe, Cuba, North Korea, Indo-china, etc. However, there is nothing proletarian or communist in any of these countries. They are countries where, under the weight of one of the greatest lies in history the dictatorship of capital rules in its most decadent form. Any defence of these countries no matter how 'critical' or 'conditional', is a completely counter-revolutionary activity.

6. THE PROLETARIAN STRUGGLE UNDER DECADENT CAPITALISM

Since its beginnings, the proletariat's struggle in defence of its own interests has carried within itself the perspective of ultimately destroying capitalism and establishing communism. But the proletariat does not pursue the final goal of its struggle out of pure idealism, guided by some divine inspiration. It is led to undertake its communist tasks because the material conditions within which its immediate struggle develops, force the class to do so since any other method of struggle can only lead to disaster.

As long as the bourgeoisie, thanks to the vast expansion of the capitalist system in its ascendant phase, was able to accord real reforms to the workers, the proletariat's struggle lacked the objective conditions necessary for the realization of its revolutionary programme.

Despite the revolutionary and communist aspirations expressed even during the bourgeois revolution by the most radical tendencies in the workers' movement, in that historic period the workers' struggle could not go beyond the fight for reforms.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, one of the focal points of working class activity was the whole process of learning how to organize itself to win economic and political reforms through trade unionism and parliamentarism. Thus, side by side within the genuine organizations of the class, one could find 'reformist' elements (those for whom the whole struggle of the class was simply a struggle for reforms) and revolutionaries (those for whom the struggle for reforms was simply a step, a moment in the process which would ultimately lead to the revolutionary struggle of the class). Also in this period the proletariat was able to support certain factions of the bourgeoisie against other more reactionary factions in order to push forward social changes favourable to its own development and favourable also to the development of the productive forces.

All these conditions underwent fundamental changes under decadent capitalism. The world has become too small to contain within it all the existing national capitals. In every nation capital is forced to increase productivity (ie the exploitation of the workers) to the most extreme limits. The organization of this exploitation has ceased to be a matter conducted solely between individual employers and their workforce; it has become the concern of the state and all the thousand and one mechanisms created to contain the class, direct it, and steer it away from any revolutionary danger - condemning it to a systematic and insidious repression.

Inflation, a permanent phenomenon since World War I, immediately devours any wage increases. The length of the working day has either stayed the same, or has been reduced only to compensate for the increased time it takes to get to and from work and to avoid the total nervous collapse of the workers, subjected to the shattering pace of life and work.

The struggle for reforms has become a hopeless utopia. In this epoch the proletariat can only engage in a fight to the death against capital. It no longer has any alternative between consenting to be atomized into a sum of millions of crushed, tamed individuals, or generalizing its struggles as widely as possible towards a confrontation with the state itself. Thus it must refuse to allow its struggles to be restricted to a purely economic, local, or sectoral terrain and to organize itself in the embryonic forms of its future organs of power: the workers' councils.

In these new historic conditions many of the old weapons of the proletariat can no longer be used by the class. In fact the political tendencies who continue to advocate their use only do so in order to tie the working class to its exploitation, to undermine its will to fight.

The distinction made by the workers' movement in the nineteenth century between the minimum programme and the maximum programme has lost all meaning. The minimum programme is no longer possible. The proletariat can only advance its struggles by situating them within the perspective of the maximum programme: the communist revolution.

7. THE TRADE UNIONS: YESTERDAY ORGANS OF THE PROLETARIAT, TODAY INSTRUMENTS OF CAPITAL

In the nineteenth century, the period of capitalism's greatest prosperity, the working class often through bitter and bloody struggles, built up permanent trade organizations whose role was to defend its economic interests: the trade unions.

These organs played an essential role in the struggle for reforms and for the substantial improvements in the workers’ living conditions which the system could then afford. They also constituted a focus for the regroupment of the class, for the development of its solidarity and consciousness, so that revolutionaries could intervene within them and help make them serve as 'schools for communism'. Although the existence of these organs was linked in an indissoluble way tothe existence of wage labour, and although even in this period they were often substantially bureaucratized the unions nevertheless were authentic organs of the class to the extent that the abolition of wage labour was not yet on the historical agenda.

As capitalism entered its decadent phase it was no longer able to accord reforms and ameliorations to the working class. Having lost all possibility of fulfilling their initial function of defending working class interests, and confronted with an historic situation in which only the abolition of wage labour and with it the disappearance of trade unions was on the agenda, the trade unions became true defenders of capitalism, agencies of the bourgeois state within the working class. This is the only way they could survive in the new period. This evolution was aided by the bureaucratization of the unions prior to decadence and by the relentless tendency within decadence for the state to absorb all the structures of social life.

The anti-working class role of the unions was decisively demonstrated for the first time during World War I when alongside the social democratic parties they helped to mobilize the workers for the imperialist slaughter. In the revolutionary wave which followed the war, the unions did everything in their power to smother the proletariat's attempts to destroy capitalism. Since then they have been kept alive not by the working class, but the capitalist state for which they fulfil a number of important functions:

- actively participating in the efforts of the capitalist state to rationalize the economy, regularize the sale of labour power, and intensify exploitation

- sabotaging the class struggle from within either by derailing strikes and revolts into sectional dead-ends, or by confronting autonomous movements with open repression.

Because the unions have lost their proletarian character, they cannot be 'reconquered’ by the working class, nor can they constitute a field of activity for revolutionary minorities. For over half a century the workers have shown less and less interest in participating in the activities of these organs which have become an integral part of the bourgeois state. The workers' struggles to resist the constant deterioration of their living conditions have tended to take the form of wildcat strikes outside of and against the trade unions. Directed by general assemblies of strikers and, in cases where they generalize, co-ordinated by committees of delegates elected and revocable by these assemblies, these strikes have immediately placed themselves on a political terrain in that they have been forced to confront the state in the form of its representatives inside the factory: the trade unions. Only the generalization and radicalization of these struggles can enable the class to move from the defensive terrain to the open and frontal assault on the capitalist state; and the destruction of bourgeois state power necessarily involves the destruction of the trade unions.

The anti-proletarian character of the old trade unions is not simply a result of the fact that they are organized in a particular way (by trade, by industry), or that they had 'bad leaders'; it is a result of the fact that in the present period the class cannot maintain permanent organizations for the defence of its economic interests. Consequently, the capitalist function of these organs also applies to all those 'new' organizations which play a similar role, no matter how they are organized and no matter what their initial intentions. This is the case with the 'revolutionary unions' and 'shop stewards' as well as those organs (workers' committees, workers' commissions …) which stay in existence after a struggle - even in opposition to the unions - and try to set themselves up as ‘authentic’ poles for the defence of the workers' immediate interests. On this basis these organizations cannot escape from being integrated into the apparatus of the bourgeois state, even in an unofficial or illegal manner.

All political strategies aimed at ‘using’, ‘regenerating’, or ‘reconquering' trade union type organizations serve only the interests of capitalism, in that they seek to vitalize capitalist institutions which the workers have often already deserted. After more than fifty years of experience of the anti-working class character of these organizations, political tendencies which still advocate these strategies place themselves firmly in the camp of the counter-revolution.

8. THE MYSTIFICATION OF PARLIAMENT AND ELECTIONS

In the ascendant period of capitalism, parliament was the most appropriate form for the organization of the political life of the bourgeoisie. As a specifically bourgeois institution, it was never a primary arena for the activity of the working class and the proletariat's participation in parliamentary activity and electoral campaigns contained a number of real dangers, against which the revolutionaries of last century always alerted the class. However, in a period when the revolution was not yet on the agenda and when the proletariat could wrest reforms from within the system, participation in parliament allowed the class to use it to press for reforms, to use electoral campaigns as a means for propaganda and agitation for the proletarian programme, and to use parliament as a tribune for denouncing the ignominy of bourgeois politics. This is why the struggle for universal suffrage was throughout the nineteenth century in many countries one of the most important issues around which the proletariat organized.

As the capitalist system entered its decadent phase, parliament ceased to be an instrument for reforms. As the Communist International said at its Second Congress, "The centre of gravity of political life has now been completely and finally removed beyond the confines of parliament." The only role parliament could play from then on, the only thing that keeps it alive, is its role as an instrument of mystification. Thus ended any possibility for the proletariat to use parliament in any way. The class cannot gain impossible reforms from an organ which has lost any real political function. At a time when its basic task is to destroy all the institutions of the bourgeois state and thus parliament; when it must set up its own dictatorship on the ruins of universal suffrage and other vestiges of bourgeois society, participation in parliamentary and electoral institutions can only lead to these moribund bodies being given a semblance of life, no matter what the intentions of those who advocate this kind of activity.

Participation in elections and parliament no longer has any of the advantages it had last century. On the contrary, it is full of dangers especially that of keeping alive illusions about the possibility of a 'peaceful' or 'gradual' transition to socialism through the conquest of a parliamentary majority by the so-called 'workers' parties'. '

The strategy of 'destroying parliament from within' through the use of 'revolutionary' delegates has proved in a decisive manner to have no other result except the corruption of the political organizations who undertake such activities and their absorption into capitalism.

Finally, to the extent that such activity is essentially the concern of specialists, an arena for the games of political parties rather than for the self-activity of the masses; the use of elections and parliaments as instruments for agitation and propaganda tends to preserve the political premises of bourgeois society and encourage passivity in the working class. If such a disadvantage was acceptable when the revolution was not an immediate possibility, it has become a decisive obstacle in a period when the only task on the historical agenda for the proletariat is precisely the overthrow of the old social order and the creation of a communist society, which demands the active and conscious participation of the whole class.

If at the beginning the tactics of 'revolutionary parliamentarism' were primarily an expression of the weight of the past within the class and its organizations, the disastrous results of such tactics show that they can only have a counter-revolutionary significance for the class. Those currents who advocate it, just like those who present parliament as an instrument for the socialist transformation of society, are today irreversibly among the ranks of the bourgeoisie.

9. FRONTISM: A STRATEGY FOR DERAILING THE PROLETARIAT

Under decadent capitalism when only the proletarian revolution is historically progressive, there cannot even momentarily be any tasks held in common between the revolutionary class and any faction of the ruling class, however 'progressive', 'democratic', 'or 'popular' it claim to be. In contrast to the ascendant phase of capitalism, the decadence of the system makes it impossible for any bourgeois faction to play a progressive role. In particular, bourgeois democracy, which in the nineteenth century was a progressive political form in relation to the vestiges of feudalism, has lost any real political content in the period of decadence. Bourgeois democracy only serves as a deceptive screen hiding the strengthening of the totalitarian power of the state, and the bourgeois factions who advocate it are just as reactionary as the rest of their class.

Since World War I 'democracy,' has shown itself to be one of the most pernicious opiums of the proletariat. It was in the name of democracy that the revolutions that followed the war in several European countries were crushed; it was in the name of democracy and against 'fascism' that tens of millions of workers were mobilized for the second imperialist war; it is once again in the name of democracy that capital today is trying to derail the struggle of the proletariat into alliances 'against fascism’, 'against reactionaries', 'against repression', 'against totalitarianism', etc.

Because it was the specific product of a period in which the proletariat had already been crushed, fascism is simply not on the agenda today and all propaganda about the 'fascist menace' is pure mystification. Moreover, fascism has no monopoly of repression and if the democratic or left-wing political tendencies identify fascism with repression it is because they want to hide the fact that they are themselves resolute practitioners of repression, that it is they who have always borne the brunt of crushing the revolutionary movements of the class.

Just like 'popular fronts' and 'anti-fascist fronts', the tactic of the 'united front' has proved to be a major weapon for the diversion of the proletarian struggle. This tactic which advocates that revolutionary organizations call for alliances with the so-called 'workers' parties' in order to' 'force them into a corner' and expose them, can only succeed in maintaining illusions about the 'proletarian' nature of these bourgeois parties and thus delay the workers' break with them.

The autonomy of the proletariat in the face of all other classes in society is the first precondition for the extension of its struggle towards the revolution. All alliances with other classes or strata and especially those with factions of the bourgeoisie can only lead to the disarming of the class in the face of its enemy, because these alliances make the working class abandon the only terrain on which it can temper its strength: its own class terrain. Any political tendency which tries to make the class leave that terrain is part of the bourgeois camp.

10. THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY MYTH OF 'NATIONAL LIBERATION'

National liberation and the formation of new nations has never been a specific task of the proletariat. If in the nineteenth century revolutionaries gave their support to certain national liberation movements, they did not have any illusions that these were anything but bourgeois movements; neither did they give their support in the name of 'the right of nations to self-determination'. They supported such movements because in the ascendant phase of capitalism the nation represented the most appropriate framework for the development of capitalism, and the establishment of new nation states by eliminating the constricting vestiges of pre-capitalist social relations, represented a step forward in the development of the productive forces on a world scale and thus in the maturation of the material conditions for socialism.

As capitalism entered its epoch of decline, 'the nation together with capitalist relations of production as a whole, became too narrow for the development of the productive forces. Today in a situation where even the oldest and most powerful countries are incapable of developing, the juridical constitution of new countries does not lead to any real progress. In a world divided up amongst the imperialist blocs every 'national liberation' struggle, far from representing something progressive, can only be a moment in the continuous conflict between rival imperialist blocs in which the workers and peasants, whether voluntarily or forcibly enlisted, only participate as cannon fodder.

Such struggles in no way 'weaken imperialism' because they do not challenge it at its roots: the capitalist relations of production. If they weaken one imperialist bloc it is only to strengthen another; and the new nations set up in such conflicts must themselves become imperialist, because in the epoch of decadence no country, whether large or small, can avoid engaging in imperialist policies.

In the present epoch a 'successful' struggle for 'national liberation' can only mean a change of imperialist masters for the country concerned; for the workers, especially in the new 'socialist' countries, it means an intensification, a systematization, a militarization of exploitation by the statified capital which because it is an expression of the barbarism of the system proceeds to transform the 'liberated' nation into a concentration camp. Contrary to what some people claim these struggles do not provide the proletariat of the Third World with a springboard for class struggle. By mobilizing the workers behind the national capital in the name of 'patriotic' mystifications, these struggles always act as a barrier to the proletarian struggle which is often extremely bitter in such countries. Over the last fifty years history has amply shown, contrary to the affirmations of the Communist International, that 'national liberation' struggles do not serve as an impetus for the struggle of the workers in the advanced countries or for the workers in the backward countries. Neither have anything to gain from such struggles, no camp to choose. In these conflicts against this latter-day version of 'national defence' dressed up as so-called 'national liberation', the only revolutionary slogan is the one revolutionaries took up during World War I: revolutionary defeatism, "turn the imperialist war into a civil war". Any position of 'unconditional' or 'critical' support for these struggles is no less criminal than the position of the 'social-chauvinists' during World War I and is thus totally incompatible with communist activity.

11. SELF-MANAGEMENT: WORKERS' SELF-EXPLOITATION

If the nation state itself has become too narrow a framework for the productive forces, this is all the more true for the individual enterprise which has never had a real autonomy from the general laws of capitalism; under decadent capitalism, enterprises depend even more heavily on those laws and on the state. This, is why 'self-management' (the management of enterprises by the workers in a society which remains capitalist), a petty-bourgeois utopia last century when it was advocated by Proudhonist tendencies, is today nothing but a capitalist mystification.

It is an economic weapon of capital in that it tries to get the workers to agree to take up responsibility for enterprises hit by the crisis by making them organize their own exploitation.

It is a political weapon of the counter-revolution in that it:

- divides the working class by imprisoning it and isolating it factory by factory, neighbourhood by neighbourhood, sector by sector.

- burdens the workers with the concerns of the capitalist economy when their only task is to destroy it.

- diverts the proletariat from the fundamental task which determines the possibility of its emancipation: the destruction of the political apparatus of capital and the establishment of its class dictatorship on a world scale.

It is only on a world-wide scale that the proletariat can really undertake the management of production, but it will do this not within the framework of capitalist laws but by destroying them.

All those political currents who (even in the name of 'working class experience' or of 'establishing new relations among the workers') defend self-management are in fact objectively defending capitalist relations of production.

12. 'PARTIAL' STRUGGLES: A REACTIONARY DEAD-END

The decadence of capitalism has accentuated the decomposition of all the moral values of capitalism and has led to a profound degradation of all human relations.

However, if it is true that the proletarian revolution will engender new relationships in every area of life, it is wrong to think that it is possible to contribute to the revolution by organizing specific struggles around partial problems, such as racism, the position of women, pollution, sexuality, and other aspects of daily life.

The struggle against the economic foundations of the system contains in it the struggle against all the super-structural aspects of capitalist society, but this is not true the other way around. By their very content 'partial' struggles, far from reinforcing the vital autonomy of the proletariat, tend on the contrary to dilute it into a mass of confused categories (races, sexes, youth, etc) which can only be totally impotent in the face of history. This is why they constitute an authentic instrument of the counter-revolution which bourgeois governments have learned to use to good effect.

13. THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTER OF THE 'WORKERS" PARTIES

All parties and organizations which defend even critically or conditionally certain states or certain factions of the bourgeoisie against others (whether in the name of 'socialism', 'democracy', 'anti-fascism', 'national independence', the 'lesser evil', or the 'united front'); who participate in any way in the bourgeois game of elections, or in the anti-working class activities of the trade unions, or in the mystifications of self-management, are agents of capital. This is particularly the case with the 'Socialist' or 'Communist' Parties. The former lost any proletarian character by participating in 'national defence' during World War 1; after the war they showed themselves to be veritable executioners of the revolutionary proletariat. The latter in their turn passed into the camp of capital, when they abandoned the internationalism which had been the basis of their split with the Socialist Parties. Through their acceptance of the theory of 'socialism in one country' - which marked their definitive passage into the bourgeois camp - then through their participation in the efforts of their national bourgeoisies to rearm, in the 'popular fronts', in the 'resistance' during World War 11 and in the 'national reconstruction' which followed, these parties have shown themselves to be the faithful servants of national capital and the purest incarnation of the counter-revolution.

All the Maoist, Trotskyist, or anarchist currents which either come directly from these bourgeois parties or defend a certain number of their positions (defence of the 'so-called 'socialist' countries, 'anti-fascist' alliances, etc) belong to the same camp as they do: that of capital. The fact that they have less influence or use a more radical language, does not alter the bourgeois nature of their programme, but it does allow them to serve as useful touts or understudies for the larger parties of the left.

15. THE FIRST GREAT REVOLUTIONARY WAVE OF THE WORLD PROLETARIAT

By marking the entry of capitalism into its decadent phase, World War I also showed that the objective conditions for the proletarian revolution had ripened. The revolutionary wave, which arose in response to the war and which thundered across Russia and Europe, made its mark in both Americas and found an echo in China, and thus constituted the first attempt by the world proletariat to accomplish its historic task of destroying capitalism. At the highest point of its struggle between 1917 and 1923, the proletariat took power in Russia, engaged in mass insurrections in Germany, and shook Italy, Hungary, and Austria to their foundations. Although less strongly, the revolutionary wave also manifested itself in bitter struggles in for example, Spain, Great Britain, North and South America. The tragic failure of the revolutionary wave was finally marked in 1927 by the crushing of the proletarian insurrection in Shanghai and Canton in China after a long series of defeats for the working class internationally. This is why the October 1917 revolution in Russia can only be understood as one of the most important manifestations of this immense class movement and not as a 'bourgeois', ‘state capitalist’, ‘dual’, or 'permanent' revolution which would somehow force the proletariat to fulfil the 'bourgeois-democratic' tasks which the bourgeoisie itself was incapable of carrying out.

Equally part of this revolutionary wave was the creation in 1919 of the Third International (The Communist International), which broke organizationally and politically with the parties of the Second International whose participation in the imperialist war had marked their passage into the bourgeois camp. The Bolshevik Party, an integral part of the revolutionary left which split from the Second International, by taking up clear political positions expressed in the slogans "turn the imperialist war into a civil war", "smash the capitalist state", and "all power to the soviets", and through its decisive part in the creation of the Third International, made a fundamental contribution to the revolutionary process and represented at that moment an authentic vanguard for the world proletariat.

However, though the degeneration both of the revolution in Russia and of the Third International were essentially the result of the crushing of revolutionary attempts in other countries and the general exhaustion of the revolutionary wave, it is equally necessary to understand the role played by the Bolshevik Party - since owing to the weakness of the other parties, it was the leading light in the Communist International - in this process of degeneration and in the international defeats of the proletariat. With, for example, the crushing of the Kronstadt uprising and the advocacy (despite the opposition of the left of the Third International) of the policies of 'conquering the unions', 'revolutionary parliamentarism', and the 'united front', the Bolsheviks' influence and responsibility in the liquidation of the revolutionary wave were no less than their contribution to the original development of that wave.

In Russia itself the counter-revolution came not only from 'outside' but also from 'inside' and in particular through the state structures which the Bolshevik Party set up and became identified with. What in October 1917 had simply been serious errors explicable in the light of the immaturity of the proletariat in Russia and of the workers' movement in general in the face of a new historical period, were from then on to become a screen, an ideological justification for the counter-revolution, and served as an important factor in it. However the decline of the post-war revolutionary wave and the revolution in Russia, the degeneration of the Third International and the Bolshevik Party, and the counter-revolutionary role, which the latter played after a certain point, can only be understood, by considering this revolutionary wave and the Third International, including their expression in Russia, as authentic expressions of the proletarian movement.

Any other explanations can only lead to confusion and will prevent the currents which defend these confusions from really fulfilling their revolutionary tasks.

Even if these experiences of the class have left no 'material' gains, it is only by beginning from this understanding of their nature that real and important theoretical gains can be obtained from them. In particular, as the only historical example of the seizure of political power by the proletariat (apart from the ephemeral and desperate attempt represented by the Paris Commune in 1871, and the aborted experiences of Bavaria and Hungary in 1919), the October 1917 revolution has left a number of precious lessons for the understanding of two crucial problems of the revolutionary struggle: the content of the revolution and the nature of the organization of revolutionaries.

15. THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

The seizure of political power by the proletariat on a world scale, the preliminary condition for and first stage in the revolutionary transformation of capitalist society, means in the first place the total destruction of the apparatus of the bourgeois state.

Since it is through its state that the bourgeoisie maintains its domination over society, its privileges, its exploitation of other classes and of the working class in particular, this organ is necessarily adapted to this function and cannot be used by the working class which has no privileges or exploitation to defend. In other words, there is no 'peaceful road to socialism: against the violence of the minority of exploiters exerted openly or hypocritically, but in any case more and more systematically by the bourgeoisie, the proletariat can only put forward its own revolutionary class violence.

As the lever of the economic transformation of society, the dictatorship of the proletariat (ie the exclusive exercise of political power by the working class) will have the fundamental task of expropriating the exploiting class by socializing the means of production and progressively extending this socialized sector to all productive activities. On the basis of its political power, the proletariat will have to attack the political economy of the bourgeoisie by carrying forward an economic policy leading to the abolition of wage labour and commodity production and to the satisfaction of the needs of humanity.

During this period of transition from capitalism to communism, non-exploiting classes and strata other than the proletariat will still exist, classes whose existence is based on the non-socialized sector of the economy. For this reason the class struggle will still exist as a manifestation of the contradictory economic interests within society. This will give rise to a state whose function will be to prevent these conflicts leading to society tearing itself apart. But with the progressive disappear of these social classes through the integration of their members into the socialized sector, and with the eventual abolition of classes, the state itself will have to disappear.

The historically discovered form of the dictatorship of the proletariat is that of the workers' councils - unitary, centralized, and class-wide assemblies based on elected and revocable delegates which enable the whole class to exercise power in a truly collective manner. These councils will have a monopoly of the control of arms as the guarantee of the exclusive political power of the working class.

It is the working class as a whole which alone can wield power in order to undertake the communist transformation of society. For this reason in contrast to prior revolutionary classes, the proletariat cannot delegate power to any institution or minority, including the revolutionary minority itself. The latter will act within the councils, but their organization cannot substitute itself for the unitary organizations of the class in the achievement of its historic goals.

Similarly, the experience of the Russian revolution has shown the complexity and seriousness of the problem of the relationship between the class and the state in the period of transition. In the coming period, the proletariat and revolutionaries cannot evade this problem, but must make every effort to resolve it.

The dictatorship of the proletariat implies the absolute rejection of the notion that the working class should subordinate itself to any external force and also the rejection of any relations of violence within the class. During the period of transition, the proletariat is the only revolutionary class in society: its consciousness and its cohesion are the essential guarantees that its dictatorship will result in communism.

16. THE ORGANIZATION OF REVOLUTIONARIES

a. Class consciousness and organization

Any class fighting against the social order of the day can only do this effectively if it gives its struggle an organized and conscious form. Whatever the imperfection and alienation in their forms of organization and their consciousness, this was already the case for classes like the slaves or the peasants who did not carry within them a new social order. But this necessity applies all the more to historic classes who carry the new relations of production made necessary by the evolution of society. The proletariat is, among these classes, the only class which possesses no economic power within the old society. Because of this its organization and consciousness are even more decisive factors in its struggle.

The form of organization the class creates for its revolutionary struggle and for the wielding of political power is that of the workers' councils. But if the whole class is the subject of the revolution and is regrouped in these organs at that moment, this does not mean that the process by which the class becomes conscious is in any way simultaneous or homogeneous. Class consciousness develops along a tortuous path through the struggle of the class, its successes and defeats. It has to confront the sectional and national divisions which constitute the 'natural' framework of capitalist society and which capital has every interest in perpetuating within the class.

b. The role of revolutionaries

Revolutionaries are those elements within the class who through this heterogeneous process are the first to obtain a clear understanding of "the line of march, the conditions and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement" (Communist Manifesto), and because in capitalist society "the dominant ideas are the ideas of the ruling class", revolutionaries necessarily constitute a minority of the working class.

As an emanation of the class, a manifestation of the process by which it becomes conscious, revolutionaries can only exist as such by becoming an active factor in this process. To accomplish this task in an indissoluble way, the revolutionary organization:

- participates in all the struggles of the class in which its members distinguish themselves by being the most determined and combative fighters.

- intervenes in these struggles always stressing the general interests of the class and the final goals of the movement.

- as an integral part of this intervention, dedicates itself in a permanent way to the work of theoretical clarification and reflection which alone will allow its general activity to be based on the whole past experience of the class and on the future perspectives crystallized through such theoretical work.

c. The relationship between the class and the organization of revolutionaries

If the general organization of the class and the organization of revolutionaries are part of the same movement, they are nonetheless two distinct things.

The first, the councils, regroup the whole class. The only criterion for belonging to them is to be a worker. The second, on the other hand, regroups only the revolutionary elements of the class. The criterion for membership is no longer sociological, but political: agreement on the programme and commitment to defend it. Because of this the vanguard of the class can include individuals who are not sociologically part of the working class but who, by breaking with the class they came out of, identify themselves with the historic class interests of the proletariat.

However, though the class and the organization of its vanguard are two distinct things, they are not separate, external, or opposed to one another as is claimed by the 'leninist' tendencies on the one hand and on the other hand by the ouvrierist-councilist tendencies. What both these conceptions deny is the fact that, far from clashing with each other, these two elements - the class and revolutionaries - actually complement each other as a whole and a part of the whole. Between the two of them there can never exist relations of force because communists "have no interests separate and apart from those of the proletariat as a whole" (Communist Manifesto).

As part of the class, revolutionaries can at no time substitute themselves for the class, either in its struggles within capitalism or, still less, in the overthrow of capitalism and the wielding of political power. Unlike other historical classes, the consciousness of a minority, no matter how enlightened, is not sufficient to accomplish the tasks of the proletariat. These are tasks which demand the constant participation and creative activity of the entire class at all times.

Generalized consciousness is the only guarantee of the victory of the proletarian revolution and, since it is essentially the fruit of practical experience, the activity of the whole class is irreplaceable. In particular, the necessary use of violence by the class cannot be separated from the general movement of the class. For this reason terrorism by individuals or isolated groups is absolutely foreign to the methods of the class and at best represents a manifestation of petty-bourgeois despair when it is not simply a cynical method of struggle between bourgeois factions.

The self-organization of workers' struggles and the exercise of power by the class itself is not just one of the roads to communism which can be weighed against others: it is the only road.

d. The autonomy of the working class

However, the concept of 'class autonomy' used by ouvrierist and anarchist tendencies and which they put forward in opposition to substitutionist conceptions, has a totally reactionary and petty-bourgeois meaning. Apart from the fact that this 'autonomy' often boils down to no more than their own 'autonomy' as tiny sects who claim to represent the working class in the same way as the substitutionist tendencies they denounce so strongly, their conception has two main aspects:

- the rejection of any political parties and organizations whatever they may be by the workers

- the autonomy of each fraction of the working class (factories, neighbourhoods, regions, nations,. etc) in relation to others: federalism.

Today such ideas are at best an elementary reaction against Stalinist bureaucracy and the development of state totalitarianism, and at worst the political expression of the isolation and division typical of the petty-bourgeoisie. But both express a total incomprehension of the three fundamental aspects of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat:

- the importance and priority of the political tasks of the class (destruction of the capitalist state, world dictatorship of the proletariat)

- the importance and indispensable character of the organization of revolutionaries within the class

- the unitary, centralized, and world-wide character of the revolutionary struggle of the class.

For us, as marxists, the autonomy of the class means its independence from all other classes in society. This autonomy constitutes an INDISPENSABLE PRECONDITION for the revolutionary activity of the class because the proletariat is today the only revolutionary class. This autonomy manifests itself both on the organizational level (the organization of the councils), and on the political level and therefore, contrary to the assertions of the ouvrierist tendencies, in close connection with the communist vanguard of the proletariat.

e. The organization of revolutionaries in the different moments of the class struggle

If the general organization of the class and the organization of revolutionaries are two different things as far as their function is concerned, the circumstances in which they arise are also different. The councils appear only in periods of revolutionary confrontation when all the struggles of the class tend towards the seizure of power. However the effort of the class to develop its consciousness has existed at all times since its origins and will exist until its dissolution into communist society. This is why communist minorities have existed in every period as an expression of this constant effort. But the scope, the influence, the type of activity and the mode of organization of these minorities are closely linked to the conditions of the class struggle.

In periods of intense class activity, these minorities have a direct influence on the practical course of events. One can then speak of the party to describe the organization of the communist vanguard. On the other hand, in periods of defeat or of downturn in the class struggle, revolutionaries no longer have a direct influence on the immediate course of history. All that can exist at such times are organizations of a much smaller size whose function is no longer to influence the immediate movement, but to resist it, which means struggling against the current while the class is being disarmed and mobilized by the bourgeoisie (through class collaboration, 'union sacrees', 'resistance', 'anti-fascism', etc). Their essential task then is to draw the lessons of previous experience and so prepare the theoretical and programmatic framework for the future proletarian party which must necessarily re-emerge in the next upsurge of the class. These groups and fractions who, when the class struggle is on the ebb, have detached themselves from the degenerating party or have survived its demise, have the task of constituting a political and organizational bridge until the re-emergence of the party.

f. The structure of the organization of revolutionaries

The necessarily world-wide and centralized character of the proletarian revolution confers the same world-wide and centralized character on the party of the working class, and the fractions and groups who lay the basis of the party necessarily tend towards a world-wide centralization. This is concretized in the existence of central organs invested with political responsibilities between each of the organization's congresses to which they are accountable.

The structure of the organization of revolutionaries must take two fundamental needs into account:

- it must permit the full development of revolutionary consciousness within itself and thus allow the widest and most searching discussion of all the questions and disagreements which arise in a non-monolithic organization

- it must at the same time assure the organization's cohesion and unity of action; in particular this means that all parts of the organization must carry out the decisions of the majority.

Likewise the relations between the different parts of the organization and the ties between militants necessarily bear the scars of capitalist society and therefore cannot constitute an island of communist relations within capitalism. Nevertheless, they cannot be in flagrant contradiction with the goal pursued by revolutionaries, and they must of necessity be based on that solidarity and mutual confidence which are the hallmarks of belonging to an organization of the class which is the bearer of communism.

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The historical context of the ICC Statutes

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INTRODUCTION

The First Congress of the International Communist Current, as well as drawing up a platform, adopted statutes which have the function of sealing and cementing the existence of a unified organization. We publish here an article, based on the report which introduced the discussion on the statutes, and which attempts to trace the general framework within which these statutes were drawn up.

When one looks at the statutes of the different political organizations of the class, the general programmatic principles affirmed in them can give one a reasonable picture of the particular circumstances in which they originated. The programme of the proletariat, even though it is not 'invariable' as some claim, is not something circumstantial, something that can be put in question at every turn of the class struggle; but the way in which revolutionaries organize to defend this programme is intimately linked both to the practical conditions which face them and to the historic moment in which they are carrying on their activities. Far from being simply neutral or timeless rules, the statutes are a significant reflection of the life of a political organization, and their form changes when the conditions of this organizational life alter. Thus they have never had a definitive form and have always had to evolve during the existence of the organization, or from one organization to another. By looking at the statutes of the four main international organizations of the class (the Communist League, the First, Second and Third Internationals) it is possible to follow the evolution and maturation of the class movement itself.

THE COMMUNIST LEAGUE (1847)

One can distinguish three essential characteristics of the statutes of the Communist League: first, the affirmation of the principle of the international unity of the proletariat; secondly, a strong preoccupation with the problems of clandestinity; and thirdly, the vestiges of utopian communism.

1. The Affirmation of the Principle of the International Unity of the Proletariat

At the head of the statutes of the League was the celebrated watchword, "Workers of All Countries Unite!" From the very first stammerings of the class internationalism was one of the touchstones of its programme. Similarly, the organization of its most conscious elements, the communists, was unified on an international scale and its statutes were addressed not to particular territorial sections (regional or national) but to the whole membership of the organization.

However, the existence of these unified statutes regulating the activity of each member on an international scale, should not only be seen as a powerful expression of the League's internationalism. In reality the League was first and foremost a secret society like many others which existed at the time. Essentially it regrouped German workers and artisans, most of them émigrés in Brussels, London and Paris. Consequently, it did not have any effective national sections that were really connected to the political life of the proletariat indifferent countries. It should not be forgotten that the League only regrouped a small minority of the proletariat's most conscious elements; the Proudhonist and Blanquist currents, to mention only those that were influential in France, were not part of the League. The League remained a small organization whose members were often bound together by the vestiges of the old artisan relationships. It is noteworthy that the travels undertaken by the workers when they were serving as Journeymen played an important role in the diffusion of the League's ideas and in the development of the organization.

Concerning the area the League's statutes applied to, it should be said that it was quite clearly organized on a territorial basis: the cells ("communes") of the League were based on localities and were grouped together in geographical sectors and not on a professional basis or according to industrial activities. This is a characteristic of a party-type organization, distinct from organizations of the trade union kind. From the beginning then, the League had understood the necessity for the class to have the former kind of organization, but this still did not correspond to the level of maturity the class had reached at the time.

2. Preoccupation with Problems of Clandestinity

In the Europe of 1847, a Europe under the shadow of that symbol of feudal reaction, the Congress of Vienna, bourgeois liberties were still very underdeveloped and the programme of the League forced it into clandestinity. This to a large extent explains the arrangements made in the statutes to ensure the clandestinity of the organization:

"to keep silent about all the affairs of the League" (Article 2, point f)

"to be admitted by the unanimous assent of the cell" (Article 2, point g)

"the members must have assumed names" (Article 4)

"The different cells are not to know about each other and do not exchange correspondence." (Article 8)

However, if the police surveillance of that period explains the necessity for a certain number of these measures, it is also necessary to see these measures as an expression of the League's character as a secret society, a character inherited from the different conspiratorial sects which preceded it and from which it originated (Society of the Seasons, League of the Just, etc). Here again, the immaturity of the proletariat at that time was transcribed into the organizational provisions of the League. But this was even more the case with the third characteristic.

3. The Vestiges of Utopian Communism

The statutes of the League bore the mark of its origins in the secret societies with their flowery language and with the ritual which accompanied the admission of new members:

"All the members are equals and brothers, and must therefore help each other in all circumstances." (Article 3)

The Communist League also repeated the slogan of the League of the Just in which it had had its origins:

"All men are brothers."

But it should be said here that the idea of solidarity between the members of a revolutionary organization is not a vestige of a bygone age. On the contrary, against the deformations undergone by the parties of the IInd and IIIrd Internationals, in which unscrupulous ambition, careerism, and the whole game of professional rivalries were one of the expressions of their degeneration, we have found it necessary to write in the ICC platform that: .

"The relations between the militants of the organization ….. cannot be in flagrant contradiction with the goal pursued by revolutionaries, and they must of necessity be based on a solidarity and mutual confidence which are the hallmarks of belonging to an organization of the class which is the subject of communism."

In the statutes of the League one also finds:

"the (adherent must) ….. profess communism" (Article 2, point c)

and in Article 50, there is a description of the ritual which has to accompany every new admission:

"The president of the cell reads Articles 1 to 49 to the candidate, emphasizing particularly the obligations of those who enter into the League; he then poses the question: 'Do you, on these conditions, want to enter this League?’"

Here again one sees the vestiges of the League's sectarian origins. However, these provisions contain another fundamental idea which was by no means a mere product of its time: that of the necessary commitment of the members of the organization which cannot be made up of dilettantes. We should remember that the split between the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in 1903 was over the same question.

The League represented an important stage in the development of the proletariat. It has bequeathed certain fundamental acquisitions to the class, in particular its Manifesto, which is probably the most important text in the workers' movement. But it could not really accomplish the regroupment of the most advanced elements of the world proletariat. This task fell to the International Workingmen's Association in the period that followed.

THE INTERNATIONAL WORKINGMEN'S ASSOCIATION (1864)

The statutes of the IWA played a fundamental political role in the development and activity of the organization. In the evolution of these statutes, the discussions around them, and the manner in which they were applied, one can see in a condensed way an entire stage in the life of the class.

The form of these statutes gives rise to some preliminary remarks. First, the 'provisional rules' constituted the actual programme of the IWA. The statutes and the platform of the organization were combined together. This was also the case with the statutes of the Communist League, the first Article of which states:

"The aim of the League is the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, the rule of the proletariat, the abolition of the old bourgeois society with its class antagonisms, and the establishment of a new society, without classes and without private property.

It was possible to put the programme of the organization in the statutes at the beginning of the workers' movement, when this programme could be summed up in a few general principles about the goal that was being sought. But as the experience of the class developed and this programme became more precise - not so much with regard to the final goal which had been defined at the very beginning of the workers' movement, but with regard to the means to attain that goal - it was increasingly difficult to integrate the programme into the statutes. The 'provisional rules' in the IWA's statutes were already more developed than the first Article of the League's statutes, but they still contained the essential points of the proletarian programme of that era: self-emancipation of the proletariat; abolition of classes, the economic basis of the exploitation and oppression of the workers; the necessity for a political means to achieve the abolition of exploitation; the necessity for solidarity; action and organization on an international scale. These rules therefore constituted a basis for the unification of the most advanced elements of the class at that time.

The second remark one can make about these statutes is to point out the persistence of a certain flowery language:

"The basis of their behaviour towards all men (must be) truth, justice, morality ….."

"No rights without duties, no duties without rights."

In a letter dated 29 November 1864, Marx, who edited these statutes, wrote:

"Out of politeness towards the French and the Italians, who always make use of fine phrases, I had to allow some rather useless figures of speech into the preamble of the statutes."

The 1st International regrouped a whole series of working class tendencies:

Proudhonists, Pierre-Lerouxists, Owenites, even followers of Mazzini. This was to some extent reflected in the statutes of the IWA which had to be able to satisfy all these heterogeneous tendencies.

The third remark concerns the hybrid character of the IWA which was at once a political party and a general organization of the class (or tended to be), regrouping both professional organizations (workers' societies, mutual aid societies, etc) and political groups (like Bakunin's celebrated 'Alliance of Socialist Democracy').

This was an expression of the immaturity of the class in that period and the question was only clarified in a gradual way, without ever being resolved. One can follow this process of clarification by looking at the evolution of the statutes and of the special regulations adopted by successive Congresses. For example, Article 3 was transformed between the founding conference of 1864 and the First Congress of 1866. The phrase "(the Congress) will be composed of representatives of all the workers' societies who adhere (to the IWA)" became "Every year a general workers' Congress will take place, composed of delegates from the branches of the Association". Thus one can see that the IWA, having started as a conglomeration of workers' societies, began to organize itself into branches, sections, etc.

In fact, the statutes and the amendments and additions that were made to them were in themselves an instrument of clarification and of struggle against the confusionist and federalist tendencies. One could cite the case of the special rules adopted at the Geneva Congress of 1866; Article 5 of these rules stipulated that:

"Wherever circumstances allow it, central councils grouping a certain number of sections will be established."

Thus the regulations became an active and dynamic tool in the process of centralizing the International. The necessity of this effort towards centralization is highlighted in a negative manner by the way the statutes were translated by the French sections:

"The Central Council functions as an international agency” became "etablira'des relations (will establish relations)" (Article 6);

"Under a common leadership" became "dans une meme esprit (in the same spirit)"(Article 6);

"International Central Council" became "Conseil Central (Central Council)" (Article 7);

"National central organs" became "organe special (special organ)" (Article 7);

"The workers' societies who adhere to the International Association will continue to maintain intact their existing organization," became "n'en continueront pas moins d'exister sur les bases qui leur sont particulieres, (will nonetheless continue to exist on their own particular basis)" (Article 10).

This struggle against the petit-bourgeois currents reached its conclusion at the Hague Congress of 1872 which adopted Article 7a of the statutes:

"In its struggle against the collective power of the propertied classes, the proletariat can only act as a class by constituting itself into a distinct political party, opposed to all the old parties formed by the propertied classes.

The constitution of the proletariat into a political party is indispensable in ensuring the triumph of the social revolution and the attainment of its supreme goal: the abolition of classes.

The unity of the workers' forces, already obtained by the economic struggle, must also serve as a lever in the hands of this class in its struggle against the political power of its exploiters."

Thus the last Congress of the IWA laid down a clear basis for the pursuit of the proletarian struggle, affirming:

- the necessity for the political activity of the class rather than just economic activity;

- the necessity for the constitution of a political party distinct from the numerous 'workers' societies' and other purely economic organs.

This effort towards clarification in the IWA reached its conclusion at this Congress with the departure of the anarchists regrouped around Bakunin's 'Alliance'. The anarchists could no longer be assimilated into the organization. This conclusion meant that from the programmatic point of view the International had returned to the positions of the Communist League. But while the latter had to a large extent been a sect, regrouping only a tiny minority of the proletariat and without any major influence on the class, the International had gone beyond the sects and regrouped the best elements of the world proletariat around a certain number of fundamental points, not least of which was the principle of internationalism.

In contrast to the League, the IWA was thus a real international organization which had an effective activity within, and impact on the class. This is why in contrast to the League, whose statutes were addressed directly to the members of the organization, the Ist International was structured around national sections since it is in the national framework, first of all, that the proletariat is confronted with the bourgeoisie and its state.

However, this did not weaken the strongly centralized character of the organization in which the General Council in London played a fundamental role, both in the struggle against the confusionist tendencies1 and in the taking up of positions in response to important political events. One can cite, for example, the fact that the two texts on the Franco-Prussian war in 1870 and the text on the Commune of 1871, written by Marx, were published as addressees of the General Council and thus as the official positions of the International.

The IWA died in 1876, as a result of the reflux in the workers' movement which followed the crushing of the Commune; but it was also an expression of the fact that after a series of economic and political convulsions between 1847 and 1871, capitalism had entered the most prosperous and stable period of its entire history.

THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL (1889)

When the IInd International was founded, capitalism was at its zenith. This had immediate repercussions both on the programme of the IInd International and on the way it was organized. Thus the agenda of the First Congress included:

1. International labour legislation. Legal regulation of the working day; day work, night work and holidays for adults and children.

2. Workshop inspection in large and small industry, as well as in domestic industry.

3. Ways and means to obtain these demands.

  1. Abolition of standing armies and the armament of the people.

One could thus say that the preoccupations of the parties which made up the IInd International were concerned with winning reforms within the system.

On the organizational level, the least one can say is that this International did not at all resemble the previous one. For over ten years it only existed through its Congresses. Until 1900 there was no permanent organ responsible for carrying out the decisions of Congresses. Preparation and organization of the Congresses was left to the parties of the countries in which they were going to be held. It was not until the Paris Congress of 1900 that the principle of setting up a 'permanent international committee' was accepted; this was constituted at the end of 1900 under the name of the International Socialist Bureau (ISB). This was composed of two delegates for each country and it nominated a permanent secretariat.

Until 1905 the ISB had a somewhat shadow existence. And it was not until 1907, at the Stuttgart Congress, that statutes and rules for the Congresses and the ISB were adopted. But even at the critical moment just before the outbreak of World War I, the ISB meeting on 29 July did not take up any position and supported the solution put forward by Jaures:

"The ISB will formulate the protest against the war and the sovereign Congress will decide on it."

This Congress was never to take place because the International died in the anguish of war, its main parties going over to 'national defence' and the 'sacred union' with the bourgeoisie of their respective countries.

Up until the end, therefore, the Socialist International remained a federation of national parties: this was expressed in the form taken by the ISB which was not the collective expression of a unified body but the sum of delegates mandated by the national parties. How are we to explain this considerable regression in comparison with the IWA's centralization'?

Essentially this derived from the historic conditions of the proletarian struggle at that time. The revolution which in the mid-nineteenth century with its many crises and convulsions had seemed imminent - had become a much more long-term perspective. This made it necessary to concentrate on the struggle for reforms, which in turn led the proletariat to develop its organizations on a national level since this was the level on which reforms could be obtained.

The IInd International represented a stage in the workers' movement in which the class developed mass parties which became an important and effective force in the political life of various countries. But the conditions of capitalist prosperity under which this process took place made room for, the opportunism and weakening of internationalism which were to cost the International its life in 1914.

The Socialist International also carried on the work begun by the IWA of clarifying the distinction between the general organization of the class and the organization of revolutionaries.

Although it was often responsible for setting up the trade unions (especially in Germany), the IInd International progressively distanced itself from the trade unions on the organizational level; after a series of debates this organic separation was consummated in 1902 by the creation of an ‘International Secretariat of Trade Union Organizations'. Even if one cannot totally identify the trade unions with the general organization of the class, and the parties of the IInd International with the revolutionary minority, both of which appeared in a clearer form in the ensuing period, the distinction between them was already pre-figured by the distinction between trade unions and political parties made by the IInd International.

THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL (1919)

In the thirty years between the foundation of the IInd International and the foundation of the IIIrd International events took place of considerable importance to the workers' movement. From being a system in full flower, capitalism became a decadent system, opening up "the epoch of wars and revolutions". The first great sign of decadence, the imperialist war of 1914-18, also marked the death of the Socialist International and gave rise to the Communist International whose function was no longer to organize the struggle for reforms, but to prepare the proletariat for revolution. Both from the programmatic and organizational point of view, the IIIrd International was in opposition to the IInd International. No longer was there a distinction between the minimum and the maximum programme:

"It is the aim of the Communist International to fight by all available means including armed struggle, for the overthrow of the, international bourgeoisie and for the creation of an international Soviet republic as a transitional stage to the complete abolition of the State." (Preamble to the statutes of the Communist International, 1920)

And for this task the organization of the proletariat's vanguard could only be worldwide and centralized.

However, if the Cl had made a fundamental break with the IInd International, it had not totally detached itself from it. Thus, while trying to give them a 'revolutionary' direction, it preserved the old tactics of trade unionism, parliamentarism and later on, frontism. Similarly, on the organizational level it retained a certain number of vestiges of the old era. Thus Article 4 of the statutes said:

"The supreme authority in the Communist International is the World Congress of all the parties and organizations which belong to it."

This still left room for ambiguity about the International being a sum of different parties. Other vestiges of the IInd International were contained in Articles 14, 15 and 16, which provided for a special relationship between the Cl and the trade unions, the youth movement, and the women's movement.

However, the 'strongly centralized' character of the organization was well emphasized as the following Articles show:

"The World Congress elects the Executive Committee of the Communist International which is the directing body of the Communist International in the period between its World Congresses. The Executive Committee is responsible only to the World Congress." (Article 5)

" …..The Executive Committee of the Communist International has the right to
demand that parties belonging to the International shall expel groups or persons who offend against international discipline, and it also has the right to expel from the Communist International those parties which violate decisions of World Congress …..
" (Article 9)

"The press organs of all parties and all organizations which belong to the Communist International ….. are bound to publish all official decisions of the Communist International and its Executive Committee." (Article 11)

This centralization was a direct expression of the tasks of the proletariat in the new epoch. The world revolution implied that the proletarian vanguard must also unify itself on a world scale. As in the 1st International, those elements who demanded the greatest 'autonomy' for the sections were actually the ones most influenced by bourgeois ideology (eg the French party). And it was the Italian Left who through Bordiga, proposed the creation of a world party. Thus, although some of the seeds of the Cl's ultimate degeneration expressed themselves through this centralization, it must always be remembered that, in the present period, centralization is an indispensable condition for the organization of revolutionaries.

THE STATUTES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CURRENT

1. Their Form

As we saw at the beginning of this text, the statutes of the various political organizations of the class were, as well as being instruments of political struggle, a mirror of the conditions in which that struggle took place. And in particular they carried within them the weaknesses and the immaturity of the proletariat at different stages of its history. The statutes of the ICC are no exception to this rule. They are a product of their time and it is because the general movement of the class has progressively overcome its immaturity that they can, in their turn, go beyond the weaknesses of the statutes that we have examined.

For example, in the statutes of the ICC no longer is any reference made to the idea that "all men are brothers" or that there are "no duties without rights". Contrary to the IWA or the IInd International at the beginning, they make a clear distinction between the class and revolutionaries. Since they no longer have the task of unifying different sects and progressively clarifying the proletarian programme, they are no longer part statutes, part programme, as was the case with the IWA. They have also abandoned any federalist conceptions, such as those held by the IInd International. Finally, they do not provide for the existence of any parallel trade union, youth, or women's organization, as the IIIrd International did.

On the basis of the whole experience of the workers' movement and of the tasks facing the ICC in the current period, the essential characteristic of these statutes is their firm insistence on the internationally unified and centralized character of the organization. This still allows for the existence of sections in each country, since, in the coming struggles, it is at this level that the proletariat will first confront the bourgeoisie and that revolutionaries will be called upon to act. This is why the statutes address themselves to the sections of the various countries and not to individuals.

Elsewhere, in the light of the experience of the degeneration of the IIIrd International, in which administrative measures were used against the revolutionary fractions, it was judged necessary to insert into the present statutes points clarifying the conditions under which divergences can and must be expressed within the organization.

Consequently, the statutes are subdivided into a number of parts which can be summarized as follows:

- a preamble indicating the significance of the Current and making reference to its programmatic basis: the platform, for which the statutes cannot substitute themselves

- the unity of the Current

- the Congress as the expression of this unity

- the centralizing role of the executive organ

- the centralized way of dealing with external relations, finances, and publications

- the life of the organization

2. Their Significance

The adoption of statutes by the ICC has a considerable importance at a time when both the crisis of capitalism and the movement of the class are deepening inexorably. It is a manifestation of the fact that revolutionaries have armed themselves with one of their most fundamental instruments: the international organization. In this context it is important to point out that, for the first time in the history of the workers' movement, the international organization is not being constituted as a sum of already existing national sections. On the contrary it is the sections which are the result of the activity of an international current which was conceived as such practically from the beginning.

In contrast to the past, the effective constitution of the international organization is taking place before the proletariat has entered into its decisive battles: in 1919 the International was founded when the revolutionary movement had already passed its peak. Certain revolutionary groups agree with us about the need for an international organization of revolutionaries while claiming that the time for this is not yet ripe and that we must wait for the decisive battles to come: the creation of an international organization today is 'voluntarist' according to them. This temporizing attitude is in fact an expression of their localism and group patriotism and this 'later' that they propose really means 'too late'. Revolutionaries must not make a virtue out of the errors of the past.

The organization of revolutionaries which is being reconstituted today with great difficulty after the organic break in the link with past communist fractions, a break resulting from half a century of counter-revolution, still carries with it grave weaknesses that can only be overcome through long and difficult experience. Even so, the fact that from now on the class is equipped with an international revolutionary organization is an extremely positive factor which can in part compensate for these other weaknesses and will certainly have a significant influence on the outcome of the gigantic struggles that the future holds.

C.G. (Translated from the French)

1“The history of the International has been a continuous struggle against the sects and the amateurs who are always trying to maintain themselves within the International itself against the real movement of the class.” (Marx, letter to Bolte, 23 November 1871)

 

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Theses on the international situation

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1. The crisis which began to affect the developed countries in 1965 and which accelerated dramatically at the end of 1973, is neither a crisis of civilization, nor a monetary crisis, nor a crisis of raw materials, nor one of 'reconstruction'. It is the crisis of the world capitalist system itself.

2. The growth in unemployment which accompanied the generalized drop in world production, and which has reached a scale comparable to that of 1929, together with the multiplication of famines and epidemics in certain 'Third World' countries, and finally the continuous crisis of agriculture even in the most developed countries, are the clearest symptoms that the sickness which is increasingly shaking world capitalism today is not a mere passing conjunctural or cyclical recession but the convulsions of a
system in its death-throes.

3. This second open crisis of the capitalist system resoundingly confirms the thesis, defended by revolutionaries for nearly sixty years in the wake of the Communist International, that the period opened up by World War I is one of decline of a mode of production which has reached the limits of its historical trajectory. In this period, the world crisis is the reflection of the state of decomposition of a decadent system.

4. Faced with the end of the reconstruction period which originated in the destruction caused by the second imperialist conflict, capitalism has tried to escape from an open crisis by pushing its first symptoms onto the backward regions and by trying to find a solution to its own contradictions in local wars, in particular the Vietnam war. These efforts have ended in total failure. In fact, they have had a boomerang effect which has considerably intensified the destructive shocks of the crisis.

5. In contrast to 1929, when a generalized crash signalled the beginning of an open crisis, the present crisis is no longer characterized by a brutal collapse but by a prolonged, gradual momentum. The bourgeoisie, forced by its own class survival instincts to draw the lessons of the last crisis, is accelerating the tendency towards state control of the whole economy. The injection into capital’s ailing veins of fictitious capital in the form of generalized inflation, has made it possible to hold back the system's slide towards a final collapse.

6. However, the recourse to these palliatives has only amplified the problems capitalism has been trying to ward off. Today, whatever the hemisphere, continent, or nation, the crisis has made itself felt everywhere. The various 'economic miracles' with their steady and rapid rates of growth are now nothing but shadows haunting the memory of the ruling class. The sombre reality of life in the 'Third World', which has been in permanent crisis throughout the period of reconstruction, has now become part of the whole world economic scene.

The world economy - despite the apparatus of state capitalism in each of its national sectors - is today doomed to go through increasingly violent oscillations between hyper-inflation and brutal deflation. This destruction of money capital is simply an expression of the impossibility of global capital escaping from the asphyxiation which is choking it in the form of over-production and massive budget deficits, and which can in the long run only result in the catastrophic downfall of the system.

7. The countries of the Russian bloc, the numerous 'picturesque' varieties of 'socialism' which, according to the left and the leftists, are free from the effects of the crisis thanks to their so-called 'scientific', 'socialist' planning, have also been plunged into the crisis in 1975. This late entry into the crisis can be explained by the permanent mechanisms and manipulations resorted to by the 'ideal capital: the state'; but now these countries are poorly placed to resist the shocks of a crisis which grows deeper and deeper as more and more countries are hit by it.

9. The crisis in the Eastern bloc strikingly confirms the marxist thesis according to which decadent capitalism is incapable of resolving its contradictions. 'State capitalism' is not a solution to the crisis, as the Stalinists assert, together with those councilists who define it as 'state socialism'. The failure of this 'solution' is now depriving the bourgeoisie of one of its most powerful mystifications.

10. Revolutionaries must energetically denounce the mystifications about a 'recovery' which are now being put forward by the bourgeoisie, whether in the form of plans to get the economy 'on the move', or of nationalizations. The propaganda of revolutionaries within their class must be based on the fact that within a framework of capitalist decadence all these so-called 'solutions' can do nothing but plaster over the cracks in a way that involves attacking the proletariat's standard of living and constantly worsening its conditions of existence.

11. Today, as it was fifty years ago, there is only one alternative: war or revolution. On a hyper-saturated world market where each national capital in order to survive must export its own commodities to the detriment of rival capitals, the only 'solution' can be a violent one. The proletariat has been plunged brutally into a crisis which could result in its being used as cannon-fodder in a third imperialist conflict. As the last two wars have shown such a conflict could easily mean for humanity an irremediable relapse into barbarism. Therefore, the communist revolution, which will allow humanity to pass from the reign of necessity to the reign of freedom, appears as an historic necessity.

12. In contrast to the inter-war period the main tendency today is not towards imperialist war. Since the end of the reconstruction period the proletariat has displayed a combativity which has increased ten-fold with the deepening crisis. Only a brutal crushing of the proletariat, or a series of repeated defeats, could reverse the current trend-towards revolution and open the way to another imperialist war. Today, the fact that the crisis has coincided with a rising tide of class struggle means that the proletarian revolution is on the agenda in similar conditions to those envisaged by Marx and not like the last revolutionary wave, which came out of an imperialist war. Such a war today could only come after the proletarian movement had disappeared.

13. As the two great imperialist conflicts have shown, war is the only perspective for the bourgeoisie. Imperialist war, whose world-wide destructive effects lead to a regression of the productive forces, cannot be a remedy for the decline of capitalism: in fact each war only accelerates that decline. For capital war is the only way out, but it can never resolve the problem of the crisis; it is simply the continuation of the crisis by other means.

14. Although world war is not on the immediate agenda today, capital is nevertheless using 'national liberation' wars and local wars just as it did in the past: to test and perfect its arsenal of death in preparation for a third world conflict.

15. The end of the Vietnam war did not mark the beginning of an era of 'armed peace' between the two blocs, sanctioned by the Helsinki conferences. The armaments industry is the only sector of the economy to have undergone a rapid feverish development since the crisis began. The year 1975 was accompanied by the most enormous armaments programmes humanity has ever known. Far from establishing an era of Russo-American co-partnership, as the latter-day descendants of Kautsky would have it, this year has seen the acceleration of armaments production; the only limit on this growth is the increasing combativity of the proletariat.

16. Though the two imperialist blocs continue to gauge their strength in the zones peripheral to capitalism, today inter-imperialist conflicts are moving closer to the vital centres of the system. The Mediterranean, where Russia and the USA confront each other through different local wars, is tending to become the powder-keg of the capitalist world. The development of the war in Angola, the border incidents between China and India and China and Russia, are a sign of the fact that for both strategic and economic reasons the two big imperialisms are concentrating their forces on areas closer and closer to the industrial heartlands of capital.

17. The multiplication of local wars between countries within the same bloc (Greece and Turkey) or the apparent 'national independence' granted to the countries of South East Asia by the two big imperialist powers do not signify a weakening of the blocs constituted around the USSR and USA. Such phenomena show that each camp has strengthened its political stranglehold over its sphere of influence to the point where direct military intervention is no longer necessary. The apparent development of centrifugal tendencies within each bloc, tendencies originating in the desperate attempts of each national bourgeoisie to find a way of resolving 'its own' crisis, represents nothing but an anachronistic resistance against the centripetal force which pushes each national capital into the lap of its respective imperialist bloc. Today the slogan of each bourgeoisie can no longer be 'every man for himself' as it was during the period of reconstruction; instead it must be 'everyone stick together'. The collapse of a single industrial country could lead to the collapse of all the others, and the necessity to reinforce the blocs in preparation for world war more and more imposes an iron discipline within each camp.

18. In the game of strength between the two great imperialist powers, it is the USA which has scored the most points at the expense of Russia which has had to withdraw to its positions of strength; it has been concentrating on reinforcing internal discipline and cohesion even though its foreign policy is still based on the search for new sources of strategic support.

China, the third biggest imperialist power in the world, is playing the same role Russia played before 1914: although it is trying to find new spheres of influence in Asia and Africa its economic weakness prevents it from undertaking a policy of expansion on its own. Like Czarist Russia it is destined to provide the cannon-fodder for one bloc or another in a third imperialist conflict. If China is today allied with the USA against Russia, the history of the last fifty years has shown that a change of allies is always possible.

19. The thesis defended by the leftists which holds that US imperialism has been weakened by the blows of different 'national liberation' struggles is a complete mystification and an attempt to mobilize the workers behind the Russian bloc. The corollary of this thesis, the 'crumbling of the blocs', when it is not a veiled apology for nationalism with its talk of 'national independence', is a dangerous under-estimation of capital's preparation for war and leads either to pacifism or a wait-and-see attitude.

20. In the face of the reawakening class struggle which poses a mortal threat to capital, the bourgeoisie can only reinforce its preparations and its cohesion on a global scale in order to be able to form a single bloc against the eventuality of a proletarian revolution. Against a bourgeoisie forced to take more and more extreme measures to get out of the crisis, the proletariat will be forced to understand the immense importance of the ruthless struggle it has to wage against its mortal enemy.

21. The 1929 crash could lead revolutionaries in the past to believe that the crisis would be a factor of demoralization for the proletariat, opening the fatal path to war. But the present crisis is in fact a real school of struggle for the proletariat whose fears are dissolved in the flames of the class struggle. In the present period the deepening of the crisis under the repeated blows of the international class struggle can only accelerate that struggle, reinforcing the cohesion and strength of the proletariat's ranks; and this is a vital pre-condition for the proletariat to move onto a qualitatively higher stage of consciousness and organization. The giant lulled by fifty years of counter-revolution but galvanized by the crisis has reappeared on the historic scene with a new strength. From Spain to Argentina, from Britain to Poland, whatever name capitalist exploitation goes by, the proletariat is once again the spectre that haunts the world.

22. Although the explosions of working class struggle between 1969 and 1971 in Europe were followed by a certain reflux, the year 1975 marked a new stage in the proletarian struggle, which once the initial stupor had disappeared, took the form of an intense resistance against capital's attacks (massive unemployment rapid deterioration of living standards. The course of the class struggle is today at a decisive turning point. The class struggle, though it develops slowly and through sporadic outbursts, is more and more tending to attain a qualitatively higher level, gaining in breadth and depth what it may have temporarily lost in sheer weight of numbers. Although the renewal of workers' struggles has so far taken place in countries with a deeply rooted tradition of class struggle, the extension of these struggles all over the world is the sign of their impending mass generalization and thus the embryo of the formation of the world proletarian army.

23. Nevertheless it is on Spain that the attention of revolutionaries is concentrated today, owing to the intensity and radical nature of the struggles of the Spanish workers. Although in 1936 Spain was quickly transformed into a testing ground for the second imperialist world war, in the current period it is destined to play a decisive role in the international balance of forces between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It will serve as a real laboratory for the titanic struggles brewing between the two antagonistic classes and revolutionaries will have to be able to draw all the lessons from the crucial events which will take place there, and which will have a vital influence in deciding whether the world revolution will surge forward or be smothered.

24. However, because of the

- still gradual and relatively slow rhythm of the crisis

- and the weight of fifty years of counter-revolution, during which the proletariat went through the bloodiest defeats in its entire history and lost the most elementary of its class instincts

the reawakening of struggle still manifests itself on the economic terrain of resistance to capital. Even when these struggles reach the level of mass strikes which immediately pose the question of confronting the state, they tend to take on a jerky movement, to follow an irregular course; very often big outbursts of struggle are followed by an apparent apathy. The proletariat still seems not to have become fully conscious of the rich lessons contained in the struggles it has engaged in, even if its general experiences are everywhere the same.

Despite the sporadic appearance of political nuclei within the proletariat in places where the class struggle has attained the highest levels of development, the class has not been and is still not able to become spontaneously conscious of the need to move from the economic terrain to the political terrain of generalized offensive against capital, from partial struggles to the global struggle which will necessarily involve the appearance of the unitary, economic and political organs of the whole class: the workers' councils.

25. Throughout the world the lessons which are already beginning to be engraved on the heart and mind of the class are everywhere the same, from the most backward to the most developed countries:

- bitter resistance against the effects of the crisis through the generalization of the class struggle.

- class autonomy through confrontation with the unions, the arm of capital within the factory.

- necessity of a direct political struggle through confrontation with the capitalist state.

26. The appearance and development in this heat of struggle of workers' assemblies which bring together all the workers of one or several factories for a given struggle, express the gropings of the revolutionary class towards autonomy. In the present period, when the level of class struggle remains relatively modest, these organs can only be the embryos of the unitary organizations of the class. As such, in the absence of a permanent class struggle, they will be forced either to disappear as the struggle dies down, or to be transformed into trade unions and thus into new instruments of mystification.

27. The increasingly chronic paralysis of the political apparatus of capital which is taking place in countries whose economy is half-way between development and industrialization, such as Portugal and Argentina, is a pre-figuration of the social and economic decomposition which, as the crisis and the class struggle accelerate, lies in store for the whole of capitalism. As past revolutions have shown, the proletarian revolution occurs when the bourgeoisie can no longer govern in the old stable way and when the workers more and more refuse to go on living as they had been.

28. In the face of art increasingly audacious and combative proletariat, the bourgeoisie is less able to muster the capacity and cohesion needed to 'crush the class and mobilize it for a third world war. Its strategy today is to avoid any frontal struggle with its mortal enemy, anything which might push the class struggle in a revolutionary direction. Mystification - ie the whole strategy of diverting, dividing and demoralizing the proletariat - is the only real weapon the bourgeoisie can use today. The various mystifications used by capital to prevent or at least slow down the development of revolutionary consciousness in the class are in the present period much more effective and dangerous weapons than its whole arsenal of repression, or all the measures it has already taken to prepare for civil war. Nevertheless the bourgeoisie is well aware that, in the end, a direct confrontation is inevitable; the mystifications it is using now pimply serve to gain time so that the proletariat can be taken on in the most favourable circumstances.

29. Because they alone can serve to divert the proletariat from its class terrain, the parties of the left, whose accession to power is an ineluctable necessity for capital, constitute the only possible replacement for the traditional governing parties who today find it impossible to keep the working class under control. Their capacity to present themselves to the workers as 'their' parties enables them to play a vital role in persuading the class to make sacrifices for its own 'popular government' or 'socialist economy'. It is true that there are cases where the instability or archaic nature of the political apparatus of capital, or else a local defeat for the proletariat, have led to the replacement of the left by the right; but because the political solutions of the bourgeoisie can only work on a global scale, the necessity of the left-wing solution will tend to impose itself everywhere in the face of a proletariat which cannot be defeated or at least paralyzed unless this happens on a global scale.

30. Nevertheless, since the mystifying capacities of the traditional parties of the left have begun to run dry after fifty years of the counter-revolution, they will increasingly be replaced by more radical or leftist factions in their efforts to derail the class struggle. These factions are the last card of mystification which the bourgeoisie is keeping carefully in reserve until the moment when a global confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat becomes unavoidable. However, neither the left nor the leftists, nor any other faction of capital are capable of resolving the crisis: their arrival may hold back the final conflagration between the two classes but it cannot prevent it.

31. Today, as in the past, the weapon the left uses against the proletariat, which still retains many illusions from the period of counter-revolution, is that of frontism. All the varieties of anti-fascism, anti-Stalinism, etc are so many systematic manoeuvres by capital to make the proletariat abandon its class terrain. Revolutionaries must warn the proletariat against all the 'democratic' illusions which, as in the past, can only serve to lead it to another massacre; they must tirelessly denounce all the parties who make themselves the propagandists of all the 'democratic' and 'anti' campaigns.

32. Today neither 'fascism' nor 'dictatorship' is on the agenda: East and West the bourgeoisie is preparing its democratic arsenal. But in the present period this theme cannot have the same influence it did during the period of counter-revolution. Limiting the proletariat to the framework of the factory by means of self-management; making the workers believe that the solution to the crisis is to be found in 'national independence' from the 'multinationals' or 'foreign imperialism'; these are the principal mystifications which will be used today to obstruct any movement towards class autonomy, towards generalized class consciousness, and to atomize and dissolve the interests of the class into those of the 'whole nation'.

33. Thus its 'understanding' of the situation, sharpened by the fact that its very survival as a class is at stake, has allowed the bourgeoisie to carry on with its manoeuvres this year to avoid any direct confrontation with the proletariat. Even if on a local level (Portugal, Spain) the bourgeoisie has been unable to manoeuvre with its usual facility, on a global scale it has managed to deal with the proletariat's response to the crisis and the crisis itself with a whole number of plans and strategies without suffering any major setbacks. Even so the proletariat has already begun to free itself from the illusions and mystifications thrust upon it by the ruling class.

34. Revolutionaries must warn the proletariat against any under-estimation of the strength and manoeuvrability of its class enemy. Even more than in the past, faced with a bourgeoisie strengthened by all the lessons and experience of a century and a half, the cohesion and organization of the proletariat on a world scale are an imperious necessity. By their active participation in all the proletariat's struggles against capital, revolutionaries must show that today the slightest set-back in the fight against a bitter enemy could have disastrous repercussions if the proletariat fails to draw the lessons of its experience by developing its own autonomous forms of self-organization.

35. The ICC calls on all revolutionary groups and individuals to regroup in a single fighting organization, to concentrate their forces and not disperse them. When the choice is between the triumph of communism or an irreversible relapse into barbarism, revolutionaries must be aware of the weight of historic responsibility which lies on their shoulders. The slightest delay in organization or the rejection of organization can only mean abandoning their task of intervening within the class in an organized way, of acting as the most resolute fraction of the world proletarian movement. If revolutionaries fail to live up to the task for which the class has engendered them, they will bear a heavy responsibility if their class is defeated.

In the great battles which are now brewing the organized and resolute intervention of revolutionaries will have an influence which, at a decisive moment, could tip the balance in favour of the victory of the world proletariat over capitalism.

Life of the ICC: 

  • Congress Resolutions [45]

Rubric: 

International Situation

International Review no.6 - August 1976

  • 4008 reads

Introduction to the texts from "Bilan"

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By republishing these texts from Bilan (the publication of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left) dealing with events in Spain between 1936-9, we do not pretend to be historians at pains to provide detailed and chronological descriptions of events as they happened. For the researcher look­ing for material, there are dozens of often well-documented history books available today that can amply fulfil his needs. Our aim is quite different. If the history of humanity has always been the history of class struggle, then yesterday’s struggles do not represent for the proletariat a ‘fixed’, ‘dead’ past, but are ever-living moments in the proletariat’s historic struggle for the revolutionary transforma­tion of society, a struggle that is always underway. Not only have the content and final goal of the struggle always remained the same, but even the basic political features - the political forces present, their importance and the positions they take up and defend - hardly vary. Thus the understanding of its past struggles, constit­utes for the proletariat (the only revolu­tionary class in capitalist society) a nece­ssary and constant effort to go on deepening its knowledge of the content and methods of proletarian struggle in order to grasp and overcome its own weaknesses and errors, expose and avoid dead-ends and diversions, and forge its consciousness and weapons for the battles of the future and its ulti­mate victory. The texts from Bilan remain of immense inte­rest, not only because the positions defended by the Italian Left were the only sound class response to the problems facing the Spanish proletariat forty years ago, but still more because the same problems remain at the core of the present-day struggles of the Spanish and international proletar­iat. It is not a question of showering praise on a revolutionary group of the past whose contribution, in any case, no revolu­tionary could ignore, but of grasping its positions that have for the most part with­stood the test of living experience, and which must be used by us as a guiding thread in the present and future confrontations of the working class. The strength of Bilan’s analysis of the sit­uation in Spain lies primarily in the fact that it placed this particular situation in a global and historic context. A com­mon error, even within the ranks of the, Communist Left, is to analyse situations from the point of view of one country in isolation from all others. Such an approach, which purports to be ‘marxist’, ‘materialist’ and ‘concrete’, inevitably leads to the worst aberrations. The ‘unequal develop­ment’ of capitalism that Marx spoke about, and its implications for the class struggle, clearly had an important role to play at the beginning of capitalism and during its ascendant period. Capitalism developed out of a regionalized economy and slowly broke loose from its restrictions. Under such conditions the importance of regional or national particularities could. Still have a preponderant effect on the evolution of capitalism both on the local and general level. But to the extent that capitalism developed and created the world market, the local specificities while still existing, lose their importance, and give way to the general laws of capitalism, so that as a world system capitalism imposes its domi­nation on each country alike and on all countries in general. One can thus make the following general formulation: the more developed capitalism is as a system the more individual countries find they are dependent on the evolution of the system as a whole, and characteristics peculiar to a particular country play a less impor­tant role in analyzing its own development.

It is in the period of decadence, when the capitalist system, as a whole, enters into its decline and when the development of its contradictions has become insurmountable, that the global unity of the system is mast apparent. This being the case it is a diversion to focus an analysis on the basis of the particularities of each country and the degree of capitalist development each has reached, on the pretext of applying the law of ‘unequal development’. There are numerous analyses which have as their point of reference the backward state of the Russian economy, taken in isolation, and thus came to reject the very possibility of a socialist revolution and, consequently, deny any proletarian significance to the October Revolution in 1917. This is a typically Menshevik approach and in the fi­nal analysis means applying the schemas and norms of the bourgeois revolution to the crisis of capitalism and to the proletarian revolution. The Communist International of Stalin/Bukharin went back to this schema in order to justify its policy of a bloc of four classes in China, and in so doing rediscovered the bourgeois-democratic revo­lution ten years after the October Revolu­tion took place. This approach was shared by those who fought for the, proletarian revolution in Germany, but denied it could happen in Russia; by those who invented the theory of a ‘dual revolution’ (bourgeois and proletarian at the same time); as well as those who continue to see a progressive movement in ‘national liberation’ wars and persist in seeing the bourgeois-democratic revolutions on the historical agenda for the under-developed and colonial countries, while simultaneously preaching quite happ­ily a sermon on the proletarian revolution in the industrialized countries. The first difficulty, the first obstacle, which Bilan came up against regarding the events in Spain, was the approach of all those who put forward the idea that Spain was a ‘special case’ and talked about “feudalism and the struggle against reactio­nary feudalism”. The backward state of the Spanish economy became a thing in itself, and served as a justification for all the compromises and opened the door to all the betrayals. By putting Spain back into the world economy, Bilan pointed out the capi­talist nature of this country and demonstra­ted that it was only within the framework of the world capitalist economy in crisis that the situation in Spain could and had to be understood. No less important, Bilan situated the struggle of the Spanish proletariat within the context of the overall global evolution of the proletarian struggle. On what course of action did the proletariat in the 1930s find itself set? On a course of mounting revolutionary struggle? Or a course in which, having suffered profound defeats, the demoralized proletariat would let itself be integrated into the mobiliza­tions for national defence, under the slo­gans of defending democracy and anti-fascism - a course which would inevitably lead to the imperialist war? Trotsky recognized that the victory of Hitler in Germany had opened the way to war and he denounced this as such; but with the advent of the Popular Front in France and Spain his analysis altered completely and he boldly announced in 1936 that, “The Revolution had started in France”. Bilan’s analysis was totally dif­ferent. They did-not see the triumph of the Popular Front as a reversal of the course towards war, but on’ the contrary considered it to be a reinforcement of this course. They saw that the Popular Front was an appro­priate response by the democratic countries to the hysterical war-mongering of Germany and Italy - a way, and one of the most effec­tive ways - to make the proletariat leave its class terrain in order to mobilize it for the defence of ‘democracy’ and the national interest; a necessary preparation before leading the proletariat off to fight another imperialist war.

What perspective could there be for, the heroic struggles of the Spanish proletariat within this context? It is undeniable that the Spanish proletariat gave a magnificent example of combativity and decisiveness in its vigorous struggle against the uprising carried out by Franco’s armies - especially in the early days. But no matter how remarkable the combativity of the Spanish working class was, the development of events showed only too quickly that it was, not within the power of the Spanish proletariat to go on to a revolutionary victory, while there was a world reflux and immobilization of the inter­national working class. Bilan, and using as their only criterion the combativity of the Spanish workers, they imagined that the Spanish working class now had a chance to reverse the general process of reflux and inaugurate a new revolutionary movement. Carried along by revolutionary sentimentalism rather than by rigorous analysis, they did not see in the events in Spain the last ripple of the great revolu­tionary wave of 1917-20 - the last convul­sive movement of a world proletariat engul­fed in a tide of national unity and war. By announcing that the events in Spain were a reawakening of the revolution, they thus took up Trotsky’s perspective. It is hardly surprising, then, that by clinging to the vain hope for a miracle that could never happen, they were led to see such things as the workers’ militias and participation in government as victories for the working class when they served only to reinforce capitalism. And they thereby closed their eyes to the tragic reality of the completely disoriented Spanish pro­letariat being handed over to the very worst capitalist massacre. These communist groups found themselves foundering politi­cally, becoming ‘critical’ accomplices and touts of the war, just like the Trotskyists and POUMists. The tragic events experienced by the Spa­nish proletariat in 1936 have left us with this precious lesson: just as October 1917 showed us the possibility of victory for a proletarian revolution in a backward capita­lism because it was borne along by a general revolutionary wave which the Russian prole­tariat only expressed and initiated, so Spain in 1936 showed us how impossible it was for a proletariat in an under-developed country to reverse a general process of tri­umphant counter-revolution, no matter how combative that proletariat might be. This has nothing to do with fatalism or standing passively to one side. As Bilan wrote: “The task of the moment was not to ‘betray!” In Spain in 1936 it was not the victory of the revolution that was at stake; the essen­tial point was to prevent the proletariat abandoning or being thrown off its class terrain and sacrificing itself on the altar of the counter-revolution, whether in its fascist or democratic form. If the Spanish proletariat was not able to make a success­ful revolution, it could and had to remain firmly on the terrain of the class struggle, rejecting any alliance or coalition with bourgeois factions and rejecting the anti-fascist war as a lie which would lead to its crushing defeat - a war that would serve as a prelude to six years of uninterrupted massacre of millions of proletarians in a second imperialist world war. Such was the first task and first duty of revolutionaries at that time as Bilan made clear in denoun­cing with all its might that false ‘solida­rity’ that consisted of appealing for men and arms to send to Spain. The only out­come of this could be the prolongation and growth of the war to the point where a local capitalist war would be transformed into a general imperialist war.

The war in Spain rejuvenated and produced yet another myth, another lie. At the same time as the class war of the proletariat against capitalism was replaced by a war between ‘democracy’ and ‘fascism’ and class frontiers were replaced by territorial fron­tiers, the very content of the revolution it­self was deformed by replacing its central objective - the destruction of the bourgeois state and the taking of political power by the proletariat - for so-called socializa­tion measures and workers’ control in the factories. It was above all the anarchists and certain tendencies claiming to come from councilism who were conspicuous in extolling this myth the most - going so far as to declare that in Republican, Stalinist, anti-fascist Spain, socialist positions were more advan­ced than those reached by the October Revolution. We do not want to enter here into a detai­led analysis of the importance and signifi­cance of these measures. The reader will find a sufficiently clear answer to those questions in the following texts taken from Bilan. What we do want to make clear is that even had these measures been more radi­cal than in fact, they were, nothing could change the fundamentally counter-revolutio­nary nature of the events that took place in Spain. For the bourgeoisie, as for the proletariat, the crux of the revolution can only be the preservation or destruction of the capitalist state. Not only can capita­lism temporarily accommodate itself to self-management measures or a so-called socialisation of farming (in other words the form­ation of co-operatives), while still wait­ing for a chance to restore order at the first propitious moment (see the recent experiences in Portugal) it can also per­fectly well instigate these measures as a means of mystification to derail the ener­gies of the proletariat in the direction of illusionary ‘victories’ in order to di­vert it from the central objective - the stakes of the revolution - the destruction of capitalism’s focus of power, its state. To glorify these alleged social measures as the summation of the revolution is only a verbal radicalism which at best masks the same old reformist idea of a gradual social transformation. But this radical phraseology meant more than that in Spain in 1936: it was a capitalist mystification attempting to divert the proletariat from its revolut­ionary struggle against the state. Them­selves duped by mystifications and appear­ances, in the first place currents supporting such measures became accomplices to this diversion doing their utmost to blur and confuse the clear view of the primary task of proletarian revolution. Against these radical phraseologists, and in com­plete agreement with Bilan, we affirm that a revolution which does not begin with the destruction of the capitalist state can be anything you like to call it, but not a proletarian revolution. The events that took place in Spain in 1936 have only tragi­cally confirmed the revolutionary principle which the Bolshevik Party recognized and applied in 1917 and - which was one of the decisive factors in the victory of October 1917. In Spain in 1936, the proletariat sustained one of its most bloody defeats followed by forty years of ferocious repression. Redu­ced in the course of defeat and triumphant reaction to small groups who found a vehicle for their voice in Bilan, the communist left was painfully aware of its isolation and powerlessness in terms of the immediate situation. Just like the Bolshevik Party and the handful of other revolutionaries of 1914, they remained faithful to communism by going against the stream. If the war and forty years of victorious counter-­revolution finally got the better of its organization, the lessons of the struggle and the revolutionary positions developed by the communist left in the thirties have not been lost. Today with the reawakening of class struggle and with the perspective for its revolutionary development, commu­nists are rediscovering and renewing the thread of this political continuity. In republishing these texts from Bilan we hope to make them an instrument for the political rearming of the proletariat today, and from the lessons of yesterday’s defeats, to forge weapons for the final victory tomorrow.

M.C. Revolution Internationale August 1976.

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1936 - Spain [35]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Italian Left [37]

Bilan 34: Against the imperialist front and massacre of the Spanish workers

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AGAINST THE IMPERIALIST FRONT AND MASSACRE OF THE SPANISH WORKERS - FOR THE CLASS FRONT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROLETARIAT!

The simple general assertion that in Spain today there is a bloody struggle in progress between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, far from helping to take up a political position favourable to the defence and ultimate victory of the proletariat, could actually lead to the most terrible disaster and massacre of the workers. In order to arrive at a positive assessment it is first of all necessary to see whether the masses have been fighting on their own class terrain, and thus whether they are in a position to move forward, to develop the capacity to drive back the attacks of their class enemies.

At the moment there are several explanations of the political situation. Let us deal first with the one put forward by the Popular Front, to which the centrists have given a ‘theoretical’ gloss. According to them ‘the dissidents, the rebels, the fascists’ are fighting a life or death struggle against the ‘legal government which is defending bread and freedom’. The duty of the proletariat is thus to defend the government which represents the pro­gressive bourgeoisie against the forces of feudalism. Once the workers have helped it to defeat these feudal elements, they can then advance to the next stage of the struggle: the fight for socialism. In our last issue we showed that while Spanish capitalism was incapable of achieving the same kind of social organization as exists in other European countries, nevertheless, it is the bourgeoisie which is in power in Spain, and only the proletariat and it alone is capable of overhauling Spain’s economic and political structures.

The Popular Front in Spain, as was the case in other countries, has in the course of events shown itself to be not an instru­ment of the workers but a powerful weapon of the bourgeoisie in its effort to smash the working class. We only have to recall that it was under the Popular Front government that the Right was able to organize its activity in a methodical way; thus the Right was given all the room it needed to prepare its plots and conspiracies (though this more theatrical side of its activities was actually the least important). More signi­ficant than this was the fact that the actions of the Popular Front government have led to the demoralization of the peasant masses and to a profound hostility on the part of the workers, who once again had been moving towards another big wave of strikes like those of 1931-2 that were crushed by the terror carried out by a left-­wing government, by a crew very similar to today’s Popular Front government.

Right from the beginning of the present situation the Popular Front adopted a policy of compromise with the Right, as can be seen by the setting up of the Barrios government. Hence there is nothing surpri­sing in the fact that Franco did not arrest Azaña right at the beginning, even though he could have done so without any problem. The point is that the whole situation was very uncertain and, although the capitalists opted for a frontal attack in every town, they were unsure as to whether their extreme right wing would be able ‘to immediately win a complete victory. Because of this the arrest of Azaña was put off, and it was really the subsequent actions of the Popular Front which gave the capitalist offensive its greatest chance of succeeding.

First in Barcelona and then in other working class centres, the right-wing attack was met by a popular uprising which, because it took place on a class basis and came into conflict with the capitalist state machine, could have very quickly led to the disintegration of the army: as the events of the uprising unfolded on the streets, the class struggle broke out in the regiments and the soldiers rebelled against their officers. At this point the proletariat was moving directly towards an intense political armament, which could only have resulted in an offensive directed against the capitalist class and towards the communist revolution.

Owing to this vehement and powerful response of the proletariat, capitalism felt that it had to abandon its original plan of a uni­form, frontal attack. In the face of the insurgent workers who were developing a powerful class consciousness, the bourgeoisie saw that the only way it could save itself and win out was to give the Popular Front the task of directing the political action of the workers. The arming of the masses was tolerated only so that it could be strictly contained within the limits of a ‘united command’ with a specifically capi­talist political orientation. Today Caballero is in the process of perfecting this instrument from the technical point of view. At the beginning the workers were poorly armed in material terms but well armed politically; after this, however, the workers were laden with sophisticated arms but they were no longer fighting on their own instinctive class basis: they had been gradually shifted onto the opposite terrain, the terrain of the capitalist class.

Rapidly in Madrid, less easily in the Asturias, and after an even more complicated process in Barcelona, the Popular Front was able to achieve its aims and today the masses find themselves trapped by a logic that maintains the capitalist state machine is inviolate, that it must be allowed to function as freely as possible so that the Right can be defeated, since the crushing of the ‘rebels’ is the supreme duty of the hour.

The proletariat has laid down its own class weapons and has consented to a compromise with its enemy through the medium of the Popular Front. In the place of a class line-up (the only one which could have put Franco’s regiments out of joint and res­tored confidence in the peasants who had been terrorized by the Right) a new line ­up has emerged, a specifically capitalist one, and the Union Sacrée (trans. ‘Holy Alliance’) has been achieved. Now the imperialist carnage can set town against town, region against region in Spain, and by extension, state against state in the struggle between the two democratic and fascist blocs.

The fact that a world war has not yet broken out does not mean the Spanish and international proletariat has not already been mobilized for the purpose of butchering itself under the imperialist slogans of fascism and anti-fascism.

After the Italian and German experience, it is extremely depressing to see politically developed workers, basing their analysis on the fact that the Spanish workers are armed, come to the conclusion that, even though the Popular Front is leading these armies and in the absence of a total change in the situation, the conditions exist for the victory of the working class. No, Azaña and Caballero are worthy brothers of the Italian and German socialists whom they have ably emulated - in an extremely difficult situation they have succeeded in betraying the workers. They have allowed the workers to keep their arms only because they are being used in a class struggle which is not that of the proletariat against Spanish and international capital, but that of capital against the working class of Spain and the whole world - a struggle that has taken the form of an imperialist war.

In Barcelona reality is hidden behind a façade. Because the bourgeoisie has tempor­arily withdrawn from the political scene, and because certain enterprises are being run without bosses, some people have come to the conclusion that bourgeois political power no longer exists. But if it didn’t really exist then we would have seen another power arise: the power of the pro­letariat. And here the tragic answer provided by the reality of events is cruel. All the existing political formations, even the most extreme (the CNT), openly proclaim that there can be no question of attacking the capitalist state machine - for even headed by Companys it can be ‘of use’ to the working class. Our position on this question is absolutely clear: there are two principles opposing each other here, two classes, two realities. It is a question of either collaboration and treason, or struggle. In such an extreme situation the forces of collaboration also resort to extreme methods. If in the course of a social conflagration like the one that took place in Barcelona, the workers are pushed not towards attacking the capitalist state, but towards defending it, then it is class collaboration and not class struggle which has won the day. Class struggle does not develop through a series of material con­quests which leave the enemy’s apparatus of power untouched, but through the outbreak of genuinely proletarian actions. To soci­alize an enterprise while leaving the state apparatus intact, is a link in the chain which ties the proletariat to its class enemy, both on the home front and on the imperialist front of struggle between fascism and anti-fascism, whereas the out­break of a strike based on the simplest

class demand and even in a ‘socialized’ industry can be a moment in the eventual triumph of the Spanish and international proletariat.

It is just as impossible to identify the proletariat with the bourgeoisie as it is to identify the present territorial front, the armies of the Union Sacrée, with a class line-up and a class army. The differ­ence between the two is fundamental and is not a question of detail. At the moment there is an apparent contradiction between the details and essentials, between the ardour, the sacrifices, the heroism of the workers enrolled in the armies of the Popular Front and the historic political function of the latter. Like Lenin in April 1917, we have to go to the heart of the problem and it is here that the only real political differentiation can be made. The capitalist attack can only be answered on a proletarian basis. Those who ignore this central problem are deliberately placing themselves on the other side of the barri­cades. As for the much-vaunted social conquests, they are nothing but a mesh tying the workers to the bourgeoisie.

In the present situation in which the proletariat is caught between two capitalist forces, the proletariat can only go forward by following the path that leads to insur­rection. It is impossible for the armies of Catalonia, Madrid, or the Asturias to evolve in a positive direction: a brutal, unequivocal break with them is the only course open to the class. The essential precondition for the salvation of the Spanish working class is the re-establish­ment of class frontiers in opposition to the present territorial divisions. Above all in Catalonia, where the energy of the proletariat is still powerful, it is nece­ssary to channel this energy towards class strugg1e. It is necessary to foil the plans of the capitalists, which consist in crushing the peasant masses with naked terror while using political corruption to seduce the industrial masses into joining the ranks of Spanish and international capital. NO to the Union Sacrée, at any stage of the struggle, at any moment of the battle! It may be that this step in the imperialist war may not immediately lead to a world-wide conflagration. In that case unless there is a total change in the situation, the present conflict in Spain will end in a victory for the Right, because the Right has the role of massacring the workers in their thousands, of installing a regime of total terror like the ones that exterminated the Italian and German prole­tariat. The Left, the Popular Front, has a different capitalist function: its role is to make a bed for the reactionaries, a bloody bed in which thousands of Spanish workers and workers of other countries have already lain.

The working class has only one bastion: its own class struggle. It cannot be victorious when it is imprisoned in the bastion of the enemy and that is what the present military fronts represent for the class. The heroic defenders of Irún were condemned in advance. They had been led onto the capitalist terrain by the Popular Front which succeeded in obliterating their own class terrain and in so doing made them a prey for the armies of Franco.

Armed struggle as part of an imperialist front is the grave of the proletariat. The only response of the proletariat is an armed struggle on its own class terrain. Instead of competing for the conquest of towns and regions, the class must mount an attack on the state machine. This is the only way to disintegrate the regiments of the Right; the only way of foiling the plans of Spanish and international capital. Otherwise, with or without the French proposals about non-intervention, with or without the Coordination Committee composed of fascists, democrats, and centrists (all the important countries are represented on it), capital will have its bloody triumph and the arms merchants of France, Britain, Germany, Italy and the Soviet State itself will deliver the goods to the two general staffs - Franco’s and Caballero’s - so that they can finish off the massacre of the Spanish workers and peasants.

In all countries, whether the bourgeoisie is for or against neutrality, for or against sending arms to Franco or the government, the workers must respond with their own class demonstrations, with strikes against the legal shipment of arms, with struggles against each imperialism. Only in this way can they express their solidarity with the cause of the Spanish proletariat.

(Bilan, no.34, August-September 1936)

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1936 - Spain [35]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • The "united front" [36]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Italian Left [37]

Bilan 35: A slaughter-house for the proletariat in Spain

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The fascists launch their attack in Spain. The traitors to the working class everywhere rush to their posts and demand that their governments send arms and muni­tions to the ‘legal government of the Republic’. This is very different from calling on the working class of each country to mobilize itself for a bitter struggle against ‘its own’ capitalists. That is the class struggle; that is the only way of expressing solidarity with the Spanish workers. The traitors could not even con­ceive of taking such a course of action, which would lead to the weakening of capitalism in every country and would ricochet back to foil the fascist offen­sive in Spain. But such a position is restricted to a few very small proletarian groups, and, almost daily we can watch their number dwindle. Thus the POUM (Workers’ Party of Marxist Unification), the CNT, and the FAI have all protested against M. Blum’s mystifying speech at Luna-Parc only to call upon the French workers not to launch a struggle against their own imperialism, but rather to force the Popular Front government (in France) to lift the blockade of arms shipments to Spain and thus neutralize the aid given by Hitler and Mussolini to the Spanish fascists…

…If we reflect on the profound differ­ence between the first and second phase of events, we can begin to understand the cruel logic of the present situation. On 19 July (1936) the proletariat rose up against the fascist attack and unleashed a general strike. The proletariat was on its feet, the class itself, the only class capable of beating back the fascist offensive. And it was fighting with its own weapon of struggle - the strike. Armed struggle? Yes, but in the service of class resistance. And at that moment there was no government at the workers’ side, no Republicans, no separatists.

The proletariat was terribly strong, because it was terribly alone. After that the whole situation changed. From then on the Spanish workers had the Popular Front government next to them and the sympathy of other powerful governments: the French, the British, the Russian. But the proletariat no longer existed as a class, since once it had left its own elemental class terrain it was nailed to a terrain that was not its own, and was actually in opposition to it - the terrain of its class enemy.

And so the tragedy began. The fascists grew in strength the more the workers - through the Popular Front government - clung to their own bourgeoisie. In Barcelona the capitalist state machine was not only left intact, it was made inviolate, because the workers were being persuaded to make it function as effectively as possible in order to wage the war. The strengthening of the state machine in Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, and its corollary - the strengthening of the same machine in Seville and Burgos - allowed the fascist attack to have an even greater chance of success.

The traitors of various countries are urging the workers to call for government intervention. What would be the result of that? The lesson of 1914-18 is tragically and eloquently applicable. Even if a world conflict did not ensue and an improvement in the military position of the ‘loyalist’ armies allowed them to defeat the generals, the Spanish workers fighting under the leadership, control, and for the objectives of the Popular Front government would dis­cover, just like the French and British workers in 1918, that the price of falling for the deceptions of their exploiters would be an intensification of their slavery. Even if the manoeuvres of capitalism, setting worker against worker, were limited to Spain, even if they do not lead to a world conflict, it doesn’t mean that the Spanish proletariat will be alone in paying the price.

But this hypothesis (of a victory of the Popular Front) does not seem to correspond to the evolution of the terrible events in Spain. Our initial impressions seem to have been confirmed. Capitalism was forced to undergo a bloody conversion from its ex­treme left to its extreme right - the initial plan of crushing the workers of Spain in one fell swoop did not succeed. To achieve that the bourgeoisie has had to make use of a force which acts in a complimentary manner to the general’s frontal attack. This force is represented by the Popular Front.

The manoeuvres of the Popular Front have succeeded in tearing the workers away from their own class front, from street battles against the bourgeoisie, in order to push them onto a purely territorial front. And with every defeat on this front capitalism has fortified its positions of strength within the masses. The defeat at Irún was accompanied by the formation of the extreme-left Caballero government; the fall of Toledo was followed by the entry of the POUM and the anarchists into the Barcelona Generalitat. In this way Spanish capitalism has suffocated the slightest response of the class.

The workers of Spain and of the entire world will remember today’s horrible tragedy. They will add it to the list of similar tragedies in Germany, Italy, Russia, and other countries. The capitalist enemy will enter it into its list of victories against the proletariat, but in historical terms capitalism is definitively condemned. In revenge for being incapable of developing the productive forces it is piling up a mountain of proletarian corpses. But from these countless victims will spring up anew the invincible power that will build a communist society. The workers of Spain are fighting like lions, but they are being beaten because they are being led by traitors, led to fight within the enemy’s bastion on the territorial fronts. From their defeat will arise that wall of steel of class struggle against which the weapons of capital will be powerless, because the workers will no longer be fighting against their brothers but against their class enemies and for the victory of the revolu­tion.

(Bilan, no.35, September-October 1936)

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1936 - Spain [35]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • The "united front" [36]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Italian Left [37]

Bilan 36: The order of the day: Don't betray!

  • 4378 reads

THE ORDER OF THE DAY: DON’T BETRAY!

Our position can be utterly destroyed by a single sentence. Which? That when the Spanish workers are struggling resolutely against the fascist attack, fighting like lions against an enemy which gets its arms and ammunition from Hitler and Mussolini with the complicity of Blum and Eden; when they are making barricades out of their own bodies to stop the advance of the fascist hordes; when, in every country, there are hundreds and thousands of workers who are ready to join the battle front - your posi­tion serves only to demoralize the ranks of the fighters, facilitates the advance of the fascist enemy, and fragments the fronts where the workers are contesting every inch of the ground with Franco, behind whom stands the coalition of international fascism.

However, this sentence doesn’t constitute an argument. And, even if it’s able to get a bigger hearing - because of its dema­gogic appeal - than that found by our posi­tion, this doesn’t mean it expresses a gen­uine solidarity with the Spanish workers. It represents, in short, nothing but one more twist in the rope used to bind up the proletariat before turning it over to the forces who are leading the workers, their institutions and class, to the scaffold. Let us say again that in a discussion bet­ween different currents who claim to be working for the liberation of the workers from the capitalist yoke, it is not a ques­tion of engaging in a polemical battle aim­ed at alienating and silencing one’s adver­sary and his arguments. It is a question of presenting political positions and mobi­lizing those forces that can shape the struggle for the defence and the victory of the working class against the capitalist enemy. It is only on this terrain that political divergence can correspond to the interests of the workers in Spain and in every other country; only on this front can the energies of the working class be concen­trated on building the barricades of defence and victory.

Waves of demagogy may drown us, but the ruthless momentum of events has not only left all our political positions intact, it has also confirmed them in the most tragic way; and this only because we remain unshakably anchored to the class interests of the proletariat. If we thought it could help the Spanish workers, we would swallow our words down to the last syllable. But we have, no choice but to view the anger of those militants who oppose us, not as a positive element in the resistance of the Spanish workers, but as another expression of the triumph of our class enemy’s strata­gems. Capitalism can only win this new battle if it succeeds in mobilizing the most advanced sectors of the class and the revolutionary militants who struggle within these sectors. And it is doing this with the aid of the colossal mystification of anti-fascism, which is yet again proving to be a bed for fascism.

What is happening today is a most tragic confirmation of marxism. Much more than in an intermediary situation, the position of the working class in decisive moments can only be salvaged on the basis of class positions: anything else can only lead to the worst possible massacre of the workers. The slightest compromise brings with it (in exchange for illusions about having got something out of the struggle) the dismal certainty that the enemy has penetrated the ranks of the workers and is methodically preparing their downfall.

Yes. We have taken up a firm unshakeable decision concerning the events in Spain. At no price, under no circumstances, will we fall into the trap that is being laid for us. Our reply to the enemy who calls us to arms to fight against fascism is to proclaim the necessity to struggle against our own capitalism. The millions of workers who fell in the 1914-18 war believed that they were fighting in order to uproot the main obstacle preventing the emancipation of the working class, whether this was Czarism or Prussianism. But in reality they fell in order to safeguard the capitalist system and their corpses on both sides built a macabre barricade, the barricade of the bourgeoisie against the revolutionary onslaught of the masses. We will never ever forget this tra­gic lesson, and our watchword will be to strike against each sector of capitalism in order to undermine the system throughout the world.

On the question of bourgeois power, our watchword is again quite clear: the lesson of 1914 has taught us that under no pretext can we collaborate with the bourgeoisie. Against the alluring idea of penetrating the capitalist state in order to work within it either for socialism, or to block an attack by the forces of reaction, the mill­ions of workers who fell in the struggle for ‘liberation’ are proof that collaboration with the bourgeoisie means the imprisonment and ruin of the workers. It means deliver­ing the workers into the hands of the enemy.

Now we come to the events in Spain. What remains of the tragic lessons of 1914? Some people began to talk about the emergence of a revolutionary situation, only to add imm­ediately that to unleash class struggle, to attack the capitalist state, destroy it and set up a proletarian power - all this would not be in the interests of the workers, but rather the fascist aggressors. One thing or the other is true: either a revolutionary situation does exist and you have to fight against capitalism, or it doesn’t. If the latter is the case then to speak of revolu­tion to the workers, when unfortunately what is on the agenda can only be a defence of partial gains, is to hurl the masses into an abyss where they will be slaughtered. “The workers believe that they are fighting for socialism” Of course! It couldn’t be otherwise. It was the same in 1914. But is the task of revolutionary militants to go among the workers and say that the road to socialism is the one which leads to the destruction of the capitalist regime or the one which leads to the imprisonment of the workers within that regime?

But, we are told, we are not in 1914. In Spain there is not a confrontation between two imperialist armies in the service of contending states - or in any case, not yet. Today, fascism is on the attack and the workers are defending themselves. By participating in the armed struggle of the workers, by working for a military victory over fascism, we are not at all repeating the actions of those who led the workers to slaughter in 1914.

The lesson of the last war is indeed still cruelly vivid in the memory of the workers. Even the bait of a war against fascism is insufficient, and as soon as the workers see the various capitalist states enter the lists they will quickly understand that they are fighting and dying not for their own interests, but for the interests of their class enemy. Before the last war, the nat­ionalist movements of each country were directed against each other, while socia­lism raised the banner of the unification of all peoples in order to maintain peace. Today the rightist movements in each coun­try have established themselves everywhere, and it’s here that we have a re-edition of 1914 in a new form. The difference in form is a result both of the extreme tension in the relationship between the classes and the fact that capitalism today is forced to mis­lead and deceive the workers in order to be able to slaughter them by putting a new em­blem on the same old flag - the flag defen­ding and safeguarding the capitalist system. But, we are so often told, the events in Spain have not yet unfolded in the same way as the events in 1914, though they may do tomorrow. Still, as long as they haven’t reached that point, we must defend territo­ries threatened by the fascist attack.

But isn’t the future something real? Can tomorrow be anything else than the develop­ment of what is happening today? The moment the workers set foot on a path which could lead to war, they have left their own path and have become the victims of forces which they can no longer outwit, because they have been politically disarmed by those forces the moment they get mixed up with them. Of, course a militant or a group can wash his hands of the whole thing as soon as there is no longer any doubt about the situation and the contending imperialist states intervene openly, but how can the mass of workers disengage themselves from the resulting tur­moil? Moreover, wasn’t it clear that from the very beginning of the events in Spain, the different capitalist states were pulling the strings of the situation in order to en­sure that the Spanish workers got crushed? And that means all states, the fascist and the democratic states, as well as the Soviet state. And what other way is there of dis­lodging these states except the class strug­gle in every ‘country? Doesn’t the slogan “Lift the blockade” simply prepare the ground for the next imperialist war? Isn’t it simply to go the way of Jouhaux, of the 2nd and 3rd Internationals, who have succeeded in suffocating movements of the class (the only response of the workers which can really express solidarity with the Spanish workers) by tying the workers to the capitalist state and pushing the latter towards a new imperialist war?

Our central position follows from the thesis (which everyone seems to admit as being be­yond dispute) that fascism is simply the most savage expression of capitalism, so that it is only by attacking capitalism that the proletariat can defend its interests and thwart the enemy’s offensive. And it is really disconcerting when we hear that wa­ging a class struggle against capitalism could actually serve the interests of capi­talism. It is obvious that when we compare Barcelona to Seville there is a much greater possibility in Barcelona of waging a struggle against, capitalism, and it is incomprehen­sible that the energies of the proletariat there should be channelled not towards the struggle against the bourgeoisie, but in the opposite direction: towards the integration of the proletariat into the capi­talist state. It should be recalled that the anarchists, in order to justify their entry into the Caballero government, argued that this was the only way of permitting the real arming of the workers which had been sabotaged by previous governments. We can understand the panic suffered by those who are caught up in the whirlpool of events, but to us this argument of the CNT is simply a repetition of what the reformists have always said: that we have to enter the ‘state’ apparatus in order to prevent it serving the interests of capitalism. The Spanish tragedy has added a new and dismal note to the tragedy of 1914.

“Unleashing the class struggle in regions which are not under fascist control would result in the fall of these territories and their occupation by Franco’s hordes.” That is the reply we get, an attempt to prove the impossibility of applying the positions we have defended since these events began. Apart from the fact that this has in no way been proved, there is another consideration: even if the defence of a class position had the result of hastening the tragic outcome of the situation - which would in any case show that the situation had been an extreme­ly unfavourable one for the workers - then at least the arrival of the fascists would take place when the energies of the prole­tariat or at least part of the proletariat would still be strong. In such a situation, after a struggle which could only result in defeat, the enemy would at least have been unable to strangle the best elements of the proletariat by demoralizing the class as a whole.

Immediately after the workers’ uprising of 19 July Spanish capitalism followed a dual strategy in its efforts to strangle the proletarian class struggle. In the rural areas it resorted to the White Terror; in the working class centres it integrated the masses into the state apparatus, putting them under a general staff which would inev­itably lead them into a massacre. Right from the beginning there were two main aspects to the situation. On the one hand, we saw capitalism each day gaining new posi­tions of strength within the proletariat until it was able to direct the workers on­to the fronts where they were slaughtered; on the other hand, we saw the workers, after fighting on their own class terrain in the first week, being pushed off it by the very forces in whom they had put their trust. Each time that the workers could have re­dressed the situation and rediscovered their terrain (ie after each military defeat), capitalism widened its field of manoeuvre and went from the Giral government to the Caballero government, and in the end to a government in which the anarchists parti­cipated. Thus capitalism was able to pre­vent the proletariat from drawing the les­sons from its defeats, ensuring that the workers would continue to put their trust in those who could only lead them to the slaughter. Once you have been integrated into the apparatus of the class enemy, you are no longer working for the proleta­riat, but for capitalism.

In today’s extremely difficult situation, when the chances of resistance and victory are becoming more and more limited, those militants who still defend the need to return to struggle on a class basis find them­selves exposed to the blows of a capitalist apparatus which in Valencia and in Catalonia can count on the support of all the organi­zations operating inside the proletariat. As in 1914 - indeed, even more so than in 1914 - the means for silencing the sightest voicing of class positions seem to have been found. Our fraction, which in Spain as in other countries has not neglected any possi­bility open to it, no matter how modest, of defending its positions; our fraction, which has always been guided, by the principle that, in order to earn the confidence of the masses, you must remain firmly on the terrain of the class struggle, and that any position won by the workers by struggling on a capitalist front is a position which can only, serve the interests of the class enemy; our frac­tion, which finds itself in a situation of agonizing isolation tragically illustrated by the corpses of the Spanish workers, re­mains convinced that what is being buried today is not the proletariat, but all those ideologists and forces which, because they are not armed with marxism, with the theory of the proletarian class, can do nothing but lead the workers to the slaughter.

The fascist hyenas can cynically say that, confronted ,with only 50,000 of its assass­ins, millions of workers have been unable to resist and win. But the hyena well knows that this has only been made possible because the workers have been forced from their own class terrain, because they have been led by the direct accomplices of Franco: the anti-fascists of all varieties.

The only way of remaining on the side of the workers, even if the crushing superio­rity of the enemy precludes any possibility of reversing the situation, is by refusing to betray, just as Lenin did in 1914. To desert the military fronts in Spain as an example for the whole proletariat is to disassociate oneself from capitalism. It is to struggle against capitalism and for the working class.

In every country to struggle against one’s own capitalism is to fight in solidarity with the Spanish workers. Any other posi­tion, no matter whether it is embellished with socialist, centrist, or anarchist jus­tifications, can only lead to the crushing of the proletariat in Spain as in the rest of the world.

(Bilan, no.36, October-November 1936)

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1936 - Spain [35]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • The "united front" [36]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Italian Left [37]

Bilan 36: The events of 19 July (1936)

  • 3670 reads

The events of 19 July

First of all we must draw attention to cer­tain facts. When news of the movement of 17 July in Morocco reached Madrid and Barce­lona, the reaction of the capitalists was to wait and see how the proletariat would respond before deciding themselves what course of action to take. At first, as we pointed out in the last issue of Bilan, the Quiroga government was replaced by the gov­ernment of Barrio in an attempt to carry out a peaceful move to the right. But be­cause of the extent of the workers’ uprising in Catalonia and Madrid, this attempt fail­ed miserably and Giral came to power. Mean­while Barrio went off to Valencia where, in the name of the government, he tried to institutionalize the workers’ revolt.

The manner in which events unfolded after 17 July confirms our analysis. On 17 July the Barcelona seamen’s union seized a supply of arms from the ships Manuel Arnus, Argen­tina, Uruguay, and Marquis de Comillas (150 rifles plus ammunition). The union took them to its local. On the 18th, the eve of the military uprising, the police took away some of these arms.

After the 17th, leaders of various workers’ parties went to ask Companys for arms since it was public knowledge that the army would be out on the street at dawn on the follow­ing Sunday, only to have the leader of the Generalidad assure them that the Civil Guard and the Assault Guard were perfectly capable of dealing with the situation, and in any case, if they were beaten, the wor­kers could then take the rifles from the dead and go into action. For Companys the best thing the workers could do on Satur­day night and Sunday was to go home and wait for the outcome of the struggle.

But the turbulence of the Barcelona prole­tariat was reaching bursting point. On Sunday morning the entire proletariat – some armed in a make-shift way, but most unarmed – was in the streets. At five o’ clock the battle, broke out. Surrounded by the workers the Assault Guard and part of the Civil Guard were forced to march against the army. Soon the courage and heroism of the workers (among whom the militants of the CNT and FAI particularly distinguished them­selves) had enabled them to take command of the most important positions in the city; here and there the soldiers fraternized with the workers, as for example at the Tarragona barracks. By that same evening the soldiers had been defeated and General

Goded capitulated. At this point the arma­ment of the proletariat became general.

As for the Generalidad, it hid itself timid­ly in the face of the workers’ combativity. But despite the fact the workers who had previously asked it for arms had now taken them by force, it did not believe they would turn their guns against the Generalidad itself.

On Monday the 20th, the CNT followed by the UGT called for a general strike through­out Spain. But everywhere the workers were already in the streets. They had taken up arms but were putting forward their own class demands. The old differences between the CNT and the UGT, over the 36- or 40-hour week and the question of wages, all came up again during the course of the struggle since the workers had already begun to take over a number of companies. Also, on the 20th, militias to clean up Barcelona were formed. The Generalidad published a decree on the 21st which said, “First: citizens’ militias have been set up for the defence of the Republic and the struggle against fascism and reaction.” The Central Commit­tee of the militias was comprised of a dele­gate from the advisory committee to the government, a delegate from the general commission for public order, and representa­tives of all the workers’ or political orga­nizations struggling against fascism.

Thus from the 21st onwards, the Generalidad was trying to set its stamp on the initia­tive of the armed workers in order to con­tain their struggle within the limits of’ bourgeois legality.

On the 24th, the general strike continued and the POUM spoke of carrying on with it until fascism was crushed everywhere. But already the CNT, which dominated Barcelona, was calling for a return to work in the food industries and public services. The POUM published this appeal without criti­cism. However, class demands were still being discussed. The workers expropriated the central tram depot – the Metropolitan – and all other means of transport, including the railways. Once again, the Generalidad intervened to legalize the situation by ma­king its own expropriations. Later on it took the initiative of expropriating certain companies before the workers could do so.

On the same day, the Esquerres front, which regrouped all the parties of the bourgeois left, received a letter from the POUM. At Companys’ invitation the POUM agreed to collaborate with all parties against fascism; but, after discussing it in its Executive Committee, refused to collaborate in a Popular Front government.

It seems that from the 24th onwards, under the pressure of the Generalidad, the majority of the workers’ organizations tried to hold back the movement of class demands. The social-centrists of Barcelona were against the strike; the CNT was calling for a return to work; the POUM still kept up its progra­mme of demands but didn’t say whether it was for or against a return to work.

After the 24th, the departure of the mili­tia columns to Saragossa was being organiz­ed. But it was necessary that the workers should go off feeling that their demands had been met. The Generalidad issued a de­cree saying wages for the strike days would be paid. But here again in the majority of the factories the workers, arms in hand, had already obtained some partial conces­sions.

Since the bourgeoisie had managed to bring the general strike to an end thanks to the role played by parties and trade unions who claimed to be a part of the proletariat, and since in the factories occupied by the wor­kers, the 36 hour week had been established ipso facto – the Generalidad issued a decree on 26 July introducing the 40 hour week with a 15% increase in wages.

And so, while the Generalidad is strength­ening its efforts to tame this outburst of social conflict, we come to the 28th, which already marked an important turning point in the situation. The POUM, which through the F.O.U.S. controlled the employees’ union (‘Commercial Union’) and a few other small companies, called on those workers who were not in the militias to return to work. It was necessary for them to create a mystique around the march on Saragossa. Let’s take Saragossa, the workers were told, then we can settle our scores with the Generalidad and Madrid.

By calling for a return to work, the POUM clearly expressed the change that had taken place and the success of the bourgeoisie’s manoeuvres. The bourgeoisie had managed to bring the general strike to an end first by issuing decrees to stifle the workers’ response, and finally by pushing the workers outside the towns towards the siege of Saragossa. But in Saragossa the general strike continued through phases of retreat and acceleration, and it was only much later that the workers would accede to Cabanellas’ ultimatum to return to work or be massacred. After that the workers no longer hoped for a resurgence of the strike movement, but for the victory of the government forces, and this allowed Cabanellas to organize the ferocious and bloody repression of the class.

According to the 29 August edition of La Batalla, the POUM’s newspaper, the wor­kers of Saragossa continued the general strike for fifteen days. This is what their paper says: “On Sunday morning, 19 July (when the army came out onto the streets – editorial note), the workers immediately organized their resistance and the struggle lasted for a number of days. The strike was absolutely general fifteen days later and the shooting at the workers’ barricades continued long after that. There were still some unconquerable heroes who preferred to die rather than accept the rule of fascism.”

From 28 July onwards, the movement in Cata­lonia took on a different aspect. The ex­propriation of factories and the election of workers’ councils continued, but all this took place with the agreement of the dele­gates of the Generalidad, which obviously didn’t try to resist the armed workers since it knew that as long as the majority of the workers were engaged in the war, it would get what it wanted.

Already the outline of Spanish capital’s plan of attack was becoming clear. In the agricultural regions that had already experienced ‘repression at the hands of the Popular Front and where there was no longer a concentrated proletariat, the agrarian problem would be resolved by Franco through ferocious and bloody repression. In this department Franco is quite the equal of Mussolini or Hitler. In the industrial centres, especially in Catalonia, where the agrarian problem does not exist, it was necessary to attack the proletariat side­ways on. Push it into a military trap, fragment its unity from within, but at all costs succeed in liquidating it as a class. In Madrid this task fell to the Popular Front. By making formal insubstantial concessions in Catalonia concerning econo­mic management and political leadership, the Generalidad managed to incorporate the CNT and the POUM (that opportunistic party attached to the London Bureau, which has as one of its leaders the ex-Trotskyist, Nin, who is today Minister of Justice).

In Madrid after 19 July the general strike was simply the prolongation of the big building strike, which had lasted since June. And it came to an end only a few days after the strike in Catalonia was over, owing to the extreme state of confusion in the capital. Here the workers went out onto the streets on the Monday only, when in Barcelona the army had already been crushed. The Barrio government only lasted a few hours and its successor, formed by Giral, promised to give everything except the arms that the workers’ organizations had asked for. On Monday, without arms, the workers of Madrid made for the Montana barracks, which they soon took over. From then on all the barracks in Madrid began to frater­nize with the workers and there was also a short battle on the outskirts of Madrid when the army tried to march on the city. On Tuesday the workers, now on general strike, were looking for their enemies and since everyone from the CNT to the social-centrists was proclaiming that the Popular Front was their ally – the avenging hand of the armed proletariat – the workers dis­persed to the provinces of Madrid and took on the army at Guadarama. Here after a bloody but confused struggle the workers withdrew and the majority of them went back towards Madrid. There and then came the call for an end to the strike and the orga­nization of the columns.

As in Barcelona and the rest of Spain, the workers, who from February 1936 had been told to regard the Popular Front as a trus­ty ally, had gone into the streets on 19 July without being able to use their arms in a way that would have allowed them to smash the capitalist state and beat Franco. They left Giral in Madrid and Companys in Barcelona at the head of the state apparatus contenting themselves with the burning of churches and the ‘cleaning up’ of capitalist institutions like the social security, the police, the Civil Guard and the Assault Guard. Certainly in Catalonia they expropriated the essential branches of production, but the banking system was left intact with the same capitalist function as before.

We shall examine these events in greater detail elsewhere, when we have more thorough documentation.

From the 19-28 July, the situa­tion was such that the armed workers, at least in Barcelona, could have taken power – albeit in a confused manner, but neverthe­less in such a way as to constitute a power­ful historic experience. The march to Saragossa saved the bourgeoisie. La Batalla, organ of the so-called ‘marxist’ party, de­clared that the eyes of the world revolu­tionary movement were concentrated on Sara­gossa. But from 27 July the bourgeoisie was already cautiously feeling its way for­ward. At Figueras, after beating the fas­cists, militants of the CNT were disarmed by the Civil Guard and the militias of the Popular Front. At this point the CNT iss­ued an appeal to the masses, calling on them to shoot anyone who tried to disarm them. The Generalidad took heed of the warning. From now on it would use other methods.

On 2 August there was a new attempt by the Generalidad to institutionalize the situa­tion: it decided to call several classes to arms. The soldiers refused to go off to the front unless they were in the militias. The CNT immediately took up a position: “Mili­tiamen - Yes! Soldiers - Never!” Meanwhile the POUM called for the dissolution – not the destruction – of the army. Of course the Generalidad tolerated all of this, sat­isfied with being able to tie the Central committee of Anti-Fascist militias to the Generalidad’s Department of Defence.

The composition of the Central Committee of Anti-Fascist militias was as follows: 3 delegates from the CNT, 3 delegates from the UGT, 2 delegates from the FAI, 1 dele­gate from the Republican Left, 2 from the United Socialists, 1 delegate from the ‘Lea­gue of Rabassaires’ (small farmers under the influence of the Catalan Left), 1 dele­gate from the coalition of Republican par­ties, 1 delegate from the POUM and 4 repre­sentatives of the Generalidad (the defence councillor, Colonel Sandino; the general commissioner of public order, the prefect of Barcelona; and 2 delegates of the Generalidad without fixed responsibilities).

From the point of view of the political evolution of the situation the proletariat of Madrid was quickly shunted on to the bourgeoisie’s terrain; in Barcelona this process took several weeks more of war and further manoeuvring.

On 30 July in Madrid, La Pasionaria decla­red that it was a question of defending the bourgeois revolution, which still had to be completed. On 1 August the police remained active in Madrid and Mundo Obrero, following Giral’s attempt to take away the militia’s right of arrest, spoke of the need to clear up the ‘confusion’ by convincing the Popu­lar Front that the militias were acting in the interest of order.

On 3 August Mundo Obrero proclaimed that it would defend the property of the friends of the Republic. And it also said: “No strikes in democratic Spain.” There was to be no rest for the workers on the labour front! Its whole programme can be summed up in a few words: after having beaten fascism, the Republican Left would remember the workers’ actions leading up to 19 July and would do everything possible to prevent a return to that situation.

On 8 August, Jesus Hernandos made a resoun­ding speech, toasting the workers’ struggle for the bourgeois democratic Republic and nothing else. On 18 August the centrists were able to say that the struggle in Spain had taken on the aspect of a national war, a war for the independence of Spain. For them what was necessary was the creation of a new peoples’ army composed of the old officers and the militias. From this point on they would become the partisans of severe discipline.

When the Giral cabinet came into being all the Caballeros and the Prietos called for the formation of a Commission of the Popu­lar Front, linked to the Ministry of War, in which they would participate. By this means they would become ‘official’ ministers.

As for Barcelona – now that it had entered into the latest phase of the war for Saragossa, which was presented as a precon­dition for ‘resolving’ the social question, Solidaridad Obrera (Workers’ Solidarity) of 1 August greeted the dawn of a new era, the beginning of the period leading to the establishment of libertarian communism.

When the Casanova administration was set up following the departure of the delegates of the PSUC (United Socialist Party of Catalo­nia, members of the IIIrd International) from the government, the CNT insisted that while the newly formed government was not a true expression of all the gains the workers had made, nonetheless, the CNT would give it total support.

Throughout the first week of August, the CNT mobilized the masses to fight on the Aragon front, insisting that this was no regular army, but a battalion of volunteers in which every officer of the old army would be super­vised by a militiaman. In the end, it put forward an idea previously completely un­known to the anarchists: that of military discipline. But then the CNT was soon to be absorbed in the problem of controlling the initiative of the workers in the econo­mic sphere as well, in order to keep up maximum output for the war.

On 14 August, Solidaridad Obrera openly de­clared that relations of war production had been set up in the economic sphere. We will however examine this aspect of the question separately when we look at the economic mea­sures and the new social and political insti­tutions that emerged in Catalonia.

We have yet to mention the position of the POUM. Far from being a party capable of moving towards revolutionary positions, the POUM is simply an amalgam of opportunist tendencies (Left Socialists, Communists of the extreme Right, Trotskyists), and an obstacle to any revolutionary clarification. The schema that has determined the POUM’s intervention has been more or less the fol­lowing: the Bolsheviks fought first against Czarism, then against the bourgeoisie and its Menshevik agents. Without the Cheka and the Red Army, the Bolsheviks would have been unable to defeat their internal and external enemies (La Batalla, 4 August). Thus, the POUM should fight first against fascism, then against the bourgeoisie: just like Nenni fighting Mussolini first, then the bourgeoisie: just like Breitscheid fighting Hitler first, then the bourgeoisie…  As if Lenin in April 1917, in opposi­tion to Stalin and Kamenev, did not defend a programme of struggle against all forms of bourgeois rule. As if it were possible to fight against fascism without engaging in a struggle against the whole capitalist system.

The meaning of the new institutions

First of all we must mention something of central importance that sheds a great deal of light on the whole situation. When the capitalist attack came in the form of Franco’s uprising, neither the POUM nor the CNT even dreamed of calling the workers to go out into the streets. They organized delegations to go to Companys for arms. On 19 July the workers came out spontaneously – by calling for a general strike the CUT and UGT were simply acknowledging a de facto state of affairs.

Since Companys, Giral, and their ilk were immediately regarded as allies of the proletariat, as the people who could supply the keys to the arms depot, it was quite natural that when the workers crushed the army and took up arms no one would think for a moment of posing the problem of the destruction of the state which, with Com­panys at its head, remained intact. From then on an attempt was made to spread the utopian idea that it is possible to make the revolution by expropriating factories and taking over land without touching the capitalist state, not even its banking ‘system.

The constitution of the Central Committee of the militias gave the impression that a period of proletarian power had begun; while the setting up of the Central Council of the Economy gave rise to the illusion that the proletariat was now managing its own econ­omy.

However, far from being organs of dual power, these organs had a capitalist nature and function. Instead of constituting a base for the unification of the proletarian struggle – for posing the question of power – they were from the beginning organs of col­laboration with the capitalist state.

In Barcelona the Central Committee of the militias was a conglomeration of workers’ and bourgeois parties and trade unions; not an organ of the soviet type arising spontan­eously on a class basis and capable of pro­viding a focus for the development of prole­tarian consciousness. The Central Committee was connected to the Generalidad and disap­peared with the passing of a simple decree when the new government of Catalonia was formed in October.

The Central Committee of the militias repre­sented a superb weapon of capitalism for leading the workers out of their towns and localities to fight on the territorial fronts where they are being ruthlessly mas­sacred. It is the organ that established order in Catalonia, not in conjunction with the workers, but against the workers who had been dispersed to the fronts. It is true that the regular army was practically dissolved, but it is gradually being recon­stituted within the militia columns whose general staff – Sandino, Villalba and Co. – are clearly bourgeois.  The columns are made up of volunteers and this will probably remain the case until the intoxication and illusion in the ‘revolution’ is over and capitalist reality is restored. Then we will soon see the official re-establishment of a regular army and obligatory service.

Far from being the embryo of a Red Army, the columns were set up on a basis having nothing whatever to do with the proletariat. If this were not the case, we would have seen the workers destroying the capitalist state and taking power, or at least turning their guns against the state. The militia columns did nothing of the sort. All that happened was that the Catalonian columns went off, to Saragossa and Huesca; the Madrid columns to Toledo and Guadarama. The armed workers were thrown into the struggle against fascism, not against capitalism in all its forms. Under these conditions all the demo­cratic forms that in the beginning existed within the columns, have no real importance. What is important is the tendency the militias follow and this was quite clearly that of the Popular Front: the anti-fascist struggle which not only respects the organs of capitalist domination, but actually strengthens them, thanks to the support gi­ven them by the anarchists and the POUM who have entered into the ministries of government.

In Madrid the militias were practically under the control of Caballero’s Department of War, which supplied non-commissioned officers to the different organizations that were forming columns.

While the main part of the regular army went over to Franco, the Popular Front and its allies, by organizing the militias, have been trying to push the workers away from the terrain of the class struggle towards the formation of a new regular army. This is why, despite all their courage, the workers are being crushed. On the military terrain Franco is in his element, whereas men like Companys and Caballero are pursuing a social not a military strategy, designed to get the workers massacred. With their incorporation into the army, the workers have lost the strength needed to rediscover the path that allowed them to beat the army in Barcelona and Madrid on 19 July.

Let us now take a look at the other instru­ments of capitalist rule. The Civil Guard (which distinguished itself in the massacre of the workers under the monarchy) was trans­formed into a Republican National Guard. It is true that in Barcelona the CNT procee­ded to clean up this institution, but it still remained intact and was even embelli­shed by the entry of anarchist militants into its ranks. In Madrid the Civil Guard remained intact and jealously guarded the strong-boxes of capitalism: the banks.

The only real exception occurred in Valencia where the workers of the Iron Column (CNT) opposed the agreement fixed on by their own organization, which merely asked the Civil Guard to give up its rifles. In this instance the workers came back from the front, forced the Civil Guard at the point of their machine-guns to disarm itself completely, and burnt the police archives. In Madrid it was soon understood that it would be best to withdraw the Civil Guard and the Assault Guard and allow the setting up under the auspices of the Popular Executive Committee (a sort of Popular Front) of an Anti-Fascist Popular Guard, which would also maintain order behind the lines. The Assault Guard (which the workers came up against under the Republic) remains intact and in Barce­lona is extremely well armed.

Concerning the Department of Criminal Investigation, there was simply a clean-up operation of this institution, which remained intact. In France Blum replaces function­aries by decree and democratizes the state: in Spain functionaries are replaced at gun­point in order to ‘proletarianize’ capita­list institutions. In Barcelona the anar­chists have taken command of the Department of Criminal Investigation first in the form of an Investigation Section of the Central Committee of the militias, today in the form of the Department of Safety whose gene­ral secretary is the CNT militant, Fernandez.

In Madrid, at the beginning of October, after the proclamation of the militarization decree, all the vigilance committees of the political and trade union organizations were subordinated to the Department of Public Safety. Neither in Barcelona nor in Madrid have the lists of spies, sent by the political police into the workers’ organizations, been published. And this is significant.

Tribunals were quickly set in motion again, through the utilization of the magistrate apparatus of the old regime and the parti­cipation of the ‘anti-fascist’ organiza­tions. The popular tribunals of Catalonia, both the initial version, then the ‘extre­mist’ version (following the decree by the POUM minister, Nin), were always based on collaboration between the professional magistrates and the representatives of all the parties, though Nin’s suppression of the popular jury was an innovation. In Madrid the percentage of professional magistrates was higher than in Barcelona, but after October Caballero issued decrees aimed at simplifying the procedure for passing judgment on fascists. Thus he achieved the same exalted ends as Nin.

Only one institution was swept away in earnest in Catalonia: the Church. Since the Church is not an essential instrument of capitalist rule, this simply gave the masses the impression that a real transfor­mation had taken place, whereas it is actu­ally very easy to rebuild churches and equip them with new priests as long as the essen­tials of the capitalist regime still exist.

If one considers another, factor, it can immediately be seen that the Church is not the nub of the problem. The banks and the Bank of Spain remained intact, and everywhere precautionary measures were taken to prevent them being taken over by the masses, by force of arms if necessary. The contrast between the extremism exhibited in the demolition of the churches and the passivity displayed in regard to the banks is the key to the pre­sent events, in which the masses have been pushed to demolish the marginal elements of the capitalist system, but not the system itself.

Let us now look at two forms of organization that were set up in opposition to each other: the factory councils and the Council of the Economy of Catalonia.

When the workers went back to work in the factories where the bosses had fled or had been shot by the masses, factory councils were set up as an expression of the expro­priation of these companies by the workers.

Here the trade unions intervened very quickly, setting up a procedure that would allow proportional representation in places where the CNT and the UGT had members. Moreover, although the workers returned to work on condition that they would be getting a 36 hour week and a wage increase, the unions intervened to defend the need to work at full output for the war effort, without worrying too much about the regula­tion of work or about wages.

The factory committees and the committees for the control of industries which were not expropriated (out of consideration for foreign capital or for other reasons) were thus immediately smothered; transformed into organs for stimulating production, they lost their class content. They were not organs created during an insurrectionary strike in order to overthrow the state; they were organs whose function was the organiza­tion of the war, and this was an essential precondition for the survival and reinforce­ment of the state.

After being put under the control of the unions to further the anti-fascist war effort, from 11 August onwards the factory committees were linked to the Council of the Economy which, according to official decree, was “the deliberative organization for the conclusion of agreements on economic matters between the various organizations represented on it (Catalan Republican State, 3; United Socialist Party, 1; CNT, 3; FAI, 2; POUM, 1; UGT, 3; Catalan Action, 1; Republican Union, 1) and the Generalidad government, which would carry out the agreements reached through these deliberations.”

Henceforward the workers became prisoners inside the factories, which they thought they could take over without destroying the capitalist state. Soon afterwards, in October, the workers in the factories were militarized under the pretext of opening up a new era and winning the war. Right from the beginning, the Council of the Economy claimed to be working for socialism in harmony with the Republican parties and the Generalidad. No more, no less. The man who – on paper – was carrying out this “first step from capitalism to socialism” was Mr. Nin, who elaborated the Council’s eleven points. By the end of September the new ‘workers’’ minister in the Generali­dad was given the task of making this first step, but by then the mystification and dupery of the whole thing was more obvious.

The most interesting fact here is this. Following the expropriation of companies in Catalonia, their co-ordination through the Council of the Economy in August, and the government decree of October laying down the norms for ‘collectivization’, after each one of these steps came new measures for disciplining the workers in the factories – discipline they would never have put up with under the old bosses. In October the CNT issued an order forbidding defensive struggle of any kind and stating that the workers’ most sacred duty was to increase production. Apart from the fact that we have already rejected the Soviet fraud, which consists of the physical assassination of the workers in the name of “building socialism”, we declare openly that for us the struggle in the factories cannot cease for a moment as long as the domination of the capitalist state continues. Certainly the workers will have to make sacrifices after the proletarian revolution, but a revolutionary will never advocate the cessation of defen­sive struggles as a way of achieving socialism. Even after the revolution we will not deprive the workers of the strike weapon, and it goes without saying that when the proletariat is not in power – as is the case in Spain – the militarization of the factories is the same as the mili­tarization of the factories in any capitalist state at war.

To become the weapon of the revolution, the factory councils would have had to allow the workers to enter into a struggle against the state; but since the workers’ organiza­tions immediately allied themselves with the Generalidad, this was impossible without a struggle against the CNT, UGT, etc. Thus all talk of ‘dual power’ in Catalonia is just empty chatter. It is obvious that these forms of working class struggle did not appear in Valencia or Madrid, but we lack the space to examine in more detail the initiatives taken by the workers in these two centres.

Before returning to an analysis of the actual events, we would like to say a few words about the agrarian question. It is true that there were a lot of innovations in this sphere. In Catalonia a decree was issued for the obligatory ‘syndicalization’ of various agricultural activities (sale of products, buying of agricultural materials, insurance, etc). In addition, it is clear that after 19 July the ‘raba­ssaires’ (small holders) got rid of a whole series of rents and taxes, while in areas where the land belonged to owners suspected of fascist sympathies, the land was divided up under the auspices of anti-fascist committees. But following this, first the Council of the Economy, then in October the Council of the Generalidad, set about containing these initiatives and channelling them towards the needs of the war economy which was being set in motion.

Already in August, part II of the programme of the Council of the Economy spoke of “the collectivization of big, landed property which will be cultivated by the peasants’ unions with the help of the Generalidad” (our emphasis). Following this, and parti­cularly in September and October, the slogan of the CNT and the other organizations was: “We respect the property of the small peasants”. In other words, peasants, get back to work! Finally, there was a reaction against forced collectivization and the Agricultural Council hastened to reassure the peasants who were only interested in certain general measures to do with the selling of goods and the purchase of mater­ials, that “the collectivization of land must be limited to big landed properties that have been confiscated”. In Valencia when things went into a reflux, there was also a tendency to set up committees for the export of oranges, rice, onions, etc, while the land belonging to fascists was confiscated by the peasants who worked these estates in a collectivized manner because of the sheer necessities of culti­vation (eg the problem of irrigation).

In Madrid the Communist Minister of Agriculture, Uribe, issued a decree in October in which he specified “the author­ization of the expropriation, without compensation and with the state’s favour, of agricultural properties of whatever size or type, belonging after July 1936 to natural or legal personages who intervened directly or indirectly in the insurrectionary movement against the Republic.”

In essence these were no more than the measures of war which any bourgeois state would take against the ‘enemy’. The only difference was that Uribe and Co. had to take into account the intervention of the peasant masses, who after 19 July went much further than the provisions set out by such decrees. But even if it were conceded that an ‘agrarian revolution’ was carried out in Spain, it would still have to be shown that this was the crux of the situa­tion and not the reinforcement of the capitalist state in the cities, which is precisely what makes such a mockery of any idea of a profound and lasting revolutionary transformation of agriculture and economic relations. We have not exhausted all these problems in the brief examination we have attempted here. We will deepen this analysis in further studies with the aid of docu­mentation.

The massacre of the workers

Throughout the month of August the rush towards the territorial fronts continued, amid the enthusiasm of the workers. “We are threatening Huesca, we are marching triumphantly on Saragossa, now we are encircling Teruel.” Such was the recurring theme all the organizations repeated to the workers for two months. But parallel to this, all the organizations intervened in an attempt to substitute the decisions and initiatives taken among themselves for the initiatives taken by the workers behind the lines.

On 19 August the POUM intervened with an editorial whose main message was: “The regular organs created by the Revolution itself, are the only organs responsible for the administration of revolutionary justice.”

Round about the same time, the Barcelona edition of Anti-Fascist Spain published an interview with Companys in which the latter insisted that the CNT and FAI are today representatives of order and that the Catalan bourgeoisie is not a capitalist bourgeoisie, but a humanitarian progressive bour­geoisie…(1)[1] [46]

On the 22nd, under the slogan “Hasta el fin!” (To the end!), an expedition to Majorca was organized. Thousands of Cata­lan workers were thrown into this adventure, the majority of whom had to be evacuated back towards Barcelona, amid a total silence on the part of the anti-fascist front. This experience, which clearly showed the willing­ness of the ‘humanitarian’ bourgeoisie of Catalonia to plunge the workers into a military massacre, led to the establishment of a closer liaison between the War Committee of the Central Committee of the militias and the Generalidad’s Department of War.

On the 25th, the aggravation of the military situation had its repercussions on the relationship existing between the various organizations. The POUM echoed this by demanding that the cordial relations between the militiamen at the front should also exist behind the lines. Addressing the CNT, the POUM said that they both totally shared the same revolutionary élan and that the masses’ unity of action must be maintained at all costs. But on the 25th Solidaridad Obrera wrote that at its last plenum, the CNT had drawn up an agreement providing for the disarmament of 60% of the militiamen belonging to the different parties. The militiamen would carry out this act themselves or else the CNT would make sure it was done. The main slogan of the plenum was: “all arms to the front.”

The CNT thus made it clear that as far as it was concerned the violent struggle behind the lines – in the cities – was now finished and there was only one front left for the workers to fight on: the military front.

All the parties shared this point of view. On the 29th a decree of the Central Committee of the militias was published, saying that those who were in possession of arms must immediately hand them over or go off to the front. From now on Companys could rub his hands together in satisfaction.

All this time the whole farce of non-inter­vention was going on. All the capitalist states and Soviet Russia were in agreement about facilitating the dispatch of powerful arms to Franco and the expedition of columns of foreign workers to Companys and Caballero. All the states were keen to intervene in Spain in order to lend a hand to the massacre of the workers, all within the framework of ‘non-intervention’. Italy and Germany supplied arms to Franco, Blum facilitated the formation of “proletarian foreign legions” (Solidaridad Obrera), but kept watch over the sending of arms.

From this point on, the POUM and the CNT understood the help of the international proletariat to mean the workers putting pressure on their governments to send “aeroplanes to Spain”. These aeroplanes and tanks would come from Russia when mili­tarization had been carried out in Spain and the Spanish workers had lost any chance of avoiding a massacre at the hands of Franco. We will examine all this later on.

On 1 September Mr. Nin, at a meeting of the POUM, defended the idea that “our revolution is more profound than the one Russia made in 1917”. Perhaps the reason for this is that in Spain the masses are being called upon to make the revolution without destroying the capitalist state? For him, the originality of the Spanish revolution resides in the fact that the dictatorship of the prole­tariat is being exerted by all the parties and trade union organizations (including the parties of the bourgeois Left under Mr. Companys). But on 1 September during the time leading up to the fall of Irún, the Barcelona newspapers and above all La Batalla issued a joyful cry: “The fall of Huesca is imminent.” The day after they were saying that, “We are in the outlying streets of Huesca”, but the days and weeks passed without any outcome and, in the end, they were whispering that the Commander-in-Chief of the government forces, Villalba, was a traitor, that it was all his fault, etc… On 2 September, the POUM further ‘deepened’ the revolution by dissolving its trade union organization into the UGT (2)[2] [47] under the pretext of injecting a revolutionary vaccine into the latter.

But the defeat at Irún, and the betrayal by elements of the Popular Front, was soon known about. In La Batalla and Solidaridad a campaign was launched against those who, like Prieto, were in favour of a compromise with the fascists.

“What happened at Badajoz? What happened at San Sebastián?” asked the POUM. And the POUM’s answer was that what was needed was a workers’ government.

The reaction of the CNT and the social-centrists in Barcelona to the Majorca adventure and the betrayals at Badajoz and Irún was to launch a mighty campaign for the unification of the command and centrali­zation of the militias. But at this point, the attention of the masses was directed towards Huesca, since it was being said every­where that “the encirclement of Huesca is complete” and that its fall was imminent.

Here the Caballero government made its debut, presenting itself with a ‘constitutional programme’ and setting itself the task of creating a unified command for waging the war. “Hasta el fin!” Badajoz and Irún were quickly forgotten and when the Basque nation­alists handed San Sebastián over to Franco’s armies, the Caballero government set up a Basque Department to formulate legal statutes for a free Basque state.

Caballero, who had tried to bring the CNT into his ministry, now contented himself with the technical support the latter gave him, and got down to organizing the defeat at Toledo and the fall of Madrid.

Before this had happened, the POUM (La Batalla, 11 September) saluted the Caballero cabinet as a progressive government compared to Giral, but declared that if it was to be a true workers’ government, it would have to incorporate all the proletarian parties and above all the CNT and FAI (and of course the POUM). For these reasons it stuck to its slogan of a workers’ government based on a Constituent Assembly of workers and soldiers. Mundo Obrero, organ of the Madrid centrists, who held several ministries in the government, issued an appeal which demanded “everything for the government and by the government.”

On the 12th we were “on the outskirts of Huesca”.

But on the 13th Huesca had still not been taken, and it became necessary to try to normalize life in Catalonia in expectation of a long war. The CNT made an address to the peasants, stating that it only wanted to collectivize the big estates and that it would respect the small-holders. Its slogan was: “To work, peasants”. The POUM publicly expressed its agreement with this and con­tinued miserably to tail-end the CNT, regularly throwing bouquets in its direction, only to have them publicly disavowed by the CNT.

On the 20th a campaign began in Madrid in favour of re-establishing a regular army. The social-centrists were the ones who started it. The POUM accepted the principle of ... a Red Army. The CNT maintained a dis­dainful silence and got on with organizing the national plenum of its regional bodies in Madrid.

This plenum took the following decisions: to begin a campaign for the creation of a National Council of Defence based on regional Councils, which would have the task of leading the struggle against fascism and the struggle for the construction of a new kind of economy. The composition of the National Council of Madrid should be: five representatives for the CNT, five for the UGT, four for the Republican parties. Largo Caballero would become President of the Council with Azaña remaining at the head of the Republic. The programme included the elimination of voluntary service, a unified command, etc....

These propositions immediately gave rise to an animated polemic. But two essential things had happened: the anarchists would enter the ministries providing they changed their names. Claridad, Caballero’s paper, said this was not too much of a problem. Secondly, the anarchists accepted the principle of militarization – the same anarchists who on 2 August had told the workers of Barcelona to refuse to be soldiers, to agree only to be the people’s militiamen.

In the meantime, the military situation got worse. Toledo was about to fall and we were still “in the outlying streets of Huesca.” The threat to Madrid grew sharper.

On 26 September the crisis of the General­idad government began. The next day the new government was constituted: the CNT, the POUM, and the social-centrists partici­pated in it. The programme of this ‘workers’ government’, in which the parties of the bourgeois Left participated as representatives of the petty bourgeoisie, included a unified command, discipline, elimination of voluntary service, etc    

A few days later Mr. Caballero judged that the moment had come to issue his famous decree on the militarization of the militias and the application of the military code in this new military army. In Madrid the decree came into force after 10 October; in the surrounding regions where it was nece­ssary to manoeuvre much longer against the proletariat, the decree wasn’t put into effect until the 20th. The setting up of the new Council of the Generalidad and Caballero’s decree came just in time to prevent workers from asking: “What happened at Toledo? Why are we always ‘about to take Huesca’? How come Oviedo, which was going to be taken by the miners, was so easily rescued by fascist reinforcements? Why are we getting massacred, and for whose benefit? Caballero, Companys, Sandino, Villalba, the whole Republican general staff – now joined by people like Grossi, Durruti, Ascasso – aren’t they the same people who in 1931, 1932, and 1934 made a red carpet out of our corpses and laid it at the feet of the Right? When we’ve got traitors leading the military operations, is it any wonder we are being defeated and massacred?”

The workers didn’t have time to ask them­selves these questions. If they had’ve had it would have meant abandoning the territorial fronts and unleashing an armed struggle against both’ Caballero and Franco. The workers didn’t have time to take such a course of action, which is still the only one that would make it possible for the workers to put an end to fascism because they would be putting an end to capitalism as well. The new Council of the Generalidad is keeping them in line in Catalonia. The decree concerning the militarization of Madrid, with its threat of serious punishments for those who resist, is doing a similar job in the other regions.

Things now began to develop very quickly. In Catalonia a simple decree dissolved the anti-fascist Central Committee (that had lent a ‘revolutionary’ gloss to the manoeuvres of capital), since as the CNT delegate Garcia Oliver said, “We are all represented on the Council of the Generalidad.” All the anti-fascist committees were dissolved and replaced by ‘ayuntamientos’ (the traditional municipalities). Not one institution from 19 July survived, and a second decree stated that any attempt to reconstitute organs outside the municipalities would be considered an act of sedition.

On 11 October came the CNT’s “Trade union regulations”: the decree on the militariza­tion and mobilization of Catalonia. On the same day the Soviet ship, Zanianine, put in at the port of Barcelona to indicate with much pomp that the USSR had broken with the policy of ‘non-intervention’ and had come at last to the aid of the Spanish workers.

The trade union regulations of the CNT absolutely forbade any demands for new working conditions “as long as we are at war”, especially if they threatened to aggravate the economic situation. They stated that in branches of production directly or indirectly related to the anti-fascist struggle, it was not possible to demand the maintenance of working conditions, either in terms of wages or the length of the working day. Finally, the workers could not ask to be paid for the extra hours put into production useful for the anti-fascist war; instead they had to produce even more than before 19 July.

It was up to the trade unions, the committees, and delegates from factory, shop and yard, with the “co-operation of revolutionaries”, to make sure that these regulations were enforced. The militarization of the militias replaced the levy of workers and peasants collected to fight on the fronts in the name of a war for ‘socialism’; the appeal to class interests was replaced by an appeal to the whole population to fight fascism as an ‘armed nation struggling for freedom’.

Certainly the POUM and CNT had to carry on with their manoeuvres in order to pull the wool over the eyes of the masses, to disguise militarization as a vital necessity which class vigilance (?) would prevent from being transformed into a measure for strangling the workers. But the essential point is that militarization was strictly carried out. All this shows us that capitalism had succeeded in crucifying the workers at the front, that Caballero and his ‘revolutionary’ allies had meticulously prepared these military catas­trophes. Henceforth, the massacre of the workers in Spain took the form of an essentially bourgeois war in which the workers were slaughtered by two regular armies – that of democracy and that of fascism.

And on the same day that the militarization decree was passed, in Barcelona the Soviet ship Zanianine docked, symbolizing Russia’s turn towards Spain. Russia intervened with arms and technicians only after the consti­tution of Caballero’s regular army had clearly shown that what was going on was a bourgeois war. Let us not forget that at the beginning of these events, Russia had been busy with the murder of Zinoviev, Kamenev and all the others. Now it could pass directly on to the business of murdering the Spanish workers, for whom Russian tanks and planes would be a powerful argument in favour of their being incorporated into a bourgeois army, led by men well versed in the massacre of workers.

In Madrid up until the constitution of the new ministry (or Council as the anarchists called it), the CNT was against militariza­tion. In Frente Libertario (the publication of the confederated militias of the CNT in Madrid) of 27 October, one could still find this position: “Militias or National Army? We are for popular militias!” But here again the position of the CNT was based on shameful opportunism. As long as it was not part of the government and was unable to control military operations, it kept up a token opposition.

As we know, Caballero managed to kill two birds with one stone, reshuffling his cabinet eight days before fleeing to Valencia. The anarchists entered the ‘Council’ and thus sanctioned not only militarization and the creation of a National Army, but also the whole work of Caballero, who after the fall of Toledo allowed and even facilitated the fascist advance on Madrid. Each time the proletariat was plunged into a bloodbath, the bourgeoisie took another step towards the extreme left. From Giral to Caballero in Madrid; from Casanovas to Fabregas-Nin in Catalonia; and today Garcia Oliver is a minister and representatives of the Socialist and Libertarian Youth of Madrid have entered the Defence Junta.

This then was the rhythm of events. In Catalonia under the banner of the ‘revolutionary’ Council of the Generalidad, we had the alliance between the anarchists and the social-centrists to prevent the workers from struggling for their class interests and to keep them out in the murderous rain of bullets and shells. “Hasta el fin!” In Madrid Caballero left for Valencia, but the workers stayed behind to be massacred – the price they paid for the tragic aberration that had led them to entrust their fate to agents of capitalism and traitors. How right was General Mola when he said: “I have five columns marching on Madrid: four outside the city and one on the inside.” The fifth column – Caballero and Co. – has done its work in Madrid and now, fraternally united with the CNT and the POUM, they are going to follow up that work in the other regions. After Madrid capitalism will mount its frenzied assault on the proletariat of Barcelona and Valencia.

Here we must finish our study of the events in Spain, even though we are well aware of the insufficiency of our analysis of this period we describe as that of “the massacre of the workers”. We will come back to this in the next issue of Bilan; right now we must finish with a brief declaration of the positions our fraction defends against the mystification of anti-fascism.

We address ourselves vehemently to the pro­letarians of all countries so that they may not sanction the massacre of the workers in Spain by sacrificing their own lives. They must refuse to go off to Spain in the international brigades, but instead engage in class struggle against their own bourgeoisie. The Spanish proletariat must not be supported at the front by foreign workers, whose presence gives the impression that the struggle is really for the inter­national cause of the proletariat.

As for the workers of the Iberian Peninsula, they have but only one road today, that of 19 July: strikes in all industries whether engaged in the war or not; class struggle against Companys and against Franco; against the ukases (edicts) of their trade unions and the Popular Front; and for the destruc­tion of the capitalist state.

And the workers should not be alarmed if people proclaim that to fight like this would be to do the work of fascism. Only charlatans and traitors can pretend that by fighting against capitalism – which holds sway in Barcelona no less than in Seville – you are doing the work of fascism. The revolutionary proletariat must remain loyal to its own class conceptions, its own class weapons; every sacrifice that it makes in this cause will bear fruit in the revolu­tionary battles of tomorrow.

(Bilan, no.36, October-November 1936)



[1] [48] “Question: Isn’t the daily preponderate role of’ the CNT in Catalonia injurious to the democratic government?

Companys: No. The CNT has taken up the responsibilities abandoned by the bourgeois and fascists who fled: it is establishing order and defending society. It is now the incarnation of Strength, Legality, and Order.

Question: Don’t you think that once the revolutionary proletariat has crushed fascism it will then wipe out the bourgeoisie?

Companys: Don’t forget that the Catalan bourgeoisie is different from the bourgeoisie of certain democratic countries in Europe. Capitalism is dead, completely dead. The fascist uprising was its suicide. Our government, though bourgeois, doesn’t defend financial interests of any sort; it defends the middle classes. Today we are moving towards a proletarian order. Our interests will perhaps suffer a bit because of this, but we see it as our duty to remain useful to the process of social transformation. We don’t want to give exclusive privileges to the middle classes. We want to create democratic individual rights without social or economic compulsion.” , (From an interview Companys gave to the News Chronicle on 21 August and reproduced by La Vanguardia of Barcelona, paper of the Catalan government, and by Anti-Fascist Spain, the publication ofthe CNT-FAI, 1 September.)

[2] [49] General Union of Workers (reformists).

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1936 - Spain [35]

Bilan 37 The reality of a facade government

  • 2958 reads

How many times haven’t we heard it said: “Caballero and Companys are merely a facade. In reality the workers are in power and the proletariat is hiding the real state of affairs to prevent foreign intervention”. For four months now the workers have been served up this same old refrain, along with another one - that we’re in danger of seeing a repetition of the scenario of the Kornilov affair. No doubt about it - the demagogues are still going strong and the mere sight of thou­sands of workers’ corpses will not silence them or make them think again.

According to this refrain, Companys is just a facade. Caballero is nothing but a screen - and that’s enough to put the capitalist states on the wrong scent. Do these gentle­men truly take the workers for imbeciles? Because it is difficult to believe that the anarchists, the POUM, the Social-Centrists would have gone to so much trouble to join the government if it were only a facade. Since the national plenum of the regional organizations of the CNT in September, the CNT has been feverishly struggling to be part of the Caballero government (now sanctified by the name ‘Council’), while the POUM could find no rest until it was given a portfolio in the Council of the Catalan Generalidad.

But let’s look at things again more closely. Is it or isn’t it the case that the so-called facade in Madrid has control of the military forces of ‘democracy’? Wasn’t it this fact that forced the anarchists to demand so stridently that they be allowed to participate in this facade? It’s a funny kind of ‘revolutionary’ who says that the revolution depends on war, and who then gives the leadership of this war to Mr. Caba­llero.

But if you really want to prove that the bourgeois governments of the Spanish Popular Front are devoid of any importance, you should at least be able to show that there are other, real organs of power existing outside them. But since this is a bit dif­ficult to do it is necessary to resort to other arguments: like, for instance, the idea that the entry of workers’ organiza­tions into various ministries changes the nature of the state. Certainly, (the argu­ment goes on) in appearance the new state is quite similar to the old one, just like one drop of water resembles another. But this is, you see, just an ‘exterior facade’ .... The old reformists used the same argu­ments when they participated in the govern­ments of the bourgeoisie. But the problem is to see .who or what gets changed: the bourgeois state which absorbs the ‘workers’ ministers’, or the workers’ representatives who take on state functions. A half century of reformism has resolved this problem, and Lenin was right in October 1917 when, faithful to the teachings of Marx, he advo­cated the violent and total destruction of the capitalist state.

When we look at the concrete example of Spain, it will not be very difficult to prove that the ‘façade’ is in fact the reality of the situation, while on the other hand the so-called reality put forward by the anarchists and POUMists is truly a vulgar facade.

What does the Spanish bourgeoisie want to do? It wants to put an end to the workers’ movement for a whole period, since the lat­ter is an obstacle to the establishment of a stable regime capable of ‘peacefully’ ensuring the exploitation of the workers and peasants. It could only achieve this end by means of a monstrous massacre of the workers who rose up on 19 July; and this massacre was effected through a holy war, an anti-fascist crusade, which the workers fought in the belief that they were fight­ing for their revolution.

An essential bourgeois rule had to be ob­served: leave the mechanisms of the bour­geois state intact and reinforce it with the help of the workers’ organizations, who were given the supporting role of Peter the Hermit for the anti-fascist crusade. Of course, the factories expropriated by the workers were collectivized, big areas of land belonging to fascists were divided up; but always in conformity with the mainten­ance and strengthening of the bourgeois state, which was able to grow and develop in a situation in which the collectivized factories became militarized factories where the workers had to produce “more than before 19 July” and where they were no longer allowed to put forward the sligh­test class demand. The bourgeois state lives and strengthens itself the more the war effort prevents workers from living and strengthening themselves in the class struggle. “Everyone to the front or to the factory.” It is this situation which has allowed the bourgeois and workers’ organi­zations to replace the characteristic acti­vity of the proletariat with the character­istic activity of the bourgeoisie……..

Let us proceed with our study and take a look at the battle fought around Madrid. Who was responsible for Franco’s advance? It’s all well and good to rail against Italy and Germany for providing arms and troops to Franco’s fascists. The truth is that the Caballero government, allowed Toledo to fall and left Franco to concen­trate his troops when its own were scattered across a vast front deprived of any chance of success. However, Caballero claimed - along with the rest of the anti-fascist front - that Madrid was the real stake in the battle. But, after the flight of the government to Valencia - determined by the entry of the anarchists into it - was the reality of the facade thought worthy of notice? But of course not, the ‘Junta for the Defence of Madrid’ placed itself under the authority of the Madrid government and assumed the appearance of the old ‘façade’. And all our fine speechifiers, our demago­gues with their pretty revolutionary phrases, our commercial travellers-in-arms did not dream that it would be monstrous and criminal to call on the workers of Madrid and the international brigades to get themselves butchered for the sake of orders coming from their worst enemies.

If the proletarian revolution had developed in Spain, the workers would have quickly demanded that the understanding of the sit­uation be translated into deeds. How can you demand, call to the workers of other countries to come to the rescue when your actions are being lied about and distorted? The transfer of power from one class to another is the least conformist and traditional act imaginable. The question of ‘facades’ just doesn’t come into it when what is demanded is the total overthrow of the old state of affairs and the establish­ment of a new one.

The reality of the situation is really quite straightforward. Those who ask the workers to applaud the ‘façade’ of Companys and Caballero are the very same people who think that you can make the proletarian revolution with the permission of the demo­cratic bourgeoisie and set up a proletarian power by reforming the bourgeois state. These intentions are what the proletariat should ponder, and not the reality of this vulgar facade.

Everything would be fine if only events didn’t speak so cruelly for themselves.The workers would get killed on the fronts, the economic and social legislation of the ‘new society’ would develop little by little and .... Franco would be advancing militarily. But facts like these tend to give rise to disquiet among the workers. Hence, the Catalan bourgeoisie lately has been sending out feelers to Franco. Perhaps by proclaiming Catalonia an independent Republic Franco would be able to finish off Madrid more quickly? The ‘conspiracy’ has been discovered, the guilty have been punished (?) and order has been restored, because the anarchists don’t want the imposition of a ‘medieval republic’. But in its 2 December issue, Avangardia - a publication controlled by the Generalidad - denounced the lack of discipline within the rearguard. Since all the workers’ parties and organizations are represented in the government, those who act without represen­tation in the government must be regarded as fascists. As you can see, the ‘façade’ government isn’t doing at all badly. The bourgeoisie can also send out feelers among the workers and nobody can act outside the state.

Then there is the POUM, bewailing its so-called pseudo ‘workers and petty bourgeois government’. The Socialist ministers of Valencia claim that a quarter of an hour after a decision has been taken, their own civil servants will transmit it to Franco. The whole of the old bourgeois state appara­tus remains intact.

And when the Cortes met in Valencia, there was stupefaction everywhere. The CNT deci­ded that its ministers would not participate in the debates - perhaps for the sake of decency. But it let the parliamentary comedy be played out without saying a word. The anarchists are great statesmen who understand Caballero’s foreign policy and want to avoid disturbing it at all costs.

The POUM allows the representatives of its left wing to blather on about the fact that the bourgeois state still exists and explain the need to base the revolution not on the Cortes but on a Congress of workers’ and peasants’ committees. Four months after July, it can write that the bourgeoi­sie is making a symbolic gesture that sig­nifies the preservation of the form and content of the bourgeois democratic state.

The ‘revolution’ in Spain is truly a ‘pro­found’ one. It is tempting to blame the massacre of the workers and peasants on the verbiage of the demagogues alone. But what is needed is struggle and an appeal to the workers of all countries to come to the aid of the Iberian proletariat, to help it get out of this massacre. Already it is impos­sible to deny that the increasingly active intervention of Germany, Italy and Russia is making the Spanish events a moment in an imperialist war. The resistance of the Republicans around Madrid is heightening the tension of the international situation and is making the real nature of the struggle quite clear.

Only through the intervention of the workers of all countries struggling against their own bourgeoisie, and only through the inter­vention of the Spanish workers turning their guns against the ‘facade’ government of Valencia and Barcelona as well as against Franco, only through the workers unleashing their defensive struggles, struggles repre­senting moments of a generalized attack on the capitalist state - only this can allow the world proletariat to rediscover the path leading to the proletarian revolution.

(Bilan no.37, November-December 1936)

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1936 - Spain [35]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • The "united front" [36]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Italian Left [37]

Bilan 36 The isolation of our fraction in the face of the Spanish events

  • 2926 reads

Basing our work of today on the example of the Bolsheviks after 1914, we are trying in vain to discover those rare, isolated, marxist groupings who, confronted with the war in Spain and the world-wide wave of betrayals and abrupt changes of course, stand firm - those who, despite the activity of that rabid pack of traitors of yesterday and today, continue to proclaim their loyal­ty to the independent struggle of the pro­letariat for its own class goals.

How many of them are there? Where are they? The facts of the situation provide us with a laconic and sinister reply. It seems that all have gone under and that we are living in a lamentable epoch of the bank­ruptcy of the few remaining revolutionary elements.

Our isolation is not fortuitous. It is the consequence of a profound victory by world capitalism which has managed to infect with gangrene even those groups of the communist left whose spokesman up until now was Trotsky. We do not claim that at the pre­sent moment we are the only group whose positions have been confirmed by every turn of events, but what we do claim categorical­ly is that, good or bad, our positions have been based on a permanent affirmation of the necessity for the autonomous class acti­vity of the proletariat. And it is on this question that we have seen the bankruptcy of all Trotskyist and semi-Trotskyist groups.

At no price and under no pretext do we want to depart from a principled position in determining the groups with whom we can pursue joint work and with whom we can set up a centre for international liaison with a view to establishing the programmatic foundations of the International which tomorrow’s revolutionary wave will allow us to build. The criterion we use consists of a merciless rejection of those elements who have succumbed to the course of events or who are openly working on the side of the enemy. We must bear in mind that any agree­ment with opportunists of this kind on a question that the proletariat must approach with brutal intransigence the question of the formation of parties - could cause irreparable harm to the future of the work­ing class.

Even before Hitler assumed power and before Trotsky began his campaign to create a IVth International, the first issue of Bilan laid down the programmatic basis of our break with Trotsky, as a result of his ori­entation towards a compromise with the left of social democracy on the question of founding new parties. Subsequent events have only served to widen the gulf separa­ting ourselves from Trotsky: which on his side has taken the form of a re-entry tactic into the traitorous parties of the Ilnd International; then leaving these parties to create a type of IVth International com­posed of brawlers and demagogues who use the name of Trotsky as political capital in order to introduce their rubbish into the revolutionary proletariat. It is impossible to come to any agreement with these people in a situation where, despite the enforced silence of Trotsky, they are participating in the bloody masquerade of intervention in Spain. To do so, what’s more, would be a grave betrayal. We have got to fight against the buffoons of the IVth Internatio­nal, the Navilles and Cies in France, the Lesoil-Dauges in Belgium. When they joined with the traitors in demanding “arms for Spain”, when they jumped on the bandwagon behind the opportunists of the POUM, when they sent young French militants to their death under the pretext of sending military aid to the POUM - then the Trotskyists placed themselves on the other side of the barricade, among the battalions capitalism has dispatched to greet the proletariat with salvoes of fire and steel. We don’t know whether Trotsky - who has to remain silent because he is in prison - will follow his followers in their policies of capitula­tion and treason. Let us hope that he will not sanction opportunistic politics by disavowing his glorious past of 1917.

We can expect nothing from this utterly bankrupt tendency. From now on events them­selves will justify the marxist criticism of these organizations and sweep them away. This is the only way of freeing a number of militants precious to the revolutionary struggle. At the present time the ‘IVth International’ has two important (?) sec­tions - France and Belgium. In the USA the Trotskyists entered the official Socia­list Party after fusing with an independent socialist party, and they are still there today. Within the Italian emigration, Blanco and Cie have widened their field of activity to encompass the movement for go­ing off to Spain; they are now talking pompously about an Italian group of the IVth International. But this is all a farce, the kind of farce which the condi­tions of life in the emigration frequently produce.

Neither in France nor in Belgium do the two Trotskyist parties have anything to do with the life and struggle of the proletariat. They have replaced the search for a program­matic basis for a new party with a faction fight between Naville’s clique and Molinier’s ,clique. When the June wave of strikes broke out in France the new party was formed on the basis of a compromise, wherein adventurism and demagogic positions were dressed up as a programme (armament of the workers, the creation of armed militias, etc). After this, the Molinier clique was liqui­dated and we had the Spanish events in which (despite Trotsky calling Nin a traitor) the French Trotskyists went full steam behind the POUM.

In Belgium, where the working class charac­ter of the Trotskyist groups is much more marked than in France, we saw at Trotsky’s instigation their entry into the Parti Ouvriere Belge (Workers’ Party of Belgium). This was resisted by the Brussels group, not on principle but for ‘tactical’ reasons (in France it was justified, but not in Belgium, etc ....). Within the POB we had the alliance between the orthodox Trotsky­ists and the ex-left of Minister Spaak, deprived of its old leader, who was repla­ced by Walter Dauge. The circumstances in which the faction ‘Action Socialiste Revolutionnaire’ (Revolutionary Socialist Action) was expelled are not very edifying: it was over an electoral incident when the POB decided to remove Dauge from its list of candidates unless the latter was prepared to accept certain preconditions which would have finished him as a leftist. Af­ter various attempts to come to a deal the split took place, and after the elections there was a campaign for the creation of a revolutionary socialist party, which has recently been founded, taking in the Sparta­cus group of Brussels. On Spain, they have the same position as in France: arms to Spain, the struggle against neutrality, sending young workers to the battlefields of Spain, etc .... It is thus clear that our differences with the Trotskyist groups over Spain have now become .a gulf, the same gulf which separates those who are strug­gling for the communist revolution from those who have taken up capitalist ideology.

But already last year at the Congress of our fraction, we expressed our concern about the isolation of the fraction and we looked to see what groups could be approached with a view to joint work. First of all we rejected the proposal of the American group, Class Struggle, who wanted to call an Inter­national Conference which would draw up the programme of a New International. Against this we put forward the more serious idea of setting up a centre for liaison with those groups who claim continuity with the IInd Congress of the Communist International, have broken with Trotsky, and see the neces­sity to make a fundamental critique of the whole experience of the Russian Revolution.

Our proposition didn’t have any outcome and our relations with all other groups remain the same. In Belgium relations with the Ligue des Communistes Internationalistes (International Communist League) are still marked by a mutual desire for discussion and confrontation, and this has been the only place where our fraction has encounter­ed the desire for work in a positive direction. Today the only internationalist voices daring to make themselves heard amid the din of the Spanish debacle are in the Ligue, and it is a real joy for us to be able to publicly salute these comrades, who remain loyal to the basic principles of marxism.

The majority of the comrades of the Ligue1 have profound differences with our fraction, but our co-operation with them, including the project of setting up a liaison centre, is based on the fact that the Ligue like our fraction is evolving on a working class terrain and the programma­tic documents of the Ligue do not show any break with this evolution.

As for France, it is time to draw up a balance-sheet summarizing our attempts to come to an agreement with groups of revolu­tionary militants.

The failure of the group Union Communiste (Communist Alliance) is not accidental. It is a result of the fact that, despite many invitations and warnings from us, they have refused to follow the historic route which will eventually lead to the formation of a proletarian party. A conglomeration of conflicting tendencies, the Union Communiste has always shied away from a strict deline­ation of its programme. Its political posi­tions are nothing but an eternal compromise between orthodox Trotskyism and a confused attempt to break away from Trotskyism. When the events of June took place, the Union collapsed and a section of its membership went back to the Trotskyist party. At that time we intervened in France in order to push the comrades of the Union to use this latest split as a signal for drawing up a programme. We proposed the organization of meetings at which dif­ferent communist groupings (including the Union) would confront each other, each one bringing its own specific political contri­bution, and justifying its existence as a separate group, in order to give some direc­tion to the workers’ movement in France today. Here again, our efforts met with failure because of the inability of any of these groups to make the slightest step for­ward, because of their desire to give faith­ful expression to the degeneration of the French proletarian movement rather than reacting against it. The Spanish events sorted things out here as well. Thus we saw the debris of the Union Communiste falling in step with the POUM and more or less defending the positions of the Trot­skyist groups. We don’t doubt for a moment that within the Union there are militants who want to remain loyal to internationalism and marxism. But if, in the light of the massacres in the Iberian Peninsula, they are unable to break out of the rut and prepare themselves for a rupture with the past and with the political premises of the Union, they will be lost to the proletarian cause.

We say openly that we were mistaken about the possibility of engaging in a process of clarification with the Union Communiste. The positions which it has more or less put forward on Spain force us to have the same attitude to it as to any other groups that we may encounter.

It would be useful to see what class organi­zations of the proletariat exist in Spain. On this question we refuse to regard the POUM as anything but a counter-revolutionary obstacle to the development of consciousness in the class.

First we know that the Spanish Trotskyists refused to enter the Socialist Party as Trotsky had asked, but what they did do was jump into the opportunist party of Maurin, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Bloc. It is also fitting to point out the Catalan regionalism of the POUM which it styles ‘marxism’ in the name of the right of the people to self-determination. (Regionalism is the result of this political marriage.) This allowed it to enter the government of the Union Sacree in Catalonia without having to worry about Madrid (just like the CNT). Finally, we should not forget that the POUM is a member of the London Bureau alongside the Independent Labour Party; that it works with the left of the French Socialist Party (Pivert, Collinet and Cie); that it is in close contact with the Italian maximalists of Balabanora and the Brandler group which, while continuing to stand for the reform of the IIIrd International and the defence of the USSR, has decided to give every assis­tance to the POUM.

The POUM has never really broken with the parties of the Esquerra Catalan with whom, in the name of the united front with the petty bourgeoisie, it has made all kinds of compromises. After 19 July, the POUM was connected to the Generalidad like the other Catalan organizations. It didn’t find it very difficult to move from its confused demand for a Constituent Assembly based on Committees of Workers and Soldiers and for a workers’ government, to participating in the Generalidad which is not exactly a workers’ government.

All the tendencies of the POUM Gorkin (who is the heir of Maurin’s policies), Nin, Andrade - gravitate around the same political axis without having any funda­mental differences. They all participated in the strangling of the class response of the Spanish workers by organizing the mili­tary columns, and though Andrade attempted to differentiate himself in the POUM’s Madrid publication by using pseudo-marxist phraseology, in reality he still supported the overall policies of the POUM leadership. The Spanish Trotskyists wanted to concretely practice the ‘Leninist’ (?) notion of entering an opportunist party in order to win it over to revolutionary positions.

The result has been the transformation of the leaders of the former communist left into avowed traitors to the proletarian cause. It’s not by chance that Mr. Nin is now Minister of Justice in Catalonia, applying ‘class’ justice under the aegis of Mr Companys. Nin has forgotten his ‘Trotskyist’ interlude in Russia and has gone back to being the clown of the ISR that he was before. As for Andrade’s left faction, it’s also not by chance that it has associated itself with the POUM’s military campaign. And like Nin and Gorkin, it calls us counter-revolutionaries for daring to denounce the monstrous and criminal dupery to which the Spanish workers have fallen victim. The POUM is a field of activity for the class enemy and no revolutio­nary tendencies can develop within it. Just as the workers who want to rediscover the path of the class struggle must seek a radi­cal transformation of the present situation in Spain, opposing the territorial fronts with their own class front, so the Spanish workers who want to lay the basis for a revolutionary party must first of all break with the POUM, opposing the capitalist ter­rain on which it is operating with the class terrain of the proletariat. Andrade and company have the function of tying the most advance workers to the counter-revolutionary politics of the POUM. Our task is not to give them credibility by supporting them politically; it is to denounce them with the utmost vigour.

Our fraction has no intention of coming to any agreement with anyone in the POUM (here it must be said that the minority in our fraction has a different position), or giv­ing any support to the so-called Left in the POUM. The fact is that the proletariat of the Iberian Peninsula has still to lay the basic foundations of a marxist nucleus. This is something that can’t be accomplish­ed by means of ‘revolutionary’ manoeuvres with opportunists. The only way to do it is to call upon the workers to act on a class basis, independently of any capitalist interest, outside of and against all the parties who defend the interests of the bourgeoisie, such as the POUM and the FAI, (Iberian Anarchist Federation), who have constructed a firm Union Sacree with the Republican Left and the Popular Front.

Thus we must conclude that in Spain, as in the rest of the world, there is no sign of the kind of historical political evolution the Italian workers underwent through seve­ral years of civil war against fascism, an evolution which our fraction, for all its limited resources, has attempted to express. We are profoundly aware of the impossibility of changing this international situation (which is simply the manifestation of a balance of class forces unfavourable to the proletariat) through proposals for creating new Internationals or through alliances with opportunists like the Trotskyists and the POUMists. If the defence of revolutionary marxism today means total isolation, we must accept this and understand that it is an expression of the terrible isolation of the proletariat, betrayed by everyone and cast into oblivion by all the parties who claim to stand for its emancipation. We do not hide the dangers that this situation could represent for our organization, know­ing full well that it is not the perfect repository of marxist understanding. Only the social movements of the future, by setting the proletariat back on its class terrain, will give real strength to revolutionary marxism and the organizations which defend it, including our fraction.

(Bilan no.36, October-November 1936)

1 The current represented by comrade Hennaut fights energetically against our positions but has not fallen into a Trotskyist-type interventionism.

 

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1936 - Spain [35]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Italian Left [37]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Party and Fraction [50]

Spain – Yesterday and Today

  • 2918 reads

A few ‘Spanish’ lessons

Forty years ago, on July 19th 1936, the Spanish workers hurled themselves barehanded into battle against Franco’s ‘pronuncia­mento’. Their spirited resistance, emerging without any order or directive having been issued from the mass organizations, demon­strated the fierceness of their class instincts. At that point they constituted an autonomous force moving towards an ideo­logical break with the state. By the evening of that memorable day, the working class had spontaneously created its own organ of struggle, the workers’ militia, which was made up of all those who were exploited. Sectional and trade union divisions along with differences of political maturity amongst the militiamen were disregarded. The militia was actually the only gain made by the proletariat during this time. It was the proletariat’s only material weapon at a time when the CNT leadership was trying to get the workers to go back to work for the good of the ‘social’ Republic, the same Republic which had previously massacred them and armed Franco’s insurrec­tion from top to bottom.

The Spanish proletariat was capable of blocking the Francoist uprising - but it was too weak to seize power, to preserve and develop its own organs of struggle. An intimate cause-and-effect relationship existed between the world situation and this powerlessness. With the Moscow trials in 1936, the last sods of earth were thrown onto the coffin of the world revolution. But the shots of the firing squads exterminating the last of the Bolsheviks, were drowned out by the clamour of anti-fascism.

What kind of social revolution is it when the international conditions for world revolution are completely non-existent and the state remains intact? Generally, this question is answered with lies that explain the defeat of the class by referring to the ‘betrayal’ of the anarchist leaders, or the ‘non-intervention’ policies of Daladier and Chamberlain (sic), or by accusing the POUM of being incompetent in executing its tasks.

In the epoch of the decadence of capitalism there can be no intermediate stage between the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Hence the working class is faced with an insoluble dilemma when it is fighting within a national framework: either it can carry on fighting alone or enter into an alliance with factions of the bourgeoisie. In Spain the class took the second path, dragged along by anarchist leaders who had been cured as if by magic of their phobia about ‘politics’. From a class war against the capitalist enemy, the struggle was transformed into a conflict between the democratic and fascist factions of the bourgeoisie. Instead of resolutely following the path of revolutionary defeatism - in the tradition of the October victory in Russia - the class was used as cannon fodder in a war fought to serve the ambitions of Franco and the survival instincts of the Negrin-Caballero government.

As a militant who had, together with a handful of internationalists, raised the banner of revolutionary defeatism in opposition to the slaughter of the First World War, Trotsky now opted for perjury. He inculcated in his Spanish followers the idea of defending democracy, no matter how rotten it was, under the pretext that demo­cracy (unlike fascism) did allow the proletariat the freedom to organize. A piercing strain in the writings of all kinds of people at the time was the need to support anti-fascism in order to ensure the military victory of the legal government. When you look through issues of La Batalla, Solidaridad Obrera and Mundo Obrero it is impossible to suppress your disgust. All of them demanded a wholesale alliance of the prole­tariat with the bourgeoisie. All of them abased themselves before the militarist state. The ‘marxists’ of the Union Sacree and the POUM did not blush a bit when they called the Republican government an expres­sion of the will-to-struggle of the toiling masses. The anti-statists of the CNT-FAI did not hesitate to turn themselves into its lackeys, a role which made them the alter-ego of Stalinism: “First the war (an imperia­list war, mind you:) then the fight for bread!” Thanks to them the state was able to regather into its criminal hands the momentarily-broken thread of control it had lost over the class and its organs of struggle.

From the moment the proletariat allowed it­self to be drawn away from its own class terrain, the road was open for capitalism to massacre it. What was the proletariat defending? A fundamental position from which to launch a revolutionary offensive, or the cardboard conquests of agrarian reform and workers’ control over production? We have no choice but to insist that even while they were crushing the fascist hydra under the leadership of the Republican government, the Spanish workers were rapidly and decisively being led into defeat. While the proletariat everywhere was rushing to attack the fascist menace (had this monster arisen from the putrid mould of a decaying bourgeoisie or the fevered brain of the disloyal military staff?) capitalism was able to celebrate in blood - dancing a saraband over the corpses of hundreds of thousands of ‘blacks’ and ‘reds’. Franco came to power and managed to keep Spain out of the second imperialist war, for which Spain (like the Sino-Japanese conflict and the Italian military operations in Abyssinia) was simply a preparatory episode, sealed with the blood of thousands. Once again in the name of humanist and democratic prin­ciples, peacetime production was transformed into the production of human cadavers on an unheard of scale.

As soon as the imperialist brigands signed the diplomatic agreements putting an end to hostilities, the bourgeoisie could set about restoring the world from a state of smoking ruin. At the price of terrible exploitation and unspeakable deprivation, the capitalist order was able to heal the awful wound of war, which the bourgeoisie presented as a humanitarian operation. ‘In the name of humanity I wreak havoc; in the name of humanity I reconstruct the ruins!’ Such is the ship that capitalism will sail until it is broken on the reef of proletarian struggle.

Today, a new act in the world-wide struggle of the proletariat against capitalist society is being played out on the Spanish stage, precipitating a whole development of events. Far from leading to a stabilization of the system, the death of Franco (who counted on the church as the most stable mainstay of his dictatorship) has opened up a new era of instability for Spain.

The recent decades of capitalist recon­struction brought with them profound changes in the structure of the Spanish economy. Taking advantage of the possibilities of the boom, the Spanish bourgeoisie developed and concentrated Spain’s productive appara­tus. Shining new industrial sectors sprung up on soil fertilized by a rain of cash, generously splashed about by other western countries. But the post-war boom was followed by a world-wide recession in industrial production and trade. Today the world economy is forced to breathe the stale air of protectionism. For Spain the changing situation has taken the concrete form of a fall in demand for its products.

Despite the active support given the Spanish economy primarily by the US and the Common Market countries in the hope of integrating Spain fully into the Atlantic community, the Spanish bourgeoisie under Juan Carlos has shown itself to be incapable of under­taking a quiet transition to a post-Franco regime. Spanish capitalism so infatuated with its success that it believed some of its factories were about to eclipse their French and Italian rivals, now appears to the proletariat in the light of the hideous reality of hunger, falling wages, material insecurity, and state violence. The false perspective of a continual improvement in workers’ living standards under capitalism and the theory of the smoothing-out of class contradictions, once triumphantly put forward by the ‘transcenders’ of marxism - all this has had its day. The working class in Spain had to pay a heavy tribute for the industrialization of the previous decade which reached a growth rate of more than 10%; it also had to be content with a meagre reward for its labour. Today not only is it being told to pull in its belt, but also to identify with the policy of national reconciliation.

Political life in Spain is a swamp exuding the pestilential stink of decadence. Who would have thought that one day Stalinists and monarchists would be allies? Who could have predicted that those ‘proud rebels’, the anarchists, would shamelessly enter the vertical trade unions in order to “play off corporatism in favour of the workers”? But those whose eyes are open and who know their history will not be astonished. All factions of the Spanish bourgeoisie are able to join together in a Union Sacree in order to save their economy. However, this does not mean they can control class antagonisms. Today we are faced with the historical exhaustion of the bourgeoisie, a class totally incapable of resolving a problem which has outdistanced it: the increasingly explosive contradiction between the develop­ment of the productive forces and the form of social organization in which they are contained.

The working class in Spain never fell on its knees and renounced its struggle. Even before the end of the ‘Spanish miracle’ (blown away like a straw in the wind by the world crisis), the spares of social con­flagration were being lit in the majority of the country’s economic centres. The determination of the workers was manifested not only in work stoppages, but also in street-fighting. As intrepid as ever, braving the bullets of the Civil Guard, the Spanish proletariat toward the end of the 60s, resolutely launched itself into the struggle. In recent weeks hundreds of thousands of strikers have made an indelible imprint on Spanish social life. The bour­geoisie is finding it extremely hard to make the working class accept the need for sacrifices. The strike movement broke out in full force when the Arias-Navarro government stupidly tried to impose a wage freeze while lengthening the working day. Beginning with the strike of the Madrid metro, the chain of class solidarity was forged link by link in the heat of the struggle against the militarization of the strikers and the intervention of the troops. Of its own accord, the movement took on a political character. The dockers of Barcelona, the electricians of Standard in Madrid, the bank employees of Valencia and Seville had only to show themselves to be fighting on their own class terrain to inflict insomnia on the government and the opposi­tion, which aspires to install itself in power with a minimum of social unrest.

The heroic Spanish proletariat has come to the fore in this political setting, indica­ting capitalism’s entry into a whole series of violent upheavals. The class which the ‘innovators’ and ‘transcenders’ of marxism saw to be a non-revolutionary class; the class which the system thought it had domesticated with the crumbs of its much vaunted prosperity - once again that class is on the move.

Their combativity has put the Spanish workers in the vanguard of the world prole­tarian movement. In the 30s, owing to its tragic isolation in terms of the inter­national situation, each battle-field of the proletariat in Spain became a mass grave. But today the Spanish proletariat constitutes the advanced detachment of that immense proletarian army in the process of raising its head from east to west. As one of the most decisive centres of world class struggle, the situation in Spain allows us to understand the magnitude of the effort the international bourgeoisie is making to shore up the last ramparts of its system.

The proletariat has re-emerged on a terrain which will enable it to propel events toward a revolutionary conclusion. That terrain is the class autonomy of the proletariat; that conclusion is the seizure of political power. The chances for the whole of human­ity to extricate itself from the mire in which it has languished for three-quarters of a century depend on the proletariat’s ability to take up this banner, a banner which has been raised by the class ever since its first efforts to storm the heavens.

The enemy and its weapons

Faced with a whole number of strikes which have developed like a powder-trail despite the firm vigilance of the workers’ commis­sions in their efforts to ensure a peaceful transition to democracy, the forces of the Left are putting all their skills into action. They are trying to derail the workers’ response, to cut it down to ‘peaceful’ dimensions, to transform the workers’ consciousness into a vulgar ‘public opinion’.

Long before the military victory of Franco the Stalinists and Social Democrats were terrorizing the workers in the 30s. Give yourselves up body and soul to the needs of the struggle against fascism or we will strike you down like dogs: In May 1937 the Stalinist-reformist riff-raff engaged in the armed destruction of the final battle of the proletariat of Barcelona and other working class suburbs, when the workers had the audacity to go on strike in sectors that were supposed to be ‘con­quests of the revolution’. Once again they asked the workers to show themselves to be ‘responsible’ by respecting the law. For them, any will to autonomous struggle or any independent action of the class was akin to the proverbial bull in the china shop. The holy alliance concluded by the Stalinists, POUMists, Socialists, and anarchists functioned to smother any sign of strength in the proletariat as soon as it appeared.

Every democratic slogan, every transitional demand pushes the proletariat into a union with the left wing of the Spanish bourgeoisie. The leftists play the role of gad­flies. The Stalinists will respect “the verdict of the ballot, no matter what the result”. The Trotskyists will also respect it so as not to cut themselves off from the masses. The Stalinists will make the workers go back to the very factories they have deserted in order to come out onto the streets. The Trotskyists will issue warn­ings against provoking the ‘reactionaries’ who-are-only-waiting-for-an-excuse-to-­repress-us. In all cases, the leftists will reveal their intention of guaranteeing social peace for the bourgeoisie by holding back the increasingly huge numbers of workers who are coming to consciousness.

The fact that capitalism can no longer govern within the framework of Francoist authoritarianism is shown by the relaxation of the ‘sumarismo’ procedure and by the amendments to the anti-terrorist law passed during the summer of 1975. The Spanish bourgeoisie must move toward making the necessary political changes the situation requires. A country which for thirty-five years has lived under the single-handed reign of an autocrat needs the democratic envelope to serve as a lightning conductor for social electricity. In Spain, anti-Francoist sentiments are rife and slogans about ‘winning democratic rights’ have an excep­tional importance in attempts to dupe the working class. The democratic parties will be legalized, the CSN will be converted into ‘genuinely representative trade unions’ in order to cushion as much as possible a direct confrontation with the working class.

The proletariat must not allow itself to be taken in by this. It must be aware what all those who talk about ‘democratic rights’ are on about. The state, whatever its constitution, remains a machine for oppressing the working class. When the class struggle has reached a higher level and the workers move toward the seizure of power, this ‘purified’ state will spill the blood of the workers as they pursue the path leading to armed insurrection.

The sirens of democracy make all kinds of noises, promising the working class a journey to a land of milk and honey. But this formal democracy is nothing but bourgeois dictatorship in disguise. The more decrepit the tart, the more she uses rouge and make-up. The bourgeoisie uses the same seductive weapons in its period of decadence. It is true that Franco, like the Hindu Thugs, practised state murder with the aid of the garotte. But what did the Spanish Republic get up to during its interregnum?

As each successive dictatorship fell like a rotten fruit, the bourgeoisie achieved a more advanced concentration of its forces in preparation for the physical crushing of the working class. From 1931 to 1936, the government of the social Republic machine-gunned, bombed, and deported to its African prisons whole batches of insurgent workers. It more or less integrally maintained the police and judicial apparatus of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. The coalition of Republicans and Socialists in the Azana government very quickly showed its worth. The 114 Socialist Deputies in the Consti­tuent Cortes covered up all the crimes committed by the liberal cannibals. Among the interminable series of legal murders perpetrated in the name of ‘democracy’ there was Arnido and Casas Viejas. Even more horrible was the repression in the Asturias. The conscripts, both regulars and legion­aries of the ‘Tercio’, plunged the miners of Oviedo and the workers of Giron into a bloodbath, with the full blessing of the Church. It was the Republic which gave its soldiery a licence to spread terror through the working class districts; and today the creation of a Republic is being called for once again by the whole crowd of the ‘Left’ and the ‘extreme Left’.

Fifteen years earlier, at its first Congress, the Communist International honoured the victims of the White Terror, a terror which was being further incensed by the calumnies of the Social Democrats against the soviet power in Russia. It declared that: “In its struggle to maintain the capitalist order, the bourgeoisie is using the most out­rageous methods, in the face of which all the cruelties of the Middle Ages, the Inquisition and colonization pale into insignificance.”

As the inheritor of a coherent communist programme through the Fractions which came out of the Third International, the ICC insists that the establishment of a Spanish Republic elected by universal suffrage will in no way create constitutional conditions favourable to the proletariat. On the contrary, the setting up of such a Republic will result from the need of the bourgeoisie to carry out repression under the cover of juridical rules and regulations ‘legalized’ by the will of the majority of the ‘people’. As the somewhat rickety last hope of capi­talism, it is logical that the ‘democratic’ parties should now come forward with their soporific phrases about the ‘need for compromise’ and ‘anti-fascist unity’. To oppose these parties, to denounce them for what they are - strike-breakers, butchers of workers’ uprisings - is one of the fun­damental political duties of a revolutionary.

The proletariat in Spain has given itself with ardour to the revolution, but the bourgeoisie is making use of all its supporters - its lawyers, journalists, parliamentarians, and separatist agents in an effort to reduce the class to impo­tence.

The political lessons of events in Spain stand out in particularly bold relief. The Spanish tragedy of yesterday must serve as a guide to the struggle today and as a warning to the world proletariat. The class must first of all take political power since in contrast to previous revolutionary classes, it has no economic base within society. This is the sine qua non for any socialization of the productive forces. Though strikes are a vital necessity of working class struggle, they are simply the point of departure for the movement toward the complete emancipation of the working class which can only come into being after the destruction of the state.

R.C.

Revolution Internationale

Geographical: 

  • Spain [33]

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1936 - Spain [35]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • The "united front" [36]

Theses on organization

  • 2774 reads

I. “The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based on ideas or principles that have been invented, or dis­covered by this or that would-be universal reformer.

They merely express in general terms, act­ual relations springing from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on under our very eyes.” (Marx & Engels, The Communist Manifesto, 1847)

II. The last fifty years have been ravaged by the counter-revolution which has systematically masked and falsified all theoretical expressions defending the historic interests of the proletariat. This veil of distortion has naturally kept buried all the central questions of marxism as the theory of the historic development of the working class. The question which is fundamental for revolutionaries (the nature of the movement which drives the class and party forward - the party being the organi­zation of revolutionaries defending class positions) has been caricatured and per­verted as much by the Leninist version as by the anti-Leninists - both of whom ignore the very essence of the class/party rela­tionship, which is the development of consciousness.

III. The understanding of ‘how the working class becomes conscious of its historical task’ (how the proletariat constitutes it­self as a united class) is the very heart of an understanding of the role of revolu­tionaries.

IV. For us, as marxists, the consciousness of the proletariat is the consciousness of what it is within the mode of production and therefore what it will be forced to carry out: the communist revolution. This consciousness of ‘what it is’ can only be achieved by itself, through its daily class struggle, through its praxis.

V. It is by virtue of its role as creator of new value in the capitalist process of production that the proletariat alone is able to have a collective (that is class) consciousness of its interests and its future. “It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness.” (Marx, Preface to the Critique of Political Economy, 1859)

VI. The process whereby consciousness develops in the working class - the passage from its being a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself - is necessarily a collec­tive process because the working class carries out associated work in capitalist production which necessitates collective participation by the workers. The workers can only defend their interests collectively because they only have collective interests.

VII. The communist revolution, as distinct from all previous revolutions, can only be accomplished by a class highly conscious of its historic task, since the working class has no economic base in capitalist society to aid it in making its revolution. Its only weapons are its class consciousness and the organization it creates to realize its aims.

VIII. The constitution of the proletariat into a conscious and united class takes place at the conjuncture of a certain number of objective factors which act as cata­lysts. Among these factors economic pres­sure is indeed an indispensable, but still insufficient condition for the development of consciousness, The whole history of the workers’ movement has indicated that, while such economic pressure is necessary, it can only be really effective within the decadence of the system, that is in that period when the system can be materially destroyed.

IX. The intervention of revolutionaries (organized at first internationally as a fraction and later as a world party) has the role of diffusing the past experiences of the working class and of foreseeing future perspectives for the class struggle (based on the past experiences of the class and a socio-economic analysis). Because of this role, the intervention of revolutio­naries is also an active factor in the impetus within the class towards the development of consciousness by and for the class, as well as in its generalization. (This is a necessary task as the conscious­ness of the class is never a homogeneous phenomenon.)

X. The communist fractions organize them­selves on the basis of agreeing, both theoretically and practically, with the class positions (the communist programme), and they have the responsibility to the proletariat of organizing themselves in the same international, unified and centra­lized manner as the working class, in order to constitute a coherent revolutionary pole (fraction or international communist current).

XI. Once this revolutionary pole has been constituted, then it must be transformed into a world communist party. This trans­formation can certainly only take place in a period of mounting class struggle internationally and at a time when the international fraction has an effective influence within the working class.

XII. The party is a political expression secreted by the very experience of the class (the revolutionary theory defended by the party), which acts on the class by encouraging the unleashing and generaliza­tion of class consciousness, produced by and for the proletariat itself. There is, therefore, a dialectical relationship bet­ween the class and the party based on the fact that the party, produced by the class, becomes at the same time an active factor within the class.

XIII. The conception defended by Lenin in What is to be Done? (1902), asserts that the constitution of the proletariat as a unified class is not a product of the daily struggles of the class but is a product of a ‘socialist consciousness’ imported from outside the class. This theory creates an ideological split between being and cons­ciousness; between the brutal, dirty being, the worker, and the ‘pure-as-the-driven-­snow’ consciousness of the bourgeois intellectuals who deign to bring this consciousness to the masses. This dichotomy between matter and the idea which stands above matter, is an expression of an all pervasive idealism that claims that a higher idea pre-exists matter and that only a mediator (such as religion, philosophy, the Leninist Party, etc) can unite the idea and matter together.

The proletarian movement is basically a natural series of historic phenomena subject to laws which are not only indepen­dent of the will, of the consciousness and intentions of the proletariat, but which, on the contrary, determine the workers’ will, their consciousness and their inten­tions; “For me the movement of thought is only a reflection of the real movement, transported and transposed into man’s brain.” (Marx, Capital)

XIV. Similarly, the so-called ‘councilist’ conception, which adopts the opposite point of view to What is to be Done?, ends up with the same idealist deformation, but the other way round. For ‘councilism’ consc­iousness can only come from the class itself; any theoretical expression of the interests of the class by a revolutionary group cannot help but be a substitution for the real movement. And these indivi­duals, guilt-ridden by Lenin’s errors, refuse to intervene at all, thereby denying that the revolutionary theory diffused within the working class is, as we have seen an active factor in the process of the development of consciousness. Refusing to carry out their responsibilities to the class, they accept the Leninist dichotomy between being and consciousness, but more sheepishly.

XV. “However, the effort of the class to develop its consciousness has existed at all times since its origins and will exist until its dissolution into communist society. This is why communist minorities have existed in every period as an expression of this constant effort.” (Platform of the ICC, International Review, no. 5)

Marc M.



Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary organisation [5]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • International Communist Current [6]

Contributions on the period of transition

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The texts we are publishing here are con­tributions to discussion on the period of transition, which has always been an open question in the workers’ movement, and one to which revolutionaries must address them­selves without making ‘recipes for the future’, or oversimplifying such a complex question, or drawing up class lines around problems which the practical experience of the class has not yet settled.

The debate within the ICC on this question began as soon as the ICC was formed, and the following texts are a continuation of the discussion initiated in the first issue of The International Review. The debate is still going on within the Current, and we have not yet come to a homogeneous posi­tion, particularly on the question of the state in the period of transition which is dealt with in these texts.

  • The period of transition

I. The nature of transition periods

Human history is made up of different stable societies based on a mode of production, with corresponding stable social relations within that society. These societies are based on the dominant economic laws by which they are defined, are composed of fixed social strata, and are supported by the appropriate superstructure (primitive communism, Asiatic productive mode, Ancient, feudal, and capitalist).

Every mode of production has an ascendant phase during which it is able to develop the productive forces, and a decadent phase, in which the mode of production becomes a brake on this development, and finally leads to its exhaustion and decom­position.

A period of transition begins after a more or less lengthy period of decadence during which the seeds of the new mode of produc­tion develop to the detriment of the old, thus enabling the old contradictions to be resolved and transcended, and leads finally to the establishment of the new dominant mode of production. The transition period has no mode of production of its own, but the old and the new modes both exist, entangled together. This period of transition is an absolute necessity, because the decay of the old society doesn’t automati­cally bring about the maturation of the new, but merely produces the conditions for this maturation. Thus, capitalism tended to socialize production on a world scale - to create a real community - but, at the same time, this would have immediately abolished the raison d’etre of commodity exchange and directly posed the realization of communism. But, with the creation of the world market which placed definite limits on accumulation, capital undermined the basis for the complete socialization of humanity: it destroyed modes of production in the non-capitalist world but wasn’t able to integrate them into capitalist production. Capitalism had entered its decadent phase.

II. Communist society

All periods of transition are born of the same conditions which give rise to the new society which will follow. In order to an­alyze the nature of the transition period between capitalism and communism and to see what distinguishes this period from all previous periods we must describe the nature of communist society or rather how it’s distinguished from all other societies:

- Contrary to past societies - with the exception of primitive communism - which have all been class divided and based on property and the exploitation of man by man, communism is a society without classes and without any kind of property; it is a unified and harmonious human community.

- The other societies in history were founded on the insufficient development of the productive forces in relation to the needs of man: they were societies of scarcity, dominated by natural forces and blind socio-economic laws. Communism is the full development of the productive forces in relation to the needs of man, the abundance of production capable of satisfying human needs: it is the world of liberty, the liberation of humanity from the domination of nature and the economy.

- All previous societies carried with them the anachronistic vestiges of economic and social relations, of ideas and prejudices of past societies, because they were all foun­ded on private property and exploitation. In contrast to this, breaking with all these characteristics, communist society cannot tolerate within itself any surviving ele­ments of the preceding society.

- The low level of development of the prod­uctive forces in past societies brought with it the uneven development of different sections of society: as well as being based on class divisions, these societies were divided into regions and nations. Only the productive forces developed by capitalism since its zenith allow for the first time in history a true interdependence between different parts of the world. Communism is universal from its inception or it is nothing; it demands that all parts of the world develop together simultaneously.

- There is neither exchange nor the law of value under communism. Production is socia­lized in the fullest sense of the word: it is planned completely according to the needs of the members of society and for their satisfaction. And such production, based on use-values, and where distribution is direct and socialized, excludes trade, markets, and money.

- All past societies - with the exception of primitive communism - have been divided into classes with antagonistic interests and have only been able to exist and survive by creating a special organ which seems to stand above classes, but which in fact imposes the domination of the ruling class over society; this organ is the state. Communism, knowing no such divisions, has no need of a state. Moreover inasmuch as it is a human community no organism for the government of men can exist within it.

III. Characteristics of the period of transition

Up until now all periods of transition in history have had this in common, that they developed inside the old society. The political revolution of the new ruling class was no more than the culmination of its economic domination which had developed progressively inside the old society. This situation proves that the new society, like the old one, blindly obeys the imperatives of laws produced by the scarcity of the pro­ductive forces, and that the new ruling class simply brings with it another form of exploitation and class division.

Communism is the total break with all exploitation and all class divisions, as well as being a conscious organization of production which permits an abundance of the productive forces. This is why the transition period to communism can only begin outside of capitalism after the political defeat of capitalism and the tri­umph of the political domination of the proletariat on a world-wide scale. The first preoccupation of the proletariat, then, is the taking of power on a world scale and the total destruction of capitalist institu­tions: the state, the police, the army, the civil service etc.

Thus the transition period which then be­gins is an unceasing movement of the revolu­tionary overthrow of capitalist relations to be replaced by communist relations. The transition period must abolish all capita­list relations, for capital is a process in which every moment is inextricably linked to another, (the sale of labour-power, extraction and realization of surplus-value, capitalization etc). Therefore trade, markets, and money all disappear (and with them wage-slavery).

It is important to see that any check to the revolutionary transformation of society presents the danger of a return to capita­lism. Indeed, the whole system of market relations will only definitively disappear under full communism when classes have ceased to exist, since the perpetuation of classes means the perpetuation of commodity exchange. Equally, we insist that there is no transitional mode of production between capitalism and communism. During the period of transition, “What we have to deal with .... is a communist society not as it has developed on its own foundations, but, on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is in every respect, economically, morally and intel­lectually, still stamped with the birth marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.” (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme)

IV. Economic measures

Although it is difficult to say precisely what economic measures will be taken during the transition period, we can state that we are in favour of measures which tend direct­ly to regulate production and distribution in collective, social terms, rather than measures which demand calculation of distri­bution in terms of individual contributions to social work.

It is necessary to criticize the system of ‘labour time vouchers’ which perpetuates the division of the working class into an aggregate of individuals who obtain the means to live on the basis of their indivi­dual work. Under this system, each worker receives, in exchange for one hour of work, a voucher representing one hour of work with which he can get a number of products, equal to the time he has given. It is a wage form without the wage content. In such a system, concrete work, real time, the effort crystallized in a product are of little importance; only abstract work time, necessary labour time determined by the global productivity of society is taken into account and this divides the workers on the basis of their productivity. But above all this system is impracticable: indeed, in order to calculate an ‘average hour’ of labour, productivity would need to be uni­form in each branch of production; and even if this could be achieved, then a form of calculation on a world scale would need to be developed which was able to continually keep track of the changing levels of pro­ductivity throughout the period of transi­tion. It would necessitate a monstrous bureaucracy on a scale previously unknown in the history of man in order to prevent each producer or production unit from ‘cheating’, from declaring unworked hours, etc. This system also runs the risk of an easy degeneration into money wages during a moment of reflux in the revolution.

All measures taken must, be guided by the need to tend towards collectively controlled production for the satisfaction of social needs based on use-values and real labour: towards the reduction of working hours and the assimilation of other strata into associated work. It is necessary to insure that all the good, essential for human life are collectivized and freely distributed as quickly as possible, especially in industrialized sector where socialization will be able to proceed more quickly.

V. The revolutionary civil war

Because the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are both world classes, when the workers take power in one country t this will lead to a world civil war against the bourgeoisie. Until it is victorious, until the proleta­riat has conquered world power, we can’t really talk about a period of transition or a communist transformation of society.

During the world civil war everything wi1l be subordinated to the interest of the civil war: production still won’t be based principally on human need, which is what define communist production, but on the urgent need to extend and consolidate the international revolution. Even if the proletariat is able to eradicate the formal characteristics of capitalism while it is arming itself and producing for the civil war, one can’t refer to an economy oriented towards war as ‘communism’. As long as capitalism exists in any part of the world its laws continue to determine the real content of productive relations everywhere else. Nevertheless, as soon as it has taken power in one area, the proletariat must begin the assault on capitalist relations of production:

a. Because any blow struck against capita­lism will result in a profound disintegra­tion of world capital which will deepen the world-wide class struggle.

b. In order to facilitate the political direction of a zone under the control of the proletariat. Because the political power of the workers will depend on their capacity to simplify and rationalize the processes of production and distribution, a task which is impossible in an economy totally dominated by market relations.

c. In order to lay the foundations of the social transformation which will follow the civil war.

Moreover it is important to note that, if the communist transformation of society can only be fully embarked upon after the establishment of the world-wide political power of the proletariat - after the world civil war has been won - it is nevertheless the case that the proletariat will set up its organs of power immediately after taking power in one area of the globe. In this area these organs have the same charac­ter as during the entire period of transition; this applies not only to the workers’ councils, but also to the state which is already the state of the period of transi­tion.

VI. Principal aspects of the period of transition

Here we can only enlarge upon the tasks that the proletariat will have to accom­plish during the transition period; they are enormous and many. The proletariat will have an entire society to build.

1. The dictatorship of the proletariat

Several classes will still exist in the transition period. But the proletariat is the only one whose interest is communism. Other classes can be drawn into the struggle that the proletariat wages against capita­lism, but they can never, as classes, be the bearers of communism. It is for this reason that the proletariat must constantly guard itself against blurring the distinc­tion between itself and other classes or dissolving itself into other classes. It can only ensure the forward movement to­wards a classless society by asserting itself as an autonomous class with politi­cal domination over society. This is be­cause economically the proletariat remains exploited since the world is still dominated by the law of value. It must keep all political power and all its armed force in its own hands. It is the working class in its entirety that has the monopoly of arms.

While the working class must take other classes into account in economic and admini­strative life, because in the beginning these classes will constitute the majority of society, it must not allow these classes the possibility of autonomous organization. These numerous classes and strata will be integrated into the territorial soviet administrative system as citizens, not as classes. These classes will progressively be dissolved and integrated into the working class. Of course this only applies to the non-exploitative classes; the whole capita­list class and all of the old upper classes of capitalist society will be directly excluded from political life.

The proletariat in order to assert its dictatorship must give itself two organi­zational forms: the workers’ councils and the revolutionary party.

If in all other previous class societies, the ruling class exercised its dictatorship openly or hypocritically over the other classes, the dictatorship of the proleta­riat is different from previous class dictatorships:

- Its dictatorship is directed solely against the old classes of society. It doesn’t bring with it new privileges, or new exploitation, but suppresses all privi­leges and all exploitation. Far from being a guardian of the status quo, its aim is the uninterrupted transformation of society.

- For this reason unlike other classes it has no need to conceal its aims, to mystify oppressed classes by presenting its dicta­torship as the reign of Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity.

- It sets itself the task of destroying all specializations and hierarchical divi­sions within society. It. must guarantee that the whole of the working class has the right to strike, to bear arms, to have com­plete freedom of assembly and expression, etc. All relations of force and all viol­ence inside the proletarian camp must be rejected.

2. The Workers’ Councils

The workers’ council is the historic form for the self-organization of the proleta­riat in revolutionary struggle; it is an autonomous organization regrouping the entire class, the form of power developed for the dictatorship of the proletariat. The councils are assemblies of delegates elected and revocable at all times by gene­ral assemblies of workers, carrying out the decisions taken by these assemblies. The councils centralize themselves on a world­wide basis for they must enforce the world­wide dictatorship of the proletariat, the proletariat’s world political power and the whole revolutionary transformation of society.

- Therefore, political power is exercised through the workers councils and not through a party.

- The councils are the autonomous organiza­tion of the working class. Of the two dan­gers which can arise in the formation of the councils, the infiltration of bourgeois ele­ments and the containment of the workers within the rigid confines of the factory, the second has shown itself to be the most dangerous. The danger of infiltration by bourgeois elements was the reason given by German Social Democracy for refusing Rosa Luxemburg access to the workers’ councils. The party is a fraction of the class and so intervenes freely within the councils.

- The councils are not organs of self-man­agement. The isolation of workers in ‘councils’ composed simply of productive units can only serve to reinforce the divi­sions imposed on the working class by capi­talism and leads to certain defeat. The councils are above all instruments of centralized political power.

- The councils are not an end in themselves: they are the best means the proletariat can use to bring about the communist transform­ation of society. If the councils become an end in themselves this will simply mean that the process of social revolution has been arrested, which means the beginning of a return to capitalism.

3. The Revolutionary Party

The revolutionary party, formed by revolu­tionary fractions during a. revolutionary period, is a fraction of the class which has a clear vision of the communist aims carried by the proletariat. Its only task is the generalization of revolutionary conscious­ness within the class. In no case can it take power ‘in the name of the class’, or organize the class.

The party will have an active role to play within the class until communism is achie­ved and, therefore, the practical realiza­tion of the communist programme. Right through the period of transition the party will express the unity of proletarian cons­ciousness while there is still heterogen­eity of consciousness within the class, and will continue to pose the problem of class autonomy, thus fulfilling its role as the party.

4. The State

The class antagonisms which are fermenting within society constantly threaten to ex­plode into struggles which put at risk the equilibrium and indeed the very existence of that society. To prevent this, the bour­geoisie, like the classes which preceded it, has been forced to create institutions and a superstructure of which the state is the highest expression and whose basic function is to maintain class struggle within an acceptable framework, and to safeguard and strengthen the existing social order. This is why as a general rule, the state remains the expression of the ruling class par excellence and is identified with that class.

The period of transition to communism is still a society which is divided into clas­ses. Therefore this super-structural orga­nism, this unavoidable evil - the state -will inevitably arise to prevent the vio­lent disintegration of this hybrid society. The proletariat as long as it is the poli­tically dominant class will use the state to maintain its power and to defend the gains of the communist transformation of society. This state will be different from all states in the past. It will in fact be a semi-state. For the first time the new ruling class, the proletariat, will not ‘inherit’ the old state machine and use it to serve its own interests, but will over­throw and destroy the bourgeois state and build its own organs of power. This is because the proletariat does not use the state to exploit other classes, but to defend a social transformation which will lead to the disappearance of exploitation forever, which will abolish all social antagonisms and lead to the state becoming extinct.

But the proletariat will continue to be the exploited class in society for its domina­tion of society is entirely political and not economic. Because of this it cannot identify with the state, the instrument of social preservation which reflects the obs­tacles to social development posed by other classes who are vestiges of the past, and which expresses the continued existence of class society and therefore of exploitation. It is because the function and the interests of the bourgeois state are closely bound to those of the economically dominant class, ie the preservation of the existing social order that the bourgeois state can and must identify with that class. This is not at all the case with the proletariat which does not try to preserve the existing state of affairs, but to overthrow and continually transform it. This is why the historic dictatorship of the proletariat cannot find its true expression in that institution of preservation par excellence the state. There can be no such thing as a ‘socialist’ or a ‘communist’ state. Communism is the real development of the historic interests of the proletariat, and by definition there cannot be an identification between commu­nism and the state. As a result, in so far as one speaks of a communist proletariat, one cannot speak of a ‘workers’ state’ or a 'proletarian state'. There are arguments which support this conception of the state in the period of transition:

- To identify the proletariat with the state - as the Bolsheviks did - leads at a time of reflux to the disastrous situa­tion in which the state, considered as the ‘embodiment of the working class’, is allowed to do anything to maintain its power while the working class as a whole remains defenceless.

- On a world scale, the proletariat is only a minority of the population. The majority of the world population (peasants, artisans, etc, mainly in the third world) cannot be integrated into the workers’ councils by the proletariat as the proletariat would lose its class autonomy. Neither can they be suppressed, nor ignored. This majority will have to be allowed to organize itself (with the exception of the bourgeoisie), and to form councils. The negative example of the Russian Revolution has shown us that violence must not be employed against classes, other than the bourgeoisie, except as a last resort. But just as the other strata will only be integrated into associ­ated production as individuals, so the prole­tariat will only allow them to express their interests as individuals and not as classes within civil society. This implies that the representative organs, through which these interests are expressed, in contrast to the workers’ councils, will be based on territorial units and forms of organization. All this allows us to say that while making use of the state, the proletariat expresses its dictatorship not through the state but over the state. In order to ensure the subservience of this state, a certain number of measures will have to be taken:

- The workers organized in councils have ultimate authority with regard to all mea­sures taken by the state; no measure is taken without their agreement and active participation

- The workers have a monopoly of arms and are ready to/use these arms against the state if necessary.

The workers are represented in the state in maximum proportion, that is, in relation to the balance of forces at any time.

- All members of the state are elected and recallable at any time; the workers’ representatives report to the councils on all measures and steps which are taken.

- The councils can decide to make any changes which are necessary in the state and also in society taking account of the evolution of the balance of forces.

M. Lazare

(Treignes – 1975)


  • State and dictatorship [51]

  • A contribution to the study on the question of the state

 

Only the historical experience of the prole­tariat can provide revolutionaries with a real basis for the elaboration of the commu­nist programme. Against the philistines, the armchair intransigents and the alchem­ists of the revolution, revolutionaries affirm the fundamental unity of the theory and practice of the working class. Only by referring to concrete examples of class struggle can they trace the long-term pers­pectives of the revolutionary movement, put the proletariat on guard against many dan­gers awaiting it and theoretically clear away the obstacles which will undoubtedly arise along the path to revolution. If revo­lutionaries cannot definitively settle the questions which concrete proletarian exper­ience has not yet decided in practice, they can nevertheless, on the basis of histori­cal lessons, try to develop the theoretical groundwork for the understanding of certain problems.

 

Far from being confined to mere mental act­ivity and speculation, the communist pro­gramme is a real problem linked to the deve­lopment of consciousness in the proletariat, a development of consciousness which can really only be the practical and theoretical destruction of capitalist social relations. That is why the theoretical work undertaken by revolutionaries is constantly enriched by both the proletariat’s historical exper­ience and present-day actions. It is from these struggles that revolutionaries draw the lessons for the elaboration of general perspectives and predictions for the workers’ movement:

“To predict is therefore not to invent but to reveal the new content which lies buried in the old society, by going be­yond phenomenological appearances. Only in this way can theory become an active factor and a guide for action and socia­lism become the conscious transformation' of society.” (Parti de Classe, no.1)

It was by drawing the lessons from the ex­perience of the insurrections of 1848 and, more important, of the Paris Commune of 1871, that Marx and Engels were led to aban­don the perspective they developed in the Communist Manifesto that the proletariat was to take over the bourgeois state. In the same way, revolutionaries today must analyze the revolutionary wave of 1917-23, (the first large-scale attempt of the proletariat to affirm itself as a revolutionary class conscious of its historical role, the taking of power), so that all the lessons about the organization of the proletariat and the taking of power can be assimilated.

The Russian Revolution has taught us that the working class must affirm its autonomy and must organize in workers’ councils. For the first time in the history of humanity, the concrete objective basis of the consc­ious transformation of capitalist social relations by an exploited and revolutionary class was posed. But, to simply say that the material economic conditions of capita­lism’s decline ‘permit’ or ‘determine’ the proletarian revolution is not sufficient:

“The objective economic premises are not enough to determine the victory of commu­nism because communism cannot develop independently of the growth of prole­tarian consciousness; it cannot come as the result of a pre-ordained mechanistic process going on behind the back of the proletariat.” (Parti de Classe, no.1)

Right from the outset the communist revolu­tion is a conscious dialectical process sweeping away the concrete obstacles in the way of the development of the productive forces. Theory and practice are therefore indissociable. From its beginnings, the proletariat as an exploited class has shown its violent opposition to the existence of the capitalist system; the proletariat has always affirmed the need to create the essential instruments of the development of its consciousness. The experience of the Russian Revolution confirms the need of the working class to acquire an overall cons­ciousness of society as a whole and of its place within it. The role of the Bolshevik Party, its inability to solve a series of problems which proletarian practice had not yet decisively clarified, its degeneration into the counter-revolution, are all essen­tial elements towards forging the under­standing and clarity of revolutionaries participating in the process of conscious­ness today.

To claim to preserve the lessons of the Russian Revolution while at the same time using the substitutionism and many other serious errors of the Bolshevik Party to deny the decisive role of the Bolsheviks in that revolution is to engage in futile ‘purism’, and to fall into the emptiest bourgeois sociology. Revolutionaries do not deliver moral judgments about the past, nor do they mechanistically imitate the past; sociological ‘objectivity’ is not their instrument either. Revolutionaries theorize the experiences of the past in relation to the final goal; that is why they form revolutionary organizations to inter­vene in the workers’ movement, and do not form ‘discussion groups’:

“The task of theory is not to reflect immediate reality (which would imply that theory only comes after the fact and would therefore have no active role to play) but to predict the major histori­cal tendencies which are evolving within this reality.” (Parti de Classe)

Only through the fullest understanding of the Russian Revolution and its degeneration into state capitalism and all the impli­cations flowing from this can we develop any general perspectives about the dictatorship of the proletariat, and specifically the state, in the period of transition.

The dictatorship of the proletariat in the period of transition

The political position that the dictator­ship of the proletariat must be exercised through workers’ councils, centralized on a world scale, is a fundamental tenet of the revolutionary movement today. In the past the slogan “All power to the Soviets” expressed the understanding revolutionaries had of the seizing of political power by the proletariat and the rejection of any class collaboration or compromise with the bourgeoisie.

But the dictatorship of the proletariat is not an end in itself, nor a definitive answer to all the problems raised by the transformation of the capitalist mode of production into communism. The dictatorship of the proletariat is an indispensable pre­condition of this transformation but it is not a panacea. The conscious action of an entire class to change outdated social rela­tions cannot be condensed into the imposi­tion of political power over other classes. In the last analysis, the dictatorship of the proletariat is but the transition to the abolition of all classes, to the establish­ment of a mode of production without clas­ses. The historical mission of the prole­tariat cannot be limited to the simple poli­tical domination of society. As both a revolutionary and exploited class, the pro­letariat’s mission is to lead humanity to make the leap from “the reign of necessity to the reign of liberty” and to free it from all forms of exploitation. In itself the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be a guarantee of this mission; it is only an instrument in a complex process which re­quires the conscious intervention of the working class as a whole. After the proletariat’s seizure of power, the change from capitalism to socialism cannot be carried out by decree; it requires a long period of transition during which the pro­letariat will eliminate the vestiges of the old society, and integrate other classes into the productive process, in sum, begin to create a new society.

This period of transition between capita­lism and communism is burdened with “the traditions of all the dead generations which weigh like a nightmare on the minds of the living” (Marx); this period will still bear the traces of capitalist society: “What we have to deal with here is a communist soc­iety, not as it has developed on its own foundations, but on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society; which is thus in every respect, economically, morally and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.” (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme)

This means concretely: the continued exis­tence of social classes and class antago­nisms, the subsistence of the law of value (even though it will undergo profound changes in its very nature so as to be pro­gressively eliminated), and the existence of social intermediaries destined to dis­appear but necessary for the maintenance of social cohesion. Thus the proletariat will have recourse to the state, the embodi­ment of social coercion: “an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worst sides the victorious proletariat, just like the Commune, cannot avoid having to lop off at once as much as possible until such time as a generation reared in new, free social conditions is able to throw the entire lum­ber of the state on the scrap heap.” (Engels, ‘Introduction’, (1891), The Civil War in France, (Marx)) The state is an evil which is necessary and unavoidable because of the continued existence of social classes.

But the existence of this state must never be a hindrance to the dictatorship of the proletariat or to the conscious transforma­tion of society. The dictatorship of the proletariat must affirm its autonomy in relation to other classes and must stand resolutely against any dictatorship of the party and any form of substitutionism, con­cerning either the state and the party, the class and the state or the party and the class.

By refusing to let a minority of ‘profes­sional’ revolutionaries exercise power in its place, the working class organized in workers’ councils affirms the fact that the dictatorship of the proletariat is the cons­cious activity of the working class as a whole. Although the revolutionary party continues to play a decisive role during the period of transition, it remains distinct from the councils[1] and does not seek to exercise a separate power within them:

“The communist party of the future will have no other weapons than its theoreti­cal clarity and its active commitment to the communist programme. It cannot seek power for itself but must fight within the general organs of the class for the implementation of the communist programme. It can in no way force the class as a whole to put this programme into action or implement it itself because communism can only be created by the conscious activity of the entire working class.” (‘The Proletarian Revolution’, Interna­tional Review, no.1)

The problem of the state in the period of transition

When the proletariat is victorious and the revolution has spread to the entire world, a state will arise in the period of transi­tion between capitalism and socialism. It will be a very different state to the bour­geois state (which the proletariat has des­troyed during the civil war) but one which still maintains a fundamental characteris­tic of all states: coercion. In this context, how can we explain the apparent con­tradiction between the existence of a conservative social form (the state) and the need for the proletariat to proceed with a radical transformation of society? The answer is to be found in the ambiguous nature of the period of transition itself. The proletariat will have only two weapons against this ambiguity: its class conscious­ness and the power of its workers’ councils.

1. Destruction of the Bourgeois State

“The proletariat appears as the first revolutionary class in history which must destroy the ever-more-centralized bureaucratic and police machine which all exploiting classes have, up to now, used to crush the exploited masses. In his Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx emphasized that ‘all political revolutions have only perfected this machine instead of des­troying it’. The centralized power of state goes back to the absolute monarchy; the rising bourgeoisie used it to fight against feudalism; the French Revolution rid the state of the last feudal fetters and the first Empire completed the crea­tion of the modern state. Developed bourgeois society transformed the central power into an oppressive machine against the proletariat.” (Mitchell, ‘Problemes de la Periode de Transition’, Bilan)

The proletariat, the first revolutionary exploited class in history, cannot take over the bourgeois state but must attack it dir­ectly and destroy it completely so as to impose its class power through the workers’ councils created by the proletariat in arms.

(The class as a whole will be armed and not simply a specialized body, a ‘Red Army’.) But this process of destruction is not only directed against the elimination of the bourgeois state. The proletariat will have a second task: the gradual destruction of the state in the period of transition. This state is necessary for a certain time but nonetheless it constitutes an expression of the conservation of the status quo. The dictatorship of the proletariat does not therefore consist of taking over the bour­geois state nor of destroying it to create a ‘workers’ state’ identified with the class.

The proletarian revolution is fundamentally a political one which affirms the power of the entire, conscious, revolutionary class. But, although the seizure of power by the proletariat opens the way to the overthrow of capitalist social relations and to the beginning of communist society, this new society will not develop spontaneously or automatically from the old:

“The working class is not separated from the old bourgeois society by a wall of China. When the revolution breaks out, things do not happen as they do when a man dies and his body is simply taken away and buried. When the old society declines, its remains cannot be nailed into a coffin and put in the grave. It decomposes in our midst; it rots, and its decay affects us all. No great world revolution has happened in any other way, nor can it. That’s why we must fight to protect and develop the seeds of the new society in the midst of this atmosphere infested with the poisoned air of decay­ing corpses.” (Lenin.)

2. The Need for a State in the Period of Transition

As we have seen, when the proletariat takes power, social classes will not have been completely eliminated. As long as classes exist a state will arise to contain class antagonisms and prevent the society from tearing itself apart. The proletariat will not use this state to exploit other classes but to gradually integrate other sectors of the society into the productive process. The proletariat will have absolute control over the state and will use it to regulate relations with other classes and sectors of the population. Generalizing from this statement to assume that the proletariat and the state are identical is only a small step but it must not be taken. To identify the state with the proletariat is to confuse the issue and pose the problem very badly. The confusion of the class with the state in fact reveals a misunderstanding of the profoundly political nature of the prole­tarian revolution and of the motor force which propels it.

The period of transition is therefore completely encapsulated within this contra­diction: that on the one hand the proletariat possesses political power through the armed workers’ councils; but on the other hand, other classes still exist, as does the law of value, and the proletariat remains an exploited class, a class which possesses no particularistic economic power within the society.

It is this apparent contradiction which stimulates the revolutionary dynamic to­wards the elimination of commodity rela­tions, towards the socialization of produc­tion and the gradual forging of new social relations. This conscious transformation cannot be carried out unless the proletariat integrates all of society into itself. This process not only takes place outside of the state but is profoundly-antagonistic to the state in that it tends to destroy the state, to render it more and more unnecessary. The proletariat thus remains an exploited class during the period of transition and this exploitation is inversely proportional to the destruction of the state and of other social classes.

Unlike past revolutions which used a politi­cal revolution to consummate an already established economic power, the proletarian revolution and the passage from the capita­list mode of production to communist produc­tion requires an overall consciousness of the nature of the transformation. Although the bourgeois state was progressive during a certain period because it uprooted feudal relations and confirmed capitalist ones, by its very nature the state in the period of transition expresses an unavoidable conser­vatism. Although it does not put the dic­tatorship of the proletariat in question, it expresses the whole social context of the period of transition, a turning point in history when, little by little, the prole­tariat will destroy the capitalist corpse, the last decaying vestiges of commodity production.

3. The proletariat must remain independent of all other classes and must consciously transform all of society. The state, how­ever, incarnates the existence of social classes. It is the concrete expression of the need for regulation and exchange between the proletariat and the remaining social classes; it concretizes the coercion necessary in this period, after the taking of power, when other classes will still exist. To some extent the state is the super-struc­tural materialization of the existence of exploitation (linked to exchange and the social division of labour) of the proleta­riat during the period of transition. Even if negotiations between the proletariat and other classes will be done in the interests of the working class and under the control of the councils, the state tasks during the period of transition on the one hand, and the conscious transformation of social relations on the other, while being parts of the same overall process - the dictator­ship of the proletariat - are two different things:

“The proletariat alone contains within itself the seeds of communist social re­lations; the proletariat alone is capable of undertaking the communist transforma­tion. The state at best helps to guard the gains of this transformation (and at worst becomes an obstacle to it) but it cannot, as a state, undertake that transformation. It is the social movement of the whole proletariat in creative self-activity which actually ends the domina­tion of commodity fetishism and builds up a new social relationship between hu­man beings.” (‘The Proletarian Revolution’, International Review, no.1)

We must not confuse the instrument with the person who uses it.

4. It is essential for the development of proletarian consciousness that the state be distinct from the class because the prole­tariat must always act in accordance with the final communist goals of its movement. These goals are not the maintenance of ex­ploitation and of social classes nor are they the dictatorship of the proletariat as an end in itself but rather the abolition of all classes through a conscious change in production relations. These final goals of the proletariat are in contradiction with the very function of the state and its con­servative nature. As the old popular saying affirms, an enemy known as an enemy is better than too many unknown friends. In distin­guishing itself clearly from the state, the proletariat becomes conscious of the exis­tence of this useful ‘enemy’ over which it must exercise vigilant control. (Only some­thing separate from oneself can be control­led; if it is not separate in some way, control is no longer possible.) Only a clear idea of what to destroy and what to build constitutes a guarantee that the pro­letariat will indeed change social relations in a conscious way.

Thus the state is a necessary social form but it must be progressively destroyed:

“We must keep in mind that the hypothesis of the withering away of the state is bound to become the touchstone of the content of proletarian revolutions. We have already indicated that the revolu­tion breaks out in a historical milieu which obliges the proletariat to tolerate the existence of a state. But this can only be a ‘state in the process of with­ering away, that is, a state so consti­tuted that it begins to wither away from the start and cannot but wither away’ (Lenin)”. (Mitchell, ‘Problemes de la Periode de Transition’, Bilan)

The apparent contradiction between the essentially dynamic character of the period of transition, (the dictatorship of the proletariat), and the need for the state, (the guardian of the status quo); the appa­rent contradiction between the existence of this state and the goal of the prole­tariat which is the destruction of this historically conservative institution and the abolition of all classes - all these ambiguities go to the heart of the nature of the period of transition and reveal the fundamentally difficult and painful charac­ter of this period as well as the immense tasks which the proletariat will have to undertake. This is the.sine qua non of the proletariat’s awareness of its class inte­rests, and of the ever-present danger of a return to capitalism, a danger which arises because the seeds of communism will have to develop in an atmosphere infested by the poisoned air of the decaying corpse of capitalism.

J.L.

1. This is true even if the influence of revolutionaries grows enormously, even if the unity of theory and practice during this period becomes such that the proletariat considers the organization of revolutionaries as the spokesman of their goals.

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Dictatorship of the proletariat [16]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Period of Transition [19]

Address to revolutionaries in Britain

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In the present period of rising class struggle, revolutionaries all over the world must regroup their forces in order to be able to intervene effectively in the movement of the working class towards revolution. After fifty years of triumph­ant counter-revolution, in which the organic continuity with the past workers’ movement was brutally interrupted, the constitution of the International Communist Current as a pole of revolutionary coherence and clarity is a vital moment in the process of international regroupment which will ultimately lead to the re-emergence of the world communist party.

This break in organic continuity is especi­ally obvious in Britain where there has been no tradition of left communism since the disappearance of the Workers’ Dreadnought in 1924. Today the revolutionary movement in Britain is extremely restricted and ele­ments who come toward revolutionary ideas are still struggling to break out of the influence of Trotskyism, libertarianism, marginalism, and other bourgeois ideologies. All this can only increase the importance of the presence of the ICC in Britain in the form of World Revolution. As the class struggle deepens, WR will have a heavy responsibility in acting as the pole of communist regroupment in Britain. In this context, this Congress

* regrets that other expressions of the re-emerging communist movement in Britain specifically the elements who now con­stitute the Communist Workers’ Organiza­tion - have failed to understand the need for regroupment and have fallen into a sectarian attitude which can only serve to fragment the revolutionary movement today.

* affirms that the historical experience of the revolutionary working class is expressed in the platform of the ICC

* calls upon all revolutionary elements in Britain to recognize the need for the centralization and unification of all revolutionary activity, to regroup with the ICC and help to make it an indispen­sable, active factor in the reconstitution of the world party of the communist revolution.

REVOLUTIONARIES OF ALL COUNTRIES, UNITE!

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Left [4]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • International Communist Current [6]

The first congress of WR

  • 2393 reads

The ICC section in Britain, World Revolution, held its First Congress in April of this year. The Congress confirmed the work achieved by World Revolution in 1975, and the discussions at the Congress centred on the perspectives for the crisis and class struggle in Britain and the role and parti­cipation of World Revolution in the work of the ICC as a whole.

The First Congress was above all a ‘working’ congress in that it permitted World Revolu­tion to consciously account for its resources, maturity, and capacity to inter­vene in the class struggle. It was also the occasion for a balance-sheet to be drawn up or World Revolution’s origins and its activities since it began to participate fully with the groups which later constituted the ICC.

The Congress endorsed the intention of publishing the magazine, World Revolution, more regularly as soon as possible. Other resolutions and documents, which expressed the level of clarity achieved by WR on vital issues confronting the working class today, were also endorsed. Among these documents were the ‘Theses on the Class Struggle in Britain’ and the ‘Perspectives on the Crisis and Class Struggle in Britain’, both of which are included in World Revolu­tion no.7. In this issue of the International Review we are presenting another document which was discussed and approved by the Congress: the ‘Address to Revolutionaries in Britain’. This ‘address’ is a contribution of WR in regard to a central concern of revolutionaries in our period: the need for all revolutionary forces to unify and regroup their forces around the basic lessons of the historical struggle of the proletariat. After fifty years of counter-revolution, this necessity is all the more urgent, all the more crucial, when the forces of the proletariat, dispersed and weak, face immense tasks in this epoch of crisis and rising class struggle.

The fundamental gain of WR’s First Congress was that it reaffirmed WR’s participation in the work of the ICC, and as part of that whole, it pledged itself to play an increa­singly decisive role in the struggles of the proletariat in Britain.

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • International Communist Current [6]

International Review no 7 november 1976

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Theses on the Situation in Italy

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1. The gradual deepening of the crisis of capitalism expresses itself more and more in chaotic oscillations between chronic inflation and brutal recession. Although each of these shifts allow the most powerful countries to win for themselves a short respite - pompously referred to as a ‘reco­very' - such respites occur only to the detriment of the weakest economies. One after another, in a movement from the periphery of capitalism towards its centre, from the Third World towards the industrial metropoles, such countries are being plun­ged into a hopeless state of chaos. In Europe, the weak Portuguese national capital was the first to be hit in this manner. Today, while capitalism is allowing itself to be lulled by soothing talk of a ‘recovery', it is Italy's turn to play the role of ‘sick man'. Tens of billions of dollars in debt, with inflation on a ‘South American' scale, with its currency continuing to plummet in value, with a fall in productivity which defies all measures taken to counter it - Italy and the ‘Italian miracle' has become a nightmare for the bourgeoisie.

2. Today not only has the basis for this much-vaunted ‘miracle' been completely used up, it has to some extent been trans­formed into an additional handicap for Italian capital. The relative success of Italian capital in the period following World War II obscured the fact that Italian capitalism remained structurally weak and extremely dependent on foreign capital. Its post-war boom was based to a large extent on the existence within the country of a large backward agricultural sector which constituted a massive reserve of cheap labour power. Through the exploitation of this labour force Italian capital was able to take advantage of the period of reconstruction to grab hold of important markets in Europe, particularly in the sphere of consumer goods (automobiles, clothing, electrical appliances, etc). This favourable situation was supplemented by the fact that Italy had none of the colonial problems which served to hold back the development and competitiveness of rival European countries (France, Portugal, Spain and Belgium).

This conjunction of favourable conditions was disrupted for Italy at the end of the reconstruction period. The solution of their colonial problems found by other European countries meant that Italy no longer had any advantage over them in this area. At the same time a growing number of problems began to plague the Italian economy. In particular, at a time when a more and more restricted world market could no longer absorb Italy's products, the backward agricultural sector of the economy became a reservoir of unemployed workers who had to be supported by the state and so became a heavy weight upon the shoulders of Italian capital. Italian agriculture re­mained unable to supply the population with food. Moreover the rapid post-war develop­ment of industrial production in a country still deeply marked with underdevelopment created internal imbalances and destabiliza­tion on the economic, social, and political levels.

3. Such weaknesses of Italian capital have expressed themselves on the social level in the development of a movement of class struggle which ever since the ‘rampant May' of 1969 has placed the proletariat of Italy owing to the depth and extension of its struggles in the front ranks of the world proletariat. These struggles have also constituted an additional handicap for Italian capital. On the political level, the weaknesses of Italian capital have manifested themselves in a series of govern­mental crises which, although they did not seriously disturb the ‘boom' during the reconstruction period, have with the arrival of the economic crisis become an additional barrier against any attempt to re-establish economic order. The basis of this vulner­ability within the political apparatus of Italian capital has been the growing corruption, exhaustion, and senility of the ruling party - the Christian Democracy. Basing itself on the most anachronistic sectors of Italian society and having been saddled with an almost solitary exercise of power for thirty years, the Christian Democratic Party is becoming less and less capable of managing the national capital. This deficiency within the political appara­tus of the bourgeoisie is at the root of the general ‘anything goes' attitude permeating the state apparatus. At a time when the situation demands a resolute intervention on the part of the state in the affairs of the national economy, the state thus finds itself more and more impotent.

4. In spite of this accumulation of weak­nesses, Italian capital does have a parti­cularly important trump card yet to play. Although it cannot accomplish a new ‘miracle' the ‘Communist Party' (PCI) is one of the last resorts of Italian capital.

With a membership of over a million, an electorate of twelve million, and a highly structured mode of organization, the PCI is the greatest political force in Italy, the most powerful Stalinist party in the Western world, and one of the leading political parties in the whole of Europe. While exerting an extremely effective control over the workers, particularly through the main trade union body - the CGIL - the PCI has also acquired a great deal of experience in the direction of ‘public affairs'. It not only controls some of the most important towns in Italy it also exercises political control over an appreciable number of regions.

 Carrying on the work it began by mobilizing the Italian proletariat for World War II (via the ‘resistance'), and by containing and repressing the class in the interests of ‘national reconstruction' after the war (the comrade minister Togliatti did not hesitate to shoot workers when he was in the government then), the PCI has disting­uished itself (especially since 1969) in the loyal service it has rendered to its national capital. Whether through its ‘clean' management of the municipalities and regions under its control, through the discreet support it has given to government policies (for several years the majority of laws, including some of the most repre­ssive legislation Parliament has adopted, have been voted for by the PCI), or through activities aimed at keeping order in the factories, this ‘party of the working class' has given proof of its "elevated sense of responsibility"... to capitalism. In the latter sphere it has shown since 1969 its great ability to recuperate the extra-and even anti-trade union organs of class struggle which emerged from the ‘rampant May' of 1969 by integrating them back into official trade union channels. By organi­zing ‘days of action' to demobilize the class, by taking charge via its union conve­yor belt of the various movements for the ‘self-reduction' of rents and fares, by its agitation about the ‘fascist menace', and by presenting its own participation in government as the perspective for getting the country back on to its feet, the PCI has up until now succeeded in diverting the increasing discontent of the workers and thereby channeling it into a dead-end.

5. Although the PCI's policy of ‘constructive opposition' has for several years allowed Italian capital to avoid an even bigger catastrophe than that which it currently faces, the present situation has made a much more direct participation of the PCI in the management of the national capital an urgent necessity. The perspective of the PCI entering the government cannot indefinitely steep the class struggle in check if such an event is continually being postponed. The draconian austerity measures which are needed if the Italian economy is going to slow down its progress towards bankruptcy can only have a chance of being accepted by the working class if they are put into effect by a government which the workers feel to be representative of their interests. And only the PCI, by being given an effec­tive presence in the government, can provide it with such a ‘proletarian' colouring. If the PCI spends too much time supporting austerity measures from outside the govern­ment, it runs the risk of suffering from the unpopularity such measures will give rise to while being unable to counteract this with the myth of a ‘working class victory' that the presence of ‘comrades' at the head of the state is supposed to represent.

In a more general sense the accession of the PCI to governmental office would considerably strengthen the Italian state, not only in its capacity to mystify the workers, but also in its ability to under­take all its other tasks. Presenting itself as the party of ‘order', ‘morality' and ‘social justice' the PCI is that party in the political spectrum least tied to the defence of particular petty interests or to a more or less parasitic ‘clientele'. It is therefore the best equipped to stand for the general interests of the national capital against any particular interests or privileges of groups within it. In par­ticular it is the only party which can effectively contribute to the operation of state capitalist measures imposed by the deepening crisis on the Italian economy. In a country where the state sector already dominates the economy, the restoration of the authority of the state itself is a first and foremost requirement. It is the only party which can present measures necessary for the defence of capital as ‘great victories' for the working class and thus be in a position to use such measures as effective instruments of mystification. Moreover the strong state which the PCI calls for and explicitly proposes to help set up is the precondition for the re-esta­blishment of order in the street and in the factories and hence for an increased rate of exploitation of the working class.

6. While the extreme vulnerability of Italian capital makes it necessary for it to adopt emergency measures internally, it also makes Italy extremely dependent on the other countries of Europe and the imperia­list bloc to which it belongs - the US. This explains why the PCI has for a number of years, and more and more today, loosened its ties with Russia and made itself a partisan of the EEC and keeping Italy in NATO. Furthermore, because it is perfectly aware of the fact that the Western bloc absolutely refuses to accept a government dominated by the PCI - even if it does ardently defend the EEC and NATO - the PCI has built its whole perspective around the ‘historic compromise' (an alliance between the PCI, Christian Democracy and the Socialists) in which it would be a minority, rather than an alliance of the left alone which the PCI would overwhelming­ly dominate.

In this the PCI differs from the French and Portuguese CPs who can count on an alliance with the Socialist Parties alone. In these countries the CPs are less strong than the SPs and would therefore only play a secon­dary role in any ‘Union of the Left'. Even if the CPs' participation in government becomes absolutely indispensable in certain western European countries, the American bloc would only allow a minority participation by the CPs in government. The eviction of the Portuguese CP from a government it had to all intent and purposes been running on its own following massive pressure being exerted by the western countries is a striking illustration of this.

The ‘Communist' Parties are above all parties of national capital. In a world divided into imperialist blocs and where each national capital has to decide its policies in relation to those blocs, they represent the faction of national capital most favourably predisposed towards an alliance with the USSR and a greater inde­pendence with respect to the US. Because they are parties of national capital, if this original orientation of the CPs enters into conflict with a coherent and effective defence of the national capital, then the CPs will jettison their previous international options. This is especially true when the country is weak and thus more dependent on its imperialist bloc. This situation is particularly applicable to the PCI which, because of the extreme dependence of Italian capital on the US since the end of World War II, has always been in the vanguard of ‘polycentrism', independence from the USSR, and ‘Eurocommunism'. However, such an orientation by the Stalinist parties should not be considered as fixed. In a different balance of forces between the imperialist blocs these parties would be the most sus­ceptible in the national political arena to ‘revising' their position in order to tip their country toward the Russian bloc. It is for this reason that the western bloc cannot tolerate the establishment of governments dominated by the CP. Even though such governments might be loyal in the short term, in different circumstances they could swing their national capital into the other bloc.

7. Despite the urgent need for the PCI to participate in government, despite the PCI's realism and flexibility both in terms of its foreign and internal policies, Italian capi­tal is exhibiting the greatest hesitation and encountering great difficulties in playing this vital card. The reason for this is the enormous pressure being exerted by the American government and the governments of the major western European countries against Italian capital resorting to this solution. (The French government included - it has more and more abandoned the ‘independent' line of Gaullism). Important sectors of the American bourgeoisie - the so-called liberals - have understood that the acces­sion of the PCI to governmental responsibility is inevitable. In particular they have under­stood that an ally sunk into a state of chaos is in no position to carry out its functions within the bloc, both from an economic and military point of view. The present ruling team in America showed its own understanding when it put pressure on the Spanish bourgeoisie to abandon the political structures inherited from the Franco era since such a political apparatus is less and less capable of dealing with Spain's social and economic problems. But the ‘democratization' programme prescribed for Spain does not necessarily imply the entry of the PCE into government. In the case of Italy, the American government is still holding to a policy of resolute resistance to any governmental formula that includes the PCI. Whether in the name of ‘defending democracy' or defending the Atlantic Alliance, it is making a great deal of noise, even to the extent of threat­ening economic sanctions, in order to dis­suade the Italian bourgeoisie from resorting to such a solution. This is a striking example of one of the aspects of the poli­tical crisis facing the bourgeoisie as a result of the economic crisis: the contra­diction between the essentially national interests of capital and the necessity to strengthen the blocs in response to growing inter-imperialist tensions. For the moment, as long as the survival of capitalism itself is not at stake, the blocs tend to give priority to their immediate general interests, (ie the interests of the dominant power) over and above the particular difficulties of the national capitals which make up the blocs - sometimes to the detriment of their future interests.

8. In Italy itself, this resolute opposition orchestrated by the US to any governmental role for the PCI, has determined allies in the most anachronistic strata of Italian capital. This strata includes those most threatened by the political and economic house-cleaning advocated by the PCI and who, apart from those who are behind the MSI, are grouped around the right of the Christian Democracy under the leadership of Fanfani. However, this opposition up until now has only been decisive because extremely important strata of the Italian bourgeoisie remain very distrustful of the PCI. Its democratic and pro-Atlantic turns have not obscured the fact that the PCI belongs to a particular category of capi­talist parties. It is one of those parties which is most resolute in defending the general tendency towards state capitalism and which is always liable, if the situation demands it to eliminate all the factions of the bourgeoisie who are tied to individual property, both on the economic level (stati­fication of capital) and on the political level (the one party state). Even if deci­sive sectors of Italian capital, of which the former ‘boss of bosses' Giovanni Agneli is a significant representative, have become convinced of the necessity for the PCI to enter the government, they will try to obtain the maximum guarantees that the PCI will not embark upon any ‘totalitarian' course at their expense.

9. The recent Italian elections have not fundamentally modified this situation. By maintaining the position of the Christian Democracy electorally - a party which is so used up and discredited - the elections served to highlight the importance of the opposition to the PCI coming into the govern­ment. The Christian Democrats under Fanfani's leadership based its whole election campaign on this issue. However, while spreading alarm among the most backward sectors of the bourgeoisie, the powerful advance of the PCI has also strikingly demonstrated to the ruling class the inevi­tability of the ‘historic compromise' - the PCI's participation in government. The pol­arization engendered by the electoral con­frontation has not, despite the hopes of the right-wing of the Christian Democracy, led to an irremediable break between the two main parties of the political apparatus of Italian capital. By eliminating any possibility of going back to the ‘centre-left' formula which has been used until recently, the result of the elections has pointed out for the whole Italian bourg­eoisie the path that it must follow: an alliance between the two main parties. This is the meaning of the agreements between the parties of the ‘constitutional arc' concerning the allocation of a certain number of parliamentary appointments which, in the context of Italian politics, are actually posts in the executive.

These agreements, a new step towards the ‘historic compromise', are the practical expression of the fact that the objective needs of the whole national capital must in the end take precedence over the resistance put up by this or that faction of the bourg­eoisie. However, the delay in this solution being achieved is an expression of the continuing importance of the resistance to it, which the recent elections have not been able to overcome. In fact, al­though the recent elections have clarified what is at stake in the Italian political game and clearly shown to the ruling class the path that it must follow, they have also partly tied its hands. Since it has been so obviously restored to power on the basis of its refusal to conclude the ‘compromise' with the PCI, the Christian Democracy cannot for the moment throw away all its electoral promises and involve itself fully in such a compromise.

The situation created by the Italian elec­tions highlights the fact that, while electoral and parliamentary mechanisms still constitute an effective instrument for the mystification of the working class in the most developed countries, they can equally serve as an obstacle to the national capi­tal's adoption of measures most appropriate for the defence of its interests. As an expression of the decadence of the capi­talist mode of production inaugurated by World War I, the general tendency towards state capitalism which has already emptied Parliament of any real power to the benefit of the executive wing of the state, tends more and more to enter into conflict with the vestiges of parliamentary bourgeois democracy which has been inherited from the system's ascendant phase. This is particularly the case in the weakest countries where the general tendency towards state capitalism is at its strongest.

10. The coming to power of the PCI is inevitable, but the delay in this happening is another manifestation of the insoluble contradictions which capitalism faces. A coherent defence of capital can only take place at a national level, but each nation, especially in the Western bloc, is divided internally into a host of contradictory interests. Because the Italian bourgeoisie has not yet called upon the PCI to assume governmental office, this shouldn't be inter­preted as the result of a machiavellian plan to play the card of the PCI as late as possible, when the economic and social situation is even worse. Apart from the fact that the bourgeoisie -- imprisoned as it is by its own prejudices - is generally incapable of achieving a long term vision of how to defend its interests, today in Italy it would have nothing to gain from putting off still further the economic and political measures of ‘national salvation' that the situation demands. And these measures require the institution of the ‘historic compromise'. The more these eco­nomic measures are put off the harder it will be for Italian capital to get back on its feet even with the PCI in power. Simi­larly, the bourgeoisie has no interest in waiting for the class struggle to really get going before applying more effective methods of containment and mystification. Measures imposed in the heat of struggle are always less effective than preventative measures, since they are less sophisticated than the latter and the instability which gives rise to them can never be totally re-absorbed. Since it would be presented in any circumstances as a ‘victory for the working class', the coming to power of the left in response to a massive class mobili­zation would tend to instill in the workers the idea that ‘it pays to struggle', where­as all the efforts of the bourgeoisie are aimed at demonstrating the contrary.

These structural contradictions of capital, which oblige it to carry out a pragmatic short term policy in the face of the threat posed by the working class, constitute a highly favourable factor for the proletariat in its ultimate confrontation with the existing social order. However, all these antagonisms within the ruling class itself, both on the national and international level, must not lead the revolutionary class to forget that, in the face of the prole­tariat, the bourgeoisie maintains a funda­mental unity which it can reinforce at the most crucial moments - even if this means sacrificing important factions of its own class - in order to safeguard what is essential: the maintenance of capitalist relations of production. In particular the workers today must reject any idea of trying to make use of conflicts within the ruling class by supporting one faction against another: democracy against fascism, state capital against private capital, this nation against that nation, etc. For over half a century, such ‘tactics' have never led to the weakening of capitalism, but they have always led to the negation of the autonomy and unity of the working class, and in the end, to its defeat.

11. Owing to its geographic location, the weight of its economy, and the combativity of its working class, Italy occupies an extremely important position in Europe against which the bourgeoisie can counter-pose a highly sophisticated arsenal. More­over the proletariat of Italy has since the First World War benefited from one of the richest veins of experience, both from the practical and the political-theoretical point of view (Labriola, Bordiga, the Italian Left).

For some time Portugal operated as an impor­tant laboratory for all the various ‘solutions' the bourgeoisie has put forward to ward off the crisis. But with the further deterioration of the economic, political, and social situation, Spain appeared as one of the weak links of capitalism. This was evidenced in the intensity of social conflicts taking place there and the pronounced delay of the bourgeoisie in setting up the approp­riate structures to limit and direct these conflicts. With the brutal unfolding of the crisis in Italy, the axis of the social-political situation in Europe is today passing through this country.

For a whole period this axis will continue to be centred both in Spain and Italy. Events in Spain, which the European bourgeoisie will exploit to the utmost in order to set its anti-fascist mystifications into operation, will allow revolutionaries and the class as whole to draw a whole number of lessons. However, as the crisis and the class struggle develop, the situation in Italy will tend to come to the forefront to the extent that Italy is a country where since 1969 the class struggle has attained one of its highest levels, while at the same time Italy's general characteristics closely resemble those of the main capitalist metropoles of Europe. In this sense the experience that comes out of the future social conflicts in Italy will be extremely important both to the bourgeoisies of these metropoles and to the proletariat and its vanguard.

12. Up until now one of the general charac­teristics of the present situation, exempli­fied significantly in Italy where the class struggle has achieved such high levels of expression, is the existence of an enormous gap between the depth of the political crisis of the bourgeoisie reflecting the depth of the economic crisis, and the still-limited degree of mobilization and conscious­ness within the working class. This contrast is notable in Italy where the first manifes­tations of the crisis provoked a generalized proletarian response in 1969 that managed to a great extent to break free of the trade union straight jacket. Today however the crisis has produced a much more limited proletarian response entirely kept under control by the unions, despite its increased gravity.

The cause of this gap resides in the weight of mystification which the left and the leftists have systematically developed within the working class by presenting the coming to power of the left as a solution to the crisis, and the way of obtaining a ‘victory' that the workers have not been able to obtain through economic struggle. This mystifica­tion is made possible by the difficulty the class has in disentangling itself from the deepest counter-revolution it has ever known. The role of the leftists in Italy, particu­larly those regrouped in the ‘Proletarian Democracy' electoral cartel, has been over­whelmingly important. Through their left-wing anti-fascism (more ‘radical' than that of the PCI) and their ability to take charge of sectors of the class like the unemployed who tend to escape the control of the PCI and the unions, coupled with their advocacy of a ‘working class alternative' in the form of a Socialist Party/Communist Party leftist government, they have undertaken with a gusto their task as touts of the capitalist left. Far from being an expres­sion of the development of consciousness in the class, the development of these leftist currents as the evolution of the situation in Italy over the last seven years has shown, represents a secretion by the capital­ist organism of anti-bodies against the virus of class struggle. We will see these anti­bodies coming into existence alongside the development of the class struggle in all countries in the future. Such anti-bodies serve the purpose of guiding back into the official left with its policies of ‘critical' support, all those elements of the class who begin to move away from it.

The gap existing between the level of the crisis and the level of class struggle will not be prolonged indefinitely. Today when the left can no longer be content with carrying out its capitalist functions in opposition but is more and more constrained to take up its governmental responsibilities, the conditions are ripening for the dis­appearance of this gap. If at the beginning the governments of the left will allow a more effective containment of the class in the interests of capital to take place, their inevitable economic bankruptcy and the increasingly violent anti-working class measures the irresolvable crisis will force them to impose, will eventually undermine the mystifications which today obscure the consciousness of the proletariat.

The International Communist Current

Geographical: 

  • Italy [52]

Class Consciousness and the Role of Revolutionaries

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“When the proletariat,” Marx tells us, “calls for the destruction of the existing world order, it is simply expressing the secret of its own existence, because it constitutes the actual destruction of this world order.”

However this destruction can in no way be a blind and strictly predetermined act - some­how the direct product, the mechanical re­sult of a certain number of economic causes. On the contrary it demands of its subject a fully developed consciousness of the goal to be attained. But if one holds to a bour­geois vision of history, this consciousness, defined as an awareness that one has of one’s own existence, is limited to the subjective and intellectual category of a sum of ideas applied to the interpretation of reality.

For all bourgeois science, thought, consci­ousness, detached from the general movement of matter, is above all the affair of isolated individuals or groups of individuals with some vague interests in common. Thus, because its reasoning is unable to break free from the gross distortions of the domi­nant ideology, bourgeois science conceives of the process of gaining consciousness only as a purely mental mechanism which leads an individual, or even a social group, to gain a consciousness of what he (or it) is, through a process of stimulus-reaction­reflection-action. By transforming this movement of an isolated individual into the dynamic of a social class, this vision is led to depict and fix social classes in indi­vidual and mythical terms. The proletariat thus appears solidified, objectified as a simple economic category. It is reduced to a kind of compact to ‘gain consciousnesses’ as a single entity of what it is and what it has to accomplish. And from this learned two-dimensional view of society the conclusion is reached that the proleta­riat is now simply a class-for-capital; or that it is enough for it to wait, a ‘teeming mass’, for consciousness to come simultane­ously and homogeneously into the brain of each worker; or that it is nothing more than a sort of human body, with the party for a head, the workers’ councils for legs, etc ...

This completely erroneous way of conceiving of the historic process of a social class, first criticized by Marx in the Theses on Feuerbach, is explained by the fact that the bourgeoisie, unable to question its own existence, can only think in terms of strati­fications, categories and arbitrary divi­sions. For the bourgeoisie there is only the complete and finished reality of a world di­vorced from practice, unchanging and dead matter, thought surrounding reality like a veil, neither able to transform itself nor reality itself. Form and content, perceived object and conceived subject, idea and mat­ter, theory and practice, are joined, stuck hack to back and bonded inseparably but also differentiated, envisaged each accord­ing to a mode of existence of its own. The world of objects is content to ‘be there’. As for their unity, which in the bourgeois mind can be no more than that of parallel lines which meet at infinity, it is reduced to no more than an intellectual conjuring trick.

In fact it is the failure of all vulgar materialism that, even if it recognizes the determination of matter it only considers the object in a form independent of and ex­terior to the subject, and not as human practice. Class consciousness has only to be condensed into a theoretical programme, and held by a minority while the proleta­riat acts in the material world unable to achieve consciousness without the help of an intermediary, an indispensable link, the party which provides the mediation between experience and class consciousness. Or else proletarian class consciousness is no more than a sort of instructive, immediate res­ponse to external stimuli and revolutio­naries - for fear of disturbing and viola­ting this natural metabolism, can only bury their heads in the sand like ostriches and wait for things to happen spontaneously.

Revolutionaries themselves cannot be content with this simplistic view; because they are aware that they have not arrived at their vision of reality by chance, nor is it the product of individual will; because the es­sential role they play in social reality can­not be restricted to an intellectual or emp­irical description of the objective and sub­jective conditions of the communist revolu­tion. And what might seem too abstract or too theoretical is only a necessary step, a moment in the practice of their organized intervention. Conceiving of a movement the­oretically, trying to get a mental ‘picture’ of a process, is rather like wanting to float down a river without leaving the bank. This is why revolutionaries, having no inte­rests separate from those of the proletariat, cannot be content with abstract representa­tions or schemas, with journalistic or day-to-day descriptions of social reality. Part of a whole, products of and active factors in an historical process, their theoretical reflections signify, in the last instance, the adoption of political positions on rea­lity, a desire to radically transform soci­ety. Today in the era of social revolution, when the proletariat is re-emerging onto the historical scene, their intervention is even more vital - after a half-century of counter-revolution and confusion which has weighed heavily on the class struggle, grossly fal­sifying revolutionary theory, leading some groups into the swamp of degeneration, and demanding of today’s revolutionary minorities an indispensable theoretical clarification as a precondition for organized practice within the class.

For this reason, these reflections on class consciousness and the role of revolutiona­ries and the party must absolutely not be approached from their purely theoretical aspect. If the first elements of the analy­sis put forward here have been confined to tracing the broad outlines, other factors taken from the actual experience of class struggle will reinforce, modify and clarify a number of points. In the last analysis only the activity of the class can confirm or invalidate revolutionary theory. As Marx wrote in the Theses on Feuerbach: “All systems which lead theory towards mys­ticism find their rational solution in hu­man practice and in the understanding of this practice.” (Thesis no.8).

Conditions of the communist revolution

1. When the capitalist mode of production has exhausted its usefulness, it can only be superseded by the action of a class in which consciousness is generalized and which is united on a world scale: the proletariat. And this condition is of such cen­tral importance because it is the only one which enables us to clarify the specific character of the communist revolution, and the passage from a mode of production based on the law of value to a higher mode of existence. In fact there is a gulf between what humanity has experienced up to now, on the level of its historical development, and the qualitative leap for which it is prepa­ring itself, a leap which will bring the pre­sent period to a close and liberate man from all exploitation. And this immense differ­ence is all the more difficult to conceive of since the historical succession of diffe­rent modes of production has unfolded as a necessary, determined, and more or less un­conscious process; since up until the present period of time the motive force had been a revolutionary class which already possessed economic power within the old outmoded system of production. This qualitative diffe­rence is reflected in the historic level of consciousness which is demanded for the des­truction of the capitalist mode of production and the transition towards communism. This consciousness, far from being reducible to a simple mental, ideological or individual phenomenon, must be placed within the context of a social class.

2. The concept of social class comprises not simply an economic classification or cate­gory, or a sum of isolated individuals. It is essentially based on a historical evolu­tion which forges common political interests. The proletariat does not really exist as a class except through the historical develop­ment which places it in mortal confrontation with capitalism, and this development itself is fundamentally only real in the process of coming to consciousness which accompanies it. The communist revolution differs fundament­ally from all previous revolutions to the extent that for the first time in the history of humanity a revolutionary class, the bearer of new social relations, does not possess any economic power within the old society. The proletariat is the first and the last revo­lutionary class in history which is also an exploited class. This clearly shows that it must, because of the socio-economic position that it occupies in the capitalist mode of production, be fully conscious of its historic goals. In fact it is the only class which has the subjective and objective pos­sibility of coming to an understanding of the whole of society. The proletariat has no roots in capitalism’s soil; it has no possi­bility of developing an ideology on the bas­is of these roots, because it does not pos­sess within itself the seeds of a new exploi­tation of man by man.

Since ideology presupposes a politico-juri­dical superstructure and an economic infra­structure determined by the productive forces which continue to dominate man, the process of coming to consciousness can, for the pro­letariat, only pose itself as a necessary precondition for the capture of power and the complete dismantling of the capitalist infrastructure.

3. The proletariat is the only class in his­tory for which the historic necessity to destroy the whole system of exploitation co­incides completely with its interests as a revolutionary class, interests which are themselves linked to the interests of the whole of humanity. No other class or social strata in society can bring about this historic future. This is why these classes cannot reach a consciousness of the neces­sity to transform the whole of society, even if they have vague awareness of the social barbarism which surrounds them (an awareness which is however always recupera­ted in one way or another by the dominant class and the blindness of bourgeois ideo­logy). From a capitalist and thus an ideo­logical point of view, realization of the historic and transitory character of society is obviously impossible. For the bourgeoi­sie, social relations are fixed, eternal, existing outside the realm of human will. Although the bourgeoisie uses its mystifi­cations against the working class more or less clear-sightedly, its whole aim is to banish all awareness of the class struggle. In this way the objective limits of capita­list production determine the limits of its consciousness, which because of these limitations can never be more than mere ideology. It is in this context that the principal bourgeois mystifications today attempt to make the proletariat believe that a new kind of management more appropriate to the system could put off the collapse of capitalism indefinitely.

4. Class consciousness, far from coinciding with ideology, is above all its principal negation, its fundamental antithesis. Today it is above all a question of drawing human­ity from the lethargy in which it is sub­merged, of making the world conscious of it­self and its actions - which no ideology can possibly achieve. Because ideology, the product of economic factors and an alienated social reality, attributes an autonomous existence to objects, and to consciousness a power of abstraction divorced from all material contingencies, it is impossible for it to undertake the critical or practical transformation of society. Revolutionary class consciousness, far from preceding action so as to direct it towards a precise aim, is above all the process of transforming society; a living process which, as a product of the development and exacerbation of the contradictions of the decadent capitalist mode of production, forces a social class to realize the essence of its existence through a practical and theoretical (and thus cons­cious) negation of its conditions of life. The history of this process includes the his­tory of proletarian struggle, and that of the revolutionary minorities which have ari­sen as an integral part of this struggle.

The characteristics of coming to consciousness

1. The fundamental differences between ideo­logy and class consciousness are based on the origin itself of ideology and its mate­rial roots. These roots reach back into the history of the division of labour, the sepa­ration of the producers from what they pro­duce, the independence of the relations of production and the domination of man by the material form of his own labour. The laws inherent in capitalism, laws which are char­acterized by the domination of dead labour over living labour, the domination of exchange value over use value and the fetish­ism of value, lead to the transformation of social relations into relations between things, and allow the development of juridi­cal relations whose point of departure is the isolated individual.

It is also these laws which through the development of specialization prevent man from seeing things as a totality, and imprison him in a series of separate categories, isolated and independent from one another (the nation, the factory, the neighbourhood etc ...). The vision of totality becomes nothing more than a simple addition of dif­ferent branches of knowledge; knowledge which is itself the exclusive property of specialists.

For its part, class consciousness appears as a vision of totality, the consciousness of the class as a whole. This can only be a wholly collective process, Its point of departure is a class united in struggle, destined to destroy capitalist social rela­tions: it implies the domination of the whole over the parts. But this totality can only be posed if the subject which poses it is itself a totality, and only if the subject is a class does it possess this cha­racter of a totality. This is why to be­come a unified, conscious class, the prole­tariat will have to smash all barriers, all separation, all frontiers whatsoever, and impose the dictatorship of its workers’ councils beyond national barriers.

Another consequence of the reification of social consciousness is the separation be­tween parts and the whole. In this period of capitalist decadence, where all reform has become impossible and where revolution is the order of the day, economic struggles tend to transform themselves into political struggles and openly confront the system. The proletariat is led to consciously transform society: this is why for the pro­letariat the vision of totality implies an understanding of the dialectical contradic­tion between its immediate interests and the final goals, between an isolated moment and the totality. From the isolated moment, in other words in situations where the class is atomized and mystified and an inte­gral part of the capitalist system, the pro­letariat must go on to unite on a world scale and transform itself from an economic category to a revolutionary class. Only the proletariat is able to achieve this unification as a conscious class, because the nature of associated labour gives it the possibility of this global vision.

2. The nature of this coming to conscious­ness, which makes it above all a class consciousness, allows us to understand the fundamental opposition which at present exists between ideology and consciousness. And it is not out of linguistic purism that we affirm that there is no proletarian ideology or revolutionary science, and fur­ther that a revolutionary minority can nev­er be the ‘bearer’ or the ‘embodiment’ of this class consciousness. Reducing a whole historical phenomenon, at once practi­cal and theoretical, to a mere reflection crystallized in the party programme, Lenin­ists and Bordigists of every tendency under­stand the nature of class consciousness with the same flawed reasoning that allows mys­tics to affirm that the body of Christ is the incarnation of the Holy Ghost.

In fact both ideology and mysticism owe their existence to the fact that the separa­tion between manual and intellectual work has allowed the development of a mode of thought which is characterized by the distance it attempts to place between its own reality and the material conditions of its existence, and by its concern to appear as independent and autonomous thought, as the unique causal agent which animates matter.

Conceiving of reality as a series of media­tions, necessary steps between man and mat­ter, bourgeois ideology refuses to recognize its real origins. Attributing to reality an independent existence, bourgeois ideology opposes to metaphysical materialism an idea­lism of action, by considering theoretical acumen as the only valid and true cause of action and by relegating practice to its lowest ‘natural’ form.

For its part, class consciousness coincides fully with social reality, its raison d’etre being a product of the historical develop­ment of the contradiction between the pro­ductive forces and the relations of produc­tion. The need for a radical transformation of the relations of production demands a true, global vision of the whole of social reality.

Class consciousness recognizes its origins and its object: the proletariat, the living kernel of production, a social class in a constant state of becoming. The process of the proletariat’s coming to consciousness, based on the dialectical unity between being and thought, rejects any form of intermed­iary or mediation between existence and cons­ciousness. Proletarian class consciousness becomes conscious of itself and in this way restores the unity between man and reality.

3. The proletarian is forced to sell his labour power as a mere object in relation to the whole of his personality, and it is this objectivity, this rupture created bet­ween labour power, an object condemned to exploitation and the subject who sells it, which makes for the possibility of gaining consciousness. It is through its struggle against capitalist exploitation that the proletariat is able to perceive itself at the same time as the subject and the object of understanding. This perception, and the proletariat’s awareness of its own condition of extreme poverty and inhumanity, is at the same time the exposure and destruction of the whole of society.

Thus by destroying the whole of society the proletariat simply expresses the essence of its own existence, being itself a negation of society (the only social relation exist­ing between capitalism and the proletariat being the class struggle). The self-reali­zation of the proletariat as a class-for-­itself is achieved through the destruction of the system; consciousness is both a fac­tor and a product of this process. For the proletariat the understanding of itself is the understanding of the essence of society; it arrives not simply at a consciousness about an object, but at a direct conscious­ness of the object itself. To this extent it is already practice and effects a modifi­cation of the object. By recognizing the objective character of labour as a commodity this process can expose the fetishism of commodities and reveal the human character of the labour-capital relation.

The illusions, mystifications and barriers imposed on thought by ideology are thus simply the mental expressions of a reality itself reified by an economic structure and their negation cannot be accomplished by a simple effort of will, but only by over­coming them in practice. This is why class consciousness is not simply a theoretical calling into question of capitalist society but proceeds above all from a critique and a material destruction of the system as a whole. Class consciousness, by recognizing the historical nature of economic laws, exposes the historic and transitory charac­ter of the capitalist mode of production, describes the objective limits of this mode of production and analyzes the historical periods of society. This exposure is a pro­cess which joins theory and practice to the extent that each illusion which is dispelled, each mystification exposed, corresponds to a real desire to destroy wage slavery.

4. However, if this historic consciousness emerges from the need for the proletariat to gain an overall understanding of reality from a class viewpoint, this does not in itself means that the proletariat will immed­iately attain this understanding. On the contrary, the class character of this pro­cess exactly corresponds to the heterogen­eous and painful development of working class practice and theory, which right from the very beginning confronted the coercive pressures of the bourgeoisie.

The proletariat, even when unified in times of struggle, cannot act as a single entity mechanically directed towards its goal. The dialectical contradiction between its posi­tion as a revolutionary class and an exploi­ted class, its total destitution within society, means that it is the first victim of bourgeois ideology. Unable to develop its consciousness along the set lines of an ideology, or a series of practical ‘recipes’, the proletariat can only come to consciousness of its position through a real process linked to the material conditions of its social existence. It is these objective conditions and the ever-present oppression of the dominant ideology which constrain the proletariat, as an integral part of the ten­dency to constitute itself as a revolution­ary class, to secrete revolutionary minor­ities in order to accelerate the process of theorization of its historic acquisitions, and the diffusion of these within the class struggle. Class consciousness is thus not a ‘mirror’ of reality, a mechanical reflec­tion of the economic situation of the work­ing class (if this were true it would have no active role to play), and is not the spontaneous product of the soil of capita­list exploitation.

In reality class struggle arises from the convergence of several factors: the economic premises, although indispensable, are not in themselves sufficient. The economic struggle of the proletariat is not enough to engender a whole theoretical and practi­cal movement; it doesn’t have magic creative powers, like the single, all-powerful force which is idolized by certain spontaneists. Class struggle is not an entity in itself, separated from the world and detonator of the movement of matter, it is the world, for­ged by it and forging it in its turn. For this reason, only the fusion of a number of elements, the product of the development of the class struggle itself, can in the last analysis lead socialist consciousness to its highest historical level. Fundamentally these elements are the following:

-- the economic constraints to which the proletariat is subjected and its position as an exploited class;

-- the objective conditions of the period and the level reached by the contradictions of the system (the decadence of capitalism, deepening of the crisis);

-- the level of class struggle in response to the situation, and the more or less deve­loped tendency for the proletariat to orga­nize itself as an autonomous class;

-- the increasingly decisive influence of revolutionary groups in the class struggle and the ability of the proletariat to re-appropriate its revolutionary theory.

None of these elements can, seen in isola­tion, be detached from the others and be posed as a single basic cause of the whole process. It is quite clear that economic constraints and revolutionary theory impose themselves as active factors in the develop­ment of proletarian consciousness, but they do not constitute the primary cause of the process. To look for a basic, isolated cause of a whole process leads to the fos­silization of this process and to completely sterile debates like ‘which came first, the chicken or the egg?’.

The role of revolutionaries and party

To define proletarian consciousness as an historic process characteristic of a social class, and characterized by the affirmation of the ‘conscious being’ on the scene of history, is to go no further than a simple statement of fact. To stop at this point would leave us with nothing more than a theoretical dissertation on the characteris­tics of class consciousness with no understanding of the objective forces which have led us to formulate these definitions. In fact it is by going beyond the purely theo­retical aspect of their activity that revo­lutionaries gain a consciousness of their historical role as an active part of a whole. One can’t knock down a wall by blowing at it, or destroy a whole system of exploita­tion with pious words and philosophical re­flections. It is by fully taking up their responsibilities to the working class that revolutionaries can accelerate the process of gaining consciousness and the constitu­tion of the proletariat as an autonomous class. For revolutionaries this responsibi­lity necessitates a clear vision of their function, the identification of the historic tasks for which they have been engendered.

1. The nature and function of revolutionary groups and of the party can only really be explained through the profoundly contradic­tory nature of the process of the proletar­iat’s coming to consciousness. This is a contradiction which underlies and accompanies the development of class struggle itself, and will continue to be a feature of the period of transition right up to the final disappearance of classes: the contradiction between the position of the working class as an exploited class and its historic tasks which will lead to the abolition of all exploitation; the contradiction between the proletariat’s inability to create a ‘proletarian ideology’ on the basis of any kind of economic power, and the over-riding need to gain a theoretical understanding of the lessons of its struggle, to be fully conscious of its historic goals. Thus the proletariat is force:

-- on the one hand to put into practice in its day-to-day struggles the fundamental watchword of the communist revolution: “the emancipation of the workers will be the task of the workers themselves”;

and on the other hand to forge the indis­pensable theoretical weapons for its cons­cious emancipation, even though it is impos­sible for the proletariat to break complete­ly from the hold of the dominant ideology.

Revolutionary minorities thus appear as pro­ducts of this contradictory need. They arise as an integral part of the proletariat and yet are not necessarily members of the working class in a sociological sense. Be­cause the economically dominant class con­trols the material and ideological means of production, the proletariat cannot give birth to a culture or ideology ‘sociologi­cally intrinsic’ to itself, since this would imply an economic interest, and thus an interest in the perpetration of its position as an exploited class. For this reason revolutionaries are defined as members of the proletariat (according to political criteria); their task is the theoretical elaboration of the historic lessons of the class, and to ensure that these lessons are understood on the widest possible scale.

2. Because the proletariat has to conscious­ly overthrow the old society, this transfor­mation, at once practical and theoretical, demands a clear vision, a keen understanding of “the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the prole­tarian movement” (Marx, The Communist Mani­festo). So long as class antagonism and capitalist exploitation continue to exist, this vision of the final goals of the move­ment will continue to be confronted with the coercive influence of bourgeois ideol­ogy. For this reason this vision will not immediately be granted to the majority of the proletariat. The diffusion and growth of revolutionary theory, and consciousness of the final goals of the proletarian revo­lution within the class as a whole, cannot take the form of a ‘natural’ phenomenon, or a mathematical and linear progression: above all it is the product of an organized effort by the class. This conscious attempt by the proletariat to equip itself with a revolutionary theory, and to draw lessons from its past struggles, takes a material form in the appearance of revolutionary minorities and their constitution in pre­-revolutionary periods into a party.

This constant striving of the proletariat itself towards the constitution of a revo­lutionary party is absolutely not compar­able to the voluntarist action of indivi­duals or groups of individuals who think that the construction of a revolutionary party is a substitute for action by the class as a whole. The fact that revolutio­nary theory appears as the theory of revo­lutionary groups does not make it a result of individual effort or the ‘discovery’ of “this or that would-be universal reformer” (Marx, The Communist Manifesto). It is the concretization of the development of actual class struggle, and arises in response to a vital need in the proletariat.

3. The proletariat is thus not considered as a class on an abstract level, but on the level of its real actions, its incessant struggle to confront the objective conditions of the period. From this historic practice there has arisen, not a series of dogmatic principles applied to the class struggle like a theoretical ‘recipe’, but the theoretical expression of this experi­ence. Revolutionary theory does not consti­tute a definitive and invariant body of principles, but a true reflection of the concrete activity of the proletariat, made explicit and generalized on a theoretical level by revolutionary groups and re-approp­riated by the class. Thus each problem solved by the struggle and self-organization of the class corresponds to a new theoreti­cal gain, which will itself be transformed into actual practice by the intervention of revolutionaries in future struggles. Thus theory, product of the social existence of struggles, draws its energy from practice, and in turn influences the political clarity of coming struggles.

Developing out of the concrete struggles of the class, revolutionary theory, originally the expression of revolutionary groups does not remain their exclusive property, like a hidden treasure. On the contrary, the very role of revolutionaries and the party con­cretizes the fundamental concern of the proletariat to re-appropriate its historical lessons and to generalize them as widely as possible. Their function is to diffuse revolutionary theory within the class, under­standing that this process is a phenomenon occurring within the proletariat itself, and that it isn’t a question of ‘injecting’ theory into practice, or of seeing theory as some sort of chemical yeast which acti­vates a whole historical process.

Theory and practice complement and interpenet­rate one another. To concentrate on one at the expense of the other, to insist that theory is the primal cause, or on the other wand to ignore the active side of theory, is to risk being lead down the dangerous paths of voluntarism or academicism.

4. It is not the existence of revolutionary groups which makes the proletariat a revolutionary class. Even if the bourgeoisie were to suppress every revolutionary in the world, it would be simply putting back the hour of its death, without being able to suppress the class struggle or prevent the proletariat from throwing up new groups of revolutionaries. By destroying the first blossoms on a tree, one can’t definitively halt the whole process of its reproduction.

For this reason revolutionaries, while hav­ing no interests distinct from those of the class, are at the same time not synonymous with it. They are only a part of it, the most resolute part. Revolutionaries are not the general staff of an unconscious and obedient army, nor are they the helmsmen of the revolution. They trace the broad out­lines of the struggle and point out the final aims of the movement. Their function is not to prepare to take on the ‘management’ of workers’ struggles or to issue the “correct slogans (which) organically give birth to the conditions and possibilities for the technical organization of the proletariat” (Lukacs). Their role is not to organize the class, to direct the autonomous organization of the class by means of prac­tical ‘recipes’ for this or that form of unitary organization, but to always put forward the general political aims of the movement.

5. Revolutionaries and the party cannot sub­stitute themselves for the class. This implies that their function, while being indispensable, does not constitute an end in itself, a complete and perfect process which can replace the activity of the prole­tariat itself, or inject into the spontaneous mass class movement the truth which is inherent to it, or ‘raise’ the proletariat from the level of its primitive economic needs to conscious revolutionary activity. This is why, while being an active and cons­tituent part of the proletariat, which par­ticipates fully in the proletariat’s coming to consciousness, the party is in no way a mediator between theory and practice, exper­ience and consciousness. Both of them, the party and the class, are the material unity between theory and practice; there is no need for this unity - identical in both party and class - to be the responsibility of an intermediary (since an intermediary can only really be placed between two initi­ally separate entities). This unity is a living process which determines both the party and the class as a whole and the class’s unitary organization in workers’ councils. To make the party the mediation between theory and practice comes down to conceiving of theory as external to the pro­letariat, as the sole property of the party, which thus becomes the only force able to ‘draw the sense out of praxis’; it comes down to denying all possibility of the political and conscious seizure of power by the proletariat. Following this reasoning, the workers’ councils would become empty shells, administrative and statified organi­zations. The party would be the sole bearer of revolutionary content within the councils. In which case it would be very logical to assign to the party the actual direction of the dictatorship over society and to put the party at the head of the state and the dic­tatorship of the proletariat.

The party is not a directive or executive organization, an organ created by the prole­tariat for the seizure for power. The idea that the direction of the workers’ dictator­ship is the task of a single revolutionary party constituted as a mass party during the post-revolutionary period, shows a grave misunderstanding of the real political goals of the party. In fact the party does not aim at disproportionate growth so as to in­corporate as many elements as possible into itself. Its function is not that of a single totalitarian state party. On the contrary it will always remain the expression of a part of the class and its raison d’être will tend to disappear in proportion to the growth of socialist consciousness within the class as a whole.

The fact that the party does not have the task of substituting itself for the class in no way implies that its existence represents a last resort, a necessary evil which should be kept in check or avoided as much as pos­sible. Revolutionaries and the party are necessary products, indispensable elements in the process of the proletariat’s coming to consciousness. To negate their function using the excuse of substitutionist errors in the past is to display a sterile purism; it is to disarm the proletariat of one of its most vital weapons. The historic task of revolutionaries and the party, far from representing some sort of panacea, forms part of a general tendency for the proletariat to constitute itself as a conscious revolutionary class. Revolutionaries are the most combative and resolute elements within the working class; they develop an organized intervention within the class struggle with the perspective of putting forward the final goals of the movement. Their active participation within the class struggle exercises a decisive influence on the general orientation of the movement, an influence which can actually show material results in the general political direction of the struggle, the acceleration of the constitution of the proletariat as an auto­nomous class with the aim of seizing power and destroying wage slavery.

Conclusion

The rift between the relations of production and the means of production has reached such a high level in the period following World War I that today the obviously mendacious character of the ideologies corresponding to these social relations makes it inadequate and forces the bourgeoisie to use a whole series of mystifications which consist in diverting workers’ struggles from their true end.

These basic differences from the ascendant period fundamentally affect the unity bet­ween theory and practice; the developments of the objective conditions for the commu­nist revolution have strengthened this unity. In the period of decadence the communist revolution becomes an objective possibility and the struggles of the class are radicalized in this direction; theory tends more and more to see class conscious­ness as a true unity of theory and practice, thus affirming itself as the simple expres­sion of a conscious unity.

The strengthening of the unity between the social being of the proletariat and its theory expresses itself, throughout the his­tory of the working class in the period of decadence, in the appearance of revolutionary organizations of the class which no longer see their objectives as the amelioration of the living conditions of the proletariat in­side capitalism, but clearly put forward for the working class the violent destruction of the capitalist mode of production and the taking of political power through its own autonomous organizations.

In the ascendant period of capitalism, when the permanent organization of the proletar­iat in its class parties and unions represented its own struggles for real and last­ing reforms, the appearance of revolutionary minorities occurred within a limited frame­work. Today all permanent forms of organi­zation of the class are inevitably doomed to disappear or be integrated into the counter-revolution. As for revolutionary minorities, they are not limited simply to theorizing the lessons of the experience of the proletariat; their practice within the class struggle can be a real contribution to the transformation and clarification of the historical perspective of the class. Theory tends not only simply to be realized in practice, but reality itself changes and begins to incorporate thought; that is to say, that the proletariat tends to re-approp­riate theory for itself, by developing in struggle an awareness of the class frontiers which express the acquisitions of its historic past.

Thus, the revolutionary programme isn’t simply a sum of more or less flexible posi­tions following the fluctuations of history. It is the result of the historic link which unites the different moments of the appear­ance of the proletariat as a class thinking and struggling for its historic mission, which is the destruction of capitalism.

The intervention of revolutionaries repre­sents nothing more than the attempt of the proletariat to reach an understanding of its real interests by going beyond a simple emp­irical statement of particular phenomena; it is the attempt to find the relationship between these phenomena by using the general principles drawn from its historic experience.

Because the incessant defence of class frontiers, the increasingly profound clari­fication of the historic goals of the prole­tariat simply concretizes, in the final analysis, the necessity for it to be fully conscious of its practice, the existence of revolutionary organizations is truly a product of this necessity. Because this coming to consciousness both precedes and completes the taking of power by the proletariat through the workers’ councils, it heralds a mode of production in which men, finally masters of the productive forces, will deve­lop them in a fully conscious manner in order to end the reign of necessity and begin the reign of freedom.

J.L.

August 1976



Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Class consciousness [53]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Left [4]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • International Communist Current [6]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Communism [17]

People: 

  • Karl Marx [54]

Bilan’: Lessons of Spain 1936 and the Crisis in the Fraction

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Introduction

In the fourth number of the International Review we published the first in a series of articles taken from Bilan, covering the period from the fall of the Primo de Rivera regime and the monarchy to the events of 1936. In these articles, Bilan attempted to show that the fall of the old regime was due to its anachronistic features, which made it absolutely incapable of dealing with the problems posed to Spanish capitalism by the general crisis of world capital. Only by beginning from this global historical context could the development of the situa­tion in Spain be understood. The stance adopted by the Communist Left, led by the Italian Fraction, was radically opposed to Trotsky’s and that of other groups born out of the degeneration of the Communist International. They began by fixating on all the specific characteristics of Spain which led them into all manner of aberra­tions, the most noteworthy of which was to see in the advent of the Republic the triumph of some kind of ‘progressive’ bourgeois-democratic revolution over the old ‘feudal’ order. Bilan, of course, never ignored the backward characteristics of Spanish capital, but insisted on that point. However, it energetically rejected the deviation of defining backward Spain as a feudal society about to give birth to a bourgeois-democra­tic revolution and all that that implied. In general Bilan categorically rejected any idea of the possibility of bourgeois-democratic revolutions taking place in the present period of the decline of capitalism.

In this historical epoch the only alternative facing society is proletarian revolution or imperialist war, socialism or barbarism.1

The great majority of groups on the left, even if they did not talk about an ‘anti-feudal revolution’, still saw the events in Spain as a movement of continual advance for the working class, a movement which was forcing the bourgeoisie to retreat. This was how they interpreted any strengthening of the Republic and the left-wing parties in­side it. The development of ‘democracy’ was seen by such groups as the expression of the proletariat’s advance, as a strengthening of its class positions. The reinforcement of the ‘democratic’ state and its apparatus, in however violent and repressive a manner, was seen as an indication of the weakness of the bourgeoisie and synonymous with the advance of the proletariat.

Bilan’s interpretation was in diametrical opposition to this analysis. It saw in the formation of the democratic Republic, the state structure best adapted to divert the proletariat from its own class terrain in order to fragment it politically while controlling it physically. At that time capitalism - of which Spanish capitalism was an integral part - was moving faster and faster towards the only answer it had to the world crisis: imperialist war. Moreover, capitalism had managed to com­pletely dominate and master the only alter­native, the only barrier to war: the class struggle of the proletariat. Having suffered a multitude of defeats, having seen the triumph of Stalinism, fascism, Hitlerism, and the Popular Fronts, the working class in the most important countries was in a profoundly demoralized and powerless posi­tion. Only in the Iberian region was there a section of the proletariat which had maintained a tremendous combative potential. In such circumstances such combativity was absolutely intolerable to capitalism; it not only had to break apart such resistance, but also make use of it - to turn Spain into an immense bloodbath that would help mobi­lize the workers of the entire world for the imperialist massacre. This was the real meaning of the rise to power of the demo­cratic Republic and the triumph of the Popular Front in Spain. Such a radically different analysis led the Italian Fraction to be increasingly isolated from other groups who had survived the degeneration of the Communist International. Bilan’s warnings against the imminent catastrophe that was being prepared for the proletariat in Spain received no echo. And all Bilan could do was sadly recognize the blindness which had struck these groups, their gradual tendency to go astray, which made them at once the victims and the accomplices of the ‘anti­fascist’ massacre in Spain.

The development of events quickly sealed the fate of these groups. Not one of them had the strength to avoid being dragged into support for the imperialist war which followed on from Franco’s military uprising. The magnificent spontaneous response of the proletariat, which by staying on its class terrain rapidly got the better of the army in the main working class centres in Spain, was soon broken by the contortions and manoeuvrings of the Republican state. All the political forces organized within and against the working class - the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the anarchists, trade unionists of the UGT and CNT - managed to deprive the workers of their victory over the army by turning their class victory into a battle for the defence of democracy, the Republican state, and capitalist ‘order’. Class lines were blurred; class frontiers obliterated. The class struggle of the proletariat against capitalism was replaced by the struggle against fascism, by the union of all the democratic forces of the bourgeoisie - the characteristic line-up of capitalist rule. Spain was a general rehearsal for the whole campaign of mystifi­cation that would be used to march the prole­tariat off under the banners of democracy against fascism to fight in the second imperialist world war.

The trap was snapped shut, tragically con­firming Bilan’s position on the function of democracy generally in capitalism and in Spain in particular. Far from being a sign of the proletariat strengthening itself, and far from representing a step towards new conquests by the proletariat as the various groups on the left claimed, the struggle for democracy was actually a sign of the derail­ment and defeat of the working class. The function of democracy was to lead the class into an imperialist war. Not only was Bilan’s position fully confirmed by events, but this revolutionary marxist thesis enabled it to remain loyal to the principles of the class, and to resist being drawn into the nauseous cess-pit of the ‘anti-fascist’ imperialist war. And this was to its lasting honour and credit.

Very different was the fate of the great majority of other groups, even communist ones. Without wasting words on the riff­raff of the socialist left like Pivert and Co., all the groups of the Trotskyist opposition, the POUM, the revolutionary-­syndicalists of Revolution Proletarienne, up to an including groups like L’Union Communiste in France and the internationa­list group in Belgium, all plunged miserably into the anti-fascist mire. Some with enthu­siasm, others with doubts and breast-beating, but all of them caught up in the anti­fascist web they themselves had woven, and there they ended their days in lamentable debates and hagglings. The most radical groups denounced the Popular Front and participation in the Republican government, but still considered it absolutely necessary to participate in the war against Franco, arguing that a military victory over fascism was the precondition for the success of the revolution. Or else they tried to link the ‘external’ war at the Front against Franco with the ‘internal’ class struggle against the bourgeois Republican government.

In the International Review no.6 we repro­duced a series of articles in which Bilan exposed this whole tissue of lies and sophisms whose only function was to justify participation in an imperialist war under the guise of proletarian anti-fascism. The war in Spain led directly to World War II. The radical groups, caught in their own trap, could do nothing then but fall apart and disappear; as for others, like the Trotskyists, they simply passed once and for all into the camp of the class enemy by fully participating in the generalized imperialist war.

The events in Spain reaffirmed a fundamental lesson for revolutionaries: a proletarian group cannot stick its finger into the wheels of capitalism with impunity. At a given moment, in one of those sudden convulsions which occur in history, it can become irremediably caught within those wheels and dashed to pieces. If the proletariat, deluded and crushed, is unable to spring back into struggle, its revolutionary organizations will be likewise hamstrung since they are simply the organizations and instruments of the class. The working class as a class is and remains the subject of history. Caught up in the spokes of the class enemy’s machine, revolutionary groups are irretriev­ably lost and destroyed, and then there is nothing for it but for the class to engender new organizations. Revolutionary organiza­tions are thus constantly exposed to the danger of corruption by the class enemy. There is no absolute guarantee against this danger. Only loyalty to principles and a constant political vigilance can offer the revolutionary organization some assurance against the corrosive penetration of bour­geois ideology. And even then there can be no total security.

In no.6 of the International Review we term­inated the series of articles from Bilan with an article entitled ‘The Isolation of our Fraction in the Face of the Spanish Events’. Here Bilan wrote: “Our isolation is not fortuitous. It is the consequence of a profound victory by world capitalism which has managed to infect with gangrene even the groups of the Communist Left.” Not only did the Italian Fraction find itself isolated as other communist groups became infected with the gangrene of world capit­alism, the Fraction itself did not succeed in escaping from such contamination, despite all its vigilance. It, in turn, found this gangrene in its own midst in the form of a minority calling for the support of the ‘anti-fascist’ war in Spain. We know that when World War I was declared, a large part of the Parisian section of the Bolshevik Party gave its support to the ‘defensive’ war of the ‘democratic’ allies against Prussian imperialist militarism. With the experience of the minority of the Italian Fraction we can see once again that no absolute immunity exists against the pene­tration of capitalist gangrene into the body of a revolutionary organization. But once more, as was the case with the Bolshevik Party, the robust health of the organization allowed it to get the better of the gangrene without too much damage being done to itself.

We considered it absolutely necessary to publish all the texts and declarations, both of the minority and the majority, concerning the debates and crisis provoked by the events in Spain in the Italian Frac­tion of the Communist Left. This was done for several reasons, not least because to have done otherwise would have meant failing in that elementary duty of providing other revolutionaries with all the information. Reading these texts is a highly edifying experience and gives some idea of the breadth, content, and seriousness of these discussions, as well as a more precise picture of the political life of the Fraction. The arguments of the minority, which were more the result of a sentimental reaction to the events in Spain than anything else, were not especially different from those of other radical groups who had fallen into the same mystifications and errors. Their main argu­ment boiled down to saying that non-inter­vention would be to assume an aloof attitude of intolerable indifference to what was happening in Spain. Accusations of this sort often act as a cover for thoughtless, ill-considered, and rash actions.2 The min­ority’s own sad experience attests to this. It is striking to find this same accusation of indifference thrown at us today by the Bordigists as a justification for their support for national liberation struggles (read massacres).

It came as no surprise that after their mis­adventures in the anti-fascist militia of the POUM following its dissolution and incorporation into the army, the minority returned from Spain and plunged straightaway into the swamps of L’Union Communiste. A natural home for them! Neither was it surprising that at the end of the war, it was the minority who were the most enthusi­astic participants in the formation of the Bordigist’s International Communist Party; the French section of the Party was virtu­ally constituted by the minority. That Party was also a perfect home for them. What an ironic revenge. And it was precisely the positions of the minority which really, if not formally, triumphed within the ICP. If the ICP does not recognize its origins in the Italian Fraction and Bilan it should at least see its roots in the political positions of the minority of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left and give them the honour they deserve.

Finally, it is extremely interesting and significant to see how the Fraction conducted these discussions, to see how patiently it put up with all the organizational infringe­ments of the minority by making all kinds of organizational concessions to them. This was done not in order to hang on to the minority whose political positions were considered absolutely incompatible with those of the Fraction, nor to prevent the inevitable split from happening, but to clarify political differences as far as possible so that the split would strengthen the consciousness and cohesion of the revo­lutionary organization. In this the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left has given us an extremely rare and valuable lesson. Today, with the tendency towards the reconstitution of the revolutionary movement, the young groups springing up must reflect carefully on this lesson in order to fully assimilate it and make it an added weapon in the regroupment of revolutionaries.

To conclude, we are publishing the Appeal of the Communist Left issued in response to the massacres of May 1937 which finally settled the debate with the minority on the meaning of the anti-fascist Republican coalition and the events in Spain. Those who claim to be able to draw other positive lessons from these events (the collectivizations in the countryside or the syndicalization of industry are often presented as new or higher forms of working class autonomy) are allowing themselves to be mystified by an appearance which they take for reality.

The one tragic reality was the transforma­tion of Spain into an immense field of massacre on which hundreds of thousands of Spanish workers were executed in the name of defending democracy and in preparation for the second imperialist war. This and this alone is the lesson of Spain that the workers of the world must never forget.

The communiqué of the Executive Commission

The events in Spain have caused a grave crisis within our organization. The present situation has not made it possible for us to embark upon a thorough going discussion of the divergences, especially because some of our comrades are unable at the present time to clarify their position.

In this situation, the Executive Commission of our organization has only been able to record the initial attempts of these com­rades to put forward their political posi­tions, while at the same time insisting that those positions inevitably pose the question of a split in our organization. This split will obviously be ideological and not simply organizational, provided the differences over the fundamental problems are presented with complete clarity.

Beside the position publically defended by our Fraction (which needs no further explan­ation here), other opinions have been put forward which, as we have said, have not yet coalesced into a general position. Neither have the comrades who hold these opinions been able to define precisely the respective arguments they agree on. The central idea of those comrades who do not share the opinion of what is today the majority of the organization is, however, that they consider it possible to defend the autonomy of the working class, especi­ally in Catalonia, without the whole situ­ation in Spain first undergoing a radical transformation and without posing the front of the class struggle in the towns and countryside, against the present (territorial) fronts in Spain, which we consider to be of an imperialist nature.

The Executive Commission has decided the discussion should not be carried on in a hurried manner so that the organization can benefit from the contribution of the comrades who are unable at the moment to intervene actively in the debate, and also because the further evolution of the situ­ation in Spain will allow for a more complete clarification of the fundamental differences which have emerged.

With these considerations in mind, it is clear that the comrades of the present minority have, as much as anyone else, the possibility of publically setting apart their responsibilities from those of the Fraction and, while still claiming membership in the Fraction, carrying on the struggle in Spain on the basis of their positions (ie of seeking to establish the autonomy of the working class within the framework of the present situation in Spain).

In the next issue of Bilan we intend to publish all the documents relevant to the divergences which have emerged in our organization.

(Bilan, no.34, August-September, 1936)

The crisis in the Fraction: The communiqué of the Executive Commission

The crisis which has developed in the Fraction as a consequence of the events in Spain has now reached a decisive point in its evolution. The fundamental diver­gences which we mentioned in our first communiqué have come up once again during the course of discussions which have taken place within the organization. The dis­cussions have not yet led to a clarifica­tion of the fundamental points of differ­ence; this is mainly because the minority has not yet found it possible to elaborate an analysis of the recent events in Spain which could serve as a confirmation of the central positions they defend.

Faced with major disagreements that not only make collective discipline impossible but turn such discipline into an obstacle to the expression and development of the two poli­tical positions, the Executive Commission, on the basis of the programmatic conceptions it defends concerning the construction of the party, considers it necessary to work towards a separation on the organizational level. This separation must be as clear as the one which already exists on the poli­tical level, where the two conceptions are in reality an echo of the opposition be­tween capitalism and the proletariat.

The Executive Commission is aware that the minority, having set up a ‘Co-ordinating Committee’, is moving in a similar direction. This Committee has taken a series of deci­sions which the Executive Commission has limited itself to recording, while refraining from criticism and taking every measure to ensure that the minority has every possi­bility of carrying on its activity. However, the Executive Commission believes that it cannot accept the minority’s demand for the recognition of the Barcelona Federation, since the latter was founded on the basis of enlistment in the militias, which have more and more become appendices of the capitalist state. The disagreement with members of the minority itself on the question of the militias can still be submitted for discus­sion at the next Congress of our Fraction, because this difference has arisen on the basis of a solidarity affirmed in the fundamental documents of the organization. It quite another thing for those who want to join the organization on the political basis of enlistment in the militias; the question of whether this is compatible with the programmatic documents of the Fraction can only be decided by the Congress. For these reasons, the Executive Commission has decided not to recognise the Barcelona Federation and to count the votes of com­rades who are now part of it as votes coming from the groups that they belonged to prior to joining the Federation.

The Executive Commission reaffirms that the unity of the Fraction, which has been broken by the events in Spain, can only be rebuilt on the basis of excluding political positions which, far from being able to express any solidarity with the Spanish proletariat, can only serve to justify in the eyes of the masses those forces profoundly hostile to the proletariat, which capitalism is using to exterminate the working class in Spain and all over the world.

See below: ‘Communique of the Coordinating Committee’.

(Bilan, no.35, September-October, 1936)

The Spanish Revolution

This article, by a comrade in the minority of the Fraction, was written on 8 August at a time when the extreme scarcity of news hardly permitted an analysis of the events to be made. It has not been possible for the author to revise his text in order to take certain necessary corrections to statements of fact contained in it. The reader should bear this in mind.

**********

The fall of the monarchy, although it happened in a peaceful even chivalrous manner - in an atmosphere of rejoicing and not struggle - opened up the revolutionary crisis in Spain. The dictatorship of Primo de Rivera was also a symptom of this crisis.

The political and economic structure of Spain was entirely built upon the feudal scaffol­ding of a state that existed parasitically for four centuries through the exploitation of its immense colonial empire, a source of inexhaustible wealth. At the end of the nineteenth century when it lost its last colonial possessions, Spain was reduced to a third-rate power, surviving on the basis of its agricultural exports. The world crisis following the war considerably reduced its markets and bit into the reserves of capital accumulated during the war thanks to Spain’s policy of neutrality. The crisis also posed the question of the economic transformation of the country. The attempt to stimulate Spain’s productive forces by creating a modern industrial apparatus and an internal market for industrial production by transforming the system of production in the countryside came up against the conservative spirit of the old privileged feudal castes.

Five years of successive right- and left-wing governments did not even solve the political problem of the constitutional form of the regime. The existence of the Republic itself was threatened by a determined monarchist party. Still less was any solution found to the economic problem which can only finally be resolved by a violent transformation of social relations in the countryside. The agrarian question is of fundamental importance. It cannot be solved within a framework of bourgeois institutions, but only by revolutionary methods - the expropriation without compensation of the latifundia and the seigneurial estates.

Of the million square kilometres which constitute Spain, two-thirds of the land belongs to 20,000 landowners. The remaining fragments are left to the twenty million human beings who live out their misery in brutish time-honoured ignorance.

Azana’s attempt at agrarian reform had to have a negative outcome. The confiscation of the land, with indemnity being paid to the landowners, was followed by a dividing up of the land. This put a heavy burden on the peasant who now not only had to culti­vate land which was often arid and neglected but started off doing so with debts and without any circulating capital. In places where the land was divided up, discontent grew among the peasants who were unable to derive any advantage from their own possession of the land. This situation of discontent explains why in some agrarian provinces the ‘rebels’ found support among the local population.

After two years of right-wing dominated governments, the threat of a thorough-going attack led to the formation of a coalition of Republican and workers’ parties, and ultimately to the electoral victory of 16 February. The mass pressure leading to the release of 30,000 political prisoners even before the amnesty decree was pro­claimed shifted the balance of forces. But the hopes of the masses were dashed. During the five months in which the Popular Front governed the country, there was no real, change in the situation. Meanwhile, the economic situation continued to be extremely serious. Nothing was done to find a lasting solution to the crisis, since the bourgeois character of the new government limited it to taking up a defen­sive position towards the monarchist party. It simply dispatched to Morocco a large number of officers disloyal to the Republican regime. This explains why Morocco was the guiding centre of the military rebellion, capable of mustering within a few days an army of 40,000 fully-equipped troops and completely shielded from any repressive measures. The Foreign Legion, ‘La Bandera’, which formed the basis of this army only had a few foreigners in its midst (10-15%). In the main it was made up of Spaniards -- unemployed, declassed, or criminal elements -- in other words, real mercenaries easily tempted by the mirage of a soldier’s pay.

The murder of the socialist Lieutenant de Castillo, followed the next day by the murder of the monarchist leader, Carlos Sotelo in reprisal (July 9 and 10), caused the Right to decide on action. The insurrec­tion began on 17 July. It did not have the character of a typical military pronun­ciamento, which is based on surprise, speed, and limited goals and objectives; in short, a change of governmental personnel. The length and intensity of the struggle shows that we are dealing with a vast social movement in the process of transforming Spanish society down to its roots. The proof of this lies in the fact that the democratic government, itself altered twice within the space of a few hours, instead of folding up or rushing to make a compromise with the insurgent military leaders, chose to ally itself with the workers’ organizations and to hand out arms to the proletariat.

This event is tremendously important. Al­though the struggle is formally situated within the framework of a conflict between two bourgeois groups, and although its pre­text is the defence of the democratic Republic against the threat of fascist dictatorship, it has today a much wider meaning, a profound importance for the class. It has become the lever, the motor force of a genuine social war.

The authority of the government is in pieces. In a few days the control of military opera­tions had passed into the hands of the ‘workers’ militias; logistical services, the general direction of all matters related to the war effort, circulation, production, distribution, all this has fallen under the control of the workers’ organizations.

The de facto government is the workers’ organizations; the legal government is an empty shell, a facade, a prisoner of the situation.

The burning of all the churches, the confis­cation of goods, the occupation of houses and other properties, the requisitioning of news­papers, summary trials and executions -- even of foreigners -- all these are formidable passionate plebian expressions of this pro­found transformation of class forces which the bourgeois government can no longer prevent. In the meantime the government intervenes not to wipe out these ‘arbitrary’ measures, but simply to legalize them. It takes over banks and factories abandoned by their owners, and nationalize the factories engaged in war production. Social measures have been taken: the forty hour week, 15% increases in wages and a 50% reduction in rents.

On 6 August a ministerial shake-up took place in Catalonia as a result of pressure exerted by the CNT. It appears that Companys, President of the Generalidad, was forced by the workers’ organizations to stay at his post in order to avoid any international complications that cannot but fail to arise in the course of such events.

The bourgeois government remains standing. Without any doubt, once the danger passes, it will make a desperate attempt to regain its lost authority. Then a new stage of struggle will begin for the working class.

***************

It is undeniable that the struggle has been set in motion by the conflict between two bourgeois factions. The working class has ranged itself alongside the one dominated by the ideology of the Popular Front. The democratic government is arming the prole­tariat as a last-ditch defensive measure. But the state of decomposition of the bourgeois economy is making any re-adjust­ment in the situation an impossibility, no matter whether fascism or democracy is victorious. Only the autonomous intervention of the proletariat can solve the political crisis of Spanish society. But the result of that intervention is dependent on the international situation. The Spanish revo­lution is intimately linked to the problem of the world revolution.

The victory of either the one faction or the other cannot resolve the basic problem. It can only be decided by a change in the balance of class forces on an international scale and by the demystification of the masses, hypnotized by the serpent of the Popular Front. However, the victory of the one group rather than the other will have political and psychological repercussions which have to be borne in mind in any analysis of the situation. The victory of the army would not only be a defeat for bourgeois democracy; it would also signal a brutal and merciless defeat for the working class since it has thrown itself wholeheartedly into the fray. The working class would be nailed to the cross of its defeat in an irremedial and total manner, just as it was in Italy and Germany. More­over, the entire international situation would be modeled on the victory of Spanish fascism. A storm of violent repression would descend upon the working class throughout the whole world.

We will not even bother to discuss the conception which holds that the proletariat would be able to develop a firmer class consciousness after the victory of the reactionaries.

A victory for the government, by giving encouragement and consciousness to the proletariat of other countries, would lead to extremely important changes in the international situation. Without doubt these advantages would be partially neu­tralized by the nefarious influence of intensive nationalist, anti-fascist, war­mongering propaganda on the part of the parties of the Popular Front and first and foremost among them the Communist Party.

It is doubtful whether a defeat of the army would inevitably lead to a strengthen­ing of the democratic government. On the other hand, it is certain that the masses, still armed, proud of their painfully-acquired victory and strengthened by the experience of war, would demand their dues from this government. The ideological powder used by the Popular Front to confuse the masses could explode in the hands of the bourgeois state.

Only an extreme distrust in the class in­stincts of the masses could lead one to think that the demobilization of millions of workers who had already gone through a long hard struggle could be carried out without confrontations and upheavals ensuing.

But, even given the validity of the supposi­tion that the victory of the government would be followed by a material and spiritual dis­armament of the proletariat -- without any friction occurring -- this would still not mean that the whole balance of class forces had changed. New and powerful energies could arise out of such a vast social conflagration and the movement towards the formation of the class party would thereby be accelerated.

The class struggle is not made of soft wax that we can mould according to our schemas and our preferences. It evolves in a dialec­tical manner. In politics, prediction can only be an approximation of reality. To close one’s eyes in the face of reality, simply because it does not correspond to the mental schema we have constructed, is to withdraw from the real movement by completely removing oneself from the dynamics of the situation.

The ideological poison of the Popular Front and the lack of a class party are two nega­tive elements of overwhelming importance. But it is precisely because of this that we must place all our efforts on the side of the Spanish workers.

To say to them that this danger exists and then not intervene ourselves to fight this danger is an expression of insensibility and dilettantism.

Our abstentionism over the Spanish question signifies the liquidation of our Fraction, a sort of suicide resulting from an indi­gestion of doctrinaire formulae.

Obsessed with ourselves, like Narcissus, we drown in the waters of abstraction, while the beautiful nymph Echo dies of langour out of love for us.

Tito

(Bilan, no.35, September-October, 1936)

The crisis in the Fraction: Communiqué of the ‘Coordinating Committee’

The minority of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left, after examining the Spanish events and hearing the verbal report of a delegate who was sent to Spain:

-- Denies any solidarity with and responsi­bility for the positions taken by the majority of the Fraction in its press (Bilan, Prometeo, manifestos, etc);

-- Approves the attitude taken by the group of comrades who, against the veto of the Executive Commission, have gone to Spain to defend, arms in hand, the Spanish revolution -- even on the military front;

-- Considers that the conditions for a split already exist, but that the absence of the comrades who have gone to the Front would remove from the present discussion an indis­pensable political and moral element of clarification;

-- Accepts the proposal to wait for the next Congress to come to a definitive solution to our disagreements;

-- Remains, therefore, from the organizational point of view -- if no longer from the ideological point of view -- in the ranks of the Fraction on the condition that the thought of the minority will be guaranteed free expression both in the Fraction’s press and its public meetings.

Decides:

-- To send one of its delegates to Spain immediately to be followed, if necessary, by a group of comrades in order to embark upon an effective activity within and in agreement with the spirit of the vanguard of the Spanish proletariat wherever it is to be found so as to accelerate the politi­cal evolution of the proletariat in struggle until it has completely emancipated itself from all capitalist influences and from any illusion in class collaboration. This poli­tical work will be done, when it becomes possible, in association with the comrades who are now at the Front;

-- To nominate a Coordinating Committee which will take charge of relations between the comrades, the Barcelona Federation (recognition of which we demand immediately) and the comrades of other countries, in order to define the relations which the minority will have with the Executive Commission;

-- To authorize the comrades of the minority to fight against the positions of the majority and to refrain from distributing the press and other documents based on the official positions of the Fraction;

-- To demand that this resolution is pub­lished in the next issue of Prometeo and Bilan;

-- Concludes by sending a fraternal greeting to the Spanish proletariat which is defending the world revolution within its workers’ militias.

The Minority of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left

(Bilan, no.35, September-October, 1936)

The crisis in the Fraction: Communiqué of the Executive Commission

The Executive Commission remains firmly bound to the principle that a split within the fundamental organ of the proletariat disturbs and arrests the delicate living process of that organ when such a split is not the result of programmatic differences which express or tend to express the his­toric demands, not of a tendency, but of the class as a whole.

The Executive Commission is of the opinion that the minority is basing itself on different criteria and is threatening to split not only before the Congress, but even before the discussion has begun; and this on the controversial issue of the recognition or non-recognition of the Barcelona group. Despite the minority’s injunction, the Executive Commission reaffirms the necessity of resolving the crisis within the Fraction at the Congress.

The Executive Commission has ratified the position taken by one of its representatives who was charged with taking down all the decisions of the Coordinating Committee. But the Committee restricted itself to demanding the recognition of the Barcelona group which was therefore not a decision but a request to the Executive Commission, which remained free to make its own decision. It is thus inaccurate to talk about any undertakings not having been met.

The Executive Commission based its decision on an elementary criterion and a principle the organization was founded upon when it decided not to recognize the Barcelona group. This decision was taken on the basis of considerations which were not even dis­cussed by the Coordinating Committee and which were published in our previous communiqué. It was decided that no member of the minority was to be expelled and thus the decision of the Coordinating Committee in considering the whole minority expelled if the Barcelona group was not recognized, is quite incomprehensible.

The Executive Commission, faced with today’s situation wherein there are no perfectly defined norms to regulate the life of an organization that is going through a period of crisis, although convinced that its pre­vious decision was correct, has decided, in order to guide the whole Fraction towards a programmatic discussion and faced with the ultimatum of the Coordinating Committee, to redress its former decision and recognize the Barcelona group.

The Executive Commission has also raised certain political considerations concerning the impossibility of recruiting new militants in a period of crisis which must -- in the shared opinion of both tendencies -- lead to a split, since the new elements who came into the organization on the basis of disputed programmatic principles would find it quite impossible to resolve the fundamental issue. This fundamental issue revolves around the problem of the programme. It can only be resolved by those who were part of the organ­ization before the crisis broke out and who joined on the basis of the programmatic documents of the Fraction.

The Coordinating Committee is pursuing a path which can offer nothing positive to the proletarian cause, while at the same time claiming that the Executive Commission has been led to act as it has done out of fear of becoming a minority within the organiza­tion. The Coordinating Committee knows just as well as the Executive Commission that even if the absurd idea of counting the votes of the workers who joined the Fraction in Barcelona were taken up, the present balance of forces would not be over­turned.

The Executive Commission urges all the com­rades to recognize the gravity of the situa­tion and to restrain from any impulsive reactions, in order chat a discussion may be initiated whose aim will not be a victory for one tendency or the other but will allow the Fraction to be able to live up to the cause of the revolutionary proletariat by ridding itself of any ideology which, during the course of the Spanish events, will have shown itself to be injurious to the needs of the proletarian class struggle.

Documents of the minority Communiqué of the minority

The Coordinating Committee, in the name of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left:

Is of the opinion that the Executive Commission has not kept the promise given by its representative to the Coordinating Committee, that it would accept the resolution presented by the minority in which, among other things, the recognition of the Barcelona group was demanded;

In view of the communiqué of the Executive Commission which appeared in Prometeo where it declared that it did not want to recog­nize the Barcelona group, using as a pretext the claim that the basis for the constitu­tion of this group was participation in the military struggle;

Considering that the basis for the constitu­tion of this group is the same as for the whole of the minority;

Has decided that, if the Executive Commission persists in this position, the minority can only consider this position as signifying the expulsion of the whole minority of the Fraction.

For the minority,

The Coordinating Committee

Postscript: Since the decision of the Execu­tive Commission dated 23 October, not to recognize the Barcelona group is based on the fact that the minority could become the majority, the Coordinating Committee dec­lares that it is prepared not to count the votes of the new members in Barcelona and that the Executive Commission can consider as valid only the votes of the comrades who were part of the organization before going to Spain. For its part the minority considers the new recruits as members of the Fraction.

24 October 1936

Motion (address) adopted at the meeting of the Barcelona group of the Italian Fraction of the 'Communist Left (taken before their departure to the Front).

Barcelona, 23 August 1936

The comrades of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left have entered the ranks of the workers' militias in order to support the Spanish proletariat in its great struggle against the bourgeoisie. We are at the side of the workers ready to make any sacrifice for the victory of the revolution.

During the long years of militant activity, of struggle and exile, we have had a dual experiences that of fascist reaction which has hurled the Italian proletariat into a desperate situation, and the degeneration of the Communist Party which has ideologically crucified the masses. However, the problem of the revolution can find no solution if the masses do not disengage themselves from the influence of the IInd and IIIrd Internationals and reconstruct a genuine class party capable of guiding it to victory.

We hope that the dynamic development of the present events can create in Spain and elsewhere the party of the revolution. The present vanguard in the POUM has in front of it a great task and a profound responsibility.

We are going off to the battle front within the International Column of the POUM’s militias, inspired by a political ideal which is held by all those heroic and magnificent Spanish workers: the ideal of fighting to the end, not to save the debris of the bourgeoisie, but to uproot and hurl down all forms of bourgeois power and to assist in the victory of the proletarian revolution. So that the efforts of all of us will not be in vain, the revolutionary vanguard of the POUM must succeed in con­quering its last hesitations and resolutely place itself on the path leading to the Spanish October. Today it must choose between giving either direct or involuntary support to the bourgeoisie, and allying itself with the revolutionary workers of the whole world.

The destiny of the workers of the world depends on the character of political activity undertaken in the present social conflagration in Spain.

Long live the workers’ militia!

Long live the revolution!

(Blonde’s motion and the most recent resolution of the minority will appear in the next issue -- The Editors.)

(Bilan, no. 36, October-November, 1936)

Resolution voted by the Executive Commission (29 November 1936) on the relationship between the Fraction and the members of the organization who accept the positions contained in the letter of the Coordinating Committee

25 December 1936

Throughout the development of the crisis within the Fraction, the Executive Commis­sion has been guided by a dual principle: to avoid disciplinary measures so that the comrades of the minority could co-ordinate their activities in order to form a current within the organization whose aim would be to show that the other current had broken with the fundamental principles of the organization while it alone remained the real and faithful defender of these princi­ples. This polemical confrontation could only take place at the Congress.

Following the meeting of the Parisian Federation of 27 September, at which the Coordinating Committee was born, the Executive Commission urged the Fraction to put up with a situation in which the minority enjoyed a privileged position. It was not participating in the financial effort necessary to keep our press alive, while at the same time it could write for that press. The Executive Commission did this solely to prevent a split taking place over a question of procedure.

Immediately after this came the threat of a split if the Executive Commission did not recognize the Barcelona group. The Executive Commission while still basing itself on the same principle -- that splits must take place over questions of principle and not over questions particular to a tendency and still less over organizational questions -- then decided to recognize the Barcelona group.

Finally, when the Executive Commission was forced to assert that the minority’s refusal to exchange with the other current documents relating to its political life would split the organization (but despite this the Executive Commission still defended the necessity for the Congress); the minority, through a ‘verbal’ communication of comrade Candiani, informed us that it would immediately break with the organization. The last appeal of the Executive Commission (25 November) received a response which must undermine any possibility of the minority attending the Congress.

In these circumstances, the Executive Commission is of the opinion that the evolution of the minority is clear proof that it can no longer be considered as a tendency of the organization but as a reflection of the manoeuvres of the Popular Front within the Fraction. Consequently there can be no problem of a political split in the organization.

Considering, moreover, that the minority is flirting with obvious counter-revolu­tionary enemies of the Fraction (in the shape of Ginestizia e Liberta, debris of maximalist Trotskyism while at the same time declaring any discussion with the Fraction to be useless, the Executive Commission has decided to expel for political unworthiness all the comrades who are in solidarity with the Coordinating Committee’s letter of 25 November 1936, and it will allow fifteen days for the comrades of the minority to come to a collective decision. These comrades are invited to give their individual responses by 13 December. An exception will be made for the comrades who are living in Barcelona; we will wait for their return so that they can be put fully in the picture. These reserva­tions do not concern comrade Candiani who, before going back, had every opportunity of finding out about the situation.

Documents of the minority (cont’d)

(After their return from the Front and after they had been in contact with the official delegate of the Fraction)

Spain today is the key to the whole inter­national situation. The situation in Europe depends on the victory of one side or the other. A victory for Franco would mean the strengthening of the military bloc between Italy and Germany. A victory for the Popular Front would mean the strengthening of the anti-fascist military bloc (both outcomes leading towards an imperialist war); while victory for the proletariat would be the point of departure for a world-wide reawakening of the proletarian revolution.

In Spain we are confronted with an objectively revolutionary situation.

The February elections which ended in a victory for the Popular Front acted as a cushion, a safety valve, functioning to prevent the violent explosion of class antagonisms. The big strikes and demonstra­tions following the elections prove this.

The revolutionary menace of the proletariat forced the bourgeoisie to steal a march on events. This enabled us to conclude that the struggle was not between two factions of the bourgeoisie, but between the bourg­eoisie and the proletariat; and that the proletariat was taking up arms to defend its living conditions and its organizations from attack by the reactionaries. For the same reasons that the Russian proletariat took up arms against Kornilov, the Spanish workers took up arms against Franco. It is not a question of democracy versus fascism, but of capitalism versus the proletariat. And if the bourgeoisie is still more or less in power, if the relations of produc­tion have not undergone a profound trans­formation, the cause must be sought in the fact that the proletariat is not ideologi­cally armed. It does not possess a class party.

The existence of a class party would have settled the issue in the proletariat’s favour from the first days of the struggle. The Spanish Revolution has not yet entered into decline and the possibility of a victory for the proletariat cannot be categorically excluded.

Against capitalism fighting on two fronts, the proletariat must also fight on two fronts: both the social and the military. On the military front the proletariat is fighting to defend what it has conquered after decades of struggle; on the social front, the proletariat must accelerate the decomposition of the capitalist state, forge its own class party and the organs of proletarian government that will allow it to mount an attack on the capitalist power. On the military front the proletariat is today moving towards the creation of a future red army. Within the zones the mili­tias have occupied, in one after another, we have seen the immediate foundation of peasant committees and the collectivization of the land happening under the very noses of the Madrid and Barcelona governments.

The group set up in Spain considers that it has not broken with the principles of the Fraction and for this reason it should not go unrecognized. We have been asked to break off all contact with the POUM: such contact never existed. To dissolve the Column is not in our power because it was not us who set it up. As for dispersing ourselves among the proletariat in its place of work, this will be done as far as possible.

(This document should be considered as a response to the Executive Commission resolu­tion of 27 August 1936 and must have been written at the end of September.)

Declaration

A group of comrades in the minority of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left, disapproving of the official attitude taken by the Fraction towards the Spanish Revolution, has broken abruptly all disci­plinary and formalistic links with that organization and has put itself at the service of the Revolution, up to and including participating in the workers’ militias and going off to the Front.

Today a new situation is emerging full of unknown perils for the working class. The dissolution of the Central Committee of the Anti-fascist Militias, an organ arising out of the revolution and guaranteeing the class nature of the militias, and their re-organization into a regular army depen­dent on the Council of Defence, violates the principle of a voluntary workers’ militia.

The necessities imposed by the historic moment in which we are living demand an extreme vigilance on the part of the van­guard of the proletariat. This vigilance is crucial in order to prevent the new military structure in which the masses are now being organized from becoming an instrument of the bourgeoisie which in the future could be used against the interests of the working class. The work of vigilance will be all the more effective if the class organizations become conscious of their interests and engage in a wholly proletarian course of political action.

Political work in these organizations assumes a primordial importance and is no less crucial than the military tasks at the Front.

These same comrades, while holding firmly to the principle of the necessity for armed struggle at the Front, have not agreed to be part of a regular army which is not an expression of proletarian power and within which it would be impossible to carry out direct political activity. On the other hand they can make a more effective contri button to the cause of the Spanish prole­tariat today through political and social activity, which is indispensable for preserving and strengthening the revolu­tionary ideology of the workers’ organiza­tions. These organizations must re-approp­riate on the political and social terrain the influence which in the new conditions, has been weakened at the level of military leadership.

These same comrades, while abandoning their posts as militiamen in the Lenin Inter­national Column, are still mobilized in the services of the revolutionary prole­tariat of Spain, and have decided to continue to dedicate their activity and their experience on another terrain, until the definitive victory of the proletariat over all forms of capitalist rule.

Barcelona, October 22 1936

(Bilan, no.37, November-December 1936)

Bullets, machine guns, prisons: this is the reply of the Popular Front to the workers of Barcelona who dared to resist the capitalist offensive

Workers!

July 19th 1936 -- the workers of Barcelona, barehanded, crushed the attack of Franco’s battalions which were fully armed to the teeth.

May 4th 1937 -- the same workers, now equipped with arms, left many more dead on the streets than in July when they had to fight back against Franco. This time it is the anti-fascist government -- including the anarchists and receiving the indirect solidarity of the POUM -- which unleashes the scum of the forces of repression against the workers.

On 19 July the workers of Barcelona were an invincible force. Their class struggle, free from any ties with the bourgeois state, echoed inside Franco’s regiments and caused them to decompose by awakening the soldiers’ class instincts. It was the strike that snatched the rifles and cannons from Franco and shattered his offensive.

History only records a few brief moments during which the proletariat can become completely autonomous from the capitalist state. A few days after 19 July, the Catalan proletariat reached the cross-roads. Either it would enter into a higher stage of struggle and destroy the bourgeois state, or capitalism would reforge the links in its chain of power. At this stage in the struggle, when class instinct is not enough and consciousness becomes the decisive factor, the proletariat can only win through if it has at its disposal theoretical capital accumulated patiently by its left fractions, transformed by the explosion of events into parties. If the Spanish proletariat today is living through such a stark tragedy, this is the result of its lack of maturity in being unable to forge its class party: the brain which, alone, can give life to the class.

From 19 July in Catalonia the workers created, spontaneously and on their own class terrain, the autonomous organs of their struggle. But immediately the anguishing dilemma arose: either fight to the end the political battle for the total destruction of the capitalist state and thus bring to perfection the economic and military successes, or leave the enemy’s machinery of oppression standing and thereby allow it to deform and liquidate the workers’ other conquests.

Classes struggle with the means imposed on them by the situation and by the level of social tension. Confronted with class con­flagration, capitalism cannot even dream of resorting to the classical methods of legality. What threatens capitalism is the independence of the proletarian struggle, since that provides the condition for the class to go on to the revolutionary stage of posing the question of destroying bourg­eois power. Capitalism must therefore renew the bonds of its control over the exploited masses. These bonds, previously represented by the magistrates, the police, and prisons, have in the extreme conditions which reign in Barcelona taken the form of the Committee of Militias, the socialized industries, the workers’ unions managing the key sectors of the economy, the vigi­lante patrols, etc.

And so in Spain today, history once again poses the problem resolved in Italy and Germany by the crushing of the proletariat: the workers manage to keep their own class weapons that they have themselves created in the heat of struggle, only as long as they use them against the bourgeois state. The workers arm their future executioners if, lacking the strength to smash their class enemy, they allow themselves to be caught in the net of the bourgeoisie’s apparatus of power.

The workers’ militia of 19 July was an organ of the proletariat. The ‘proletarian militia’ of the following week was a capitalist organ adapted to the needs of the moment. And in the implementation of its counter­revolutionary strategy, the bourgeoisie was able to call upon the centrists (the Stalinists), the CNT, the FAI, and the POUM to convince the workers that the state changes its nature when it’s managing personnel changes colour. Disguising itself behind a red flag, capitalism patiently set about sharpening the sword of its repression which by May 4 was made ready for use by the forces who had since 19 July broken the class backbone of the Spanish proletariat.

The son of Noske and the Weimar Constitution was Hitler; the son of Giolitti and ‘workers’ control’ was Mussolini; the son of the Spanish anti-fascist Front, the ‘socializa­tions’, and the ‘proletarian’ militias was the carnage in Barcelona on 4 May 1937.

And only the Russian proletariat responded to the fall of Czarism with October 1917 because it alone had managed to build its class party through the work of the left fractions.

Workers!

Franco was able to prepare his attack under the wing of the Popular Front government. In a spirit of conciliation Barrio tried to form on 19 July a united government capable of carrying out the programme of Spanish capitalism as a whole, either under the leadership of Franco, or under the mixed leadership of a fraternally united left and right. But the workers’ revolts in Barcelona, Madrid, and the Asturias forced capitalism to divide its government in half, to share out the tasks between its Repub­lican and military agents, who were joined together by an indivisible class solidarity.

Where Franco was unable to achieve an imme­diate victory, capitalism called the workers into its services in order to ‘fight fascism’. This was a bloody trap in which thousands of workers died, believing that under the leadership of the Republican government they could crush the legitimate heir of capitalism - fascism. And so they went off to the passes of Aragon, to the mountains of Guadarrama, to the Asturias, to fight for the victory of the anti-fascist war.

Once again, as in 1914, history has underlined in blood, over the mass graves of the workers, the irreconcilable opposition existing between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

Are the military fronts a necessity imposed by the current situation? No! They are a necessity for capitalism if it is to contain and crush the workers! May 4 1937 is stark proof of the fact that after July 19 1936 the proletariat had to fight Companys and Giral just as much as Franco. The military fronts can only dig a grave for the workers because they represent the fronts of capi­talism’s war against the proletariat. The only answer the Spanish workers can give to this war is the one given by their Russian brothers in 1917: revolutionary defeatism in both camps of the bourgeoisie, the Republican as well as the ‘fascist’; the transformation of the capitalist war into a civil war for the total destruction of the bourgeois state.

The Italian Left Fraction has solely been supported in its tragic isolation by the solidarity of a current of the International Communist League in Belgium, which has just founded the Belgian Fraction of the International Communist Left. These two currents alone have rung the alarm bells while everyone else has been proclaiming the necessity to safeguard the conquests of the revolution, to smash Franco so as to be able to smash Caballero thereafter.

The recent events in Barcelona are a gloomy confirmation of our initial thesis. They showed how the Popular Front, flanked by the anarchists and the POUM, turned on the insurgent workers on the 4th of May with a cruelty equal to that of Franco.

The vicissitudes of the military battles were so many occasions for the Republican government to regain its grip over the masses. In the absence of a proletarian policy of revolutionary defeatism, both the military successes and failures of the Republican army were simply steps in the bloody defeat of the working class. At Badajoz, Irun, and San Sebastian, the Popular Front contributed to the deliberate massacre of the proletariat while strengthening the bonds of the Union Sacree, since in order to win the anti-fascist war, there had to be a disciplined and centralized army. The resistance in Madrid, on the other hand, facilitated the offensive of the Popular Front which could now rid itself of its former lackey, the POUM, and prepare the attack of 4 May. The fall of Malaga reforged the bloody chains of the Union Sacree, while the military victory at Guadalajara opened the period which culminated in the massacre in Barcelona. The attack of 4 May thus germinated and blossomed in an atmosphere of war fever.

Parallel to this, all over the world, Spanish capital’s war of extermination gave life to the forces of international bourgeois repression: the fascist and ‘anti-fascist’ deaths in Spain were accom­panied by the murders in Moscow and the machine-gunnings in Clichy. And it was on the bloody altar of anti-fascism that the traitors mobilized the workers of Brussels around the democratic wing of Belgian capitalism in the elections of April 11 1937. ‘Arms for Spain’: this was the great slogan drummed into the ears of the workers. And these arms have been used to shoot their brothers in Barcelona. Soviet Russia, by co-operating in the arming of the anti­fascist war, has also demonstrated itself to be part of the capitalist system in this carnage. On the order of Stalin -- who exposed his anti-communist violence on 3 March 1937 -- the PSUC of Catalonia took the initiative in the massacre.

Once again, as in 1914, the workers are using their arms to kill each other instead of using them to destroy the regime of capitalist oppression.

Workers!

On May 4 1937 the workers of Barcelona returned to the path they had taken up on 19 July. The path capitalism had been able to divert them from with the help of all the forces composing the Popular Front. By launching the general strike, even within the sectors presented as conquest of the revolution, they formed a class front against the Republican-Fascist bloc of capital. And the Republican government responded with the same savagery that Franco displayed at Badajoz and Irun. If the Salamanca government did not take advantage of this conflagration behind the Aragon Front to go onto the offensive, it was merely because it knew that its accomplices on the left would admirably carry out their role as executioners of the proletariat.

Exhausted by ten months of war, by class collaboration by the CNT, by the FAI, and by the POUM, the Catalan proletariat just suffered a terrible defeat. But this defeat is also a step towards the victory of tomorrow, a moment in the emancipation of the proletariat, because it signifies the death of all those ideologies which enabled capitalism to maintain its rule in spite of the gigantic shock of 19 July.

No, the proletarians who fell on 4 May cannot be laid claim to by any of the political currents who on 19 July led them off their own class terrain into the jaws of anti-fascism. The fallen workers belong to the proletariat and to the proletariat alone. They represent the raw stuff of the brain of the world working class: the class party of the communist revolution.

The workers of the whole world bow before all the dead and lay claim to their corpses against all the traitors: the traitors of yesterday and of today. The proletariat of the whole world salutes Berneri as one of its own, and his martyrdom for the ideal of anarchism is yet another protest against a political school which has met its downfall during these events in Spain. It was under the direction of a government in which the anarchists participated that the police have done to the body of Berneri what Mussolini did to the body of Matteotti!

Workers!

The carnage of Barcelona is the harbinger of even more bloody repression against the workers of Spain and the rest of the world. But it is even more a fore-runner of the social tempests which, tomorrow, will sweep across the capitalist world.

In a mere ten months capitalism has had to use up all the political resources it had been hoping to use in order to demolish the proletariat, in order to prevent the class from completing the task of forming the party, the weapon of its emancipation, and creating the communist society. Centrism and anarchism, by rejoining the ranks of Social Democracy, have reached in Spain the end of their evolution, as was the case in 1914 when the war reduced the IInd International to a corpse. In Spain capitalism has un­leashed a battle of international importance: the battle between fascism and anti-fascism. In the extreme form of armed confrontation, it demonstrates the acute tension between the classes on the international arena.

The deaths in Barcelona have cleared the ground for the construction of the party of the working class. All those political forces who called upon the workers to fight for the revolution while mobilizing them into a capitalist war have passed to the other side of the barricade. Before the workers of the whole world a bright horizon is opening up: a horizon in which the workers of Barcelona have emblazoned with their own blood the class lessons already sketched in the blood of the dead of 1914-18. The workers’ struggle is a proletarian struggle only if it is directed against capitalism and its state: it serves the interests of the enemy if it is not directed against both, at every instant, in every sphere, in all the proletarian organizations the situation engenders.

The world proletariat must fight against capitalism even when the latter begins to repress its erstwhile lackeys. It is the working class, not its class enemies, which has the responsibility of settling its debts with those forces which were once part of its own development as a class, which were a moment in its struggle for emancipation from capitalist slavery.

The international battle which Spanish capi­talism has launched against the proletariat has opened up a new chapter in the life of the fractions in different countries. The world proletariat, which must continue to fight against the ‘builders’ of artificial Internationals, knows that it can only build the proletarian International in a situation where a profound transformation of class forces on a world scale has opened up the way to the communist revolution. In the face of the war in Spain, itself a sign of the development of revolutionary ferment in other countries, the world proletariat feels that the time has come to forge the first international links between the fractions of the communist left.

Workers of the world!

Your class is invincible; it is the motor force of historical evolution. The events in Spain are proof of this, because it is your class alone which is the stake in the battle shaking the whole world!

This defeat must not discourage you; you must draw from this defeat the lessons for tomorrow’s victory!

On your own class basis, reforge your class unity, beyond all frontiers, against all the mystifications of the capitalist enemy!

In Spain, against any attempt at a compromise aimed at the establishment of peace based on capitalist exploitation, fight back with fraternization between the exploited of both armies and a simultaneous struggle against capitalism!

On your feet for the revolutionary struggle in all countries!

Long live the workers of Barcelona who have turned a new and bloody page in the history of the world revolution!

Forward to the construction of an Inter­national Bureau to accelerate the formation of left fractions in every country!

Let us raise the standard of the communist revolution which the fascist and anti-fascist murderers are preventing the defeated workers from passing on to their class heirs.

Let us be worthy of our brothers who have fallen!

Long live the world communist revolution!

The Belgian and Italian Fractions of the International Communist Left

(Bilan, no.41, June 1937

1 One can measure the enormous distance separating the Bordigist Party (Programa Communiste) from the Italian Fraction by noting the fundamental difference contained in the notion of the historic era which was at the centre of all the analyses made by the Fraction, and the idea of geographic areas (‘progressive’ and ‘non-progressive’) which is the theoretical foundation stone forty years later of the Bordigist Party. It is therefore possible to understand quite easily why this Party cannot claim any continuity with the work of the Fraction nor with Bilan. Not only has this Party situated itself outside the framework of positions defended by Bilan; it is also operates outside the fundamental positions of the IIIrd International and even outside the framework around which it was constituted.

2 Today we can see a specimen of the ‘anti-wait-and-seeism’ school in group like Pour Une Intervention Communiste. The PIC is forever throwing itself into ‘actions’, ‘campaigns’, and participation in ephemeral committees including all kinds of different people in an effort to prove itself much more influenced by pure excitement than by a desire for considered activity. It is true, however, that in contrast to the PIC whose intervention is above all verbal, the members of the minority of the Italian Fraction took their lack of reflection to its final conclusion and joined the militias and fought at the front.

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1936 - Spain [35]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Left [4]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Italian Left [37]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Party and Fraction [50]

The Frazione Comunista di Napoli: A Political Balance Sheet

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Introduction

We are publishing here the final text writ­ten by the Frazione Comunista di Napoli (the. Communist Fraction of Naples). The Frazione began as a discussion circle in 1975, basing its work on reading texts pro­duced by the ICC and other political tenden­cies. Most of its members came from the milieu of ‘contestation’ politics and were trying to break with extra-parliamentary leftism in order to move towards revolutio­nary positions. The evolution of their pol­itical discussions reached a point where, on the one hand the members of the original nucleus joined the ICC, while on the other hand the Frazione circle itself dissolved as such. In this document the former members of the Frazione have attempted to make their experience conscious and explicit, by drawing up the lessons of the evolution of their circle so as to assist others who are or will be in the same situation to understand their own political evolution.

Their document shows the inevitable and positive aspect represented in the appearance of ‘political discussion circles’ today. The resurgence of class struggle at the end of the 1960s found the revolutionary move­ment dispersed and cut off from any organic link with past revolutionary organizations. The need to create ‘circles’ in order to contribute to political clarification is a result of the difficulties of orientating oneself after so many years of counter-revo­lution. However, the document also shows the ambiguities and difficulties which can be encountered by such circles during the course of their political development. Using the particular experience of the circle in Naples as our example, we will attempt to draw out the general lessons of how this process of gaining consciousness proceeds.

One of the main dangers of any ‘discussion circle’ is that its members take it to be what it can’t be: an actual political group. A ‘discussion circle’ expresses one moment in the process of political clarification. It represents a relatively open framework in which discussion and political research can be carried on through the confrontation of ideas. This is very different from a political group based on a coherent platform that finds its concrete expression in an international organization seeking to inter­vene in the class struggle on a world scale. The process should not be confused with its final goal, either by freezing a moment in the evolution of such circles by producing incomplete and incoherent ‘semi-platforms’, or by setting up a local, isolated ‘organi­zation’, or by attempting to intervene as a political body in the class struggle without any clear political framework for doing so. The Frazione Comunista came up against these difficulties when it tried to adopt a partial platform, and also when it tried to face up to the political responsibility implied in producing publications. The former Frazione comrades themselves point out in their text that the idea of writing a ‘mini-platform’ for the Frazione actually expressed their desire to preserve the ‘autonomy’ of the Naples circle, to ‘resist’ pressures exerted by other political groups, notably the ICC - even though this desire wasn’t entirely conscious at the time. Despite these diffi­culties, the Frazione was able to go beyond its weaknesses thanks to its profound convic­tion in the international nature of the class struggle. This conviction made it keep in contact with the ICC.

Another danger such circles are prone to in the course of their evolution is that of not being aware of their inevitable heterogene­ous nature. The members of a circle may not only develop in different directions, but even their evolution towards the same goal may take place at a varying rhythm. It is extremely important that those members of the circle who achieve a relatively coherent vision learn how to galvanize the work of the whole circle without hindering their own development under the pretext of artifici­ally preserving the circle as a united body. Those who become conscious more quickly al­ways have the greatest responsibility; this applies to every level of political life. Thus although we cannot put forward any neat solutions or recipes, we can assert that a circle must remain open to influences out­side itself and the dynamic in its own internal evolution.

After a period of several months of politi­cal maturation, the founding members of the Frazione became aware that a discussion circle has no meaning in itself unless it leads to commitment to militant activity within the class. Since they agreed with the platform of the ICC, they integrated themselves into the work of the Current through its section in Italy. But as soon as they recognized the necessity for a pole of organizational regroupment, these comrades understood that their circle should not transform itself into an obstacle to understanding by maintaining itself as a sort of political ‘ante-chamber’. For this reason, affirming that its work had come to an end, they dissolved the Frazione.

In general, discussion or study circles can’t be seen as ends in themselves; one does not search out ‘ideas’ for their own sake, but as the expression of a social activity. These circles are part of a whole social process within the working class by which the class tends to secrete a political organization. In this sense, the appearance of these circles all over the world today is proof that we are entering into a new period of class struggle. After the organi­zational break in the workers’ movement, we are seeing the rebirth of small nuclei moving towards revolutionary positions. In order that this enormous effort - unfortun­ately so fragmented - may lead somewhere, it is especially important to recognize that the evolution of these circles can’t remain stationary. Either they integrate themselves into a coherent international political cur­rent, or they will end up as obstacles to the development of consciousness. If these circles preserve themselves as local and politically limited formations, all that will be left will be the scattered dust of small, half-baked groups, each one isolated from the other, and all sowing confusion both about the need for overall political coherence and for the organizational regroupment of revolutionaries on an internatio­nal scale. Most often such aborted group­ings end up breaking themselves to bits and the founding members of the group disappear, victims of the most abject demoralization. In sum, discussion circles while constitu­ting a positive step forward, must be trans­cended.

If we make so much of the experience of the Frazione in Naples, it’s precisely because its experience is not a ‘Neapolitan’ affair. Its experience contains the same richness and the same problems as that of many other circles in Spain - one of which has joined Accion Proletaria - Seattle, Toronto, Sweden, Denmark, France, and Bom­bay. Certain of the experiences of the above circles have led to some sort of poli­tical clarification, but with others self-dispersal and demoralization provide the only balance-sheet the working class can draw up from them. And if we are able to cite certain examples, we know perfectly well that there are dozens more we don’t know about because of their isolation. If the ICC insists so much on the necessity for the regroupment of revolutionary forces, it’s not, as some claim, out of any “desire for hegemony, exerted openly or underhandedly over other groups” (Jeune Taupe! no.10, paper of Pour Une Intervention Conununiste).

Such claims simply prove that when a problem is not understood, it is often reduced to the level of psychological explanations con­cerning some kind of ‘will to power’. Such explanations only serve to mask the real problem, the resistance put up by small groups in an attempt to preserve their own autonomy. The ICC intervenes as actively as possible in the development of all poli­tical life and particularly in the evolution of political nuclei. In the case of the Frazione, the intervention of the ICC was a decisive factor in the process of clarifi­cation within the Frazione, precisely because we tried to generalize its experiences and always put forward the overall goals of the discussion.

The fundamental aim of the ICC’s interven­tion in such circles is to help break down the walls of isolation and political confu­sion. When some elements get lost along the way owing to confusion and the constant pol­itical pressure of the enemy class, the whole movement suffers from that loss. The former Frazione comrades who have written this text have done so in the spirit which animates the whole ICC: that of carrying out the task of political clarification with­in the class and so working towards the constitution of a coherent pole of revolutionary regroupment.

J.A.

A political balance-sheet

“In any case it can only function as a provisional organization. And an aware­ness of this provisional character is a precondition for a positive final result. A discussion circle which pretends to be a full political organization is neither a good political organization nor a good discussion circle.” (Letter from the ICC to the Naples comrades, 3 December 1975)

If we look back over the history of its political evolution, we can see that the group which originated the Frazione began to discuss during the spring and summer of 1975 on the basis of reading texts of the ICC. For a whole period the Frazione developed more and more into a centre for political debate, above all in the autumn of 1975. The publication of the document on Portugal1 marked a radical turning point: in order to sign the text the group gave itself a name (Frazione Comunista di Napoli) and the introduction to it which the Frazione wrote, was that of a political group. The first consequence of this was that the num­ber of comrades already in the Frazione was doubled by the arrival of new elements who were in actual practice joining a political group in formation in the same way as they would have joined any extra-parliamentary group.

Later on, we often said that writing this introduction was too big a step forward for the group; but in fact it was the publica­tion of the document itself which was too big a step. A discussion circle is, by its very nature, transitory and informal; it can’t have any outside intervention (publi­cations, etc) with all that intervention implies: organizational and political crystallization, etc. What happened was that political positions were taken up - without being fully understood - because it was felt that “the document can’t come out just as it is”. The result of all this was that the immediate necessity to situate ourselves vis-a-vis the outside world got in the way of our internal debate, and thus of our event­ual conscious self-definition.

The Frazione’s agreement with the ICC’s letter was in fact only a formal agreement, because while defining itself as a discus­sion group, the original group was already no longer a discussion group and was half­way towards being a political group. This was expressed in the production of the platform of the Frazione Comunista, which gave concrete expression to the level rea­ched by the comrades and defined the pro­grammatic basis for joining the group. This was certainly an anomalous situation for a discussion group to be in. It was not by chance that it was realized later on that the platform had only been fully understood by the original members of the group. It was also significant that the platform was proposed and written by comrades (now mem­bers of the ICC) who were afraid of the ICC using the Frazione. By adopting their own platform they were instinctively tending to­wards defending their own little group against ‘external invasion’, which is a typ­ical problem with such groups and which invariably leads to degeneration in the end.

The whole existence of the Frazione was im­pregnated with this basic ambiguity, which threatened to jeopardize the enormous amount of work that had already been achieved. The subsequent abandonment of all external acti­vities including producing publications (af­ter ‘I sindicati contro la classe operaia’ the Frazione didn’t publish anything else) was an indication of the Frazione’s growing understanding of the danger of becoming fix­ated in a bastardized, semi-political form. This helped to clarify the ambiguous situa­tion of the comrades who had formed the ori­ginal nucleus and who had inspired the poli­tical positions of the platform; these com­rades recognized that they stood outside this intermediate situation and saw the ICC as the political organization they wanted to discuss with. The speed with which this discussion led to their integration into the Current was the proof that this step had been necessary for a long time.

We must be clear about this: the discussion group in Naples was dead the moment it adopted a platform, which signified its transformation into a semi-political, group. Although we now understand the need to de­nounce the Frazione as a bastard organiza­tion doomed to political degeneration, this was no less true and inevitable five months ago.

Any organization which defines itself orga­nizationally without basing itself on a coherent political programme and taking up its own militant responsibilities towards the class can only transform itself into an obstacle to the regroupment of revolutiona­ries, into a kind of purgatory or swamp in­habited by semi-militants trapped in a per­petual state of semi-confusion.

This is especially true today when the pro­letariat is returning to the stage of history after a period of counter-revolution so deep that it almost wiped out all trace of the revolutionary wave of the early twenties from the consciousness of the wor­king class. The small communist fractions which survived the defeat and preserved the lessons of the struggle could not avoid succumbing one by one to the triumphant counter-revolution. It is therefore with­out their direct support that the proleta­rian giant must get off its knees and re­discover its historical mission. Moreover, with the end of the period of reformism and the entry of capitalism into its decadent phase, all the old instruments of the class have been transformed into so many obstacles to the development of consciousness. The trade unions, labour laws, ‘Houses of the People’: this whole reformist apparatus which once hundreds of socialist workers converged upon after a day’s work to gain information, discuss the events of the day, prepare their struggles - these former cen­tres of working class life - are now active instruments of the bourgeoisie.

Those workers who are now rediscovering the path of class struggle without the tradi­tional apparatus of support feel the need to come together to discuss and reflect all the more because it is so difficult for them to do so. This is why after every wave of struggle we see the creation of dozens of small workers’ groups, generally formed around anti-trade union positions. It is certainly not by chance or because of any academic spirit that many of the workers’ collectives formed during the ‘hot autumn’ in the Italian factories called themselves ‘study groups’. This was an expression of the overriding need for reflection, for the working class to rediscover its own history and its own future.

But the gulf of fifty years which is the reason for the proliferation of these groups is also the reason for their intrin­sic weakness. The disappearance of the com­munist fractions, which had left the degen­erating International, has meant that these workers have been deprived of the natural framework for their research. They find themselves practically alone in the face of demoralization, reflux, and the weight of loca­list tendencies and of the left-wing of the unions.

This is why we must insist that none of these groupings can resist for very long the weight of the dominant ideology, as long as they are unable to break completely with the narrow horizon of a single factory and to orientate their activity towards the clarification of basic political questions and their own position as militants. The only way that comrades who have come out of these experiences can subsequently contri­bute to the class struggle is to integrate themselves actively and consciously into the process of the international regroup­ment of revolutionaries: to follow any other path must lead to an impasse.

What lessons can be drawn out of our exper­ience? A discussion circle is by its very nature a transitory formation, engendered by the necessity to clarify the problems of the class struggle. To the extent that, by means of discussion, this clarification is accomplished, the discussion circle does not strengthen itself (through adopting a plat­form, organizational structures, etc) - it withers away, having exhausted its role. Whatever the future of its members as individuals (evolution or disappearance), the discussion circle itself can then only deg­enerate or die.

It is the task of revolutionaries to indicate the function and the limits of such circles, and to denounce any pernicious survivals.

The former members of the ex-Frazione Comunista



1 Lotte Operaie in Portugallo: Una Lotta Esemplare: Il Lavoratori della TAP di fonte al PCP ed al ‘Esercito Democratico’.

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary organisation [5]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • International Communist Current [6]

Combate: The peaceful road to self-management

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The Portuguese group, Combate, was formed in 1974 in the re-emergence of the workers’ struggles in Portugal after the overthrow of the Caetano dictatorship. Like similar groups in other countries, Combate’s appear­ance was symptomatic of the general awaken­ing of the workers’ movement after fifty years of world counter-revolution, an awake­ning which has been on the rise since 1968. During and after the May days in France, many groups emerged promising to contribute to the generalization of the lessons the proletariat has so painfully acquired since the revolutionary wave of 1917-23 was engul­fed by the growing counter-revolution.

The present revitalization of the international class struggle can be traced to the deepening world crisis of capitalism, caused by the end of the post-war reconstruction. Thus the crisis also lays the social and political preconditions for the emergence of groups which attempt to place their activity within the camp of the working class in oppo­sition to the mystifications of the left-wing of capital and its ideological pimps (Trotskyists, Maoists, populists, anarchists, etc). When it first appeared, Combate was not only a genuine and refreshing emanation of the struggles of the Portuguese workers -- it promised to become much more. Indeed, Combate was the only group in Portugal -- apart from the chronically crippled anarch­ist and councilist sects -- which rallied around certain revolutionary positions. Combate boldly attacked the mystifications of the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement (AFM) and the trade unions and leftist apparatus of the bourgeoisie. The group defended the autonomous struggles f Portuguese workers and claimed to stand firmly for internationalism. In the repugnant climate of triumphalism created by the lef­tist carnival in Portugal from April 1974 to November 1975, the stance of Combate offered a glimmer of hope. It was as if in the very midst of the ‘Portuguese Revolution’ -- the ‘carnation revolution’ which ruthlessly confronted workers’ struggles at TAP, Timex, the Post Office, etc -- a proletarian voice had finally been raised.

The limitations of Combate

In issue no.5 of World Revolution, the publication of the ICC in Britain, it was “The main weaknesses of (Combate) appear to be its lack of clarity about organi­zation combined with a certain localism. (Their) article, seems to argue for an abstract opposition to ‘parties’, rather than seeing the reactionary policies of the leftist parties as a function of their capitalist nature. This attitude is lin­ked to a failure on Combate’s part to see the need to organize in a coherent and centralized way, around a definite plat­form. The article also reveals a tend­ency to see the present crisis in Portu­gal as a Portuguese phenomenon rather than as a manifestation of the world capi­talist crisis; and furthermore, there seems to be a limited awareness of the fact that the problems facing the Portu­guese working class can only be solved at an international level.” (Introduction in World Revolution no.5 to Combate’s article: ‘Portugal -- What Workers’ Councils?’)

These words were confirmed by the subse­quent evolution of Combate. Comrades of the International Communist Current met and dis­cussed with Combate extensively in 1975. But, unfortunately, these fraternal discus­sions only brought to light a propensity in Combate to localism, theoretical stagnation, and eclecticism. In the Portuguese situa­tion, where revolutionaries with very clear heads were and are urgently needed, these negative features rapidly disclosed the widening gap between Combate’s activities and the needs of the working class.

Combate’s limitations had existed within it from its beginning, but they became a real brake on the group’s development when they began to be ‘theorized’. As the class struggle in Portugal entered a temporary lull (during and after the summer of 1975), Com­bate clearly entered into a state of regres­sion. Confused perhaps by the temporary retreat of the proletariat after the Novem­ber events, Combate began to exhibit a mar­ked tendency to defend the ideology of self-management, including the defence of populist and marginal struggles. This was paralleled by Combate’s almost complete dis­regard and abstention from broader political issues confronting the Portuguese and world proletariat over the past few months. Responding to the recent elections in Portugal, Combate printed a front-page headline proclaiming: “No to Otelo, No to Eanes -- for Direct Democracy!”. With this banality, supplemented by an editorial in which ‘dir­ect democracy’ was transformed into ‘wor­kers’ democracy’, Combate then proceeded to submerge its readers in a flood of articles eulogizing workers’ and peasants ‘control’ of Portuguese enterprises (Combate, no.43, June/July 1976) (1). Combate’s evolution is not accidental nor exceptional. It shows the immense weight that the counter-revolu­tion still exerts over emerging revolutionary forces; a weight that is so great that it can easily curtail the positive development of a group, particularly in a situation where in the group is cut off from organic and theoretical continuity with the historic workers’ movement. The evolution of Combate is important, therefore, because it helps revolutionaries to assess the difficulties faced today by the working class in its permanent search for clarity and deeper understanding.

Combate’s origins

The tasks that Combate attempted to fulfill in the Portuguese class struggle were never defined very clearly. Combate began in 1974 as a sort of self-managed ‘collective’, centred around a bookshop in Lisbon. This bookshop in turn, was open to workers in struggle and ‘autonomous revolutionary groups’ as a place to hold meetings. The premises were also offered to ‘self-managed’ enterprises -- which are a common feature of Portuguese light industry since 1974 -- as an outlet for their sales. In answer to a reader’s letter, Combate affirmed in one of its issues that the reason for the paper’s existence was to contribute to the working class’s “self-organization and self-leader­ship, helping to create conditions that favour and accelerate that self-organization” (Combate, no.29). Although this was correct in itself, the task of ‘helping’ the workers was approached in a purely academic way in the sense of ‘demystifying’ the state capi­talist ideology held by the supposed ‘techno­cratic class’ which was said to be taking over society (a notion culled perhaps from the writings of James Burnham or perhaps Paul Cardan). Otherwise, Combate saw its task as one of intervention within the wor­kers’ commissions which arose during wor­kers’ struggles in Portugal to ‘unify’ them. These commissions have now become, in the downturn of the class struggle, vehicles for self-management ideology within the proletariat.

To these tasks of ideological ‘demystifica­tion’ and ‘practical unification’ of the class in Portugal, a weak and incoherent call for internationalism was appended. But this call was understood by Combate only in terms of the “international solidar­ity” of workers in other countries -- pref­erably those similarly engaged in ‘self-management’ activities -- with the workers in Portugal. Combate was completely uninter­ested in the fight to create an international organization, politically defined by its defence of class positions within the inter­national class struggle. Apparently the creation of a body of communists regrouped around a platform with a clear internatio­nal framework, based on the past and present lessons coming from the struggles of the class, was a bit too ‘theoretical’ for Com­bate. Over and over again, Combate insisted that it wasn’t “Leninist or anarchist”, as if the question of revolutionary organiza­tion could be reduced to such a simplistic level. Combate remained, however, willing to enter into ‘common work’ with anybody -- including Stalinists -- provided a fuzzy common denominator of confusion was respec­ted by the participants. Such frontism was candidly admitted in a manifesto produced by Combate:

“All our work has as its only point of reference, the practical positions assu­med in the workers’ struggle. And it has as its only objective to contribute to the unification of the various struggles in a general struggle of the masses of the working class and remaining workers. We are not a party and we do not intend to constitute any party based on the work linked to this paper. Elements or groups coming from any party, or coming indepen­dently, are collaborators in this work with the condition that they develop in the workers’ struggle practical revolutionary positions.” (Manifesto of Combate, London, 1975)

Exactly what was meant by developing “prac­tical revolutionary positions” was not made clear, but one is led to suspect that it is the cuckoo’s egg of self-management. Thus, for Combate, the whole question of revolu­tionary organization was but a vague ‘pro­ject’ rooted in localism and buttressed by self-management conceptions -- an effort neatly combining the features of both anar­chism and leftist vanguardism. The task of organizing and fermenting the class struggle and with it the struggle within the army and navy was boldly asserted by Combate as the following passage makes clear:

“This paper intends to be an active agent in the linkage of various particu­lar struggles and the organizational experience resulting from them and accelera­ting in that way the development of the workers’ general struggles. It is from these struggles and the development of the general struggle that the whole elaboration of the paper will be based and will result in the deepening of the positions taken by us. This paper is the first axis of our work.”

Let us note that Combate bases its existence as a newspaper on contingencies, on the existence of “various particular struggles” upon which all its elaboration will be foun­ded. By writing this Combate therefore pro­claims its own disappearance at the first sign of a reflux in the struggle, which means that either Combate is completely igno­rant of the way the proletarian struggle develops, with all its pauses, refluxes, and sudden upsurges, or that it will refuse to engage in any activity as soon as the class goes into a temporary retreat. In both cases we are dealing with an irresponsible atti­tude. It shows a grave lack of any sense of responsibility to try to influence a move­ment as crucial in the destiny of humanity as that of the proletariat without having any understanding of its basic essentials and with the intention of deserting that movement as soon as it meets the slightest setback.

“Intimately connected with the paper, is the work to ferment the organization of mass meetings among workers, soldiers and sailors, or workers with soldiers and sailors located in specific struggles. We know that this is difficult work, which demands not only the preparation of num­erous material conditions such as defence against the repression of the bourgeoisie. But there can be no development and gene­ralization of our struggle without the realization of mass meetings among wor­kers who have different particular expe­riences of struggle. This is the second axis of our work ...” (Ibid)

Although it is true that a revolutionary group intervenes and participates in the struggles of the working class, especially when the entire proletariat is entering a new period of combativity as it is today, the revolutionary organization does not (for that matter cannot) prepare the ‘material conditions’ for the revolutionary struggle of the class (the creation of mass links be­tween workers in struggle, and the launching of class action against the repression of the bourgeoisie and its state, etc). Depar­ting from its previously humble role as a welfare organization offering services to the working class, Combate quite imaginat­ively adopted the star-billing of majordomo of the revolution -- a transition equivalent to Clark Kent’s transformation into Superman!

The revolutionary minorities of the prole­tariat defend the final general goal of the proletarian movement: communism. Their task is not to ‘organize’, ‘unify’, or ‘ferment’ the struggle of the proletariat. Only the class as a whole can steel its own battalions, temper them in struggle for the assault on the bastion of bourgeois power, the state, since only the revolutionary proletariat as a whole can become the ruling class of society, not a minority of self-appointed leaders and ‘tacticians’. Combate’s concep­tions of its own function not only lack a sense of proportion, owing to the fact that they are not based on a clear definition of the political principles of a revolutionary organization and of the responsibilities of the militants of such an organization; they also lead Combate to invite the class enemy to participate fully with it in “practical revolutionary projects”. Stalinists, popu­lists of the COPCON-PRP variety, isolated Trotskyists, etc, all have their contribution to make as long as they bow their heads to the mysteries of ‘workers’ control’ and ‘self-management’. Their contributions would surely gain Combate’s approval if they chose to add resolute phrases against the creation of ‘political parties’ since for Combate their creation automatically spells Leninism -- indeed there is no reason why Otelo himself might not have some contribu­tion to make to Combate’s efforts.

The Portuguese experience, along with many others, has shown that behind the slogan “No political parties!” you will often find the light artillery, the snipers of capital, those who instead of openly confronting the class movement try to flatter its gropings towards clarification in order to divert them into an impasse. When the workers begin to revolt against bourgeois parties, the ‘non­party’ specialists try to turn it against all parties, including the organizations which the class has historically engendered in its struggle for consciousness. Unable to elimi­nate the distrust that the working class has towards the traditional parties and forms of mystification, capital tries to extend this distrust to those revolutionary organizations who defend the historic programme of the proletariat, in order to deprive the class of one of the fundamental weapons of its struggle. In Portugal, as elsewhere where the bourgeoisie has been gasping for breath, this hoary phrase of “No political parties!” in fact expresses the interests of the state machine in its attempts to drown the autonomy of the class struggle under the ‘non-political’ hegemony of Portuguese state capitalism.

Internationalism – Combate style

To explain the Portuguese events, Combate wrote:

“The unsustainable situation of the Portu­guese bourgeoisie in the colonies, the incapacity of militarily defeating the colonial peoples, was one of the factors which made extremely urgent for the bour­geoisie the ‘detournement’ of its politics and led it to search, through military peace, for political and economic neo­colonial solutions.

The multiplicity of strikes and struggles that the Portuguese workers were develop­ing were showing to the bourgeoisie that the repressive apparatus of the Caetano regime was already completely inadequate to try to contain and repress these strikes. The bourgeoisie wanted, then, to allow the ‘freedom to strike’ at the same time appointing to the head of the union apparatus reactionary elements con­trary to the strike practice.

The exploiting classes and layers needed also to adapt the state apparatus for the resolution of grave economic problems which were accumulating without the Cae­tano administration being able to find any solution. Inflation, the necessity to expand industrial development relations with the Common Market, emigration, was all urging a rapid and large-scale reorganization of the state institutions.” (Manifesto of Combate, p.1)

As can be seen from the above, Combate’s explanation for the coup of April 1974, did not transcend the narrow framework of loca­lism -- a view of the coup strictly contained within the Portuguese context. Rampant inflation (today at 50per cent), the need to integrate the Portuguese economy more fully into the EEC, the rising wave of class strug­gle in Portugal, are all aspects of the rea­lity of Portuguese capital as part of the international capitalist system. The Portu­guese crisis has been, in other words, an expression, a moment, of the world crisis of capital which has marked the end of the post-­war ‘boom’. Combate, however, considered the class struggle in Portugal as an essentially ‘Portuguese’ phenomenon. It was if the whole world revolved around Portugal and around the Portuguese proletariat. The heavy in­flux of leftists arriving in Portugal gave substance to this illusion and contributed to the euphoric atmosphere generated by the ‘carnation revolution’. Just as Allende’s Chile became a great laboratory for diffe­rent leftist experiments in ‘socialism’, Portugal too was transformed into a vital centre of leftist mystifications. Portugal, unlike Chile, is in Western Europe and there­fore that much more relevant to leftism. As an important link in NATO’s umbrella and a country firmly integrated into the European economy, Portugal became a veritable El Dorado for leftist entrepreneurs.

In such a relatively backward country, where the workers’ movement has suffered immense atomization in the course of the last fifty years, where a strong, coherent tradi­tion of revolutionary politics has never existed, the emergence of pitched class stru­ggle was destined to give revolutionaries in that country a false sense of triumph, espe­cially when their enthusiasm was not temper­ed by a sober and rigorous understanding of the international class struggle and its perspectives. This false sense of optimism, this naive triumphalism, was to find its accompaniment on the practical level in imme­diatist activity and local prejudice when confronted with the implications of the development of the international crisis of capitalism and struggle of the proletariat. In January 1976, a member of Combate could write: “I would say that the class struggle in Portugal is ideal, pure: the producers find themselves in struggle against the expropriators, a struggle almost without insti­tutional mediations integrated into the appa­ratus of exploitation.” The writer could go on to refer to the new Portuguese regime as a “degenerated capitalist state”, degene­rated presumably by a working class with “strong consciousness and political ability” (Joao Bernardo, Portugal, Economy and Policy of the Dominant Class, London 1976, p.20). In fact this delirious conception is nothing more than the mindless ‘enthusiasm’ which always characterizes leftist demagogues.

For the localist the whole universe revolves around him, and his dilettantish little ‘projects’. Localism sees the proletarian struggle only from a day-to-day perspective; it gets lost when it attempts to generalize such experiences to a more global level. Localism is thus always inherently nationa­list in outlook, incapable of gauging the weight and significance of the immediate situation in relation to wider questions and events. Localists only find renewed ‘sustenance’ in their native and immediate surroundings -- from a chat with an individual worker, a letter by a self-managed enter­prise in the vicinity, or the hearsay of everyday life. A certain ‘physical presence’ in the ‘daily struggles’ of the workers gives localists an inflated opinion of themselves causing them to assume the role of interpreters of the local aspirations and cons­ciousness of the proletariat. If a struggle deepens, localists (who tend to become super-activists in such conditions) have their field day. The extent of the struggle is blown out of all proportion and mindless enthusiasm and messianic predictions grip the heart and fall from the tongue of the localist. But when the struggle goes into reflux, the localist is left high and dry, feeling ‘betrayed’ by the class struggle. Pessimism, the deadening ‘theorization’ of individual isolation or a cynical surrender to the goals of leftism follow. In short the political durability of localists is always minimal and unstable and of no posi­tive value to the proletarian struggle at all.

For Combate too, optimism based on a super­ficial analysis of local events melted away to be replaced by pessimism, when the class struggle in Portugal entered into a phase of retreat. At the beginning of 1976 Combate began to draw up a balance-sheet of its international work:

“We note that for the groups who claim to defend the autonomous struggles of the workers and which sometimes write to Com­bate there is almost only one worry: the discussion of theoretical concepts in general in an idealistic way and indepen­dent of the real experiences of the pro­letarian struggles, above all, with the object not of publicizing the new forms of social organization which the prole­tariat in struggle has created, but of publicizing their own political group, considered to be the trustees of theore­tical recipes without the knowledge and the study of which the proletariat cannot be saved.

When these groups publish texts from Com­bate they are, with a few exceptions, the editorials, groups abroad who publish the texts of the workers, or interviews, hardly exist and this is, for us, the part of the newspaper which is more important to know the state of organization, the forms of struggle and the conscious­ness of the Portuguese workers, for deve­loping these forms of struggle internat­ionally. Almost two years of correspon­dence has convinced us that these organi­zations confuse the gigantic world of class struggle with the microscopic world of the struggles of organizations.” (‘Internationalism, the Communist Struggle and Political Organization’, supplement to Combate, no.36)

Preferring telescopes to microscopes, Combate shows us what it means by the “gigantic world of class struggle”:

“From the beginning of this newspaper we have sought that groups and comrades in other countries who have similar prac­tice to ours should unite their forces in order to set up relationships between the workers. (One example, very recently workers of TIMEX said that it was diffi­cult to enter into contact with workers of that multinational in other countries because by telephone they didn’t receive workers at the other end of the line but the bosses who boycotted such a contact). Would it not be easier for the groups who attempt to dynamize the struggles of the workers to work in the sense of making these contacts possible?” (Ibid).

Poor proletariat: It’s gigantic: world is so vast; that it requires the ‘dynamism’ of such groups as Combate to transcend the open spaces. How can the working class unify its struggles if it doesn’t have the correct com­munications network established for it by the resourceful elves of ‘revolutionary’ organizations working overtime at dialing the right numbers? But Combate doesn’t want to be considered merely as a handy telephone exchange. Its role of revolutionary major­domo can’t stop there -- there has to be some room somewhere for ‘theory’:

“We don’t want to say that we don’t con­sider the discussion of theoretical pro­blems important, or that these couldn’t be enriched by different practices of struggle in different countries. But in our understanding of it, the platform for the unity of the revolutionary proletariat lies in the forms of organization which are developed by the autonomous struggle and the consciousness which arises from this, and not in one or another indivi­dual ideological systems dealing with theoretical disputes. For us, it is more important to contribute to practical forms of struggle, which break down the fron­tiers and which allow the workers to esta­blish direct relations in the common struggle against capitalism.” (Ibid)

Indeed for Combate, ‘theory’ bears a purely immediate, subordinate and mechanical rela­tion to the fragmented ‘practical forms of struggle’ of the present moment, without any consideration being given to the historical aspect of class consciousness, bound as it is to the whole experience of the internat­ional proletariat, gained from more than 130 years of struggle.

These confusions of Combate stem from a to­tal incoherence as to what is the communist goal of the working class, what is the role of the party and the mass proletarian organs, the workers’ councils. Combate fails to understand the present period of capitalist decadence the impossibility of reformism, the reactionary nature of leftist parties (reactionary not because they ‘curtail’ self-management, but owing to their defence of capital over the last fifty years of counter-revolution), and what internationa­lism for the working class truly implies. In sum, Combate shows under the pretext of rejecting what it calls “theoretical squab­bles” a complete disregard for clarity with­in the revolutionary struggle of the class and the need for a coherent platform within the class struggle. Class consciousness is the historic element in the struggle of the proletariat -- it doesn’t arise anew from scratch every day, generated by each frag­mented act of working class individuals. Internationalism is not a random, ad hoc exchange of the ‘practical experiences’ of such individuals or sects operating under an implicitly federalist conception of ‘I'll help you it you help me’. Such ‘practical experiences’ don’t break any frontiers ex­cept in tide minds of their advocates.

In fact behind this attitude of abasing one­self in front of every ‘concrete’ struggle and of distrusting past experience, behind this ‘practical’ vision of internationalism, there lies a narrow and distrustful vision of the proletariat. Such a vision no longer sees the class as a social being with a historical and geographical unity: the class has become a simple agglomeration of worker or of enterprises, whose historic movement towards communism can be reduced to the daily accumulation of ‘practical experiences’ and ‘new forms of organization’ which ‘prefigure’ the emergence of new social relations. In this way we arrive unintentionally at a gradualist world-view which believes that communism can be established step by step in capitalism while the bourgeois state continues to hold sway over the whole of social life.

Such nonsense is similar to Bernstein’s theory, but glossed over with the charming, additive of self-management and other ideo­logical trinkets of the last fifty years of counter-revolution, such as the defence of marginalist struggles, the defence of ‘opp­ressed peoples’, etc. The idea of ‘socialism in one country’ coined by Stalinism, is not inimical to this vague theorizing. Thus we are told by Combate that “communist social forms can be created for a while in certain particular cases, without the soc­iety as a whole having reached them and having transformed the mere social forms into effective communist economical organi­zations” (Ibid). Combate doesn’t seem to have noticed the role played by self-management ideology within the class struggle in Portugal in terms of helping to salvage capitalist production. Instead, workers’ self-management, ‘communist forms’ of running capitalist firms are presented by Com­bate as the “solidarity of the workers” in struggle. The Titoist, Ben-Bellaist recipes dished up by Combate in its usual ‘non-doctrinaire’ way seeks to avoid confusing the workers struggles with the ‘microscopic’ world of struggle between organizations, by simply drowning the class struggle in the macroscopic swamp of the counter-revolution. When Combate demands ‘autonomy’ for the masses, in fact its appeals have nothing to do with the masses – it’s simply the demand of Combate to be allowed to continue to de­base the meaning of communism in its own so practical, so concrete, so ‘apolitical’ and ‘autonomous’ way. It’s a cry for organizational autonomy that demands to be spared the searching and principled criticism of communist organizations who recognize the absolutely vital importance of clarification and not confusionism within the class struggle.

The further evolution of Combate

Combate’s fate is the fate of a group which attempted to place itself on the terrain of working class struggle, but failed to recog­nize that this involved breaking with all the ideological muck of decadent capitalism. No group can last today in the no-man’s land between vague leftist-councilist political positions and the communist positions of the proletariat. In the last analysis, a class frontier separates the one from the other. For Combate to have evolved positively, it would have had to break with its past conceptions and activities completely, and realized the need to regroup with an international organization defending class positions, clarified by the historical struggle of the international proletariat. This did not (and perhaps given the confu­sions generated by the ‘carnation revolution’ could not have) happened. After a certain point Combate’s evolution became overwhelm­ingly negative and the group became the mouthpiece of many leftist mystifications, all the while pretending to be the ‘reporter’ of the activities of the workers. The stan­dard bete noire concerns of libertarian poli­tics became increasingly fashionable in the pages of Combate with articles on abortion, reprints from foreign publications such as International Socialism in Britain on women’s problems, or articles on racial iss­ues uncritically reproduced from Race Today, etc. Vital issues confronting the proleta­rian struggle fared less well in Combate. The need for internationalism in the class struggle, for example, was met with equivo­cations by Combate, whose half-truths and truisms on the subject seek to evade any organizational responsibility towards this fundamental of working class struggle. Com­bate, like most confusionist elements, can agree on almost anything with a communist group provided agreement can be given with­out conviction and thus carries no political consequences. This kind of attitude can only end up in a spineless opportunism.

The difficulties confronted by revolutionaries in Portugal and Spain

The objective limitations of today originate in the disarray, demoralization, and confu­sion within two generations of the world proletariat who suffered the worst batter­ings of the counter-revolution. While the present rising level of class struggle creates the conditions necessary for the formation of revolutionary groups, this per­iod is still afflicted by the ideological aberrations and debris of the previous one. Today, if emerging groups do not firmly base their activity within the context of a coh­erent international framework, sooner or later they will enter into the path of theo­retical and practical decomposition. Marx used to say that the ideas of dead genera­tions weigh like a nightmare on the brains of the living. The negative evolutions of Combate poignantly illustrates this truth.

Portugal and Spain today present specific examples of the difficult situation faced by revolutionaries. The economic and political backwardness of these two weak links of European capitalism has meant that the proleta­riat of these countries has tended to be propelled onto the political arena at the onset of the economic crisis. In order to deflect the proletariat’s struggle, the lef­tist forces in Portugal and Spain have also appeared on the political stage, announcing to the whole world that the proletariat is to be drowned amidst the whole ‘revolutionary people’. The attempts of leftism to sub­merge the working class into the common front of ‘the people’ opens the way to a whole barrage of mystifications the left uses to marshal the proletariat behind the needs of the national capital.

A whole mythology was brought into being by the leftists in Portugal in 1974 about the ‘Portuguese revolution’. The same will hap­pen in Spain tomorrow. From every rooftop in Lisbon and Porto, the leftists proclaimed the need to ‘defend’ the fraudulent ‘revolu­tion’ at the same time as they were systema­tically setting about derailing the autono­mous struggles of the workers into the dead ends of ‘national defence’ and ‘workers’ self-management’. The entire revolting campaign for ‘popular committees’, ‘popular democracy’, ‘grass-roots democracy’, ‘wor­kers' councils’ (sic!), ‘inter-empresas’, was used by the leftists in Portugal for all those wretched lies were worth. In Portugal, it was almost impossible to swim against this tide of lies, confusions, and false hopes generated so hysterically by leftism. Initially, Combate seemed to be capable of doing so. But Combate’s mistake was to as­sume that the rising class struggle in Port­ugal was a direct harbinger of total social transformation in Portugal. It didn’t rea­lize that the struggles of the Portuguese workers were a growing link in the chain of international class struggle, and that the promise of the Portuguese proletariat was to be seen in terms of the lessons gained in to­day’s struggle finding their consummation in the revolutionary struggle of the interna­tional working class in the years to come.

Combate, however, over-estimated events in Portugal and later proved unable to put for­ward a communist analysis of what was actu­ally going on. Its emphasis was on self-management and the ‘day-to-day’ struggles of the Portuguese working class. And indeed there was an immediate upsurge of working class militancy in Portugal which demanded the intervention of any revolutionary group to the best of its abilities. But such an intervention could have been fruitful and systematic only if it had been based on a clear international conception of the global class struggle. Combate naively dismissed the need for such clarification. It belie­ved that political clarity would spontane­ously flow from the ‘daily struggles’ of the Portuguese working class. There was, there­fore, no fundamental need for them to relate to anything outside Portugal beyond ascri­bing to some vague notion of ‘internationa­lism’, which at best amounted to a vague sense of moral solidarity between dispersed sectors of the class. Their advocacy of permanent ‘links’ between workers boiled down to a fear that the workers themselves were incapable of establishing class solidarity in a revolutionary upsurge and, in fact, was nothing less that a political defence of the ideas of self-management carried to an ‘international’ level. Different sectors of the class joined together with permanent ‘links’, could apparently struggle better for the fight for reforms. But reformism is impossible today in a world beset by the historical crisis of capitalism. For revolutionaries to advocate ‘links’ or ‘rela­tionships’ based on the reformist illusions of the proletariat is to confuse and lower the level of class consciousness coming out of the sharp battles of the class such as took place in Portugal itself in 1974 and 1975.

The political decomposition of Combate is, in some respects, a loss for the revolutio­nary movement today. But it is a loss only when one thinks what Combate, and similar groups, could have become had they evolved positively. In their present state such groups act as a barrier to consciousness in the proletariat: they become obstacles to organizational coherence and principled regroupment of revolutionaries. Hencefor­ward, in the absence of any rectification -- which becomes less and less possible the more they settle into their errors and what’s more into theorizing those errors – these groups cannot put up much resistance against the terrible contradiction between their own revolutionary principles and the immense pressure of bourgeois ideology, which they have allowed to penetrate their ranks by refusing to give these principles a clear and coherent basis founded on the historic ex­perience of the class. The choice before them is thus a simple one: either they res­olve the contradictions, cross the Rubicon, and join the camp of the bourgeoisie by abandoning principles which have become more and more of an embarrassment to them; or they simply disappear, dislocated by their own inner contradictions. This is probably what will happen to Combat whose disappearance is, as we have seen, already inscribed in the platform on which it bases its existence. If, as is very likely, such a group does not succeed in overcoming its confu­sions, this is in the final analysis the only outcome which corresponds to the vital necessity for clear communist positions within the workers’ movement.

Nodens,

August 1976

Life of the ICC: 

  • Correspondance with other groups [20]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • "Self-management" [40]

1977 - 8 to 11

  • 4760 reads

   

International Review no.8 - 1st quarter 1977

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COMBATE: 'Against the stream' ... or against the ICC?

  • 1232 reads

In a recent letter, the Contra-a-Corrente bookshops of the group Combate in Portugal informed us of their decision to stop selling publications of the ICC. It's not the usual practice of the ICC to go into such details in its publications, although we don't share the contempt displayed by the 'modernists' for what they call 'a concern for political merchandise'. On the contrary, we think that the widest possible dissemination of the revolutionary press is an important contribution to clarification and thus constitutes an elementary political preoccupation. Moreover, as long as revolutionary groups remain as a small minority, it would be difficult for them to carry on publishing unless they maintain some level of sales.

But the reason why we are discussing Combatels letter here is to publicly raise the question: why has Combate decided to close its bookshops to us? In their letter, we find only a refusal, not an explanation.

On a purely practical level we can say that with the reflux in class struggle in Portugal, revolutionary publications are not selling as well as they did between 1974-5. Therefore it had seemed necessary to reduce the number of copies being sent to the bookshops (a decision taken in common between Combate and the ICC comrades who went to Portugal last summer). But it's quite another thing to ban all sales. Only a bourgeois bookshop can use as its one criterion the idea that if publications don't sell quickly enough and in sufficient quantities, they and their contents are a waste of time. But the Contra-a-Corrente bookshops in Oporto and Lisbon belong to a group which claims to be revolutionary, to be interested in making the ideas of communist tendencies more accesible to workers. Thus we think we should drop any 'practical' hypothesis as an explanation for this decision.

On a political level, the ICC has never hidden its criticisms of Combate - either verbally when we met with these comrades, or in our press. Despite all the weaknesses and confusions which we pointed out in the article on Combate in International Review no.71, we have always considered Combate as one of the only groups in Portugal which defends class positions: the denunciation of the mystifications of the Armed Forces Movement, of the trade union and left-wing apparatus of capital, and the defence of autonomous workers' struggles and of proletarian internationalism. This is why we made contact with Combate and put militants from other countries in contact with them. But the main weakness of Combate - its lack of clarity on the need to constitute an organization on the basis of a coherent political platform - has inevitably led it into a certain localism, an ambiguous support for 'self-management' experiences, a growing confusion about the orientation of revolutionary activity. Indeed we have said that if Combate continues to theorize its errors, they will be unable to:

" … put up much resistance against the terrible contradiction between their own revolutionary principles and the immense pressure of bourgeois ideology, which they have allowed to penetrate their ranks by refusing to give these principles a clear and coherent basis founded on the historic experience of the class." (International Review no.7)

Our criticisms of Combate are part of an effort to contribute to the clarification of revolutionary positions within the working class. Is Combate so 'sensitive' that these criticisms have made it close the door to the ICC? The ICC only engages in a confrontation of ideas with groups which belong to the proletarian camp, despite all the confusions they may have. We don't polemicize with Stalinism, Trotskyism, or Maoism; we simply denounce them as ideological arms of capital. And we are not surprised when bookshops directly or indirectly under the control of Stalinists or Trotskyists refuse to take our publications or - as happened with a bookshop in Boston - the Trotskyists send our magazines back to us after tearing up the articles on Vietnam. It's a waste of time asking the bourgeoisie to be 'democratic'. But has Combate also begun to use administrative measures in order to settle political accounts?

In the discussions we had with Combate, Combate reproached the ICC for being fixated on the need to create an international organization on the basis of clear, tested class positions. According to some of its members, we are a vestige of the 'old conception' of a revolutionary organization, obsessed with ourselves, sectarian, unable to “open ourselves up to the new gains of the struggle", especially in Portugal. We regret that our intransigence about political class positions and our concern for the regroupment of revolutionaries has found no echo in Combate. We also regret that Combate seems to be much more interested in groups whose main characteristic is a political fluidity and a search for 'novelties' like the 'self-management' ideas of Solidarity in Britain, or of other libertarians without a clear political definition. Maybe we must draw the conclusion that there are no worse demagogues than those claiming to be 'libertarian', until differences lead them to take repressive measures? To accuse us of being the sectarians seems to be too easy an alibi.

It should be pointed out that the Contra-a-Corrente bookshops don't only distribute revolutionary publications. One can understand that in the capitalist world today it's impossible to run a bookshop which only sells communist publications. Consequently, Contra-a-Corrente sells publications of all kinds: psychology, novels, books by Stalin and Mao, texts by Trotsky, as well as the publications of Solidarity, the Communist Workers Organization, and the ICC, in Portuguese and in other languages. Are we to understand that the working class in Portugal needs to read the sophistries of the counter-revolution written by Stalinists or Trotskyists, but that it has to be 'protected' from the ICC? That the rabble of Stalinism are given the means to disseminate their mystifications but that a revolutionary voice must be silenced? Then you would have to put a sign on the doors of the Contra-a-Corrente bookshops saying: "There is no greater enemy of the working class than the ICC and that's why you won't find its press here!"

What's at stake in this discussion is not simply the distribution of ICC material. Whatever happens, our press will get distributed in Portugal. But the kind of attitude shown by Combate is not worthy of people who are attempting to rediscover the path of revolution. It is repugnant that Combate should take such decisions without any explanation. There are too many groups today who claim to be revolutionary but who set themselves up as the judges and censors of the revolutionary movement: the CWO is a flagrant example of this with their unfortunate conviction that all those who don't agree with them are part of the counter-revolution. We have to fight against this tendency for everyone to establish their 'own' class frontiers in order to defend the interests of their little sect. Today, when the working class must have a clear political orientation if it is to act in time in the face of the crisis, when after fifty years of the barbarism of the counter-revolution there is at last an opening in history, it is lamentable that groups like Combate should remain content with confused political positions and fall so easily into taking repressive measures against other political tendencies, measures which recall the 'good old days' of Stalinism.

We thus openly ask Combate to reconsider this ban on our press and repudiate this aberrant decision.

30 November 1976

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CURRENT


 

Letter from Combate

Dear Comrades,

In a meeting a few days ago the Contra-a-Corrente bookshops (in Oporto and in Lisbon) decided that they would no longer sell RI or any other publications of your Current; in future we only want to receive two copies of RI for the archives; we will try to pay you for what we have sold as soon as possible. Until the next time. (A bientot)
F.S.

LIVRARIA CONTRA-A-CORRENTE
Oporto, 9 September 1976

1 This article, 'Combate: the Peaceful Road to Self-Management', was written in the summer before the letter from Combate had arrived, and published after it had been received. It thus plays no particular role in the bookshop affair except as a general resume of discussion and criticism.

 

Texts from the 2nd Congress of Revolution Internationale

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The texts on the international situation and the period of transition which we are publishing in this issue of the International Review were presented to the Second Congress of Revolution Internationale, the ICC's section in France. These two themes were the main focus of interest in the work of the Congress. They were put on the agenda of the Congress not as purely theoretical questions but as a response to the real situation in which we find ourselves today. The present evolution of the crisis of capital - which is simply the continuation of the system's decay – is demonstrating more and more clearly that the only way out of the crisis is the revolution. The inexorable development of the crisis, which no one tries to deny anymore, will force the proletariat to once again take up the weapons of its historic struggle. At a time when capital has given up talking about the 'good times' ahead and is simply asking the workers everywhere to 'pull in their belts', the revolution no longer appears as a distant possibility but as a vital necessity.The content of sociaiism, the problems posed by the victory of the revolution, are going to become increasingly important preoccupations for revolutionaries, It is these problems - the analysis of the situation which leads up to the revoiution and the initial problems posed by the seizure of power - which the Congress attempted to deal with, These two aspects of the future - the situation before and after the revolution - are intimateiy connected with each other, because the present evolution of the crisis, by making the revolution a more and more concrete perspective, will oblige the proletariat to consider the content of the revolution as a reai and urgent question.

 

This is indicated by the fact that today a number of groups have begun to realize the importance of the problems of the transition period. Groups like the PlC (Pour Une Intervention Communiste), the CWO (Communist Workers' Organization), and the Spartakusbond have written articles on this question, which only a few years ago was practically ignored by the newly emerging revolutionary movement. Reality itseif has given rise to this need for clarification. The full reality of the crisis had to become quite obvious before eiements of the class like ICO (Informations Correspondance Ouvrieres), GLAT (Groupe de Liaison pour l'Action des Travailleurs), Alarma, or the situationists, who in 1968-9 used to make ironic comments about the 'apocalyptic prophecies' of RI, would be forced to recognlze the crisis and discuss it. Similarly it is the present evolution of the situation which is impelling various groups today to recognize and examine the problems of the revolution. "Mankind always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve." It is the real situation which demands that the proletariat becomes aware of its interests and its tasks; it is the real situation which forces revolutionaries to fulfil their responsibilities in the development of this awareness.

The development of the situation will therefore increasingly confront the workers movement with the problem of the content of the revolution. Who takes power, what form does this power take, how will it be organized, what are the first measures to be taken - all these questions will have to be raised and discussed as widely as possible. We can only begin to answer these questions by basing ourselves on the experience of the past. These questions must be approached in an extremely serious manner, and the responsibility of revolutionaries in this work is emphasized by the rupture in organic continuity with the past workers' movement, which has left the present workers' movement in a state of ignorance about the acquisitions of its own past. For several years now RI has been engaged in a discussion on the period of transition: this discussion has culminated in the passing of the resolution published in this Review, and the resolution is in turn a contribution to the discussion that is going on in the ICC and in the working class as a whole.

Concerning the texts on the international situation, the first, which deals with the world political situation, is an attempt to make a synthesis of the discussions on current events which have taken place in the ICC this year, and to highlight the various general factors which determine each particular situation. It is in this sense a methodological text which seeks to develop instruments for understanding any political situation that might arise. The second text examines the economic situation of capital at this juncture.

We can thus see that the Second Congress of RI didn't restrict itself to the specific problems of the section in France. The Congress was seen as an integral part of the work of the ICC as a whole. We published the texts which related more directly to the French section in Revolution Internationale no.32 (and the text on the situation in France also appeared in World Revolution no.9), but the following texts are of a general international interest, and we are publishing them in our international press as a contribution to the workers' movement as a whole. CN

The International Political Situation

1. For years the appointed spokesmen of the bourgeoisie tried to exorcize the demons of the crisis with their pseudo-scientific incantations. By handing out the Nobel Prize and other honours to its most cretinously complacent economists, the bourgeoisie hoped that reality would concur with its aspirations. But today the crisis of capitalism has become so blatant that even the most 'confident' and 'optimistic' sectors of the ruling class have had to admit not only its existence but also its severity. Because of this the task of revolutionaries today is not to proclaim the inevitability of the crisis, but to underline the bankruptcy of all the theories which sprang up like mushrooms after the rain during the fake 'prosperity' of the post-war reconstruction period.

2. Among the more fashionable theories of the bourgeoisie, those of the neo-Keynesian school were surely the most favoured. They promised an era of unlimited prosperity on the basis of judicious state intervention in the economy through various budgetary mechanisms. Since 1945, intervention of this kind has indeed been the rule in all countries: but the present economic crisis is shattering the illusions held by disciples of the man the bourgeoisie called: "the greatest economist of the twentieth century."

On a more general level, the present situation is exposing all those bankrupt theories which saw the state as the instrument that would save the capitalist system from its own internal contradictions. State capitalism - which these theories presented as simply the prolongation of the process of capital concentration which began in the ascendant period of capitalism, or even as a 'transcendence of the law of value' – is increasingly being revealed for what it always has been since its appearance during World War I: the essentially political expression of an economic system at the end of its tether, the desperate attempt of capitalism to retain a minimum of cohesion and to ensure not the expansion of the system but simply its survival.

The violent way in which the world crisis is now hitting those countries where state capitalism is most developed is more and more dispelling any illusions about their 'socialist' nature, or about the supposed ability of 'planning' or a 'monopoly on foreign trade' to end the anarchy of capitalism. In these countries it's becoming harder and harder to cover up unemployment by underutilizing the labour force. The authorities are now openly and officially recognizing the existence of this classical capitalist scourge. At the same time, rising prices which until recently have only affected the private sector market, are now hitting the official market in a spectacular manner. The economies of these countries which were supposed to be able to stand above the convulsions of world capital are now proving to be extremely fragile; poorly equipped to face up to the exacerbation of commercial competition. Despite the claims of their leader about 'overtaking the capitalist west' these economies have in recent years run up enormous debts with the west, which makes them more or less bankrupt today. This vast state of debt is a ringing refutation of all those theories which - sometimes in the name of 'marxism' - forgot that the general saturation of the market is not a phenomenon specific to this or that region of the world, and which saw the so-called 'socialist’ countries as a miraculous outlet for the resolution of capitalism's problems.

3. Since the end of the I960s, when it first began to become aware of its economic difficulties, the bourgeoisie has repeated over and over again that the present situation is fundamentally different from that of 1929. Terrified by the idea that it might enter another 'depression', it has tried to console itself by emphasizing all the differences between today's crisis and the crisis of the I930s. Thus the bourgeoisie has been trying to fixate on different aspects and stages of the crisis; it began by talking about a simple 'crisis in the monetary system' and then about the 'oil crisis', which was held responsible both for galloping inflation and the recession.

But in contrast to the explanations given by most 'experts' of the ruling class, it is clear that the crises of 1929 and of today do have the same underlying nature: both are part of the infernal cycle of the capitalist mode of production in its epoch of decadence, the cycle of crisis-inter-imperialist war-reconstruction-crisis, etc. They are both expressions of the fact that, after a period of reconstructing the productive apparatus destroyed by imperialist war, capitalism is unable to find outlets for its production on a saturated world market. The differences between the two crises are purely circumstantial. In 1929, the saturation of the market manifested itself through the collapse of private credit, in turn expressed through the collapse of the stock exchange. After an initial panic massive state intervention in the mechanisms of the economy permitted a temporary recovery; this took the form of armaments production and public works programmes, as in Hitler's Germany or the American New Deal. But these policies reached their own inherent limits because the reserves of the state were not inexhaustible: by 1938 the Treasuries were empty and the world economy plunged into a new depression, from which it emerged only because of the war …

In the period after World War II, state intervention was not relaxed as it had been after the first war. In particular, arms expenditure retained a crucial role in the economy. This explains the structural inflation which has existed in the system since 1945. Such inflation expresses the growing weight of unproductive expenditure necessary for the system's survival which leads to an increasingly generalized state of debt, especially on the part of the state machine when the period of reconstruction ends and the market is saturated, the only escape route open to the system is the accumulation of huge anticipatory debts which transform structural inflation into galloping inflation. Henceforth capitalism has no alternative but to oscillate between this inflation and recession as soon as the governments try to intervene. This is why 'recovery' and 'austerity' plans succeed each other at a growing pace in time with the system's catastrophic convulsions. At the present stage of the crisis, inflation and recession are more and more hitting national economies simultaneously and not one after the other.

Systematic state intervention has avoided the collapse of private credit which took place in 1929. Obfuscated by mere epiphenomena, unable to understand the fundamental laws of its own economy, the bourgeoisie does not see itself faced by a new 1929 … for the simple reason that it is already in the situation of 1938!

4. The present situation of the world economy also invalidates an idea which was defended even amongst revolutionaries, namely that the present crisis is a ‘crisis of reconstruction' - not meaning that it has no solution except a transformation of the structure of society itself, but that it is a result of a rearrangement of the existing economic structures. In this conception, state capitalist measures are often presented as a means for the system to overcome its contradictions.

At the end of the 1960s such theories could have a certain credibility; today they just look like intellectual gimmicks. The managers of the bourgeois economy would be wretched sorcerers' apprentices if they alone had plunged the world into the present state of chaos just to 'restructure' the economy.

In fact, in every sphere, the situation today is far worse than it was five years ago, which in turn was a considerable come-down from the situation ten years ago. If the conditions which began ten years ago led to the situation we were in five years ago, and if the conditions of five years ago have in turn led to the present situation, it's impossible to see how the present conditions - in which recession, debt, and inflation have never been worse - could lead to some kind of amelioration of the capitalist economy.

Nobel prize-winning economists, and those 'revolutionaries' who threw marxism on the scrap-heap because they thought they had gone beyond it, might as well resign themselves to the fact that there is no way out of the crisis and that it can only get worse.

5. Although the present crisis can only deepen inexorably, although no measure the ruling class might take can change its direction, the bourgeoisie is forced to adopt a series of policies aimed at assuring some kind of defence of the national capital amid the general panic and at slowing down the process of deterioration.

Because the crisis is the result of the conflict between the limitations of the world market and the expansion of capitalist production any defence of a national capital's interests must be based on a strengthening of its competitive abilities in relation to other national capitals; this also involves pushing its own difficulties onto others. Apart from the external measures aimed at improving its position on the international arena, each national capital must, on the internal level, put into effect policies which help to reduce the price of its commodities in relation to those of other countries; this requires cutting the costs of production. A fall in the costs of production in turn demands a maximum return on capital and a reduction of a country's over-al consumption; and this means, on the one hand an attack on the most backward sectors or production and on the middle classes as a whole and, on the other hand, an attack on the living standards of the working class.

There are thus three aspects to the policies of the bourgeoisie: deflecting difficulties onto other countries, onto the intermediate strata, and onto the working class. The common denominator of all three is the strengthening of the tendency towards state capitalism, which the bourgeoisie everywhere is trying to put into effect. The resistance against this, and the contradictions it gives rise to explain how the economic crisis is leading to a political crisis which is becoming more and more generalized today.

6. The first aspect of the response to the crisis by the bourgeoisie of each country - the attempt to deflect its problems onto other countries - comes up against the immediate and obvious problem that it is met by the same effort on the part of all the other national bourgeoisies! It can only lead to an intensification of economic rivalry between countries which inevitably has repercussions in the military sphere. But no single nation can be in opposition to all the other nations of the world, whether it be on the economic level or, still less, on the military level. This is why there are imperialist blocs, and these blocs inevitably tend to strengthen themselves as the crisis deepens.

The division of the world into these blocs does not necessarily correspond to the main economic rivalries which continue to intensify (thus Western Europe, USA, and Japan, the main economic rivals, are all in the
same imperialist bloc). But even though military conflict between the countries of one bloc can't be ruled out (eg. Israel and Jordan in 1967, Greece and Turkey in 1974), these economic tensions do not override the military 'solidarity' between the main countries of a bloc when they are confronted with the other bloc. If the intensification of economic rivalries between the countries of one bloc expresses itself in military terms, it only serves the interests of the other bloc; thus it expresses itself as a rule in the intensification of military rivalry
between the blocs. In this situation, the defence of the national capital of each country tends more and more to come into conflict with the defence of the interests of the bloc as a whole. This constitutes another difficulty encountered by the bourgeoisie of each country in its attempts to put into effect the first aspect of its response to the crisis; and the only outcome can be the submission of national interests to the interests of the bloc.

7. The ability of each bourgeoisie to carry through this aspect of its policy is conditioned basically by the strength of its economy. This is expressed by the fact that the first waves of the crisis hit countries at the periphery of the system, the countries of the Third World. But as the crisis deepens, its effects begin to shake the industrial metropoles with increasing brutality; and here again it is those metropoles which have the most solid economic base that are best able to resist the crisis. Thus the 'recovery' u:t 1'175-76, which mainly benefited the USA and West Germany, was paid for by a catastrophic deterioration of the weakest European economies such as Portugal, Spain, and Italy; this increased these latter countries' dependence on the more powerful economies, above all on the USA. This economic superiority also expresses itself on the military level: not only do the weaker countries of each bloc have to subordinate themselves more and more to the most powerful country, but also the bloc which has the strongest economic base - ie. the American bloc - is advancing and strengthening itself at the expense of the other bloc. It is quite clear today, for example, that the much vaunted American 'defeat' in Vietnam was no more than a tactical withdrawal from an area which was of no great military and economic interest in order to reinforce American power in much more important areas like Southern Africa and the Middle East. The intensification of the crisis is thus silencing the chatter about 'national independence' which developed in countries like France during the reconstruction period; at the same time it is giving the lie to all the mystifications disseminated by the extreme left of capital about' national liberation' and a 'victory against American imperialism'.

8. The second aspect of the bourgeoisies' response to the crisis consists in trying to make the productive apparatus more profitable by acting against other social strata apart from the proletariat. On the one hand this involves an attack on the living standards of all the middle strata linked to non-productive sectors or small scale production; on the other hand it requires the elimination of economic sectors which are the most backward, the least concentrated, or which use the most archaic techniques. These heterogeneous social strata are essentially composed of small peasants, artisans, small capitalists and shopkeepers, whose incomes are often being reduced in a draconian way because of fiscal pressure and competition from more concentrated units of production and distribution. Quite often this has led to the ruin of these strata. Through state capitalist measures this policy can also hit the liberal professions, officers in the armed forces, certain elements in administration or the tertiary sector, as well as those factions of the ruling class which are most tied to the classical forms of individual property.

Such policies when executed by the national capital inevitably come up against resistance, sometimes extremely fervent, from all these strata. Although they are historically doomed and incapable of unifying themselves, these strata can have a considerable weight in political life. In particular, they can have an important, even decisive electoral influence in certain countries. They represent the main source of support for right-wing governments linked to 'classical' capitalism - governments which dominated most countries during the reconstruction period - or even a balancing force to governments of the left, particularly in Northern Europe. Because of this, the resistance put up by these social strata can act as a powerful obstacle in the way of state capitalist measures which governments desperately need to take. This obstacle can lead to a real paralysis in a government's ability to act which further serves to aggravate the political crisis of the ruling class.

9. The third aspect of capitalism's response to the crisis, attacking the living standards of the working class, is bound to become the most important since the proletariat is the main producer of social wealth. This policy, whose main aim is to reduce real wages and increase exploitation, manifests itself primarily through the inflation which is hitting consumer prices in goods most important to the working class ( food, etc.); through a massive increase in unemployment; through the elimination of certain 'social advantages' which are actually a part of the means of reproducing labour power and thus a part of wages; and finally through speed-ups in the pace of work which are sometimes extremely brutal.

This assault on the living standards of the working class is a reality which the capitalist class has to recognize; in fact it is the cornerstone of all its 'austerity' plans. This assault is actually much more violent than official figures dare admit, since these do not take into account the reductions in 'social advantages' (medical facilities, social security, housing, etc.), or the effects of unemployment which not only hits workers out of a job but the class as a whole since it means a general reduction in the variable capital available for the maintenance of labour power.

This situation is destroying another theory which had its hey-day in the period of reconstruction: the so-called refutation of the marxist prediction about the absolute pauperization of the proletariat. Today the consumption of the working class is being reduced and exploitation being increased, not in a relative but in an absolute manner.

10. Since around 1968-69, the capitalist attack on the working class has encountered a very lively response. This confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat determines the general direction which the current crisis is imposing on history, a direction which leads not to the imperialist war which followed the 1929 crisis but to class war. So, of the three aspects of the bourgeoisie's response to the crisis, the one which relates directly to the working class is going to become more and more important in the general political developments ahead. Especially where the proletariat is strongest, we are going to see capital making increasing use of its 'left' factions, those political forces best qualified to mystify and contain the working class, to impose on it the 'sacrifices' demanded by the economic situation. This need to call on the left will be most strongly felt in those industrialized countries whose economy makes it impossible to establish any kind of social 'consensus' or to inspire any confidence in capital's ability to overcome the crisis. In contrast to the more prosperous countries which are better able to resist the effects or the crisis and have less need for 'anti-capitalist' propaganda in their efforts to tie the workers to the defence of the national capital, the weaker countries are about to go through important changes in their political apparatus. However - and this is another contradiction which the ruling class has to deal with - these changes are being met with a determined resistance from the old governing clique; these cliques are doing everything they can to stay where they are or at least retain a position of importance, even if this works to the detriment of the national capital.

11. We can thus see how, in trying to put these three aspects of its strategy into effect, the bourgeoisie is coming up against a whole series of resistances and contradictions. Not only that, but each aspect of capital's strategy has its own internal contradictions. In some cases, there is a convergence between certain of these aspects: for example, state capitalist measures which are bound to hit the most backward sectors of capitalism also provide the left factions of capital with an opportunity to mystify the working class by presenting them as 'anti-capitalist' or 'socialist' measures. Similarly, it can be the case that a struggle against the most backward sectors of society is led by political forces who enjoy the confidence and support of the dominant imperialist bloc. This is the case in Spain today where the process of ‘democratization’ is being set in motion in liaison and agreement with the European and American bourgeoisie. Very often, however, there is a conflict between the state capitalist measures demanded by the deepening of the crisis and the increased subordination of the national capital to the interests of the bloc. Such conflicts can be the result either of a threat to the economic interests of the major power in the bloc, or of the fact that the political forces most qualified to serve the interests of the national capital defend international policies which do not conform to the interests of the bloc. For the same reason there may be a conflict between the needs of a national capital in its international policies and the nationalist mystifications which it tries to use against the proletariat.

12. As the crisis deepens, these contradictions tend to get sharper, to make the bourgeoisie's problems more inextricable. In trying to cope, the bourgeoisie does not have recourse to any long-term or even middle term plans. It proceeds blow by blow, from day to day, according to the needs of the moment. The empirical character of bourgeois politics is further accentuated by the fact that the bourgeoisie is incapable of developing a long-term view of its own historical perspectives. Certainly it has profited from past experiences and its political and academic advisers, its economists and its historians are always on hand to jog its memory and prevent it from making the same mistake twice: on the economic plane for example, it has understood the need to avoid another 1929; similarly, on the political plane, in 1945, it was able to take measures against the possibility of a post-war revolutionary wave like the one of 1917-23. However the bourgeoisie's use of its own experience never goes beyond learning how to make a few fixed responses to a situation that has already appeared before. Its own class prejudices prevent it from developing a real understanding of the laws of history; this lack of vision is further aggravated by the fact that today, the bourgeoisie is a reactionary class whose social system is in total decomposition and decadence. As the economic system gets out of control, it becomes harder and harder for the bourgeoisie to understand the complex and contradictory mechanisms which underlie the crisis.

Any understanding of the different policies which the bourgeoisie of this or that country is compelled to adopt at any given moment, any grasp of the relations of force between contending factions of the bourgeoisie, must therefore take into account the contradictory elements of the various problems which confront the ruling class, and the relative importance which these elements acquire in a given geographic, historic, economic and social context. It is particularly important to bear in mind that the bourgeoisie does not always act in its own best interests, either immediate or historical; very often the factions of the bourgeoisie most suited to deal with a situation only come to the fore after violent conflicts with their rivals.

13. It is in the under-developed countries that the bourgeoisie comes up against the most violent contradictions in its efforts to deal with the crisis. The measures taken by the ruling class are doomed to meet a total impasse at the economic level. These countries are unable to push the effects of the crisis elsewhere: on the contrary they are the main victims of this policy when it is used by the bourgeoisies of more developed countries. This economic impotence expresses itself on the political level in the form of chronic instability and brutal convulsions. Confrontation between different factions of the national capital cannot be resolved through the machinery of 'democracy', and often leads to armed conflict. These conflicts are particularly violent when they take place between the partisans of state capitalism - the need for which increases as the economy falls to pieces - and the most anachronistic factions of capital, who have a particular importance in countries with a low level of industrialization.

These confrontations between factions of national capital are usually amplified by the pressure of inter-imperialist rivalries, and in areas like Lebanon and Southern Africa today, they are entirely subordinated to the conflict between imperialisms.

For all these reasons, the under-developed countries are the main breeding ground for 'national liberation' struggles - especially when they happen to be situated in regions over which the great imperialist brigands are squabbling - and for military coups d'etat; the latter because the army is the only force in such societies which can guarantee a modicum of cohesion because it offers something which is crucial to the struggle between factions of the ruling class in these countries: physical violence. Very often the army in the under-developed regions is the most resolute agent of state capitalism in contrast to the 'democratic' factions who are tied to private interests. The predominant role of confrontations between factions of the ruling class in these countries is further underlined by the fact that the working class, despite frequent violent reactions to ferocious levels of exploitation, is relatively weak, owing to the low level of industrialization.

14. It is in the countries with the greatest economic strength that the ruling class has the strongest grip over the problems thrown up by the crisis and therefore enjoys the highest level of political stability. This is connected to the fact that in these countries the different aspects of the bourgeoisie's response to the crisis do not lead to so many contradictions. Since the economic situation is less chaotic than elsewhere, the ruling class is not forced to take such extreme measures and still has a wide margin of political manoeuvre.

In concrete terms, this is expressed by the fact that the national capital is in a position to compete with its rivals on the economic and military front. This makes it less dependent on the imperialist blocs and more able to impose its own objectives on them. The strength of these capitals is further reinforced:

-- By the fact that the anachronistic sectors of production have a small numerical, economic and political influence in these countries;

-- By the ability of these countries to use the simple mystification of 'prosperity' against the working class.

This second aspect of the power of the bourgeoisie is particularly apparent in countries like the USA and West Germany where the ruling class has been able to mount an officially acknowledged attack on the living standards of the workers (a fall in real wages and massive increases in unemployment) without any major reaction from the proletariat, even though it is amongst the most powerful in the world. Moreover in countries of this kind, the general tendency towards state capitalism which the crisis accelerates does not take the form of violent conflicts as it does in the backward countries. Instead there is a gradual fusion between private and state capital.

In these conditions, the bourgeoisie retains a fairly wide margin of manoeuvre which tends to keep confrontations between ruling factions within certain limits (eg. the similarity between the programmes of Carter and Ford in the USA), and to absorb the repercussions of these confrontations (eg.the ease with which the American bourgeoisie survived and made use of the Watergate affair). The fact that moves, towards implementing the first and third aspects of the bourgeoisie's strategy does not lead to many contradictions at the moment can, even though these two are the most important historically, lead to a temporary pre-eminence of the contradictions created by the second aspect. In this way one can explain the defeat of the Social Democrats in Sweden and the SPD's losses in Germany.

But the SPD is being kept in power thanks to the co-operation of the liberals and this expresses the German bourgeoisie's need to retain a vehicle for carrying out state capitalist measures and mystifying the working class.

15. In countries which are developed but where capitalism is relatively weak, the contradictions engendered by the different aspects of the bourgeoisie's strategy are tending to find their own balance and to interact in a way that may appear paradoxical and precarious at first sight. This phenomenon is particularly clear when we look at the role of the Communist parties in certain European countries. These parties represent the faction of the bourgeois political apparatus which is best qualified both to take the state capitalist measures demanded by the situation and to make the working class accept the necessary sacrifices. This is why their participation in government is becoming more and more urgent. However, because of their international policies and the fear that they invoke in important sectors of the ruling class, the CP's accession to government office is being held up by a determined resistance from the American bloc, which is supported by the most backward sectors of society. In recent years, the CP's have been trying to prove to the rest of the bourgeoisie that they are loyal servants of the national capital, that they are independent from the USSR, and that they have every intention of respecting the rules of democracy; an intention which their rejection of the term 'dictatorship of the proletariat' clearly indicates. However, all these concessions have yet to overcome all opposition, even though the entry of the CP into government is extremely urgent in some of these countries. This again illustrates the fact that, shaken by its own internal contradictions both nationally and internationally, the bourgeoisie does not always grasp the right instrument at the right time. This is a significant, though temporary and unstable, characteristic of the situations and balance of forces which prevail today in a number of European countries, especially Portugal, Spain, Italy and France.

16. Of all the European countries, Portugal has in the last few years been the best illustration of the political crisis of the bourgeoisie. Portugal has the combined characteristics of both a 'backward' country - which explains the role played by the army - and a 'developed' country with a highly concentrated proletariat which became extremely combative around the end of 1973. These factors were at the root of the country's convulsions in 1974 and 1975. The first phase of these convulsions was a sharp move to the left, led by the established left, the left of the army and the extreme left. This expressed both the urgent necessity for state capitalist measures in a particularly catastrophic economic situation, and the need to derail and contain the working class. This phase was followed by a return to the right, which corresponded to a decline in the class struggle to an extremely strong resistance to state capitalism by sectors linked to small property, and to enormous political and economic pressure from the American bloc. The present orientation of Portuguese politics to the right (the abandoning of some aspects of agrarian reform, the return of Spinola, the liberation of PIDE - secret police agents) is an expression of a reflux in the class struggle and reinforces the demoralization of the class; at the same time the agents of these policies are poorly equipped to deal with a revival of class struggle, so the Portuguese situation is full of instability for the future.

17. Spain is one of the European countries destined to go through major convulsions in the next few years. The sharpness of the crisis, together with the senility and unpopularity of the old Franco regime, have made it extremely important that Spain should undergo a 'democratic' transformation. The death of Franco has set this process in motion. Such a change is all the more important for a bourgeoisie that has to deal with one of the most combative proletariats in the world: mere repression is becoming less and less effective as a means for containing the struggles of the Spanish working class. 'Democracy' is the only instrument Spanish capital can use to derail the combativity of the workers. And yet despite the urgency of this democratic transition, the whole process is being held up by the determined resistance of the most backward sectors of the ruling class based around the state bureaucracy, the army, and above all, the police. At the same time the Spanish bourgeoisie, like the rest of the Western bourgeoisie, is still extremely distrustful of the Spanish Communist Party, even though it is one of the staunchest advocates of 'Eurocommunism'. Alarmed by the Portuguese experience, the Spanish bourgeoisie wants to avoid a too rapid shift of power into the hands of the opposition, in case this might give too many advantages to the CP which is the main force in the opposition movement. Therefore, before any major changes take place, the bourgeoisie is trying to set up a strong centre party to defend the interests of the classical bourgeoisie and form a counter-weight to the CP.

The political crisis of the Spanish bourgeoisie is thus expressing itself in an extremely precarious balance between the vestiges of Francoism, the demands of the western bloc, and the strength of tile class struggle.

18. The situation of Italian capital is also characterized by the extreme precariousness of the political solutions it has resorted to up until now. Confronted with one of the most chaotic economic situations in Europe, the ruling political faction, the Christian Democracy, is incapable of taking the necessary measures to bring some degree of health to the economy and to strengthen the authority of the state. But although a growing element of the bourgeoisie recognizes the indispensability of the Italian Communist Party to the government, this solution is encountering fierce resistance today. In Portugal an alliance between the interests of the American bourgeoisie and those of backward sectors of the national economy opposed to further state capitalism pushed the CP from power. The same alliance is now keeping the Italian CP out of the government. At the moment the PCI is carrying out its responsibilities to Italian capital in an indirect manner. But its 'critical support' of the minority government of Andreotti can only be temporary. If it lasts too long it will bring considerable problems for capital in Italy.

This bastard solution has a dual inconvenience: it does not allow the adoption of energetic state capitalist measures, and it cannot be presented as a 'victory' for the workers in the way that direct PCI participation in government could. At the same time the unpopularity of austerity measures is to some extent directed at the PCI. In Italy as in Spain, capital is walking a tight-rope.

19. In France a long period of political stability is coming to an end. It is now following the path of other Latin countries hit by the crisis and is also on the verge of major political upheavals. The political forces which have been in power for nearly twenty years are becoming worn out, incapable of taking energetic measures to ameliorate the economic situation. As the parliamentary fracas about capital-gains tax showed, these forces are extremely dependent on the most backward sectors .of society, and they are only capable of mounting a relatively timid attack on the living standards of the working class. This is illustrated by the moderate character of the Barre plan. In these circumstances, the 'united left' is confidently putting itself forward as the most likely successor to the right after the legislative elections of 1978. The left will tend to move towards the centre of political life in France. It will also make use of the municipal elections of 1977 in order to induce an increasingly discontented working class to be patient and 'await the 'great victory' of a left government.

In the meantime, the right will have to improvise. However, although the situation in France is transitory - just as it is in Portugal, Spain and Italy - French capital has a greater structural strength and therefore a wider margin of manoeuvre and more effective means of holding its political problems at bay.

20. The precarious situation of British capital is not fundamentally different from that of other European countries we have looked at. But the point to emphasize about Britain is the paradoxical relationship between the depth of the economic crisis and the ability of the bourgeoisie to retain political control of the situation. If we bear in mind the three main aspects of the bourgeoisie's strategy, we can see that the British ruling class does not have much difficulty with the middle strata, in particular the peasantry, which is practically non-existent. At the same time British capital's main left faction, the Labour Party, enjoys the full confidence of the American bloc. Finally, the political strength of British capital is demonstrated by the way that the trade union apparatus from the TUC to the shop stewards has succeeded in maintaining control of one of the most militant proletariats in the world.

However, although the oldest bourgeoisie in the world has surprised everyone with the breadth of its resourcefulness, in the end all its 'savoir faire' will be rendered powerless by the continued decomposition of an economy which since 1967 has been one of the hardest hit by the world crisis.

21. The situation in the so-called 'socialist' countries is fundamentally no different from the situation in western Europe. The economic crisis is moving onto a political level because of the contradictions engendered by the divergences between national interests and the interests of the bloc; by the necessity to breathe some life into the productive apparatus; by the sullen but sometimes decisive resistance of sectors like the peasantry; and by the sporadic but violent reactions of the working class. In fact the fragility of these regimes, their economic weakness and their unpopularity, leave them with a much narrower margin of manoeuvre than the 'democratic' countries. In particular, the almost total statification of political life means that there are no political forces capable of channelling working class discontent into a 'democratic' dead-end a la Spain. The only political changes that can take place in these countries involve a modification of the ruling clique within the single party apparatus, and this places considerable limits on the mystifying effect of such window-dressing. Apart from the recuperation and institutionalization of organs of working class struggle, and the 'democratic' phraseology of certain forces which are doomed to remain in opposition, capital in these countries lacks any method for dealing with the working class excepting ferocious and systematic repression. The situation in Poland is a graphic illustration of all these points: Polish capital is extremely weak, and this means that its rigid political apparatus is subject to all kinds of convulsions which make it incapable of mounting an attack on the living standards of the peasantry and of an extremely combative working class.

22. China is a particularly significant example of the crisis of the 'socialist' countries. The development of its domestic and international policies confirms the analysis put forward for other countries.

To begin with, its rapprochement with the USA towards the end of the I960s has invalidated the theory that there is a 'state capitalist bloc' with a fundamental solidarity of interests against the 'private capitalist bloc'. This rapprochement also shows that it is impossible for any country, no matter how powerful, to be independent of the two great imperialist blocs which dominate the globe. The only 'national independence' is the ability to move from one bloc to another.

Secondly, the convulsions which have followed Mao’s death show the extreme instability of regimes of this kind. Once again we have seen confrontations between political forces more or less favourable to the Russian bloc or the American bloc, combined with conflicts within the state bureaucracy over various political and economic orientations. These conflicts have been settled in a violent and sometimes bloody manner by the different cliques that make up the state and the party.

Thirdly, the fact that Hua Kuo-Feng, former chief of police and now strongly supported by the army, has emerged as Head of State shows that open systematic repression is the main way of dealing with the working class in China. It also illustrates the fact that despite its particular characteristics, China does not escape the rule which gives the army a preponderant role in the internal politics of under-developed countries.

23. Although we can only understand the current political crisis of the bourgeoisie by taking into consideration all three major aspects of capital's response to the crisis, this doesn't mean that the three aspects have the same impact in the evolution of the crisis. We have already seen that certain of these aspects can, at a given moment and for largely circumstantial reasons, constitute the determining factors in a particular situation. But it is also true that on a historic level certain of these aspects will tend to play a more decisive role than others. We can thus say that the importance of problems arising from capital's attack on the middle strata will tend to give way to problems which are more directly linked to the fundamental interests of capital and which are at the heart of the historic alternative posed by the crisis: generalized class war or imperialist war. In the coming period we are going to see a growing concern with, on the one hand, the question of competition between national capitals, which will be expressed by the aggravation of inter-imperialist tensions and the internal strengthening of the blocs; and, on the other hand, with the question of the class struggle. And since it is the class struggle which will determine the survival of the system, the more the class struggle threatens the existence of capital the more it will come to the fore over the factor of inter-imperialist rivalries. History has shown, especially in 1918, that the only time the bourgeoisie is able to forget rivalry between nations is when its own life is at stake; and at such extreme times the bourgeoisie is perfectly capable of uniting against its common enemy, the proletariat.

Having outlined this general perspective, an examination of the political situation in most countries (with the exception perhaps of Spain and Poland) leads us to the conclusion that, over the past year, the factor of class struggle has to some extent given way to the other factors which determine the way the bourgeoisie runs its affairs.

Although in contrast to the 1930s the general perspective today is not imperialist war but class war, it must be said that the present situation is characterized by the large gap between the level of economic and political crisis and the level of class struggle. This gap is particularly striking when we look at a country which since 1969 has experienced a large number of social movements: Italy. The first effects of the crisis produced a powerful response from the working class, like the 'rampant May' of 1969. But today the massive assault on the working class which is the result of the country's political and economic disintegration has provoked a very limited response from the class, a response which in no way measures up to the previous levels of struggle. We are not just talking about a stagnation of class struggle, but an actual retreat by the proletariat. This applies both to the combativity of the class and to its level of consciousness, since today in Italy the trade union apparatus especially, which was previously brushed aside and denounced by an important number of workers, has regained a fairly effective control over the class.

24. Leaving aside the explanation for the present downturn in the class struggle, this phenomenon has delivered the coup de grace to all the theories which see the class struggle as the cause of the crisis. Whether they come from bourgeois economists - usually the most stupid and reactionary - or whether they hide behind a 'marxist' screen, such conceptions are today quite incapable of explaining how a reflux of class struggle can lead to such an intensification of economic crisis. The 'marxism' of the situationists, who saw May 1968 as the cause of economic difficulties which they only 'discovered' several years later, like the 'marxism' of a group like the GLAT ( Group de Liaison pour l'Action des Travailleurs) which spends its time accumulating vast stocks of statistics, is in dire need of a rest cure.

On the other hand, the present situation might appear to provide grist to the mill of those theories which hold that the crisis is the enemy of the class struggle and that the proletariat can only make its revolution against the system when it is functioning 'normally'. This idea, which bases its arguments on the way the class struggle developed after 1929, is one expression - when it's defended by revolutionaries - of the demoralization engendered by the terrible counter-revolution which has dominated one half of the twentieth century. It turns its back on the whole historical experience of the class and has always been opposed by marxists. If we look at the present situation in a static, immediatist manner, it might appear that the relative reflux of the class struggle is the result of the deepening crisis. But if we take into account all the characteristics of the proletarian movement, we can understand the real causes of this reflux and draw out the perspectives which arise from this situation. And of all the factors which determine the present situation three in particular must be borne in mind:

-- the characteristics of the historical development of revolutionary movements of the class;

-- the nature and rhythm of the current crisis;

-- the situation created by a half-century of counter-revolution.

25. For over a century revolutionaries have defended the idea that, in contrast to bourgeois revolutions which "storm quickly from success to success", proletarian revolutions "constantly engage in self-criticism, and in repeated interruptions of their own course … they seem to throw their opponent to the ground only to see him draw new strength from the earth and rise again before them, more colossal than ever …" (K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte). The jagged course of the class struggle, which manifests itself both in the great historic cycles of flux and reflux and in fluctuations within these cycles, is connected to the fact that, in contrast to previous revolutionary classes, the working class has no economic base in society. Because its only source of strength is its consciousness and its capacity to organize which are constantly threatened by the pressure of bourgeois society, any mistake by the proletariat can mean not simply a standstill but a defeat which immediately plunges the class into demoralization and atomization.

This phenomenon is further accentuated as capitalism enters into its decadent epoch, when the working class no longer has any permanent organizations, such as the trade unions last century, to defend its interests as an exploited class. Today, as we emerge from the most terrible counter-revolution in the history of the working class, the jagged evolution of the class struggle is further accentuated by the profound break between the new generation of workers and the past experience of the proletariat. The working class today will have to endure a whole series of experiences over and over again before it will be able to draw the lessons of these experiences, renew the links with its own past, and integrate everything it has learnt into its future struggles.

The long road the class struggle must follow today is elongated further by the conditions in which the resurgence of class combativity is taking place: the slow development of an economic crisis of the system. Previous revolutionary movements of the proletariat all grew out of wars; this immediately forced the class to deal with the most violent convulsions that capitalist society can give rise to, and which very rapidly confronted the proletariat with political problems, above all the problems of seizing power. In the present circumstances, the development of an awareness of the total bankruptcy of the system - especially where the proletariat is most concentrated, ie in the most developed countries - is necessarily a slow process which has to follow the rhythm of the crisis itself. This allows all kinds of illusions to linger for quite some time about the possibility of the system overcoming the crisis by simply changing the bourgeois team in power and applying a few choice formulae.

26. This who l e situation has allowed capital to recoup some of the ground it lost at the beginning of the crisis when the sudden initial reaction of the proletariat came as quite a surprise to the ruling class. In particular, the left factions of capital and their trade union machinery have managed to systematically sabotage the struggles of the class: when they are in power by brandishing the threat of the return of the 'right', of the 'reactionaries or even more frequently, by presenting state capitalist measures as a way of overcoming the crisis and of defending the interests of the proletariat. The 'extreme left' has played an important part in all this with its policy of 'critical support' which serves to steer elements of the class who are beginning to break with the established left back into the electoral and trade union fold.

The idea of waiting for the victory of the left has gained ground in the working class because of the disappointment engendered by a series of defeats on the level of economic struggles. Feeling the need for some kind of 'politicization' of its struggles, but lacking sufficient experience, the class has been led onto the terrain of bourgeois politicization. This disappointment has also bred a certain fatalism in the working class; the workers will not tend to react again until the crisis has deepened in a really violent manner.

27. All these factors allow us to understand the present mood of the proletariat and the relative decline of its struggles. But because the crisis can only get worse, and because, in contrast to 1929, the working class today is an undefeated class, the conditions which for the moment have allowed the ruling class to regain control of the proletariat will tend to disappear.

As the crisis deepens and the living conditions of the proletariat get worse and worse the class will be forced to respond no matter what mystifications are obscuring its consciousness today. In places where the left and its leftist pimps are already in power this response will tend to unmask their real nature quite quickly. In places where the left is not yet in office, its accession to state power will probably allow it to keep things ticking over for a little while longer. But at the same time this will give rise to the conditions which will enable the proletariat to understand that its struggles can only lead in one direction: direct confrontation with the capitalist state.

Finally, as an accumulation of experience allows the class to draw the lessons from its struggle, the demoralization and the mystification that it is going through today will be transformed into positive factors in the development of combativity and class consciousness. At the moment, the mystifying manoeuvres of the bourgeoisie are still bearing fruit and the role of revolutionaries is to carry on denouncing them with the utmost energy, especially those mystifications promulgated by the 'extreme left'. But this very gap between the level of the crisis and the level of the class struggle means that important upsurges of the class are on the agenda, and these upsurges will tend to narrow the gap.

The relative calm in the class at a time when the crisis is getting worse and worse (particularly the period 1974-5) and seems to have stunned the class to some extent, should not be seen as an inversion of the general tendency for the class struggle to follow the ascendant course it began in the late sixties. The calm today is simply the calm before the storm. After its initial battles at the end of the sixties and beginning of the seventies the working class is often in an unconscious manner preparing and concentrating its forces for a second round. Revolutionaries must also prepare themselves for this second round so that it doesn't take them by surprise and so that they can fully carry out their tasks in the coming struggles.

November 1976

The Acceleration of the Economic Crisis

"It seems that this time, happily, the danger will be avoided. The recovery has taken on afresh and has become general during the first quarter of 1976; unemployment which had reached one of the highest levels since the war, has started to fall in some countries." (OECD, Economic Perspectives, June 1976)

These optimistic predictions of the OECD would be swept away just a few months later. For the first time since the recession of 1974-5 the stock exchanges in New York, London and Paris experienced their lowest trade-figures. Confirming the profound scepticism of the bourgeoisie as to the depth of the 'recovery', the Paris stock exchange experienced its 'black Thursday' on 12 October with an average 3 per cent fall in one day of all its shares. On the very same day, Spain, Portugal and Italy took the most draconian measures in their histories: interest rates were raised; wage and price freezes introduced; and a series of protectionist measures against imports brought in. Actually Paris had already preceded them on this path (though not with the same severity) with the ‘Barre Plan'. Simultaneously, in the same month, the franc, pound and lira continued their slow descent to hell. On 5 October Le Monde could laconically conclude that the "recovery was drawing to a close".

THE FINALE OF THE 'RECOVERY'

Before examining the phenomena and nature of the 'recovery' we must first of all recall the state of the world economy in 1975. According to the Bangue de Reglements Internationaux world trade for that year expanded by 33 billion dollars, an eighth of the figure for 1974; the most significant contraction in world trade since World War II.

This paralysis in trade, the expression of an over-developed productive apparatus acting on a world market saturated with unrealizable commodities, was concretized in a 10 per cent decline in the volume of international trade.

In August 1975 the decline in industrial production taken over a year was the following: the USA by 12.5%, Japan by 14%, West Germany by 12%, France by 9%, Great Britain by 6% and Italy by 12.2%. As a corollary to this, the indices for world trade in metals went from 245.8 in May 1974 to 111.5 in May 1975, (using 100 as the base in 1970). That classic expression of the insoluble contradiction between the relations of production and the productive forces, unemployment, had reached a record total of 23 million unemployed in the OECD countries by the middle of 1975.

THE PHENOMENA OF THE ‘RECOVERY’

The reason for the 'recovery' - beginning in the last quarter of 1975 - was essentially the purely conjunctural movement of stock-building that had taken place during 1975. This artificial aspect of the ‘recovery' was emphasized by the fact that "the build-up of stocks this year will undoubtedly have contributed about 1.75 per cent to the expansion of production in real terms, although this played a negligible role during the recoveries of 1969 and 1972." (OECD, Economic Perspectives)

What are the results of this 'technical operation'? According to the OECD Ministers who met last June in Paris:

"The rapid expansion experienced by the USA since mid-1975 provided a strong impetus to the recovery in other countries, notably Japan. The level of industrial production in the OECD zone is now approaching the highest achieved in the last months of 1973. The level of unemployment which had reached some 5.5 per cent of the active population towards the end of 1975 has now fallen to about 5 per cent of the active population, a fall which essentially reflects the improved situation of the USA. In Japan and in Europe part-time working has clearly receded, but the number of unemployed remains high.”

Once again these optimistic predictions would be contradicted by reality only a month later:

“The deviation already observed in May and June is now being transformed into a slowing-down and we could even see a sudden drop in economic activity. The rates of industrial growth for France and Germany are falling far more than could have been predicted some months ago; 5 per cent growth per annum is small for a growth economy which should normally be around 7 or 8 per cent. In Italy, where the recovery is most recent, the rate of growth is also falling, although it still remains quite high (18 per cent). Let’s not discuss Great Britain where the ending of the recovery followed on almost immediately after the first serious effort to get the economy moving.”

As for the two big economic giants, the USA and Japan, they too have experienced the same process of declining growth since the third quarter of 1976 - although less marked because of their economic strengths.

“In Japan the recession hit later but was devastating: the rate of growth has fallen from almost 30% in April to no more than 9% in June-July to hardly 2% in November. Only the rate of industrial growth in the USA shows a different pattern, less abrupt and more reassuring: after a pinnacle of 18% in September-October 1975 the growth rate fell to 6% in the beginning of 1976, to stabilize at 7% in June-July.” (Le Monde, 5 October 1976)

As for the fall in unemployment, presented as the great victory of the ‘recovery’, this was essentially due to the fact that the USA added 1.8 million to its labour force from the beginning of 1976.1 In Europe, on the contrary, not only has the number of unemployed remained exactly the same in France, Italy and even West Germany, but in Great Britain the number has grown to the record figure of 6.4 per cent of the active population.

It is this extremely ‘moderate’ nature of the ‘recovcry’ which explains the fall-back in the inflation of wholesale prices and raw material prices (but not retail prices which always rise): thus, as in 1975, a movement started from July-August to lower metal prices in order to counteract the falling sales in metals, particularly from Japan. The fall-back in inflation, which the economists of capital have taken to be a sign of 'recovery', actually expresses a relapse into the crisis.

MECHANISMS OF THE 'RECOVERY’

Unlike the ‘recoveries’ following the recessions of 1967-8 and 1971 the 'recovery' in the first quarter of 1976 was of a sectoral and non-generalized nature. The boost to production was far from being the result of a rise in investment in fixed capital (as had been the case with the preceding ‘recoveries’ through a policy of hyper-inflation); this ‘recovery’ was above all the result of purchases in durable goods (cars, electrical gadgets, etc) in addition to public service expenditure (social security, public works, housing etc). In fact the ‘recovery’ was quite simply a matter of 'depreciation’ costs (wear and tear of durable goods and public facilities). As the OECD asserted on the subject in France:

“Demand emanating from the public sector and private consumption were the motive force behind this recovery. Later they were replaced by foreign demand and a new restocking cycle. The extremely brisk increase in demand for household goods was stimulated by last autumn's reflationary measures and essentially meant a catching-up on the purchase of durable goods which had been deferred since 1974.”

Today, whatever Professor Duhring's descendants in the shape of the left and leftists may claim to the contrary, the idea that consumption can be a boost to production is more than ever an utter lie. This is so not only because the very survival of capital implies a more rapid growth in Sector I (production goods) than in Sector II (consumption goods), but also because growth in Sector I implies the necessary relative or absolute decline in Sector II, this being the contradiction which lies at the very heart of the capitalist system. In fact there can only ever be a rise in oonsumption when it is based on a massive and lasting growth in production which corresponds to the existence of solvent markets. And today the crises of decadent capitalism are accompanied not only by a relative decline in consumption but also by an absolute decline. Today when millions of workers are being thrown out of production and the mass of the proletariat is subject to an ever-increasing decline in its wages, both nominal and real, this analysis is proved more than ever to be correct.

This is why the apparent demand for consumer goods was really an attempt to keep ahead of the wear and tear on consumer goods necessary for the upkeep of the labour force.

Moreover, we can observe the complete inability of capitalism to maintain any level of consumption,except for a more and more restricted sector of the population, in the fact that this so-called policy of 'stimulation' of the economy has not only not stopped the decline in production for all capitalist countries, but has been accompanied by a real worsening in inflation through a policy of growing debts and budgetary deficits. Thus the increase in the volume of trade in the first quarter of 1976 has brought with it a speed-up in the current deficits of the OECD which have risen from 6 billion dollars in 1975 to some 20 billion dollars (annual rate) during the first quarter of 1976.

Faced with the growing pessimism of the bourgeoisie, governments have implemented all kinds of measures to encourage investments in production: from tax credits to subsidies for investments, to a quicker redemption of debts. Thus at the end of 1975 the French government granted fiscal reductions to companies on 10 percent of the value of orders for capital goods carried out between 1 May 1975 and 7 January 1976. When governments are in a state of semi-bankruptcy financially they make urgent appeals for foreign loans: a loan of 1 billion dollars to Italy from the OECD and also to Great Britain and Portugal where the central banks have been propping up these flagging economies. But, as The Economist recently noted: "The bankers are worried now about the fate of these loans, but they have allowed trade to continue." (our emphasis) It could not have been stated clearer: survival by credit, or the sudden death of the system!2

Through this growth in budgetary deficits and foreign debts we see the ever-increasing role of state intervention in the economy. This is the real motive force behind the 'boom' when a real boom in markets is missing, for markets have continued to stagnate and even to decrease (the share in the world market of the seven largest OECD countries further declined in 1976, the only exceptions to this tendency being West Germany and Japan). Faced with this state of affairs governments have implemented a system to encourage exports by subsidies and lessening taxes on profits. This policy has encouraged exporting countries like West Germany and Japan to significantly increase their share of exports in world trade.

THE BREVITY OF THE 'RECOVERIES'

One of the most convincing indications of the permanent character of the general crisis of the system since 1967 is that the length of the phases of 'recovery' have become shorter. The crisis of 1967-8 was followed by a two-year 'recovery'; the 'recovery' in 1971 only lasted a year and a half.
The 1976 'recovery' lasted scarcely more than six months. On the other hand the phases of recession have lengthened: one year in 1967 and 1971 and almost two years in 1974-5. Thus the phases of 'recovery' become shorter and shorter to the point that they become non-existent, while the phases of recession become longer and longer, tending to become permanent.

We can thus clearly see the futility of 'marxist' explanations (like the one in Programme Communiste, no.67) which describe cycles of growth and recession in capitalist decadence. These cycles had a real existence in the nineteenth century when recessions opened up the way to an enlarged expansion onto the world market. But they can have no real existence when capitalism is in decline.

While capitalism was still an ascendant mode of production and was still developing its modern form of industrial capital, the development of economic cycles was a manifestation of the organic growth of the system. The cycles of expansion and recession were therefore expressing in a material way the contradictory development of a system coming up against the limitations of national markets when its mode of existence was already set within a global framework. Capital was not yet limited by the completion of the conquest of the world market and experienced crises which essentially were ones
of adaptation, when the growth in production tended to be more rapid than that of the market, or when the incessant technical revolution imposed an ever more rapid transferring of capital to new branches of production. The crises therefore acted as spurs
to new and greater cycles of production on the level of the world market. The reason for these periodic phases of recession and stagnation, as regular as the tides and generally short, came to lay less and less in the burden of agricultural or climatic conditions (for example the crisis of 1847) as in the temporary weakness of that universal aspect in the world-wide growth of production: capital in its money or credit form. The long phases of depression (long in relative terms) such as the one from 1873-96 found their origins in the appearance of more modern capitals (Germany and the USA) who started to compete with the old capitalist countries (Great Britain, France) and were therefore of a more local than international nature. It was then a question of different levels of development in the general period of international expansion of the system. As for the crises which burst out at the peak of these cycles, they became less and less frequent but more severe (1873) in relation to the colossal expansion of the system itself.

What were natural cycles in the life of a developing system are today nothing but convulsions, spasms of a declining system which occur with greater frequency and with shorter and shorter intervals in between. Only the mechanisms applied by the bourgeoisie since 1929 have to some extent attenuated the violent growth of these convulsions - although these mechanisms are becoming weaker and weaker like a brake will with overuse. To imagine in spite of all this that the bourgeoisie is able to launch 'recoveries' and booms at will before falling once more into a new crisis, is to believe that the bourgeoisie is able to overcome its mortal contradictions indefinitely:

"The global cycle we have observed from 1971 to 1975 has an average duration of four to five years ….. Within this hypothesis the slow recovery in the beginning must speed up towards 1977 because of the simultaneity of forces at play in the economic cycle and the interdependence of economies; this recovery would have to be as vigorous as the fall was deep and should take place towards 1978 with a new productive boom." (Programme Communiste, no. 67)

The transparency of the 'recovery' in today's crisis and the bankruptcy into which the whole of Europe is slowly sinking in the wake of the Third World countries, will soon sweep away such pseudo-dialectical mumbo-jumbo about the 'natural' cycles of capitalism in decadence.3

THE 'RECOVERY' IS UNEQUAL

Recessions in the period of reconstruction during the fifties were of a purely conjunctural origin (due to the inequality of reconstruction according to country, the weight of colonial wars etc) which is also why the recovery was general and continued on such a regular and strong path.

Since 1967, the beginning of the phase of the general crisis of capitalism, the very opposite has taken place. Recession has become the rule and recovery the exception.In general, the 'recovery' on a world scale has only affected the most powerful economies, essentially the dominant imperialisms who can throw off the effects of the crisis onto their zone of influence, like the USA and Russia who temporarily benefited from the 'recovery' by strengthening their hold over their own bloc. In reality only three countries experienced a real recovery in production and foreign trade: the USA, West Germany and above all Japan. The famous 'recovery' in fact saw the fall of the three larger capitalist powers: Italy, Great Britain and France.

At the end of the day, only the USA with its greater economic strength has been able to withstand the increasing competition posed by West Germany and Japan. It has achieved this by floating the dollar and taking a series of protectionist measures, while at the same time exerting political pressure on its allies. The weakness of Japan and West Germany, whose production depends on keeping up and even increasing exports, is clear to see; and in the USA industrial production has already declined in the third quarter of 1976 and unemployment has reappeared. Thus we can see that movements of 'recovery' that were both local and international in 1969-70 and 1972-3 have now become unequal and purely local. We can also say that as these periods of 'recovery' become purely local expressions and then increasimgly appear in only two or three nation, they also take on a negative character: the 'recovery' in production is simply a relative slowing down in the fall in production as compared to the previous period of 'recession'. At the same time the precondition for this local 'recovery' is the acceleration in the decomposition of the
weakest competing economies. And within this general decomposition, what the bourgeoisie calls 'recovery' is no more than a greater capacity to put a brake on the free fall of the economy on the part of the economically strongest countries, and no longer corresponds to a rise in industrial production and world trade. In this new mortal crisis of world capitalism there can no longer be an alternation of economic cycles as in the ascendant phase: there is only one cycle, that of the permanent crisis which leads either to war or revolution.

Let us examine in more detail some of the measures which capital has tried to take in both the national and international spheres in order to halt the rapid decomposition of the economy.

THE SOLUTIONS OF THE BOURGEOISIE:

Export More

From the East to the West it is heralded as the miracle solution. This is the solution which presents itself particularly to the weaker capitals on account of their own second-rate home market. For example, in Poland, exports were increased by 30 percent in 1975 acting as the key to the maintenance of the GNP. For all the Eastern bloc countries exports to the OECD zone have increased from 22 per cent to 30 per cent in 1975. The same thing applies to Italy and Great Britain where successive devaluations allowed them to increase the volume and value of their exports.

Despite the massive aid pumped into exporting companies by the different countries a much smaller number of countries have enjoyed the few months of 'recovery' than in 1972; Essentially these were countrles where the productivity of labour has been noticeably raised or was maintained at a former level, while the real wages of the workers have diminished. This is particularly true in the three major powers in world trade: Japan, West Germany and the USA. This can be proved by looking at the development of unit-costs of manpower in manufacturing industries:

% INCREASE IN LABOUR COSTS

 

1973-74

1974-75

1975-76

Germany (all industry)

+11.6

+7.5

+2.0

USA

+9.5

+11.0

+4.5

Japan

+28.7

+22.5

+6.0

France

+13.5

+16.0

+9.0

Italy

+20.5

+25.0

+17.0

Figures from the OECD Economic Perspectives, 1976

It is thanks to its greater competivity that Japanese capital has been able to improve its position to the detriment of the USA by becoming the main exporter of steel and by solidly implanting itself in Latin America and Europe in the automobile and electronic fields. To a lesser extent it has done this in the USA and West Germany as well. However, the fact that Japan's hold over such crucial capital exports is at the expense of other capitals, means that the latter can less and less be used as outlet for Japan's goods, so that overall there is in fact a decrease in markets.

The first contradiction of this 'solution' for capital can be observed in the current massive export of capital. Foreign investment has increased to a previously unknown proportion; for example, West Germany and Japan have increased theirs seven times since 1967. What people refer to as the 'multinationals' having increasing investments outside their country of origin really expresses the need of capital to reduce its costs of production by lessening the share of variable capital included in the price of a commodity. The places for investment can only be those where the average cost of labour is below the average in developed countries and where the production of commodities is necessarily a simple process. The installation of production units discharging commodities onto a world market at lower prices can only reinforce the very competition it is trying to overcome: according to the Far Eastern Review (15.10.76) the implantation of Japanese electronic factories in Singapore and South Korea brought with it an increased competition on the Japanese home market for cameras and transistor radios. The same thing has happened in the largest capitalist power, the USA. Because of the lowering costs of labour power in the USA over the last three years4 European and Japanese multinationals have already taken one quarter of American exports with investments costs at half those in 1970. (Mentioned in Neue Zurcher Zeitung. 29 June 1976.)

This pursuit of lower investment costs on the world market is accompanied by a fall in investment in the larger industrial countries.

This brings us to the second contradiction, (a corollary to the first) which increasingly affects the industrialized countries, and that is the need to continue investing productively in their own national capital in order to maintain the minimum of modernization in machinery, a prerequisite for the maintenance of competivity in export commodities. But budgetary restrictions and a massive reduction in profits for capital bring with them a growing reduction in productive investments and technical research in proportion to decreasing markets:

"The weak inclination to invest, apparent in the USA for some years, has now resulted in the phenomenon of a much more rapid ageing in machinery than in Japan or West Germany. While in West Germany in 1975 less than 50 per cent of industrial machinery was eleven years old or more, in the USA the proportion was 85 per cent; in the most important sectors such as steel, paper and cars, there is no longer any trace of innovation." (Der Spiegel, 29 March 1976)

What is already true for the USA (and even more so for Britain) can only be repeated on a larger scale in the weaker countries. Countries like Russia or Poland which, in spite of their accumulation problems, or rather because of them, attempt to modernize their productive apparatus with investments obtained through systematic overseas borrowing, can in the long run only burden their commodities with the heavy weight of these foreign debts. Without a foothold in the world market they will only accelerate their bankruptcy and also the bankruptcy of the lending countries who will be unable to recover their loans.

This is why the only possihle investments for the capitalists are those that they cynically call 'rationalizations'. Further on we will look at how these 'rationnlizations' really mean more unemployment and increasing exploitation for the working class.

Thus, what the bourgeoisie is pleased to call the 'scarcity of capital' really only expresses the growing powerlessness of capital, both East and West, to find new outlets for its commodities. To develop the productive apparatus in order to realize an ever shrinking volume of capital becomes increasingly absurd even within the framework of this system. Today only the most developed capitals are able in any way to break the fall in their investments and keep production at previous levels; and this can only be at the expense of destroying weaker capitals, which leads to a further contraction of solvent markets.

The Return of Protectionist Measures

The end of the Irecoveryl once more puts on the agenda the time-honoured recipes of the bourgeoisie in crisis. Because of the generalized bankruptcy expressed in the negative balance of payments of the Eastern countries, Third World countries and the OECD countries (apart from West Germany and Japan for the time being), each country is trying to protect its own home market from competition by restricting import commodities.

Over recent months the free circulation of products within the EEC was a reality. However, France recently decided to put a price freeze on importers' goods until 31 December in order to fight against German competition. Since last spring, Italy has put a 50 percent surcharge on imports. In order to fight against Japanese competition Great Britain started talking about imposing supplementary quotas. In general, all the anti-inflation plans adopted in Europe over the last few months will have the effect of restraining foreign trade. The EEC believes that trade within the community will decrease in value from 13 percent to 10 percent in a year.

In the Eastern bloc countries the same tendency is apparent. In Hungary, for example, the five-year plan predicted a decline in imports as much from within COMECON as from the OECD, the figures given being respectively: from 9.9% a year to 6.5% and from 8.3% to 6.5% (Courrier des Pays de l'Est, May 1976).

In the USA, that haven of 'free trade', the government decided in June to impose quotas on steel imports (specialized steel and stainless steel). This recent imposition of quotas in steel imports reveals the same tendency to return to a sort of autarky as did the numerous inquiries into Japanese dumping of televisions, cars and shoes.

Nevertheless, such extreme measures can only be taken within very well-defined limits owing to:

– the greater international division of labour and interpenetration or rather inter-dependence of the largest capitals than in the past;

– the strengthening of blocs which demands a minimum level of economic stability. The bankruptcy of a given country under the blows of too-vicious protectionist measures can only lead to the bankruptcy of other economies in a chain reaction;

– the lessons which the bourgeoisie has learnt following the 1929 crisis about the catastrophic effect of a brutal return to autarky by national capitals;

– the development of the class struggle since 1968, which imposes a certain prudence on the bourgeoisie about limiting essential consumer imports (for example, the lesson which the Polish bourgeoisie learnt from the workers' riots in 1970).

In the coming period, therefore, we can predict that we will see protectionist measures being accompanied by hagglings over export quotas and 'mutual compensations'.5 However, the gradual limitations on trade can only postpone the inevitable crash of the world economy, and ensure that it will take place on a much more extensive scale. At the same time, the massive 'aid' granted to the weaker economies by the central banks, by unleashing new waves of hyper-inflation, risks unleashing at some time or other a generalized financial bankruptcy; this is because the permanence of the crisis will produce movements of more and more uncontrollable panic within the bourgeoisie.

State Capitalism and Austerity Measures

All the measures to 'boost' the economy taken by the different national states demonstrate the growing importance of the statels role in favorizing exports and restricting imports on the home market and expresses the tendency for the whole economy to be taken over by the state apparatus, the ultimate crutch of this declining system.

The tendency towards state capitalism, which has resulted in total control of the economy in the Eastern bloc and most Third World countries (eg Peru, Algeria, China etc) also exists in all countries where capitalism is in a state of debilitation and endemic stagnatlon; and recently the tendency has considerably increased in countries where the economy is in an adverse position vis-a-vis the world market. The coming to power of the left in Europe, in order to take the nationalization measures necessary to obtain a centralized control over the economy, will appear more and more inevitable in the months to come. The repeated cropping up of 'scandals' in all the Western countries could perhaps be interpreted as signs of the increasingly intense pressures being exerted by a growing faction of the bourgeoisie on the most backward or developed sectors of capital, in order to get them to submit to the necessity for an increasingly energetic state control of the most important capitalist firms.

Where capital has traditionally been the most powerful (Japan and the USA) this tendency to state capitalism is essentially expressed by an increasingly rapid rate of capital concentration, encouraged for the most part by means of a variety of state 'aids', Just between January and April 1976 the number of fusions rose to 264, 40 percent more than during the same period in 1975. What's more, in the USA there is a growing faction of the capitalist class which has no hesitation in envisaging a planned economy as a very real possibility. In April 1976, the President of the Ways and Means Commission of the House of Representatives had to announce that:

"The expression 'planned economy' is considered in some circles to be like a red flag used against private enterprise and evokes the image of soviet commissars; it would be absurd for a government to plan the complex system of supply and demand down to the very last detail, but it would be even more absurd to claim that the government has no responsibility about having some foresight and taking intelligent measures in order to avoid dangers or even disaster." (Cited by Hiscox in 'Analysis of the Crisis in the USA', Critique of Political Economy, nos.24-25.)

But even in the state capitalist countries this tendency is accelerated by putting into operation plans (like the ones in Russia) which envisage the liquidation of the small peasant property-holder and the reorganization of land into agrico-industrial complexes. This is now a necessity after the recent succession of agricultural disasters. Thus the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party issued a decree on 2 June 1976 concerning the "development of specialization and agricultural concentration on the basis of inter-company co-operation and agrico-industrial integration." Such statements quite clearly point out their main preoccupations, (quoted from Courrier des Pays de l'Est, July-August 1976). In addition there has been over the last few years a particularly accelerated fusion of capital by horizontal and vertical concentrations: these measures have made the fusion of capital with the state more direct, and in 1976 have led to the development of industrial units regrouping formerly autonomous companies (their number has now reached 2300 according to Kosygin's speech at the Twenty Fifth Congress of the Russian CP).

These measures to 'rationalize' the economy in face of the crisis are accompanied by unprecedented austerity measures which tend towards 'cheapening' accumulation for a state severely paralyzed by budgetary deficits of dizzying proportions. In 1975, as a result of the 'stimulation' measures following the recession, the budgetary deficits reached unprecedented heights: 70 billion dollars for the USA; 35 billion for West Germany; 10 billion dollars for Japan, etc.

With the end of the 'recovery' the OECD warned and advised its members to reduce their budgetary deficits; according to the OECD they should be reduced from 1977 onwards. These reductions would come primarily from cuts in 'services' (social security in particular, whose costs have risen everywhere) which constitute a part of workers' wages. In New York the 'rationalization' measures in municipal services balanced the books by getting rid of 36,000 jobs, while other big cities decided on massive lay-offs, increased taxes, and a draconian reduction in social aid. Similarly, from France to Italy and Poland the governments have taken measures to freeze wages and introduce tax increases; and in Poland the government decided, as a matter of course, to levy some part of savings bank deposits in order to subsidize house-building.

GROWING PAUPERIZATION OF THE PROLETARIAT

In recent years we have seen a considerable growth in the rate of exploitation of the proletariat through a vicious increase in productivity for those workers still employed. This increase in the rate of exploitation through the extraction of relative surplus value is supplemented by absolute exploitation through enforced overtime.

The relative pauperization of the proletariat which is a permanent feature of the capitalist system, is now joined by the growth of absolute pauperization. In the past this was denied by the reformists when the cyclical crises crashed down on the vast majority of the proletariat, and today it is denied by the left of capital when the crisis has become permanent and has ended up affecting the entire class. Limited during the period of reconstruction to Third World and East European countrics, the tendency towards pauperization is now affecting the immense majority of the world proletariat through:

– the constant unemployment which now affects 20 million workers in the OECD countries and at least 20 percent of the active population in Third World countries; in East European countries where it is not officially recognized, it is often hidden by the existence of labour camps, (according to Contemporary Poland, September 1971, there were 600,000 unemployed before the 1970 events). More and more this immense mass of unemployed is being pushed towards the threshold of physical poverty as governments cut down their already paltry benefits to the unemployed. While this threshold of physical poverty varies quantitatively according to each country (depending on the historic rates of pay of the different working classes), qualitatively speaking (as the OECD inquiries into 'poverty' have demonstrated) the whole capitalist world is moving towards the poverty-line,and in some cases has already crossed over it.6

– the cutting of real wages, which is expressed both by the cutting of benefits (family allowances, social security etc) and by the decrease of buying power which is being attacked with increasing severity by galloping inflation. The official statistics from the Department of Trade reveal that the average real wage of wage-earners has fallen by more than 10 percent between 1972 and 1975, even in the USA. Judging from the official statistics from Ministries of Labour and employers, it seems that in one year from 1974-5 real wages fell on average more than 6 percent in France, Japan and Great Britain. This fall can be more or less sharp in the different countries affected by the crisis depending on how fiercely the workers resist the massive attacks of capital; in Poland, for example, the workers had just peen subjected to massive reductions in their real wages when the insurrection of 1970 forced the Polish government to become massively indebted to the USA and Russia in order to dampen the powder-keg of class struggle with a nominal 40 percent raise in wages to be spread over five years (Le Monde Diplomatique, October 1976). This to a large extent explains the bankruptcy of Polish capital, which sees today that 'to produce more' means to 'consume less'.

The living conditions of the working class were only made worse by the 'recovery', which was accompanied by wage freezes and an inflation which became more violent when 'boom' techniques were set in motion. The complete lie of a 'recovery' is exposed by this more than anything else.

The return of absolute pauperization, believed to be definitively banished from 'industrial societies', confirms the analysis Rosa Luxemburg made almost seventy years ago:

“The lowest, most reprobate and miserable layers which are rarely or never employed are not the rubbish which the bourgeoisie describes as the 'good for nothings' of 'official society'; these layers are intimately linked to the best placed upper layers of industrial workers down through all the intermediary members of
the reserve army. The existence of the lowest layers of the proletariat is determined by the same laws of capitalist production that swell or reduce its numbers; and so the proletariat forms an organic whole, a social class whose degrees of misery and oppression allow it to grasp the capitalist law of wages in its totality, and that includes farm labourers and the reserve army of unemployed with all its different strata, from the highest to the lowest.” (Rosa Luxemburg,
Introduction to Political Economy) (our translation)

Thus the pauperization of the class does not mean its defeat or atomization; absolute pauperization far from expressing the organic decomposition of the exploited class, as was the case in the periods of decline in the slave and feudal systems, is the organic affirmation of a whole class, an historic class forced to affirm itself through revolution, or to disappear through the war that will signify the general destruction of humanity.

PERSPECTIVES

In the report brought out after the meeting of the principal OECD members in June 1976, the world bourgeoisie imagined 'scenarios' of growth (the bourgeoisie no longer speaks of forecasts, given the growing bankruptcy of state capitalism). It considers:

– that growth until 1980 must be moderate (not more than 5 per cent per annum) in order to avoid a new wave of inflation which could make the international monetary and financial system sink into bankruptcy after too strong a 'recovery'. Thus the bourgeoisie, which once developed the productive forces in a historically progressive manner, and puffed itself up with the pride of a conquering class, today acknowledges that the condition for its survival now rests upon "containing the risks of an excessive growth in profitslt and avoiding “the risk involved in an under-estimation of the strength of expansionist forces", (OECD, June 1976);

– that “growth between 1975 and 1980 can only happen if wage rises are prevented from reaching a level which would compromise productivity and discourage investment.” Said another way, the slowing-down in decline now depends on whether the bourgeoisie can limit the class struggle. The bourgeoisie is beginning to understand that the survival of its system now lies in the hands of the proletarian class.

Nevertheless, today's crisis is still developing slowly. Unlike in 1929 the crash in the economy doesn't spread from the most powerful nations to the weakest (from the USA to Germany from 1929 to 1932) but rather from the least developed centres (Italy, Great Britain and France) to the heartlands of capitalism (USA, Japan, Russia) because of a slow process whereby the fall of the weak economies is momentarily accompanied by the relative strengthening of their strongest rivals. In view of the gradual disappearance of the phases of 'recovery' and the support world capital has given to its bankrupt partners by an increasing resort to fictitious capital, the bourgeoisie has to resist the temptations to panic which are more and more appearing in its midst (despite all the international organs which it has set up since 1945 to assure some kind of cohesion among the various national capitals). Otherwise the threat of generalized bankruptcy will present itself to a terrified bourgeoisie.

These then are the two factors - class struggle and the growing panic of the bourgeoisie - which together determine the survival of the system.

The State and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat

Presentation on the Period of Transition

In the ICC Platform adopted at the First Congress of the ICC in January 1976, the question of the relationship between the proletariat and the state in the period of transition remained “open”:

“The experience of the Russian Revolution has shown the complexity and seriousness of the problem of the relationship between the class and the state in the period of transition. In the coming period, the proletariat and revolutionaries cannot evade this problem, but must make every effort to resolve it." (The Platform of the ICC, “The Dictatorship of the Proletariat” (Point 15), in International Review no.5.)

It is in the context of this effort that the Second Congress of Revolution Internationale has approached the question and tried to formulate a resolution which sums up the point reached by the discussion so far.

But the question which has been raised is of a programmatic character. Since the ICC Platform is the only programmatic basis for all sections of the Current, it goes without saying that only the general Congress of the ICC has the competence to decide about any possible changes in the Platform.

Thus by taking up a position on the resolution on the period of transition, the Second Congress of RI will not be altering the programmatic basis of RI; just like any other section of the ICC, RI does not have a distinct programmatic basis from the Current as a whole.

THE LIMITS OF THE DISCUSSION

Before going into the complex problems of the period of transition, it would be useful to distinguish three main areas of discussion:

– The general specificities which characterize the period of transition from capitalism to communism and which distinguish it from other historical periods of transition.

– The relationship between the revolutionary class and the rest of society during the period of transition; in other words the problem of what is meant by the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and, consequently, what must be the relationship between the revolutionary class and the state during the transition period.

– Questions about all the concrete 'economic' measures for the transformation of social production.

Revolutionaries must try to give an answer to all those problems. However, ever since Marx and Engels first laid down the bases of 'scientific materialism', revolutionaries have been aware that they must be conscious of the tremendous limitations imposed by the very limitations of proletarian experience in this area. Otherwise they risk losing themselves in the kind of speculations which Marx dismissed contemptuously as "recipes for the dishes of the future". The extent of these limitations was underlined by Marx in 1875 in his Critique of the Gotha Programme:

" … what transformation will the nature of the state undergo in communist society? In other words, what social functions will remain in existence there that are analogous to present functions of the state? This question can only be answered scientifically, and one does not get a flea-hop nearer to the problem by a thousandfold combination of the word people with the word state."

This same awareness was expressed by Rosa Luxemburg in 1918 in her pamphlet on the Russian Revolution:

"Far from being a sum of ready-made prescriptions which only have to be applied, the practical realization of socialism as an economic, social, and juridical system is something which lies completely hidden in the mists of the future. What we possess in our programme is nothing but a few signposts which indicate the general direction in which to look for the necessary measures, and the indications are mainly negative in character at that … (socialism) has as its prerequisite a number of measures of force against property etc. The negative, the tearing down, can be decreed; the building up, the positive, cannot. New territory. A thousand problems. Only experience is capable of correcting and opening new ways." (The Russian Revolution)

Beyond these general limitations, the resolution is bound by the objectives it sets for itself. It does not claim to make a synthesis of everything that has been clarified by revolutionaries on the period of transition. In particular the resolution does not go into the question of the economic measures for the transformation of social production. On the one hand, it includes the positions which were acquired by the workers' movement before the experience of the Russian Revolution and which have shown themselves to be genuine class frontiers; on the other hand it includes a number of positions concerning the relationshlp between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state in the period of transition. These positions have been derived mainly from the Russian Revolution, and although they are not in themselves class frontiers, they are lessons sufficiently developed by historical experience to be an integral part of the programmatic basis of a revolutionary organization.

These fundamental class frontiers are: the inevitability of a transition period; the primacy of the proletariat's political activity as the precondition and guarantee of the transition towards a classless society; the world-wide character of this transformation; the specificity of the power of the working class, in particular the fact that the proletariat, in contrast to other revolutionary classes in history, has no economic basis within the old society, and therefore does not fight for political domination in order to consolidate itself as an economically ruling class, but in order to put an end to all economic domination by abolishing classes themselves; the impossibility of the proletariat using the bourgeois state apparatus and the necessity for its destruction as a precondition for the establishment of proletarian political power; the inevitability of a state during the period of transition, even though this state will be profoundly different from all other states in history.

These positions already represent a categorical rejection of all the social democratic, anarchist, self-management, and modernist conceptions which have always been present in the workers' movement but which are today pillars of the counter-revolution.

On the basis of these fundamental class positions the resolution goes on to define, primarily from the experiences of the Russian Revolution, certain aspects of the relationship between the proletariat and the
state during the transition period. Thus we have an understanding of the inevitably conservative nature of the transitional state; the impossibility of the proletariat or its party identifying themselves with this state; the necessity for the working class to conceive of its relationship to this state (in which it participates as a politically ruling class) as being a relationship of force: "domination over society is thus its domination over the state"; the necessity for the existence and armed strength of the working class's own specific organizations: only the working class is organized as a class in this period and the state can have no coercive power over the proletariat's own organizations.

These positions enable us to reject the mystifications which served as a basis for "the counter-revolution which developed in Russia under the direction of a degenerating Bolshevik Party" and which are defended today by all the Stalinist and Trotskyist currents as a theoretical justification for identifying state capitalism with socialism.

The content of this resolution thus represents a real safeguard against all the erroneous conceptions which the proletariat could encounter in its coming world-wide assault on the capitalist system. However, no matter how important these positions might be for the future struggles of the class, we must understand the real limits of this acquisition today.

The historic experiences which gave rise to these positions dealing with the relationship between class and state in the transition period are still much too rare and specific for the conclusions that can be drawn from them to be considered class lines by revolutionaries today. Class lines are positions which establish a clear point of demarcation between the bourgeois camp and the proletarian camp. They cannot be drawn up by revolutionaries on the basis of insufficient historical experience or in anticipation of the future; they can only arise on the empirical basis provided by the very history of proletarian struggle, which must be sufficiently clear to supply us with lessons that are'beyond discussion'.7

It is therefore necessary to underline how very limited are the points which we can consider as definite gains on this question: the rejection of the identification of the proletariat or its party with the transitional state; the definition of the relationship between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state as being one of the dictatorship of the class over the state, and never the state over the class; the defence of the autonomy of the proletariat's own organizations in relation to the state, as being the precondition for the real autonomy and strength of the proletarian dictatorship.

These points are still inevitably abstract and general. They are simply "a few main signposts which indicate the general direction in which to look for the necessary measures, and the indications are mainly negative in character at that." The precise forms in which they will be put into practice inevitably remain a "new territory" which only experience will allow us to open up.

A precondition for the effectiveness of a revolutionary organization is not only understanding what it knows and can know, but also what it does not and cannot know. This can only come from its ability to show a real programmatic rigour and to grasp the fundamental lessons provided by the living struggle of the proletarian masses.

THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLASS AND STATE IN THE HISTORY OF THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT

The general lack of knowledge about the history of the workers' movement, which has been aggravated by the organic break between the revolutionaries today and the former political organizations of the class, have led some to think that the analysis presented in this resolution is somehow a 'discovery' or an 'originality' of the ICC. A brief summary of the way this question has been tackled (one might even say 'discovered') by revolutionaries since Marx and Engels will soon show how wrong this view is.

In the Communist Manifesto which did not yet make use of the term "dictatorship of the proletariat", the "first step in the revolution of the working class" is defined as raising "the proletariat to the position of ruling class, (winning) the battle of democracy". This conquest refers in fact to the apparatus of the bourgeois state which the proletariat must use in order:

" ... to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of the state ie of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible."

Even if the idea of the ultimate disappearance of the state was already affirmed in The Poverty of Philosophy; even if the idea of the inevitable existence of a state during the “first step of the revolution of the working class” is present in the Manifesto, the actual problem of the relationship between the working class and the state during the period of transition was hardly touched upon.

It was the experience of the Paris Commune which really began to allow the problem to be more fully understood through the lessons that Marx and Engels drew from it: the necessity for the proletariat to destroy the bourgeois state apparatus, the setting up of a completely different apparatus which was "no longer a state in the proper sense of the word" (Engels), since it was no longer an organ for the oppression of the majority by a minority. That this apparatus was still burdened with the weight of the past was clearly underlined by Engels who defined it as a "necessary evil”:

" … an evil inherited by the proletariat after its victorious struggle for class supremacy, whose worse sides the victorious proletariat, just like the Commune, cannot avoid having to lop off at once as much as possible until such time as a generation reared in new, free social conditions is able to throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap heap." ('Introduction' to The Civil War in France.)

However, despite an intuitive awareness of the necessity for the proletariat to distrust this apparatus inherited from the past (the proletariat, Engels, said "must safeguard itself against its own deputies and officials, by declaring them all, without exception, subject to recall at any moment"), and probably because the extremely short and circumscribed experience of the Paris Commune did not make it possible to really pose the problem of the relationship between the proletariat, the state, and the other non-exploiting classes in society, one of the ideas which came out of the Commune was the identification of the proletarian dictatorship with the transitional state. Thus, three years after the Paris Commune, Marx wrote in his Critique of the Gotha Program:

"Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.”

This was the theoretical basis which Lenin reformulated in the concept of the 'proletarian state' in State and Revolution; and it was on this basis that the Bolsheviks and the Russian proletariat established the dictatorship of the proletariat in 1917.

This attempt at proletarian power confronted the most enormous difficulties - the overwhelming majority of peasants in Russian society, the immediate necessity to wage a pitiless civil war, the international isolation of Russia, the extreme weakness of a productive apparatus destroyed by the First World War and then the civil war. All this was to dramatically highlight the problem of the relationship between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state.

The grim reality of these events was to prove that it was not enough to baptize the state as 'proletarian' for it to serve the revolutionary interests of the proletariat; that it was not enough to place the proletarian party at the head of the state (to the point where it became totally identified with it) for the state machine to follow the course on which even the most dedicated revolutionaries wanted to set it.

The state apparatus, the state bureaucracy, could not be the expression of proletarian interests alone. As an apparatus whose task was to ensure the survival of society it could only express the survival needs of the moribund Russian economy. What Marxists have said from the very beginning was powerfully vindicated: the imperatives of economic survival imposed themselves mercilessly on the policies of the state. And the economy was a long way from being influenced in any proletarian direction. Lenin had to admit this powerlessness at the Eleventh Congress of the Party, one year after the NEP had begun:

"You communists, you workers, the politically enlightened section of the proletariat, which undertook to administer the state, must be able to arrange it so that the state, which you have taken into your hands, shall function the way you want it to … the state is in our hands: but has it operated the New Economic Policy in the way we wanted in this past year? No! … How did it operate? The machine refused to obey the hand that guided it. It was like a car that was going not in the direction the driver desired, but in the direction someone else desired." (From Lenin and Trotsky, Lenin's Fight Against Stalinism, ed. Russell Block, Pathfinder Press, Inc. New York, 1975, p. 75.)

The identification of the proletarian party with the state did not lead to the state being subordinated to the revolutionary interests of the proletariat, but to the subordination of the party to the Russian state. Under the pressure of the survival needs of the Russian state, which the Bolsheviks saw as the incarnation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the 'proletarian bastion' that had at all costs to be defended, the Bolshevik Party ended up subordinating the tactics of the Communist International to the interests of Russia (for example, alliances with the big European 'social-chauvinist' parties in an attempt to break the 'cordon sanitaire' which was strangling Russia); it was this pressure which led to the signing of the Rapallo Treaty with German imperialism; and it was to prevent any weakening of the power of the 'proletarian' state apparatus and in the name of this state, that the Kronstadt insurgents were crushed by the Red Army.

As for the working masses, the identification of their party with the state led to their vanguard being cut off from them precisely when they most needed it, while the idea of identifying their power with the power of the state rendered them powerless and confused in the face of the growing oppression of the state bureaucracy.8

The counter-revolution which reduced the dictatorship of the proletariat to ashes had arisen out of the very organ which for decades revolutionaries had thought could be identified with the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The long process of drawing out the lessons of the Russian experience began right from the beginning of the revolution itself.

The first theoretical reactions came in the midst of an unavoidable confusion; they were limited to attacking partial aspects of the problem and unable to grasp the essence of the question in the tumult of a revolution whose signs of degeneration began to appear right from the start. Rosa Luxemburg's pamphlet on the Russian Revolution in 1918, which criticized the identification of the dictatorship of the proletariat with the dictatorship of the party as well as warning against any limitation of working class political life by the state, contained already the germs of a critique of the identification of the proletariat with the transitional state. Rosa Luxemburg, although she still considered this transitional state as a 'proletarian' state, and although she still retained the idea of the "seizure of power by the socialist party", pointed out the only way of "lopping off the worse side" of this "evil", the state:

" … the only effective means in the hands of the proletarian revolution are: radical measures of a polical and social character, the speediest possible transformation of the social guarantees ol the life of the masses – the kindling of revolutionary idealism, which can be maintained over any length of time only through the intensely active life of the masses themselves under conditions of unlimited political freedom." (Rosa Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution)

In Russia and within the Bolshevik Party itself, the development of the state bureaucracy, and thus of the antagonism between the proletariat and the state power, provoked early on various reactions, such as that of Ossinky's group or later on the Workers' Group of Miasnikov. These groups, by questioning the rise of the bureacracy, were already raising, albeit in a confused manner, the question of the nature of the state and its relationship to the class.

But it is probably the polemic between Lenin and Trotsky at the Tenth Congress on the question of the unions that most sharply posed the problem of the state. Against Trotsky's idea of more and more integrating the workers' unions into the state inorder to deal with economic difficulties, Lenin defended the necessity to safeguard the autonomy of the proletariat's organization, so that the workers could defend themselves against "the nefarious abuses of the state bureaucracy". Lenin even went so far as to say that the state was not a "workers' state, but a workers' and peasants' state with numerous bureaucratic deformations". Even though these debates took place in a milieu of a generalized confusion (Lenin considered his differences with Trotsky to be questions of contingency, not principle), they were nevertheless authentic expressions of the proletariat's search for answers to the problem of the relationship between its dictatorship and the state.

The Dutch and German Left continued along the path laid down by Rosa Luxemburg concerning the development of the state bureaucracy in Russia. Having been forced to confront the problem of the degeneration of the international policies of the C.l., they were also led to elaborate a critique of what they called 'state socialism'. However, the work done by Jan Appel in collaboration with the Dutch Left on the Basic Principles of Communist Production and Distribution was mainly concerned with the economic aspects of the transition period. Concerning its political aspects they tended to reaffirm the fundamental ideas of Rosa Luxemburg.

The theoretical basis for a more profound understanding of the problem was posed above all by the work of the Italian Left in Belgium, in particular the articles by Mitchell published from no. 28 of Bilan (March-April 1936). While retaining a 'Leninist' position on the quasi-identity between party and class, Bilan was the first to clearly affirm the pernicious character of any identification between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state in the period of transition. At the same time Bilan stressed the importance of the class and its party remaining autonomous from the state. Taking up some of Rosa Luxemburg's ideas, Mitchell saw the vitality of the proletariat's own organs as the necessary antidote to the "worst sides" of the state:

"But in the middle of the most terrible contingent difficulties, the Bolsheviks did not consider the Soviet State as 'an evil inherited by the proletariat … whose worst sides the victorious proletariat … cannot avoid having to lop off as much as possible', but as an organism which could be completely identified with the proletarian dictatorship, ie with the Party.

The result of this important modification was that the foundation of the dictatorship of the proletariat was no longer to be the Party, but the state; and through the ensuing reversal of roles the latter found itself in a course of development which led not to the withering away of the state but to the reinforcement of its coercive and repressive powers. Once an instrument of the world revolution, the proletarian state was inevitably converted into a weapon of the global counter-revolution.

Although Marx, Engels, and above all Lenin had again and again emphasized the necessity to counter the state with a proletarian antidote capable of preventing its degeneration, the Russian Revolution, far from assuring the maintenance and vitality of the class organs of the proletariat, sterilized them by incorporating them into the state; and thus the revolution devoured its own substance." (Mitchell, Bilan)

Bilan's analysis still contained hesitations and weaknesses, in particular its analysis of the class nature of the transitional state, which it still characterized as a 'proletarian state'.

These understandable hesitations and inadequacies were transcended in the analysis of Internationalisme in 1946 (see the article 'The Nature of the State and the Proletarian Revolution', republished in RI's Bulletin d'Etude et de Discussion, no.1, January 1973). Basing itself on an objective analysis of the economic and political nature of the period of transition, Internationalisme clearly affirmed the non-proletarian, anti-socialist character of the transitional
state:

“The state, insofar as it is reconstituted after the revolution, expresses the immaturity of the conditions for a socialist society. It is the political superstructure of an economic base which is not yet socialist. By its very nature it is opposed to and hostile to socialism. Just as the period of transition is a historically inevitable stage which the proletariat has to go through, so the state is for the proletariat an unavoidable instrument of violence which it must use against the dispossessed classes but with which it cannot identify itself ...

The Russian experience in particular has demonstrated the theoretical falsity of the idea of the workers' state, of the proletarian nature of the state, and of identifying the dictatorship of the proletariat with the utilization by the proletariat of this instrument of coercion, the state." ('Theses on the Nature of the State and the Proletarian Revolution', Internationalisme, no.9, April 1946.)

Internationalisme drew from the experience of the Russian Revolution the vital necessity for the proletariat to exert a strict and permanent control over the state apparatus, which at the slightest reflux would become the principal force of the counter-revolution:

"History and the Russian experience in particular have demonstrated that there is no such thing as a proletarian state as such, but only a state in the hands of the proletariat, a state whose nature remains anti-socialist and which, as soon as the political vigilance of the proletariat weakens, will become the stronghold, the rallying point and the expression of the dispossessed classes of a reborn capitalism." (Ibid)

Still impregnated with certain conceptions held by the Italian Left from which Internationalisme had evolved, especially on the question of the party and of the trade unions, but clearly aware that the subject of the revolution was the working class, Internationalisme defended the necessity for total political freedom for the class and its class-wide organs (which it still thought could take the form of 'unions') in relation to the state. In particular Internationalisme condemned any use of violence by the state against the class. It was also the first to develop a real understanding of the link between economic and political problems during the transition period:

"This period of transition between capitalism and socialism under the political dictatorship of the proletariat expresses itself on the economic terrain in an energetic policy which aims to diminish class exploitation, to constantly increase the proletariat's share in the national income, to alter the relationship between variable capital and constant capital in favour of the former. This policy cannot be based simply on the programmatic declaration of the party; still less is it the prerogative of the state, the organ of coercion and administration. This policy can only find a guarantee and a real expression in the class itself, through the pressure which the class exerts over society, through its opposition to and struggle against all other classes ...

Any tendency to reduce the role of the trade unions after the revolution; any pretence that the existence of a 'workers' state' means the end of freedom to engage in union activities or strikes; any advocacy of fusing the unions with the state, through the theory of handing economic administration over to the unions, which seems revolutionary but which in fact leads to an incorporation of the unions into the state machine; any position which, however revolutionary its intentions, calls for violence within the proletariat and its organizations; any attempt to stand in the way of the broadest workers' democracy and the free play of political struggle and of fractions within the unions: any such policies are anti-working class. They falsify the relationship between party and class and weaken the proletariat's position during the transition period.

The duty of communists will be to energetically denounce and fight against all these tendencies and to work for the full development and independence of the trade union movement, which is an indispensable condition for the victory of socialism." (Ibid)

It was the achievement of Internationalisme to have provided the general theoretical framework in which the question of the relationship between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state in the period of transition could finally be posed in a solid and coherent manner.

Situated firmly within this process, the resolution presented to the Congress is to be seen as an attempt to reappropriate the principal gains of the workers' movement on this question and as an effort to continue the unending work of deepening the programmatic basis of the proletariat's revolutionary struggle.

We can see that this resolution is in no way a 'discovery' of the ICC. But we must also understand the weight of responsibility which the revolutionary organization is taking on its shoulders by attempting to assume this inheritance.

Contribution from the 2nd Congress of RI

1. Between capitalism and socialism there inevitably exists a more or less long period of transition from one to the other. It is transitional in the sense that it does not have its own stable mode of production. Its specific characteristic is the systematic and uninterrupted transformation of the relations of production. By means of political and economic measures it undermines the basis of the old system and lays the basis for new social relations, for communism.

2. Communism is a society without classes. The period of transition, which can only really develop after the victory of the revolution on a world scale, is a dynamic period which tends towards the disappearance of classes, but it still suffers from class divisions and the persistence of divergent and antagonistic interests in society.

3. In contrast to previous periods of transition in history, all of which unfolded within the old society and culminated in revolution, the period of transition from capitalism to communism can only begin after the destruction of the political domination of capitalism, and in the first instance of the capitalist state. The general political seizure of power over society by the proletariat, the dictatorship of the proletariat, precedes, conditions, and guarantees the process of economic and social transformation.

4. In contrast to the bourgeois revolutions which took place within the framework of the region or nation, socialism can only be realized on a world scale. The extension of the revolution and of the civil war is thus the primordial act which conditions the possibilities for and the rhythm of the social-economic transformation in the country or countries where the proletariat has already taken political power.

5. A product of the division of society into classes, the dictatorship of the proletariat is distinguished from the power of previous ruling classes by the following essential characteristics:

a. Not being an economically dominant class, the working class does not exert power in order to defend any economic privileges (it does not and can never have any) but in order to destroy all privileges.

b. For this reason, unlike other ruling classes, it has no need to hide its goals, to mystify the oppressed classes by presenting its dictatorship as the reign of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity.

c. This dictatorship does not have the aim of perpetuating the existing state of affairs, but on the contrary of revolutionizing the social fabric so as to ensure the advent of a genuinely human society without exploitation or oppression.

6. In all class societies, in order to prevent the class antagonisms of society from exploding into permanent struggles which threaten its entire equilibrium, endangering the very existence of that society, superstructures and institutions have emerged of which the state is the highest expression, whose essential function is to maintain these struggles within an acceptable framework, to adapt themselves to and conserve the existing economic infrastructure.

7. The period of transition to socialism is as we have seen a society still divided into classes. This is the reason why there will inevitably arise in this period this superstructural organism, this unavoidable evil, the state.

But there are fundamental differences between this state and the state in other class societies:

a. In the first place, the fact that for the first time in history it is the state of the majority of exploited and non-exploiting classes against the minority (the former ruling class), and not of an exploiting minority for the oppression of the majority.

b. The fact that it is not constituted on the basis of a specialized body - of political parties - but on the basis of delegates elected by local territorial councils and revocable by them.

c. This whole state organization categorically excludes any participation in it by exploiting classes and strata, who are deprlved of all political and civil rights.

d. The fact that the remuneration of the members of this state is never more than that of the workers.

It is in this sense that marxists can justflably speak of a semi-state, an altered state, a state on the road to extinction.

8. The experience of the victorious Russian Revolution bears with it certain precise though negative, lessons concerning the relationship between the dictatorship of the proletariat and state institutions in the transition period:

a. The function of proletarian political parties is fundamentally different from that of bourgeois political parties, above all because they are not and cannot be state organisms. While bourgeois parties can only exist by tending to become integrated into the state apparatus, the integration of workers' parties into the state after the revolution perverts them and causes them to completely lose their specific function in the class.

b. Because the function of the state is the conservation of the existing social order the state in previous class societies could not fail to be identified with the economically dominant class, to become the main expression of its general interests and of its unity, both within that class and in the face of other classes in society.

This is not at all the case ror the proletariat which does not tend to conserve the existing state of affairs but to overthrow and transform it. That is why its dictatorship cannot find its authentic and total expression in a conservative instrument par excellence, the state.

There can be no such thing as a 'socialist state'. This is a contradiction in terms. But soclalism is the historic interest of the proletariat, its own evolving essence. There is identity and identification between the two. To the extent that onc can talk of a socialist proletariat, one cannot speak of a workers' state, a proletarlan state.

We also consider that, on the basis of the Russian experience, a theoretical effort must be made concerning the necessary distinction between the state in the period of transition, which the proletariat is forced to use and over which the proletarlat must exert its dlctatorship at all times, and the proletarian dictatorship itself. Politically this identification has been tremendously harmful to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat, serving as a mystifying cover for the counter-revolution in Russia, under the direction of a degenerating Bolshevik party.

c. The state in the transition period, with all its distinctive characteristics and limitations, still bears all the marks of a class-divided society. It can never be the organ which establishes and symbolizes socialism. Only the proletarian class is the seed-bearer of socialism. Its domination over society is also its domination over the state, and can only be assured by its own class dictatorship.

9. The dictatorship of the proletariat must be defined by:

a. The necessity to maintain the unity and autonomy of the working class in its own organs, the workers' councils, accompanied by the proletariat's dissolution of all organs belonging to other classes as classes.

b. The proletariat's exertion of its hegemony in society, which means a hegemonic participation within the organizations from which the state emanates, while denying the other classes any right to intervene in its own class organs.

c. The proletariat's assertion of itself as the only armed class, independently of any other organ, above all the state.

1 This 'increase' in the labour force, greeted by the American bourgeoisie as the great success of the 'recovery', simply expresses a certain decrease in the number of unemployed, an absurd success when there were 9 million unemployed in 1975.

2This survival 'by credit' is still clearer in the so-called 'socialist' countries where the debt of all the countries in the Russian bloc to the West is now calculated to be 35 billion dollars. The situation is so serious that they have already asked for a moratorium. North Korea has even stopped paying the interest back on its debt which is something like 1.5 billion dollars. The situation is identical in the non-oil producing backward countries where the current deficit has now reached the incredible figure of 37 billion dollars. Faced with this state of affairs, bankers and Western governments have therefore decided to curtail their loans to the East, and within their own bloc loans to countries like Italy and Great Britain are matched with all sorts of conditions which undermine any pretence to 'national independence'; and these loans are only granted because of the necessity to safeguard the cohesion of their own bloc. Russia has only granted new credits on condition of a stricter control of its clients' foreign policy.

3 It is no accident that this view is very similar to the Trotskyist analysis of someone like E. Mandel, who claimed to see in the 1967-8 crisis a "new long wave of stagnant tonality", "the result of a traditional cyclical movement (septennial, decennial, or quinquennial)". In short the Bordigist and Trotskyist augurs are the birds of good omen for suffering capitalism, to which they ascribe the virtues of immortality.

4 The hourly rate of pay went from $4.20 to $6.22 in the USA during the period 1970-75, while in Belgium it rose from $2.08 to $6.46 and even in Sweden it rose from $2.93 to $7.12 (City Money International, May 1976).

5 This was effectively done during the last quarter when Japan's competivity threatened to inundate the EEC countries with its commodities, so that the latter forced Japan to climb down. It yielded to the EEC's decision whereby Japan would allocate its exports of steel according to quotas, limiting its policy of dumping and opening up its own market much more to European goods.

6 80 percent of the unemployed hit by the crisis were unable to find another permanent job during the 'recovery' and are attempting to live by various forms of casual or illicit labour. This is becoming less and less possible. The capitalist class speaks not only of cutting 'social welfare' but of creating work camps. For example, in Belgium, the Minister of Labour has announced a a plan to force the unemployed to work for three days a week for nothing under pain of having its welfare immediately withdrawn.

7 The 'programmatic basis' of a revolutionary organization is made up of all the principal positions and analyses which define the general framework of its activity. Positions that represent 'class lines' are part of this and are inevitably its backbone. But the activity of a revolutionary organization cannot be defined in terms of class lines alone. The necessity for the highest degree of coherence in its intervention obliges it to search for the highest degree of coherence in its conceptions, and thus to define as clearly as possible the general framework which links together all the class positions and situates them in a coherent, global vision of the aims and methods of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat.

8 These two factors partly explain the often extreme confusion which characterized the proletariat's outbursts against the counter-revolution (eg Kronstadt).

 

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Congress Revolution Internationale

The Communist Left in Russia, 1918-1930, Part 1

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When one talks about the revolutionary opposition to the degeneration of the revolution in Russia, or of the Communist International, it is generally assumed that one is referring to the Left Opposition led by Trotsky and other Bolshevik leaders. The wholly inadequate criticisms of the degeneration made after much delay by those who had played an active part in that degeneration are taken to be the be all and end all of communist opposition inside Russia or the International. The much deeper and more consistent critique elaborated by the ‘left wing communists' long before the Left Opposition came into existence in 1923 is either ignored or dismissed as the ravings of sectarian lunatics cut off from the ‘real world'. This distortion of the past is simply an expression of the long ascendancy of the counter-revolution since the years of the revolutionary struggle ended in the 1920s. It is always in the interests of the capitalist counter-revolution to hide or distort the genuinely revolutionary history of the working class and its communist minorities, because only in this way can the bourgeoisie hope to obscure the historic nature of the proletariat as the class that is destined to lead mankind into the reign of freedom.

Against this distortion of the past revolutionaries must reaffirm and re-examine the historic struggles of the proletariat; not out of an archivist's interest in history, but because the past experience of the class forms and unbreakable chain with its present and future experience, and only by understanding the past can the present and the future also be understood and outlined. We hope that this study of the communist left in Russia will help to reclaim an important chapter in the history of the communist movement from the distortions of bourgeois history, whether academic or leftist. But more important we hope that it will serve to clarify some of the lessons that emerge out of the struggles, failures and victories of the Russian left, lessons that have a vital role to play in the reconstitution of the communist movement today.


"In Russia the problem could only be posed. It could not be solved in Russia". (Rosa Luxemburg, in The Russian Revolution.)

In the wake of the counter-revolution which inundated the world after the revolutionary years of 1917-23, a myth grew up around Bolshevism, portraying it as a specific product of Russian ‘backwardness' and Asiatic barbarism. Remnants of the German and Dutch left communists, profoundly demoralised by the degeneration and death of the revolution in Russia, regressed to the semi-Menshevik position that the bourgeois development of Russia in the twenties and thirties was inevitable, because Russia had been unripe for communism; and Bolshevism was defined as an ideology of the ‘intelligentsia' who had sought only the capitalist modernisation of Russia and who had thus carried through a ‘bourgeois' or ‘state-capitalist' revolution in place of an impotent bourgeoisie, basing itself on an immature proletariat.

This whole theory was a total revision of the genuinely proletariat character of the Russian Revolution and of Bolshevism, and a repudiation by many left communists of their own participation in the heroic events that began in October 1917. But like all myths, it contained a grain of truth. While fundamentally a product of international conditions, the workers' movement also contains certain specificities arising out of particular national-historic conditions. Today, for example, it is not by accident that the re-emerging communist movement is strongest in the countries of Western Europe and far weaker, indeed almost non-existent, in the countries of the Eastern bloc. This is a product of the specific manner in which the historic events of the last fifty years have unfolded, in particular the way in which the capitalist counter-revolution has organised itself in different countries. Similarly, when we examine the revolutionary movement in Russia prior to and following the October insurrection: while its essence can only be grasped by considering it in the context of the international workers' movement, certain of its strengths and weaknesses can be linked to the particular conditions then prevailing in Russia.

In many ways, the weaknesses of the Russian revolutionary movement were simply the other side of the coin of its strengths. The ability of the Russian proletariat to move very quickly towards a revolutionary solution to its problems was largely determined by the nature of the Tsarist regime. Authoritarian, decrepit, incapable of erecting any stable ‘buffers' between itself and the proletarian menace, the Tsarist system ensured that any attempt of the proletariat to defend itself would immediately bring itself up against the repressive forces of the state. The Russian proletariat, young but highly combative and concentrated, was neither given the time nor the political space to develop a reformist mentality which could lead it to identify the defence of its immediate material interests with the survival of its ‘motherland'. It was thus far easier for the Russian proletariat to refuse all identification with the Tsarist war-effort after 1914, and to see the destruction of the Tsarist political apparatus as a precondition for its advance in 1917. Very broadly, and without trying to make too mechanical a connection between the Russian proletariat and its revolutionary minorities, these strengths of the Russian class were one of the factors which allowed the Bolsheviks to stand at the head of the world revolutionary movement both in 1914 and in 1917, with their ringing denunciation of the war and their uncompromising advocacy of the need to smash the machinery of the bourgeois state.

But as we have said, these strengths were also weaknesses: the immaturity of the Russian proletariat, its lack of organisational traditions, the suddenness with which it was propelled into a revolutionary situation, tended to leave important lacunae in the theoretical arsenal of its revolutionary minorities. It is significant, for example, that most of the pertinent critiques of the reformist practices of social democracy and trade unionism began to be elaborated precisely in those countries where these practices were most firmly established, in particular, Holland and Germany. It was here, rather than in Russia where the proletariat was still struggling for parliamentary and trade union rights, that the pernicious dangers of reformist habits were first understood by revolutionaries. For example, the work of Anton Pannekoek and the Dutch Tribune group in the years preceding World War 1 helped to prepare the ground for the radical break that the German and Dutch revolutionaries made with the old reformist tactics after the war. The same applies to Bordiga's Abstentionist Fraction in Italy. In contrast to this, the Bolsheviks never really understood that the period of reformist ‘tactics' had ended once and for all with the entry of capitalism into its death throes in 1914; or at least they never fully understood all the implications of the new epoch for revolutionary strategy. The conflicts over trade union and parliamentary tactics which rent the Communist International after 1920 resulted to a large extent from the failure of the Russian party to thoroughly grasp the needs of the new epoch; and this failure was not entirely restricted to the Bolshevik leadership: it was also reflected in the fact that the critique of unionism, parliamentarism, substitutionism and other social democratic hangovers which the Russian left communists made never achieved the same level of clarity as that of their Dutch, German and Italian counterparts.

But here again we must temper this observation with an understanding of the international context of the revolution. The theoretical weaknesses of the Bolshevik party were not absolutes, precisely because this was a genuinely proletarian party, and therefore open to all new developments and understandings that come from the proletarian struggle when it is on an ascendant path. Had the revolution of October extended itself internationally, these weaknesses could have been overcome; the social democratic deformations in Bolshevism only hardened into a fundamental obstacle to the revolutionary movement when the world revolution entered into a reflux and the proletarian bastion in Russia became cripplingly isolated. The rapid slide of the Communist International into opportunism, largely under the influence of the Russian party, was, amongst other things, the result of the Bolsheviks' attempt to balance the survival needs of the Soviet state with the international needs of the revolution, an attempt which became increasingly contradictory the more the tide of revolution receded, and which was finally abandoned with the triumph of ‘socialism in one country', which signified the death of the Communist International and crowned the victory of the counter-revolution in Russia.

If the extreme isolation of the Russian bastion was to ultimately prevent the Bolshevik party from going beyond its initial errors, it also severely hampered the theoretical development of the left communist fractions who detached themselves from the degenerating Russian party. Cut off from the discussion and debate which was still being maintained by the left fractions in Europe, subjected to a ruthless repression by an increasingly totalitarian state, the Russian left tended to restrict itself to a formal critique of the degeneration of the Russian counter-revolution, and rarely penetrated to the roots of the degeneration. The sheer novelty and rapidity of the Russian experience were to leave an entire generation of revolutionaries utterly confused as to what had happened there; not until the thirties and forties did a coherent understanding began to emerge out of the remaining communist fractions. But this understanding came above all from revolutionaries in Europe and America; the Russian left was too close, too caught up in the whole experience to elaborate an objective, global analysis of the phenomenon. We can therefore only endorse the assessment of the Russian left made by the comrades of Internationalism:

"The enduring contribution of these small groups trying to come to grips with the new situation, is not that they could have possibly understood the entire process of state capitalism at its beginnings nor that they expressed a totally coherent programme, but that they sounded the alarm and were among the first to prophetically denounce the establishment of a state capitalist regime; their legacy in the workers' movement is to have provided the political proof that the Russian proletariat did not go down to defeat in silence". (J. Allen, ‘A Contribution on the Question of State Capitalism', Internationalism n°6)

What is the communist left?

An aspect of the myth of ‘backward' or ‘bourgeois' Bolshevism is the idea that there is an impassable gulf between the Bolsheviks, who are presented as partisans of state capitalism and party dictatorship, and the left communists who are painted as the real defenders of workers' power and the communist transformation of society. This idea has a particular appeal to councilists and libertarians who want to identify only with what pleases them in the past workers' movement and reject the real experience of the class as soon as they discover its blemishes. In the real world however there is a direct and irreplaceable continuity between what Bolshevism originally was and what the left communists were in the 1920s and after.

The Bolsheviks were themselves on the extreme left of the pre-war social democratic movement, especially because of their resolute defence of organisational coherence and the need for a revolutionary party independent of all reformist and confusionist tendencies of the workers' movement.[1] Their position on the 1914-18 war (or rather the position of Lenin and his supporters in the party) was again the most radical of all the anti-war stances in the socialist movement: "turn the imperialist war into a civil war"; and their call for the revolutionary liquidation of the bourgeois state in 1917 made them the rallying point for all the intransigent revolutionary minorities in the world. The ‘left radicals' of Germany - who were to provide the main nucleus of the KAPD (German Workers' Communist Party) in 1920 - were directly inspired by the example of the Bolsheviks, especially when they began to call for the constitution of a new revolutionary party in total opposition to the social-patriots of the SPD (Social Democratic Party).[2]

Thus, up to a certain point the Bolsheviks and the Communist International, which was largely set up on their initiative, represented the pre-war ‘left'; they became the communist movement. Left communism only has a meaning as a reaction against the degeneration of this original communist vanguard, against the betrayal of what the vanguard has stood for at the beginning. Left communism thus emerged organically out of the original communist movement led by the Bolsheviks and the CI.

This becomes startlingly clear when we look at the origins of the communist left in Russia itself. All the Russian left fractions had their origins in the Bolshevik party. This is in itself proof of the proletarian character of Bolshevism. Because it was a living expression of the working class, the only class that can make a radical and continuous critique of its own practice, the Bolshevik party perpetually generated revolutionary fractions out of its own body. At every step in its degeneration voices were raised inside the party in protest, groupings were formed inside the party, or split from it, to denounce the betrayals of Bolshevism's original programme. Only when the party had been buried by its Stalinist gravediggers did these fractions no longer spring from it. The Russian left communists were all Bolsheviks; it was they who defended a continuity with the Bolshevism of the heroic years of the revolution, while those who calumniated, persecuted and exterminated them, no matter how exalted their names, were the ones who were breaking with the essence of Bolshevism.

The Communist Left during the heroic years of the revolution, 1918-21

The first months

The Bolshevik party was actually the first party of the reconstituted workers' movement to give rise to a ‘left'. This was precisely because it was the first party to lead a successful insurrection against the bourgeois state. In the conception of the workers' movement of the time, the role of the party was to organise the seizure of power and to assume governmental office in the new ‘proletarian state'. Indeed the proletarian character of the state, according to this conception, was guaranteed by the fact that it was in the hands of a proletarian party which sort to lead the working class towards socialism. The fundamentally erroneous character of this dual or treble substitution (party-state, state-class, party-class) was to be laid bare over the ensuing years of the revolution; but it was the tragic destiny of the Bolshevik party to put the theoretical errors of the entire workers' movement into practice, and thus to demonstrate through their own negative experience the absolute falsity of this conception. All the shame and betrayals associated with Bolshevism derived from the fact that the revolution was born and died in Russia, and that the Bolshevik party, by identifying itself with the state that was to become the internal agent of the counter-revolution, itself became an organiser of the revolution's decline. Had the revolution broken out and degenerated in Germany and not Russia, the names of Luxemburg and Liebknecht might today cause the same ambiguous and mixed reactions as do the names Lenin, Trotsky, Bukharin and Zinoviev. It is only because of the great adventure that the Bolsheviks undertook that revolutionaries can assert unambiguously today: the role of the party is not to take power on behalf of the class, and the interests of the class are not identical to the interests of the post-revolutionary state. But it has taken many years of painful reflection to be able to spell out these apparently simple lessons.

As soon as it became a party ‘in charge of' the Soviet state in October 1917, the Bolshevik party began to degenerate: not all at once, not in a completely unbroken downward course, and, as long as the world revolution was on the agenda, not irreversibly. But nevertheless, the general process of degeneration began immediately. Whereas formerly the party had been able to act freely as the most resolute fraction of the class, always showing the way to deepen and extend the class struggle, the Bolsheviks' assumption of state power put a growing brake on their ability to identify with and participate in the proletarian class struggle. From now on the needs of the state were to more and more take precedence over the needs of the class; and although this dichotomy was hidden at first by the very intensity of the class struggle, it was nevertheless the expression of an intrinsic and fundamental contradiction between the nature of the state and the nature of the proletariat. The needs of the state are essentially concerned with holding society together, of containing the class struggle within a framework acceptable to the maintenance of the social status quo; the needs of the proletariat, and thus of its communist vanguard, can only be the extension and deepening of its class struggle towards the overthrowing of all existing conditions. Now as long as the revolutionary movement of the class was on the ascendant both in Russia and internationally, the Soviet state could be used to guard the conquests of the revolution; it could be an instrument in the hands of the revolutionary class. But as soon as the real movement of the class disappeared, the status quo defended by the state could only be the status quo of capital. This was the general tendency, but in fact the contradictions between the proletariat and the new state began to appear immediately, because of the immaturity of the class and the Bolsheviks in their attitude to the state, and above all because the consequences of the revolution remaining isolated in Russia began to take their toll on the new proletarian bastion from the very beginning. Faced with a number of problems which could only be solved on the international arena - the organisation of a war ravaged economy, relations with huge peasant masses inside Russia, and with a hostile capitalist world outside - the Bolsheviks lacked experience to take measures which could have at least diminished the nefarious consequences of these problems; as it was the measures which they took tended to compound the problems rather than relieve them. And the overwhelming majority of the errors they made flowed from the fact that they had taken charge of the state, and thus felt justified in identifying proletarian interests with the needs of the Soviet state, and indeed subordinating the former to the latter.

Although no communist fraction in Russia at the time succeeded in making a fundamental critique of these substitutionist errors - and this was to remain a failing on the part of the entire Russian left - a revolutionary opposition to the Bolsheviks' early state early state policies crystallised only a few months after the seizure of power. This opposition took the form of the Left Communist group around Ossinski, Bukharin, Radek, Smirnov and others; organised mainly in the party's Moscow Regional Bureau and expressing itself through the factional journal Kommunist. This opposition of early 1918 was the first organised Bolshevik fraction to criticise the party's attempts to discipline the working class. But the original raison d'être of the Left Communist group was its opposition to the signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty with German imperialism.

This is not the place to undertake a detailed study of the whole Brest-Litovsk issue. In brief the main debate was between Lenin and the Left Communists (led on this issue by Bukharin) who were in favour of a revolutionary war against Germany and denounced the peace treaty as a ‘betrayal' of the world revolution. Lenin defended the signing of the treaty as a way of obtaining a ‘breathing space' while reorganising the military capacities of the Soviet state. The Lefts insisted that:

"The adoption of the conditions dictated by the German imperialists would be an act going contrary to our whole policy of revolutionary socialism; it would lead to the abandonment of the proper line of international socialism, in domestic as well as foreign policy, and could lead to one of the worse kinds of opportunism." (R. Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution, 1960, p.73)

Acknowledging the technical inability of the Soviet state to wage a conventional war against German imperialism, they advocated a strategy of tying the German army down with guerrilla tactics by flying detachments of Red partisans. The waging of the "holy war against German imperialism", they hoped, would serve as an example to the world proletariat and inspire it to join in the fight.

We do not wish to enter into a retrospective debate about the strategic possibilities open to the Soviet power in 1918. We should make it clear that both Lenin and the Left Communists recognised that the only ultimate hope of the Russian proletariat lay in the world extension of the revolution; both of their motivations and actions were placed within a framework of internationalism and both presented their arguments in full view of the Russian proletariat organised in the Soviets. We therefore consider it inadmissible to define the signing of the treaty as a ‘betrayal' of internationalism. Nor as it turned out, did it mean the collapse of the revolution in Russia or Germany, as Bukharin had feared. In any case, these strategic considerations are imponderable to some extent; one of the most important political questions deriving from the Brest-Litovsk debate is the following: is ‘revolutionary war' the principal means for extending the revolution? Does the proletariat in power in one region have the task of exporting revolution at bayonet point to the world proletariat? The comments of the Italian Left on the Brest-Litovsk question are significant in this regard:

"Of the two tendencies in the Bolshevik party who confronted each other at the time of Brest-Litovsk, Lenin's and Bukharin's, we think that it was the former who was more in line with the needs of the world revolution. The positions of the fraction led by Bukharin, according to which the function of the proletarian state was to liberate the workers of other countries through a ‘revolutionary war', are in contradiction with the very nature of the proletarian revolution and the historic role of the proletariat." (‘Parti-Etat-Internationale: L'Etat Proletarien', Bilan n°18, April-May, 1935)

In contrast to the bourgeois revolution, which could indeed be exported by military conquest, the proletarian revolution depends on the conscious struggle of the proletariat of each country against its own bourgeoisie: "The victory of a proletarian state against a capitalist state (in the territorial sense of the word) in no way means the victory of the revolution". (ibid). The Red Army's advance into Poland in 1920, which only succeeded in driving the Polish workers into the arms of their own bourgeoisie, is proof that military victories by a proletarian bastion cannot substitute for the conscious political action of the world proletariat, and therefore the extension of the revolution is first and foremost a political task. The foundation of the Communist International in 1919 was thus a far greater contribution to the world revolution than any ‘revolutionary war' could have been.

The actual signing of the Brest-Litovsk treaty, its ratification by the party and the Soviets, coupled with the Left's earnest desire to avoid a split within the party over the issue, ended the first stage of the Left Communists' agitation. Now that the Soviet state had acquired its ‘breathing space', many of the immediate problems facing the party were centred around the organisation of the war-torn economy within Russia. And it was on this question that the Left Communist group contributed its most valuable insights into the dangers facing the revolutionary bastion. Bukharin, the fervent partisan of revolutionary war, was less interested in formulating a critique of majority Bolshevik policy on the internal organisation of the regime; from now on many of the most pertinent criticisms of the leadership's domestic policies were to come from the pen of Ossinsky, who was to prove himself to be a much more consistent oppositional figure than Bukharin.

In the early months of 1918 the Bolshevik leadership attempted to deal with Russia's economic turmoil in a perfunctorily ‘pragmatic' manner. In a speech given to the Bolshevik Central Committee and published as The Immediate tasks of the Soviet Regime, Lenin advocated the formation of state trusts in which the existing bourgeois experts and owners were to be retained, though under the supervision of the ‘proletarian' state. The workers in turn would have to accept the Taylor system of ‘scientific management' (once denounced by Lenin himself as the enslavement of man by the machine), and one-man management in the factories: "The revolution demands... precisely in the interests of socialism that the masses unquestionably obey the single will of the leaders of the labour process". All of this meant that the factory committee movement, which had spread like wildfire ever since February 1917, was to be curbed; expropriations carried out by such committees were to be discouraged, their growing authority in the factories was to be reduced to a mere ‘checking' function, and they were to be made into appendages of the trade unions, which were much more manageable institutions, already incorporated into the new state apparatus.

The leadership presented these policies as the best way for the revolutionary regime to overcome the threat of economic chaos and to rationalise the economy towards an eventual social construction, when the world revolution extended itself. Lenin frankly called this system "state-capitalism", by which he understood the proletarian state's control of the capitalist economy in the interests of the revolution. In a polemic against the Left Communists (Left-wing Childishness and the Petty Bourgeois Mentality) Lenin argued that such a system of state capitalism would be a definite advance in a backward country like Russia, where the main danger of counter-revolution was the fragmented, archaic petty bourgeois mass of the peasantry. This conception remained a tenet of creed to the Bolsheviks and blinded them to the fact that the internal counter-revolution was expressing itself first and foremost through the state, not through the peasants. The Left Communists too were worried about the possibility of the revolution degenerating into a system of "petty bourgeois economic relations" (‘Theses on the Present Situation', Kommunist, n°1, April 1918, available in English in Daniels, A Documentary History of the Revolution), and they also shared the leadership's conviction that nationalisation by the ‘proletarian' state was indeed a socialist measure, and in fact they demanded its extension to the whole economy. Clearly they could not have been fully aware of what the danger of "state capitalism" actually meant, but basing themselves on a strong class instinct, they quickly saw the dangers inherent in a system which claimed to organise the exploitation of the workers in the interests of ‘socialism'. Ossinsky's prophetic warning is now well known:

"We do not stand for the point of view of ‘construction of socialism under the direction of the trusts'. We stand for the point of view of the construction of the proletarian society by the class creativity of the workers themselves, not by ukases of ‘captains of industry'...We proceed from trust for the class instinct, to the active class initiative of the proletariat. It cannot be otherwise. If the proletariat does not know how to create the necessary prerequisites for socialist organisation of labour, no-one can do this for it and no-one can compel it to do this. The stick, if raised against the workers, will find itself in the hands of a social force which is either under the influence of another social class or is in the hands of the soviet power; then the soviet power will be forced to seek support against the proletariat from another class (e.g. the peasantry), and by this it will destroy itself as the dictatorship of the proletariat. Socialism and socialist organisation must be set up by the proletariat itself, or they will not be set up at all; something else will be set up - state capitalism." (‘On the Building of Socialism', Kommunist n°2, April 1918, in Daniels, The Conscience of the Revolution, p. 85).

Against this threat the Left Communists advocated workers' control of industry through a system of factory committees and ‘economic councils'. They defined their role as that of a "responsible proletarian opposition" constituted within the party to prevent the party and the soviet regime "deviating" towards the "ruinous path of petty bourgeois policies" (‘Theses on the Present Situation', Kommunist no. 1, in Daniels, A Documentary History etc).

That the dangers that the Lefts were warning against were not restricted to the economic plane, but had far-reaching political ramifications, can be shown by another warning they issued against the attempt to impose labour discipline from above:

"With the policy of administering enterprises on the basis of broad participation by capitalists and semi-bureaucratic centralisation it is natural to combine a labour policy directed towards the installation amongst the workers of discipline under the banner of ‘self-discipline', towards the introduction of obligatory labour for workers (such a programme was advocated by the rightist Bolsheviks), piecework payment, lengthening of the working day, etc.

"The form of governmental administration will have to develop in the direction of bureaucratic centralisation, the deprivation of the local soviets of their independence, and in practice the rejection of the type of ‘commune state' administered from below" (ibid).

Kommunist's defence of factory committees, soviets, and working class self activity was important not because it provided a solution to the economic problems facing Russia, or still less a formula for the ‘immediate construction of communism' in Russia; the Lefts explicitly stated that "socialism cannot be put into operation in one country and a backward one at that" (L. Schapiro, The Origin of the Communist Autocracy, 1955, p. 137). The imposition of labour discipline by the state, the incorporation of the proletariat's autonomous organs into the state apparatus, were above all blows against the political domination of the Russian working class. As the ICC has often pointed out,[3] the political power of the class is the only guarantee of the successful outcome of the revolution. And this political power can only be exercised by the mass organs of the class, by its factory committees and assemblies, its soviets, its militias. In undermining the authority of these organs the policies of the Bolshevik leadership were posing a grave threat to the revolution itself. The danger signals so perceptively observed by the Left Communists in the early months of the revolution were to become even more serious during the Civil War period. In fact this period would in many ways determine the ultimate destiny of the revolution inside Russia.

The civil war

The period of the Civil War in Russia, from 1918-20, above all attests to the immense dangers facing a proletarian outpost if it is not immediately reinforced by the armies of the world revolution. Because the revolution did not take root outside Russia, the Russian proletariat had to fight virtually alone against the attacks of the White counter-revolution and its imperialist backers. In military terms, the heroic resistance of the Russian workers was victorious, but politically the Russian proletariat emerged from the Civil War decimated, exhausted, fragmented, and more or less deprived of any real control of the Soviet state. In their fervour to win the military struggle, the Bolsheviks had accelerated the decline of working class political power by a continuous militarisation of social and economic life. The concentration of all effective power in the higher echelons of the state machine allowed the military struggle to be prosecuted in a ruthless and effective manner, but it further undermined the real bastions of the revolution: the mass unitary organs of the class. The bureaucratisation of the Soviet regime that occurred during this period was to become irreversible with the reflux of the world revolution after 1921.

With the outbreak of hostilities in 1918, there was a general closing of ranks within the Bolshevik party, as everybody recognised the need for unity in action against the external danger. The Kommunist group, whose publication had ceased to appear after being severely hounded by the party leadership, ceased to exist, and its original nucleus went in two directions in response to the Civil War.

One tendency, exemplified by Radek and Bukharin, greeted the economic measure imposed by Civil War with unabashed enthusiasm. For them, the wholesale nationalisations, suppression of trade and monetary forms, and requisitioning of the peasantry, the so-called ‘War Communism' measures, represented a real break with the previous "state capitalist" phase and constituted a major advance towards communist relations of production. Bukharin even wrote a book, The Economics of the Transition Period, explaining how economic disintegration and even forced labour were inevitable preliminary stages in the transition to communism; he was clearly trying to demonstrate ‘theoretically' that Russia under War Communism, which had been adopted simply as a series of emergency measures to deal with a desperate situation, was a society in transition to communism. Former Left Communists like Bukharin were quite prepared to abandon their previous criticisms of one-man management and labour discipline, because for them the Soviet state was no longer trying to compromise with domestic capital, but was acting resolutely as an organ of communist transformation. In his Economics of the Transition Period, Bukharin argued that the strengthening of the Soviet state, its increasing absorption of social and economic life, represented a decisive advance towards communism:

"The ‘governmentalisation' of the trade unions and in practice all mass organs of the proletariat result from the inner logic of the transformation process itself. The smallest germ cell of the labour apparatus must become a support for the general process of organisation, which is planfully led and conducted by the collective reason of the working class, which has its material embodiment in the highest, all-embracing organisation, its state power. Thus the system of state capitalism is dialectically transformed into its own opposite, into the governmental form of workers' socialism." (Bukharin, Economics of the Transition Period, quoted in A Documentary History of Communism, edited by R. Daniels, 1960, p. 180).

With such ideas Bukharin ‘dialectically' reversed the marxist understanding that the movement towards a communist society will be characterised by a progressive weakening, a "withering away" of the state machine. Bukharin was still a revolutionary when he wrote the Economics; but between his theories of a statified ‘communism' entirely contained within one nation, and the Stalinist theory of ‘socialism in one country' there is a definite continuity.

While Bukharin made his peace with War Communism, those Lefts who had been most consistent in their advocacy of workers' democracy continued to defend this principle in the face of the growing militarisation of the regime. In 1919 the Democratic Centralism group was formed around Ossinsky, Sapranov and others. They continued to dispute the principle of one-man management in industry and continued to advocate the collective or "collegial" principle as "The strongest weapon against the growth of departmentalism and bureaucratic deadening of the soviet apparatus" (Theses on the Collegial Principle and Individual Authority). While accepting the need for the use of bourgeois specialists in industry and the army, they also stressed the need for these specialists to be put under the control of the rank and file. "No one disputes the necessity of using the spetsy - the dispute is over how to use them" (Sapranov, quoted in Daniels, Conscience of the Revolution, p.109).

At the same time the Democratic Centralists, or ‘Decists' as they were known, protested against the loss of initiative by local soviets, and they suggested a series of reforms aimed at restoring them as effective organs of workers' democracy; it was policies of this sort which led critics to remark that the Decists were more interested in democracy than in centralism. Finally the Decists called for the restoration of democratic practices in the party. At the Ninth Congress of the RCP in 1920 they attacked the bureaucratisation of the party, the increasing concentration of power in the hands of a tiny minority. It is indicative of the influence that these criticisms could still have in the party that the congress ended up voting a manifesto vigorously calling for "broader criticism of the central as well as the local party institutions", and the rejection of "any kind of repression against comrades because they have different ideas". (Resolution of the Ninth Party Congress, ‘On the Next Tasks of Building the Party'.)

In general the Decists' attitude to the tasks of the Soviet regime in a period of Civil War can be summed up in Ossinsky's words to that same Congress:

"The basic slogan which we should proclaim at the present time is the unification of military work, military forms of organisation and methods of administration, with the creative initiative of the conscious workers. If, under the banner of military work, you in fact begin to implant bureaucratism, we will disperse our own forces and fail to fulfil our tasks." (Quoted in Daniels, A Documentary History of the Revolution)

Some years later the left communist Miasnikov had this to say about the Democratic Centralism group:

"This group did not have a platform of any real theoretical value. The only point which attracted the attention of all the groups and of the party was its struggle against excessive centralisation. It is only now that one can see in this struggle a still imprecise attempt of the proletariat to dislodge the bureaucracy from the positions it had just conquered in the economy. The group died a natural death, without any violence being used against it..." (L'Ouvrier Communiste, 1929, a French journal close to the KAPD.)

The Decists' criticisms were inevitably "imprecise" because they were a tendency born at a time when the Bolshevik party and the revolution were still very much alive, so that any criticisms of the party were bound to take the form of appeals for the party to be more democratic, more equitable etc... in other words, to restrict criticisms to the level of organisational practice rather than of fundamental political positions.

Many of the Democratic Centralism group were also involved in the Military Opposition, which was formed for a brief period in 1919. The requirements of the Civil War had impelled the Bolsheviks to set up a centralised fighting force, the Red Army, composed not only of workers but of recruits from the peasantry and other strata. Very quickly this army began to conform to the hierarchical pattern that was being established in the rest of the state apparatus. Election of officers was soon dispensed with as "politically pointless and technically inexpedient" (Trotsky, ‘Work, Discipline, Order', 1918, quoted in Daniels, Conscience of the Revolution, p. 104); the death penalty for disobedience under fire, saluting and special forms of address to officers were restored, and differences between ranks solidified, especially with the appointment of former Tsarist officers to high command posts in the army.

The Military Opposition, whose main spokesman was Vladimir Smirnov, was formed to fight against the tendency to model the Red Army along the lines of a typical bourgeois army. They did not oppose the establishment of the Red Army as such, nor the use of military spetsy, but they were against excessive hierarchy and discipline, and wanted to ensure that the army was guided by an overall political orientation which did not depart from Bolshevik principle. The party leadership falsely accused them of wanting to disband the army in favour of a system of partisan detachments more suited to peasant warfare; as on many other occasions, the only alternative that the Bolshevik leadership could see to what they termed "proletarian state organisation" was petty bourgeois, anarchist decentralisation; in fact very often the Bolsheviks confused bourgeois forms of hierarchical centralisation with the self discipline and centralisation produced from below which is the hall mark of the proletariat. In any case the demands of the Military Opposition were rejected and the grouping soon fell apart. But the hierarchical structure of the Red Army - in conjunction with the disbanding of the factory militias - were to make it more amenable to be used as a repressive force against the proletariat from 1921 onwards.

Despite the persistence of oppositional tendencies within the party throughout the Civil War period, the need for unity against the attack of the counter-revolution tended to act as a cohesive force within the party and among all the classes and social strata who supported the Soviet regime against the Whites. The innate tensions within the regime were held down during this period, only to burst up to the surface when the hostilities ceased and the regime was faced with the task of reconstructing a ruined country. Dissension over the next step for the Soviet regime expressed itself in 1920-21 in peasant revolts, discontent in the navy, workers' strikes in Moscow and Petrograd, to culminate in the Kronstadt workers' uprising in March 1921. These antagonisms inevitably expressed themselves within the party itself, and in the traumatic years 1920-21, it fell to the Workers' Opposition group to provide the main focus for political dissent inside the Bolshevik party.

The Workers' Opposition

The tenth Party Congress in March 1921was the arena for a controversy within the Bolshevik party which had been getting sharper and sharper since the end of the Civil War: the trade union question. On the surface this was a debate about the role of trade unions under the proletarian dictatorship, but it in fact expressed far deeper problems about the whole future of the Soviet regime and its relationship to the working class. Broadly speaking there were three positions within the party: that of Trotsky, who stood for the total integration of the unions into the ‘Workers' state' where they would have the task of stimulating labour productivity; that of Lenin, who argued that the unions still had to act as defensive organs of the class, which, he pointed out, was actually a "workers' and peasants' state" which suffered from "bureaucratic deformations"; and finally the position of the Workers' Opposition group who stood for the management of production by industrial unions independent of the Soviet state. Although the entire framework of this debate was profoundly inadequate, The Workers' Opposition expressed in a confused and faltering way the proletariat's antipathy to the bureaucratic and military methods which had more and more become the trademark of the regime, and the hope of the class that things would improve now that the rigours of the Civil War were over.

The leaders of the Workers' Opposition group came mainly from the trade union apparatus, but it appears to have had considerable working class support in South Eastern parts of European Russia and in Moscow, especially among metal workers - Shliapnikov and Medvedev, two of the groups leading members, were both metal workers. But the most famous of its leaders was Alexandra Kollontai, who wrote the programmatic text The Workers' Opposition as an elaboration on the ‘Theses on the Trade Union Question' submitted by the group to the Tenth Congress. All the strengths and weaknesses of the group can be gauged from this text which begins by affirming that:

"The Workers' Opposition sprang from the depths of the industrial proletariat of Soviet Russia. It is an outgrowth not only of the unbearable conditions of life and labour in which seven million industrial workers find themselves, but it is also a product of vacillations, inconsistencies and outright deviations of our Soviet policy from the early expressed class-consistent principles of the Communist programme." (Kollontai, The Workers' Opposition, Solidarity pamphlet n°7, p. 1).

Kollontai then goes on to outline the appalling economic conditions facing the Soviet regime after the Civil War, and draws attention to the growth of a bureaucratic stratum whose origins lie outside the working class - in the intelligentsia, the peasantry, remnants of the old bourgeoisie, etc. This strata had more and more come to dominate the Soviet apparatus and even the party itself, infusing both with a careerism and a blind disregard for proletarian interests. For the Workers' Opposition the Soviet state itself was not a pure proletarian organ but a heterogeneous institution forced to balance between the different classes and strata in Russian society. They insisted that the way that the revolution remained loyal to its original goals was not by entrusting its direction to non-proletarian technocrats and the socially ambiguous organs of the state, but by relying on the self-activity and creative powers of the working masses themselves:

"This consideration, which should be very simple and clear to every practical man, is lost sight of by our party leaders: it is impossible to decree Communism. It can be created only in the process of practical research, through mistakes, perhaps, but only through the creative powers of the working class itself." (Kollontai, ibid, p. 33).

These general insights of the Workers' Opposition were very profound in many ways, but the group was unable to contribute much of lasting value beyond these generalities. The concrete proposals they put forward as a solution to the crisis the revolution was passing through were based on a series of fundamental misconceptions, all of which expressed the magnitude of the impasse the Russian proletariat faced at this juncture.

For the Workers' Opposition, the organs which expressed the pure class interests of the proletariat were none other than the trade unions, or rather the industrial unions. The task of creating communism should therefore be entrusted to the unions: "The Workers' Opposition sees in the unions the mangers and creators of the communist economy..." (Kollontai, ibid, p. 28).

Thus while the left communists of Germany, Holland and elsewhere were denouncing the trade unions as one of the main obstacles to the proletarian revolution, the left in Russia was extolling them as potential organs of communist transformation! Revolutionaries in Russia seemed to have had great difficulty grasping the fact that the trade unions could no longer have any role to plat for the proletariat in the epoch of capitalist decadence: although the appearance of factory committees and soviets in 1917 signified that the unions were dead as organs of working class struggle, none of the left groupings in Russia really understood this, either before or after the Workers' Opposition. By 1921, when the Workers' Opposition was portraying the unions as the backbone of the revolution, the real organs of revolutionary struggle - the factory committees and the workers' soviets - had already been emasculated. Indeed in the case of the factory committees, it was their integration into the unions after 1918 which effectively killed them as organs of the class. The transfer of decision making power into the hands of the unions, despite the good intentions of its advocates, would in no way have restored power to the proletariat in Russia, even if such a project had been possible, it would simply have been a transfer of power from one branch of the state to another.

The Workers' Opposition programme for the regeneration of the party was also flawed at its roots. They explained the growing opportunism of the party purely in terms of the influx of a non-proletarian membership. For them the party could be put back on a proletarian path if an ouvrièrist purge was carried out against non-worker members. If the party was overwhelmingly composed of ‘pure', rough-handed proletarians, all would be well. This ‘answer' to the degeneration of the party completely missed the point. The opportunism of the party was not a question of its personnel but was a response to the pressure and tensions of holding state power in an increasingly unfavourable situation. Given the reigns of state in a period of reflux in the revolution, anyone would became an ‘opportunist', no matter how ‘pure' his proletarian ‘pedigree'. Bordiga once remarked that ex-workers often became the worst bureaucrats. But the Workers' Opposition never challenged the notion that the party had to control the state in order to guarantee that it remained an instrument of the proletariat:

"The Central Committee of our party must become the supreme directing centre of our class policy, the organ of class thought and control over the practical policy of the Soviets, and the spiritual personification of our basic programme." (Kollontai, ibid, p.42).

The Workers' Opposition's inability to conceive of the dictatorship of the proletariat as anything else but the dictatorship of the party led them to make frantic pledges of loyalty to the party when, in the middle of the Tenth Congress, the Kronstadt revolt broke out. Prominent leaders of the Workers' Opposition even backed up these pledges by putting themselves in the front line of the assault on the Kronstadt garrison. Like all the other left fractions in Russia, they completely failed to understand the importance of the Kronstadt rising as the last mass struggle of the Russian workers for the restoration of soviet power. But assisting in the suppression of the revolt did not save the Workers' Opposition from being condemned as a "petty bourgeois anarchist deviation", as an "objectively" counter-revolutionary element at the conclusion of the Congress. The banning of "factions" in the party at the Tenth Congress dealt a stunning blow to the Workers' Opposition. Faced with the prospect of illegal, underground work, they proved unable to maintain their opposition to the regime. A few of its members fought on throughout the twenties in association with other illegal fractions; others simply capitulated to the status quo. Kollontai herself ended up as a loyal servant of the Stalinist regime. In 1922 the left communist paper, the Workers' Dreadnought referred to the "unprincipled and backboneless leaders of the so-called ‘Workers' Opposition'" (Workers' Dreadnought, July 29, 1922), and certainly there was a real lack of resolution in the group's programme. This was not a question of the courage or lack of courage of the group's members, but resulted from the extreme difficulty Russian revolutionaries faced in trying to oppose or break from a party which had been the moving spirit of the revolution. For many communists, to challenge the very premises of the party was sheer folly; outside the party was nothing but the void. This deep attachment to the party - so deep that it became a barrier against the defence of revolutionary principles - was to be even more pronounced in the Left Opposition later on.

Another reason for the weakness of the Workers' Opposition's criticisms of the regime was their almost total lack of an international perspective. While the most determined left fractions in Russia drew their strength from an understanding that the only true ally of the Russian proletariat and its revolutionary minority was the world working class, the Workers' Opposition's programme was based on a search for solutions entirely within the framework of the Russian state.

The central concern of the Workers' Opposition was this: "Who shall develop the creative powers in the sphere of economic construction?" (Kollontai, ibid, p. 4). The primordial task which she ascribed to the Russian working class was the construction of a "communist economy" in Russia. Their preoccupation with the problem of the management of production, with creating so-called ‘communist relations' of production in Russia show a complete misunderstanding of a fundamental point: communism could not be built in an isolated bastion. The main problem facing the Russian working class was the extension of the world revolution, not the "economic reconstruction" of Russia. Although the Kollontai text criticises "foreign trade with the capitalist states... [that is] carried on over the heads of the Russian as well as the foreign organised workers" (ibid, p. 10), the Workers' Opposition shared the growing tendency of the Bolshevik leadership at the time to put the domestic problems of the Russian economy above the problem of the international extension of the revolution. That the two tendencies had a different vision of this economic reconstruction is less important than the fact that they both tended to agree that Russia could turn in on itself for an indefinite period without betraying the interests of the world revolution.

This exclusively Russian perspective of the Workers' Opposition was also reflected in the group's failure to establish any firm ties with the left communist opposition outside Russia. Although Kollontai's text was smuggled out of Russia by a member of the KAPD and published both by the KAPD and the Workers' Dreadnought, Kollontai soon regretted this and tried to get the document back! The Workers' Opposition offered no real criticisms of the opportunist policies being adopted by the Communist International, endorsed the 21 Conditions, and did not seek to ally itself with the ‘foreign' oppositions within the CI, despite the obvious sympathy accorded them by the KAPD and others. In 1922 they made a last-ditch appeal to the Fourth World Congress of the CI, but restricted their protest entirely to the bureaucratisation of the regime and the lack of free expression for dissident communist groupings within Russia. In any case, they received scant echo from an International which had already expelled many of its best elements and was about to endorse the infamous United Front policy. Shortly after this appeal was made a special Bolshevik commission was set up to investigate the activities of the Workers' Opposition; it came to the conclusion that the group consisted an "illegal factional organisation", and the ensuing repression soon put an end to most of the group's activities.[4] The Workers' Opposition had the misfortune of being thrust into the political limelight at a time when the party was going through profound convulsions which would soon make legal oppositional activity. In trying to balance between the two stools of legal intra-party faction work and underground opposition to the regime the Workers' Opposition fell into the void; henceforward the torch of proletarian resistance would have to be carried on by more resolute and intransigent fighters.



[1] The Bolsheviks themselves produced extreme left tendencies in the pre-war period, notably the so-called ‘Ultamists' and ‘Recallists' who criticised the parliamentary tactics of the Bolshevik organisation after the 1905 Revolution. But since this debate took place in the twilight period between capitalism's ascent and decline, this is not the place to discuss these issues. The Communist Left is a specific product of the workers' movement in the epoch of decadence, since it originated in a critique of the ‘official' communist strategy concerning the revolutionary tasks of the proletariat in the new epoch.

[2] See ‘Lessons of the German Revolution' in the ICC's International Review n°2.

[3] See ‘The Degeneration of the Russian Revolution' and ‘The Lessons of Kronstadt' in International Review n°3.

[4] Although the Workers' Opposition effectively ceased to function after 1922, its name, like that of the Democratic Centralists, crops up over and over again in connection with illegal underground activities until the beginning of the 1930s, which implies that elements of both groups fought on till the bitter end.

Historic events: 

  • Brest-Litovsk [55]

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1917 - Russian Revolution [13]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Left [4]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Russian Communist Left [56]

People: 

  • Miasnikov [57]
  • Kollontai [58]
  • Bukharin [59]
  • Ossinsky [60]
  • Sapranov [61]

The ambiguities of the Internationalist Communist Party over the ‘partisans’ in Italy in 1943

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Letter from Battaglia Comunista

Dear Comrades,

In the September issue of your paper (Revolution Intenationale, no. 29) we read the following passage:

“To be honest, revolutionaries (‘impotent metaphysicians’ according to the Internationalist Communist Party) aren’t all that surprised to find the Bordigists offering their services to the united front.  The ICP was carrying the baggage of anti-fascism with it when it was founded. The first to join its ranks had come out of the Italian ‘Partisans’; it was then joined by people who had been involved in the Brussels Anti-Fascist Committee, then by elements from the old minority of the Italian Left, which had been in favour of ‘real class struggle’ against Franco. In   contrast to all this, the Communist Left in France and Belgium had remained intransigently loyal to the principles of the International Communist Left. During World War II, its appeals were not addressed to ‘sincere’ or ‘proletarian’ anti-fascists, but to the world proletariat, calling upon the class to turn the imperialist war into a civil war, excluding in advance any gesture that could be     interpreted as critical support for democracy.”

This passage is from the article ‘Honnetes  Propositions d’Hymen Frontiste du PCI’, a polemic against another frontist escapade by  Programma Communista (Le Proletaire in France).

We don’t want to go into the details of a polemic which doesn’t concern us and about which we have already clearly expressed our position. What we do want is a full rectification of the grave assertions contained in the above passage, assertions which we don’t hesitate in calling entirely and completely false, though we don’t know whether they derive from lack of knowledge or from an irresponsible political attitude.

It is true that Programma Communista (the Bordigists) have put themselves outside the Partito Communista Internazionalista which in Turin “in 1943 held its first convention, which brought together those same comrades who are once again regurgitating the frontist positions (anti-fascist and trade unionist) which were long ago rejected by the revolutionary Left”. But it is also true that the PCI has continued to be the only force in Italy to defend, in a serious and consequential manner, everything that was best in the Left’s work of drawing the lessons and conclusions from the first revolutionary wave opened by the revolution in Russia and closed inside the IIIrd International. The fact that the ‘Programmists’ lay claim to this patrimony of elaboration and struggle while negating it in their political practice only concerns us because of the confusion that it can engender even amongst the most advanced sectors of the working class.

And the PCI, founded in 1943, and which went through the Turin convention, the Florence Congress in 1948, and the Milan Congress of 1952 didn’t start out with no more than an ‘anti-fascist’ baggage. The comrades who came from the Communist Left and who constituted the party were the first both in Italy and outside it to denounce the counter-revolutionary policies of the democratic bloc (including the Stalinist and Trotskyist parties) and were the first and only ones to act inside the workers’ struggles and even in the ranks of the Partisans, calling on the workers to fight against capitalism no matter what kind of regime it was hiding behind.

The comrades who RI calls ‘Resistance fighters’ were revolutionary militants who engaged in the task of penetrating the ranks of the Partisans in order to disseminate the principles and tactics of the revolutionary movement, and who paid for this work with their lives. Must we remind the comrades of RI about Acquaviva and Atti? Well, these two comrades, despicably assassinated on the order of the Stalinist leaders (the ‘democrats’ of today), were cadres of the PCI. Because of their heroic revolutionary behaviour the PCI was and is still able to put all its cards on the table.

Concerning the comrades who, during the war in Spain, decided to abandon the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left and to throw themselves into an adventure which took them outside class positions: let us remember that the events in Spain, which simply confirmed the positions of the Fraction, taught a lesson to these comrades and allowed them to return to the revolutionary Left. The Brussels Anti-Fascist Committee, in the person of Vercesi who thought he had to join the PCI when it was founded, held onto its own bastardized positions until the party, making the sacrifices that clarity demanded, rid itself of the dead leaves of Bordigism.

What we are saying here is confirmed by documents which the comrades of RI have at their disposal, but which they don’t seem to have read. The documents of the period show what the politics of the PCI were, and what kind of ‘frontism’ it stood for (the unity of the workers against the war and its fascist and democratic agents). This was very different from the frontism of organizations which the Programmists defend today.

By asking for this rectification, at a time when RI has declared itself in favour of discussion between revolutionaries and of the international initiative of our party, we hope that all revolutionaries will know how to undertake a serious critical examination of the main political problems confronting the working class today; when dealing with the errors of the past – something which is always necessary – it is precisely up to revolutionaries to document their work in the most serious manner. Communist Greetings.

Damen,

for the Executive of the Partito Communista Internazionalista.

 

The ICC’s Reply

We were a little surprised to receive and read your letter, which to say the least is full of righteous indignation. What exactly is at issue here? The matter has arisen over an article published in Revolution Internationale no. 29 (September), an attack on the Bordigist International Communist Party which showed up the profound opportunism of this organization, especially their more and more pronounced tendency towards frontism. Bordigism, which reconstituted itself into a party at the end of World War II, is a striking example of the degeneration of a current which came from the communist left. This degeneration can be seen in relation to all the questions which have been posed to the workers ‘ movement since the decomposition of the IIIrd International: the function of the party, and the historical context in which parties are formed; the nature and function of trade unions today; the problem of transitional demands; electoralism; national liberation; frontism. On all these questions, Bordigism has moved further and further away from communist positions and is moving closer and closer to Trotskyism. This political regression seems to be the only kind of ‘invariance’ in the evolution of Bordigism, and every genuinely revolutionary group has no alternative but to confront this tendency and wage an implacable battle against it. This is what RI was doing in the offending article.

How is it that these attacks on Bordigism have affected Battaglia Communista and impelled it to write this letter of protest? It seems that the bullet has ricocheted in an unfortunate manner. But who has been caught by the ricochet?

 

In the first place, a considerable part of the problem is caused by the fact that in Italy today there are at least four groups[1] who call themselves the ICP, all of them deriving from the original party, all of them claiming the same continuity, the same ‘invariance’, the same tradition and the same original platform. Each one argues that it is the only true heir of this platform. It’s certainly a pity that, out of amour propre and a concern for authenticity, these groups all hold onto the same name, because this only leads to confusion. This is something which we can only regret. It should be said at this point that, outside Italy, and especially in France, it is the Bordigist group (Programma Communista) which is known as the ICP; and, whatever Battaglia might think, this isn’t entirely illogical. Although it’s not our job to hand out certificates of legitimacy, it seems to us to be going a bit far to consider that Bordigism is a current which simply ‘ran across’ the Italian Left, as this letter would have us believe. However much it has regressed today, no-one can ignore or deny the fact that, over a period of twenty-five years, Bordigism was totally bound up with what is known as the Italian Left. This is not only true for Bordiga’s abstentionist fraction and its paper Il Soviet in the early twenties; it’s also attested by the fact that the platform presented by the Left at the Lyon Congress of 1926, which led to the Left being expelled from the Communist Party, was expressly entitled Platform of the Left (Bordigist).

In any case, no-one could have any doubts about which group our article was addressed to. There was no room for ambiguity because we took the precaution of writing ‘A Frontist ICP (Programme Communiste)’ in our subtitle. As for the passage you cite and which seems to irritate you so much, we can only say that it is not only our right but politically logical to inquire whether the degeneration of Bordigism is a question of pure chance, or whether we should look for the germs of this degeneration in the past, in the very conditions in which the party was set up. What embarrasses you is that the history of the formation of this party is also your own history. Thus you are trying to minimize the unity of responsibility, the unity which existed at the beginning of the party, by making various distinctions which, according to you, were there from the start:

“It is true that Programma Communista (the Bordigists) have put themselves outside the Partito Communista Internazionalista which in Turin ‘in 1943 held its first convention, which brought together those same comrades’ (…)

… until the party, making the sacrifices that clarity demanded, rid itself of the dead leaves of Bordigism.”

In other words: when the ICP was set up, there was us and them. What was good about the party was us, what was bad was them. Even if one was to admit that it was like this, it wouldn’t alter the fact that the ‘bad’ was there, that it was a fundamental element in the constitution of the party, and that at the time no-one raised the slightest criticism of this element. This was because, with everyone rushing together to build the party, no-one took the time to look a bit closer at the people who were taking part in this enterprise and what positions and forms of activity they defended (not to speak of engaging in a serious study of the whole context in which the party was set up). Not seeing or understanding something when it happens might be an explanation, but it can never be a justification, certainly not an a posteriori one. This is why we don’t understand why you are protesting when all we are doing is going over the facts and analyzing their significance.

Battaglia Communista asks us to make “a full rectification of the grave assertions made in the above passage, assertions which we don’t hesitate in calling entirely and completely false”. Rather than making any rectification, we feel obligated to explain what we mean and to elaborate our initial assertions, which are far from being “entirely and completely false” as Battaglia Communista claims. First of all, one thing must be clear: we have never said that the ICP formed in 1943 started out “with no more than an ‘anti-fascist’ baggage”. If that had been our position, we would have said so, and we would follow up the political implications of such a position. We would have purely and simply denounced it, as we do with the Trotskyists. This would be quite different from our attitude of confronting the positions of the party, even though this confrontation is sometimes quite violent. We don’t say that the positions of the ICP were “no more than” anti-fascist. What we do say is that elements were allowed to exist in the party, even in its leadership, who quite openly defended their frontist and anti-fascist experiences. We want to point out that, while affirming some class positions, the ICP allowed all kinds of ambiguities to subsist, whether we are taking about the elements it regrouped with or the formulations it put forward. It was as though it was closing the door while leaving the window half open. It’s no good making us say things we haven’t said; but we do defend everything that we have actually said. We fully endorse what was written in Internationalisme no. 36, July 1948:

“Just as we did after the 1948 Conference, we consider that within the ICP there are a lot of healthy revolutionary militants, and that because of this, this organization cannot be seen as being lost in advance to the proletariat.”

Internationalisme is certainly not talking about a simple anti-fascist group here, but this didn’t alter the “grave assertions” and criticisms which it made concerning the ambiguities and the errors of the ICP, criticisms which were fully vindicated by the subsequent vicissitudes of the party, by all its crises and splits.

These ambiguities and errors can be traced to the very fact that the party was set up in the first place. The party cannot be constituted at any given moment. The Gauche Communiste de France (Internationalisme) was quite right when it made a thorough critique of the formation of the ICP, basing itself on Bilan’s pertinent criticisms of the proclamation of the Trotskyist IVth International. A party set up in a period of reaction, when the working class is defeated, is bound not only to have an artificial and voluntaristic character, but also to contain all kinds of political ambiguities. As far as we know, the ICP (whether or not you alone are its continuatiors) never replied to this criticism; instead, in the excitement of constituting itself, if preferred to ignore this critique with a disdainful silence, while at the same time opening its doors to politically dubious elements.

These ambiguities can be found in the Political Platform of the ICP, published in French in 1946. It hardly needs to be said that, during the war and especially towards the end of the war, the attitudes revolutionaries had towards the war, the partisan resistance, the anti-fascist mystification and other kinds of “liberations” took on a particular importance and demanded the greatest clarity and intransigence. And yet while condemning the Resistance as a whole, the ICP Platform said:

“The effective elements of the clandestine activity which has developed against the fascist regime were and are the informal and spontaneous reaction of proletarian groupings and of a few unselfish intellectuals, as well as being the kind of activity and organization which every state and every army creates and nourishes behind enemy lines.” (ICP, Platform, p. 19, paragraph 7)

The whole of paragraph 7, which deals with the question of the Partisans, is a defence of the idea that this movement had a dual nature – one of proletarian origin, the other emanating from states and armies. And to emphasize its character as an “informal and spontaneous reaction of proletarian groupings”, the Platform even minimizes the importance of the second aspect: “These political big-shots who appeared like flies in the ointment only had a minor influence in this activity.” (Ibid)

Another passage in the same paragraph contains the same ambiguities:

“In reality the network set up by the bourgeois and pseudo-proletarian parties during the period of clandestinity did not at all have as their goal a national-democratic partisan insurrection. What they wanted to do was to create an apparatus capable of immobilizing any revolutionary movement that might arise with the collapse of the fascist and German defences.” (Ibid)

This insistence on distinguishing and showing the opposition between “a national-democratic partisan insurrection” and the attempt at “immobilizing any revolutionary movement” follows on naturally from the original distinction the Platform makes between the dual origins and characteristics of the Partisan movement. And it lead logically to a recognition of the possibility of a sincere, democratic, proletarian anti-fascist movement, in opposition to the false anti-fascism of the bourgeoisie.

This is a thinly-veiled version of the idea that there is a ‘natural’ link between the proletariat and the Partisans. And in another passage, the veil disappears completely:

“These movements (the Partisans), which don’t have a sufficient (sic!) political orientation, still express the tendency of local proletarian groups to organize themselves and to arm themselves           in order to seize and maintain control of the situation locally, and thus take power.”  (Ibid, p. 2, paragraph 18)

The Partisan movement is no longer denounced for what it is – the mobilization of the workers for imperialist war – but has become a tendency of proletarian groups to take power locally, although it unfortunately doesn’t have sufficient political orientation”.

If this sort of thing can be found in the platform, ie a founding document written with great care by the party’s most responsible members, one can easily imagine the kind of anti-fascist diatribes which appeared in the local press of the PCI, especially in the South which was isolated and cut off from the party centres in the North.[2]

It should come as no surprise that such a definition of the Partisans should lead to a defence of their struggle:

“Concerning the partisan and patriotic struggle against the Germans and the fascists, the party denounces the manoeuvres of the international and national bourgeoisie who, with their propaganda for the rebirth of official state militarism (a propaganda which can have no meaning) (sic), are aiming at the dissolution and liquidation of the voluntary organizations of this struggle. In a number of countries these organizations have already been subject to armed repression.”

We are asked to make “a full rectification of (our) grave assertions”. We are absolutely agreed and convinced that these rectifications are necessary. The only question is: who must rectify what? Is it up to us to rectify a false accusation of anti-fascism? Or is it up to Battaglia to rectify the highly ambiguous postulates and formulations of the ICP Platform?

How could the ICP seek to defend the Partisan organizations from the threat of dissolution by the state? The Partisans were the armed organizations through which the bourgeoisie mobilized the workers behind enemy lines into the imperialist war, in the name of anti-fascism and national liberation. This didn’t seem to be very clear to the ICP, who saw something else in the patriotic, anti-fascist Partisans: a spontaneous reaction of proletarian groupings”. Thus the ICP had an attitude of extreme solicitude towards the Partisans:

“With regard to these tendencies, which constitute an historic reality of the greatest importance, the party affirms that a proletarian tactic demands that the most resolute and combative elements must finally (!) arrive at the political positions and the organizational form which will enable them to at last fight in their own interests, after such a long period of giving their blood in the service of others.” (Ibid)

There can be no doubt about this. The ICP is not talking about workers who have been derailed into a capitalist organization which the proletariat has to destroy, but about a working class organization “an historical reality of the greatest importance”, which doesn’t have “a sufficient political orientation”, which must be defended against the bourgeoisie’s attempts to dissolve it. It is an organization with which one can have a dialogue; it is a fertile soil for the revolution and revolutionaries must enter its ranks in order to bring communist positions to it.

It might appear that our criticism can be answered by the assertion that the militants of the ICP didn’t enter the Partisans in order to do ‘resistance’ work but to “disseminate the principles and tactics of the revolutionary movement”. But revolutionaries don’t make oral or written propaganda by joining a counter-revolutionary organization. This kind of penetration is an ‘entry tactic’ which we don’t subscribe to and which we are happy to leave to the Trotskyists. But this doesn’t explain why the ICP was in favour of penetrating the Partisans, and not, for example, the Socialist or Communist Parties. This would be even closer to the ‘entry’ tactics of the Trotskyists. In any case, these kind of tactics have nothing in common with the revolutionary positions of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left. Whether it was the decision of its leader or of the party as a whole, the ICP accepted elements who belonged to the Partisans as ‘cadres of the Party’. This is a rather strange ‘tactic’, one which we can only describe as political collaboration. Let’s not forget that the Partisans were a counter-revolutionary organization of the worst kind, created during the war in order to perpetuate the massacre of the workers. It was a military organization based (just like the SS) on voluntary membership. Because of this it did not provide any suitable context for the dissemination of revolutionary principles and tactics. This is in contrast to the army, since the workers are mobilized into the army by force.[3] The fact that this organ of war had a ‘popular’ and ‘anti-fascist’ façade in no way justified the policy of penetration, of a revolutionary party sending its cadres into its ranks. If the ICP did this, it was because it was itself confused. Consumed by activism, it committed an act of terrible irresponsibility by allowing – or worse still, sending – its militants to join this counter-revolutionary military organization in which all they could do was to get themselves murdered. There’s nothing to boast about in such errors.[4]

 

We don’t know the details of the circumstances in which comrades Acquaviva and Atti were murdered at the behest of the Stalinists. But their tragic end, far from vindicating your policy of participation, only strengthens us in our convictions. Many Trotskyists in France and elsewhere lost their lives in analogous circumstances; this is no way proves that the policy of participation which they followed was a revolutionary one.

After all this, there can be no doubt that the ICP had all kinds of ambiguities on the question of the anti-fascist resistance from the moment it was set up. This was to weigh heavily on the subsequent evolution of the organization. As a confirmation of what we are saying, we only have to cite Danieli’s intervention at the ICP Congress in Florence (6-9 May, 1948).[5]

“One thing must be clear for everyone: the party has suffered gravely from a facile extension of                its political influence – the result of an equally facile activism – on a purely superficial level. I must recount a personal experience which will serve as a warning against the danger of the party exerting a facile influence on certain strata of the masses, which is an automatic consequence of the equally facile theoretical formation of its cadres. In the last months of the war I was a party representative in Turin. The Federation was strong numerically; it had a lot of young, activist elements; it organized many meetings, leaflets, the newspaper, a bulletin, contacts with the factories; there were internal discussions which always had an extremist tone when differences on the question of the war in general and the Partisans in particular came up;               there were also contacts with deserters. The position on the war was clear: no participation in the war, refusal of military discipline by elements who called themselves internationalists. One might think therefore that no member of the party would have accepted the directives of the ‘Committee of National Liberation’. Now, on the morning of 25 April (the day Turin was ‘liberated’) the whole Turin Federation was in arms, insisting on participating in the crowning of       six years of massacre, and some comrades from the provinces – still under military discipline – came to Turin to take part in the whole thing. As for myself, I should have declared the organization dissolved, but I found a way of compromising and got a resolution passed, in which comrades agreed to participate in the movement as individuals. The party no longer existed; it had liquidated itself.”

This public testament of an old and responsible militant, formed by a long experience with the Italian Fraction in exile, is both eloquent and dramatic. We can see that it wasn’t the party which was penetrating the ranks of the Partisans and disseminating revolutionary tactics and principles; it was the spirit of the Partisans which penetrated the party and corrupted its militants. The party has never engaged in a critical discussion of these questions; for reasons of prestige it has taken refuge in silence on this and other questions. This is why all its initial ambiguities have survived and developed in all the groups it has given rise to.

This ambiguity on the question of the Partisans can be found in all the groups emanating from the original ICP, and not only among the Bordigists (Programma) with their support for national liberation movements in the underdeveloped countries. They can be found, for example, in the International Bulletin published in French in the early sixties as a joint effort of News and Letters, Munis, and Battaglia Communista. An article written by an Italian comrade uses the theory of the ‘special case’ to show that the Partisans in Italy were different from other resistances in other countries, and thus had to be treated in a particular manner. Traces of this ambiguous position can still be found in Battaglia Communista’s present letter, where it talks about acting “inside the workers’ struggle and even in the ranks of the Partisans”.

According to Battaglia’s letter, the comrades of the minority of the Italian Fraction went to Spain and passed “outside class positions”, in contrast to the militants of the ICP who “engaged in the task of penetrating the ranks of the Partisans in order to disseminate the principles and tactics of the revolutionary movement”.  But do the comrades of Battaglia Communista think that the militants of the minority went to Spain to defend Republican democracy against fascism? Just like those of the ICP who went into the Partisans, they went to Spain to disseminate in the ranks of the militias “the principles and tactics of the revolutionary movements”, to fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat and communism.

Why is it that what the minority did was an “adventure” and what the ICP did was an act of heroism? A simple question, and one that is not answered by the gratuitous assertion that the events in Spain “taught these comrades a lesson and allowed them to return to the revolutionary Left.” The minority excluded from the Fraction in 1936 ended up regrouping with Union Communiste, which defended the same positions, and there they remained until the dispersion of the group during the war. There was no question of these militants going back to the Communist Left until the Fraction was dissolved and its militants integrated into the ICP (at the end of 1945). It was never a question of a ‘lesson’ being learned, or of these militants rejecting their old position and condemning their participation in the anti-fascist war in Spain. It was simply that the euphoria and confusion of setting up the party ‘with Bordiga’ inspired these comrades, including a few French comrades left over from the old Union Communiste, to join the party. And this was done at the direct instigation of Vercesi, who in the meantime had become leader of the party and its representative outside Italy. The party in Italy did not ask these comrades to account for their past activities. This was not because of ignorance – old comrades of the Fraction like Danielis, Lecce, Luciano, Butta, Vercesi and others could hardly be ignorant of a minority which they themselves had expelled nine years before. It was because it was a time to forget ‘old quarrels’: the reconstitution of the party wiped the slate clean. A party which was not very clear about the effect of the Partisan movement on its own militants wasn’t likely to have a very rigorous attitude towards what the minority had been doing some years before. Thus it ‘naturally’ opened its doors to these comrades, quietly making them the nucleus of the French section of the new Party.

If we examine the explanation given in the letter about the Brussels Anti-Fascist Committee and Vercesi’s part in it, it doesn’t fare any better. The letter says that “the Brussels Anti-Fascist Committee, in the person of Vercesi who thought he had to join the Partito Communista Internazionalista when it was founded, held onto his own bastardized positions until the party, making the sacrifices that clarity demanded, rid itself of the dead leaves of Bordigism”. What an elegant way of putting it! He – Vercesi - thought he had to join!!!??? And the party – what did the party think of him? Or is the party a bridge club which anyone can join? Vercesi didn’t come out of nowhere. He was an old militant of the Italian Left in the 1920s, and the main spokesman of the Italian Left in exile. He was the guiding spirit of the Fraction and the main editor of Bilan. His militant contribution and his revolutionary merits were enormous, and his influence was considerable. This is why the struggle within the Fraction on the eve of the war and during the war against his increasingly aberrant positions was so important.

The announcement of the formation of an Italian Anti-Fascist Committee in Brussels in the last months of the war, with Vercesi, in the name of the Fraction at its head, provoked a violent response from revolutionary elements and groups in France. Elements of the Italian Fraction who were in France – with the agreement of the French Group of the Communist Left – reacted by expelling Vercesi from the Fraction, a few months before hearing about the constitution of the party in Italy and proclaiming the dissolution  of the Fraction. What makes Vercesi’s political conduct even more serious is the fact that he took with him the Italian comrades in Brussels and the majority of the Belgian Fraction. A few months later Vercesi went to Italy where he was given a leading role in the new party and the task of representing it abroad. The party must have known about all these events because not only had a number of the comrades from the recently dissolved Fraction just arrived in Italy, but even more because the French Group of the Communist Left raised the question publicly in its review Internationalisme and addressed a number of letters and open letters to the ICP and the other fractions of the Communist Left, criticizing and condemning all these activities. But apart from the Belgian Fraction, there was no reply. The ICP shut itself up in silence, and its only response was to recognize as its sole expression in France the Fraction recently set up by Vercesi around the old minority, thus keeping away from Internationalisme and its embarrassing questions. We had to wait until 1948 for the party to break its silence, passing a brief and laconic resolution against the Brussels Anti-Fascist Committee without mentioning by name the man who remained one of its leaders: Vercesi. This policy of silence is one of holding onto ambiguities. And it took another five years for the party to make “the sacrifices that clarity demanded, (and) rid itself of the dead leaves of Bordigism”.

We don’t want to write a history of the ICP here. If we have dwelt at length on the Platform and the question of the Partisans, it’s because this was the crucial question at the time. We didn’t spend a long time discussing the question of the integration of the minority of the Fraction who had fought in Spain, or the issue of the Brussels Anti-Fascist Committee, even though the political implications of these questions are of the greatest importance. This is because what we were interested in doing was not making ad hoc condemnations, but simply corroborating what we said originally about the ICP: that the very basis on which it was set up contained all kinds of ambiguities which meant that the party was a political regression in relation to the positions of the Fraction before the war, the positions of Bilan. While remaining within the proletarian camp in a general sense, the ICP failed to break away from the erroneous positions of the Communist International, for the example on the union question and the question of participating in electoral campaigns. The subsequent evolution of the ICP and its dislocation into a number of groups are proof of its failure. The contribution of the Italian Left is considerable, and its theoretical and political work is part of the heritage of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. But, as with the German and Dutch Left, the traditional Italian left exhausted itself a long time ago. This is simply an expression of the break in organic continuity in the revolutionary movement. The terrible length and depth of the counter-revolution physically destroyed all that was left of the Communist International. The Fraction wanted to be a bridge between yesterday’s party and the party of the future. But this hope was not realized. The ICP attempted to be the pole of a new revolutionary movement. But the period, plus its own insufficiencies and ambiguities, didn’t allow this either. It failed and today looks more like a survival of the past than a new point of departure.[6]

With the re-emergence of the historic crisis of the capitalist system, and the resurgence of workers’ struggles all over the world, new revolutionary groups are bound to arise, expressing the necessity and possibility of the regroupment of revolutionaries. It’s time to stop claiming a vague and dubious organic continuity, it’s time to stop giving it artificial respiration. What we have to do is apply ourselves seriously to the task of regroupment, to create a pole of revolutionary regroupment. That is the task of the hour.

But if such a regroupment is to fulfill its real function, it must be based on precise political criteria, on a clear and coherent orientation, which springs from the experiences of the workers’ movement and its theoretical principles. This is something that has to be sought after as methodically and as seriously as possible. We must, as Danielis said, guard against a facile attitude, such as convening conferences on the vague basis of denouncing this or that about-turn of the ‘Communist’ parties in Europe. This would be chasing after numbers at the expense of examining the political criteria for a solid revolutionary regroupment. Here again, the experience of the formation of the ICP has an important lesson for us.

Because it is firmly committed to the necessity of contact and regroupment in the revolutionary movement, the ICC will encourage and actively participate in any initiative in this direction. This is why we have responded positively to Battaglia’s suggestion for an international conference of revolutionary groups, even though we have criticized its lack of political criteria which has allowed invitations to be sent to the modernist Trotskyists of Union Ouvriere and Maoist-Trotskyists like Combat Communiste, who have no place in a conference of communists.

We have been asked to make a “rectification”. This is what we have done – a bit long perhaps, but clear enough we hope. Precisely because we are more than ever convinced of the necessity for discussion between groups who defend communist positions, we think that this discussion can only be fruitful when it aims at the highest degree of clarity about political positions, both in the present and in the past. Until we next hear from you.

Communist Greetings,

The International Communist Current

30.11.76



[1]At the moment there are two groups calling themselves Partito Communista Internazionalista (their respective papers being Battaglia Communista and La Rivoluzione Communista) and two groups calling themselves Partito Communista Internazionale (their publications are Programma Communista and Il Partito Communista). There are many other groups who derive from the original ICP: Lotta Communista, Iniziativa Communista, etc.

[2]We know about these papers, but we can’t cite any passages from them as we don’t have any available. The ICP could of course republish them … ?

 

[3]The Partisans were set up under the direct control of the Allies and locally under the control of the Communist and Socialist Parties.

[4]In general, we aren’t very keen on the bragging tone of the assertion that the comrades who set up the ICP were “the first and only ones to act inside the workers’ struggles and even in the ranks of the Partisans, calling on the workers to fight against capitalism no matter what kind of regime it was hiding behind.” First of all its not hard to be the ‘first’, when you are the ‘only’ one. There were other groups like the American and Dutch council communists, the RKD (Revolutionary Communists of Germany), the Communistes Revolutionaires de France, etc who defended class positions against capitalism and against the war. Thirdly, if we are talking about participation in the ranks of the Partisans, the part of the Italian Left which followed this policy certainly didn’t suffer from isolation, being in good company with all sorts of groups, from Trotskyists to anarchists.

[5]Danielis was an active militant of the Italian Fraction and returned to Italy on the eve of the war.

 

[6]We only have to recall the total absence of the different groups who come from the ICP during the struggles at FIAT and Pirelli during Italy’s Hot Autumn of 1969; they were taken completely by surprise by these events. Not to mention the ridiculous appeal issued by the Bordigists in May 1968 in France, in the form of a small handwritten poster stuck to the walls of the university, calling upon the twelve million workers on strike to put themselves behind the banner of the Party … .

 

 

Rubric: 

Internationalist Communist Party

International Review no.9 - 2nd quarter 1977

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The Communist Left in Russia 1918-1930 Part 2

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The communist left and the counter-revolution, 1921-30

After 1921 the Bolshevik Party found itself in a nightmarish situation. Following the defeat of workers’ uprisings in Hungary, Italy, Germany and elsewhere between 1918 and 1921, the world revolution went into a profound reflux from which it was never to recover, despite sending out after-shocks like Germany and Bulgaria in 1923 and China in 1927. In Russia both the economy and the proletariat itself had reached a level of near disintegration; the working masses had withdrawn or been chased from political life. No longer an instrument in the hands of the proletariat, the Soviet state had effectively degenerated into a machine for the defence of capitalist ‘order’. Prison­ers of their substitutionist conceptions, the Bolsheviks still believed that it was possible to administer this state machine and the capitalist economy while waiting for and even assisting the resurgence of the world revolution. In reality, the neces­sities of state power were transforming the Bolsheviks into overt agents of the counter­revolution, both at home and abroad. Inside Russia they became the overseers of an increasingly ferocious exploitation of the working class. Although the NEP brought with it a certain relaxation in the state’s economic domination, especially over the peasants, it did not see any let up in the party’s dictatorship over the proletariat. On the contrary, since the Bolsheviks still considered that the main danger of the counter-revolution within Russia came from the peasants, they concluded that the econo­mic concessions given to the peasants had to be counter-balanced by a strengthening of the political domination of Russian soci­ety by the Bolshevik Party; and this brought with it a reinforcement of tendencies towards monolithism in the party itself. This ‘tightening up’ of control by the party, and within the party, was seen as the only way of erecting a proletarian dam against a flood-tide of peasant capitalism.

Internationally, the requirements of the Russian state were, through the medium of the dominant Russian party, having a more and more pernicious effect on the policies of the Communist International: the United Front, the workers’ government -- reactionary ‘tactics’ such as these were to a large ex­tent the expression of the need for the Russian state to find bourgeois allies in the capitalist world.

Although the Bolshevik Party had not yet definitively abandoned the proletarian revolution, the whole logic of the situation it was in more and more pushed the party into a final and complete identification with the demands of Russian national capital. Lenin’s last writings show an obsessive concern with the problems of ‘socialist construction’ in backward Russia. The victory of Stalinism merely made this logic explicit, eliminating the dilemma between internationalism and Russian state interests by simply abandoning the former in favour of the latter.

The events of the last fifty years have shown that a proletarian party cannot sur­vive in a period of reflux or defeat in the class struggle. Thus, the only way that the communist parties could preserve their physical existence after the failure of the revolutionary wave was to pass lock, stock and barrel into the camp of the bourgeoisie. In Russia the tendency towards degeneration was further accelerated by the fact that the party had fused with the state and thus had to adapt itself even more quickly to the demands of national capital. In a per­iod of defeat, the defence of revolutionary positions can only be carried on by small communist fractions who detach themselves from the degenerating party or survive its demise. This phenomenon took place in Russia, mainly between 1921 and 1924, with the emergence of small groupings determined to defend communist positions against the betrayals of the party. As we have seen, the emergence of oppositional tendencies within the Bolshevik Party was not new, but the conditions in which these fractions had to operate after 1921 differed dramatically from those under which their predecessors had worked.

The precondition for defending a communist perspective against the advancing counter­revolution was, especially in Russia, the ability to place loyalty to those perspec­tives above all sentimental, personal, and political attachments to the original organ­izations of the class, now that the latter had embarked upon a path of class betrayal. And, indeed, this was the great achievement of the Russian left fractions; their defiant commitment to carry out communist work against the party and against the Soviet state as soon as such work could no longer be carried on within those institutions.

For the left, communist positions came first. If the ‘heroes’ of the revolution no longer defended the communist programme, then those heroes had to be denounced and left behind. It is not surprising that the Russian left communists tended to be made up of relatively obscure individuals, main­ly workers, who had not been part of the Bolshevik leadership during the heroic years. (Miasnikov even used to deride the Left Opposition as being nothing but an “opposition of celebrities” who only oppo­sed the Stalinist faction for their bureau­cratic reasons -- see L’Ouvrier Communiste, no. 6, January 1930). These revolutionary workers were able to understand the condi­tions facing the Russian proletariat much more easily than high-ranking Bolshevik officials who had really lost touch with the class and were only capable of seeing the problems of the revolution in terms of state administration. At the same time, however, the obscure origins of the left fractions’ members were often a factor of weakness in these groups. Their analyses tended to be based more on a raw class instinct than on a profound theoretical formation. Coupled with the historic weak­nesses of the Russian workers’ movement, which we have already mentioned, and the isolation of the Russian left from communist fractions outside Russia, these factors placed serious limits on the theoretical evolution of left communism in Russia.

Despite the left’s ability to break from ‘official’ institutions and to identify with the struggle of the class against them, the immense retreat of the class in Russia posed the left fractions with a series of opaque and contradictory problems. Despite its rapid degeneration after 1921, the Bolshevik Party remained the focus of pro­letarian life in Russia since the soviets, factory committees and other mass organs of the class were dead, and the state itself had become an organ of capital. Because of the apathy and indifference of the class, political debate and conflict were centred almost exclusively around the party. It is true that the very indifference and non-activity of the class made most of the ideo­logical debates within the party in the twenties sterile from the beginning, but the fact that the party was a kind of oasis of political thought in a desert of working class apoliticism could not be ignored by revolutionaries.

This situation placed the left fractions in a horrible dilemma. On the one hand the apathy of the masses, together with the rep­ressive actions of the state, made it extr­emely difficult to militate within the pro­letariat ‘in general’. On the other hand, any work towards the party was severely hampered by the banning of factions in 1921 and the increasingly stifling atmosphere within the party; it was almost impossible for any genuinely oppositional group to do legal work within the party. Even the rel­atively mild criticisms voiced in 1923 by the Platform of the Forty-Six (the founding document of the Left Opposition) contained the complaint that “free discussion within the party has in fact disappeared; the party’s social mind has been choked off”. For the tendencies to the left of the Left Opposition, the situation was even worse; and yet all of them continued to combine propaganda work among the ‘broad masses’ of the factories with secret work within the local party cells. The Workers’ Group in its 1923 Manifesto spoke of the “neces­sity to constitute the Workers’ Group of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) on the basis of the programme and statutes of the RCP, in order to exert a decisive pressure on the leading group of the party itself.” The Workers’ Truth group’s 1922 Appeal expressed the view that “everywhere in the mills and factories, in the trade union organizations, the workers’ faculties, the Soviet and party schools, the Communist Union of Youth, and the party organizations, propaganda circles must be created in soli­darity with the Workers’ Truth.”1 Such declarations of intent demonstrate the extreme difficulty facing these groups in their efforts to find an echo in the Russian proletariat and the impossibility of their finding clear-cut organizational solutions in a period of disarray and confusion.

Finally, we must bear in mind the fact that these groupings were subject to the most intense persecution and repression at the hands of the party-state. Precisely because Russia had been the ‘land of the Soviets’, the country of the proletarian revolution, the counter-revolution there had to be total, ruthless and implacable, burying the last traces of everything that had been revolu­tionary. Even before the victory of the Stalinist faction, the left groupings had been subject to investigation by the GPU, arrest, imprisonment and exile. Deprived of funds and equipment, constantly on the run from the secret police, it was difficult for them to carry out even a bare minimum of political propaganda. The solidification of the counter-revolution after 1924 made things even harder. And yet throughout these dark years of reaction the left commu­nists continued to fight for the revolution. As late as 1929 the Workers’ Group was pub­lishing an illegal paper in Moscow, The Workers’ Road to Power. Even in the Stali­nist labour camps their political voices were not silenced. A proletarian revolution does not die easily. The revolutionaries who fought on in such adverse circumstances derived their courage and their tenacious­ness from the simple fact that they had been born out of a revolution of the working class. Let us therefore examine in more detail the principal groupings who kept the flag of the communist revolution flying in spite of everything that was piled up against them.

1. The Workers’ Truth

The Workers’ Truth group was formed in the autumn of 1921. It appears to have been composed mainly of intellectuals, and to have grown out of the ‘Proletkult’ cultural milieu whose main animator was Bogdanov  - a party theorist who had clashed with Lenin over philosophical problems in the 1900s and who had been prominent in the ‘left’ tendencies in Bolshevism at that time. In its 1922 Appeal, Workers’ Truth characteri­zed the NEP, “the rebirth of normal capita­list relations”, as signifying a profound defeat for the Russian proletariat:

“The working class of Russia is disorgan­ized; confusion reigns in the minds of the workers; are they in a country of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, as the Communist Party untiringly reite­rates by word of mouth and in the press? Or are they in a country of arbitrary rule and exploitation, as life tells them at every step. The working class is leading a miserable existence at a time when the new bourgeoisie (ie the responsible functionaries, plant directors, heads of trusts, chairmen of execu­tive committees, etc) and the Nepmen live in luxury and recall in our memory the picture of the life of the bourgeoisie of all times.”

For the Workers’ Truth the ‘Soviet’ state has become “the representative of the nation­wide interests of capital ... the mere dir­ecting apparatus of political administra­tion and economic regulation by the organizer intelligentsia.” At the same time the working class had been deprived of its defensive organs, the unions, and of its class party. In a manifesto issued to the Twelfth Party Congress of 1923, Workers’ Truth charged the unions with:

“converting themselves from organizations to defend the economic interests of the workers into organizations to defend the interests of production, ie of state capital first and foremost.” (Quoted in E.H. Carr, The Interregnum.)

As for the party, the Appeal asserts that: “The Russian-Communist Party has become the party of the organizer intelligent­sia. The abyss between the Russian Communist Party and the working class is getting deeper and deeper ...”

They therefore declared their intention of working towards the formation of a real “party of the Russian proletariat”, though they admit that their work will be “long and persistent, and first of all ideologi­cal”.

Although the relatively modest aims of the Workers’ Truth group appear to express some understanding of the defeat the class had suffered and of the consequent limitations on revolutionary activity in such a period, their whole framework is vitiated by a peculiar ambiguity about the historic epoch and the tasks confronting the class globally. Perhaps basing themselves on Bogdanov’s idea that until the proletariat has matured into a capable organizing class, socialist revolution would be premature, they imply that the revolution in Russia had had the task of opening up a phase of capitalist development:

“After the successful revolution and civil war, broad perspectives opened be­fore Russia, of rapid transformation into a country of progressive capitalism. In this lies the undoubted and tremendous achievement of the revolution in October.” (Appeal)

This perspective also led the Workers’ Truth group to advocate a strange foreign policy for Russia, calling for rapproche­ment with ‘progressive’ capitalism in America and Germany against ‘reactionary’ France. At the same time the group seems to have had little or no contact with left communist groups outside Russia.

It was positions such as these which no doubt led the Workers’ Group of Miasnikov to proclaim that it had “nothing in common with the so-called ‘Workers’ Truth’ which attempts to wipe out everything that was communist in the revolution of October 1917 and is, therefore, completely Menshevist” (Workers’ Dreadnought, 31 May 1924) -- though in its 1923 Manifesto the Workers’ Group acknowledges that groups like the Workers’ Truth, Democratic Centralism and the Workers’ Opposition contain many honest proletarian elements and calls on them to regroup on the basis of the Workers’ Group’s Manifesto.

At the time of the Russian Revolution those who talked about the ‘inevitability’ of a bourgeois evolution for Russia tended to be identified as Mensheviks. But in the light of subsequent experience, we prefer to com­pare the positions of the Workers’ Truth group to the analysis arrived at by the German and Dutch left in the 1930s. Like the Workers’ Truth, the latter began with some perceptive insights into the nature of state capitalism, but undermined their anal­ysis by concluding that the Russian Revolu­tion had from the beginning been an affair of the intelligentsia carrying out the organization of state capitalism in a coun­try which had been unripe for communist revolution. In other words, the analysis put forward by Workers’ Truth is that of a revolutionary tendency demoralized and confused by the defeat of the revolution and thus led to call into question the orig­inal proletarian character of that revolu­tion. In the absence of a clear and coher­ent framework in which to analyze the degeneration of the revolution, such devia­tions are inevitable particularly in the adverse conditions in which revolutionaries in Russia found themselves after 1921.

But despite a certain pessimism and intell­ectualism, the Workers’ Truth group did not hesitate to intervene in the wildcat strikes which swept across Russia in the summer of 1923, attempting to raise political slogans within the general class movement. This intervention, however, brought the full force of the GPU down on the group and its back was broken quite quickly in the repression that followed.

2. The Workers’ Group and the Communist Workers’ Party

We have seen that many of the weaknesses of groups like the Workers’ Opposition and Workers’ Truth can be traced to their lack of an international perspective. As a coro­llary to this we can say that the most impor­tant of the left communist fractions in Russia were precisely those who emphasized the international nature of the revolution and the need for revolutionaries of the whole world to join together. This was the case with the elements in Russia who corres­ponded most closely to the German KAPD and its fraternal organizations.

On 3 June and 17 June 1922, the Workers’ Dreadnought published a statement by a recently formed group calling itself the “Group of Revolutionary Left Communists (Communist Workers’ Party) of Russia”. They announced themselves as a group that had left “the social democratic Russian Commu­nist Party which has made business its chief concern” (WD, 3 June); and although they pledged themselves to “support all that is left of revolutionary tendencies in the Russian Communist Party” and to “welcome and support all the demands and propositions of the Workers’ Opposition which point in a sound revolutionary direction”, they insisted that “there is no possibility of reforming the Russian Communist Party from within. In any case the Workers’ Opposition is not capable of doing it.” (WD, 17 June). The group denounced the efforts of the Bolsheviks and the Comintern to compromise with capi­tal both in Russia and abroad, and in parti­cular attacked the Comintern’s United Front policy as a means for the “reconstruction of the capitalist world economy” (WD, 17 June). Since the Bolsheviks and the Comin­tern were taking an opportunist course which could only lead to their integration into capitalism, the group affirmed that the time had come to work for a Communist Workers’ Party of Russia aligned to the KAPD of Germany, the Dutch KAP, and other parties of the Communist Workers’ International.2

The subsequent development of this group is obscure, but it seems to have been closely bound up with the better known Workers’ Group (also known as the Communist Workers’ Group) of Miasnikov -- in fact the Russian ‘CWP’ of 1922 seems to be a precursor of the latter. On 1 December 1923 the Dread­nought announced that it had been sent a copy of the Workers’ Group’s Manifesto by the CWP, along with a protest by the CWP against the imprisonment in Russia of Miasnikov, Kuznetzov, and other militants of the Workers’ Group. In 1924 the KAPD published the Manifesto in Germany and described the Workers’ Group as the “Russian section of the IVth International”. In any case, the defence of left communism as exemplified by the KAPD was henceforward to be carried on in Russia by the Miasnikov group.

Gabriel Miasnikov, a worker from the Urals, had leapt to prominence in the Bolshevik Party in 1921 when, immediately after the crucial Tenth Congress, he had called for “freedom of the press from monarchists to anarchists inclusive” (quoted in Carr, The Interregnum). Despite Lenin’s attempts to dissuade him from this agitation, he refused to climb down and was expelled from the party in early 1922. In February-March 1923 he joined with other militants to found the Workers’ Group of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik), and they published their Manifesto, which was distributed at the Twelfth Congress of the RCP. The group began to do illegal work amongst party and non-party workers, and seems to have had an important presence in the strike wave of summer 1923, calling for mass demonstrations and trying to politicize an essentially defensive class movement. Their activities in these strikes were enough to convince the GPU that they were a real threat; a wave of arrests of their leading militants dealt a severe blow to the group. But as we have seen, they carried on their underground work, if on a reduced scale, until the beginning of the 1930s.3

The Workers’ Group’s Manifesto is a consid­erable advance on the Appeal of the Workers’ Truth, but it still shows the hesitations and half-formed ideas of the communist left, especially in Russia, in that period.

The Manifesto contains the usual denuncia­tions of the dreadful material conditions being suffered by the Russian workers and of the inequalities that accompany the NEP, and asks “is it in reality possible that the Nep (new economic policy) is changing into the NEP - the New Exploitation of the Prole­tariat?”. It goes on to attack the suppres­sion of dissent inside and outside the party, and the danger of the party being transfor­med into “a minority, wielding control of power and of the country’s economic resour­ces, which will end up as a bureaucratic caste”. It argues that the unions, soviets and factory committees have lost their func­tion as proletarian organs, so that the class has no control either of production or the political apparatus of the regime. And it calls for a regeneration of all these organs, a radical reform of the Soviet system which will enable the class to exert its domina­tion over economic and political life.

This immediately brings us to the major problem which faced the Russian left in the early twenties. What attitude should they take up to the Soviet regime? Did the re­gime still have any proletarian character, or should revolutionaries call for its out and out destruction? The trouble was that during those years there simply was neither the experience nor the established criteria for deciding whether or not the regime had become completely counter-revolutionary. This dilemma is reflected in the ambiguous attitude the Workers’ Group took up towards the regime. Thus it attacks the inequali­ties of the NEP and the danger of its “bureaucratic degeneration” while at the same time asserting that “the NEP is the direct result of the situation of the prod­uctive forces of our country. It must be used to consolidate the positions conquered by the proletariat in October.”4 The Manifesto thus puts forward a series of suggestions for ‘improving’ the NEP – workers’ control, non-dependence on foreign capital etc. Similarly, while criticizing the degeneration of the party, the Workers’ Group, as we have seen, opted for work among party members and for putting pressure on the party leadership. And although else­where the group posed the question whether the proletariat might not be “compelled to once again start anew the struggle -- and perhaps a bloody one -- for the overthrow of the oligarchy” (quoted in Carr, The interre­gnum), the main emphasis of the Manifesto is on the regeneration of the Soviet state and its institutions, not on their violent overthrow. The position of ‘critical sup­port’ is further underlined by the fact, that, in the face of the war threat posed by the Curzon Ultimatum of 1923, the members of the Workers’ Group are reported to have taken an oath to resist “all attempts to overthrow the Soviet power” (Carr, Ibid). Whether or not it was ‘correct’ to defend the Russian regime in 1923 is not really the point. The positions the Workers’ Group took up then certainly did not make it counter-revolutionary, because the exper­ience of the class had not yet definitively settled the Russian question. Its ambigui­ties about the nature of the Russian regime are above all testimony to the immense dif­ficulties this question posed to revolution­aries in the confusion and disarray of those years.

But the most important aspect of the Workers’ Group was not its analysis of the Russian regime but it’s intransigently internationa­list perspective. Significantly, the 1923 Manifesto begins with a powerful description of the world crisis of capitalism and posed the choice facing mankind as a whole: socialism or barbarism. In attempting to explain the delay in the working class arriving at a revolutionary consciousness in the face of this crisis, the Manifesto mounts a marvelous attack on the universally counter-revolutionary role of Social Democracy:

“The Socialists of all countries, are at any given moment the only saviours of the bourgeoisie from the proletarian revolu­tion, because the working masses are accustomed to be suspicious of everything which comes from their oppressors, but when the same things are described as being in its interests and are adorned with socialist phrases, then the worker who is misled by these phrases believes the traitors and expends his energies in a hopeless struggle. The bourgeoisie has, and will have, no better advocate.”

This understanding allows the Workers’ Group to make a series of bitter denuncia­tions of the Comintern’s tactics of the United Front and the Workers’ government as so many ways of tying the proletariat to its class enemies. Though less aware of the reactionary role of the unions, the Workers’ Group shared the KAPD’s perception that in the new epoch of capitalist decay all the old reformist tactics had to be jettisoned:

“The time when the working class could improve their material and legal position by strikes and entrance into Parliament is now irrevocably past. It must be said openly. The struggle for the most immed­iate objectives is a struggle for power. We must drive home by our propaganda that, though we have called for strikes in various cases, these cannot really improve the workers’ conditions. But you, workers, have not yet overcome the old reformist illusions and are carrying on a fight which only exhausts you. We are in solidarity with you in your strikes, but we always insist that these movements will not liberate you from slavery, expl­oitation and hopeless poverty. The only road to victory is the conquest of power by your own rough hands.”

The role of the party, then, is to prepare the masses everywhere for civil war against the bourgeoisie.

The Workers’ Groups understanding of the new historic epoch appears to contain all the weaknesses as well as the strengths of the KAPD’s idea of the “death crisis of capital­ism”. For both, once capitalism had entered into its final crisis, the conditions for a proletarian revolution exist at any time: the role of the party is thus one of detona­ting the class into a revolutionary explos­ion. Nowhere in the Manifesto is there any understanding of the reflux of the world revolution that has taken place, requiring a careful analysis of the new perspectives open to revolutionaries. For the Workers’ Group in 1923, world revolution was just as much on the agenda as it had been in 1917. Thus it could share the KAPD’s illusions in the possibility of building a IVth Interna­tional in 1922, and as late as 1928-31 Miasnikov was still trying to organize a Communist Workers’ Party for Russia.5 It appears that only the Italian Left was able to develop an appreciation of the role of the communist fraction in a period of reflux, when the party can no longer exist. For the KAPD, the Workers’ Dreadnought, Miasnikov and others, the party could exist at any time. The corollary to this immediatist view was an inexorable tendency towards political disintegration: even allowing for the effects of repression, the German left communists, like their Russian and English sympathizers, found it almost impossible to sustain their political existence during the period of counter-revolution.

The concrete proposals advanced by the Wor­kers’ Group concerning the international regroupment of revolutionaries show a healthy concern for the maximum possible unity of revolutionary forces, but they also reflect the same dilemmas about the relationship of the communist left to the degenerating ‘offical’ communist institutions which we have noted elsewhere. Thus while fiercely opposing any United Front with the Social Democrats, the Workers’ Group’s Manifesto calls for a kind of united front of all genuine revolutionary elements, among whom it included the parties of the IIIrd Inter­national as well as the Communist Workers’ Parties. On another occasion the Workers’ Group is reported to have entered into neg­otiations with the KPD left around Maslow in an attempt to draw Maslow into its aborted ‘foreign bureau’. The KAPD in its comments on the Manifesto was extremely critical of what it called the Workers’ Group’s “illu­sion that you can revolutionize the Commu­nist International….the IIIrd Internatio­nal is no longer an instrument of proletarian class struggle. This is why the Commu­nist Workers’ Parties have founded the Communist Workers’ International.” However the Workers’ Group’s dilemma about the nature of the Russian regime and of the Comin­tern was to be resolved in the light of practical experience. The victory of Stal­inism in Russia led it to take a more intran­sigent line against the bureaucracy and its state, while the rapid decomposition of the Comintern after 1923 made it inevitable that the future international ‘partners’ of the Workers’ Group would be the genuine left communists of different countries. It was first and foremost this ‘international connection’ with the survivors of the rev­olutionary wave which allowed revolutiona­ries like Miasnikov to attain a relatively high level of clarity in the sea of confu­sion, demoralization and dupery which had engulfed the Russian workers’ movement.

3. The ‘irreconcilables’ of the Left Opposition

We cannot go into the whole question of the Left Opposition here. Although their confu­sed defence of party democracy, of the Chinese Revolution, and of internationalism against the Stalinist theory of ‘socialism in one country’ demonstrate that the Left Opposition was a proletarian current, in fact the last spark of resistance in the Bolshevik Party and the Comintern, the inade­quacy of their critique of the advancing counter-revolution makes it impossible to consider the Left Opposition, as a body, part of the revolutionary tradition of the communist left. On the international level, their refusal to question the Theses of the first four Congresses of the Comintern pre­vented them from avoiding a pathetic repeti­tion of all its errors. Within Russia, the Left Opposition failed to make the necessary break with the party-state apparatus, a break which could have placed them firmly on the terrain of the proletarian struggle against the regime, alongside the genuine left communist fractions. Although his enemies tried to implicate Trotsky for entering into relations with illegal groupings like the Workers’ Truth, Trotsky him­self explicitly dissociated himself from these groupings. He referred to the Workers’ Truth group as the “Workers’ Untruth” (Carr, The Interregnum) and himself participated in the repression of the ‘ultra-left’, for example by assisting in the commission which investigated the activities of the Workers’ Opposition in 1922. All that Trotsky would admit was that the groups were symptoms of a genuine degeneration in the Soviet regime.

But the Left Opposition in its early years was not simply Trotsky. Many of the signa­tories of the Platform of the Forty-Six were former left communists and Democratic Centralists like Ossinski, Smirnov, Piatakov, and others. And as Miasnikov said:

“There are not only great men in the Trotskyist opposition. There are also many workers. And these will not want to follow the leaders; after some hesita­tions, they will enter the ranks of the Workers’ Group.” (L’Ouvrier Communiste, no . 6, January 1930)

Precisely because the Left Opposition was a proletarian current, it naturally gave birth to a left wing which went far beyond the timid criticisms of Stalinism made by Trotsky and his ‘orthodox’ followers. To­wards the end of the twenties a current known as the ‘irreconcilables’ grew up with­in the Left Opposition, composed largely of young workers who opposed the tendency of the ‘moderate’ Trotskyists to move to­wards some kind of reconciliation with the Stalin faction, a tendency which accelera­ted after 1928 when Stalin appeared to be rapidly carrying out the Left Opposition’s programme of industrialization. Isaac Deutscher writes that among the irreconci­lables:

“ ... the view was already becoming axio­matic that the Soviet Union was no longer a workers’ state; that the party had betrayed the revolution; and that the hope to reform it being futile, the Oppo­sition should constitute itself into a new party and preach and prepare a new revolution. Some saw Stalin as the pro­moter of agrarian capitalism or even, the leader of a ‘kulak democracy’ while to others his rule epitomized the ascen­dancy of a state capitalism implacably hostile to socialism.” (The Prophet Outcast)

In his book Au Pays du Grand Mensonge, Anton Ciliga gives an eye-witness account of the debates within the Left Opposition that took place inside Stalin’s labour camps. He shows that some Left Opposition­ists stood for capitulating to the Stali­nist system, others stood for reforming it, and still others for a ‘political revolution’ to remove the bureaucracy (the position Trotsky himself was to adopt). But the irreconcilables or “negators” as he calls them (Ciliga himself was one):

“ ... believed that not only the political order but also the social and economic orders were foreign and hostile to the proletariat. We therefore envisaged not only a political but also a social revo­lution that should open up a road to the development of socialism. According to us, the bureaucracy was a real class, a class hostile to the proletariat.” (Reproduced in ‘Revolutionary Politics in Stalin’s Prisons’, an Oppositionist pamphlet.)

In January 1930, writing in L’Ouvrier Communiste (no.6) Miasnikov wrote of the Left Opposition that:

“There are only two possibilities. Either the Trotskyists regroup under the slogan ‘war on the palaces, peace to the cottages’, under the banner of the work­ers’ revolution, the first step of which must be the proletariat becoming the ru­ling class, or they will languish slowly and pass individually or collectively into the camp of the bourgeoisie. These are the only two alternatives. There is no third way.”

The events of the 1930s, which saw the def­initive passage of the Trotskyists into the armies of capital were to bear out Miasni­kov’s prediction. But still the best ele­ments of the Left Opposition were able to follow the other path, the path of the wor­kers’ revolution. Disgusted by Trotsky’s failure to confirm their analysis in his writings from abroad, they broke from the Left Opposition in 1930-2 and began to work with remnants of the Workers’ Group and the Democratic Centralism group in prison, evolving an analysis of the failure of the world revolution and the meaning of state capitalism. As Ciliga points out in his book, they were no longer afraid to go right to the heart of the question and to accept that the degeneration of the revolu­tion had not begun with Stalin but had gathered pace even under the aegis of Lenin and Trotsky. As Marx used to say, to be radical means to go to the root. In those dark years of reaction, what better contri­bution could the communist left have made than to have burrowed fearlessly to the roots of the proletariat’s defeat?

***************

Some may see the debates that the Russian left communists carried on in prison as nothing but a symbol of the impotence of revolutionary ideas in the face of the capi­talist leviathan. But although their situa­tion was the expression of a profound defeat for the proletariat, the very fact that they continued to clarify the lessons of the revo­lution in such appalling circumstances is a sign that the historic mission of the pro­letariat can never be buried by the temporary victory of the counter-revolution – even if that victory lasts for decades. As Miasnikov wrote in connection with the imprisonment of Sapranov:

“Now Sapranov has been arrested. Even exile and the stifling of his voice did not succeed in diminishing his energy, and the bureaucracy could not feel safe about him till he was in the solid walls of a prison. But a powerful spirit, the spirit of the October Revolution, can’t be put in prison; even the grave can’t hide it. The principles of the revolution are still alive in the working class in Russia and as long as the wor­king class lives this idea cannot die. You can arrest Sapranov, but not the idea of the revolution.” (L’Ouvrier Communiste, 1929)

It is true that the Stalinist bureaucracy long ago succeeded in wiping out the last communist minorities in Russia. But today, when a new wave of international proletarian struggle is finding a muffled echo even amongst the proletariat in Russia, the “powerful spirit” of a second October has returned to haunt the minds of the Stalinist hangmen in Moscow and their offspring in Warsaw, Prague and Peking. When the workers of the ‘Socialist Fatherland’ rise up to destroy once and for all the vast prison of the Stalinist state, they will, in conjunc­tion with their class brothers all over the world, at last be able to solve the problems posed both by the revolution of 1917 and its loyal defenders: the revolutionaries of the Russian communist left.

“What is in order is to distinguish the essential from the non-essential, the kernel from the accidental excrescences in the policies of the Bolsheviks. In the present period, when we face decisive final struggles in all the world, the most important problem of socialism was and is the burning question of our time. It is not a matter of this or that sec­ondary question of tactics, but of the capacity for action of the proletariat, the strength to act, the will to power of socialism as such. In this, Lenin and Trotsky and their friends were the first, those who went ahead as an example to the proletariat of the world; they are still the only ones up to now who can cry with Hutten: “I have dared!”

“This is the essential and enduring in Bolshevik policy. In this sense theirs is the immortal historical service of having marched at the head of the inter­national proletariat with the conquest of political power and the practical placing of the problem of the realization of socialism, and of having advanced mightily the settlement of the score between capital and labour in the entire world. In Russia the problem could only be posed. It could not be solved in Russia. And in this sense, the future everywhere belongs to ‘Bolshevism’.” (Rosa Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution)

C. D. Ward

1 The Manifesto of the Workers’ Group is available (together with the KAPD’s footnotes) in French in Invariance, Series II, no. 6. An incomplete version appeared in English in the following issues of the Workers’ Dreadnought: 1 December 1923, 5 January 1924. The Appeal of the Workers’ Truth group was published in the Socialist Herald, Berlin, 31 January 1923; extracts from it appear in English in Daniels, A Documentary History of Communism.

2 The 17 June text and another text on the United Front by the same group were reproduced in Workers’ Voice, no. 14.

3 Miasnikov’s subsequent history is as follows: from 1923 to 1927 he spent most of his time in prison or exile for underground activities. Escaping from Russia in 1927 he fled to Persia and Turkey, eventually settling in France in 1930. During this period he was still trying to organize his group in Russia. In 1946, for reasons best known to himself, (perhaps expecting a new revolution after the war?), Miasnikov returned to Russia…..and has never heard of since.

4 The KAPD published the Manifesto of the Workers’ Group with their own critical footnotes. They did not accept the Workers’ Groups analysis of the NEP. For them Russia in 1923 was a country of peasant-dominated capitalism and the NEP was the expression of this. Thus they stood “not for the transcendence of the NEP, but for its violent abolition”.

5 Writing in L’Ouvrier Communiste in 1929 Miasnikov reported on a conference held in August in 1928 between the Worker’s Group, Sapranov’s ‘Group of Fifteen’, and remnants of the Workers’ Opposition. Arriving at a high level of programmatic agreement, the conference resolved to “constitute the Central Bureau of the Workers’ Group into the Central Organizational Bureau of the Communist Workers’ Parties of the USSR.” (The decision to set-up Communist Workers’ Parties for USSR may reflect the concern to ensure autonomy for each Soviet republic and its Communist Party expressed in the 1923 Manifesto, a ‘decentralist’ tendency that was criticized by the KAPD in their notes to the Manifesto.)


Of the former Democraric Centralist Sapranov and his group, Miasnikov had this to say:


“Comrade Sapranov was not made of the same material as the leaders of the opposition of the celebrities. The friendly embraces, and kisses of Lenin did not smother him or kill the living, critical, proletarian spirit in him. And in the years 1926-7 he reappeared again as leader of the ‘Group of Fifteen’. The Platform of the Group of Fifteen had no links either in ideas or theories with the platform of Democratic Centralism. It was a new platform of a new group, with no other link to the past of Democratic Centralism other than the fact that its spokesman was Sapranov.


The Group of Fifteen drew its name from the fact that its platform was signed by fifteen comrades. In its main points, in its estimation of the nature of the state of USSR, its ideas about the workers’ state, the programme of the Fifteen is very close to the ideology of the Workers’ Group.”

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1917 - Russian Revolution [13]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary organisation [5]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Left [4]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Russian Communist Left [56]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Party and Fraction [50]

People: 

  • Gabriel Miasnikov [62]

Notes towards a history of the Communist Left (Italian Fractions 1926-1939)

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The text we are publishing here was part of the introduction to the selection of artic­les from Bilan on the war in Spain, publis­hed by the ICC’s section in Italy (‘Bilan 1933-38, Articoli sulla Guerra di Spagna’, Rivista Internazionale, no.1, November 1976). Thus it doesn’t attempt to present all the positions of the Italian Left (which are developed in the articles themselves) but rather aims to define the historical con­text in which these positions evolved.

We are publishing it here not only because the texts it introduces are the ones that appeared in the International Review, nos. 4, 6, and 7, but also because they enable us to see the main stages of the struggle of the Italian communist left to keep alive the revolutionary theory of the proletariat during the period between the wars, a time when the counter-revolution was exerting a terrible weight on the workers’ movement after the crushing of the great revolutionary wave of 1917-23. It thus gives us an invaluable insight into one of the most crucial qualities that a proletarian revo­lutionary can have: to know how to hold onto and clarify the historical experience of the class without falling under the ideological influence of the ruling class.

--------------------------------

“I am going to speak briefly, fully cons­cious of my responsibilities. What I have to say is extremely serious for the party and for us all, but the development of this painful situation has forced me to speak out. Independent of any consid­eration of the greater or lesser sincer­ity and purity of individuals, I have to declare, in the name of the Left, that the proceedings taking place here have not shaken our opinions, but on the con­trary have, together with the organization and preparation of the Congress and the programme being presented, served simply to strengthen our argument and reinforce the correctness of our judgment. I must state that sadly we consi­der the method employed here is a method harmful to the interests of our cause and to the proletariat. (...) We believe it to be our duty to state without hesi­tation and fully conscious of our respon­sibilities, this important fact: that no solidarity can unite us to people who independently of their intentions and their psychological characteristics, we judge now to be the representatives of an opportunist orientation within our party. (...) If I am a victim, if we are all victims, of a terrible error in our evaluation of what is happening, then I must be and we all must be considered as unworthy to be in the party and we will disappear in the eyes of the working class. But if this unrelenting opposi­tion that we have outlined is correct and has vital implications for the future, then we can at least say that we fought to the end against the pernicious methods which have been used to attack us, and that by resisting each threat, we brought a little clarity to the murky confusion created here. Now that I have had to speak, judge me as you wish.”

This is ‘Bordiga’s Declaration’ at the Lyon Congress in 1926 (which was reported in Prometeo, 1 June 1928) and it put the final stamp on the exclusion of the Left by the Communist Party of Italy. In fact it had been the Left which had founded and led the party during its early years and which had then carried out the arduous task of oppo­sition within it up until the Lyon Congress. The enlarged Sixth Executive of the Commu­nist International in February 1926 also finally sanctioned the defeat of the Ital­ian Left on an international level in a direct confrontation between Stalin and Bordiga.

It appears necessary to give some ‘dates’ and reference points regarding the process of degeneration of the CI; we are conscious, however, of their inevitable deficiencies and limitations in only being able to pro­vide a very pallid idea of the whole uphea­val experienced by the proletarian movement during those years. Then again the aim of this history is not to deal with the period, however rich and fertile it is in lessons; a great deal of documentary evidence exists on the subject, even though much has been produced by the counter-revolution. Our aim is to look at the organized activity of those communist groupings who, in the years following 1926, and despite almost unbearable conditions, could stand firm and continued a desperate and unequal struggle while being hunted down throughout Europe by Nazi fascism and Stalinist killers, viewed by both sides as the very worst enemies that had to be eliminated at all costs. Their activity and achievements have gone completely unrecognized and unknown, even by those all too few elements who feel the need to identify with this revolutionary tradition.

In 1921 at the Third Congress of the CI, the theory of the ‘United Front’ was put forward; the validity of the Livourne split was dis­cussed; and the KAPD in Germany already pushed to the sidelines, broke with the CI.

The Communist Left seemed to be defeated. Following the work of the Essen tendency of the KAPD, the ephemeral KAI formed. Their founding Manifesto stated, amongst other things: “Nothing can stop the flow of events, nor obscure the truth. We are saying this without useless reticence, without senti­mentalism: proletarian Russia of red October is becoming a bourgeois state.”

In 1922 the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Italy took place, and saw the proclamation of the Rome Theses. Also, the Fourth Congress of the CI occurred, at which the Italian Left opposed fusion with the socia­lists; the Left also made an analysis of fascism.

In 1923 Bordiga and other leaders of the Communist Party of Italy were arrested. The Bolshevization of the Communist Parties took place and the opposition between the Italian Left and the CI continued to develop.

In 1924 the magazine Prometeo appeared Bor­diga refused to stand for election, declaring that: “I will never be a delegate, and the more you make plans without me, the less time you will waste.” The Come Conference took place as well as the Fifth Congress of the CI.

In 1925 Bordiga wrote, The Trotsky Question and The Danger of Opportunism and the International. The ‘Comite d’Entente’ was formed and dissolved.

In 1926 the Left was excluded from the Party and the International. The period of emigration began; Bordiga wrote his letter to Korsch.

The letter sent by Bordiga from Naples to Karl Korsch (dated 28 October 1926) was in response to an attempt made by Korsch to implement a programme of international unification of what remained of the Communist Left. This is the sole remaining document from the correspondence Bordiga engaged in with other revolutionaries during those years (it seems that all the rest have dis­appeared without trace) and because of its particular interest we will quote below some passages which appear to be fundamental:

“. .., The way you express yourself (Bord­iga addressing Korsch) does not seem good to me. One cannot say that the “Russian Revolution is a bourgeois revolution”. The Revolution of 1917 was a proletarian revolution, although it would be an error to generalize ‘tactical’ lessons from it. Now the problem being posed is what happens to the dictatorship of the proleta­riat in one country when the revolution does not spread to other countries. A counter-revolution can take place; a process of degeneration can occur and the question is to discover and define the symptoms of such a degeneration, and its reflection within the communist party. One cannot simply state that Russia is a country where capitalism is expanding.

Our search is for the construction of a left orientation that is truly general and not circumstantial, which analyzes the phases and developments of different past situations from a sound revolution­ary basis and certainly not by ignoring their objective and distinctive charac­teristics.

In a general sense, I think that today the first task must be the preliminary work of the elaboration of a political ideology of the international Left based on the eloquent experiences of the Comin­tern, rather than organization and manoeuvring. Unless one holds this posi­tion, any international initiative re­mains difficult.

There is no need to try to split the (communist) parties and the International. We should allow their artificial and mechanical discipline to reach its logi­cal conclusions simply by going along with the absurdities of their procedure, without ever compromising our critical ideological and political positions and without ever joining the prevailing leadership.

I believe that one of the faults of the present International has been that it was based on a bloc of ‘local and natio­nal’ oppositions. We must reflect on that, not of course to exaggerate the situation, but to draw the lessons. Lenin carried out a large amount of ‘spontan­eous’ elaboration, reckoning on first of all materially regrouping different groups in order to fuse them later into one organization during the heat of the revolution. To a great extent this did not succeed.”

Thus, there appears in the letter a defence first of all of the proletarian nature of the Russian Revolution against the facile and simplistic assertions of its ‘bourgeois nature’ by those who suddenly discovered that ‘something was wrong’ in Russia. Then the crucial problem is clearly posed: what becomes of the dictatorship of the prole­tariat if the revolution does not spread to other countries, and above all how to confront this question outside of a purely organizational solution based on alliances or various blocs, but within the context of the historic period, which was seen to be one of deepening counter-revolution; such questions were at the root of the difficult task of analysis, study and understanding of past errors, for the sake of the future upsurges in class struggle.

Amongst the intransigent positions defended there is one phrase in Bordiga’s letter that stands out: “There is no need to try to split the (communist) parties and the International”. Yet at that time the Left had already been put outside the Interna­tional. The Left was defending here the idea of remaining linked to what had, only five years before, been the real vanguard of the world proletariat. They thus wanted to hold on to the hope that the revolution was not truly finished for decades to come; that in the mortal crisis of capitalism, the working class, finding itself trapped in the terrible vice of the crisis, would still be able to raise its head; and that with a push from ‘below’ the positions defended by the Left could still triumph in the party and the International. But the class had been decapitated; the physical defeat of the proletariat in the struggle it had engaged in was reflected in the degeneration and betrayal of the communist parties and the International. The upsurge could not take place while the class was unable to secrete its vanguard, the party, which now no longer existed.

Bordiga also held the view that the Inter­national was in effect the world party of the proletariat. At the Fifth Congress of the CI (July 1924) he said:

“What I really mean is that in the pre­sent situation, it is the International of the world revolutionary proletariat which must repay a part of the many ser­vices it received from the Communist Party of Russia.”

According to this then, Bordiga was proposing that the International set itself in opposi­tion to the Russian party and not become an instrument of it -- to do so would spell the end of all hope. But this is what happened.

With this basic framework and preoccupation, the Italian Left began and continued its work in exile:

“In some ways we play an international role because the Italian people are a people of emigrants in the economic and social meaning of the word, and, after the birth of fascism, in a political sense as well. We have become a little like the Jews; if we were beaten in Italy, we can console ourselves with the thought that the Jews too are strong not in Palestine but elsewhere.” (Interven­tion by Bordiga at the Sixth Enlarged Executive of the CI.)

The whole emigration of communist militants from Italy did not take the same path. While the majority of them had to leave Italy after being pitilessly hunted down by the fascists and excluded from the Communist Party at the Lyon Congress (depriving them thus of any organized help and refuge), some elements had already gone to Austria and later in 1923 they went to Germany where revolutionary fighters experienced the tra­gic events of that year. They had been opposed to the decisions of the CI and had left the Communist Party of Italy. They represented, in practice, the first Left opposition to organize themselves in exile. They kept contact with the Entschiedene Linke1 and with Karl Korsch in Germany, as well as with comrades of the Left in Italy who formed the ‘Comite d’ Entente’. It was after this period that there was an attempt at contact between Bordiga and Korsch, and the letter quoted before was written.

This group of exiles then left Germany and met up again in France having travelled through Switzerland. While maintaining contact all the time with their German comrades, they joined a communist opposition committee (nothing to do with the Trotskyist Opposition) but did not in any sense lose the autonomy of their group.

In 1927 at Pantin, a Parisian suburb, the refuge for emigrants, the homeless, the hopeless and those driven from civil society, the Left Fraction of' the Communist Party of Italy was formed, but without Vercesi (Ottorino Perrone, later one of the main figures in Bilan) who had been expelled from ‘democratic’ France. There is all too much to say about the vicissitudes experien­ced by these comrades as they searched for work and for shelter, persecuted and unwan­ted in the democracies and tracked down by the Stalinists, and yet throughout it all continuing their intransigent struggle, defending and diffusing communist positions without fear or compromise. To exemplify the nature of the ‘relations’ existing with the Stalinists we will quote a part of a letter (dated 19 April 1929) from a certain Togliatti to Iaroslaysky:

“The struggle that our party must wage against the debris of the Bordigist oppo­sition which is,trying to organize all the malcontents into a fraction, is very difficult. We must struggle against these people in every country where the Italian emigration exists (France, Belgium, Switzerland, North America, South America etc). It is very difficult for us to wage this struggle if our sister parties do not come to our aid. The Communist Party of Italy asks the Communist Party of Russia for help in continuing this already difficult struggle, which can only be made more difficult by the exis­tence of any weaknesses. Our party has nothing more to say. It asks only that the greatest severity be meted out.”

We do not know if the scission which split the emigration in France into two parts, in­to a very reduced minority and a majority, had taken place before or after Pantin, al­though the information we have at our dis­posal makes us incline towards the second alternative. The first group, which repre­sented the continuity with the small nucleus whom we have already seen in Germany, brou­ght Le Reveil Communiste into being and appeared between 1928 and 1929. This publi­cation opened up its pages to Left groups in Germany (to Korsch from Kommunistische Politik and to what remained of the KAPD in those years) and also to the Russian Left in the person of Miasnikov.

The central point characterizing tale position of Reveil Communiste was the denial of any proletarian character in the Russian state -- a point which Bilan during the same years was much more cautious about -- and an open and manifest support for the posi­tions of the KAPD. Reveil Communiste was succeeded by L’Ouvrier Communiste based on openly councilist positions.

The second group was what was properly known as the Left Fraction of the Communist Party of Italy; it published Prometeo, written in Italian from June 1928 to 1938, sometimes every fifteen days, sometimes every month, and Bilan from 1933 to 1938. The first years of their existence witnes­sed the debate with Trotsky, exiled from then on in Prinkipo, and with groups who claimed to be linked to Trotsky and who were organizing themselves mainly in France.

In November 1927 Contre Le Courant “organ of the Communist Opposition” appeared in Paris; it tried to put itself forward as a catalyst to the various small Trotskyist groupings and to encourage, or at least initiate, a process of regroupment of the whole left opposition, ‘An Open Letter to the Communists of the Opposition’ appeared in Contre Le Courant, no.12, June 1928, and was sent to the following organizations: the Marx-Lenin Circle which published Bulletin Communiste; the Italian Left Fraction; the Barre-Treint group which pub­lished Redressement Communiste; the Lutte de Classe group whose leader was Naville and Le Reveil Communiste, which has already been mentioned.

Nothing came of this project (it was only in 1930 that La Verite, with the direct support of Trotsky, became the mouthpiece of the whole Trotskyist opposition) but it is interesting to see how the Political Bureau of the Italian Fraction responded to this in a letter written by Vercesi:

“Many opposition groups believe they must limit their role to that of a sort of tribunal which records the progress of the course of degeneration and pres­ents to the proletariat only evidence of the truth that they presume to have dis­covered. We think that we must prepare our own future, and that the most impor­tant thing is to establish an orientation for communist activity.

We believe that the crisis of the Inter­national has very profound causes: its apparently uniform foundation, which was really heterogeneous; the absence of a solid body of politics and communist tac­tics, and, flowing from this, an adulter­ation of marxist principles that led to a series of revolutionary disasters.

Apart from the Russian Opposition, only our Fraction has elaborated in a Platform a course of systematic action, and this has been due to comrade Bordiga.2

There are many oppositions. That is bad; but there is no other remedy than con­frontation with their respective ideolo­gies, to engage in a polemic in order to finally reach what you are suggesting to us. If so many oppositions exist, it is because there are several ideologies whose actual substance must be made clear. And this cannot just be done through a simple discussion in a common organiza­tion. Our watchword is to take our eff­orts to their ultimate conclusion with­out being derailed into a ‘solution’ that would in reality be a new failure.

We believe that if the International, having officially altered its programme, has failed in its role of leader of the revolution, the communist parties have done no less. In view of the situation we are living in, these are the organs we must work within in order to struggle against opportunism, and even to trans­form these organs into a revolutionary vanguard.”

This letter (published in Contre le Courant, no.13, August 1928) ends finally by refusing the invitation to regroupment for the rea­sons given before. We can see how Vercesi’s response recalls the letter from Bordiga to Korsch, and shows the same emphasis on the necessity to examine the past in a critical way and to draw the lessons from the degen­eration and the counter-revolutionary wave which had crushed the proletarian movement; and again we see a confidence in an autono­mous, intransigent and principled struggle within the communist parties. More impor­tant still was the written correspondence between Prometeo (which first started to appear in June 1928) and Trotsky. (A good documentation of this correspondence appears in a book entitled Trotsky and Italian Communism by Corvisieri.)

In its first letter to Trotsky, Prometeo gave a brief outline of its history: the break with Reveil Communiste; its constitu­tion into a Fraction; the analysis of the international situation, whose main charac­teristic was the capitalist offensive; the analysis of Russia which had divided them into a majority which saw Russia as a pro­letarian state and a minority which “denied the proletarian character of the Russian state”; the Italian question, on which the Fraction refused to recognize that Social Democracy or the democratic forces of opposition could lead a struggle against fascism and affirmed that “only the working class had the possibility of leading the struggle on the basis of the communist programme”.

Following the non-participation of the Fraction at a conference of the ‘opposition’ in Paris, relations with Trotsky became more strained and the Russian revolutionary wrote a letter which posed the following questions to Prometeo:

“1. Do you consider yourselves as a national movement or part of an interna­tional movement?

2. What tendency do you belong to?

3. Why don’t you consider creating an international fraction of your tendency?”

Prometeo answered:

“Fundamentally, you are inviting us to tell you if we consider ourselves to be communists. (...) We will now answer your questions:

1. We consider ourselves to be part of an international movement.

2. We belong, since the foundation of the Communist International, and even before, to the tendency of the Left.

3. We are not considering the creation of an international fraction of our ten­dency because we believe as marxists that the international organization of the proletariat is not an artificial sum of groups and individuals from every country around a given group. On the contrary, we consider that this organiza­tion must be the result of the experience of the proletariat in every country.”

Thus there were opposing positions on ques­tions of method and principle between Prometeo and Trotsky: on the part of Prome­teo there wasn’t total acceptance of the first four Congresses of the CI, but a crit­icism of the ‘United Front’ tactic “which (wrote Prometeo) led to the peasants’ and workers’ government, to the Anglo-Russian Committee, to the Kuomintang, to the proletarian anti-fascist committees”. The events in Spain in 1930-1 led to a split and a definitive break in contact. On Trotsky’s part:

“The slogan of the Republic is naturally also a slogan for the proletariat. But for the proletariat it is not only a question of changing a king for a presi­dent, but also a purging of the debris of feudalism.”

and he also asserted:

“The separatist tendencies pose the democratic duty of national self-deter­mination to the Revolution ... Separatism for the workers and peasants is a way of expressing their social indignation.” (Trotsky, The Spanish Revolution and the Duty of Communists)

Prometeo’s response to this could only be: “It is obvious that we cannot take the same path and we reply to him (Trotsky) as much as to the anarcho-syndicalist leaders of the CNT by denying most vehe­mently that communists must stand in the forefront of the defense of the Republic. For any Republic and least of all for the “Spanish Republic”.” (Prometeo, 22 August 1931)

The split was therefore definitive and could only become more marked on questions such as the social nature of the USSR, Trotsky’s analysis of the bureaucratic leadership in Russia, and the defense of Russia in case of imperialist war.

In November 1933 there appeared the first issue of Bilan, “the monthly theoretical bulletin of the Left Fraction of the Commu­nist Party of Italy”. A historic framework was immediately defined in the ‘Introduction’ and this underlined precisely what the work of the bulletin was and what tasks this group of revolutionaries was proposing to assume.

“It is not a change in the historic sit­uation which has allowed capitalism to weather the storm of post-war events, in 1933 as in 1917 capitalism stands con­demned definitively as a system of social organization. What changed between 1917 and 1933 are the relations of force between the two basic classes, between the two historic forces which confront each other in the present period: capitalism and the proletariat.

We have today reached a culminating point in this period: the proletariat is perhaps no longer able to oppose the outburst of a new imperialist war with the triumph of the revolution. Nevertheless if any possibility of an immediate revolutionary upsurge still remains it lies only with the understanding of past defeats. Those who prefer the catch-phrase of immediate mobilization of the workers to this indis­pensable work of historical analysis create only confusion and prevent the real upsurge of proletarian struggles.

The framework of the new parties of the proletariat can only arise on the basis of a profound understanding of the causes of the defeat. This understanding can brook neither censorship nor ostracism.

To draw up a balance-sheet (bilan) of the post-war events is therefore to establish the conditions for the victory of the proletariat in all countries.”

With this as their axis Bilan could make pro­gress and continue its work by coming to grips with all the fundamental questions of the revolutionary movement, from the analysis of the crisis of capitalism (decadence) to the criticism of national liberation move­ments, from the defining of those moments when the upsurge of the proletarian class would once more be possible, to the unrelen­ting criticism of the ‘communist parties’ and Russia. The social nature of Russia was still not clear, but its political role as an imperialist power which the working class must refuse to support in any way, especial­ly in view of the impending world war, was made clear. As a fundamental moment in revolutionary work Bilan also encouraged debate with other political groupings and published texts from other comrades.

In 1935 Bilan changed from being the “monthly theoretical bulletin of the Left Fraction of the Communist Party of Italy” to become “the monthly theoretical bulletin of the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left”, a change which represented both the final split with a party which was from now on a tool of the capitalist counter-revolution, and the affirmation of the international nature of its tasks.

In 1936 divergences started to appear on the question of the Spanish war and these divergences provoked a split in Bilan. At the same time the links with the Ligue des Communistes Internationalistes de Belgique which had been established at the end of 1932 were broken. This group had come out of Trotskyism and had immediately afterwards become subject to a strong councilist influence. In 1932, Bilan and the League took up the same positions in criticizing the International Left Opposition (Trotsky­ist) which when faced by the fascist attack in Germany launched an appeal for a united front for the defence of ‘democratic demands’, considering them to be stages in the struggle for the communist revolution.

The agreement between the two groups meant that they both refused the solution proposed by the Trotskyist Opposition for the recon­stitution of a communist party; this agree­ment also strengthened the possibility of contact and debate between the two organiza­tions, the aim of which had to be the recon­struction of the theoretical heritage of the proletariat, in order to provide an analysis of and a political response to the events of those years.

The Spanish war signaled the break-down of a debate which had been pursued for six years and which Bilan had greatly contribu­ted to. The majority of the League chose to give support to the anti-fascist war in an analagous form to the minority of Bilan and the French group L’Union Communiste.

In fact, Hennaut, a very important represen­tative of the League, wrote the following in a document sanctioning the break in February 1937:

“We know that the defense of democracy is only the formal aspect of the struggle; the antagonism between capitalism and the proletariat is its real essence. And on the basis of not abandoning the class struggle under any circumstances, the duty of revolutionaries is to participate in it.”

A substantial expression of the struggle of capitalism against the proletariat is here considered as a formal expression of the proletarian struggle against capitalism. ... But the whole League did not take this position. A small minority, but the major­ity in Brussels, defended the position of Bilan. It was expelled from the organiza­tion and formed the “Belgian Fraction of the Communist Left”. From 1937 to 1939 it published Communisme, a duplicated monthly magazine.

In 1938, Bilan ended and Octobre took its place, “the monthly organ of the Internatio­nal Bureau of the Communist Left”. Five issues of Octobre were published, the last in August 1939. A month later the second world carnage began.

What links do the groups who claim contin­uity (more or less organic) with the Ital­ian Left have with the work of the Fraction in exile? Let us examine the position of the International Communist Party (PCI) who publish Programme Communiste. Programme Communiste always claims, in words at least, to come from the work of Bilan and Prometeo -- perhaps to fill the gap existing between 1926 and World War II. It has never attemp­ted to clarify the work of Bilan for its militants and readers (except for some short articles in one issue of the magazine in 1957 when Ottorino Perrone (Vercesi) died) and so Bilan remains merely a name and not a very important one at that. To read Bilan would have been traumatic for those who then followed a diametrically opposed path to that laid down by the Ital­ian Fraction in exile. Today there doesn’t even appear to be any trace of this false modesty, for although no-one would say openly that they have nothing to learn from the work of Bilan, this is implicitly under­stood in certain articles which touch on the question of the workers’ movement in the thirties. Although in one article in Programma Comunista, no.21, 1971 there is still a criticism of Trotsky when he called for “a whole series of hybrid coalitions amongst the international opposition”, and goes on to say that “in the end this pot­pourri of opposition joined together to form the still-born IVth International”, in 1973 Programma Comunista could write:

“When Trotsky affirmed the prime necessity of forming a nucleus based solidly on revolutionary positions as an indispensable but not exclusive or sufficient condition for a revolutionary upsurge in the short-term or long-term and as the means by which the next conflict will become revolutionary, he was simply articulating a basic marxist truth, a truth all the more important when it is not so clear and can be ignored and even laughed at by the right, the ‘left’ and even the ‘extreme left’.”

Perhaps Programma Comunista mean by “based solidly on revolutionary positions” entrism into the social democratic parties, or even the defense of Russia during World War II? What other meaning can there be to the phrase “the means by which the next conflict become revolutionary” when those ‘means’ are the tactics of Trotskyism? Further on we find:

“If Trotsky was mistaken, it was not because he put forward the necessity of a IVth International, nor that he believed such a necessity to be the aim of his work, as opposed to those who abstractly recognized the necessity but sought ref­uge in the protected atmosphere of the libraries - like the Korschs and the Pannekoeks of this world.”

And why not write here ‘the Vercesis and the Bordigas’ etc? But the article continues:

“Only mindless sectarians could rejoice and mock the tragedy of the so-called IVth International, which fell because it became the prey of the most hetero­geneous forms of opportunism.”

and finally the article reaches its climax: “The IVth International remains to be built!” At last! What can a group which wants to “work today with patience, tenacity and modesty to make the day possible when the cry of the revolutionary vanguard will be: Long Live the IVth International” have to do with the Communist Left and Bilan?

Gentlemen, you have had to wait for the burial of their bodies before being able to write such things, which can’t be attributed to the madness of an imbecile writing under the anonymity of your magazine but are the ‘collective’ work of the ‘Party’.

The Internationalist Communist Party who publish Battaglia Comunista also claim origins in Bilan. One issue of Prometeo, the theoretical organ of Battaglia Comunista, was entirely dedicated to the theoretical and political work of Vercesi. We quote below some passages from this text:

“The Spanish events, superior by far to their protagonists, also brought to light the strong points as well as the weaker points of our analysis: the majority of Bilan held to a formulation which was theoretically impeccable but which had the fault of remaining a simple abstrac­tion; the minority on the other hand took the position of participation at all costs, and did not seem to be always aware of avoiding the antics of bourgeois jacobinism, even when on the barricades.

Given the objective possibilities, our comrades in Bilan had to pose the problem, the same one our party had to pose later on when faced with the question of the partisans, of calling on the workers who were fighting not to fall into the trap of the strategy of imperialist war.” (Prometeo, Series II, no.10, March 1958)

Exactly, Battaglia Comunista defended the same position in the immediate period after World War II as the minority of Bilan during the Spanish war (not to mention its electo­ral participation in 1948). The minority of Bilan did not go to Spain to defend the Republic against fascism (as is shown else­where in the texts we have published) but to defend communist principles and tactics within the militias.

But the problem does not rest there, be­cause the pivotal issue is that what Battaglia calls our ‘formalism’ or ‘abstrac­tions’ is for us a principle, a class line.

S.

1 The Entschiedene Linke was a group formed by elements expelled from KPD and was very close to KAPD (in Berlin). It was led by Schwartz but Korsch also participated in its activity. A short time before this the Spartacus League no. 2 was also formed. It regrouped the AAUE, the group around Iwan Katz and other elements. Later on Korsch has divergences with the KAPD and had to detach himself from the organization and brought Kommunistische Politik into being.

2 In all probability this is a reference to the theses presented by the Left at the Lyon Congress.

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary organisation [5]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Left [4]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Italian Left [37]

People: 

  • Amadeo Bordiga [63]

The First Congress of Internationalisme (Belgium)

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The main task of any congress is to draw up a balance-sheet of the organization’s past activity and outline perspectives for the coming year. This task was particularly important for the First Congress of Inter­nationalisme, the ICC section in Belgium. It must be remembered that it was just over a year ago, at its Founding Congress, that the section in Belgium was formed from three groups (Journal des Luttes de Classe, Revolutionnaire Raden Socialisten, Vrije Raden Socialisten) which, with the help of the ICC, had surmounted their previous confusions. These three groups had been engen­dered by the re-emergence of the proletarian struggle, and, after several years of labor­ious study and debate, were gradually won over to class positions, despite several incursions into the mire of bourgeois ideo­logy. At the time, this event was hailed by the ICC as an important step in its own development, not so much because of the new section itself, but because of the positive lessons of this experience of three isolated groups unifying themselves on the basis of a proletarian programme. This was an expres­sion of the revolutionary movement’s growing understanding of the need for world-wide unification. Thus the primary tasks of Internationalisme in its first year were to overcome localist prejudices, to centralize the activity of the section in an effective manner, to overcome linguistic divisions and assure the publication of the magazine in two Languages (French and Dutch), to inte­grate itself into the work of the whole ICC and assimilate the experience of other sec­tions, and, finally, to ensure the rapid development of its militants, so that the section could catch up with the general theoretical level of the Current. The importance of all this work could not be under-estimated, and it was only a thorough grasp of the difficulties met with in the preceding period that allowed this step to be confidently taken.

After analyzing the economic and political situation at both national and international level1, the Congress concretized the further development and strengthening of the section by adopting political perspec­tives for the year ahead. The most import­ant aspect of these perspectives was un­doubtedly the decision to publish Internationalisme in both languages on a monthly basis as soon as possible. The increased frequency of the magazine’s appearance ref­lects the fact that the developing workers’ struggle is being confronted with more and more problems which the organization of revolutionaries must respond to if it is to fulfill its function within the proletariat. With the deepening of the crisis and the intensification of class struggle, revolu­tionaries will have to intervene more and more systematically, not only in response to the immediate needs of the struggle, but also to prepare themselves in a consistent and evolving manner for the revolutionary outbreaks which are now germinating in the fertile soil of the proletariat’s day-to- day struggles.

A second task of the Congress was also con­cerned with preparing the organization for the future. That is to say, the taking up of positions on general questions which are not being posed directly to the class today, but which will inevitably arise in the struggles of the future. Like the Second Congress of Revolution Internationale, the First Congress of Internationalisme dealt with the problem of the period of transition from capitalism to communism. This is by definition a problem which demands a lot of preparatory study. When the whole proleta­riat rises up against the bourgeoisie, when it smashes the bourgeois state from top to bottom, when the world is plunged into the whirlpool of the revolution, revolutionaries will have had to have really studied and drawn the lessons from the past if they are going to give answers to the immediate prob­lems of how the proletariat will organize its political power. Because the inner dia­lectic of the struggle of the working class today is leading it towards a revolutionary outcome; because each struggle contains within it the seeds of the revolution, of communism, the ICC considers it absolutely necessary for its next International Congress to take up a position on the general frame­work of the political relations that will exist during the period of transition.

Thus the adoption by the First Congress of Internationalisme of a resolution on this question is a moment in the international discussion which is preparing the ground for the Second International Congress. And although the resolution presented at the Second Congress of Revolution Internationale (published in International Review, no. 8) was also accepted by the Congress of Inter­nationalisme, the discussion on this ques­tion was both controversial and extremely fruitful. The basic debate concerned the nature of the state during the period of transition and has already appeared publicly in International Review, no. 6; and it was considerably enriched by the discussion at this Congress.

Finally, two important texts were presented to the Congress: theses on the class strug­gle in Belgium and theses on the continuity of communist groups in Belgium.2 This Congress was an important moment in the life of the section in Belgium, in many ways a step which marked the end of its initial phase of development and the opening up of a new phase of political evolution. It is absolutely necessary to understand where we have come from in order to know where we are going. These texts were for the young sec­tion in Belgium a way of renewing its ties with the past of the proletariat and of understanding itself as a link in the histor­ical chain which connects all the struggles and political expressions of the working class.

1 We are not publishing these documents here, since the texts on the international situation from the Second Congress of Revolution Internationale have already been published in International Review no. 8, and a resolution on the situation in Belgium was published in Internationalisme no. 8.

2 These texts will be published by ICC at a later date.

 



Life of the ICC: 

  • Congress Reports [41]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • International Communist Current [6]

The CWO and the Lessons of Regroupment for Revolutionaries

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IR9, 2nd Quarter, April 1977

An important split has recently taken place in the ranks of the Communist Workers’ Organization (CWO), a revolutionary group in Britain that defends positions close to those of the ICC. Although the details of the split remain obscure, since the ‘seceders’ from the CWO have apparently failed to produce a single document explaining why they broke away, it seems that the entire Liverpool section – more or less the old Workers’ Voice group – has left the CWO complaining of its intolerant attitude both to other groups and to internal discussion. These charges have perhaps some solid justification. But the old Workers’ Voice group is hardly well-qualified to complain about intolerance towards other groups: it was the first of various groups to break off relations with the ICC, accusing it of being ‘counter-revolutionary’ on the flimsiest of political arguments (see WV 13, ‘Statement’). From what little evidence there is, it seems that the Liverpool group’s main motivation for leaving the CWO was a pronounced tendency towards localism and activism; a purely verbal commitment to ‘intervene in the working class’, seeing both intervention and the working class in the most narrow and fragmented way. Both these localist tendencies, and the Liverpool group’s failure to debate differences in a genuinely political manner, are in direct continuity with the practice of the old Workers’ Voce (see ‘Sectarianism Unlimited’ in World Revolution, 3).  The reaction of the remaining members of the CWO seems to be in line with that group’s tradition of self-enclosed dogmatism to the extent that their publications have not shown a concern to go more deeply into the political implications of this split.

We don’t want to dwell on the specific details of this split. We simply want to say that it is the logical conclusion of what we referred to as an “incomplete regroupment” (WR 5) when Workers’ Voice and Revolutionary Perspectives fused to form the CWO in September 1975. It is the inevitable result of the policy of sectarian isolation the CWO chose for themselves when they broke off with the ICC. This isolation has been growing ever since the CWO was formed: most of the contacts they have had with revolutionary elements in other countries (among them Pour Une Intervention Communiste in France and the ex-Revolutionary Workers’ Group in the US) have led nowhere. Now the group has lost one of its strongest sections. More than ever, the CWO remains a local group, trapped by the narrowness of its horizons. Although the CWO itself may be unable to understand why all this has happened in a period which is basically favourable to the regroupment of revolutionary forces, it is important for us to look at the whole experience of the CWO as a problem of the re-emerging  revolutionary movement, and to see  what lessons this experience holds for the process of revolutionary regroupment that is going on today. We would also like to take this opportunity to express our criticisms of what we consider to be the main political errors of the CWO. This critique will serve as a response to the polemic with the ICC in the CWO’s article in Revolutionary Perspectives 4, ‘The Convulsions of the ICC’, which purports to show why the ICC is part of the bourgeoisie.

THE PROBLEMS OF THE RE-EMERGING REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

In order to understand the bizarre situation in which there are two revolutionary groups in Britain, both defending class positions, but who have no relationship with each other because one considers the other to be ‘counter-revolutionary’, we have to go back several years to the time when the small but growing revolutionary movement of today began to emerge out of the long night of the counter-revolution, whose end was signalled by the resurgence of proletarian struggle after 1968.

Precisely because the counter-revolution that followed the defeat of the revolutionary wave of 1917-23 was so long and so deep, the re-emergence of the revolutionary movement in the late 1960s was hindered by innumerable obstacles and confusions. These is no automatic connection between the level of class struggle at a given time and the clarity of the proletariat’s revolutionary minorities. Following the May ’68 events in France, the international proletariat, reacting to the first shocks of the just beginning global economic exists, launched itself into a series of battles on a scale the world hadn’t seen for fifty years. But although the re-appearance of the proletariat on the scene of history posed the general conditions for the rebirth of a communist fraction within the class, the first revolutionary groups engendered by the reviving class struggle found it extremely difficult to understand the meaning of their own existence, the tasks which they had been created to fulfil.

The most serious problem confronting these groups was the complete break in organic continuity that existed with the revolutionary movement of the past. In previous periods, the proletariat had seen its parties collapse or betray the class, but each time a new organization had emerged after a brief period, taking the best elements of the old parties and creating a higher synthesis out of them. Thus although the 2nd International was lost to the proletariat when it capitulated to the imperialist war in 1914, the ‘wreckage’ was not absolute. Within a few years a new International had arisen like a phoenix out of the ashes, based on those elements of the old International who had remained loyal to the programmatic principles of the working class. While breaking with the parties of Social Democracy, the new Communist International (Comintern) did not have to ‘start from scratch’. It could count on an organizational experience and a presence within the working class built up by revolutionaries for decades before the disaster of 1914.

In contrast to this, the defeat of the revolutionary wave of 1917-23, because it took place in a new period when the only perspective facing the proletariat was socialism or barbarism, and thus when the only proletarian political minorities were ones based on an explicitly communist programme, meant the virtual disappearance of the revolutionary movement from the scene of history. The Left Communist fractions that detached themselves from the degenerating Comintern continued to play a vital role in drawing the lessons from the defeat of the revolution, but in the end they were unable to resist the immense pressure of bourgeois ideology in a period of defeat and demoralization. The story of the Left Communist movement from the 1920s to the 1950s is one of growing isolation and fragmentation.

The tragic break in continuity with the past movement meant that the new groupings which emerged in the late 1960s were deprived of vital theoretical and organizational experience, lacked traditions of intervention in revolutionary struggle, were isolated from the class, and so on. In addition to this, the movement arose ‘in parallel’, as it were, with the so-called student revolt. Many of the new revolutionary elements had originally come out of the university milieu with all the confusions and prejudices that flourish in such an environment.

This petty bourgeois influence was most strongly felt in that area where the new revolutionary groups were the most confused: the question of organization. The betrayals of the Bolshevik Party, the transformation of the previous revolutionary parties into monstrous bureaucratic machines, had as early as the 1920s produced a reaction in the working class movement that tended to suspect any form of revolutionary organization as being an expression of a desire to substitute the organization for the working class. Certain tendencies coming from the Council Communists in the 1930s and 40s began to evolve towards the position that revolutionary organizations constitute a barrier to the development of an autonomous proletarian struggle.

It is hardly surprising that the young revolutionary movement of the 1960s should have adopted these ‘councilist’ errors at the beginning. Many individuals moved towards revolutionary positions in reaction to the bureaucratic and vanguardist pre-tensions of the various leftist organizations. And if one also bears in mind the fact that libertarian, situationist, and other ‘anti-authoritarian’ conceptions were intimately bound up with the petty-bourgeois milieu out of which many of the revolutionaries had come, we can see why the question of organization was such a stumbling block to the majority of the new revolutionary currents. The role of revolutionaries within the class struggle, the way to organize a revolutionary minority, the meaning of intervention in the class struggle – these questions were understood much less readily than more general class positions like the bourgeois nature of the trade unions or of the Stalinist regimes. There was an almost endemic fear of ‘Leninism’ and ‘Bolshevism’, a feeling that anyone who tended to stress the importance of the revolutionary organization must be ‘just the same’ as the Trotskyists or Stalinists, interested only in constituting themselves as fake ‘leaders’ of the working class. Similarly any attempt to organize revolutionary activity in a centralized manner was viewed with intense suspicion: the only centralism that could be imagined was the bureaucratic hierarchy of the leftist organizations. At the same time aspects of revolutionary work such as regular, methodical publication, a systematic approach to intervention and distribution of literature, etc – were often looked down upon as so much ‘organizational fetishism’. Needless to say, this suspicion, amounting at times to a virtual paralysis of any revolutionary work, was a direct product of the trauma of the counter-revolution: an understandable obsession, but one which had to be overcome as soon as possible if the revolutionary movement was ever to get of the ground.

Because of these problems, many of the groups that were produced by the first wave of proletarian struggle between 1968 and 1972 disappeared completely. And the majority of these were casualties of a deep confusion about organization. A typical example of this was the Swedish group Internationell Arbetarkamp (IAK). Beginning as a healthy reaction against Maoism, IAK came close to elaborating a clear communist platform but when it had to confront the problem of how to organize itself, it drew back in the most abject terror. Coming under the influence of ‘modernist’ ideas like those of Invariance in France, it quickly began to theorize its own inner decomposition, arguing that all groups are ‘rackets’ and bourgeois in nature and that the task of communists is to ‘live like communists’. Not surprisingly the group soon splintered into a number of demoralized individuals pursuing their own development via vegetarianism, writing ‘anti-capitalist’ novels, etc, etc.

One of the main problems during this period was that there was not yet a political current that was capable of acting as a solid pole of regroupment, of offering groups like IAK an alternative to political disintegration. This was inevitable because the fledgling revolutionary movement had no alternative but to grow and mature through its own experiences. Nevertheless, this process of maturation was slowly unfolding. An early sign of this was the disappearance of most of the currents who, dazzled by the post-war boom, had rejected the marxist conception of crisis, and now found their fantasies about a crisis-free capitalism shattered by the dramatic sharpening of the economic crisis after 1973 (situationism, Gauche Marxiste, ICO, etc). Throughout the period 1968-1973, there was a gradual and steady process of decantation going on in the revolutionary movement. In this context the persistence and perseverance of the international current (then represented by Revolution Internationale in France, Internationalism in the US, and Internacionalismo in Venezuela) in defending the need for a coherent political platform as the basis for a regroupment of revolutionaries were an expression of the objective needs of the revolutionary movement. For us to assert this today is not a question of retrospectively blowing our own trumpet, or arbitrarily declaring ourselves to be a pole of regroupment (unique and everlasting) as the CWO seem to claim in their ‘Convulsions of the ICC’. If the international current was the most consistent revolutionary regroupment of the post-1968 period it was because of its profound concern to re-appropriate and deepen the gains of the past revolutionary movement. The fact that some of the founding members of the international current had been directly involved in the Left Communist movement from the 1930s to the 1950s was an important element here though not the only decisive factor. As we have said any direct organic continuity with the Communist Left had been finally severed by the counter-revolution. But the international current was committed to building on a political continuity with the Left Communist movement of the past and thus elaborated a platform that aims at a synthesis of the fundamental contributions of the historical workers’ movement. This meant that the current tended to become a pole of regroupment and contributed to the clarification of the revolutionary movement of the early 1970s. But, because of its immaturity, it took a long time for the implications of this to be understood by the current itself, and many internal conflicts and confusions had to be resolved before the international current could fully assimilate the reality of its own existence. For example, it had to deal with ‘anti-organizational’ hesitations in its own midst, expressed by the departure of the activist elements of the PIC from RI in 1973 and of the modernist Tendence Communiste in 1974 and so. (In the ‘Convulsions of the ICC’, the CWO present these set-backs as the signs of a group in its death-throes; today they can clearly be seen as the growing pains of the ICC).

Thus, as with most of the revolutionary currents of the time, the international current that was growing into the ICC of today understood the organizational question last of all. The relative immaturity of the current at this time was inevitable, but it was to have important repercussions on some early attempts at regroupment. This was to become painfully clear in Britain.

SETBACKS TO REGROUPMENT IN BRITAIN

In May 1973 various groups and individuals attempting to clarify communist positions came together in Liverpool to discuss the perspective ahead of them. There were three groups from Britain: the Liverpool-based Workers’ Voice, which had broken away from Trotskyism and was trying to re-assimilate the gains made by the Left Communists in the early twenties; some comrades from Scotland who had split from Solidarity in order to defend a marxist conception of the capitalist crisis; and a London-based group, some of whose members had also split from Solidarity but who saw themselves as being close to the positions of Revolution Internationale and Internationalism (who also attended). On crucial questions like the trade unions, organization, and the decadence of capitalism, there was considerable confusion in the British groups. RI’s and Internationalism’s contributions were extremely important in trying to clarify some of these problems.

A number of meetings followed over the next few months and the groups in Britain made considerable progress. (The London group evolved into World Revolution, and the elements in Scotland into Revolutionary Perspectives.) Discussion between the groups was continuous, fraternal, and constructive; a number of joint interventions were made (such as the WR/WV leaflet on Chile in September 1973 when the Allende government fell). But a problem began to be posed by the fact that WR was moving much more quickly towards the platform and politics of the international current than RP or WV. Questions as crucial as the decadence of capitalism or the alternative of war or revolution, socialism or barbarism, evoked hesitations and incomprehension on the part of WV at first. RP, while denying the problem of the saturation of markets as a source for capitalist crisis, assimilated the general concept of decadence more quickly. RP however, expressed disagreements on the question of the Russian Revolution, and the Bolshevik Party in particular. It took RP a long time to fully grasp the proletarian character of the Bolshevik Party. This ‘uneven development’ of the three groups was to become a source of complications for one fundamental reason: the discussion and cooperation between the groups had at no stage been based on a clear conception of the regroupment of revolutionaries. From the beginning, regroupment was seen as a vague, distant prospect, perhaps only necessary when the revolution began. Discussion between the groups was conducted on the unspoken understanding that each group had its own ‘autonomy’, its own positions to develop and defend. The friendliness of the discussion was genuine enough, but it was unstable to the extent that it had not had to face the uncomfortable question of real unification, fusion into a single organization, centralized on an international scale.

Here again the international current was the first to pose the question of regroupment in a clear way. But by the time the question had been made explicit, its implicit emergence had already resulted in a deterioration of relations between the groups in Britain. This was especially true after a conference in Paris in January 1974 when WR changed its position on the Russian Revolution (viz. that the October insurrection was a state capitalist counter-revolution led by a ‘bourgeois’ Bolshevik Party) and showed its clear will to be part of the international current of RI/Internationalism/Internacionalismo, Workers’ Voice interpreted this as a ‘capitulation’ by WR to the semi-Bolshevik designs of the international tendency (an interpretation still put forward by the CWO in ‘Convulsions’), and relations between WR and WV deteriorated rapidly after this. WV increasingly retreated into a sullen unwillingness to discuss its differences with WR (see ‘Sectarianism Unlimited’, WR3) and did not respond to the various letters WR wrote to it in order to try to keep the discussion going. (It seems that today the Liverpool group intends to continue the same policy of silence over its differences with the CWO.)

By the time the international current really began to make it clear that regroupment meant regroupment today into a single international organization, it appeared to the groups ‘outside’ the current that the international current (which was now being joined by groups in Italy and Spain) was expressing some kind of ‘imperialist’ desire to expand at all costs, and to incorporate all the other groups into itself in order to puff up its own pretensions. The current was not only talking about regroupment; it had begun to construct an organizational framework in which this regroupment could actually take place. This provoked a suspicious response from the other groups, and not only in Britain. The Chicago-based Revolutionary Workers’ Group, which had broken from Trotskyism and had been moving towards the current in a very positive way, also began to draw back when the practical question of its integration into the current began to be posed. Some elements of WV and the RWG also harboured certain illusions as to the possibility of independent work with the modernist Tendance Communiste before the latter’s complete political disintegration and disappearance.

In November 1974, WV’s silence was broken by a statement asserting that the current was a counter-revolutionary force because of its position on the state in the period of transition. The RP group still showed a willingness to discuss political questions, but it now began to raise more and more objections to the positions of the current, especially on the Russian Revolution and the period of transition. After discussing the possibility of entering the international current as a ‘minority’ federation and finding this proposal severely criticized by the current, it began to consider itself as the ‘clearest’ group and thus to act as if it, and no longer the current, was the pole of regroupment for revolutionaries. It demanded that the current (which in January 1975 constituted itself as the International Communist Current) change its positions, which were now seen to ‘cross class lines’ on the question of the state, and on the final demise of the Russian Revolution. At this stage its perspective was one of convincing the ICC of its “errors (which) are subjective and do not represent an alien class viewpoint” (‘Open Letter to the ICC’, RP, February 1975). Shortly after this RP abandoned hope of reforming the ICC and concentrated on regrouping with the other groups who seemed to be closer to its own positions and who by now formed a kind of ‘counter-tendency’ to the ICC: WV, RWG, and the PIC. Discussions with RWG and the PIC were to reveal substantial differences, but in September 1975 WV and RP fused to form the CWO. Initially it appears that the RP elements in the CWO continued to regard the ICC as a ‘confusionist’, not a bourgeois group, but later on the whole CWO adopted the position of the old WV, viz. that the ICC was a counter-revolutionary faction of capital with whom all discussion was useless. Despite this the CWO claim in the ‘Convulsions of the ICC’ article that it was the ICC that put an end to discussion between the groups. This is an incredible assertion when one bears in mind the endless statements issued by the ICC both before and after the formation of the CWO, affirming its willingness to maintain a dialogue with the CWO, a position it still adheres to today, without putting any conditions on the debate. It is all the more incredible when one considers that during the regroupment process in Belgium, the different groups involved (RRS of Antwerp, the VRS of Ghent and Journal Lutte de Classe of Brussels) invited the CWO to participate in their conference with the full accord of the ICC. The CWO did not come however, and their silence was regretted in the documents that came out of the Conference in 1975 (see The International Review, no. 4).

THE PRICE OF IMMATURITY

This brief trajectory of the process which led to the formation of the CWO will convey very little unless we analyse the underlying reasons for it taking place, and try to draw some lessons from it. We don’t want to rake over all the details of this sad affair. It is a story of mistakes, misunderstandings, and immaturity ‘on both sides’, and it would be quite futile to engage in petty recriminations about who did what to whom. That kind of approach only serves to obscure the wider political issues involved. Our task today is to understand why such a deterioration of relations took place. Only by considering the general characteristics of the affair will it become possible to see how at certain junctures, petty and/or secondary questions could have exacerbated the problem so much. In retrospect, it is possible to see a number of general reasons for the failure of this attempt at regroupment.

On the part of the groups ‘outside’ the current, the main obstacles to regroupment were problems which, as we have seen, were common to many of the groups who had emerged from the period of counter-revolution: a traumatic fear of ‘Bolshevism’ and the legacy of the counter-revolution, and a profound lack of clarity on the question of organization.

1. One of the main bones of contention between the ICC and the other groups was the Russian Revolution and the lessons to be drawn from it. This is no accident. The Russian Revolution was one of the most important events in the proletariat’s history, and anyone who fails to understand the lessons of this experience will not succeed in disengaging themselves from the counter-revolution. The reaction of some elements of the proletariat to the defeat of this revolution was to reject the whole experience as being no more than a bourgeois revolution or a moment in the evolution of capital into new forms. The Bolshevik Party in particular was often scrubbed out of the whole proletarian movement, and portrayed as a standard bearer of state capitalism interested only in the modernization of Russia. This kind of interpretation, which we might refer to loosely as ‘councilist’, had a considerable influence on all the groups in Britain when they started out. WR had originally called itself Council Communism and was violently opposed to Bolshevism; WV went through an explicitly councilist phase when it rejected any idea of a revolutionary party; and RP started out with positions close to those of Otto Ruhle, i.e. that all parties are bourgeois and that 1917 in Russia was a bourgeois revolution.

In contrast to this, RI from the very beginning insisted on the proletarian character of the October insurrection and of the Bolshevik Party. This ‘naturally’ produced suspicions that RI was still somehow tainted with Bolshevism and Leninism, that it was prepared to excuse or apologize for all the anti-working class actions of the Bolsheviks after 1917. Further suspicion was engendered by RI’s affirmation that during the transition period a state was inevitable, a necessary evil that the proletariat would have to make use of but could never identify itself with. And since RI had always defended the need for a ‘revolutionary party’, the current’s talk about regroupment was interpreted as yet another party-building adventure of the Trotskyist kind. Failing to understand the method the international current used to draw the lessons from the Bolshevik experience, the other groups tended to suspect the ‘counter-revolution’ behind every position that they could not immediately grasp.

After a great deal of discussion, both WV and RP moved away from the councilist interpretation of the Russian Revolution and accepted the proletarian character of the revolution and of the Bolshevik Party. They also began to talk about the need for a revolutionary party. But they would not even consider the idea that the transitional state was something distinct from the working class, and implied that the ICC’s position menat repeating the Bolshevik mistake of subordinating the workers’ councils to an alien force. (This was exactly the reverse of the ICC’s position, which stressed the need for the workers’ councils to exert their power over all other institutions in society!)

At the same time, while accepting the proletarian character of the Russian Revolution, WV, RP (and the RWG) began to insist that anyone who didn’t acknowledge that the Bolshevik Party was finished in 1921 (Kronstadt, the NEP, the United Front) had ‘crossed class lines’ and become an apologist of the counter-revolution. We will discuss the absurdity of this position later on, but even its absurdity was not without significance. Never before in the history of the workers’ movement has a question of dates, of retrospective historical interpretation, been made into a class frontier. The only possible explanation for the intransigence with which WV, RP, and RWG defended their position on ‘1921’ is that they saw this date as a kind of ‘cordon sanitaire’ protecting them from any possible connection with the degeneration of Bolshevism. It was as though they were trying to allay their lingering suspicions about accepting the Bolshevik Party as part of their own history by saying ‘thus far, but no further’. They had moved from a councilist position to a more coherent one, close to that of the ICC, but as have said, they had not assimilated a coherent method of analysing the mistakes and even crimes of the past workers’ movement, nor its approach to the problem of the degeneration and death of proletarian organizations.

2.  The WV/RP confusions about regroupment and organization were again closely linked to their fears of ‘Leninism’ and ‘Bolshevism’. This was particularly marked with WV, who for a long time considered that any talk of regroupment today was ‘substitutionist’. Though they later changed this position (without ever explaining why), the issue of regroupment was never fully clarified in the CWO, as we shall see. Parallel to this hostility to regroupment there was the above-mentioned suspicion about the very idea of the party, and unease about the concept of centralization. WV’s ideas about organization were more or less federalist: each group was autonomous and had its own intervention to do in its own corner of the world. The prospect of being absorbed into a larger international body filled them with anxiety. RP accepted the idea of regroupment and centralization more easily, but their understanding of the implications of this was severely limited. This was demonstrated, for example, by their idea of entering the current as a bloc that had its own platform within the organization. And their subsequent shift from this semi-federalist conception to an extreme monolithism, in which regroupment was impossible until there was absolute agreement on every conceivable point, was further evidence that they had never really understood the concept of centralization. In general neither WV nor RP ever abandoned the idea that they had to make their own unique contribution to the workers’ movement, that they themselves had worked out and clarified the essentials of a revolutionary platform. True, they said, the international current had helped them quite a bit, but the main achievement was their own. They had pulled themselves out of leftism by their own bootstraps.

The truth was somewhat different. Neither RP, nor WV, nor the CWO has ever made a systematic critique of their own past, but if they had done so, they would have come to some uncomfortable conclusions. While discussion between revolutionaries is never a monologue, and both sides gained mutually from the debates that took place in Britain, a cursory look at the facts will leave us in no doubt about who was the main source of clarification. The current already had a clear platform before these discussions took place: that of RI’s Declaration of Principles in 1968 and the platform in 1972. When RP and WV began discussing with the current, they were deeply confused on absolutely vital questions like the shop stewards, the Russian Revolution, decadence, organization, the Left Communist movement, etc, etc. The clear positions they moved towards were positions that the current already defended; what they considered later on to be evidence of their superior clarity (1921, the state, etc) were, in the main, confusions, which they never managed to surmount. The result was that the platforms of WV, RP, and the CWO, are essentially watered-down versions of the ICC platform, with the addition of their own hobbyhorses.

Without the intervention of the international current, it is somewhat doubtful as to whether WV and RP would have arrived at a relatively clear political perspective. Once again, we are not asserting this merely to add to the prestige of the ICC. We are simply reaffirming the fact that historical circumstances led to the international current being the first to elaborate a coherent political platform, and thus endowed it with a particular responsibility in the development of other groups. Neither RP nor WV could ever bear to admit this fact. Their desire to defend their autonomy and to develop their ‘own’ ideas prevented them from seeing the need for communists to unite their efforts and to regroup into a single organization.

But the failings of WV and RP cannot explain the whole story. We are not dealing with autonomous psychological problems here: the hesitations, confusions, and fears of WV/RP were very much a historical product of the immaturity of the revolutionary movement. And this immaturity also affected the international current, and hindered its own efforts at constituting a pole of regroupment.

As we have seen, the groups of the international current, while having a more coherent view of the organizational question in general terms, took some time to draw all the practical conclusions from this overall understanding. This applies both to their internal structure and to the question of regroupment, both of which are aspects of centralization. Only gradually did it become clear that it was necessary today to build an internationally centralized organization of revolutionaries, which in turn would be a moment in the reconstitution of the world communist party in a period of heightened class struggle. Although it imposed its general clarity on the discussions with the other groups, the international current failed to pose the vital questions of regroupment from the beginning. It did not insist soon enough that the purpose of the discussion and cooperation between groups in Britain was the fusion of the different elements into a single international organization.

When differences between the groups emerged, the current did not always respond in a politically adequate manner, and this was fundamentally the result of its inexperience in dealing with such problems. The development of new groups is an extremely delicate process which requires, alongside an intransigent defence of general political positions, a great deal of flexibility and patience on the part of the more developed group. This is not to say that the whole problem would have been avoided if the current had been more ‘tactful’ – after a point even the tact and friendliness of the current were interpreted as manifestations of unprincipled opportunism. But when the revolutionary movement is small and immature, secondary and even personal problems can have an effect out of all proportion to their real importance. This means that the way political discussion is conducted is a matter of considerable interest. It is especially necessary to separate secondary issues from the main ones, and to conduct discussion on a strictly political level, without getting lost in the minutia of inter-group psychology.

The international current’s lack of experience in conducting such discussions was compounded by the fact that it did not yet have the organizational means to steer the debate to a successful conclusion. Because the current did not yet exist as a single, unified organization, it had no way of elaborating a fully consistent and global orientation for relating to other groups. For the same reason it was difficult for other groups to see it as a pole of regroupment when it had no common platform and no unified organizational structure. Groups like the RWG actually chided it for not being centralized, failing to understand that centralization was a process which could not be proclaimed overnight. The whole perspective of the current was that it should move towards a single international organization. But the fact that it had not yet reached this stage was to weight heavily on its early attempts to regroup with other elements. Moreover, the ‘birth’ of the ICC was accompanied by inevitable birth-pangs which gave rise to a number of defections as mentioned above.

“This period of deepening understanding in the Current undoubtedly disturbed all our international contacts. To see the organization to some extent split apart by violent polemic (particularly with the modernist Tendance Communiste within RI) did not inspire confidence in those who were in any case permeated with a fear of organization connected to ‘anti-Leninism’. It is difficult to integrate other elements into an organization during its particularly painful birth” (from the ICC text, ‘Lessons of Regroupment’).

If one compares the failure of regroupment with RP and WV in Britain with the successful regroupment that took place a year later in Belgium, it immediately becomes clear how important the existence of the Current as a unified body was. The three groups that began discussing revolutionary positions in Belgium started off with many of the problems the groups in Britain had faced: different backgrounds, an uneven development towards the politics of the ICC, etc. But this time the ICC not only existed as such; it had also learned from its negative experiences in Britain, and was able to situate the discussions in a coherent framework from the beginning. It was able to minimize secondary questions and patiently assist all the groups to arrive at the same level of understanding. It was made clear all along that the purpose of discussion was the unification of the different elements into a single international organization; and the ICC was able to present itself as such an organization. In fact it soon became clear to the Belgian comrades that the ICC was the only organization capable of providing a framework for international regroupment. The intervention of the PIC and the CWO in this process simply revealed their preoccupation with attacking the ICC and obstructing any unification in the revolutionary movement. The constitution of Internationalisme as the Belgian section of the ICC, together with other successful regroupments in Canada, Italy, and Spain, were evidence that the ICC had surmounted many of its earlier difficulties and was beginning to show a real capacity to act as a pole of clarification and regroupment.

It is unfortunate that many of the bitter lessons that the ICC learned about regroupment, such as the need to situate discussion in a global framework, the need for a unified international organization, etc, were learned through a negative experience in Britain. But then defeat has always been the school of the proletarian movement. The conditions that led to the formation of the CWO were above all a product of a particular phase in the reconstitution of the revolutionary movement, and will probably not repeat themselves. In this sense, the CWO is an anomaly left over from a period that is now behind us. This is underlined by the subsequent positive growth of the ICC, and the increasing isolation and fragmentation of the CWO.

THE ISOLATION OF THE CWO

Since its formation, the CWO has more and more retreated into a shell of misanthropic sectarianism. The main role it has played has been that of confusing elements moving towards communist positions, bewildering them with its obsessive emphasis on the ‘differences’ it has with the ICC. After all, what could be more confusing for people who are only just learning what real class positions are, what the real difference between a communist group and a leftist group is, to find a whole new set of ‘additional’ class lines presented to them? It is rather difficult at this state to assess the amount of damage the CWO had done to the emerging revolutionary movement. We have mentioned their negative role in the regroupment process in Belgium. In Britain, they have succeeded in derailing a few individuals into their isolationist fox-hole. Not to mention the fact that the militants of the CWO have removed themselves from the mainstream of the revolutionary movement, and thus have robbed themselves of making the contribution to the movement promised by their earlier development.

But it would be quite wrong to over-estimate the (negative) influence of the CWO. In many instances they have failed to convince newly emerging revolutionaries that their stance ‘against the ICC’ is based on serious political criteria (the groups in Belgium, for example, and with certain comrades in Britain). And since their sectarian attitude is no longer directed at the ICC alone, they have found it difficult to maintain contact with a number of other groups, let alone regroup with them. The attitude they took up towards the PIC is typical.  The CWO demanded that the PIC simply abandon its position on the crisis, based on Luxemburg’s analysis, as a minimum precondition for regroup (see WR 5, ‘An Incomplete Regroupment’). A similar sectarian approach was adopted towards a group in Gothenburg, Sweden, which was attempting to move away from anarchism: the CWO’s response to the group’s platform was not to make a criticism of its confusions, but to write a ringing attack on the historical anarchist movement (see ‘Anarchism’ in RP 3), and insist that the Gothenburg group reply to this attack before any further dialogue could take place! Not surprisingly neither the PIC nor the Swedish group were prepared to accept the CWO’s ‘purist’ ultimatum.

Other international contacts have similarly led nowhere. The CWO had a brief flirtation with the French group, Union Ouvriere, a split-off from the Trotskyist Lutte Ouvriere. Although the CWO correctly encouraged UO’s early efforts to move towards revolutionary positions, they underestimated the difficulties of making a complete break with a counter-revolutionary organizational past on an overall political level. The CWO’s desperate search for other revolutionary contacts once they had arbitrarily cut themselves off from the ICC and anything and anywhere in contact with it, led them to harbour illusions about the actual clarity of UO and to throw themselves into a heady proclamation that UO was on the road to victory before, unfortunately, all the battles were won.

In any case the CWO’s ‘political dialogue’ with UO seems to have ended in embarrassed silence since the latter has now fragmented into a number of modernist sects. The collapse of the CWO’s relationship with the American RWG, described in the early days of the CWO as the group that was closest to it (WV 15), was also passed over in silence. Being ‘close’ to the CWO wasn’t enough to prevent the RWG from getting thoroughly demoralized and dissolving itself (see WR 5, ‘An Incomplete Regroupment’). After briefly resurrecting itself as the ‘Proletarian Communist Group’, the vestiges of the RWG finally fused with a strange Chicago club called the ‘Committee for a Workers’ Council’ to form a ridiculous semi-modernist sect called ‘Forward’. Forward thinks that the whole historical workers’ movement from Marx to the Bolsheviks and the Communist Left was just the “left wing of Capital”, and that the defensive struggles of the class (which Forward contemptuously and erroneously identifies with “collective bargaining”) should not happen. Their paper is mainly devoted to windy attacks on both the ICC and… the CWO!

The breakdown of these international contacts emphasized the isolation of the CWO: its inability to offer any real perspective for the regroupment of revolutionaries. Although it has so far failed to draw up any balance sheet of these attempts at regroupment, this series of failures must have produced tensions within the organization. As we have seen, the seceding Liverpool section gave as one of its reasons for secession the CWO’s intolerant attitude to other groups. When a group is turned in on itself like the CWO, immense internal pressure inevitably builds up, leading to sudden and unexplained defections and splits.

The pressure inside the CWO has been further increased by the group’s monolithic character: its insistence on total agreement on all possible points of the platform, its refusal to a allow minority positions. As we predicted in WR 6, this monolithic conception of organization “will lead not just to two organizations, but an unending series of splits, expulsions, denunciations, and breaking off of relations, which can be expected to clarify the communist programme no more than the CWO’s present break with the ICC has done” (‘The CWO and the Organization Question’).

This monolithism never allowed differences within the CWO to emerge and be debated publicly, or according to the ‘seceders’, within the organization itself. This can only serve to drive real differences underground and creates a stifling atmosphere inside a group; but at the same time the CWO was unable to dispense with a monolithic structure. Originating in an over-reaction to the initial federalism of RP and WV, the CWO’s monolithism became a vital protecting device ensuring the uniqueness of the CWO’s platform and sealing the CWO off from other groups.

But it is also quite clear that this monolithic structure never really eliminated the fragility of the original regroupment between WV and RP. This is admitted by the CWO itself, in its recent letter to the ICC: “In the future we will have to be more careful in our dealings with elements who give out that they agree with our politics, but who seek to use us either as a life-raft to keep them afloat, or as a shield against another political organization.”

Underneath the apparent unity and “programmatic centralism” of the CWO, there were still two groups and the Liverpool group’s acceptance of the CWO’s professed political perspectives seems to have been fairly superficial, judging from its easy regression back to the localist, activist politics of the old WV. The joint organization was an artificial creation from the beginning, constructed on an entirely inadequate political basis, as a kind of negative mirror image of the ICC. The split was therefore written into the group from the beginning, and unless the CWO radically changes its present orientation, its points to further disintegratory tendencies in the future.

Another consequence of the CWO’s isolation is an accumulation of confusions and political misconceptions, which (in the absence of discussion with anybody else) don’t get clarified, but serve as further justifications of the ‘uniqueness’ of the CWO. For now one example will suffice: in RP 5 we find the incredible assertion that neither the July 19, 1936 uprising in Barcelona, nor the Barcelona May Days of 1937, were expressions of proletarian struggle. This view is totally at odds with the position defended by Bilan (see the appeal of the Communist Left published in the International Review, no. 6) and actually obscures the whole significance of what happened in Spain, particularly the role of the ‘extreme left’ which had such an important role to play in Spain precisely because the proletarian danger had been acutely felt by the Spanish bourgeoisie. We don’t wish to go into this question in detail here. We cite it as an example of the way the CWO’s isolation both from today’s revolutionary movement and from the tradition of the Communist Left is leading it to adopt more and more bizarre and unsubstantiated positions. The CWO continues to defend class positions, and remains within the proletarian camp; its political degeneration is taking place quite slowly. But the proliferation of confusions within its ranks will inevitably accelerate this tendency towards theoretical degeneration, which is becoming increasingly apparent.

CDW.

Deepen: 

  • 1970s and the International Conferences of the communist left [64]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Workers Organisation [18]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • International Communist Current [6]

Breaking with Spartacusbond (Holland)

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Introduction

The following article was written by a Dutch comrade who has left the Spartacusbond (SB). The article is composed from various texts written in preparation for the last confer­ence of the SB and serves as a parting letter to this organization. The aim of the present article is to clarify the developments within the SB to the outside world and, in doing so, to contribute to the process of international regroupment. This concern for the inter­national regroupment of revolutionaries has led FK to join the ICC, considering it to be “the only serious pole of international regroupment of revolutionaries today.”

Spartacusbond: Alone in the world

Since the second half of the 1960s, the workers’ struggle has taken on an openly revolutionary character once more. At the same time, revolutionary nuclei are emerging which try to understand the crisis of capit­alism and the revival of the workers’ strug­gle. In doing so these revolutionary groups lay the foundations necessary for taking up propagandistic activities, as did organiza­tions of revolutionaries which emerged during the first revolutionary wave of the world proletariat following the imperialist massacre of 1914-18. Such attempts are very diffic­ult since fifty years of counter-revolution have led to an organic break not only with those communist parties which organized to form the Third International, but also with those who remained faithful to the world revolution after the Third International and the Bolshevik Party had degenerated and dis­integrated. It is thus natural that the revolutionary groups emerging in recent years should engage in intense political discus­sion in order to re-appropriate the histori­cal political gains of the working class, to clarify class positions, and to regroup internationally on the basis of a platform in which class positions have been elaborated. The ICC is an expression of the theoretical and organizational efforts of those revolu­tionary groups which have become conscious of the fact that they can only carry out their responsibilities in the working class within an international framework.

This effort is not immediately understood by everyone. Moreover, the numerous existing counter-revolutionary organizations contri­bute to derailing this effort. They have the doubtful honour, with hardly an excep­tion, of being able to claim a living and organic continuity with currents which, one by one, have revealed themselves to be the executioners of the working class: for example, the Trotskyist/Stalinist/and Maoist products of the degeneration of the Third International and the Bolshevik Party. Like a bad penny they keep turning up in myriad forms. Counter-revolutionary groups are not threatened by a downturn in the workers’ struggle. On the contrary, they are bourg­eois expressions and contribute to acceler­ating any reflux. Their mystifications con­sist of presenting defeats of the workers’ struggle as victories. In the context of the trade unions such defeats are called ‘a growth in unity’;. relapses into parlia­mentarism become ‘political struggles’; relapses into nationalism are presented as ‘proletarian internationalism’; and the workers’ involvement in imperialist war is portrayed as the defence of some ‘socialist country’.

The role of bourgeois, counter-revolutionary organizations is clear. But within the proletarian camp, is the effort towards inter­national regroupment understood by the descendants of the Dutch and Italian Left; with­in those groups which are not the result of today’s revival of class struggle, but which were able to maintain a revolutionary stance towards certain vital problems which faced the class struggle in the past? Do such groups represent the living, unbroken, organic continuity with the revolutionary currents of the revolutionary wave of 1917-­20? In other words, do they defend class positions and do they carry out their tasks as revolutionary organizations with regard to the class? These questions cannot be answered in a bloc. In the following, article we will examine the case of the Spartacusbond, a Dutch organization which is sometimes considered to be the organic continuation of the Dutch and German Left of the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s.

The origins of the Spartacusbond

When the Communistenbond ‘Spartacus’ (League of Communists ‘Spartacus’) re-emerged from illegality after world War II, many members of the pre-war GIC1 appeared to be part of this former Trotskyist group. Originally the Spartacusbond was one of the illegal groups continuing the work of the RSAP of Sneevliet (Maring). In the second imperia­list massacre, it held a coherent proletar­ian internationalist position by refusing to take sides in the imperialist war and de­fended working class struggle. The later Spartacus faction evolved particularly posi­tively toward class positions by further abandoning Trotskyist positions. It under­stood the capitalist nature of the Soviet Union; rejected trade unionism; recognized factory committees as the organs of struggle of the working class; denounced parliamentarism; and insisted on the political nature of the struggle in the factories. The Spartacus group was further stimulated in its development by the former GIC, with whom it came into contact after the arrest and execution of Sneevliet and seven other comrades in 1943. The study and discussion of theoretical questions between the former Trotskyists and the GIC members evolved so positively that they decided to continue as Communistenbond ‘Spartacus’, which openly defended class positions in the Netherlands after World War II.

The end of World War II did not bring about the proletarian revolution contrary to expectations based on the events in Germany and Russia following World War I. Instead capitalism began its period of reconstruc­tion into which it could attempt to inte­grate the working class in general. The Eenheidsvakcentrale (United Trade Union), which the Spartacus group had contributed to creating during its final years of ille­gality, and which the Spartacists hoped, through their propaganda for factory organization, would evolve in the direction of a kind of Arbeiter-Union of the German Revolution, in fact became an ordinary trade union and on top of that fell into Stalinist hands.

They then founded the Onafhankelijke Verbond van Bedrijfsorganisaties (Independent Alliance of Factory Organizations) which although it was not dominated by the Sta­linists nevertheless also became a kind of trade union, given the pressures of the reconstruction period. After this, the Spartacists left the OVB. With the decrease in the number of wildcat strikes immediately following World War II, the SB entered a difficult period. Many members left and it became a small group desperately trying to row against the stream in the reflux of the workers’ struggle. Their dissemination of class positions found no audience because of the lack of movement in the class. In­evitably, the SB tried to account for this, but it fell into a gradual theorizing of the defeat. This process expressed itself, for example, in the emergence of a council­ist faction within the SB which started to publish Daad en Gedachte (Act and Thought) independently from the SB in 1965.

Councilism

Councilism2, as a current emerging from the reconstruction period, must be disting­uished from the pre-war Left Communists.The germs of councilism, a product of degen­eration after the war, can be found in some pre-war currents within the German and Dutch Left. This is particularly so in regard to the council communism of Otto Ruhle’s Einheidsorganisation (Unity Organization) and in the council communism of the GIC. Both these currents, however, were still an expression of the serious attempts made to clarify problems around the question of the Arbeiter-Union (Workers’ Union) prior to the war. Therefore, we call them council communists and not councilists. Although Otto Ruhle’s rejection of the need for political organization and the party was already at the time a mistake, we must understand his position in terms of the confusion which also existed in the KAPD over the question of the Arbeiter-Union. Only gradually was the insight gained that the working class could no longer have per­manent organizations. This insight came to be expressed in the conceptions of the GIC. The council communism of the GIC must there­fore also be distinguished from that of Ruhle.

Councilism, on the other hand, bases itself on fragments of the council communism of the GIC and particularly that of Otto Ruhle. Councilism must not be seen as an attempt to clarify the real problems arising from class struggle. Quite the opposite. It falls back to Ruhle’s rejection of political organization at a time when the questions raised about the organs of struggle and their position in relation to the political organization had already been clarified by the GIC. CounciIism thus neglects a funda­mental lesson drawn from the workers’ struggle. Councilists take a lot of pains to project their positions back to encompass revolutionaries like Pannekoek. Daad en Gedachte (D&G) even suggest that it is the continuation of the GIC since all the ex-­GIC members of the SB, became members of D&G in 1965. But the continuation of a revolutionary current is not guaranteed by the presence of certain people in an organ­ization. A revolutionary current can only be maintained within the framework of an organization which publicly propagates class positions. This certainly cannot be said of D&G. On the contrary, D&G considers the propagation of class positions to be a ‘party practice’, which in the councilist vocabulary refers to the Social Democratic and Leninist position on the tasks of the party. The councilists completely overlook the fact that, since the foundation of the KAPD in 1920, revolutionaries defend the position that the tasks of the party are res­tricted to propaganda and to the clarifica­tion of consciousness, while the task of leading the struggle and taking power is to be accomplished by the struggling masses which use their elected committees for this purpose. This conception, of the urgent task of the party to intervene in the class strug­gle in an exclusively propagandistic manner, is a class line. It is a fundamental lesson which the KAPD learned from the practices of the reformist parties and trade unions and the perpetuation of such practices by the ‘Zentrale’ of the KPD(S) following the Moscow ‘lead’3. Otto Ruhle turned away from the KAPD because, according to him, it was financed by Moscow and was following a Leninist line. Gorter, Hempel, and Pannekoek, on the contrary, disapproved of Ruhle’s position because they were convinced that the most conscious workers, necessarily, first come together to study and discuss and then spread their positions through the entire class.

The councilists think they have found an additional argument4 against the propa­gandistic tasks of the party in the fact that class positions are grounded in the creative activity of the struggles of the working class instead of being developed independently by armchair theorists contem­plating their navels. Indeed, class positions are the result of the study of workers’ struggle by the working class. Therefore, class positions change when the class strug­gle encounters opposition from a new obsta­cle and succeeds in creatively surmounting it. For that reason the councilists think it better not to propagate positions today which, in the future, might turn out to be limited. Secondly, they feel such activity would come down to an attempt to rob the workers of their chance of leading their own struggle. This opinion is based on a far too narrow definition of class positions.

Class positions are not detailed guide-lines telling the working class how to act in every given situation. They crystallize the political gains from the experience of the highlights of the workers’ struggles; as for example, the Paris Commune, the Russian Revolution and German Revolution, or from the counter-revolution: the case of both world wars. Class frontiers are no more than a general orientation, a broad frame­work for the conscious action of the class, which can only be extended by events in the class struggle of world-historic dimensions. The fear of the councilists, that to propa­gate class positions comes down to political groups directing the workers’ struggle, is completely misplaced. This fear is even more out of place when we see that revolut­ionaries have argued since 1920 that the working class, through its struggles, pro­duces two organizations: the unitary organi­zation and the organization of revolution­aries.

Since the outbreak of World War I, capitalism has shown that it has entered its phase of decadence and revolution. In the period of decadence, gradual improvements in the position of the working class through parli­amentary and trade union struggle have become impossible, because of the lack of real growth of the productive forces. This means that the working class can no longer unite in permanent organizations of struggle, organizations like the trade unions and parliamentary parties used to be. Only during its direct struggles; in which it defends its immediate interests, can the class form temporary organizational units. Direct struggles and the independent unitary organ­izational forms engendered by such struggles always come up against the impossibility of the working class gaining any lasting reforms under decadent capitalism. What remains are the experiences of the struggle, of its organization and its results. In elaborating these experiences, within the process of the rising consciousness of the workers through their struggles, about capitalist relations of production and about their own forms of organization, the class prepares itself for the fulfillment of its global historic task: the conscious over­throw of capitalism and the foundation of workers’ power based on the councils, in order to realize the communist mode of production. The process by which the class becomes conscious of its historical task is, therefore, not some idealistic fantasy which can be injected into the class from the outside. On the contrary, this consciousness is generated by the working class elaborating its experiences by engaging in intensive discussions around various points of view.

In order to develop and propagandize their positions in the best possible way, those who hold the same positions unite in poli­tical organizations of revolutionaries, which are the permanent expressions of the workers’ struggle, in so far as they are based on the study of the experiences of that struggle from the point of view of the working class. Apart from these organizations, there exist the organizations of struggle, developing towards the unity and independence of the working class against capital. These are temporary expressions of the upsurges in the workers’ struggle. The workers’ councils become permanent when they have destroyed the bourgeois state.

Leaving the Spartacusbond

To understand the distinction between the unitary organs and the organization of revolutionaries, and also their mutual rela­tionship, is a fundamental requirement for an organization of revolutionaries to fulfill its tasks in the class in the best possible way. Only if a full understanding of this problem is present can we talk about a living, organic, continuity with the Communist Left of the pre-war period. D&G are clearly not a continuation of the Dutch Left, but it would be an exaggeration to call D&G a counter-revolutionary group. But what about the SB?

It is impossible to describe here the com­plete history of the SB. We will limit ourselves to the remark that the SB was not freed from councilism after the D&G faction split from it. D&G, it is true, is the group which contributed most to the theore­tical foundations of councilism and subse­quently put it into practice, even propaga­ting it at an international level. However, there are traces of councilism in the SB.

An evaluation of the councilist or communist nature of the SB becomes possible by studying developments at the latest conference of the SB. This conference was completely dedicated to the question of the organization of revolutionaries. The direction of the prac­tical decisions taken at this conference were for the writer of this article, reason enough to leave the SB. The considerations produced here are not unknown to the SB; they can be found in all kinds of papers written in preparation for the conference, and in letters sent to the SB after it took place.

At this conference, the councilistic inclin­ation to view all political/historical gains of the class struggle through the spectacles of defeat came very strongly to the fore. The conference, devoted to the question of the organization of revolutionaries, became necessary because of the faulty manner in which the SB worked. After publishing two international bulletins, the SB no longer appeared to be capable of reacting to the different groups that have recently arisen in the revolutionary milieu. The SB func­tioned so badly that even internal discus­sion became impossible. The conference could only have solved these problems by gaining some insight into the tasks and working procedures of a political organiza­tion. But the conference showed, alas, that there was a dreadful confusion in the SB about:

a. international regroupment;

b. the SB’s origins from the German and Dutch Left;

c. the tasks facing an organization of revolutionaries;

d, the regroupment of revolutionaries in the Netherlands.



a. International Regroupment

In its report of the conference of 25/26 September, the SB explains its refusal to develop a platform by, among other things, the following statement:

“In a platform (theses) one is obliged to reproduce one’s opinions in very general terms, because one must say a lot of things in a few words. Therefore, in practice, a platform can only be understood by other groups. And it is only useful in that kind of communication. Spartacus is different: we aren’t interested, firstly, in other groups.... Those who search for a party-form with other international groups need a platform, an elaborated declaration to decide if and with whom one can cooperate.” (Spartacus, 1976-11)

Well, at the conference it was never argued that a platform would only, or even pri­marily, be useful for contacting other groups. Apart from that, we must conclude from this quotation that the SB thinks that it is the only revolutionary organization in the world, or else it considers contact between these organizations of no importance. This isolationism shown by the SB is clearly not an acquisition from the Dutch Left, as is shown by the following facts:

1. When Gorter and Pannekoek left the Dutch Social Democratic Party in 1908 to found a new, marxist, social democratic party, they made very sure that the new party would be organized in the Second International. During this same period, Pannekoek was also active in the left wing of the German Social Democratic Party.

2. During the first imperialist massacre, particularly Gorter actively joined in the efforts towards regroupment of the Left at Zimmerwald which ended with the formation of the Third International.

3. During the German Revolution, Pannekoek, and Gorter engaged in passionate discussions within the KPD(S) and the KAPD. Gorter made a journey to Moscow to defend the positions of the KAPD in the Executive Committee of the Communist International. After the Third Congress of the Comintern, when efforts to form an opposition failed, Gorter became one of the initiators of the Communist Workers’ International.

4. After the splits in the KAPD and the ‘Union’, Canne Meijer and Hempel were closely involved in efforts made to regroup German revolutionaries in the Kommunistische Arbeiter Union.

5. In the GIC, Canne Meijer, Hempel, and Pannekoek drew out the lessons from the German and Russian Revolutions while in permanent contact with comrades in Germany, France, the United States, and Belgium.

6. After World War II, when the GIC members emerged from illegality as part of the SB, the SB didn’t hold itself aloof from international discussion: contacts existed in Germany, France and Belgium. In this period the SB also came into contact with the precursors of the ICC.

These facts clearly illustrate that there would not have been a Dutch Left had it not developed within the framework of inter­national discussions, both within the Second and Third Internationals, and among the international contacts after the degen­eration of the Third International. The working class and its struggles don’t stop at national frontiers. On the contrary, it forms a unity spanning all the national capitals. It has to do this because its starting-point and the object of its strug­gle -- capitalism -- is organized internation­ally at the level of the world market. Two world wars and two waves of international workers’ struggle, that of 1917-20 and the present one, have made this clear. The international nature of the workers’ strug­gle also means that the various organiza­tions of revolutionaries cannot lock them­selves behind national boundaries and thus study and discuss the struggle within such a limited framework. But, on the contrary, revolutionaries must lay the foundation for international regroupment.

Unfortunately, it is characteristic of the isolationism of the SB not to invite other groups to its conference in order “to prevent the discussions from centering too much around the positions of the various groups” (Spartacus, 1976-11). Before the conference the argument against inviting other groups was that the work of the conference would constitute a pre-condition and a basis for a systematic discussion of the positions of the several groups. But when “a very deviating position” (Ibid) was proposed at the conference, namely, to translate the platforms of several foreign groups (for example, that of the CWO, the PIC, the RWG, and Arbetarmakt in so far as they weren’t already translated as was the platform of the ICC ), and after that to study and evaluate them, this proposal was rejected. One must fear that at future conferences of the SB no other groups will be present. The SB’s self-chosen isolation in the face of the re-emerging internation­al class struggle and all the questions emerging from this will lead them to an increasingly dogmatic position. If the SB remains cut off from international contact, the progress of the new revolutionary wave will wash it ashore, in the bourgeois camp.

b. The Origins of the SB from the German and Dutch Left

The SB not only refuses to study the plat­forms of currently existing groups, it also refuses to examine the programmes of the organizations from which it emerged: the KPD(S), the KAPD, the KAPN (Dutch KAP), the GIC, and even its own programme of 1945. Its argument is that ‘This is all old hat. Now we live in other times.’ But the fact is that nearly everything the SB puts forward consists of bits of theory deliberately wrenched out of the context of the overall theory of the German and Dutch Left. Refusing to recognize this is not only terribly arrogant, it is also dangerous. It is precisely the uncritical and superficial manner in which the SB brings forward now this and then that element of the positions of Rosa Luxemburg, Anton Pannekoek, Herman Gorter, Henk Canne Meijer, or Hempel which will inevitably bring the SB to the very dogmatic position it is so afraid of. The only way to arrive at class positions and to see how eventually they have to be extended or changed, as a consequence of radical changes in the class struggle, is to study the fundamental positions of the German and Dutch Left within the context of the circumstances in which they were developed and against the background of the present period which separates us from the pre-war communists. In the first place, the SB isn’t aware of the totality of the positions of the German and Dutch Left. Secondly, the SB has never heard about the positions of, for example, the Italian Left regarding various questions. Thirdly, the SB hasn’t got the faintest idea what the words ‘class frontier’ mean, from which it concludes, for reasons of minor importance, that a certain position ‘out of its time’ is dangerous or even counter-revolutionary.

The critical study of the positions on several questions of the German and Dutch Left and those of existing organizations could have led the SB to accept a platform. Even the way the SB chose to reject a platform shows its tendency to bring forward un-reflected fragments of theory:

“Our work consists in making our positions clear to people, to struggling indivi­duals. To put it better, we try to pro­pagate the class struggle. With a plat­form you run the risk of judging develop­ments too much from the past, that you start working conservatively.” (Spartacus, 1976-11, underlined by F.K)

This is not a new contribution of the SB. No, this is a portion of Rosa Luxemburg’s theory, as can be seen from the following quotation:

“In general, the tactical policy of the Social Democracy is not something that may be ‘invented’. It is the product of a series of great creative acts of the often spontaneous class struggle seeking its way forward. The unconscious comes before the conscious. The logic of the historic process comes before the sub­jective logic of the human beings who participate in the historic process. The tendency is for the directing organs of the socialist party to play a conserva­tive role. Experience shows that every time the labour movement wins new terrain those organs work it to the upmost. They transform it at the same time into a kind of bastion, which holds up advance on a wider scale.” (Underlined by Rosa Luxemburg, ‘Organizational Questions of the Russian Social Democracy’, pt. l)

But for Rosa Luxemburg this consideration was not a justification for opposing the existence of a party programme. Some lines further on she says:

“Evidently, the important thing for the Social Democracy is not the preparation of a set of directives all ready for the future policy. It is important: 1. to encourage a correct historic apprecia­tion of the forms of struggle correspon­ding to the given situations, and 2. to maintain an understanding of the rela­tivity of the current phase and the in­evitable increase of revolutionary ten­sion as the final goal of the class struggle is approached.” (Luxemburg, Ibid)

Rosa Luxemburg gives an excellent definition of the origins and functions of the class positions that are written down in the plat­form or party programme of every revolution­ary organization. Indeed, to record class positions has nothing at all to do with efforts to take over the leadership of the working class struggle or (what would be the result of this) obstructing the ‘often spontaneous class struggle’.

The text of Rosa Luxemburg, from which these quotations are taken, was written at a time when the period of capitalist decadence hadn’t yet begun and the working class could still force by means of parliament and the trade unions, a still-expanding capitalism to grant reforms. At that time revolutionaries were active in the Social Democratic organizations because they were permanent proletarian organizations of struggle and propaganda. The programme on which the KAPD was founded in 1920, took into account the period of the decadence of capitalism, which apparently had started in 1914. It also explained the marked inade­quacy of parliament and the trade unions as means of struggle of the proletariat and recognized the distinction between the unitary organizations of the class and the organization of revolutionaries. This dis­tinction marks a continuous theoretical evolution which began with Rosa Luxemburg’s opposition within Social Democracy. This theoretical evolution is in no way a result of navel-gazing, but of a thorough elabora­tion of the developments within the workers’ struggle up to 1920 which shows a distinc­tion between the organizations of struggle and the organizations of the revolutionaries in the reality of class struggle. World War I and the revolutionary wave of 1917-20 shifted class frontiers, and the programme of the KAPD takes this into account. If the SB is suggesting that the class frontiers described in the programme of the KAPD have changed, through claiming they are ‘old hat’, then the SB’s responsibility is to show the historic facts proving this. It is our con­viction that these facts do not exist. But the SB has very good reasons for refusing to study the programmes and platforms of the KAPD and its continuations in the Dutch Left. At present the SB is only held to­gether by its councilist and activist re­fusal to take up its tasks as an organiza­tion of revolutionaries. The councilists, the older militants in the SB, gave up bringing forward class positions after the disappointing experiences which followed their efforts to do so during the now-ended period of reconstruction. The younger acti­vists in the SB -- in a functioning organiza­tion of revolutionaries -- are afraid to give up the safe, localistic, limitations of their own place of work or their own dis­trict, and at the theoretical level, prefer their ‘chats’ with the workers.

c. The Tasks of the Organization of Revolutionaries

During the conference, the SB couldn’t deny the distinction between the organization of revolutionaries and the unitary organiza­tions. But this was arrived at only after the greatest effort and in spite of objec­tions of a kind that can also be found in the report of the conference the SB pub­lished:

“But the conception that the political organization is so schematically distinct from the unitary organization that in practice it even boils down to a separa­tion, doesn’t fit in with reality. In the first place it hardly ever happens that only direct and immediate interests are in the focus of a struggle or action. Precisely in the concrete struggle, interests and ideas develop which trans­cend the material, temporary, and local point of struggle. It is precisely here that the basis for further political evolution is laid. And in the second place, in many movements there is no unity of class but the co-operation of the interests concerned dominates (for example, actions in workers’ districts). There must be an evolution by unitary organizations and action groups towards study and the deepening of more general questions: an evolution from practice towards study of that practice. Of course the political group is distinct from the action groups and strike committees. Because the political group has a speci­fic task of placing the experiences gained through these struggles in a broader perspective.” (Spartacus, 1976-11)

Now what the SB says here is very correct.

But it is no argument at all against the necessity for the organization of revolu­tionaries to be a political organization based on a platform. Because consciousness develops within the struggle from experiences, this is no automatic and simultaneous process. That’s why the elements which first come to consciousness must come together to deepen and propagate their understanding and positions. The SB seems to confirm this when it says:

“A platform consists of one’s positions written down in the form of theses. Posi­tions relating to the history of class struggle, to actual and international experiences, to capitalism and the per­spectives for the future. Everybody is agreed that these are things which a political group such as the SB should be engaged in. There has been a great deal of discussion about this and also a lot of confusion, but in this report we can be brief about it; everybody agreed and still agrees.” (Spartacus, 1976-11)

But what was the disagreement at the con­ference? According to the SB: “The dis­agreement was around the need to reproduce one’s positions in the form of theses and on the emphasis placed on studying a certain point.” (Spartacus, 1976-11)

Of course the disagreement wasn’t about the form a platform should take, whether theses, an essay, a poem, or a declaration of prin­ciples. The disagreement was, and is, about the content of a platform, a declaration of principles, or whatever you wish to call it. This is shown by the following: “If we want to accomplish our tasks, namely to pro­pagate the insight resulting from study, then we need a permanent discussion. The evolution of many groups has shown in practice that a platform (along with its consequences -- national guidelines which local sections have to obey, months of discussion about the formulation of objectives and procedures, etc) only obstructs that permanent confron­tation with reality.” (Spartacus, 1976-11)

By ‘reality’, the SB means the “everyday practice” of the activist who has chosen a certain “field of action”, this means for a partial struggle, and who doesn’t want to hear anything about matters which, according to him, have nothing to do with this. If he has chosen a certain workers’ district, he doesn’t want to hear about wage struggles, nor about struggles in the districts of Soweto, or Vitoria, or Gdansk, and least of all about the class positions elaborated from the highlights of the workers’ struggles historically.

The activists are characterized by their factual refusal of the organization of revolutionaries, which they wrongly identify with the Leninist party. The activists think ‘the’ political organization superfluous because they demand that political positions be directly applicable to their “field of action”. The positions resulting from past revolutionary highlights of the workers’ struggle, or from other countries, they consider to be “theory” and hence “impractical”. Activism in fact is an a-historic, localist tendency principally restricting itself to partial struggles. At its best, activism can be the reflection of a limited workers’ struggle. But activism can never help to transcend these limitations. On the contrary, it propagates the limitations of the partial struggle by holding it up before the class as exemplary.

While the working class as a class is always forced to generalize its struggle to all aspects of life and throughout a constantly enlarging part of itself, in order to make its proletarian revolution, it is confronted by the same kind of problems that earlier revolutions had to overcome. The activists stand there rejecting the experiences of earlier revolutionary highlights which have been elaborated and are formulated in the positions of the currents of the workers’ movement. Just like Lenin, the activists consider these theoretical conceptions as something which are properly alien to the working class, which according to them, only struggle on the basis of limited interests -- to which Lenin adds -- and which never can transcend this limitation without the leading role of the intelligensia. The activists con­clude from this, differing from the Leninists, that ‘the’ political organization is super­fluous. In doing so they find themselves in the company of the councilists who no longer believe in propagating class positions be­cause they are tired of rowing against the reflux of the class movement during the last fifty years of counter-revolution. Leninists, activists, and councilists all agree, despite their other differences, in their denial of the origins of class positions from the historical workers’ struggle. Hence their rejection of the exclusively propagandistic intervention in the working class by the organization of revolutionaries.

The propagandistic intervention seems after all, only completely natural and necessary if one thinks that the positions are elabor­ated from the experiences of the class it­self and that propaganda is a contribution to the elaboration of those experiences with­in the class, a contribution to the discus­sion in the working class.

A nice illustration of the SB’s tendency to consider class positions as products of navel-gazing theorists are the marginal notes in Spartacus, 1976-10 which is completely dedicated to the workers’ struggle in Poland during the winter of 1970-71 and the summer of 1976. About the author of the Poland edition, the SB remarks:

“He is ... himself not free from party conceptions, conceptions which should be distinguished from those which corres­pond to state-capitalist theories in which the party ‘leads’ or ‘uses’ the working class; a party which has to seize state-power. Nevertheless, the author has the conception of a party which puts forward the aim of the strug­gle -- the conquest of workers’ power -- and which always stimulates the workers to prepare themselves in every aspect of struggle for that ultimate goal. We get the impression that, through having these conceptions, he overlooks the im­mensely important fact that the working class will not permit its struggle to be directed by social ideals, but that the working class is inspired by the social reality it experiences.” (Spartacus, 1976-12)

As if the final object of the struggle, the conquest of workers’ power, is an ‘invention’ of the party! Even in the earlier years of scientific socialism the conquest of workers’ power was not the product of pure thought but a conclusion drawn from the historic, materialist inquiry into the essence and development of capitalism. And, at least since the Russian Revolution, the conquest of workers’ power is a fact of experience. For the workers of Szczecin during the winter of 1970-71, workers’ power was not an unknown fact; they held power over the city in their hands for some time: This power was snatched away from them by Gierek’s arrival at the shipyards. The discussions between the Szczecin workers’ council and Gierek and among the workers themselves (which is reproduced at length in Spartacus 1976-10), centred around the question of the “maintenance of workers’ power, or the handing of power over to Gierek in exchange for the satisfaction of demands.” In this respect Poland is a testing-ground for the position of the SB in a revolutionary situation:

“So it is our opinion that the workers of Szczecin and of some other towns in Poland were not able to bring down Eastern-European state capitalism. This need not be more surprising than the final defeat of the revolts in East Germany in 1953 and that of the Hungarian workers in 1956. In their isolation they were too restricted in their possibilities to allow for the complete conquest of power by those workers.” (Spartacus, 1976-12)

d. The Regroupment of Revolutionaries in Holland

Given the revival of the revolutionary workers’ struggle after fifty years of counter-revolution, the SB’s councilist tendency to view all events through the glasses of defeat, turns into the open pro­paganda of defeat. The recent workers’ struggles in Poland are not isolated pheno­mena behind the Iron Curtain, but are part of the international workers’ struggle since the second half of the sixties: France in ‘68, Belgium ‘'73, Portugal ‘74/5, Spain, and again Poland 1976. Not to mention the struggles in other parts of the world. It is the task of revolutionaries always to propa­gate class positions. Once this was also the opinion of the SB:

“Only when the third opposition group left the ranks of the SB, did it become clear that the second and also the third split-off really did have principled reasons for doing so. The real disagree­ment was about the SB’s position in the present workers’ movement, at a time when, according to those who split off, there could be no revolutionary mass movements -- or if there could be -- these would not have a revolutionary character. The opinion of those former comrades was that the SB, while sticking to propaganda calling for ‘all power to the workers’ councils’, ‘production in the hands of the factory organizations’ and ‘communist production on the basis of calculating prices on the basis of the average working hour’5, should not intervene in the struggle of the workers as they appeared in an immediate context. The propaganda of the SB should have to be of a princi­pled purity and if the masses were not interested at the moment, this would change when the mass movements would again become revolutionary.” (Uit Eigen Kring, end 1947)

So far the summary of the political reasons for the two opposition groups leaving the SB, by those who remained. The fear of the second and third opposition groups that the SB would become ‘diluted’ in the period when the workers’ struggle once more took on a revolutionary character, has come true. In a period of reviving revolutionary class struggle it becomes an absolute necessity to bring forward in the clearest possible way the historic acquisitions of the class, the class positions. The SB isn’t able to do this. An organization of revolutionaries which isn’t based on permanent discussion involving all its members on its fundamental positions, recorded in a platform, will perish. Because such an organization:

-- is not able to optimally propagate its positions (since they have not yet been determined) in the class from which they have been elaborated;

-- has no membership criteria. Thus it either has to isolate itself from potential new members and die out, or it has to open its door to all kinds of positions;

-- cannot distinguish itself from ‘competing’ organizations. Thus, it becomes a factor of confusion instead of clarification in the class struggle.

Conclusion

The refusal of the SB to inaugurate a discus­sion aimed at forming a platform, essentially comes down to its refusal to submit to a rejuvenation cure against the three complaints of old age mentioned above. The SB has now been in existence for thirty-seven years. But this alone doesn’t make it the continua­tion of the Dutch Left. Its confused positions on the question of the organization of revo­lutionaries, and on its tasks, prove that there has been a real break in continuity with the pre-war communists. By adopting the position it chose at its latest conference, it can hardly be considered to be a func­tioning pole for the regroupment of revolu­tionaries in Holland. The deepening crisis and the upsurge in class struggle make regroupment an absolute necessity.

Unlike the period in which the Dutch Left was active, the Netherlands is now a highly industrialized country with a fully-developed working class. This doesn’t imply that the formation of an organization of revolution­aries in Holland should ever be restricted by national frontiers. The Dutch economy, especially since the reconstruction period, is firmly attached to the German economy and the Dutch bourgeoisie can use Germany’s relatively strong position and its own rich supply of natural gas to relieve the results of unemployment by welfare benefits and by stimulating industry through state interven­tion. Through the phasing-in of the crisis in the Netherlands, it has been possible until recently, to contain the workers’ struggles by channeling and detouring them into demands like the leveling of wage dif­ferentials and nationalizations. But revolu­tionaries know that although the leveling of wage differentials and nationalizations may well slow down the crisis, it will in­evitably return like a boomerang. Recently, the crisis is being felt harder. The Social Democratic/Christian Democratic coalition government is starting to attack welfare benefits. Automatic compensation made to wage-earners to offset inflation is also being threatened. Slowly the Dutch working class is beginning to free itself from con­tainment by the trade unions: in 1976 we saw wildcat strikes in the ports and in the construction industry, two traditionally militant sectors of the working class. The CP, Trotskyists, and Maoists played their part as the left support of Social Democracy. Their tactic was to drive the workers back into the trade unions, or into alternative mini-trade unions, set up by the Maoists. They put forward a bourgeois caricature of political struggle by defending parliamen­tarism, nationalizations, and national ‘independence’.

In view of the still weak development of the workers’ struggles in the Netherlands, the task of the revolutionary organization is to make the working class aware of the struggles of its class brothers in those countries which have already been hit by the crisis, and conscious of the historical perspectives of these struggles. This means that the formation of an organization of revolutionaries in Holland can only take place within an international perspective and therefore an international framework. Consequently, the activity of the ICC and especially its Belgian section, in relation to the Netherlands must be applauded.

The decision of the SB not to engage in a discussion to set up a platform does not have to be final. All the questions that were discussed at the last conference will return when the SB tries to formulate a ‘declaration of principles’. If this happens within a framework of an international discus­sion on the positions of the Communist Left during the period before World War II and the positions of existing revolutionary groups, it will certainly be a contribution towards the creation of a pole for regroup­ment of revolutionaries in Holland. Above all the SB could make a valuable international contribution by aiding the revolutionary groups which emerge towards a critical re­appraisal of the political gains of the Dutch Left. Because the SB never was, and is not now, alone in the world.

F.K.

1 GIC – Groep (en) van Internationale Communisten (Groups of International Communists) can be considered to be a continuation of the Dutch KAP.

2 We only offer here a critical examination of the councilist positions on the question of organization. More about this and the councilist positions on the Russian Revolution and national ‘liberation’ struggles in the International Review no. 2, ‘The Epigones of Councilism’.

3 The Kommunistische Arbeiter-Partei Deutschlands was formed by the majority of the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Spartakusbund) which was maneuvered out of the party as a consequence of its anti-parliamentarist and anti-trade union positions.

4 This argument, from the theory of knowledge, is formulated by D&G in its motto: “In every specific act, thinking precedes action. In the action of the classes or masses the significance of the act, however, only appears afterwards. Here the action precedes the understanding.”

For a comparison with Pannekoek’s position, the interested reader can study a chapter in Worker’s Councils that, not completely accidentally, is entitled ‘Thought and Action’. We refer to the following quotation:

“Only when amongst the workers is present the understanding – at first vaguely – that they have to do everything on their own, that they themselves have to create the organization of work, beginning from the factories, will their actions signify the beginnings of more powerful developments.

The most important role of propaganda is to awaken this understanding: this is carried out by individuals and small groups who first attain this understanding.

As difficult as this may be to begin with, it will become fruitful because, it runs parallel with the line of the working class’ life experiences. This understanding will thus illuminate the masses like a torch and guide their first actions. Where this understanding is lacking (through backward political and economic circumstances) this evolution will go through many ups and downs.” (Anton Pannekoek, Workers’ Councils)

5 This position of the GIC was developed by Hempel while he was a political prisoner. He tried to draw the lessons from the general experiences of the German and Russian Revolutions, his specific experiences of the struggles of the shipyard workers in Hamburg, and his visits to the Soviets near Moscow during the Third Congress of the Comintern. The GIC worked out Hempel’s ideas in The Basic Principles of Communist Production and Distribution (published in German and Dutch), which is a valuable contribution to the question of economic aspects of the period of transition.

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary organisation [5]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Councilism [43]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • German and Dutch Left [23]

Correspondence with Combate (Portugal)

  • 2767 reads

We are publishing below a letter from the Combate group in Portugal. In order to understand and dispel the misunderstandings which have arisen in our relations with this group some explanations are required.

In the midst of the tremendous confusion in which the events in Portugal took place after the fall of the Salazar-Caetano regime, Combate appeared to be the only group situa­ting itself on a class terrain. For this reason we always tried to establish and main­tain contact with this group -- by going to see them, by inviting those comrades respon­sible for making visits to come to Paris to debate with us the problems affecting the proletarian struggle in Portugal, and, equally, by carrying on the debates and criticisms in our publications – natural activities between revolutionary groups.

Our divergences with Combate are certainly substantial. That is no reason to pass over them in silence or to be content to simply exchange ‘information’, but, on the contrary, it is the duty of any revolutionary group to discuss and openly confront these diver­gences. This is a condition for managing to clarify these divergences and eventually to overcome them.

It was with these concerns and while a com­rade from Combate was with us that we had the bewildering surprise of receiving a letter from Combate on 9 September, laconi­cally informing us of the decision to sus­pend selling ICC publications in the Combate bookshops. Our reply, published in the International Review (no. 8), was a vehement protest against such a decision which we described quite rightly as “aberrant”. We demanded an explanation in that letter and demanded that Combate withdraw its decision.

We are satisfied to have received now both the explanations and rectification which we demanded and will let pass the ironic comments accompanying them. The healthy relations which should exist between mili­tant groups of the class are for us an extremely serious problem. We intend to remain firmly resolute and alert to defending these relations in order to root out the perverted customs which Stalinism introduced into the life of the class for the past decades.

We will keep in mind the suggestion to repu­blish material from Combate on concrete struggles. We must, however, assert that we have significant differences with Combate on what the task of the revolutionary press should be. For Combate the press is essen­tially a vehicle for information and descrip­tion, for us it is an instrument of inter­vention and political orientation.

The question is not a difference between workers in struggle and ‘professors’, but between immediatists who are content to ‘inform’ and political groups who say who they are, and who defend a revolutionary orientation within the class and in its struggles.

Also, we hope to see Combate defend a clearer orientation in its publications by openly confronting the positions of other political currents.



A mountain out of a molehill

Dear Comrades,

Your interpretations are quite remarkable and it’s a great pleasure to read them, but, alas, the facts are much more prosaic and banal. It’s always better to check up on the facts before hurling down the gauntlet.

The facts: a comrade who misunderstood a decision taken at a meeting; other comrades who don’t read letters once they have been written. The decision: the bookshop in Oporto decided that it would no longer look after the distribution of your publications in the bookshops of Oporto, Lisbon and Coimbra, because of commercial problems. This has nothing to do with the selling of your publications in our bookshops. More­over, the bookshop in Lisbon has always dis­played your publications, and will continue to do so.

We thank you for your concern for us, which has twice led you to consider Combate’s ideas sufficiently interesting to figure as the subject of your critiques in the pages of your publications. We would like to point out, however, that in the pages of Combate you will find a lot of information provided directly by workers from concrete struggles -- banal, of course, but such things make up the small world the working class lives in while it waits for the pro­fessors to change society. Perhaps some of your readers would like to see some of this material in your publications?

Revolutionary greetings,

The Combate Collective

CONTRA-A-CORRENTE,

Edicoes - Livraria,

Lisbon, 5 January 1977.

Life of the ICC: 

  • Correspondance with other groups [20]

International Review no.10 - 3rd quarter 1977

  • 3532 reads

Texts of the Mexican Left 1937-38

  • 3189 reads
Introduction

The 1936-9 war in Spain was to be a decisive test for the left groups which had come out of a IIIrd International by now definitively in the camp of the bourgeoisie. Beginning as a sudden, spontaneous response by the workers to the military insurrection led by Franco, this class response was very quickly diverted from its class terrain with the help of the ‘left’ -- the Socialist and Sta­linist parties, the anarchists of the FAI and the syndicalists of the CNT. It was thus transformed into a capitalist war.

The fact that the Socialist and Stalinist parties should have exalted the war effort and put themselves at its head was hardly surprising. Since they had long since gone over to the capitalist camp, these ‘workers’ parties were only doing their job; the war was simply the continuation of their policy of national defence in another form. Be­cause of their ‘working class’ and ‘socia­list’ past, these parties were, out of all the political forces of the bourgeoisie, the best equipped to mystify the working class, derail it from its own struggle, and mobilize it for the imperialist massacre.

With these big parties of the left, then, their position in favour of the war and their participation in it were perfectly in order. Anything else would indeed have been a baffling surprise. But how are we to understand the fact that currents like the anarcho-syndicalists, the CNT, the Trotsky­ists, and, behind them, the great majority of left groups, were dragged into the whirl­pool of the war? Some, like the CNT and the POUM went as far as to participate in the (Republican) government of national defence; others, though opposed to participation in the government (the Trotskyists), still called for participation in the war in the name of the widest possible anti-fascist front. Others, more radical, marched off to war in the name of a workers’ anti­fascist resistance; still others, in order to fight enemy Number One (Franco) on the war front, the better to wage class struggle after the victory (?!). There were even those who considered that the state in the republican zone had completely disappeared or that it was simply a facade without any real meaning.

The immense majority of these left groups, who for years had taken their strength and their raison d’être from the struggle against the degeneration of the Communist Parties and the Communist International and who had ruthlessly fought against Stalinism in the name of proletarian internationalism, allowed themselves to be caught up in the spokes of the war in Spain. It is true that this was often done with a heavy heart, with many criticisms and reservations and with all kinds of justifications to calm their anxiety; nevertheless these groups actively supported the war in Spain. Why?

First of all there was the phenomenon of fascism. This problem had never been clear­ly and correctly analyzed in the Communist International, which had very quickly drow­ned it in the tactical considerations and clever manoeuvres of the United Front. The difference in the forms of the bourgeois dictatorship -- democracy and fascism -- had little by little become a fundamental social antagonism which took the place of the his­toric class opposition between the proleta­riat and the bourgeoisie. In this way class frontiers were completely covered over and confused: democracy became a terrain for the mobilization of the proletariat, fascism a synonym for capitalism. In this new ver­sion of the divisions in society, the his­torical terrain of the proletariat -- the struggle for communism -- disappeared compl­etely, and the only remaining choice for the working class was to serve as an appendage to one or another bourgeois clan. The workers’ natural revulsion and hatred for the overt, barbaric repression meted out by the bloodthirsty fascist gangs was exploited by all the so-called ‘democratic’ forces of capital to derail the proletariat, to fix its gaze on the ‘main enemy’ in order to make it forget that the fascists were just one element of a class which in the face of the proletariat, would always be a united and enemy force.

Anti-fascism, as a substitute for anti-capi­talism, as the immediate priority in the struggle against capitalism, became the most effective programme for trapping the prole­tariat in the quicksands of capital; and the majority of left groups allowed them­selves to be led into the same quicksands. Although isolated militants were able to recover after the war, this was not to be the case for political groups like Union Communiste in France, the League des Communistes Internationalistes in Belgium, the GIC in Holland, the minority of the Italian Fraction, and many others who were unable to save themselves from drowning.

Another touchstone which these left groups were to trip over was their complete incomprehension of the profound historical signi­ficance of war in the epoch of capitalist decline. They only saw the immediate, con­tingent motivations behind inter-imperialist confrontations. They didn’t see that beyond these immediate factors, imperialist wars in this epoch are an expression of the historic impasse reached by capitalism as a system. The only solution to capital’s insurmount­able contradictions was the communist revolution. In the absence of this solution, society was caught up in an inexorable pro­cess of decay and self-destruction. Imper­ialist war was the only alternative to the revolution. The historic character of this movement of destruction and self-destruction, in direct opposition to the revolution, was a hall-mark of all wars in this epoch, what­ever form they took on -- local wars or gene­ralized wars, so-called anti-imperialist wars, wars of independence or national liberation, wars for democracy against tot­alitarianism, or wars inside a country bet­ween fascism and anti-fascism.

Two groups, anchored solidly on the terrain of marxism, were able to pass the two-fold test represented by the war in Spain: the Italian and Belgian Fractions of the Commu­nist Left. Despite weaknesses, their work remains a serious contribution to the revo­lutionary movement and to this day remains a precious source of theoretical reflection for militants. They suffered the most ter­rible isolation, but their convictions re­mained firm, because they knew that this was the inevitable lot of any authentically revolutionary group in a period of defeat for the proletariat, a period that was lea­ding to war. But even though the deafening roar of the cannons and bombs in Spain smothered the weak revolutionary voice of the Communist Left, there came from the other side of the world, from the Marxist Workers’ Group (Grupo de Trabajadores Marxistas) in Mexico, a manifesto which Bilan saluted as a “ray of light”.

In the tragic light of the war in Spain, a group of revolutionaries, some of whom came from a break with Trotskyism, situated them­selves on a class terrain and denounced the imperialist war, denounced all its consc­ious and unconscious defenders, and called upon the workers to break from the repulsive alliance of classes represented by the anti­fascist war front. The effort to set up this revolutionary group was a particularly difficult one; it was tragically isolated in a distant country like Mexico, it was subjected to heavy repression by the democratic state, it was attacked from all sides, particularly by the Trotskyists, who laun­ched against it a furious campaign of slan­der and denunciation to the police. Begin­ning with a position of opposition to the ‘anti-fascist’ war in Spain, the group quickly felt the imperious necessity to con­sider the whole historical situation and to make a critical examination of all the theo­retical and practical postulates of the Trotskyist movement.

On many fundamental questions, we share with this group the same concerns and the same political conclusions, particularly on the period of decadence and the national quest­ion. We salute them as our predecessors and as a moment in the historical continuity of the proletarian programme. By publishing a first series of documents by this group, we are demonstrating the life and reality of this evolving political continuity. These documents, which have been almost totally ignored by the revolutionary movement, will, we are sure, be of great interest to all revolutionary militants, since they bring new elements to the work of reflecting on the problems of the proletarian revolution.

In another issue of the International Review we will publish two theoretical texts by this group, one on nationalizations, and the other on the national question.

International Communist Current

*************

The massacre in Barcelona, a lesson for the workers of Mexico!

The defeat suffered by the workers of Spain must not be repeated in Mexico. Every day we are told that we live in a democratic republic, that we have a workers’ government, that this government is our best defence against fascism.

The workers of Spain believed that they were living in a democratic republic, that they had a workers’ government, that this govern­ment was their best defence against fascism.

While the workers’ guard was down, while they were putting their trust in a capita­list government and not in their own stren­gth, the fascists prepared their coup in July last year in full view of the govern­ment, just as the Cardenas government is allowing Cedillo, Morones, Calles etc to prepare their own coup, while lulling the workers with its ‘proletarian’ demagogy.

How was it possible that the workers of Spain didn’t see last July that the ‘anti­fascist’ government had betrayed them by allowing the fascists to prepare their coup? How is it possible that Mexican wor­kers didn’t draw any lessons from this painful experience?

It is because the Spanish government has carried on with its demagogy and because it faced the workers with the deceiving slogan: ‘Fascism is the only enemy!’

By taking over the leadership of the war that the workers had started, the bourgeoi­sie converted a class war into an imperia­list war, a war in which the workers have given their blood to defend the republic of their exploiters.

Their leaders, having sold themselves to the bourgeoisie, put forward the slogan: ‘Don’t raise any class demands until we have beaten the fascists!’ And for nine months of the war, the workers didn’t organize a single strike; they allowed the government to suppress the base committees which were thrown up in July, and to subordinate the workers’ militias to the generals of the bourgeoisie. They sacrificed their own struggle so that it wouldn’t get in the way of the struggle against the fascists.

Why is Cardenas giving support to Azana?

Is it to give the workers confidence in their own class instincts? The Cardenas government has a vital interest in preven­ting the workers of Mexico from understand­ing why the anti-fascist government in Spain allowed the fascists to prepare their coup. Because they understand that what happened in Spain is also about to happen in Mexico.

This is why Cardenas has given his support to the legally constituted Azana government and sent arms to it. He claims demagogic­ally that these arms are for the defence of the workers against fascism.

The most recent news from Spain has destroy­ed this lie once and for all: the legally constituted Azana government has used these arms to crush the heroic workers of Barcelona when on 4 May this year they dared to defend themselves against the government which was trying to disarm them.

Today, as yesterday, the Cardenas govern­ment is aiding the legally constituted Azana government not against the fascists but against the workers.

The bloody repression which has come in the wake of the Barcelona workers’ uprising has shown up the real situation in Spain like a flash of lightning lights up the night. The illusions of nine months have been shattered. In its ferocious struggle against the workers of Barcelona, the ‘anti-fascist’ government has cast off its disguise. Not only did it send its special police, its assault guards, its machine-guns and tanks against the workers -- it even released fascist prisoners and brought back ‘loyal’ regiments from the front, thus exposing this front to Franco’s attack!

These facts have proved that the real ene­mies of the Popular Front are not the fas­cists, but the workers!

Workers of Barcelona!

You have struggled magnificently, but you have been beaten. The bourgeoisie has been able to isolate you. Your own strength alone was not enough.

Workers of the rear-guard, you must struggle alongside your comrades on the front against the same enemy: not, as your bourgeoisie tell you, against Franco’s army, but against the bourgeoisie itself, whether fascist or ‘anti-fascists’.

You must send agitators to the front with the watchword: rebellion against your own generals! Fraternization with soldiers of Franco -- the majority of whom are peasants who have fallen prey to fascist demagogy because the Popular Front government has not fulfilled its promise to give them land! A common struggle of all the oppressed, whe­ther workers or peasants, Spaniards or Moroccans, Italians or Germans, against our common enemy: the Spanish bourgeoisie and its ally – imperialism!

For this struggle you must have a party which is truly your own. All of today’s organizations from the socialists to the anarchists are servants of the bourgeoisie. In the recent events in Barcelona they once again collaborated with the government to re-establish ‘order’ and ‘peace’. The pre­condition for your victory is for you to create an independent class party.

Forward, comrades of Barcelona, to a soviet Spain!

Fraternization with the peasants who have been duped into joining Franco’s army, for a struggle against your common oppressors, whether fascist or anti-fascist!

Down with the massacre of workers and peasants in the interests of Franco, Azana and Companys!

Transform the imperialist war in Spain into a class war!

Workers of Mexisco!

 

When will you rise up?

Will you allow the Mexican bourgeoisie to get away with the same deception as in Spain? No! Will it take nine months of massacre to make you see through this decep­tion? No! Let us learn the lesson of Barce­lona! The deception carried out by the Spanish bourgeoisie has only been possible because the leaders have betrayed the wor­kers, as in Mexico, by abandoning the def­ence of the workers’ interests to the magn­animity of the ‘workers’ government’, and because they have been able to convince the workers that the struggle against fascism demands a truce with the republican bourg­eoisie.

The social leaders in Mexico have abandoned the struggle for economic demands and have bound the workers to the government.

All the trade union and political organiza­tions in Mexico support the sending of arms by the Cardenas government to the murderers of our comrades in Barcelona. They all sup­port the demagogy of the government. Not one organization has exposed the real func­tion of the Cardenas government.

If the workers of Mexico don’t create a truly independent class party, we will suf­fer the same defeat as the workers of Spain! Only an independent proletarian party can counteract the work of the government, which is dividing the peasants from the industrial workers with the farce of dividing up a few strips of land in the lagoon.

The struggle against the demagogy of the government, the alliance with the peasants, and the struggle for the proletarian revo­lution in Mexico under the banner of a new communist party -- this is the guarantee for our victory and the best help we can give to our brothers in Spain!

Be on the alert, workers of Mexico! We mustn’t be taken in by the fake ‘wor­kers’ rhetoric of the government! No more arms for the murderers of our brothers in Spain!

Fight for an independent class party! Down with the Popular Front government! Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat!

Marxist Workers’ Group

(Grupo de Trabajadores Marxistas)

May 1937, Mexico



Republic in Spain, ‘democracy’ in Mexico

In the first moments of the struggle in Spain the proletariat struggled as an inde­pendent force. Thus the struggle began as a civil war. But very quickly the betrayal of all the parties transformed the class struggle into class collaboration, the civil war into an imperialist war.

All the parties (including the anarcho-­syndicalists) broke the strike movement with the slogan: “No class demands until we have won the war!”. The result of this policy was that the Spanish proletariat abandoned the class struggle and gave its blood for the defence of the capitalist republic. Thanks to the war in Spain the bourgeoisie has managed to convince the workers of Spain and the rest of the world that its class interests are the same as those of bourgeois democracy; it has made the workers abandon their own methods of class struggle and accept the methods of the bourgeoisie: territorial struggle, worker against worker. We can thus see how the more the heroism of the Spanish proletariat and the solidarity of the world proletariat grows, the more the class consciousness of the workers is being reduced.

The world bourgeoisie, especially the so-called ‘democratic’ bourgeoisie, gives its approval to the heroism of the Spanish proletariat and the solidarity of the inter­national proletariat in order to derail the struggle from a national terrain to the ‘international’ terrain; from being a stru­ggle against the bourgeoisie at home into a struggle against the fascism of Spain, Germany, and Italy. This method has brought great advantages to the bourgeoisie in all countries: it has been used to break strikes. The war in Spain and the way the bourgeoisie has made use of it have tied the proletariat of each country more tightly to its own bourgeoisie.

The government of Mexico has outdone all the capitalist governments in the systema­tic and demagogic way it has supported the war in Spain to strengthen its own position and bind the Mexican proletariat to the bourgeoisie.

The workers’ organizations who demand that their government should send arms to Spain are actually giving their support not to the Spanish workers but to the Spanish bourgeoisie and their own bourgeoisie. Sim­ilarly taking up collections and sending volunteers to the battle-front can only serve to prolong the illusions held by the workers of Spain and the rest of the world and to provide cannon-fodder to the Spanish and international bourgeoisie.

The present government of Mexico has the task of continuing the work of its predeces­sors, ie destroying the independent movement of the workers in order to convert Mexico into a safe source of exploitation by inter­national capital. What has changed from the previous government is only the form in which this task is being carried out, ie the intensification of its leftist demagogy. The present government presents itself to the masses as the expression of true demo­cracy.

The duty of the vanguard of the proletariat is to warn its class and the toiling masses in general that:

-- democracy is simply a form of capitalist, dictatorship and that the bourgeoisie uses this form when it can’t use more overt forms of dictatorship;

-- the function of democracy is to corrupt the ideological and organizational indepen­dence of the proletariat;

-- the bourgeoisie always matches violent methods of oppressing the workers with corruption;

-- the democratic methods of today have the role of preparing the brutal repression of the workers’ movement and the setting up of an open dictatorship tomorrow;

-- and finally the Cardenas government is allowing reactionary elements both inside and outside the government to forge the weapons for this coming brutal oppression (amnesty, etc).

The present government is attempting to sep­arate the workers from their natural allies, the poor peasants, and to incorporate the organizations of both classes into the state apparatus. The government is organizing and giving arms to the peasants so that the latter will use them against the proletariat in the future. At the same time it is try­ing to get rid of all the organizations of the proletariat and form a single party and one union apparatus directly tied to the state. The government is taking advantage of the divisions within the proletariat in order to weaken all the existing organiza­tions: first of all by setting one against the other and secondly by unifying regional and local sections through aid given out by the state. Recently the government has been using Trotsky and the Trotskyists to weaken the CTM (Confederation of Mexican Workers) and the Stalinists. The duty of the vanguard of the proletariat is to systematical­ly denounce and fight against the manoeuvres of the government, intensifying the struggle against the government to the same degree that the government is intensifying its work of corruption and demagogy; it is to hasten the work of preparing a class party; it is to elaborate a revolutionary tactic for the unification of the trade union movement totally independent from the state; it is to begin systematic work amongst the agricul­tural workers and small peasants in order to undermine their confidence in the state and forge an alliance with the workers in the towns.

Every capitalist government of a semi-colonial country is an instrument of imper­ialism. The present government of Mexico is an instrument of American imperialism. Its policies can only serve imperialism and intensify the slavery of the Mexican masses. The duty of the vanguard of the proletariat is to unmask the anti-imperialist demagogy of the government and to show to the masses of this continent and of the whole world that the collaboration of the Mexican govern­ment is today indispensable for the extension of imperialism, as can be seen, for example, in the role played by the Mexican delegation to the Conference of Buenos Aires. The result of the Conference was the intensifi­cation of American domination, above all in Mexico.

The demagogic methods used by the present Mexican government in its dealings with the workers’ movement and the agitation in the countryside has so inspired the confi­dence of American imperialism that the Wall Street banks have offered a huge loan to the Mexican government on condition that the revenues of the oil companies serve as a guarantee for the payment of interest. The government accepted this condition without meeting any opposition from within the country, which didn’t happen with the prev­ious government. This was possible because of the popularity the present government has gained by sending aid to the Spanish government and distributing land in the lagoon, and also because of its promise that the loan will be used to build machi­nery. Thus we can see that the proletariat cannot struggle against the internal policy of the Mexican government without systema­tically struggling against its foreign policy, and that you can’t struggle against Cardenas without struggling against Roosevelt.

Since the whole policy of the Mexican govern­ment is dictated by the needs of American imperialism, the same can be said for the right of asylum granted to Trotsky. It is clear that Cardenas only conceded the right of asylum to Trotsky with the authorization of his master: American imperialism, which is banking on using Trotsky for its inter­national diplomatic manoeuvres, especially for its negotiations with Stalin.

The duty of the vanguard of the proletariat is to warn the workers of this situation, while naturally continuing to struggle for the right of asylum for Trotsky.

(July 1937.)

Marxist Worker’ Group, Mexico

An appeal by Mexican revolutionaries to workers organizations of this country and abroad

Comrades!

An organization which claims to be communist and internationalist has just committed an act which shows that it is neither communist nor internationalist. The Mexican section of the Internationalist Communist League has committed the crime of denouncing a for­eign comrade who lives in Mexico, attacking him for conducting activity within the wor­king class of this country against the poli­cies of the government.

Our enquiry has enabled us to establish the fact that this comrade was for eleven years, from 1920 to 1931, a member of the German Communist Workers’ Party and the General Union of Workers of Germany. From 1931 to 1934, he was a member of the German emigre group of the Communist League and broke with it when Trotsky ordered the different sections of the Opposition to enter the Second International. For several years this comrade was a militant of the Revolu­tionary Workers’ League (the Oehler Group) in the USA, under the pseudonym of Eiffel, and was a member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. Forced to leave the USA when the authorities refused to renew his passport, Eiffel took refuge in Mexico as a representative of the Political Bureau of the Revolutionary Workers’ League, and then he worked in our organization.

As a response to our enquiry, to our request for an explanation, which is the proper way of relating to other workers’ organizations, the League replied with new slanders, culm­inating in a denunciation to the police -- the review Fourth International gives the name of this comrade, his nationality and political pseudonym.

We are also accused, as an organization, being in the pay of Hitler and of ... Stalin.

We know that such methods are typical of organizations who no longer have anything proletarian about them. These are the methods of Stalinism, and prior to that the methods used by Social Democracy in its struggle against the revolutionary vanguard, the internationalists. The fact that the Communist League is following the same path is the sign of a political degeneration which makes it afraid to openly and honestly explain the differences between our two organizations.

We will now explain the content of these differences.

The case of Trotsky

Since Trotsky’s arrival in Mexico, the League has stopped attacking the Cardenas government, and has begun defending it. It calls the government ‘anti-imperialist’, ‘anti­fascist’, ‘progressive’ etc. Seeing the danger of such a policy, which will reduce the vanguard to the level of Stalinism, comrade Daniel Ayala, then a member of the Mexican League, demanded that the League should not consider itself hound by the compromise Trotsky had to make in order to obtain the right of asylum and that it should also free Trotsky of his political links with the organization. The obvious duty of any workers’ organization is to fight for comrade Trotsky’s right of asylum, without changing a single line of its doc­trine, of its propaganda.

The Communist League has not understood things in this way, and by taking responsibility for Trotsky’s acts, has provided the government with an excuse to expel this com­rade whenever the activity of the League is inconvenient to it. Our proposition there­fore gave a better guarantee to Trotsky and allowed the League to fully maintain its ideological independence.

Daniel Ayala became a member of the Marxist Workers’ Group and was accused of being a provocateur, an agent of the GPU, by the Mexican section of the IVth International.

Since then, the new policy of the League in Mexico has been the same as that of Stalin­ism, but with a different theoretical argu­mentation. One example: Diego Riveira, one of the leaders of the League, speaks openly of the necessity for the workers to defend “the independence of our country” (Excelsior, 3 September 1937). The Mexican Trotskyists joined the social patriots when they gave them the task of “defending the independence of our country” against the attempt to “subordinate the administration of our country to Moscow” (Excelsior, 3 September 1937).

The war in Spain

In our leaflet of May 1937 on the massacre in Barcelona, we said:

“All the trade union and political organizations support the sending of arms by the Cardenas government to the murderers of our comrades in Barcelona.”

This judgment applies both to the Communist Party and the League, because they are both an integral part of the anti-fascist united front whose function is to destroy the ideological independence of the workers’ organizations and to incorporate them into the bourgeois state.

Formerly, the League fought against the Stalinists for giving support to the Carde­nas government, of which it said:

“It is in reality the dictatorship of the capitalists in a camouflaged form, and represents the interests of Yankee capi­tal. The sole reason for its existence is to maintain oppression by using radi­cal phrases.”

Since Trotsky’s arrival, the League has given up this correct marxist position on bourgeois democratic states, and acts as though the government stands above classes. The slogans of the League echo what can be read in the Stalinist press: ‘The govern­ment must put an end to abuses by the capi­talists”; “It’s necessary to fight the passivity of the government”, etc.

On the war in Spain, the League criticizes the Stalinists’ support for the bourgeois democratic government, but it associates itself with this treason, because it does not explain to the workers that the war in Spain has become an imperialist war; on the contrary, it takes up the language of the Stalinists when it says that it’s necessary to fight on the fronts.

Our position on the war in Spain

We are against supporting the republican power, but not for supporting the power of Franco. We don’t accept the alternative “with Azana or with Franco”. On the cont­rary, we think that the only way to beat fascism is, first of all, for the workers to break out of the discipline of their ‘democratic’ oppressors, because the only front on which the proletariat can win is the class front.

The war in Spain, like all wars led by the bourgeoisie, is an imperialist war, and not a civil war; consequently, those who call on the workers to support this war are be­traying the real interests of the oppressed class. Only by following the policy of the Bolsheviks and other revolutionary marxists during the world war can the workers make their revolution -- by rising up against their own generals and fraternizing with the soldiers of Franco. This is the only way to transform the present imperialist war into a civil war.

…..Lenin, Liebknecht worked for the defeat of their own government, ie of the bourgeoisie, and for the victory of the prole­tariat. In Russia the revolution triumphed on the basis of the defeat of the Russian government. But the Russian revolutionaries used this defeat to make the proletarian revolution not only in Russia but in Germany as well. The same thing will happen in Spain. The rebellion of Azana’s soldiers will be the signal for the rebellion of the soldiers under Franco’s domination. This is the only way of making the proletarian revo­lution arise out of the present imperialist war. Those who say that the revolution will come after the victory of the Azana govern­ment are lying. What will follow the victory of the republican government will be a ter­rible repression of the workers and peasants of Spain, a repression much bloodier than the massacre of the workers of Barcelona by the ‘democratic’ General Pezas.

The war in China

Forgetting what he said for years about the Chinese revolution, Trotsky says today that in China “All the workers’ organizations ... will carry out to the end their duty in the war of liberation….”. Today Chiang Kai-shek is the hero of the war of libera­tion, and it is the workers’ duty to support the war. But Trotsky doesn’t explain how a war led by the bourgeoisie can be a war of ‘liberation’. Stalin also says that the workers “will carry out to the end their duty to the war of liberation”, but he doesn’t worry about the “programme and poli­tical independence” which Trotsky says the workers absolutely must not abandon. Trotsky continues to speak of this independent struggle at the same time as he abandons it in deeds. It’s worth drawing attention to a minor fact here. A note inserted into no.13 of the Fourth International review rectifies an error in the text of Trotsky’s article on the war in China which he gave to the Mexican journal Excelsior; in Excelsior the words “absolutely without abandoning” were replaced by the Stalinist phrase “without taking into consideration ...”. What is so serious and so tragic is that the Fourth International originally reproduced the same version of Trotsky’s article without correcting it. If the leaders themselves confuse the Stalinist with the Trotskyist version, how are the workers supposed to recognize the right one?

In the case of China as in the case of Spain, the workers will remember one thing: by asking them to do their duty, the League and the Communist Party are asking them to abandon their own struggle and give their support to the ‘liberating’, ‘anti-imperia­list’, ‘anti-fascist’, ‘democratic’ bourgeoisie.

Our position on the war in China

The only safeguard for the workers and pea­sants of China is to struggle as an indepen­dent force against the two governments. By organizing a struggle against their own bourgeoisie, the Chinese revolutionaries will sow the seeds of revolt against the Japanese government, and out of the frater­nization of the workers and peasants of both countries the proletarian revolution will arise. If the revolutionaries unite themselves with the bourgeoisie to defend the fatherland until the war is over, as Stalin and Trotsky advise them to do, they will assist in the destruction of the flower of the proletariat and peasantry of both countries; and at the end of it all the two conflicting bourgeoisies will come to an agreement to ensure the joint exploitation of the Chinese masses.

In all situations, our position is based on one criterion: the class interests of the proletariat require its absolute independ­ence. Its only hope is the proletarian revolution. All ‘wars of liberation’, all ‘anti-fascist wars’ are fundamentally direc­ted against the proletarian revolution. To give ones’ support to these wars is the same as struggling against the proletarian revolution.

*************

The comrades of the Marxist Workers’ Group conclude that they are neither agents of Hitler, nor of Mussolini, nor of Stalin. They continue to be marxists, whereas on the fundamental questions confronting the wor­kers’ movement, the Stalinists and the Trotskyists have arrayed themselves on the same side.



For a real communist party in Mexico

“National defence and democracy: these are the solemn formulae for capitulation by the proletariat to the will of the bourgeoisie.” (Manifesto of the Second Congress of the Communist International)

Never has the communist movement been in such ruins and degeneration as it is today. The so-called Stalinist and Trotskyist ‘communists’ have long since abandoned the communist road, capitulating before the twin fetishes of our class enemy: democracy and the fatherland. Of true communists there remain only small groups in a few countries, like the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left, which in exile prepares for the day of the proletarian revolution in its country, and another “fraction” with similar political positions in Belgium. It is the work of these two groups which has inspired us in our effort to create a commu­nist nucleus in Mexico.

In May last year, when we had only just held our first talks with several other comrades, the majority of them ex-members of the Internationalist Communist League, the massacre of our class brothers in Barcelona by the hangmen of the ‘workers’ government of Azana and Companys forced us to launch our first publication: our leaflet entitled ‘The Barcelona Massacre: A Lesson for the Workers of Mexico’.

We stated in that leaflet our opposition in principle to the participation of workers organizations in the war in Spain, which must be characterised on both sides an imperialist war, and we put forward the slogan of revolutionary defeatism, as the only watchword that can separate the proletariat from ‘its’ bourgeoisie and bring it towards the revolution.

At the same time we denounced the complicity of the ‘workerist’ government in Mexico, and all the worker organizations in the country, in the massacre of our class brothers in Spain.

However, such basic errors are not something special to Mexico. On the contrary, they are common to the communist movement in all colonial and semi-colonial countries, as was shown with cruel clarity by the defeat of the proletarian revolution in China. Such false assumptions had their origin in the unfinished and, in part, incorrect state in which the Communist International left the problem of the proletarian struggle in countries like Mexico and China.

Our first task, consequently, is a critical study of the positions of the Communist International (naturally not of today’s Comintern which shares nothing with commu­nism except the name, but that of Lenin’s time) concerning the appropriate tactics for the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Only provided that we complete that task can we prepare a solid basis for the future Communist Party in Mexico.

Departing from the same marxist principles which Lenin and the other communists of that time did, but profiting from the great experiences since then (particularly the Chinese Revolution of 1926-28), we shall revise the tactical conclusions arrived at by these comrades.

In other words, to publish a new thesis on the struggle in the colonial and semi-colonial countries is our most urgent task. We have not yet completed this task, owing in the first place to our still fairly reduced numbers and to our lack of exper­ience in such theoretical work. This is the first time in Mexico that a group of workers is dealing with the problems of the country in an independent way, solely and exclusively from a class standpoint. Our friends, in Mexico and in other count­ries, must be indulgent of the slowness or imperfections with which we complete our first task.

While the discussion continues within our group regarding the fundamental problems of the proletarian revolution in Mexico, everyday events, like the ‘nationalization’ of the oil industry, oblige and at the same time allow us to deal with some of these problems even before arriving at a complete position, which must be based in an analytical study of the whole history of the workers’ movement in Mexico and in other countries of a similar social struc­ture.

In this sense, we initiate with this first number of our review Comunismo, the dis­cussion of the fundamental problems of our struggle, a discussion which is indispen­sable for the foundation of the future Party of the proletarian revolution, if it is to be based upon solid and truly marxist foundations.

For this work we invite the co-operation of all comrades in Mexico and abroad.

We conclude by affirming the urgency of initiating the work of preparing the programmatic and organizational bases for a new Communist Party in Mexico, completely independent from all the currents which, within the workers’ movement, represent – consciously or unconsciously – the interest of our class enemy.

The publication of our leaflet dictated by our desire to awaken proletarian conscious­ness against the massacre in Barcelona and in Spain in general, was nevertheless pre­mature in so much as at that time we did not yet have a clear position on the prob­lems of our own country. But its publica­tion had a double effect:

1. On the one hand, it provoked against our group a furious campaign of calumnies on the part of the so-called Internationalist Communist League and particularly Leon Trotsky, who accused us of being ‘agents of fascism’ and denounced to the police those comrades who shared our point of view.

2. On the other hand, our first leaflet brought us the solidarity of the proletariat of two countries: the Italian and Belgian Fractions of the Communist Left, who not only defended us from these accusations, but also published translations of the entire text of our leaflet in their reviews Prometeo (in Italian), Bilan (in French) and Communisme (also in French), expressing their satisfaction that, at last, there had appeared in Mexico the first “rays of light”.

Stimulated by this international support and by the letters which the Italian and Belgian comrades sent us, we are trying to accelerate the discussion already started within our young group. But the political and personal difficulties created for us by the accusa­tions and denunciations of the Trotskyists were so grave, that we lost whole months in mere self-defence.

In the end we did advance from negative work to positive work, but we found it more difficult than we had anticipated. The fun­damental reason is that in reality in our country never before has there been posed in a correct form, the problems of the pro­letarian revolution. During its whole existence, the communist movement in Mexico was poisoned with the idea of co-operation with the ‘anti-imperialist’ and ‘progressive’ bourgeoisie of the country.

Our work, therefore, cannot base itself in the positive experiences of the Mexican proletariat, because these have been non-existent. On the contrary, it has to start with a Marxist critique of the false bases upon which the communist movement in Mexico was built.

(Comunismo, no.1, August-September, 1938)



Geographical: 

  • Mexico [65]

Deepen: 

  • The Mexican Communist Left [66]

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1936 - Spain [35]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Left [4]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Internationalism [67]

Britain and the international situation (2nd Congress of World Revolution)

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The IInd Congress of the ICC section in Britain, World Revolution, took place in April this year. Because regular congresses are at the heart of the organization of revolutionaries, such events reveal the main preoccupations and tasks of revolutionaries. They allow the organization to take account of its previous work and draw up future perspectives. In particular they reveal that revolutionaries have no other purpose than to fulfill their responsibilities within the class that has produced them: to clarify “the line of march, the condi­tions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement” (Marx and Engels).

In the main, the IInd Congress of WR, re­flected the attempt to build on the founda­tions of our activity laid at the Ist Congress of the entire ICC in its adoption of the platform and the awareness of the need for centralized, international work.1 In this sense, far from being a national affair, the congress simply expressed a moment in the international work of revolutionaries, which is the only scale of activity possible for a political organiza­tion of the proletariat.

In the context of the strengthening of WR’s work the congress affirmed the increased ability of World Revolution to intervene in the class in Britain. In particular the publication World Revolution now appears bi-monthly, and the congress adopted a resolution to proceed to a monthly regular­ity in 1978.

Other sessions of the congress took up dis­cussions which are animating the Current, and, to some extent, the revolutionary movement as a whole today. One, on the subject of confused groups, has originated in the need to better understand the actual process by which class consciousness is appropriated by the clearest elements of the proletariat today. The process is a painful one, fraught with mistakes and disorienta­tion, owing to the heterogeneous nature of the proletariat’s consciousness today, and the effects of all the limitations imposed on the class by the residues of the counter­revolutionary period. In understanding that the Current itself developed within this process, we must identify and win over those forces whether they are split offs from leftist groups, elements of degenera­ting communist tendencies, or products of the class struggle today, which are capable of moving towards revolutionary regroupment. The question of confused groups assumes all the more importance in view of the fact that a pole of regroupment is still being formed after the counter-revolutionary epoch eventually destroyed any organic continuity with the previous workers’ move­ment.

Another question, the state in the period of transition from capitalism to communism, was a vital subject for discussion at the congress, considering that the problem has not at all been “solved” by working class experience, unlike for example, the nature of the trade unions in decadent capitalism, which the proletariat has discovered time and again to be reactionary adjuncts of the capitalist state. Revolutionaries must therefore devote a large amount of their efforts to clarifying the nature of the ‘post-revolution’ phase of the proletarian struggle, basing their research as much as possible on the experience of the class, particularly that of the Russian Revolution. While only the working class in its prac­tical experience can resolve the problem of the transition period, the proletariat and its revolutionary minorities must theoretically prepare themselves today for this barely understood and formidable task of the future.

The text from the congress that we are presenting here is on the subject of the present situation, dealing with both the international and British situation. It is a contribution to one of the ongoing tasks of World Revolution and the whole ICC -- to continually analyse the present period in relation to the general tendencies of decadent capitalism. This has no academic motive, but is an attempt to make concrete, in our intervention in the working class, the context of the basic political orienta­tion we stand for -- the movement of the world situation towards the alternative of either war or revolution, the impotence of the bourgeoisie to deal with the crisis on an economic or a political level, the nature of the mystifications, particularly those of the left, hurled at the working class, and the stages of the development of the proletarian struggle towards revolution. One of the more important aspects of the text is the attempt to see the British situation in the framework of the inter­national arena, referring to the above tendencies, which have already been dis­cussed in previous issues of the International Review.

Our intention is always to make our dis­sections of the evolution of the present situation as clear and precise as possible, remembering that they are a guide to action for the proletariat. While in many respects this today means a call to revolutionaries to understand the urgency of their tasks and the need to redouble their efforts, tomorrow our analyses will be a practical weapon wielded by the class as it directly influences history in a decisive way.

International situation

1. In the fourteen years from 1953-1967 inflation, in the eleven leading industrial countries of the world, averaged 2% per year. In the two years from 1973-1975 it averaged 13% per year. During the 1960s world industrial production grew by 6-7% per annum. But by 1974 global production had stagnated, and in 1975 it fell by 10%. The volume of world trade from 1964-1974 increased every year by 9% on average, but it too fell n 1975 -- by 6%. As a consequence of these factors unemployment has risen to an official figure of 5.5% of the developed world’s labour force, over double the rate during the post-war ‘boom’.

These are some of the key figures which high­light the gravity of the economic crisis which has developed since 1968. It is a crisis emanating from the recurrence of the saturation of the world market, marking the definite end of the reconstruction period, and hailing once again the mortality of the capitalist system.

2. In 1976 and in the beginning months of 1977 we have seen the so-called recovery, which was supposed to have dealt with the recession of 1975, splutter to a virtual halt. The ‘recovery’ was founded on a shaky basis of stock-building, and a growth in consumer spending, and thus has failed to significantly affect any of the main indicators of the economic crisis. The stagnation of world trade has not really been alleviated, and industrial growth has leveled out, with the modest target of 5% per year set by the OECD in July, proving to be over-optimistic. A 3.5% growth rate is now forecast for 1977. Most importantly no real inroads have been made into the classic features of capitalist crisis: the under-utilization of the productive forces, and of labour power. On the con­trary, even during the latest ‘recovery’ a rationalization process is occurring throughout the economy, with costs of labour and production being cut back as far as possible.

3. It is more and more ridiculous to sup­pose that the Keynesian policies, designed to deal with the problems of the economy in the recent past, can solve today’s crisis. On the one hand the bourgeoisie is now terrified at the prospect of reflation: stimulating production by huge deficit financing, which without an expanding world market can only lead to even more disastrous inflation than exists now. But on the other hand deflation, by means of the restriction of credit, is equally alarming to the ruling class. The capitalist economy can only function with the goal of profitability in sight. The promise of little or no expan­sion can only lead to less and less ‘business confidence’, falling investment, and, as a result, the further bankruptcy of the system. Steering a course between these two evils is becoming more and more difficult as the depth of the crisis reduces the options open to the bourgeoisie.

4. A reversion to protectionism, through the means of the further statification of each national capital, that is policies which in the end lead to generalized war, are in the long term the only way forward for the bourgeoisie. The US will attempt to preserve the cohesion of the Western bloc, which a policy of autarky within each nation would threaten, for as long as possible. It seems that the US will attempt to use the relative strength of the German and Japan­ese economies to prop up the weaker capitals, (Britain, Italy, Spain, etc) which as a cor­ollary, will further strengthen American capital itself. Already calls are being made for the Germans and Japanese to expand their home markets for the sake of weaker countries’ exports. Talks have also begun concerning the formation of a ‘creditor’s club’ to bail out the weaker economies, financed by the stronger capitals. But even this strategy will sooner or later be doomed to failure. The trade surplus of the stronger economies, amounting to $4.5 billion in 1976, cannot soak up the deficit of the weaker ones, which reached -$27 billion in 1976. (This is not to speak of the deficit of the ‘Third World’ which in 1976 reached a figure of -$24 billion, or that of the Eastern bloc, which has accumu­lated a debt of -$482 billion!)

5. The deepening of the economic crisis will continue to exacerbate inter-imperia­list rivalries between the Russian and American axes. On a secondary level the contradictions between the interests of each nation and those of the bloc, and be­tween the progressive and backward sectors within each economy, will further heighten. The most important consequence of the crisis will be the greater deterioration of the class equilibrium. But the still existing quiet in the class struggle obliges us for the moment to concentrate on the former two factors.

6. In the sphere of international politics we have recently seen the build-up of ten­sions in Southern Africa. The visits of Castro and Russian President Podgorny to the ‘front-line’ states of Southern Africa, the arms aid which goes hand in hand with these visits, and the undoubtedly Russian-inspired invasion of Zaire, indicate the manoeuvring of the USSR in this region of the world. Its manoeuvring is characterized by an attempt to contest America’s economic and political superiority by military means and by de-stabilizing the existing situation. On the other hand the USA is attempting to hold onto its client states of Rhodesia and South Africa by maintaining a stable situ­ation in these countries, using economic and political pressure to bring about a gradual transition to black majority rule. This must be the meaning of the recent placement of a complete embargo on Rhodesian exports by the US, and the US-inspired United Nations resolution against apartheid in South Africa. But despite the manoeuv­ring of both imperialist blocs in this continent, the situation remains in the balance at the present time.

The importance attached to Southern Africa by both America and Russia, as well as to East Africa and the Middle East, rather than S.E. Asia, shows the intensification of inter-imperialist struggle in areas which will be crucial in a third round of global imperialist carnage.

7. All the talk about strategic arms limi­tation and the danger of the proliferation of nuclear power, which is currently fash­ionable amongst the bourgeoisie, cannot hide the ever-increasing volume and sophis­tication of nuclear armaments held and developed by the super powers. Carter’s cynical defence of ‘human rights’ in the Eastern bloc is nothing but the opening shot in a new phase of cold war and an escape route by means of which an arms agreement with the Russians can be avoided. Brezhnev has already warned the US about interfering in Russian affairs and claimed that Carter is endangering the so-called detente. Considering that the US now requires the left as an ally in Western Europe the cause of ‘human rights’, as opposed to ‘anti-communism’, is the most appropriate in its propaganda war against Russia.

Russia wants to avoid the political pressure which its economic subservience to the West is already producing. But even if the USSR succeeded in repaying its enormous debt to the West, this would only accelerate its own economic crisis, and compel it towards further military hostility with America.

8. The attempt of the US bloc to strengthen itself in Europe is continuing. We have already implied that America will increa­singly have an economic stranglehold over its European satellites. This permits it in large measure to supervise the political teams which are obliged to put the necessary economic policies into effect. However, this development has led to extreme tensions between US interests and those of certain European countries.

In the face of the economic crisis each national capital requires the most energe­tic move towards the statification of soc­iety. This is in order not only to centra­lize and further concentrate the national capital, but also to facilitate the greater exploitation and mystification of the working class. The latter purpose is aided by the fact that the political factions favouring state capitalism the most are usually left-wing teams spewing out ‘socialist’ rhetoric. However, as the recent histories of Spain, Portugal and Italy have shown, some of these left-wing teams are distrusted by the US bloc, and by strong sections of the local bourgeoisie. The CPs which in these countries are the strongest parties of the left, threaten backward sectors of the bourgeoisie linked to the US, and have an affinity (although this has been toned down) to the Eastern bloc in their international orientation. Thus in these countries there is an extreme political crisis mainly because a solution which could satisfy both the interests of the bloc and the national capital has yet to be satisfactorily found. This crisis intensifies as the economic situation deteriorates in these countries and the class struggle promises to develop. The huge student revolt in Italy is a symptom of the decomposition of both the economic and political situation in this country. But despite the political crisis in Western Europe the US is increasingly aware that only the left can hope to guarantee social peace and economic cohesion -- and thus will be the most adequate instrument of its heg­emony over Europe.

9. By contrast, the victory of the left coalition in the French municipal elections, which anticipates its victory in the general election in 1978, seems to point the way to the most adequate solution for both the national bourgeoisie and the entire Ameri­can axis. This is because Mitterand’s Socialist Party, the dominant force in the coalition, appears to be Atlanticist; would probably enact a gradual statification of society; and has the potential ideological apparel to mystify the working class.

10. In the Eastern bloc the attempt of the Russian bourgeoisie to maintain the internal cohesion of its satellites, has met with some problems in the recent year. In these countries, the fact that economic and poli­tical life has already been engulfed by the state means that there is very little room for the bourgeoisie to manoeuvre against today’s conjunctural crisis. The inability of the Polish bourgeoisie, for instance, to persuade the working class to accept brutal price rises in 1976, indicates the extreme rigidity of Eastern bloc regimes, and the deep political crisis which they must suffer as a result. In Czechoslovakia the movement of dissident party bureaucrats and leftists is giving the faction of the bourgeoisie in power severe headaches. ‘Democracy’, which they advocate, would if granted undoubtedly lead to the break-up of the remaining stability of the state apparatus and of the Eastern bloc as a whole. The fact that the Charter 77 movement coincides with Western propaganda about civil liberties, adds to the danger of this dissident bour­geois movement for the interests of the Eastern bloc. The obvious inability of the Czech ruling class to make effective use of this dissident stratum (which sees itself as a weapon to contain proletarian anger) to mystify the class, highlights the poli­tical bankruptcy of the Eastern bloc.

11. The charade of bourgeois democracy in the recent Pakistani and Indian elections points to the extreme weakness of the bour­geoisie in the ‘Third World’ as it is severely shaken by the crisis. While Bhutto’s Pakistani People’s Party and Gandhi’s Congress Party are really the most suitable forces for governmental rule, the strength of the less politically viable sectors of the bourgeoisie, which consti­tuted the opposition in these two countries, was such that in the case of Pakistan, it could not be kept out of office or neutra­lized without the electoral process being rigged and manipulated, and the ruling faction resorting to armed force to preserve its power. In India the fact the opposition did achieve office must mean that a period of political dislocation is on the agenda for this country, and a swing back in the long term to the reinforcement of the state, particularly the army, will become essential as a result.

12. The events in China over the last year also bring out the brittleness of ‘Third World’ countries and of ‘socialist’ coun­tries. The elimination of the more backward sector of the Chinese bourgeoisie, the radicals, who supported national indepen­dence in economic, social, and military life, was not achieved without violent up­heavals within the party apparatus (witness the wave of executions now going on), nor without the use of the army to put down rebellion throughout the country. The in­ability of the Chinese bourgeoisie to settle its differences in a stable manner, which will continue despite the victory of the ‘progressive’, pro-Western moderates, points to the certainty of extreme convulsions in the political apparatus as the crisis deepens and the working class takes the path of open struggle again.

The deeper integration of China and India into the Western bloc, as a result of re­cent developments, aggravates the reversals the USSR is suffering on the world arena.

The British situation

1. Britain does not face fundamentally dif­ferent problems to those faced by other weak European capitals, although its poli­tical crisis is less acute than some, and its economic problems are of a somewhat unique origin. Once the dominant capitalist power in the world, but eliminated as such by the Ist and Ilnd World Wars, Britain has lost its colonies, its military (parti­cularly naval) strength, and its position as usurer of world production. Its GNP only accounts today for about 5-6% of the total output of the OECD countries. The hopelessly low productivity of its capital, a result of the completion of its industri­alization at the beginning of the century, is expressed by the fact that today the average age of British plant (34 years) is three times that of the Japanese! These factors help to explain the precipitous decline of Britain’s competitive position on the world market.

2. Since 1972 British capital has not had a positive trade balance. By the autumn of 1976, following a severe ‘run on the pound’, sterling had lost 44% of its pre-1967 value. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis Healey, had to appeal to the US bloc, through the International Monetary Fund, for a $3.9 billion loan to preserve Britain’s economic life.

Inevitably conditions came with this loan; conditions which seem to express an econo­mic and political strategy in the interests of the Western bloc as a whole. This stra­tegy, in turn, is a reflection of the pro­cess of internal strengthening of the im­perialist bloc. On the economic level a deflationary policy was ‘advised’, invol­ving:

-- a savage reduction in government spending which had resulted in a £11 billion annual deficit in this department.

-- a credit squeeze to attempt to cut the money supply and contribute with the reduction in government spending to arresting Britain’s ‘above average’ inflation rate.

-- a rejection of import controls and protectionism in general. The stra­tegy embracing these elements was clearly designed to enforce an accep­tance of the continuing deterioration of Britain’s competitive position on the world market, and preserve an important link in Europe’s capitalist chain.

3. On the political level the centre/left government of Callaghan and Healey was given implicit support because it would, as well as implementing the economic policies already mentioned:

-- maintain its commitment to the Western bloc through participation in NATO with its important nuclear capability, and its army in West Germany.

-- maintain its commitment to the EEC.

-- continue a policy of the gradual fusion of the weakest elements of private capital with the state, without upset­ting the mixed economy, the parlia­mentary process, or American interests in British capital.

-- maintain social order, through its alliance with the unions and the mysti­fication of the Social Contract, while continuing to slash workers’ consump­tion and living standards.

However, such an economic and political orientation does not necessarily coincide with the strictly national interests of the British bourgeoisie which, in the long term, must proceed to a thoroughly stati­fied economy behind which the working class can be mobilized by a left-wing governmental team.

4. The contradictions between the interests of the imperialist bloc and the nation arise from the immense problems confronting the Callaghan governmental team today. Defla­tionary policies imposed by the IMF are not significantly improving Britain’s economic situation, which is likely to worsen in 1977 as the full effects of the devaluation of the pound are felt. The measures to centralize the economy and political life of the country in the hands of the state are not proceeding very rapidly. Finally, the class equilibrium and the Social Contract on which it is based are beginning to crack.

The moves the present Labour Government has made to nationalize certain sectors of industry and eliminate parasitical elements of the economic and political apparatus, relatively mild though they have been, have met with many obstacles. The Shipbuilding Nationalization Bill was held up by opposi­tion in the House of Lords and has only been passed now that the Tories have ensured that the profitable ship-repairing industry re­mains in private hands. The Bullock Report (an ingenious plan to statify industry with the help of the unions) has been effectively shelved after furious opposi­tion to it from traditional sectors of the bourgeoisie and the right-wing political parties. Measures to curtail the conserva­tive activities of the House of Lords, and nationalize the banks, are nowhere near being implemented. The frustration of these measures is the result not only of the mod­erate nature of the Labour Government but also of the electoral strength of the more backward sectors of the bourgeoisie. Now the Labour majority in parliament has gone, and the government has been obliged to enter into a quasi-coalition with the right-wing Liberal Party. This will no doubt further retard a strategy of stratification.

The Labour Government and its representa­tives entrenched in the working class in the shape of the trade unions, are finding it increasingly difficult to uphold the Social Contract. The seamen already showed their hostility to it in August of last year. The miners and railwaymen are also promising to reject it in the future. The carworkers, particularly at British Leyland, the giant, state-subsidized vehicle corpora­tion, have frequently struck against the effects of the contract. While the osten­sible reason for the recent four-week stoppage by the toolmakers at British Leyland was for the maintenance of differ­entials and separate negotiating rights, its underlying cause was the impoverishment the wage freeze is forcing on the whole class. Although the stoppage was contained by the shop stewards, who prevented the strike from generalizing and escaping its sectional preoccupations, the refusal of the workers to go back for the good of the national interest (British Leyland symbolizes the weakness of British capital), despite the open alliance of employers, unions, and the state, shows the capacity for struggle which the class promises for the future.

5. All the major unions have been obliged, sensing the angry mood of the class, to proclaim opposition to, or doubt about, the success of a third phase of the Social Contract and pay restraint. The TUC as a whole refused to commit itself to the third phase until it could see the content of the Chancellor’s budget. But considering that the Social Contract is a vital pillar of Britain’s economic survival it is essen­tial that it continues. But the bourgeoisie is already aware that concessions to certain groups of workers, and a flexible applica­tion of the Social Contract in future is also essential if there is to be any class peace at all.

6. The three basic issues confronting the British bourgeoisie today (the need to accelerate the domination of the state over society, the need to eliminate or neutralize conservative portion of the economic and political fabric of the country, and the need to mystify the working class) can only be dealt with in the long term by a move to the left of the present government. Only the left of the Labour Party has the resolu­tion to take the necessary measures of sta­tification (remember the Lefts in the present Cabinet, Tony Benn and Michael Foot, were fervent advocates of the Bullock Report). Only the Labour Left has no qualms about dealing with stubbornly backward sectors of the bourgeoisie. Finally and most importan­tly it is the left which is the best placed to derail the class struggle which is brew­ing today. The Labour Left’s policies have the greatest echo in the trade unions, and are the best able to present the interests of the nation as identical with the interests of ‘socialism’ and the working class.

7. However, the Labour Left by no means has the confidence of the American bloc, because:

-- it has a plank for the reduction of defence expenditure and commitment to NATO.

-- it defends a policy of autarky (import controls, etc) and withdrawal from the EEC.

-- its far-reaching plans for ‘public’ ownership would threaten specific US interests and undermine politically those factions of the British bourgeoi­sie most favourable to the US.

-- its close ties with the CP and some Trotskyist groups could influence it in a pro-Russian orientation in the international arena.

But despite these large obstacles the Labour Left is still the only bourgeois faction which has the long-term perspective for sus­taining capitalist order in Britain. For this reason, whatever the difficulties which exist today, a compromise between the US bloc and the Labour Left could legiti­mize the latter for power as a long range perspective.

8. The adoption of the recent quasi-coalition with the Liberals, the first move­ment in this direction since the war, is a sign of the political crisis which will more and more affect even the British bour­geoisie. In the short term the ‘deal’ with the Liberals means a swing to the right and an increase in the difficulty of slowly pre­paring a government team of the Labour Left. It is therefore likely that the latter will come to power in the future as a response to the resurgence of the class struggle and the impotence of the present team in the face of it. However, at the present time, and for the immediate future, the Callaghan regime is the most apt governmental faction for the bourgeoisie. The Lib-Lab pact is a sign that despite the electoral unpopular­ity of the government, the bourgeoisie understands the necessity of keeping it in power.

9. The situation in Northern Ireland is undoubtedly a barrier to efforts of the British bourgeoisie to face up to the crisis. Not only the rival terrorist groups, but also the parliamentary parties, resist the centralized power of the British state.

The futile terrorist campaigns severely curtail production in the North, and the continued presence of the British Army is a drain on Britain’s limited military re­sources which have to be stretched to ful­fill its NATO obligations.

The exposure of the ‘dirty tricks’ carried out by the army in Northern Ireland and President Carter’s promise to halt money going from the US to the IRA seems to show that the bourgeoisie is thinking about a move to withdraw or scale down the presence of British troops in Northern Ireland.

Class struggle

1. The attacks on the wages and living standards of the class are the most impor­tant ‘solutions’ of the bourgeoisie to the crisis, because firstly, it’s an essential means for reducing the price of commodities to be sold on the market and secondly, it helps to prepare the class for sacrifices to the nation, and in the end, for mobili­zation for war.

The first wave of world class struggle since 1968 was an elemental response by the proletariat to encroachments of the crisis on its living standards. It caught the left parties of capital and the unions by sur­prise, and temporarily went beyond them. Since then a definite recuperation of the ground lost has been achieved by the bourgeoisie, in most cases using those implacable enemies of the class. Left teams in power have to a certain degree persuaded the class to accept austerity for the good of the country, and the trade unions have faithfully managed to keep the class struggle within acceptable limits. This has led to a certain reflux during which the class has been obliged to deepen its awareness of the situation con­fronting it. The lull is therefore partly a response to the implicit perception that economistic struggles are less and less fruitful, and only by generalizing and deepening the struggle can it develop positively. At the same time such a course involves today a conscious confrontation with the left. The sense of the immensity of such a step and its implications -- the beginning of a veritable class war -- has kept the class in a passive, but not defea­ted condition.

The bourgeoisie for the future, despite its adoption of the left, has exhausted many of the options open to it when confronting the proletariat. Because of the deepening of the crisis it is able to manoeuvre much less, and, once the left card has been played, it will have used its most important source of mystification.

2. The steady exacerbation of the world crisis ensures that huge class confrontations are on the agenda in the future. The class struggle in Poland and Spain in 1976, the upsurge in Egypt and the strikes in Israel this year and the activity of the class in Western Europe, are signs of a re-emergence of the proletariat after the relative lull since 1972. The responses of the bourgeoisie to the crisis; its inter-imper­ialist conflicts; the attempts to statify each national capital; and all its political games, will be interrupted by the renewed class struggle. The tendency towards capi­talist barbarism which seems to be most evident at the moment will be eclipsed as the solution of socialism becomes a more concrete possibility.

Revolutionaries must prepare today for the second phase of class struggle since the end of the counter-revolutionary epoch.

1 See the texts in the International Review, no. 5.

Life of the ICC: 

  • Congress Reports [41]

The political confusions of the Communist Workers Organization (UK)

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In ‘The CWO and the Lessons of Regroupment’ published in the International Review, no.9, we saw how the sectarian position adopted by the CWO was leading them towards organi­zational disintegration and a growing isola­tion from the revolutionary movement. We now want to examine how this isolation is reinforcing a number of important theore­tical confusions, which are further signs of the political impasse which the CWO has strayed into. We cannot deal with all the differences we have with the CWO here. In particular, we will have to leave the question of the economic foundations of capitalist decadence to a later date, although we fully recognize the importance of discussing this question within the workers’ movement. Neither will we go into the general question of the organization of revolutionaries, because we have already published a lengthy critique of the organi­zational conceptions of the CWO (in WR, no.6 and RI, nos.27 and 28, entitled ‘The CWO and the Organization Question’). We will concentrate mainly on the questions raised by the CWO’s critique of the ICC (‘The Convulsions of the ICC’, Revolutionary Perspectives, no.4), although we will not restrict ourselves entirely to this text. ‘Convulsions’, which is supposed to be an account of the relationship between the ICC and the CWO in the past and an expose of the ‘counter-revolutionary’ nature of the ICC, is a good starting point for a critique of the CWO’s errors, because it is a significant expression of the growing irresponsibility and incoherence of this group.

Whose convulsions?

We will not attempt to dissect this text in all its details. In effect we have already answered the part of the text which con­stitutes the CWO’s version of the relation­ship between the CWO and the ICC in the article mentioned above which was published in the IR, no.9. This article drew up a balance sheet of the w ole experience and its lessons for the regroupment of revolu­tionaries. And the recent split in the CWO has succinctly shown that it is the CWO and not the ICC whose organizational prac­tices are leading to all kinds of convul­sions. At the same time, it would be futile to try to refute each one of the attacks made on the ICC in this article, many of which are so patently absurd that they can be dispelled by a cursory glance at any ICC publication. For example, the ICC is accused (RP, no.4, p.41-2) of seeing the causes of the defeat of the Russian Revolution not in the reflux of the world revolutionary wave, but in the ideological errors of the Russian workers. And yet every single text the ICC has produced on the Russian question has insisted over and over again that the whole Russian experience can only be understood if it is placed in an international context. See for example, ‘The Degeneration of the Russian Revolution’ in IR, no.3, the platform of the ICC, etc, etc. Wild and unfounded accusations of this sort, made without citing references can only stand in the way of serious discussion between revolutionaries. This kind of irresponsible behaviour also reinforces our contention that the attacks the CWO makes on the positions of the ICC serve mainly to shed light on the CWO’s own aberrations. We will deal with three main areas in this debate:

1. the crisis, intervention, and regroupment.

2. the understanding of the class nature of political organizations.

3. the Russian Revolution and the period of transition.

The crisis, intervention, and regroupment

Many of the accusations leveled at the ICC on these questions have already been dealt with in the article ‘The CWO and the Organi­zation Question’. Therefore we will not go into great detail here. In brief, the CWO asserts the following: the ICC has no vision of the present crisis of capitalism as a process gradually unfolding towards a catastrophic slump and a revolutionary situation. This is because we are adher­ents of Luxemburg’s erroneous theory of the crisis, which unlike the CWO’s theory, is not based “on the operation of the law of value” (a naive assertion since Luxemburg’s accumulation and crisis theory stands firmly on Marx’s understanding of the wage labour system as an expression of the generalized operation of the law of value). Further­more, our mistakes about economics are closely linked to our ‘voluntaristic’ con­ception of organization: “For the ICC, because markets are saturated the crisis is here and will not get more profound, merely more extensive. Thus, for them, the objec­tive conditions for revolution are already with us. What is lacking is the necessary instrument. The ICC, however, believes that it is the necessary instrument and its propaganda will provide the proletariat with the subjective will” (RP, no.4, p.38).

In reply to this gross distortion of our perspective, let us say first of all that to hold Luxemburg’s analysis of the crisis does not mean that the unfolding of this crisis cannot be seen as a process. When we affirm that the world market is satur­ated, we don’t mean that all the markets in the world are absolutely saturated: this would be nonsense, because then no accumu­lation at all could take place. What we do say is that the market is saturated relative to the accumulation requirements of global capital. In a historic sense this inability of the world market to expand in a progressive manner, keeping pace with productive capacity, implies that the objective conditions for the pro­letarian revolution have been with us since 1914. However, this certainly does not mean that revolution is on the cards at any conjuncture. The defeat of the revolu­tionary wave of 1917-23 meant that this perspective had been put off for decades and that mankind was condemned to live through decades of barbarism. Today the re-emergence of the economic crisis and the reawakening of the class struggle all over the world are once again opening up the perspective of revolution. But this does not mean that the crisis has reached its deepest point or that we are on the verge of a revolutionary situation. (See, for example, the arguments against activism and voluntarism contained in the article entitled ‘The First Congress of the ICC’ in IR, no.5.)

The ICC has pointed out over and over again that the present crisis of the system is going to be a long, drawn-out, uneven, gradual process. This is because capitalism has discovered ways of palliating the effects of a saturated market: statification, fiscal measures, the war economy, local wars, etc. And thus of staving off a sudden 1929-type collapse. Precisely because the crisis is unfolding in this way the proletariat will be given the opportunity to temper its strength over a whole series of struggles, through which it will develop the subjective awareness necessary for a political assault on the whole system. This will be a hard and painful process, in which the class will gain an understanding of its situation in the bitter school of the struggle itself. Unless the class develops its subjective understanding in this way, the intervention of revolutionaries will remain relatively ineffectual. Nothing could be further from our position than the idea that all that is necessary today is for the ICC to leap in and ‘demystify’ the class and lead it to revolution. This would be an absurd pretense from an organization which groups a mere handful of revolutionaries inter­nationally. In any case, it simply is not our role to ‘save’ the class; nor will it be the role of the party tomorrow. In fact, it is because the CWO has a conception bordering on voluntarism and substitutionism that it projects this conception everywhere else on others. For them, in an objectively revolutionary situation, “the communists will hope by their example and propaganda, to steer this activity in the direction of communism” (RP, no.4, p.38). The point is that communists do not ‘steer’ the working class towards communism. Neither today nor tomorrow does the communist organiza­tion have the task of organizing, demysti­fying, nor steering the class. The commu­nist organization is an active factor in the self-organization and self-demystifica­tion of the working class. This has been asserted 1001 times in all our writings on the question of organization (see, for example, the section on organization in the ICC platform).

Following from this it is clear that con­trary to the CWO’s claim (RP, no.4, p.38), the ICC is not engaged in an opportunistic adventure of trying to set itself up as a party before the objective conditions for the actual constitution of a party have been reached. The party of tomorrow will emerge during the course of the proletar­iat’s long and difficult ascent towards a revolutionary consciousness. But what the CWO has persistently failed to under­stand is that the party is not an automatic or mechanical product of the class struggle; its foundations have to be elaborated con­sciously and methodically by the revolu­tionary fractions which precede it. And as soon as the possibility for this work is opened up by the resurgence of class struggle, revolutionaries are faced with the responsibility of beginning the process which will lead to the formation of the party, even though this is an extremely long and arduous task. In concrete terms, this means working for the regroupment of revolutionaries on a world scale today. The CWO, however, does not think that the time for such regroupment is now (RP, no4, p.38). And, in fact, not only does the CWO choose to passively wait for an inter­national revolutionary organization to come out of nowhere, its present sectarian role is forcing it to militate against any attempt at principled regroupment today. Which only goes to emphasize that revolu­tionaries today have the choice of being an active factor in the process which will lead to the constitution of the party -- or of being a barrier against it, an obstacle in the way of the revolutionary movement. There is no third way.

The class nature of political organizations

“History is therefore freed from its mass nature, and Criticism, which has a free attitude to its object, calls to history: ‘You ought to have happened in such and such a way!’” (Marx-Engels, The Holy Family)

According to the CWO, the ICC’s errors on the crisis and intervention are “dividing lines”, but not class lines. Where we really stand revealed as a faction of capi­tal is on the positions we are alleged to hold on the Russian Revolution, and on the period of transition; the lessons of which derive mainly from the Russian experience.

“In concrete terms they (the ICC) are capitalist because: a) they regard state capitalist Russia after 1921 and the Bolsheviks as defensible; b) they main­tain that a state capitalist gang, such as was the Trotskyist Left Opposition, was a proletarian group; c) they advocate that the workers in the revolution medi­ate with the capitalist classes of the peasantry and the international bour­geoisie” (RP, no.4, p.42-3).

This remarkable passage clearly shows that the CWO does not know how to assess the class nature of a political organization. The statement that the ICC ‘defends’ Russia after 1921 is a bewildering jumble of con­fusions. Firstly it obscures the whole problem of assessing the degeneration of the revolution by confounding the state with the party, as though these two were iden­tical all along. (This confusion reappears in their text on the Russian Revolution, as we shall see.) More important, the statement is caught up in the idea (so dear to the Trotskyists) that revolutionaries have to project themselves back into the past and take up positions on questions which had not yet been clarified by the revolutionary movement (the question of the defence or non-defence of Russia was not settled until well after the revolution was dead). For marxists, the commu­nist programme is the living product of the past struggles of the working class, a synthesis of all the lessons the class has learned through decades of defeats, errors, and victories. It is something which emerges out of the historical process, and revolutionaries are at all times a part of that process. It is impossible for revolutionaries to stand outside that process and look at past events in terms of ‘what they would have done’ if they had been around. Such a question has no meaning, because revolutionaries today could not know what they know without the class having gone through the experience of struggle and becoming conscious of the lessons of those experiences by participa­ting in them. Revolutionaries can only possess the clarity they have today because of the errors and defeats of the past. It is no good trying to undo yesterday’s defeats by wishing ourselves back into the past. The very question of ‘what would you have done’ is based on an idealist vision of the development of revolutionary con­sciousness, because it sees communist clarity as existing in a timeless vortex outside of the real, historical movement of the class. Certainly revolutionaries can look back to the past and identify those fractions or tendencies which best expressed the needs of the proletariat at the time, and criticize the errors and confusions of other tendencies. But they do this to clarify the lessons for the present, not to engage in a childish game of shadow­boxing against the betrayers of the past.

Again, the CWO’s statement assumes that when revolutionaries understand that a previous proletarian organization could commit profound errors or even crimes, they are somehow ‘defending’ those crimes. In other words, if the ICC asserts that the Bolshevik Party, though degenerating in 1921, was not yet a bourgeois organization, then we must ‘defend’ all the counter­revolutionary actions and policies of the Bolsheviks of that period: Kronstadt, Rapallo, the United Front, etc, etc. Here again, our unequivocal condemnation of these policies can be found in any rele­vant ICC text.

The CWO’s problem is that it does not under­stand the criteria for judging the actual passage of a proletarian organization into the camp of the bourgeoisie. This applies both to their assessment of the Bolshevik Party and of the ICC. The ‘judging’ of the death of a proletarian organization is not up to revolutionaries alone. It is some­thing that can only be settled in the light of major historical events -- world wars and revolutions -- which leave absolutely no doubt about which side of the class line an organization is on. It cannot be a question of totting up political positions in a random way, because history has shown that a revolutionary organization can make a vital contribution to the workers’ movement even when it holds profoundly erroneous positions on crucial questions. This was the case with the Bolsheviks in 1917 (national liberation, for example) and with the Italian Left (Bilan) in the 1930s, which maintained an erroneous position on the question of the party and the unions, and even on the exact analysis of the Russian state. But when a former proletar­ian organization openly abandons an inter­nationalist position, it can be definitively declared dead to the working class. That is why revolutionaries said that Social Demo­cracy in 1914, or Trotskyism in 1939, had passed once and for all into the camp of capital since they both helped mobilize the class into a world imperialist carnage. That is also why the adoption of the theory of ‘socialism in one country’ meant the definitive abandonment of the international revolution by the Communist Parties and showed that they had become defenders of national capital and nothing else.

According to the CWO, the Bolsheviks’ crushing of the Kronstadt insurrection “placed the Bolsheviks beyond the pale and made of the party a counter-revolutionary organization” (RP, no.4, p.22). At first sight it would seem that the physical supp­ression of a workers’ uprising would be enough to show that a party was no longer part of the proletariat. But we have to bear in mind that the Kronstadt revolt was a completely unprecedented event: the workers’ uprising against the ‘workers’ state’ and the Communist Party which con­trolled it. By suppressing the revolt, the Bolsheviks certainly hastened their own demise as a revolutionary party, but they were not abandoning an already established proletarian principle like opposition to imperialist war. On the contrary, their response to the uprising was the logical culmination of the ideas defended by the whole workers’ movement at the time: the identification between the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the party’s assumption of state power. The Kronstadt revolt led to such disarray in the revolutionary movement (the Communist Left included) precisely because the move­ment lacked the criteria for understanding such a situation. In contrast to this, the theory of socialism in one country was an explicit rejection of everything that the Bolsheviks had stood for in 1917, and was denounced as such by the revolutionary fractions of the period. However criminal was the Bolsheviks’ response to the Kron­stadt revolt, we do not think that it was the anal proof of their passage into the bourgeois camp.1 The Kronstadt events were a brutal sign of the depth and serious­ness of the process of regression and de­generation of the October Revolution and the Bolshevik Party. But the revolution and the party, both inside and outside Russia, still contained living forces of the proletariat capable of class reactions; these class reactions were shown in the last, unequal but decisive combat: inter­national revolution or national interest (“socialism in one country”). If Kronstadt is taken as the definitive death knell, it becomes impossible to understand the meaning of the violent struggles which shook the Bolshevik Party, the Communist International and the entire international revolutionary movement to its foundations from 1921-1927. In the end, the CWO’s verbal radicalism about 1921 only serves as a pretext for ignoring later events and as a way of saving themselves the trouble of analyzing and understanding these events.

We also think that the characterization of the Left Opposition as a “state capitalist gang” from the very beginning is a gross oversimplification, but we cannot go into that here. (The question is dealt with in Part II of ‘The Communist Left in Russia, 1918-1930’ in the International Review, no. 9.) Rather we want to deal with the assertion that because the ICC says that the Bolsheviks were still within the pro­letarian camp after 1921, or that the Left Opposition of 1923 was a proletarian current, this makes the ICC a bourgeois group.

As we have said, revolutionaries do not denounce an organization as bourgeois until it has shown beyond the shadow of a doubt, by directly abandoning the international terrain of the working class, that it is an expression of the national capital. A group may have any number of confusions, but if it calls for revolutionary defeatism against imperialist wars, if it defends the pro­letariat’s autonomous struggle against the national capital, it must be considered part of the working class movement. There can be no doubt that the ICC does defend this internationalist perspective. Thus, even if the question of ‘1921’ were a class line it would not constitute a sufficient reason for calling the ICC counter-revolu­tionary. Similarly even if the ICC had dangerous confusions on the problems of the period of transition, it is only during a revolutionary upheaval, when all the class frontiers on this issue are clearly drawn, that it is possible to say that a group’s confusions on this question had finally led it into the enemy camp. To make such a judgment in advance is to abandon the possibility of convincing a proletarian organization of the error of its ways and as long as an organization remains a prol­etarian one it is capable of correcting its mistakes, or at least of producing fractions who will adopt a revolutionary position.

But in any case, the question of ‘1921’ cannot by definition be a class line (we also think that it is the CWO, not the ICC, which has major confusions on the transi­tion period as we shall show later on). Revolutionaries elaborate communist posi­tions, class frontiers, on the basis of the past experience of the class not in order to make retrospective judgments about the past, but in order to draw up basic guidelines for the present and future struggles of the class. Thus the question of the defence or non-defence of Russia has, through a series of crucial events, become a class line which has been written in blood. This is because it is directly linked to the key question of internation­alism. World War II showed once and for all that a position of defence for the USSR could only lead to the defence of imperia­list war. In the early 1920s this question had still to be clarified in the workers’ movement, but later on the non-defence of the USSR became the cornerstone of any revolutionary perspective.

But while there can be no room for ambigu­ity on this basic question, it is impossible to see how the problem of the exact date of the passage of the Russian state and/or the Communist Parties into the counter­revolution can be a class line today. The CWO makes no attempt to explain their asser­tion that a group which considers the ‘end’ of the CPs to be (say) 1926 or 1926, or considers the 1923 Left Opposition to have had a proletarian character, is therefore defending capitalism today. Does it mean that such a group is calling for united fronts with the CPs and the Trotskyists or for the defence of Russia today?

Of course it doesn’t. The denunciations of the bourgeois character of the CPs, of Trotskyism, and of Russia today are real class lines which derive from an under­standing of the degeneration of the Russian Revolution. They are class lines because they have a direct influence on the posi­tions revolutionaries will take up now and in the future in the crucial moments of the class struggle. But whether we con­sider that the CPs died in 1921, 1923, 1926, or 1928 is entirely irrelevant to the de­fence of this class line today. Can one imagine, for example, the workers’ councils of tomorrow spending as much energy debating the final passage of the CPs into the enemy camp as they will spend discussing ways of smashing the Communist Parties reactionary influence within the working class? No, to make a class line out of every point of historical interpretation simply diverts attention from the real problems facing the class struggle and serves to debase the very concept of a class line. Unless you define class lines according to extremely strict criteria, you end up drawing them wherever you feel like it, or wherever the require­ments of your little sect demand it. After all why restrict the class line to the date of Bolshevism’s final demise? Why not pin a class line on the definitive passage of anarcho-syndicalism into the bourgeois camp, or demand organizational separation on the question of when Blanquism ceased to be part of the workers’ movement, or whether or not Pannekoek was right to leave the Dutch Social Democratic Party in 1907? Why not indeed pins a class line on any issue you want to, especially if it serves to make you the ‘one and only’ defender of the complete communist programme...?

Since the CWO has no clear criteria for assessing the class nature of an organiza­tion, its assertions about the ICC are entirely without consistency. In ‘Convul­sions’ it remains unclear as to whether the groups of the International Current were ever part of the proletariat, and yet we find the assertion that “the future members of the CWO received many positive ideas from Revolution Internationale” (RP, no.4, p.36). Positive ideas? From a counter­revolutionary organization? And if the Current was once proletarian, but subse­quently passed into the bourgeois camp, when and why did this happen? And if the ICC’s position on the state in the period of transition (viz that the state and the dictatorship of the proletariat are not identical), and on ‘1921’ makes it counter­revolutionary today, why does the CWO accept (see RP, no.5) the precursors of the ICC -- Bilan and Internationalisme -- as communist organizations when both de­fended a position on the state in the transition period which is actually the source of the ICC’s present (majority) position? (And as for the demise of the Communist International, it was a tradition of the Italian Left to situate it in 1933!) What fundamental events in the class struggle since the 1940s have finally clarified the question of the state in the period of transition, so that anyone who holds the position of Bilan and Internationalisme today is a counter-revolution­ary? Perhaps the CWO considers that this fundamental event is none other than the appearance of the CWO, which has settled all the problems once and for all……? But in reality questions as crucial as this can only be definitively settled by the revolutionary struggle of the entire world class.

The period of transition

The CWO’s errors on the period of transition are closely linked to their misunderstand­ing of the Russian Revolution, and the extent of their confusions on both questions has been painfully exposed in their recent magnum opus on the Russian Revolution – ‘Revolution and Counter-revolution in Russia, 1917-23’ (RP, no.4). The heart of their confusion can be summed up in their reaction to the ICC’s assertion that:

“the law of value is a product of the entire capitalist world and cannot in any way, shape, or form be eliminated in one country (even one of the highly developed countries), or in any group of countries” (‘The Degeneration of the Russian Revolution’ in the IR, no.3). This is too much for the CWO. For them this can only mean that the ICC defends state capitalism or self-management during the revolution (RP, no.4, p.40). The CWO, how­ever, fails to confront the question at issue. Can the law of value be abolished in one country or not? Can a communist mode of production be built in one country or not? They give no firm answer here. But elsewhere they do indeed appear to believe that wage labour, the law of value, in short capitalism can actually be abolished within national confines. The article of Revolutionary Perspectives published in Workers’ Voice, no. 15 talks about the construction of ‘communist economies’ in individual proletarian bastions, and in general the CWO appear to believe that if a proletarian bastion cuts itself off from the world market and eliminates the forms of wages and money, then it has established a communist mode of production.

Let us be quite clear about this. Money, wages, etc, are simply expressions of the operation of the law of value; and the law of value in turn is an expression of an insufficient development, a fragmentation of the productive forces; in sum an expres­sion of the domination of scarcity over human productive activity. The elimination of certain aspects through which the law of value operates does not mean the elimination of the law of value itself. This can only come about in a society of abundance. And such a society can only be built on a world scale. Even if the workers inside a revolutionary bastion eliminated money and exchange within that bastion, and directly distributed all that they produced to the population, we would still have to call the mode of production inside that bastion a mode of production still regulated by the law of value, because everything the workers did or were capable of doing would be largely determined by their relationship to the capitalist world outside. The workers would remain under the domination, the exploitation of global capital; they would simply be socializing the misery allowed them by the capitalist blockade, because a communist mode of production can never be established by ‘enclave’ but only on a world scale. To call such misery, with its starvation, bread queues, inevitable black markets, etc, etc, a ‘communist’ economy would be to lie to the working class and divert it from its struggle. In such a situation it is not a question of ‘defending’ state capitalism and/or self-management: it is a question of calling capitalism capitalism, and thus of clarifying the content of the proletariat’s struggle against capitalism, both inside and outside the bastion. In other words, the watchword of revolutionaries will be: continue to fight against the capitalists, expropriate the bourgeoisie, attack the wages system; but never entertain the illusion that this attack can be completed inside one isolated bastion. Only the international extension of the revolution can answer the problems posed in one bastion, and therefore every­thing must be subordinated to this task.

The extension of the revolution is funda­mentally a political task. The CWO casti­gate the ICC for stressing that the politi­cal tasks of the revolution precede and precondition the economic programme of the proletariat. For them these two phases are simultaneous. “At no stage in the re­alization of communism can the political tasks be separated from the economic: both must be carried out simultaneously...” (Platform of the CWO). Unfortunately, this position reveals a fundamental misunder­standing of the very nature of the prole­tarian revolution. As an exploited, prop­ertyless class, the working class cannot have any economic basis upon which to safe­guard its revolution. The only guarantees the revolution of the proletariat can have are essentially political ones: the capacity of the class to organize itself and to consciously struggle for its goals. The proletariat cannot win a position of stren­gth ‘within’ capitalism by gradually taking over industry and then grabbing political power: first it must smash the political apparatus of the bourgeoisie, establish its political domination over society, and then struggle for the realization of its social programme: the construction of a classless society. The CWO appear to agree that the proletariat must first seize political power before being able to transform the relations of production, because they denounce ‘self-management’ as a capitalist mystification. This is all well and good; but the CWO’s defence of this principle seems to stop at national frontiers. For them, once the proletariat has seized power in one country, the political and economic tasks suddenly become simultaneous, and communist social relations can be built within the framework of a still capitalist world market! But the capitalist economy is a world economy, and the proletariat is a world class. That means that the mini­mum precondition for the creation of commu­nist social relations is the conquest of power by the proletariat on a world scale. Contrary to the CWO’s assertion (RP, no.4, p.34), isolated proletarian bastions cannot be “made safe for communism” by a series of economic measures. The only way the revolution can be “made safe” is through the political self-activity of a class which is consciously striving to impose its power throughout the world. There is absolutely nothing else for the class to fall back on; which is why the Russian Revolution could not leave the class any so-called ‘material gains’ despite the falsifications of the Trotskyists to the contrary.

However, a lingering wish to find some kind of economic guarantee has indeed led the CWO into presenting a picture of the Russian Revolution which does not escape many of the assumptions of Trotskyism, which in turn are the assumptions of the Bolshevik Party in decay. They thus present a completely distorted picture of Russia in the years 1917-1921. The fact that under the pressure of economic isolation and collapse the Soviet state was pushed into the suspension of wage and monetary forms (the War Communism period) is seen as a “step towards the disbanding of capitalism and the beginnings of communist construc­tion” (RP, no.4, p.13). Here we see the confusions of the CWO spelled out in a nutshell. For them War Communism was indeed ‘communism’ in some form; this is underlined by the fact that they insist that capitalism was restored in Russia in 1921 (RP, no.4, p.25).

Someone who never vacillated in his support for the Bolsheviks, Victor Serge, had this to say about War Communism:

“‘War Communism’ could be defined as follows: firstly, requisitioning in the countryside; secondly, strict rationing for the town population, who were classified into categories; thirdly, complete ‘socialization’ of production and labour; fourthly, an extremely complicated and chit-ridden system of distribution for the remaining stocks of manufactured goods; fifthly, a mon­opoly of power leading towards the single Party and the suppression of dissent; sixthly, a state of siege and the Chekha” (Memoirs of a Revolutionary, Chapter 4).

We have said it many times before and we will say it again now: capitalism was never abolished in Russia, and War Communism did not represent the abolition of capitalist social relations. Even if the economic measures imposed during that period had been the direct result of mass working class self-activity, this would not have eliminated the capitalist nature of the Russian econ­omy after 1917. But the fact is that nearly all the economic measures of War Communism were not imposed by the self-activity of the class -- which would at least have made them measures tending to­wards the strengthening of the political power of the workers -- but by a body that was more and more separating itself from the class: the state. And here we can see that the CWO’s inability to grasp the problem of the state in the period of tran­sition is leading them to an apologia for state capitalist measures.

For the CWO the state in Russia from 1917-­1921 was a “proletarian state”; ergo, the measures of nationalization and statifica­tion undertaken in this period were intrin­sically communist measures:

“Many people see the Nationalization Decrees as being the logical expression of state capitalism, when in actual fact they expressed the rupture of the Bolsheviks, under the impact of events, from state capitalism. The early attempt by the state to control capital was abandoned by what the class was demanding, ie expropriation or nationa­lization. The workers and the Bolsheviks were clear that this was not nationali­zation in any capitalist sense” (RP, no.4, p. 10).

Furthermore, since the state was a prole­tarian state, the incorporation of the factory committees and the workers’ mili­tias into the state apparatus were nothing but positive for the class (pp. 6-8 in RP, no.4). Even the identification of the party with the state is not seen as a danger: “At this time, ie early 1918, it is meaningless to try to make distinctions between party, class and soviets ... when a majority of the class has created state organs in which a party which has won the class’ support has a clear majority, then it is formalistic to demand ‘who is in power’” (RP no.4, p.4).

Since, despite a few criticisms here and there, the CWO present most of what went on in Russia in the 1917-1921 period as a Good Thing, it becomes rather hard to see from this why the Russian workers should have begun to revolt against this state regime in the 1920-21 period. Despite their obsession about the Kronstadt revolt, no­thing in the CWO’s analysis really gets to grips with what the Kronstadt workers were actually rebelling against: which, for the most part, were precisely the so-called ‘communist measures’ of the ‘proletarian’ state! And the implications of the CWO’s analysis for a future revolution are posi­tively disturbing. For if the economy set up in one bastion is indeed a communist one, what right will the workers there have to go on struggling, since exploitation has been ‘abolished’? And if the state is a true expression of the communist aspirations of the working class, how can the class object to subordinating itself to such a state? A hint of the direction in which the CWO appears to be travelling is given by their statement that “Labour discipline in itself, provided it is carried out by the class’ own organs is no ultimate sin” (RP, no.4, p.10). Perhaps. But what exactly are the “class’ own organs”? Sov­narkoms? Vesenkhas? The Red Army? The Cheka? The CWO is silent on these questions. Because they refuse to even consider the problem of the state in the period of tran­sition as it has been raised by the ICC and by previous fractions such as Bilan and Internationalisme, the CWO remain stuck to many of the mistakes of the workers’ move­ment at the time of the Russian Revolution. Hardly any of the lessons about the state afforded by the Russian Revolution are understood by them. For the CWO as for the Bolsheviks: statification by the ‘proletarian’ state equals real socializa­tion; the organs of the class should be merged into the state; and, as it more and more appears from the CWO’s writings, the party presents itself as a candidate for state power.

For us, if there is one fundamental lesson of the Russian Revolution, it is that revo­lutionaries can only identify with and participate in the autonomous struggles of the class, both before and after the seizure of power. The proletarian class struggle will continue during the period of transi­tion: it is in fact the dynamic factor leading to the abolition of class society. Communists must never abandon their posts in the class struggle, even if that struggle leads the class up against the ‘socialized’ economy or the ‘Commune-State’. Never again must the class subordinate its struggle to an outside force such as the state or delegate the direction of that struggle to a minority, no matter how revo­lutionary.

The ICC’s defence of the autonomy of the class even against the transitional state is interpreted by the CWO to mean that we advocate that “the class does not hold state power, but instead lends its support to an all-class state” (RP no.4 .42). In fact the ICC recognizes the inevitability of the class holding state power during the transition period but reaffirms the marxist thesis that this state is at best a necessary evil which the proletariat has to regard with distrust and vigilance. In order to wield state power, the class has to ensure that at all times it holds power over the state, so that it can prevent this state becoming an instrument of other classes against the proletariat. And because, as Engels said, the proletariat “does not use (the state) in the interests of freedom” we refuse to characterize the transitional state as the organ of communist transformation. “From the Paris Commune, revolutionaries drew, among others, a lesson of the utmost importance: the capitalist state can neither be captured nor used: it must be demolished. The Russian Revolution deepened this lesson in a decisive way: the state, however much it is a ‘soviet’ or ‘workers’ state cannot be the organizer of communism... Philosophically the idea of the state as emancipator is pure Hegelian idealism, unacceptable to historical materialism” (G. Munis, Parii-Etat, Stalin­isme, Revolution).

The CWO accuses us of harbouring counter­revolutionary intentions concerning the state’s policies towards the peasants and the world bourgeoisie. They remind us that the peasants are not ‘neutral’, as though the ICC maintained illusions in the commu­nist aspirations of the peasantry. And because we recognize the inevitability of concessions to the peasantry during the transition period, we are suspected of wanting to sell out the interests of the workers to the peasant hordes who haunt our anachronistic dreams of a complete re-run of 1917. What the ICC actually says about the peasants is that the peasant problem cannot be solved in one night, and certainly not within one proletarian bastion; nor, although it might be unavoidable at times, will pure violence solve the peasant prob­lem. The only solution to this problem is the global development of the productive forces towards a classless society. On the way to that goal the proletariat will have to find some way of co-existing with the peasants, of exchanging goods with them; and in political terms this relationship will take place through a state of soviets under the control of the working class.

The only alternative to some kind of ‘com­promise’ with the peasants is the immediate forced collectivization of the peasantry. The CWO decline to say whether this is their policy; but it would certainly be the purest folly for the working class to attempt such a project. In fact in previous texts the CWO do appear to sanction the idea of exchange between the workers’ councils and the peasants: in other words mediations. (See Workers’ Voice, no.15, ‘The Period of Transition’). Have the CWO tripped up on their own class line?

The ICC is also accused of “advocating” that the workers “mediate with the international bourgeoisie” during the revolution. The ICC “advocates” nothing of the sort. Once the proletariat has taken power in one area we advocate the extension of the revolution across the world, the prosecution of the world civil war against the bourgeoisie. Because we are not fortune-tellers we do not ‘know’ that the revolution will break out simultaneously in all countries; and although the most probable reaction of the world bourgeoisie to a single proletarian bastion will be to impose an economic blockade, we do not, like the CWO, pontifi­cate on the absolute impossibility of some negotiations or even barter taking place between the proletarian bastion and sectors of the world bourgeoisie. Even during the height of the revolutionary crisis in Europe (1918-20) the Bolsheviks were forced to have some dealings with the international bourgeoisie, and in a wider sense no war in history has ever seen a complete absence of negotiation between enemies. The world civil war itself is unlikely to be an excep­tion, despite the utter irreconcilability of the contending parties. Rather than making hazardous predictions about the impossibility of such negotiations, we have to be able to distinguish tactical negotia­tions from class betrayals. A proletarian bastion can survive certain limited, ad hoc concessions to the international bourgeoisie, providing the workers understand what they are doing, prepare for the consequences, and above all providing the world revolu­tion is in the ascendant. For example, the Brest-Litovsk treaty did not mean the end of the revolution in Russia, despite Buk­harin’s warnings to the contrary. In a period of deep revolutionary crisis this or that capitalist might be forced to offer terms which are reasonably favourable to the proletarian bastion. A bastion faced with starvation would have to soberly weigh up the consequences of any such deals, but it would be absurd for it to refuse even to consider any deals at all.

In the period of decadence any organ thrown up by the class which attempts to become an instrument of permanent negotiation with capital becomes integrated into capital. This does not mean, however, that a prole­tarian organ, such as a strike committee, immediately becomes bourgeois the moment it is mandated by the workers to enter into tactical negotiation with the bosses; as long as its primary function remains the extension and deepening of the struggle it remains an organ of the proletariat. The same can be said for the organs of a pro­letarian power during the world civil war. As long as they are basically organs for the extension of the revolution they can survive temporary negotiations with the enemy on, say, the withdrawal of armies, food and medical supplies, etc. The inte­gration of these organs into world capital only comes about when they enter into permanent, institutionalized trade and diplomatic relations with the bourgeois states, and objectively abandon any attempt to spread the world revolution. But for this to happen the whole world revolution­ary movement would have had to have entered a deep reflux; such class transformations do not happen overnight.

In light of the Russian Revolution, we can draw certain guidelines concerning the relationship between a proletarian bastion and the outside world, guidelines which will be much more useful than mere asser­tions that ‘such things can’t happen’:

a) if the soviet power undertakes any negotiations with the world bourgeoisie they must be under the vigilant control of the whole working class of that bastion.

b) measures taken to ensure survival in a hostile world must always be subordin­ated to the needs of the class struggle both inside the bastion and even more important, outside the bastion. The international needs of the working class must always take precedence over the requirements of a single soviet power.

c) as part of the principle of the impos­sibility of forming fronts with the bourgeoisie, the soviet power can never form ‘tactical’ alliances with one imperialist power against another.

Conclusions

The theoretical errors of the CWO have impor­tant consequences for their work as a revolutionary group today. All of their theor­etical shibboleths tend to reinforce their isolation and sectarianism. Their view of the crisis and regroupment underscores their pessimism about the possibility of unifying the revolutionary movement at this juncture. Their method of judging other proletarian organizations, their invention of novel class lines, is more and more leading them to the sterile position that they are the only revolutionary group in the world, and this can only serve to prevent them from contributing to the living process of dis­cussion and regroupment that is going on today.

Recently there have been signs that the CWO is at last waking up to some of the dangers of its isolationism. In various letters it has played down the accusation of the ICC being counter-revolutionary, and instead has been insisting that it is the ICC, not they, who broke off the discussion. However inaccurate this interpretation may be, we can only welcome a re-evaluation of their previous stance. We insist that differences within the revolutionary movement can only be clarified through an open, public, and honest debate. The criticisms we have made here of the CWO are quite uncompromising, but we have always recognized that we are addressing ourselves to the confusions of a revolutionary organization which still has the possibility of developing in a positive direction. We therefore urge the CWO to abandon its previous attitude to debate, and to respond to the critique we have made here, understanding that such a resumption of the dialogue does not take place for its own sake, but as a moment in the regroupment of revolutionaries, in the reconstitution of the international organization of the pro­letariat.

C.D. Ward

1 And it certainly does not support the CWO’s contention that 1921 also marked the death of entire Communist International, although perhaps this idea is consistent with the CWO’s assertion that the CI was revolutionary when it “reflected the proletarian character of the state in Russia” (RP, no. 4, p. 17);in other words, contrary to the idea that the CI died when it became an instrument of Russian state policy, the CWO consider that it was an organ of the Russian state from the very beginning!

Life of the ICC: 

  • Correspondance with other groups [20]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary organisation [5]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Workers Organisation [18]

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE CALLED BY THE PCI (Battaglia Comunista)

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IR 10, 3rd Quarter 1977

“With its still modest means, the International Communist Current has committed itself to the long and difficult task of regrouping revolutionaries internationally around a clear and coherent programme. Turning its back on the monolithism of the sects, it calls upon the communists of all countries to become aware of the immense responsibilities which they have, to abandon the false quarrels which separate them, to surmount the deceptive divisions which the old world has imposed on them. The ICC calls on them to join in this effort to constitute (before the class engages in its decisive struggles) the international and unified organization of its vanguard.

The communists as the most conscious fraction of the class, must show it the way forward by taking as their slogan: “Revolutionaries of all countries, unite!””

(Manifesto of the ICC, January 1976 [68])

The life of revolutionary groups, their discussions and disagreements are part of the process whereby consciousness develops in the working class; this is why we are radically opposed to any policy of ‘hidden discussions’ or ‘secret agreements’. We are thus publishing our point of view on the international conference that took place in Milan on 31 April and 1 May on the initiative of the PCI (Battaglia Comunista). Above all, it is necessary to clarify the context in which this initiative took place and explain why we participated in it. We think that in the present climate of political confusion and of the weakness of revolutionary forces, it is very important to emphasize the necessity for the regroupment of revolutionaries.

THE REGROUPMENT OF REVOLUTIONARIES

The historical re-awakening of the class struggle has produced a resurgence of revolutionary currents, which the most profound counter-revolution in the history of the workers’ movement had practically annihilated. The hitherto dispersed, confused and hesitant nature of this resurgence demands first and foremost that communists apply themselves to the inseparable tasks of less clarifying political positions and regrouping their forces. Inseparable because, as the Italian Left between the wars has shown, the regroupment of revolutionaries is possible only on the basis of the greatest programmatic clarity. Having said this, we feel that it is necessary to underline the enormous responsibility to the class of certain groups who, because of secondary disagreements, reject discussion and refuse to unite their efforts with ours, thus showing that they are unable to go beyond the petty bourgeois conceptions of trying to conserve ‘their’ ideas and ‘their’ group, rather than seeing themselves as part of and products of the class as a whole. It should be clear that, in the image of the class as a whole, revolutionaries today must attempt to regroup and centralize their forces on a national and international level; this implies breaking out of isolation and contributing to the development of other groups through a clear debate and through a constant criticism of one’s own activities.

When the ICC was only made up of one or two groups, it always had this aim in mind, understanding that confrontation and discussion could not be left to chance, but must be sought out and organized.

While the ICC emphasizes the fundamental necessity of working towards regroupment, it also warns against any precipitancy in this area. We must resist any regroupment on the basis of sentiment and insist on the need to base regroupment on the indispensable coherence of programmatic positions.

The counter-revolution from which we are beginning to emerge has weighed heavily on the organizations of the class. The fractions which left the IIIrd International had more and more difficulty in resisting its degeneration: most of them disappeared, and those which survived have gone through a process of sclerosis which has made them regress. Today’s vital effort towards clarification demands therefore:

-- a reappropriation by the new revolutionary organizations of the gains of the old communist fractions;

-- an effort by those fractions which have survived to criticize and deepen their analysis and programmatic positions.

While the ICC rejects over-hastiness in any process of regroupment, it also denounces sectarianism, which uses numerous pretexts to avoid engaging in and pursuing discussion between communist groups; a sectarianism which unfortunately animates a certain number of today’s revolutionary groups, who don’t understand the necessity to form the solid communist current which the reawakening of the proletariat is making more and more indispensable.

THE CONFERENCE OF BATTAGLIA COMUNISTA

In the light of what has just been said, it can be seen why the ICC attached so much importance to a conference of this kind. But it is precisely a reflection on the weaknesses of the workers’ movement in the past (the hesitation of the communists, the late formation of the IIIrd International and the difficulties which ensued from its formation) which has enabled us to understand that the organization of the vanguard of the proletariat must be formed before the decisive confrontation, and directly centralized on a world scale.

The difficulty involved in this was concretely illustrated by this conference: unfortunately, none of the other groups invited were present at the meeting. Certain groups agreed in principle to participate, but were unable to come for various reasons: Arbetarmakt (Sweden) because of the distance; Fomento Obrero Revolucionario because of the urgent work in Spain; and the Communist Workers’ Organization (UK) because of practical difficulties. Pour Une Intervention Communiste (PIC, France), on the other hand, changed its position at the last moment and decided not to come, saying that this meeting was a “dialogue of the deaf”. Other ‘Bordigist’ groups or groups coming from Bordigism did not bother to reply to the invitation.

Right at the beginning of the meeting, we made a declaration regretting the absence of the other groups and pointing out the limitations of this conference:

1. The lack of clear political criteria for such a meeting and for the invitations.

2. A certain lack of preparation: few texts were prepared and most of them came late; contrary to what we had requested, Battaglia did not publish the letters exchanged between the various groups (see ‘Correspondence with Battaglia Comunista’ in Rivoluzione Internazionale, no. 5 June 1976).

3. The sectarian spirit of certain of the groups invited and their total lack of understanding of the problems of regroupment.

In these conditions, we could only see this conference as a meeting in which the positions of the ICC and those of Battaglia could confront each other.

The discussions centred round the following points:

-- analysis of the evolution of capitalism; the meaning and implications of the current crisis;

-- the present state of the class struggle and its perspectives;

-- the function of the so-called ‘workers’ parties’ (SPs, CPs etc);

-- the function of the unions and the problem of economic struggles;

-- the problem of the party;

-- the present tasks of revolutionary groups;

-- conclusions about the significance of this meeting.

In drawing up a balance sheet of these animated, but fraternal discussions, we can say that this was neither a “dialogue of the deaf” nor a sentimental and unprincipled meeting, but the beginning of a confrontation which we sincerely hope will carry on amongst all the groups who remain attached to the revolutionary foundations of communism.

As a concrete outcome of the meeting, and in order to disseminate the discussions amongst other revolutionary groups and the class as a whole, the conference decided to publish a bulletin containing the texts presented and a synthesis of the interventions; the comrades of Battaglia took on the task of bringing out this bulletin as soon as possible. In conclusion we can say that, although there was general agreement that it would be premature to set up any ‘co-ordinating committee’, this conference was a positive step, the beginning of a process that we hope will develop more and more.

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST CURRENT

 

 

Deepen: 

  • 1970s and the International Conferences of the communist left [64]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Conferences of the Communist Left [69]
  • Battaglia Comunista [70]
  • Communist Workers Organisation [18]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • International Communist Current [6]

From Austro-marxism to Austro-fascism

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Along with Gramscian factoryism, the Austro-­marxist form of councilism seems to be approaching the zenith of a posthumous ‘marxist’ glory. Until recently, apart from the surviving veterans of the old Social-Democracy, few remembered or spoke of Austro-marxism and its ambitious project to form a ‘two-and-a-half’ International in opposition to the Comintern. But during the past few years a whole plethora of histor­ians have set about instructing us on this subject, which is presented as an attempt to strike a balance between reformist opportunism and Bolshevik ‘extremism’, the latter representing a wholly Russian, and thus Asiatic, deformation of marxism.

Naturally, these professional historians have all the facts at their fingertips, and are moreover able to see them, they claim, in the clear light of ‘objectivity’. But for revolutionaries, who lay no false claims to ‘objectivity’, Austro-marxism can only be seen from the viewpoint of a militant involvement in the class struggle. From this point of view Austro-marxism is revealed as a particularly malignant form of reformism, and as a capitulation in the face of the tasks of revolutionaries. This is clearly illustrated by the careers of the various leaders of Austro-marxism like Victor, Max and Fritz Adler, Renner, Hilferding and Bauer who all developed the thesis, in different fields, of the adapta­tion of radical socialism to the complex conditions in multi-racial, multi-religious, age-old Austria. And it is no accident that they were among the first to elaborate the thesis of a gradual and peaceful passage to socialism, through ways and means adapted to the particular national conditions in Austria.

In fact, the annals of history reveal Austro-marxism as a movement which, from the time of the great struggles in 1918, never deviated from the path of the counter­revolution. No amount of university theses can eradicate the infamous achievement of Austro-marxism; and this was, with the help of the Catholic church, to have suppressed the revolutionary movement of the Austrian proletariat, the vital link between the Russian Revolution and the German Spartacist movement. We are convinced that without the restoration of order in Austria, it would have been much more difficult for the bourgeoisie to crush the Hungarian soviets in the summer of 1919. Our disgust can only increase when we remember that Austro-marx­ism, the same movement which led the proletariat onto the imperialist battle­ground in World War 1, justified its counter-revolutionary actions in 1919 by claiming to have saved the proletariat from the unspeakable calamities which would have resulted from the ‘civil war’.

What a magnificent parallel we could draw between Gramsci dissuading workers in Turin and Milan from seizing political power and Bauer warning the masses that any ‘excesses’ might threaten the honorable peace and the republic, In Italy, it was the mystification of ‘workers control’ which allowed the Giolotti government to contain the wave of factory occupations in September 1920. In Austria, during negotiat­ions for the peace of Brest-Litovsk, when workers were taking to the streets in Vienna and Linz, the leaders of Austrian Social-Democracy were discussing with government representatives the possibility of a return to legality in exchange for a few small concessions. Austro-marxism and its Italian counterpart have another characteristic in common; they were both terribly afraid that “impatience might lead to premature actions and the futile loss of working class blood”. They both insisted that the fall of the bourgeoisie would occur through a kind of capillary action which would not require the intervention of a general strike, let alone that of that antiquated blanquist conception, the insurrection. Thus from both sides of the Adige came the watchwords ‘slowly but surely’.

Austrian Social Democracy claimed that it was acting in the interests of international solidarity. And, after the holocaust, it bestowed on itself the undeserved honour of having correctly applied the principles of internationalism. But this is just another legend which doesn’t stand up to a serious examination of the facts, and collapses like a house of cards when one realizes how the workers’ movement organized itself in the old Empire. In Austria, one saw the disastrous triumph of separatism and federalism, which are so antithetical to proletarian solidarity. A centralized party was certainly what was hoped for...as long as national autonomy was respected within it. Far from being based on the common interests of all workers, the ‘Gesantpartei’ looked like a Harlequin’s coat of different little national parties. One stressed its ‘Germanness’, another it’s ‘Italianness’, another it’s ‘Ruthenianness’. In the Reichsrat, it was common practice for a group of Czech socialist deputies to vote against whatever the German comrades voted for. The less the party was concerned with forging the proletariat into a compact army fighting for its class interests, the more it fixated the workers’ attention on the ‘fact’ of nationality, and the quicker it began to fall apart. From the 1890’s onwards the separatist crisis broke the unity of the workers. The unions were reorganized to satisfy the separatist tendencies, so that by the end of the century, Austrian trade unionism was fragmented into as many feder­ations as there were national groups.

A jurist by profession, and a political advocate of cultural and territorial autonomy, Renner’s conception of the state was entirely within a bourgeois framework. His idea of a socialist Austria of the future was one where all the nationalities within the Empire had their own governments, and their own form of administration, determined by specific national conditions. As a model he used the mediaeval Caroling­ien Empire which ruled over ten different nationalities, each with its own language and its own legal code. According to his conception the class struggle should have the function of regulating inter-community relations; social relations for him were relations of ‘Right’; society an association of individuals. On this basis, the struggle for the realization of Right necessitated that each group of workers -- Slovaks, Italians, Germans, Hungarians -- should have the freedom to create their own cultural, trade union and other organizations. From this analysis of Austria, Renner thus put forward what ought to be the mode of operation of the 11nd International, and the political principle of nationality within a future socialist community.

As for Bauer, his thesis of nationalities is hardly any better. He links the victory of socialism to the eternal principle of nationality. Under socialism, the nation, whether large or small, is able to build its own national economy on the basis of the global division of labour. Thus socialism is created in the image of existing capitalist structures: the International Telegraphic Union or the railway system. For Renner and Bauer, inheritors of the liberal thesis of the state as an abstract category existing above class relationships, capitalism remains a sealed book: for them the state is not a creation of the exploiting class with the function of protecting national industry and markets. Their state does not exist to cultivate a taste within the oppressed class for the political panaceas of trade protectionism, indirect taxes and blood; it does not serve as an instrument of imperialist conquest. It simply pursues the ideals of Justice and Right.

Within the International, neither Pannekoek nor Strasser, the leader of the Austrian left, was able to stomach such poison. They intransigently denounced the Austrian school. Strasser’s pamphlet The Worker and the Nation warned against the penetration of nationalist ideology within the proletarian movement. It advocated revolut­ionary defeatism in the event of a war between two countries and concluded that socialism could no longer have any concurr­ence of interests with nationalism. This pamphlet was sold out within two weeks of its publication in May 1912. Beginning from the same marxist vision, Strasser and Pannekoek were to arrive at identical conclusions: contrary to what Bauer claimed, there could be no common national destiny and culture between the proletariat, crushed by the weight of capitalist domination, and the bourgeoisie. There could only be an intransigent struggle between the two. This would lead to a unity based on the common interests of humanity as a whole.

Thanks to Count Sturgkh, who had just put Parliament into recess, the Austrian Social Democratic deputies did not even have to vote for war credits. But the Centre saluted its German ‘brothers’ in an article in the Arbeiter Zeitung of 5 August, 1914, entitled ‘The Day of the German Nation’, which was a veritable hymn to nationalism.

All the leading figures in the party -- from the right-wing Renner to the left-wing Bauer -- were traditionally pan-German, often to the point of lyricism: “Patience! The day will come when all German territory is forged into a single nation”. The ‘majority’ gave their seal of approval to the ultimat­um sent by Germany to Serbia, and did not hesitate to join the chorus of intervent­ionists calling on the workers to turn their faces towards the blast of war. Thus our militant materialists pray to the god of Mars to give victory to the “Holy cause of the German people, a united people impelled by a single powerful will. The failure of the German people to accomplish their mission would be a setback for world history”.

“0, bands of Smerdiakovs,” exclaimed Trotsky, who could no longer swallow the filthy air of Austrian Social Democracy. Was there any real opposition to the political line pursued by these villains? Yes, if one is prepared to include the ‘Karl Marx Circle’ which was formed within the party alongside ‘the youngsters’ (Hilferding, Bauer, M Adler), and which condemned the ‘majority’ for having violated the undertakings of the Basle International Congress; yes, if one thinks that the proletariat can be awakened from its torpor by an ‘exemplary’ act of individual terrorism. No, if one considers that one can never build revolutionary politics on the basis of a terrorist act; no, if one thinks that the only possible task of a revolutionary opposition is the formation of a fraction. This is why the shot with which F Alder killed Count Sturgkh could bring no salvation.

Certainly, it would be an exaggeration to claim that Austro-Marxism went to the same lengths as Noskeism. All the same, with the liquidation of the monarchy on 12 November 1918, it had every opportunity to fulfill its promises. A modest achievement: Renner, who during the conflict defended the idea of a ‘single, Great German Central Europe’ had his hour of glory with his nomination as Chancellor of the coalition government of the very first Austrian republic. Victor Adler, the uncontested historical authority of the ‘Gesamtpartei’ was appointed Secretary of State for foreign affairs. Seitz was elected Vice President of the Reichsrat, not to mention the innumerable sinecures distributed to party officers.

Those who were considered the pillars of marxism, the distinguished representatives of ‘culture’, the ‘Schongeist’ (great minds) no longer met each evening in the bar of the celebrated politico-literary ‘Cafe Central’ to philosophize on everything from Kant to Marx. Their new haunt was the baroque palace in the Ballhausplaez, where they occupied armchairs still warm from their previous occupants, ex-premiers Aherental and Beck. They prepared for the union of Germany and Austria, but never achieved their peaceful ‘Anshluss’ – an objective only realized, violently, by Nazism a few years later. The only difference was that the Nazis did it in a centralist manner, whereas the Austro-marxist project was a federalist one.

It is Trotsky, who lived in Austria for seven years after the defeat of the 1905 revolution, who has given us the best picture of Austrian Social Democracy: its scarcely concealed methods of collaboration with the monarchist state, its members’ way of life in the capital, the classic example of ‘municipal socialism’:

“I listened with the keenest interest, one might almost say with respect, to their discourse in the Cafe Central. But soon doubts came to me. These people were not revolutionaries. This was abundantly clear ... one could almost smell the philistinism in them”.

All these brilliant advocates of ‘possibil­ism’, these honorable citizens, who took an active part in the legislature of the Reichsrat, had ‘accomplished’ much. Not for the world would they allow their hands to be tied by ‘abstract principles’. From the viewpoint of ‘realpolitik’ the leader of the first St. Petersburg Soviet appeared to them as the kind of ‘declasse’ element, motivated by a ‘Don Quixote-like attachment to principles’. Two visions of the world confronted one another, and this was well understood by the Viennese workers. Let us once again quote Trotsky: “At the same time I found, without any difficulty, a common language with the Social Democratic workers whom I met at meetings or on 1st of May demonstrations”. Each year at these demonst­rations, the leadership pleaded fervently with the workers not to turn the demonstra­tion into a riot, or let it ‘degenerate’ into street battles as happened in 1890, when workers demanded the release of V. Adler, then in prison for ‘high treason’.

The Vienna, where Trotsky and Bukharin lived, was nearing the end of the long reign of Ferdinand, an epoch of stability and economic growth. The Viennese bourgeois­ie was personified by ‘Biedermayer’, an incarnation of the good bourgeois, whose good humour was never ruffled, eternally satisfied with the good progress of his business. Our Austro-marxists were also ‘Biedermayers’, intoxicated not by the music of the waltz, but by the hou-ha celebrating the rising electoral strength of the party. Thus the party itself increasingly took on the bureaucratic, militaristic and absolutist characteristics of the dual monarchy. And since the party had abandoned the theory of the catastrophic collapse of capitalism, it was left to the expression­ists, Trakl, Krans and Musil, to foresee the imminent catastrophes which would befall the madhouse which Austria had become, and the end of Austrian civilizat­ion in a sea of blood.

Just as in Bismarck’s Germany, the reputat­ion of Austrian Social Democracy was enhan­ced by a period of illegality, from 1885-91, when it was declared illegal under the ‘exceptional’ laws of the Taafe government. During this testing time socialist publications were confiscated, socialist militants arrested, and the party involved in interminable legal battles. It came out of this period with its head high, determin­ed to unify the whole of the workers’ movement behind the indispensable struggle for universal suffrage. The left, following the example of the left in Belgium, advocated the use of the general strike, but continuously came up against the tactical subtlety which maintained that “while it is advantageous to mislead the adversary about the strength of our forces, woe betide the party if it misleads itself about the strength of its own forces”. Such an argument could only lead to the paralysis of the living forces of the proletariat, by forever putting off ‘until tomorrow’ the struggle which was in fact already on the agenda. And the solution of the left proved to be the correct one, since universal suffrage was only achieved by the general strike of 28 November, 1905. But not only by the general strike: the Russian Revolut­ion was also an extremely important factor. The two movements, the general strike in Petrograd for the eight hour day, and the general strike in Vienna for universal suffrage, complemented each other organical­ly, since they both expressed the needs of the class.

From the moment when power was divided between the monarchy and parliament, the party threw itself headfirst into the constitutional breach. The possibility of concessions created a favourable climate for the growth of reformism and opportun­ism, which finally triumphed at the Brno Congress of September 1899. This congress declared itself in favour of the peaceful transformation of the state, and the gradual elimination of classes: the spirit of Lassalle hovered over the Congress. Basically it was a question of ‘applying pressure’, with the aim of curbing Austrian imperialism and replacing the monarchic regime and its rule by decree with complete parliamentary democracy.

In electoral terms, the Social Democratic Party was to prove the most powerful in Austria. In the elections of 1911, the last before the collapse of the Empire, the Social Democrats made tremendous gains and obtained 25 per cent of the vote. In Vienna they carried twenty out of thirty-three seats. This was the crowning achievement of the party’s ‘vulgar-democratic’ orientation, which itself could only lead the party further along the same road. It became clear that the party had become typically ‘ministerialist’ during the political crisis of 1906, even though it allowed itself the luxury of refusing to enter the Beck cabinet. In principle it was prepared to accept any alliance between its elected representatives and the leaders of the capitalist class. When the International, meeting at its Amsterdam Congress of 1906, raised the question of the ‘Millerand experience’ (Millerand was a socialist who had entered the Waldek-Rosseau government of ‘republican defence’ in Belgium), the Austrian delegation spoke in support of socialist participation in bourgeois governments. V. Alder, in good company with Jaures and Vanderville, proposed an amendment supporting the fundamental validity of ‘ministerialism’.

One need only look at the evidence provided by almost half a century of work in parliament and the municipalities by Austri­an Social. Democracy to see that in the end, it helped to make the proletariat more susceptible to bourgeois propaganda when the war-clouds began to gather overhead.

The general strike of 18 January

The monarchy ruled over 51 million subjects of which 40 million made up the population of the Empire, divided into a dozen nationalities in a territory covering almost 700,000 sq km. As the European nations prepared for war, Austria was inev­itably drawn into the conflict. A small group of Serbian nationalists, by the assassination of the Hapsburg heir, sparked off a chain of events with unimaginable consequences: world war and world revolution. For several years Austria had been waiting for the chance to neutralize the Serbian forces, and the outrage at Sarajevo provided the opportunity. With the support of its powerful ally, Germany, which had given Austria a free hand in the Balkans, Austria seized the opportunity to break what Count Czernin called “the encirclement of the monarchy by the new Balkan League, inspired and controlled by the Russians”.

On 14 July, William 11 wrote to Franz Joseph:

“I am thus prepared to support as much as I can the effort of your government to prevent the formation, under the patronage of Russia, of a new Balkan alliance aimed against you, and to provoke Bulgaria into joining the Triple Alliance to parry this threat”.

Until then Austria had emerged victorious from every war in its history, but this time the wind had turned. It was defeated at Sadowa by Prussian soldiers armed with breech-loading rifles. Instead of reinforc­ing the Serbian border in next to no time, as the Austrians had foreseen, they found themselves having to repel Russian forces from Galicia, and it was a year before Germany was able to come to their aid. By the time Italy came on the scene, the Austrian army was close to defeat. Hungary, seeing that defeat was near, attempted to secede from the dual monarchy to avoid having to pay the tributes arising from the disaster, and also to regain its independe­nce. All this was very different from what the Austrians had expected! Austria was forced to cede immense territories: Bohemia-Moravia, Silesia, Galicia, Bukovinia, Hungary, Bosnia-Herzegovinia, Croatia, Dalmatia, Carniole, Istria, Tyrol and Southern Carinthia. All that was left was German Austria, reduced in size to 120,000 sq.km., populated by a mere 12 million souls, making Vienna ‘a monstrous hydrace­phalus, a huge head on a shrunken body’.

For several months after the military debacle, conditions of life became daily more intolerable. People suffered terribly from hunger and cold. What proletariat could accept this aftermath of war, now that there was the example of Russia to follow? When at the beginning of January 1918, Hofer, the Minister of Food, decided to reduce the already inadequate bread ration by half, there was an immediate response from the class in Vienna. Under the impetus of the Workers’ Councils, the action spread throughout High Austria, Styria, and as far as Hungary. This was a unique opportun­ity to bring an end to the war, and a real possibility to come to the aid of the beleaguered Russian Revolution.

And so, our learned Austro-marxists, who understood things so much better than everyone else, these false friends of the Russian proletariat who just two months earlier had declared the necessity of supporting the Bolsheviks, issued .the following declaration in their publication the Arbeiter Zeitung of 17 January, 1918:

“In the interests of the population, we earnestly ask all workers in service industries, miners, railway, tramway and other transport workers, gas and electricity workers not to stop work (...) To avoid unneccessary casualties, we demand that workers stay calm and avoid any street confrontations”.

It is because they rapidly understood “that the outcome of negotiations will not be determined at Brest, but in the streets of Vienna and Berlin”, that the Social Democracy placed itself at the head of the movement, to crush, undercover of defend­ing it, the ‘sacred cause’ of the workers. They set out to bring an end to the strike which had become general in less than four days. Social Democratic representatives addressed the Workers’ Assemblies with a programme of demands already approved by the President of the Council, von Seider, and Count Czernin. All the workers obtained were some fine-sounding promises bearing the hallmark of social democratic craft­manship: apparently radical, in fact hollow and empty.

Instinctively the workers sensed that they had been sold out by their leaders and at the last moment refused to go back to work. To definitively put an end to the last pockets of resistance, the Social Democrat­ic leadership made use of their shop stewards to expel the ‘irreducibles’ from the assemblies. And for good measure they threatened uncooperative workers with police repression. These ‘irresponsible extremists’ branded as heretics, were the elements who were soon to found the Communist Party. At the end of the strike they issued a proclamation: ‘Betrayed and Sold Out!’

“The magnificent struggle for an immediate general peace, begun by the proletariat of lower Austria, and joined by the working class in other parts of the kingdom and in Hungary itself, has been betrayed by the leadership of the party which has shamefully sold out to the government of the capitalist state, and by a so-called ‘Workers’ Council’. Instead of pushing the movement forward, following the example of our Russian brothers, instead of the formation of a real Workers’ Council to assume all power, these leeches have begun negotiations with the government. Down with the discipline of the corpse! Enough of empty talk of responsibility and unity! Each one of us must carry within him the consciousness of proletarian solidarity”. (From Programme Communiste no. 31)

The revolt in the army

During the strike movement the prefect of Vienna noted that at first the authorities were outflanked, without any effective means of intervening in the situation, adding that he needed ten thousand men at his disposal. Colonel Klose, the Minister of War, in his military report dated 28 January, emphasized that the workers were all well armed and had access to the arsenal. But even without this testimony Bauer destroyed his own thesis that the fate of an attempted general strike would be ‘isolation and repression’.

“The general strike had even more serious consequences for the army. The rebellious mood of the troops was manifested in a series of mutinies which followed the January strike. The Slovak troops at Judenburg, the Serbians at Funfkirchen, Czechs at Runburg, and the Hungarians at Budapest, all mutini­ed”. (see the Special Issue of Critique Communiste)

Where were the Czech, Croation and Slovak troops of old, which had been placed at the disposal of the Windisgratz to crush the democratic revolution in Vienna in 1848? Who was isolated, if not the state which was denied the support of the bayonets of the standing army? Along a front which stretched from the Adriatic to the Polish plains, and ran the length of the formidable barrier of the Alps, the Austrian army had shown no signs of an ‘admirable heroism’. Since the mobilization the moral of the recruits, whom the General Staff had forced to take an oath of bravery, had not been high. In this respect the Austrian army was comparable to the Italian army. In the mud and the snow, the Austrian soldiers had only one desire: the speediest possible end to the butchery. The Austrian soldier deserted or joined the Russians; or he refused, like the ‘Good Soldier Schweik’, to expose himself to danger from whichever side it came.

The Command could find hardly any reliable regular troops with which to oppose the strikers. This was confirmed almost at once by the sailors’ mutiny at Cattaro which was only halted by the intervention of German submarines. Immediately after the outbreak of the January strike, the crew of the Austrian fleet, anchored at Cattaro, began a rebellion which lasted until 6 February. The sailors raised the red flag, formed their own councils, and joined the workers at the arsenal on strike. An anarchist, J. Czerny, who in the future ‘Chrysanthemum Revolution’ in Hungary would serve heroically in the ‘Lenin Guard’ battalion, placed himself at the head of the movement, pressing his comrades forward in the class struggle.

In a word, ‘demoralization’ rendered the army unfit for its imperialist tasks; the insubordination of entire regiments fulfill­ed the old prediction of the ‘general’, grown grey in the service of the class struggle:

“At this point, the army becomes a pop­ular army; the machine refuses to work: militarism perishes in the dialectic of its own development”. (Engels, Anti Duhring)

Similar movements attained greater proport­ions in Germany, and above all in Russia, where the Bolshevik Party was able to forge direct links between the Workers’ Councils and the Soldiers' and Sailors’ Soviets. The sailors, because service on board demanded qualities of ingenuity and discipline -- a war ship is a veritable floating factory -- resolutely placed themselves at the head of the movement. Austria, wedged between Imperial Germany and Czarist Russia, had never become a real naval power. Austrian cannon fodder was essentially made up of peasants, a class which by its very nature is disinclined to accept any discipline, even revolutionary discipline. The General Staff showed no mercy towards those who were involved in the rebellion. Szernin, who enjoyed an extremely cordial relation­ship with the Social Democratic leadership, enforced cruel reprisals against the mutineers who had rebelled against the absurd military discipline and insane conduct of the war. Even after dozens of mutineers had been hung or shot on Szernin’s orders he always continued to receive more support from the Austrian socialists than any previous Austrian statesman. “You and I, how well we get on together”, the Count liked to say to old Adler, who could only reply with the hope that his Excellency would remain true to himself, and not stray away from a policy which had won him the approval of the socialist leadership.

Things went from bad to worse. From 20 December 1917 it became clear to the ruling class that it would, very soon, have to entrust the destiny of the state to a new force more firmly based than the existing government. The choice was not difficult and without hesitation the bourgeoisie turned to Social Democracy, which had administered its party ‘patrimony’ so well during the peace. To an emperor who had ruled for sixty-eight years, Count Czernin telegraphed, with particular foresight: “If we continue to follow the present course, we will undoubtedly soon experience circumstances similar in every respect to those seen in Russia”.

The mandarins of Austrian Social Democracy -- legislators, burgomeisters, or managers of co-operatives -- were finally integrated into the ranks of finance capital. When it became quite clear that the economic demands of the strikers, provoked by the threat of starvation, were assuming an increasingly political character, they infiltrated the proletarian struggle in order to break its ‘e1an’ and divert it away from the struggle for power.

As Trotsky had already discerned, these representatives certainly had nothing in common with revolutionaries, Austrian Social Democracy was in fact representative of “The highly developed Occident, composed of scoundrels who, by remaining passive spectators, will let the Russians bleed to death”. (Rosa Luxemburg)

The struggle against the Communist Party

It was particularly difficult to constitute a Communist Party to accomplish the new tasks which confronted the radical elements who found themselves in a lamentable state of unpreparedness. Even after several years of massacre, there was still no pole around which opposition to the Social Democratic policy of the ‘Union Sacree’ could crystallize. The left could hardly have been more disunited or dispersed.

Koritschoner had struggled vainly against the sabotage of the 18 January strike; now he moved heaven and earth to join together in a single organization all those who took a minority position during the war. His task was made easier by the discussions with Lenin and Radek at Kienthal. He found a favourable terrain among certain elements of the Association of Socialist Students; a group of the semi-anarchist tendency; the revolutionary syndicalists; the extreme left of the Jewish socialist group, ‘Poale Zion’, and of course his own group of ‘Linksradicale’, including J. Strasser, which like the others had ceased to work with Social Democracy after the 1918 general strike.

The personality of F. Adler was, in many ways, the greatest obstacle to the constit­ution of this new revolutionary formation. It was he who, after the attempted assassin­ation of Count Sturgkh in October 1916, became the symbol of hostility to the war and opposition to the chauvinist position of his party for the whole working class. His courageous attitude during the trial which condemned him to death reinforced his martyr’s image. However, contrary to all expectations, on his release from prison at the beginning of November 1918, instead of serving as a revolutionary herald for the masses, he placed himself at the disposal of the Socialist Party which had described his act as one of a madman. His heroic image thus served to divert the working class from the struggle for power. He was able to unify all the Workers’ Councils into the Zentralratte, an instrument for the hard and difficult struggle against ... ‘communist’ adventurism within the Councils.

There was considerable Social Democratic propaganda against the split which had a profound influence on the workers; it kindled working class opposition to the Communists by appealing to the workers’ worst prejudices. The Communists’ slogan “For a Republic of Workers’ Councils” was denounced as “frantic agitation flying in the face of political and social reality”.

Who were these “fanatics” whose true intention it was claimed was to lead the country into chaos? In Vienna, the Commun­ist Party was supported by the workers in the districts and by the soldiers and demobilized troops organized in armed militia, installed in barracks in the Mariahilferstrasse. In Linz, the Soviet of Soldiers and Workers Deputies was influenc­ed by communist militants. In Salzburg the CP received strong support from the workers and the poor peasants in the highlands.

The old monarchists army was disbanded, the soldiers leaving the barracks and returning home. On their return from Russia the prisoners of war, demobilized troops, were completely won over to the Bolsheviks and they came home bringing with them leaflets, papers and pamphlets. To be sure, the repeated calls to workers, peasants and soldiers of all the belligerent countries had found a profound echo in Austria-Hungary; and more particularly in the ‘Manifesto of the Central Executive Committ­ee and People’s Commissars to the Workers of Austria-Hungary’ of 3 November, 1918. Even Bauer had to admit that in the streets all the talk was of the ‘Dictatorship of the Proletariat’ and ‘Soviet Power’.

Early in November 1918 the Communist Party of German Austria was formed, against the background of the first mass demonstrations, in which the most important element was formed by ‘self-demobilized’ soldiers and repatriated prisoners of war. In the opinion of the energetic militants of the Linksrad­icale (grouped around Koritschoner) the proclamation of the party was premature, since the whole organization of the party still had to be set up -- from the local sections to the central organs. But they finally joined at the opening of the First Congress on 19 February, 1919.

The Left, which was to lead the Austrian CP until Bolshevikization did its devastating work by installing two mediocrities (Fiala and Koplenig), had very little time to forge a solid and cohesive organization. The Party immediately seized the opportuni­ty presented by the official proclamation of the Republic to call upon proletarians and demoblized soldiers to demonstrate in front of the old Parliament under the slogan ‘For the Socialist Republic’ inscribed on an ocean of banners. A detach­ment of the Red Guard responded immediately by occupying the Neue Freie Presse and succeeded in printing a two-page edition which proclaimed that the proletarian revolution would soon wipe out he bourgeois Republic.

Within the young Communist organization there was a serious overestimation of the revolutionary possibilities of the situation which, moreover, was compounded by a lack of a common viewpoint. Certain militants, like those of the Linksradicale, even disapproved of the occupation of the news­paper offices. Facilitated by this disunity, a bloody tide of repression engulfed the Party. Almost from the moment of its constitution, the Party was forced to retreat into semi-clandestinity. Militants were hunted down, local sections disbanded, publications banned. The Social Democrats ratified the methods of the police: in Graz , an important Styrian industrial centre, the Social Democrat Resel, military commander of the area, directed a reign of terror against the Communists.

During the first months of 1919, the appalling situation in Austria made revolut­ion the order of the day. In Hungary on the night of 21 March, Bela Kun and his comrades were released from prison by a crowd of demonstrators: workers occupied the nerve centres of Budapest, the Workers’ Councils proclaimed the Red Dictatorship. In Bavaria the Republic of Soviets was establ­ished on 7 April. The Party in Austria judged that the time was ripe and, 50,000 members strong, fixed the day of the insurrection for 15 June, to coincide with the date set by the Armistice Commission for the reduction of military forces.

Suspecting the weakness of the Communists the Social Democratic Party quickly embark­ed on a policy of sabotage. On 13 June F. Adler warned workers to be on their guard against a possible Communist putsch. Bauer put pressure on members of the Inter Allied Commission not to empty the barracks by disbanding the militia at such an inopportune time. As a result, influenced by the propaganda of ex-hero Adler, the Vienna Workers’ Council declared itself against the insurrection, taking refuge in the arms of democracy -- by which it was soon to be crushed.

Having no solid foundation on a strong wave of class struggle (unlike the Bolshevik insurrection), with insufficient influence within the Councils, and having failed to make use of the critical moment of weakness in the enemy ranks, the insurrection was quickly defeated. The Red Guard, waiting in vain for the signal to attack, failed to coordinate with the other insurrectionary forces. The last minute refusal of party delegates to endorse the insurrection and their delays cost the lives of thirty demonstrators, when troops opened fire on the orders of the Interior Minister, the Social Democrat E.Eldersch. The tragic example of Austria shows us how not to make an insurrection, since in Vienna it took the justifiably feared form of a ‘putsch’.

The theory of defensive violence

In theory, M. Adler and O. Bauer were prepared to conceive of the dictatorship of the proletariat exercised by a system of workers’ and soldiers’ councils. But on one condition: that it didn’t happen in Austria, but in Austria’s more ‘backward’ neighbours. When the dictatorship of the proletariat was proclaimed in Russia, after the violent overthrow of ‘oriental despotism’, or when the same thing occurred in Hungary or Czechoslavakia, that was alright. But for the Austrian workers who had built up, over several generations, a tight network of municipalities, nurseries, sporting clubs and co-operatives, then “Get thee behind me Satan!” :

“We Social Democrats concede to the Communists that in many countries where the bourgeoisie opposes the proletariat with force, the rule of the bourgeoisie can only be destroyed with force. We concede that even in Austria, exception­al circumstances and above all a war, might force the proletariat to use violent means. But if there are no extraordinary circumstances to disturb the peaceful development of the country, the working class will soon come to power by the legal means of democracy: and will be able to exercise its power in a democratic and legal manner”.

This passage, spoken by Bauer in 1924, and revealing a rare wisdom, was just fine words, empty of any real content. When in 1933, the time came to demonstrate in practice the worth of this famous theory of defensive violence, the party led by Bauer refused to fight.

Further ‘left’ within the party, M. Adler took up an identical position:

“For its part the National Assembly should be the organization which decides all political and cultural questions which arise after the economic reorgan­ization; the indispensable instrument of the transitional period, preserving the dictatorship of the proletariat from terrorism, and ensuring a continuous and peaceful development far removed from the storms of the civil war”. (Democracy and Workers’ Councils, Vienna 1919).

Having smashed the old state apparatus, the Paris Commune abolished the bourgeois distinction between the legislature and the executive. Against this lesson of history, Adler wished to express his confidence in parliamentarism, this “talking shop where it is periodically decided which member of the ruling class shall crush the people” (Lenin). What an idea that the Councils should combine legislature and executive! Montesquieu would turn in his grave!

Before World War 1, Austrian Social Democracy justified its ‘defencist’ posit­ion by saying that the gains won within capitalism, from the abolition of customs duties to ‘workers’ dispensaries and municipal bakeries, had to be defended, whatever the cost in human lives (!) To this argument, after the war, another was added: that of the ‘balance of forces’.

This argument was based on the basically correct idea that Austria was in a situation of economic dependence and would never be able to satisfy its needs without the support of the victorious powers. Everything depended on their good will. The civil war, by upsetting this ‘balance of forces’ would immediately provoke the intervention of the Entente and this would bring an end to the process of ‘gradual socialization’ which, little by little, was transforming the social relations of production.

As always in such a case, the seizure of political power by the proletariat is reduced to a putschist act of the blanquist variety to be prevented at any price: one shouldn’t run before one can walk. Only if the ruling class attempts to resist being expropriated should the proletariat intervene with ‘defensive viol­ence’.

What then did Austro-marxism undertsand by ‘defensive violence’? To protect the constitution of the Republic against any attack from wherever it came: This is why it was so careful that the reconstituted army should have sufficient arms and material at its disposal. In 1923 this doctrine was put into practice by the formation of the Schutzbund to back up the federal army which was numerically very weak. Thus the Austrian proletariat became the protector of democracy, a democracy which was becoming more and more of a facade.

Socialization or the ‘slow march towards socialism’

Once the January general strike had been crushed, Social Democracy could devote itself to a problem particularly close to its heart: the pursuit of ‘Socialization’, a process begun during the period of the organic development of Austrian capital.

In March 1919, Otto Bauer found himself promoted to head of the ‘Socialization Commission’, alongside Social-Christian economic experts, where he was able to display his enormous talents for administra­tion. Socialists and Social-Christians addressed themselves to the problems of the socialization of the coal and iron mines and heavy industry. The old trusts and car­tels created during the war were to be converted into an “Industrial Union” run on the principles of co-management.

O. Bauer was never tired of repeating that they had to do the impossible by reducing costs of production, while developing the methods of rationalization in force in the more advanced countries.

“In this way the Industrial Union will considerably reduce initial expenditure and permit cheap production .... If a Union succeeds in significantly reducing the costs of production, the owners’ profit will increase and this increase in profit will accrue to the state.” (The March to Socialism,Vienna 1919)

But the indispensable condition for the success of ‘peoples’ capitalism’ lay in leading the ‘Arbeitratte’ back into the Social Democratic fold. As organizations of struggle the councils had collapsed under the carefully disguised attack of the democratic constitution, and above all, as a result of the fall of the Hungarian Repub­lic of Soviets, at the hands of the French army of d’Espery. They were transformed in­to mere instruments of co-management for fixing wage rates and stimulating production.

On 15 May 1919 the Workers’ Councils were legalized, as Factory Councils, whose task was to arbitrate conflicts arising in the workplace, to ensure a smooth recovery for Austrian capitalism after the trials of war.

When he was at university O. Bauer had made a great impression on Kautsky, having reminded him on no less a person than Marx: “This is how I picture the young Marx”. But Kautsky was confusing Marx with Lassalle, who himself flirted with Bismarck. Another optical illusion produced by the tinted glasses of opportunism!

Epilogue

The ‘wise men’ of Austro-marxism, leaders of the best organized Social Democratic party in the world congratulated themselves on having led the Austrian proletariat away from the ‘nightmare’ of civil war, and on having brought about a “truly constructive peace destined to last”. In the middle of the revolutionary crisis, to appease the hunger and anger of the masses, they threw them the bone of ‘Sozialpartnerschaft’, or in other words, co-management. In Vienna, the socialists had raised the tactic of neutralizing the proletariat to the level of an art.

Herzen, the great precursor of the Russian revolution, once said of Bakunin that the latter was too inclined to mistake the third month of pregnancy for its final stage. Our “batko” was a rather rustic countryman who had certainly never heard of social obstretics and wielded the social scalpel rather dangerously, as in Lyons in 1871. But our sophisticated doctors of Austro-­marxism did worse: having refused to deliver the child, they provided a substitute of their own .... Austro-fascism.

The final act of the Austrian civil war which had begun in 1918 was enacted in the years leading up to 1933. This model Republic, carried to the baptismal font by the lead­ing officials of the ‘peaceful road to socialism’, showed no mercy. Progressively, the legal police were invested with an authority which had formerly been reserved for the priest.

As in Italy, in one final effort, the Austrian proletariat took up arms, not to protect its institutions, but to sell its life as dearly as possible. Hundreds of working class militants sacrificed their blood, in isolated groups, with no central direction, despite the incompetence of the military leaders of the Schutzbund, and above all against the formal orders of the Zentrale who advocated, to the end, confidence in democracy. But despite this, many members of the Socialist Party contin­ued the armed struggle. And it was this that allowed the Social Democratic party as such to appear as a martyr in the cause of anti-fascism.

After the heroic uprising of February 1934, the rhythmic march of the civil guards of the Heimwehren was heard in the streets of Vienna and Linz; workers’ quarters were searched and plundered. The debonair citizen Biedermayer, enraged by the crisis, could now be seen giving chase to Jews and workers. Monseigneur Prince von Stahrenberg and the most devout Monseigneur Seipel installed the Republican mortar-launchers to bombard the last of the strikers. In factories everywhere, ‘Red’ workers were replaced by ‘patriotic’ employees. Democracy was an empty word in a state which defined itself as “totalitarian but not despotic”.

Austro-marxism cried feebly for help, and proposed a pact for united action with the Communists against the fascists. But it was Austrro-marxism, and none other, which had prepared the ground for fascism. Had not the eternal principle of support for the ‘lesser evil’ led the party to attempt an alliance with Dolfuss against Nazism? In 1934, Dolfuss showed his ingratitude by declaring the same party illegal.

Before disappearing, Bauer had time for one more final betrayal. This enemy of all violence gave his support to the sinister theory of ‘socialism in one country’. He exhorted workers of the whole world to follow the example of Stalinism. He called for the ‘workers’ parties in the democratic countries to join in the ‘Union Sacree’ with their governments. “Whoever takes up a position against the USSR during the war is siding with the counter-revolution, and becomes our mortal enemy”.

When the Red Army ‘liberated’ Vienna in April 1945, the aged Renner was given the task of forming the provisional government by the Russians. Stalin praised this “Chancellor of the Operetta”. Renner is certainly one of the rare politicians who, twice in his life, has been called upon to set up a state apparatus at a crucial moment for his own bourgeoisie.

Today, the task of administering the medicine of austerity to the Austrian proletariat has fallen to a man called Kreisky, who is proud to think that he is continuing the work of Austro-marxism. We do not doubt it for a moment....

RC

“We reply to all nationalist slogans and arguments as follows: exploitation, surplus value, class struggle. When they talk about demands for a national education, we will point out miserable education given to the children of workers, who only learn what is needed for them to work for capital later on. When they talk about the costs of administration we will talk about the poverty which forces workers to emigrate. When they talk about the unity of the nation, we will talk about class exploitat­ion and oppression. When they talk about the glory of the nation, we will talk about the solidarity of the workers of the whole world.” (Pannekoek, The Nation and Class Struggle)

Geographical: 

  • Austria [71]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary wave, 1917-1923 [15]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Second International [72]

International Review no.11 - 4th Quarter

  • 2290 reads

Review: The communist left in Germany, 1918-21 (1)

  • 2974 reads

Firstly, we welcome the recent appearance of this work by D. Authier and J. Barrot, which clearly attempts to make a clear analysis of the Left Communists from the viewpoint of revolutionary marxism, and which moreover will allow revolutionaries to study hitherto inaccessible texts of the Communist Left. The book is one of the very few2 to put forward the communist perspective -- the only possible perspective in the historical period inaugurated by the Russian Revolution -- of the proletarian revolution. The book has many strengths, but also some weaknesses, which we would like to discuss here.

The error of modernism

The book is divided into two parts, the first analyzing the general historical sit­uation and the evolution of the groups which made up the Communist Left, and the second a collection of texts. In general in their analysis, the authors are not clearly aware of the new epoch inaugurated by World War I. They do not see that the war marked the end of that period when the capitalist mode of production could effec­tively develop the productive forces; when it in fact increasingly became a barrier to all further development, a barrier concrete­ly expressed in the periodic necessity for capitalism to destroy a huge part of the productive forces in world wars. The text never clearly states the material cause for the desertion of the whole social democratic movement -- mass parties and unions -- into the camp of the bourgeoisie: the end of the period of capitalist ascendency and the onset of the period of decadence, when the only tasks of the proletariat are the destruction of the bourgeois state and the creation of the international dictatorship of the wor­kers’ councils.

Obscuring the fundamental phenomenon of the change of period behind such epiphenomena as the extraction of relative surplus value (which Marx called the real domination of capital) made possible by the huge increase in the productivity of labour, the authors fall prey to modernist sophism -- claiming to see a so-called dichotomy between the reformism of the “old workers’ movement” (which corresponds to the ascendant period) and the purity of the “new’ one. This leads them to state that “the German proletariat remained wholly reformist”, as did the “majority of the working class” (p.83). And from there they take the small step of integrating the weight of bourgeois ideology (ie reformism) into the essential nature of the working class, which in fact, whether it likes it or not, cannot be ‘reformist’ or ‘for-capital’ -- or any other novel conception.

The working class is strictly determined by its socio-economic position in production. This forces it to constantly struggle against capital; this is class struggle. The change of period only changes the conditions in which this struggle takes place. The struggle was always revolution­ary (cf the Paris Commune), but within the framework of a progressive system the struggle was able to win reforms -- real improvements in its conditions of exploita­tion. The changing conditions in which the class struggle develops are thus directly linked to the change of period which marks the passage of the capitalist system into its era of historic decline. By integrating the bourgeois ‘disorder’ of reformism into the revolutionary nature of the working class, one can no longer understand why the working class is the revolutionary class, the bearer of communism; nor how the ‘reformist’ nature of the proletarian can become revolutionary, unless by the wave of a magic wand ... No, “the proletariat is revolutionary or it is nothing” (letter from Marx to Schweitzer, 1865). This means that its struggle has always been a struggle against capital, a revolutionary struggle, a struggle which is political from the start because it aims, consciously or not, at the destruction of the bourgeois state. Thus it is precisely this change in the conditions of struggle which means that the working class, in the decadent period, can only form organizations whose purpose is the seizure of power, the workers’ councils, and which forces it to give rise to its class party as a minority of the class, a concrete expression of pro­letarian class consciousness. We can see here very clearly why the workers’ councils are not “the discovery of the form of the new workers’ movement” but are a concreti­zation of its invariable content, a content which is the driving force of proletarian struggle and which the historic period imposes as a necessity for humanity: communism, classless society.

The myth of the opposition between the Italian Left and the German Left

This myth, upheld most notably by the ‘orthodox Bordigists’ of the International Communist Party3, opposes the ‘anarchism’ of the German Left to the ‘marxism’ of the Italian Left. But while it is true that the Italian Left developed its positions with a more rigorous analysis, the whole of the international left was a product of the same movement, defending, irrespective of natio­nality, the same fundamentally correct pos­itions: marxist anti-parliamentarianism; opposition to the unions; the rejection of frontism; the need for minority parties, welded together by strict communist princi­ples and rejecting all the opportunist tactics of the past. This book is particu­larly effective in dispelling this myth.

Barrot and Authier show that, even if an international left communist fraction was never constituted, the left fraction existed in all countries (Belgium with Jan Over­straeten and L’Ouvrier Communiste was no exception), and in particular that there were strong programmatic ties between the communist abstentionist fraction of the Italian Socialist Party (I1 Soviet) and the German Communist Left (Pannekoek and Gorter). In fact it was the Italian fraction which, after its conference in Florence in May 1920, instructed its delegates to the Communist International “to constitute an anti-parliamentian fraction within the IIIrd International ...” and insisted “on the incompatibility between communist principles and methods, and participation in elections alongside bourgeois representatives” (pps. 313-4). It was with the same aim, one year later, that delegates of the KAPD (Communist Workers’ Party of Germany) went to the IIIrd Congress of the CI. And Terraccini, dele­gate of the Italian Communist Party at the same Congress, supported the intervention of the KAPD against the frontist ‘tactic’ of the ‘open letter’. One could cite many more examples of common positions to demon­strate the programmatic links existing bet­ween the different left communist groups. But it is enough to say that all the left fractions were the product of the same move­ment, based on the realization that the international communist revolution was the order of the day, the only possible way for­ward for the working class. The weakness of the left equally expressed itself in their inability to create a real internatio­nal left fraction, able to struggle effec­tively against the degeneration of the CI, which was moving inexorably, on account of the defeat of the world revolution, towards the bourgeois camp. One could cite, apart from the German and Dutch Left and the Italian Left, the Hungarian Left around Bela Kun, Vorga and Lukacs, the Bulgarian Left around I. Ganchev, John Reed in America, Pankhurst’s group in England, the French Left with Lepetit and Sigrand, the Workers’ Opposition and Miasnikov’s group in Russia ... but as this extract from the text ‘The German Left and the Union Question in the IIIrd International’4 (see p.189) clearly shows:

“Just as the Commune was the ‘Child of the International Workingmen’s Association’ (Engels), the German Revolution was the child of the international left, which was never able to complete the task of forging itself into a unified organiza­tion. But from the stronger sections of the Left: the German Left, which dared in its struggles to follow the program­matic lead given by the revolutionary movement itself; and the Italian Left, whose historic task was to continue the work of the international left, to deve­lop and apply its understanding in its attacks against the victorious counter­revolution; from the work of these groups we can forge the theoretical arms which will form the basis of the future revolu­tionary movement, whose practice will be inspired ... by the example of the Ger­man Left. The future revolution will not be a question of banal repetition; but it will take up the historic thread begun by the international Communist Left.”

The German left and the question of the Party

Another important issue raised by this book, is, among all the weaknesses of the German Communists, that which proved most damaging of all: their incomprehension of the fundamental need of the proletariat for a strong ‘vanguard’, constituted before the decisive battles, which had decisively broken with all the opportunist and bourgeois positions taken up by the social democratic parties. To bring out the mistakes of the past does not mean rejecting the heroic struggle of the communist left. On the contrary, it allows revolutionaries to draw vital less­ons for the proletarian movement concerning the function and role of the communist vanguard. In this respect the German exper­ience is full of hesitations and misunder­standings; but we can also see a clear break with substitutionism and careerism, and a growing understanding that the ‘centrists’ of the CPs were being led, with the reflux of the revolutionary movement, into the camp of the bourgeoisie; this was expressed by their adoption of the position of ‘socialism in one country’, the very nega­tion of the communist programme. On the other hand one should not see the German Left as homogeneous, riddled to the core by ‘wait-and-seeism’ (the heritage of Rosa Luxemburg’s hesitations in breaking from Social Democracy), or by the denial of the need for revolutionary minorities, although the latter tendency did eventually find theoretical expression in the Essen tendency and the AAUD-E (General Workers’ Union of Germany -- Unitary Organization), with Otto Ruhle and Die Aktion. In fact the ‘Theses of the KAPD on the Role of the Party in the Proletarian Revolution’ dwelt at length on the need for the proletariat to create for itself “the historically determined form of organization which groups together the most conscious and prepared proletarian militants ... is the party.” The party must thus above all intransigently rid itself of all reformism and opportunism. This applies equally to its programme, its tactics, its publications, its specific slogans and its actions. In particular it must never inc­rease its membership more quickly than its ability to create a strong communist nucleus permits.5

In the same sense, the interventions of Jan Appel at the Third Congress of the CI, are also significant6:

“The proletariat needs an extremely tightly constructed party or nucleus. This is essential. Each individual com­munist must be irreproachable -- this must be our goal -- and able to assume the responsibilities of leadership if need be. In his relations, in the struggles into which he is plunged, he must be able to hold on -- and what he is holding on to, his lifeline, is the programme. He acts according to the decisions taken by communists. Here, the strictest pos­sible discipline reigns. If he fails in this, he must be expelled or disciplined. Thus it is a question of a party which is a nucleus that knows what it wants, that is solidly constructed and has proved itself in combat that has finished with negotiations and struggles ceaselessly. Such a party cannot arise until it is actually thrown into the struggle, when it has broken with the old traditions of the union movement, with the reformist methods of the union movement, with parliamentarism.”

Such a clear text can leave no further doubt as to the profoundly marxist nature of the KAPD, and allows us to understand that it is the dynamic of the class struggle which gives rise to the class party. This means that in periods of counter-revolution, any attempt to form the party can only serve to spread confusion. All that can remain are small groups which preserve the programmatic gains and the class positions. But with the emergence of a new wave of class struggle, “it is no longer a question of simply defen­ding the positions, but (on the basis of a constant elaboration of these positions, on the basis of the programme of the class) of being capable of cementing the spontan­eity of the class, of being an expression of the consciousness of the class, of helping to unify its forces for the decisive offensive, in other words, of building the party, an essential moment in the victory of the proletariat.” (‘Lessons of the German Revolution’ in the International Review of the ICC, no.2.)

To conclude this short review, it should be pointed out that the choice of texts pre­sented is not really representative and does not include many of the best works of the German Left, as the authors themselves admit. But in any case the publication of these texts in French can only contribute to the recognition of this current as one of the most important of the international communist left.

This book will help satisfy the urgent need of the re-emerging revolutionary movement to: “know its own past to be better able to criticize the past.”

Marc M.

1 The Communist Left in Germany 1918-21, by Dennis Authier and Jean Barrot, Edition Payot, Paris.

2 Among which is the other excellent work by D. Authier on this subject which includes more fundamental texts of the German Left: The German Left, (texts from the KAPD, AAUD, etc) – published by Invariance. A review of this book appears in Revolution Internationale no. 6 and Internationalism no. 5. For a more general treatment of this question there is an article in the International Review no. 2: ‘Lessons of the German Revolution’.

3 However, it is understandable that the degenerated vestiges of the International Communist Party try to camouflage their Leninist virtue with calumny and insinuations, since at least two splinter groups from the same PCI. Invariance and the Danish group, Kommunismen have republished some texts of the German Left.

4 This text is in fact by the Kommunismen group, which split from PCI in 1972.

5 Extract from Invariance no. 8. This text is available in English in Revolutionary Perspectives no. 4.

6 Extract from the German Left.

 

Geographical: 

  • Germany [73]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Left [4]

Texts on the state in the period of transition

  • 2603 reads

Draft resolution on the state in the period of transition

The platform of the ICC contains the essential acquisitions of the workers’ movement concerning the conditions and content of the communist revolution. These acquisitions can be summarized as follows:

a) All hitherto existing societies have been based on an insufficient development of the productive forces in relation to the needs of men. Because of this, with the exception of primitive communism, they have all been divided into social classes with antagonistic interests. This division has led to the appearance of an organ, the state, whose specific function has been to prevent these antagonisms from pulling society apart.

b) Because of the progress in the develop­ment of the productive forces stimulated by capitalism, it has become both possible and necessary to transcend capitalism with a society based on the full development of the productive forces, on the abundant satisfac­tion of human needs: communism. Such a society will no longer be divided into social classes and because of this will have no need of a state.

c) As in the past, between the two stable societies of capitalism and communism there will be a period of transition during which the old social relations will disappear and new ones put in their place. During this period, social classes and conflicts between them will continue to exist, and so therefore will an organ whose function is to prevent these conflicts endangering the existence of society: the state.

d) The experience of the working class has shown that there can be no organic continuity between this state and the state in capitalist society. For the period of transition from capitalism to communism to get underway, the capitalist state has to be complete­ly destroyed on a world scale.

e) The world-wide destruction of the political power of the bourgeoisie is accompanied by the global seizure of power by the proletariat, the only class capable of creating communism. The dictatorship of the proletariat over society will be based on the general organizations of the class: the workers’ councils. Only the working class in its entirety can exert power and undertake the communist transformation of society: in contrast to previous revolution­ary classes it cannot delegate power to any particular institution or to any political party, including the workers’ parties themselves.

f) The full exercise of power by the proletariat presupposes:

-- the general arming of the class

-- a categorical rejection of any subordin­ation to outside forces

-- the rejection of any relations of violence within the class.

g) The dictatorship of the proletariat will carry out its role as the lever of social transformation:

-- by expropriating the old exploiting classes

-- by progressively socializing the means of production

-- by conducting an economic policy which aims at the abolition of wage labour and commodity production and the growing satisfaction of human needs.

The platform of the ICC, basing itself on the experience of the Russian revolution, underlines “the complexity and seriousness of the problem of the relationship between the class and the state in the period of transition.” It considers that “in the coming period, the proletariat and revolutionaries cannot evade this problem, but must make every effort to resolve it.” This resolution is part of that effort.

I. The specificity of the period of transition from capitalism to communism

The period of transition from capitalism to communism has a certain number of features in common with previous transition periods. Thus, as in the past:

-- the period of transition from capitalism to communism does not have its own mode of production, but is an intertwining of two modes of production.

-- during this period there is a slow development of the seeds of the new mode of production to the detriment of the old one, until the new completely supplants the old.

-- the dying away of the old society does not automatically mean the maturation of the new one; it is simply the precondition for this maturation. In particular, although the decadence of capitalism expresses the fact that the productive forces can no longer expand within the framework of capitalist society, these productive forces are still insufficient for communism and therefore have to be further developed during the period of transition.

The second common feature which should be pointed out is that all periods of trans­ition point towards the society which is going to emerge at the end. To the extent that communism is fundamentally different from all other societies; the transition to communism has a number of unprecedented characteristics:

a) It is no longer a transition from one exploiting society to another, from one form of property to another, but leads to the end of all exploitation and of all property.

b) It is not carried out by an exploiting class which owns the means of production, but by an exploited class which has never possessed and will never -- not even collec­tively -- possess its own economy or means of production.

c) It does not culminate in the conquest of political power by a revolutionary class which has already established its economic rule over society: on the contrary it begins with and is conditioned by this conquest of power. The only rule that the proletariat can exert over society is of a political and not of an economic nature.

d) The political power of the proletariat will not aim to stabilize an existing state of affairs, preserve particular privileges or maintain the existence of class divisions; on the contrary it will seek to continually overturn the existing state of affairs, to abolish all privileges and class divisions.

II. The state and its role in history

Following Engels’ own terminology:

-- the state is not a power imposed on society from outside, but is a product of society at a given stage of its development

-- it is a sign of the fact that society has entered into insoluble contradictions, is rent into an irreconcilable conflict between classes with antagonistic economic interests

-- it has the function of moderating the conflict, of maintaining it within the limits of ‘order’, so that the antagonistic classes and society itself are not consumed in sterile struggles

-- having emerged from society, it places itself above it, and constantly tends to conserve itself and become a force alien to society

-- its role of preserving ‘order’ identif­ies the state with the dominant relations of production and thus with the class which embodies these relations: the economically dominant class, which guarantees its political domination through the state.

Marxism has thus never considered the state to be the ex nihilo creation of the ruling class, but as the product, the organic secretion, of the whole of society. The identification between the economically dominant class and the state is fundamentally the result of their common interest in preserving the existing relations of production. Similarly, in the marxist conception, one can never consider the state as a revolutionary agency, an instrument of historical progress. For marxism:

-- the class struggle is the motor force of history

-- whereas the function of the state is to moderate the class struggle, and in particular to the detriment of the exploited class.

The only logical conclusion which can be drawn from these premises is that in any society the state can only be a conservative institution par excellence. Thus while the state in all class societies is an instrum­ent which is indispensable to the productive process in that it guarantees the stability needed if production is to continue, it can only play this role because of its function as an agent of social order. In the course of history the state has operated as a conservative and reactionary factor of the first order, an obstacle which the evolution and development of the productive forces has constantly come up against.

In order to be able to assume its role as an agent of security and of conservation the state has based itself on a material force, on violence. In past societies, it has had an exclusive monopoly of all existing forces of violence: the police, the army, prisons.

Since its origin lies in the historic necessity of violence, since the conditions for its own development are to be found in its coercive functions, the state tends to become an independent and supplementary factor of violence in the interests of its own preservation. Violence is transformed from a means into an end in itself, maintained and cultivated by the state; by its very nature this violence is antithetical to any form of society which tends to go beyond violence as a way of regulating relations between human beings.

III. The state in the period of transition to communism

During the period of transition the division of society into classes with antagonistic interests will give rise to a state. This state will have the task of guaranteeing the basis of this transitional society both against any attempt to restore the power of the old exploiting classes and against any disintegration of the social fabric resulting from conflicts between the non-exploiting classes which still subsist.

The state of the period of transition has a certain number of differences from previous states:

-- for the first time in history, it is not the state of an exploiting minority for the oppression of the majority, but is on the contrary the state of the majority of exploited and non-exploiting classes against the old ruling minority.

-- it is not the emanation of a stable society and relations of production, but on the contrary of a society whose permanent characteristic is a constant transformation on a greater scale than anything else in history

-- it cannot identify itself with any economically dominant class because there is no such class in the period of transition

-- in contrast to states in past societies, the transitional state does not have a monopoly of arms. For all these reasons marxists have talked about a ‘semi-state’ when referring to the organ which will arise in the transition period

On the other hand, this state still retains a number of the characteristics of past states. In particular, it will still be the guardian of the status quo, the task of which will be to codify, legalize, and sanction an already existing economic order, to give it a legal force which has to be acknowledged by every member of society. In this sense the state remains a fundament­ally conservative organ which will tend:

-- not to favourize social transformation but to act against it

-- to maintain the conditions on which its own life depends: the division of society into classes

-- to detach itself from society, to impose itself on society and perpetuate its own existence and its own privileges

-- to bind its existence to the coercion and violence which it will of necessity use during the period of transition, and to try to maintain this method of regulating social relations

This is why from the beginning marxists have always considered the state of the period of transition to be a ‘necessary scourge’ whose ‘worst sides’ the proletariat will have to ‘lop off as much as possible’. For all these reasons, and in contrast to what has happened in the past, the revolutionary class cannot identify itself with the state in the period of transition.

To begin with, the proletariat is not an economically dominant class, either in capitalist society or the transitional society. During the transition period it will possess neither an economy nor any property, not even collectively; it will struggle for the abolition of economy and property. Secondly, the proletariat, the communist class, the subject which transforms the economic and social conditions of the transitional society, will necessarily come up against an organ whose task is to perpetuate these conditions. This is why one cannot talk about a 'socialist state', a 'workers' state' or a 'state of the proletar­iat' during the period of transition.

This antagonism between the proletariat and the state manifests itself both on the immediate and the historical level.

On the immediate level, the proletariat will have to oppose the encroachments and pressure of a state which is the represent­ative of a society divided into antagonistic classes.

On the historic level, the necessary disappearance of the state in communist society, which is a perspective which marxism has always defended, will not be the result of the state’s own dynamic, but the fruit of the pressure mounted on it by the proletariat, which will progressively deprive it of all its attributes as the movement towards a classless society unfolds.

For these reasons, while the proletariat will have to use the state during the transition period, it must retain a complete independ­ence from it. In this sense the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be confused with the state. Between the two there is a constant relation of force which the prolet­ariat will have to maintain in its favour: the dictatorship of the proletariat is not exerted through or in the state, but over the state.

Concrete relationships between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state in the transition period

The experience of the Paris Commune, and of the revolution in Russia during which the state became the main agent of the counter­revolution, have shown the need for a certain number of measures which will make it possible:

-- to limit the ‘worst sides’ of the state

-- to guarantee the full independence of the revolutionary class

-- for the proletariat to exert its dictatorship over the state

a) The limitation of the most pernicious characteristics of the transitional state is effected by the fact that:

-- the state is not constituted on the basis of a specialized stratum, the political parties, but on the basis of delegates elected by local territorial councils and revocable by them

-- the whole organization of the state categorically excludes the participation of exploiting classes and strata, who will be deprived of all political rights

-- the remuneration of the members of the state, the functionaries, can never be more than that of the workers

b) The independence of the working class is expressed by:

-- its programme

-- the existence of its class parties, which, in contrast to bourgeois parties, can neither be integrated into the state, nor take on any state function without degener­ating and completely losing their function in the class

-- the self-organization of the proletariat as a class in the workers’ councils, which are distinct from all state institutions

-- the arming of the proletariat

This independence is defended against the state and the other classes in society:

-- by the fact that the proletariat will forbid them from intervening in its own activity and organizations

-- by the fact that the proletariat will retain its capacity to defend its immediate interests through a number of means, including strikes

c) The dictatorship of the proletariat over the state and society as a whole is based essentially:

-- on the fact that the other classes are forbidden to organize themselves as classes

-- on the proletariat’s hegemonic participation within all the organizations upon which the state is founded

-- on the fact that the proletariat is , the only armed class


 

Proposed resolution on the period of transition, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the tasks of the workers’ state

“We must take into account the impossibility of arriving at a transitional phase with notions that are fixed, complete, which don’t allow any logical contradiction and which exclude any idea of a transition.” (Bilan)


 

A) The period of transition from capitalism to communism

(1) The succession of modes of production; slavery, feudalism, capitalism, did not, properly speaking, undergo periods of transition. The new relations on the base of which the progressive social form was being built was created inside the old society. The old system and the new coexisted (until the second supplanted the first) and this cohabitation was possible because between these different societies there only existed an antagonism of form; all remained in essence exploitative societies. The succession of communism from capitalism differs fundamentally from all previous societies. Communism cannot emerge within capitalism because between the two societies there is not only a difference of form but equally a difference of content. Communism is no longer a society of exploitation, and the motive force of production is no longer the satisfaction of the needs of a minority. This difference of content excludes the coexistence of one with the other and creates the necessity for a period of transition during which the new relations and the new society are developed outside capitalism.

(2) Between capitalist society and communist society there is a period of revolutionary transformation from one to the other. This transitional period is not only inevitable but also necessary to complete the immature material and spiritual condit­ions inherited by the proletariat from capitalism (an immaturity which precludes the immediate establishment of communism at the end of the revolution). This period is characterized by the fusion of two social processes, one dismantling the relations and categories belonging to the system in decline, the other building relations and categories relevant to the new system. The specificity of the epoch of transition resides in this: the proletariat which has conquered political power (by the revolut­ion) and guaranteed its domination (by its dictatorship) engages in the systematic and uninterrupted overthrow of the relations of production and the form of consciousness and organization dependent on those relations. During the intermediate period, using political and economic measures, the working class develops the productive forces left as the heritage of capitalism while under­mining the basis of the old system and laying the basis of new social relations. The proletariat will produce and distribute goods in such a way as to allow all the producers to realize the full satisfaction, the free expansion, of their needs.

B) The political regime in the period of transition

(3) For capitalism, the substitution of its privileges for feudal privileges -- the epoch of bourgeois revolutions -- was able to accommodate itself to a lasting coexistence between capitalist and feudal states and even pre-feudal states without altering or suppressing the basis of the new system. The bourgeoisie, on the basis of a gradual attainment of its economic position, did not have to destroy the state apparatus of the dominant class; it was able to gradually take it over. It did not have to suppress the bureaucracy, nor the police, nor the permanent armed forces; it simply had to subordinate these instruments of oppression to its own ends, because its political revolution (which was not always indispensable) merely concretized an economic hegemony and juridically substitut­ed one form of exploitation for another. Things are different for the proletariat, which, having no economic base and no particular interest, cannot content itself with taking over the old state apparatus. The period of transition cannot begin until after the proletarian revolution, whose essence is the global destruction of the political domination of capitalism and, primarily, of bourgeois nation states. The seizure of general political power in society by the working class, the institut­ion of the global dictatorship of the proletariat, precedes, conditions and guarantees the advance of the economic and social transformation.

(4) Communism is a society without classes, and, consequently, without a state. The period of transition, which does not really develop until after the triumph of revolut­ion at the international level, is a dynamic period which tends towards the disappearance of classes, but which still experiences the division into classes and the persistence of divergent interests and antagonisms in society. As such, there must inevitably arise a dictatorship and a form of political state. The proletariat cannot make up for the temporary insufficiency of the productive forces left over by capital­ism without resorting to constraint. In fact, the transitional epoch is characterized by the necessity to discipline and regiment the evolution of production, to expand production in such a way as to allow the establishment of a communist society. The danger of the restoration of the bourgeoisie is also a result of this insufficiency of production and of the productive forces. The dictatorship and the use made of the state are indispensable to the proletariat, which is faced with the necessity to direct the use of violence to root out the privileges of the bourgeoisie, to dominate it politically, and to organize in a new way the forces of production that are gradually being liberated from the fetters of capitalism.

C) Origins and role of the state in history

5) In all societies divided into classes, in order to prevent the classes with opposed and irreconcilable interests from destroying each other, and at the same time consuming the whole of society, there arise superstructures, institutions, whose pinnacle is the state. The state is born to maintain class conflict, within certain limits. This does not at all mean that it can manage to reconcile antagonistic inter­ests on a terrain of ‘democratic’ under­standing, nor that it can play the role of ‘mediator’ between classes. As the state arises from the need to discipline class antagonisms, but as at the same time it arises in the midst of class conflict, it is in general the state of the most powerful class, which has imposed itself politically and militarily on the historic relation of forces, and which, through the intermediary of the state, impose, its domination.

“The state is the special organization of a power” (Engels), it is the centralized exercise of violence by one class against the others, and has the task of providing society with a political framework ,which conforms to the interests of the ruling class The state is the organ which maintains the cohesion of society, not by realizing a so-called ‘common good’ (which is completely non-existent), but by carrying out all the tasks involved in the rule of a given class, at various levels: economic, juridical, political, and ideological. Its own role is not only one of administration, but above all, the maintenance, by violence, of the conditions of domination of the ruling class over the dominated classes; it is to assure the extension, the development, the conservation of specific relations of production, against the dangers of restorat­ion or of destruction.

(6) Whatever the forms that society, classes, and the state may take, the role of the latter always remains fundamentally the same: the assurance of the domination of one class over the others. The state is not then “a conservative organ by nature”. It is revolutionary in certain periods, conservat­ive or counter-revolutionary in others because, far from being an autonomous factor in history, it is the instrument, the extension, the form of organization of social classes which are born, mature and disappear. The state is tightly bound to the cycle of the class and so is proved to be progressive or reactionary according to the historic relation of the class to the devel­opment of the productive forces and of society (depending on whether it favours or acts as a fetter on such development).

It is necessary to be wary of holding onto a strictly ‘instrumentalist’ vision of the state. By definition a class weapon in the immediate conflicts of society, the state is affected in turn by those same conflicts. Far from being simply the tributary of the will of the ruling class, the state apparat­us sustains the pressure of various classes and various interests. Both the economic framework and the political and military relations of force intervene to determine the actions of the state (and the possibilit­ies for its evolution). It is in this sense that the state “is never in advance of the existing state of affairs”. In fact, if in certain periods the state allows progressive classes to exercise political power in order to extend their relations of production, it is constrained -- in these same periods and in pursuit of the same aims -- to defend the new society against internal and external dangers, to bind together scattered aspects of production, of distribution, of social, cultural and ideological life; and it must do this with means which do not always and necessarily emerge from the programme of the revolutionary class, from the basic tendencies of the nascent society. “Thus, it is necessary to consider that the formula ‘the state is the organ of a class’ is not, formally speaking, a response per se to the phenomena which have determined it, the philosophers stone which lies at the bottom of all enquiry; but it does mean that the relations between class and state are determined by the function of a given class” (Bilan).

D) The need for soviets as the state power of the proletariat

(7) The state which succeeds the bourgeois state is a new form of organization of the proletariat, by virtue of which it trans­forms itself from an oppressed class into a ruling class and exercises its revolution­ary dictatorship over society. The territorial soviets (of workers, poor peasants, soldiers...) as the state power of the proletariat signify:

-- the attempt by the proletariat, as the only class which is the bearer of socialism, to struggle for the organization of all the exploited classes and strata

-- the continuation, with the help of the soviet system, of the class struggle against the bourgeoisie, which remains the most powerful class even at the beginning of the dictatorship of the proletariat, even after its expropriation and political subordination.

The proletariat still has need of a state apparatus, as much for repressing the desperate resistance of the bourgeoisie as for directing the mass of the population in the struggle against the capitalist class and for the establishment of communism. There is no need to idealize this situation: “The state is only a transitional institut­ion which will be used in the struggle, in the revolution, in order to hold down one’s adversaries by force, it is pure nonsense to talk of a free peoples’ state: so long as the proletariat still uses the state, it does not use it in the interests of freedom, but in order to hold down its adversaries.” (Engels)

(8) A product of the division of society into classes, of the irreconcilable nature of class antagonisms, the dictatorship of the proletariat is distinguished however from the power (and thus the state) of past ruling classes, by the following characteristics:

a) the proletariat does not exercise its dictatorship with a view to building a new society of oppression and exploitation. In consequence, it has no need, like old ruling classes, to hide its aims, to mystify other classes by presenting its dictatorship as the reign of “liberty, equality, and fraternity”. The proletariat resolutely affirms that its dictatorship is a class dictatorship; that the organs of its political power are the organs which serve, by their activity, the proletarian programme, to the exclusion of the programmes and interests of all other classes. It is in this sense that Marx, Engels, Lenin and the Fraction spoke -- and had to speak -- not of a state “of the majority of exploited and non-exploiting classes” (the encapsulation of the intermediate formations in the state is not synonymous with a division of power), not of a “non-class” state, or a “multi-class” state (ideological and aberrant concepts), but of a proletarian state, a state of the working class, which will be one of the indispensable forms of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

b) the domination of the majority, organized and directed by the proletariat, over the minority, dispossessed of their prerogatives, renders useless the maintenance of a bureaucratic and military machine; the proletariat puts in its place both its self-arming -- to smash all bourgeois resistance -- and a political form which allows it (and eventually the whole of humanity) to progressively take over the management of society. It suppresses the privileges inherent in the functioning of the old states (leveling of salaries, rigorous control of functionaries through election and permanent revocability) and also the separation, enforced by parliament­arism, between legislative and executive organs. From its formation, the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat ceases to be a state in the old sense of the term.

For the bourgeois state is substituted the Soviets, a semi-state, a Commune-state; the organization of the rule of the old class is replaced by institutions essentially different in principle.

E) Withering away or strengthening of the state

(9) Considering what we have said about the conditions and historic surroundings in which the proletarian state is born, it is evident that its disappearance cannot be conceived of except as a sign of the development of the world revolution, and more profoundly, the economic and social transformation. In unfavourable conditions for struggle (on the political, economic and military level) the workers’ state can find itself constrained to strengthen itself, both to prevent the disintegration of society, and to carry out the tasks of the defence of a proletarian dictatorship erected in one or several countries. This obligation reacts in turn on its own nature: the state acquires a contradictory character. Whilst being the instrument of a class, it is at the same time forced to organize distribution and social, responsib­ilities according to norms which are not always and necessarily relevant, to an immediate tendency towards communism. In coherence with the conception developed by Lenin, Trotsky and above all Bilan we must then admit -- beyond metaphysical preoccupat­ions -- that the workers’ state, although assuring the domination of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, always expresses it’s temporary powerlessness to suppress bourgeois right. This continues to exist, not only in the economic and social process, but in the heads of millions of proletarians, billions of individuals. Even after the political victory of the proletariat, the state continually threatens to give rise to social stratifications which more and more stand against the liberating mission of the working class. Also, in certain periods, “if the state, instead of wither­ing away, becomes more and more despotic, if the mandates of the working class bureaucratize themselves, while the bureaucracy erects itself over society, this is not only for secondary reasons, such as ideological survivals of the past, etc; it is by virtue of the inflexible necessity to form and maintain a privileged minority, as long as it is not possible to assure real equality” (Trotsky). Until the disapp­earance of the state, until its re-absorption in a society that administers itself, the state continues to have this negative aspect; a necessary instrument of historic evolution, it constantly threatens to direct this evolution not to the advantage of the producers, but against them and towards their massacre.

F) The proletariat and the state

10) The specific physiognomy of the workers’ state devolves as follows:

-- on the one hand, as a weapon directed against the expropriated class, it reveals its ‘strong’ side

-- on the other hand, as an organism called forth not to consolidate a new system of exploitation but to abolish all exploitation, it uncovers its ‘weak’ side (because, in unfavourable conditions, it tends to become the pole of attraction for capitalist privileges). That’s why, whilst there cannot be antagonisms between the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois state, they can arise between the proletariat and the transitional state. With the foundation of the proletarian state, the historic relation­ship between the ruling class and the state finds itself modified. It is necessary to consider that:

a) the conquering of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the existence of the workers’ state, are conditions which are advantageous to the world proletariat, but not an irrevocable guarantee against any tendency to degeneration;

b) if the state is proletarian, this in no way means that there could be no need or possibility for the proletariat to enter into conflict with it, or that no opposition to state policies can be tolerated;

c) contrary to past states, the proletar­ian state cannot synthesize, concentrate in its apparatus, all the aspects of the dictatorship. The workers’ state is profoundly different from the unitary organ of the class and the organ which regroups the vanguard of the proletariat. This differentiation operates because the state, in spite of the appearance of its greater material power, has, from the political point of view, less possibility of action. It is many times more vulnerable to the enemy than the other workers’ organs. The proletariat can only compensate for this weakness by its class politics, its party and the workers’ councils through which it exercises an indispensable control over the state’s activities, develops its class consciousness, and ensures the defence of its interests. The active presence of these organisms is the condition for the state to remain proletarian. The foundation of the dictatorship resides not only in the fact that no interdiction can limit the activities of the workers’ councils and the party (proscription of violence within the class, permanent right to strike, autonomy of the councils and the party, freedom of tendencies in these organs), but also that these organs must have the means to resist an eventual metamorphosis of the state, should the latter tend not towards its disappearance, but towards the triumph of its despotic tendencies.

G) On the dictatorship and the tasks of the workers’ state

(11) The role and aim of capitalism determines the role and aim of its different state forms: to maintain oppression for the profit of the bourgeoisie. As for the proletariat, it is again the role and aim of the working class which will determine the role and aim of the proletarian state. But in this case, the policy of the state is no longer an indifferent element in determin­ing its role (as was the case for the bourgeois and all proceeding classes) but an element of the highest importance, on which will depend its basic function in the world revolution, and by definition, the conserva­tion of its proletarian character.

(12) A proletarian policy will direct economic policy towards communism only if that development is given an orientation diametrically opposed to that of capitalism, only if it aims for a progressive, constant raising of the living conditions of the masses. To the degree that the political situation allows, the proletariat must press for a constant reduction in unpaid labour, which, in consequence, will inevitably lead to the rhythm of accumulat­ion becoming considerably slower than that of the capitalist economy. Any other policy will necessarily lead to the transformation of the proletarian state into a new bourgeois state, following the pattern of events in Russia.

(13) In any case, accumulation cannot be based on the necessity to combat the econom­ic and military power of the capitalist states. The global revolution can only come out of the ability of the proletariat of all countries to fulfill its mission, out of the world-wide maturation of the political conditions for the insurrection. The working class cannot borrow from the bourgeoisie its vision of a “revolutionary war”. In the period of civil war the struggle will not be between proletarian states and capitalist states, but between the world proletariat and the international bourgeoisie. In the activity of the proletarian state, the economic and military spheres are necessarily secondary.

(14) The transitional state is essentially an instrument for political domination and cannot be a substitute for the international class struggle. The workers’ state must be considered a tool of the revolution, and never as a pole of concentration for it. If the proletariat follows the latter course, it will be forced to make compromises with its class enemies, whereas revolutionary necessity imperatively demands a ruthless struggle against all anti-proletarian groupings, even at the risk of aggravating the economic disorganization resulting from the revolution. Any other perspective, which takes as its point of departure so-called ‘realism’, or an apparent ‘law of unequal development’, can only undermine the foundations of the proletarian state, and lead to its transformation into a bourgeois state under the false guise of ‘socialism in one country’.

(15) The dictatorship of the proletariat must ensure that the forms and procedures for control by the masses are many and varied, so as to prevent any shadow of degeneration and deformation of soviet power. It must have the aim of continuously weeding out “the tares of bureaucracy” an evil excrescence which will inevitably accompany the period of transition. The safeguard of the revolution is the conscious activity of the working masses. The true political task of the proletariat lies in raising its own class consciousness, just as it transforms the consciousness of the whole of the labouring population. Compared to this task, the exercise of constraint through the policy and administrative organs of the workers’ state is secondary (and the proletariat must take care to limit its most pernicious effects). The proletariat must not lose sight of this: that “so long as (it) still uses the state, it does not use it in the interests of freedom, but in order to hold down its adversaries.”

S, RC, Ry, M, P, JL, RJ, AF.

 

Life of the ICC: 

  • Contribution to discussion [74]
  • Life in the ICC [2]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Period of Transition [19]

From monetary crisis to the war economy

  • 2000 reads

This report on the international situation is an effort to trace the basic politico-economic perspectives which will face the capitalist system on a world scale over the coming years. Rather than a detailed ana­lysis of the present economic and political conjuncture in even the major capitalist states -- analyses which are now forthcoming on a regular basis in the publications of the various territorial sections of the International Communist Current -- we will concentrate on indicating the broad lines, the fundamental axes, which will determine the course of the capitalist economy over the next years, and which will shape the political orientation of the various nat­ional bourgeoisies and the actions of the two imperialist blocs. In so doing we hope to elaborate a coherent perspective with which to guide the intervention of the. ICC in the increasingly decisive class battles which lie ahead; a perspective which will be one of the elements which will insure that the ICC can become an active factor in the development of proletarian class conscious­ness, can become a vital element in the proletarian storm which will uproot and destroy the capitalist state throughout the world and initiate the transition to communism.

Despite the triumphant proclamations of ‘recovery’ with which bourgeois politicians and statesmen have attempted to feed an increasingly hungry and impoverished world for the past two years, the global capital­ist economic crisis has relentlessly deep­ened. In the industrialized nations of the American bloc (the OECD), both the growth in real GNP and in exports has been declining since the beginning of 1977:

Percentage change, seasonally adjusted annual rates

*1977 est

Yet even these dismal figures do not begin to convey the catastrophic situation in which the economically weakest European countries like Britain, Italy, Spain, and Portugal now find themselves. Quasi-stagnant GNPs, a collapse of investment in new plant, and huge trade and balance of payments deficits have led to effective devaluation of their currencies, drastic falls in their foreign exchange reserves and burgeoning foreign debts. The result has been hyperinflation (Britain: 16-17% Italy: 21%; Spain: 30%; Portugal more than 30%) and massive unemployment (Britain: 1.5 million; Italy: 1.5 million; Spain: 1 million; Portugal: 500,000 - 18% officially). All four countries are virtually bankrupt, and are only being kept afloat by loans and credits which ultimately depend on a green light from the US. The bourgeoisies of these sick men of Europe no longer even speak of ‘recovery’ or ‘growth’; their new watchword is ‘stabilization’, the euphemism for the draconian austerity, de­flation and stagnation to which their eco­nomic weakness and the dictates of their creditors condemn them. Moreover the ranks of these sick men are now being joined by France, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden and Canada, countries whose economic strength was unquestioned in bourgeois circles a few years ago, but which are now rapidly sinking into the quagmire of unmanageable trade and payments deficits, devaluations, mounting debts, hyper-inflation, and sky-rocketing unemployment, which have already claimed their weaker neighbours.

A look at the economic giants of the American bloc -- the US, West Germany, and Japan -- will quickly reveal the extreme fragility and grim prospects for even these seemingly strong economies. The apparent health of Germany and Japan -- with their fat trade surpluses and robust currencies -- rests almost exclusively on massive export drives and systematic dumping. The US, meanwhile, has benefitted from a reflation­ary package which has now run its course, and the fact that its trade deficit has been largely offset by huge invisible earnings (interest payments, profits, from foreign investments, capital transfers, etc) which accrue to the leader of the imperialist bloc. Indeed, despite their protestations that they would not indulge in a beggar-thy-neighbour policy to atten­uate the shock of the world crisis, the US, Germany and Japan have done precisely that, and have preserved a semblance of economic health only by deflecting the worst effects of the crisis onto the weaker nations of the bloc. However, with new investment down alarmingly, and with the trade deficit countries taking extreme steps to slash their imports, the prospects of the US, Germany and Japan achieving their planned -- for 1977 growth targets (US: 5.8%; Germany: 5%; Japan: 6.7%) and there­by reducing their already dangerously high unemployment (US: 6.7 million; Germany: 1.4 million; Japan: 1.4 million) let alone providing any sort of stimulus for their weaker ‘partners’, appears increasingly dim. Nor will any of the three giants take up the slack through new reflationary budgets at home, faced as they are with the spectre of galloping inflation, which is already again rapidly heading towards double digits in the US (6.4% and Japan (9.4%)

In the Russian bloc (COMECON) even the state planning agencies must now acknowledge the presence and growth of inflation and unemployment -- the unmistakable effects of capitalist production and its permanent crisis. Economic activity in the Russian bloc has been fuelled by $35-40 billion in loans by western banks over the past few years (part of the explosion of credit by the American bloc in a vain effort to com­pensate for the saturation of the world market). The Russian bloc has now launched a massive export drive, a frantic quest for markets, on the outcome of which the repayment of its huge loans depends. Yet not only does this export offensive occur at a time when the countries of the Ameri­can bloc are desperately moving to cut imports to the bone and when the countries of the ‘Third World’ hover on the brink of bankruptcy, it will also come to grief because of the barriers to additional loans (a result of both political and financial considerations) without which the Russian bloc cannot purchase the new technology which alone could make -- in conjunction with the planned attacks on the working class -- her commodities competitive on the world market. Thus, after a great burst of trade and exchanges with the American bloc between 1971-1976, the Russian bloc finds itself in an economic cul-de-sac.

The Third World -- including even its indus­trial powerhouses like South Africa, Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, etc -- sinks deeper into a growing barbarism with each passing day. The nightmare world of hunger, disease, labour camps and begging to which decadent capitalism condemns the masses of humanity has already claimed countries constituting two thirds of the world’s population. The $78 billion in loans to the Third World in 1974-1976 have done practically nothing to even slow the rush of these economies towards total collapse (though they were a temporary palliative for the lack of effective demand which was condemning more and more of the world’s industrial apparatus to idleness). Yet given the complete bankruptcy of the Third World countries, whatever new funds are forthcoming -- on a greatly reduced scale -- will serve only to avert default on past loans and the resultant collapse of major western banks. The brutal austerity which the regimes of the Third World –‘socialist’, Marxist-Leninist, Nationalist, and Democratic -- are now in the process of imposing, in a desperate attempt to reduce the staggering trade deficit ($22 billion in 1976 for the non-oil developing countries with the OECD alone!) brought on by their dependence on raw material and agricultural exports, will be a death sentence to millions.

We can better understand why the perspective which faces world capital today is one of an inevitable fall in production and trade, if we look at the nature, bases and limits of the upturn in production and trade during the winter of 1975-76, following the excep­tionally sharp downward plunge of 1975, and the spurt in output (though not in trade) which occurred this past winter, following last summer’s lull. The collapse of 1975 was halted primarily by hastily devised reflationary budgets and a new massive explo­sion of credit, the creation of fictitious capital, which could for a short time once again, offset the saturation of markets which underlies capitalism’s death crisis. To these two factors must be added the momen­tary shot in the arm contributed by the inventory re-stocking which followed the run-down of stocks as production plummeted, as well as falling savings by the middle classes which provoked a mini-boom in con­sumer durables (cars, etc) and which owed less to any confidence in recovery than to a well-placed conviction in the permanence of inflation. Both of these last two fac­tors helped fuel the OECD countries 7-8% growth in real GNP achieved in the winter of 1975-76, while only the credit explosion and governmental fiscal stimulation under­pinned the much more fragile upturn this winter.

Today, the barriers to a continuation of the credit explosion -- without which world trade will shrink -- is apparent in the growing threat of default by the biggest borrowers like Zaire, Peru, Mexico and Brazil, and in the gaping trade and payments deficits which plague the Third World, the Russian bloc and the weaker countries of the American bloc. The sources of credit are drying up as the capacity of the debtor countries to repay their recent loans has been stretched to the breaking point. New loans to the countries of the Third World -- hesitantly provided by the IMF rather than the overextended ‘private’ banks -- will serve to assure repayment of past loans and their service, and not to finance a contin­ued flow of commodities. Moreover, such loans will be contingent on strict controls over the debtor countries’ economies and the requirement that they reduce or eliminate their payments deficits by drastically slashing their imports. To this consider­able pressure which will contract world trade must be added the politico-financial limita­tions to a new round of massive loans to the Russian bloc, without which trade between the two blocs will decline. Finally, the trade deficit countries of the American bloc have been driven to the verge of bankruptcy by their mounting debts and their payments deficits. Having reached the limits of their credit-worthiness, and facing economic collapse, these countries must either opt for protectionism and autarky or accept IMF control and discipline -- either of which means strict limitations on imports and a further contraction of world trade.

Shrinking world trade cannot be offset by a sharp rise in demand within the industrial heartlands of capitalism. The obstacles to a continuation (let alone acceleration) of the fiscal stimulation which has been practically the sole basis for a higher level of demand in the industrialized coun­tries of the American bloc, preclude the launching of any ambitious ‘recovery’ pro­grammes and the introduction of reflationary budgets or policies adequate to generate a new spurt in industrial output. In those countries wracked by hyper-inflation, so long as political conditions permit (the level of class struggle) cuts in ‘public’ spending, compression of the money supply, in other words, deflation is a necessity. In the ‘strong’ economies (the US, Germany, Japan) the bourgeoisie is extremely hesitant to reflate lest it unleash the hyperinfla­tion which its array of austerity measures have for the moment kept at bay.

If governmental fiscal stimulation can no longer be utilized on the past scale to prevent a fall in production, the collapse will be all the more devastating because of the present catastrophic decline in new investments in industrial plant. The bour­geoisie’s unwillingness to invest is linked to the prodigious and continuing fall in the rate of profit since world capital again plunged into open crisis around 1967. This phenomenon can be illustrated by the situation of German capital (which has cer­tainly weathered the first assaults of the open crisis better than practically any other) where the average rate of profit after taxes was 6% in 1960-67, 5.3% in 1967-71, and 4.1% in 1972-75. The fall in the rate of profit has accelerated as a result of the growth in unproductive expenditures by the capitalist state as it tries to counter­act the effects of the saturation of the world market and contain the class antagon­isms brought to a fever pitch by the deepen­ing crisis. This, and the high interest rates with which the bourgeoisie desperately seeks to combat the hyper-inflation which its unproductive -- but necessary -- expendi­tures have generated, have depressed invest­ments (particularly in Department I, the production of the means of production) to the point where a collapse of production looms menacingly on the horizon.

The failure of the different governments’ efforts to stimulate their economies and overcome the effects of the crisis with alternating ‘recovery’ and austerity pro­grammes and budgets, the persistence and worsening of galloping inflation together with recession, of an explosion of credit together with a devastating fall in invest­ments, of dwindling profit rates together with unprecedented levels of ‘public’ spending, of massive unemployment together with huge budget deficits, all demonstrate the absolute bankruptcy of Keynesianism, of the reliance on fiscal and monetary policy, which has been the cornerstone of bourgeois economic policy since the reappearance of the open crisis in 1967. The impossibility of stimulating the economy without setting off hyper-inflation, the impossibility of controlling inflation without a dizzying fall in production and profits, the increa­singly short gaps between the swings of recession and galloping inflation, in fact, the permanent and simultaneous character of recession and inflation have shattered the economic theories (sic) on which the bourgeoisie has based its policies. The impotence of governmental fiscal and mone­tary policy before a new plunge in world trade and production, impose on the bour­geoisie a new economic policy to face its death crisis.

The bourgeoisie must attempt to escape the breakdown of Keynesian policies by recourse to a more and more totalitarian and direct control over the whole economy by the state apparatus. And if important factions of the bourgeoisie still hesitate to admit that Keynesianism has had its day, its more in­telligent representatives have no doubts about what the alternative will be. The leading spokesmen for the US’s dominant financial-industrial groups put it this way:

“If fiscal and monetary policy can bring the economy back toward balance, this will be all they need. If the broad policies fail, however, government, labour and business can all expect (state) intervention on a scale for which there is no precedent in this country.” (Business Week, 4 April, 1977)

Revolutionaries must be absolutely clear about the nature of the steps which capi­talism’s permanent crisis forces each national faction of the bourgeoisie to take, about the thrust of state capitalism, a new phase in whose evolution faces our class:

“State capitalism is not an attempt to resolve the essential contradictions of capitalism as a system for the exploita­tion of labour power, but the manifesta­tion of these contradictions. Each grouping of capitalist interests tries to deflect the effects of the crisis of the system onto a neighbouring, competing grouping, by appropriating it as a market and field for exploitation. State capitalism is born of the neces­sity for this grouping to carry out its concentration and to put external markets under its control. The economy is there­fore transformed into a war economy.” (‘The Evolution of Capitalism and the New Perspective’, 1952, reprinted in Bulletin D’Etude et de Discussion of Revolution Internationale, no.8, p.9).

The war economy which is arising on the shambles of Keynesianism is in no sense a way out of the world crisis, it is not an economic policy which can solve the contra­dictions of capitalism, nor provide the basis for a new stage of capitalist dev­elopment. The war economy can only be understood in terms of the inevitability of another inter-imperialist war if the proletariat does not put an end to the reign of the bourgeoisie; it is the indis­pensable framework for the bourgeoisie’s preparations for the conflagration which the blind laws of capitalism and the inexor­able deepening of the crisis impose on it. The only function of the war economy is... war: It’s raison d’être is the systematic and efficient destruction of the means of production and the production of the means of destruction -- the very logic of capital­ist barbarism.

Only the institution of a war economy can now prevent the capitalist productive appar­atus from grinding to a halt. In order to establish a full-fledged war economy, how­ever, each national faction of capital must:

1. subject the whole apparatus of produc­tion and distribution to the totalitar­ian control of the state, and direct the economy towards a single goal -- war.

2. drastically reduce the consumption of all social classes and strata.

3. massively increase the output and degree of exploitation of the one class which is the source of all value, of all wealth -- the proletariat.

The enormity and difficulty of such an undertaking is the cause of the growing political crisis in which the bourgeoisie of each country now finds itself enmeshed. The totalitarian organization of the economy and its direction to a single goal often produce bitter struggles between factions of the bourgeoisie, as those factions whose particular interests will be sacrificed fight against the juggernaut of statifica­tion. The reduction in overall consumption which the war economy necessitates provokes incessant turmoil and bitter opposition within the ranks of the middle strata, petty-bourgeoisie and peasants. But it is the assault on the proletariat which -- be­cause it risks unleashing a generalized class war -- is not only the most difficult task for the bourgeoisie to accomplish in the present conjuncture, but the veritable key to the constitution of a war economy. The war economy absolutely depends on the physical and/or ideological submission of the proletariat to the state, on the degree of control that the state has over the working class.

The war economy in the present epoch, how­ever, is not simply established on a nat­ional scale, but also on the scale of an imperialist bloc. Incorporation into one of the two imperialist blocs -- each one dominated by a mammoth continental state capitalism, the US and Russia -- is a nece­ssity which not even the bourgeoisies of formerly great imperialist powers like Britain, France, Germany and Japan can resist. The powerful drive by the US and Russia to co-ordinate, organize and direct the war-making potential of their blocs intensifies the political crisis of each national bourgeoisie as the pressure to bow to the requirements for the consolida­tion of the imperialist bloc on the one hand and the need to defend the national capital interest on the other, generate irresistible and growing tensions.

We shall now, in turn, look at the specific problems which are faced and the actual measures being taken by the bourgeoisie in the US and throughout the American bloc, and by the bourgeoisie in the Russian bloc, to organize their war economies, to over­come the different types of resistance this generates, and to resolve their poli­tical crises. We will then focus on the sharpening inter-imperialist conflicts throughout the world which are relentlessly, though gradually, leading the imperialist blocs towards world war. Finally, we will indicate the perspectives for the intensi­fication of the class struggle of the prole­tariat, indicating the impediments to and the tendencies towards generalized class war.

The United States and the American bloc

In his first months as President of the US, Jimmy Carter has dealt a stinging rebuke to the orthodox Keynesians within his adminis­tration by scrapping his original reflationary budget (in eliminating the proposed tax rebates and new investment tax credits, Carter presented a budget which is less expansionary than the one proposed by his Republican predecessor, Gerald Ford!). But if Carter and his team have seen the limits of Keynesianism, they are certainly not beating a retreat to the ‘fiscal conserva­tism’ and monetarism which many Republicans still insist is the only governmental answer to the crisis and to the spectre of gallop­ing inflation. The Carter Administration has seen the utter futility of trying to stem the crisis by relying on fiscal and monetary policies (stimulative or restric­tive), and is beginning to move the US into a new phase of war economy and state totali­tarianism.

The one element in the American budget which will grow at a prodigious rate is armaments research and production. The probable go ahead -- depending on the outcome of the SALT talks -- for the MK-12A nuclear warhead (the ‘silo-buster’) and the B-1 bomber, is only the beginning of a new explosion of armaments which will increasingly become the hub of economic activity. Furthermore the Carter Administration’s recent initia­tives to subject arms exports more directly to American strategic interests, and to limit the spread of nuclear technology which produces plutonium in a form suitable for bomb-making, are not moves to limit armaments but rather part of an overall policy to consolidate the American bloc around the exclusive domination of the US and to subject weaponry and its development solely to the control, will, and aims of American imperialism.

The Carter Administration’s resolute move towards a war economy, and its acceleration of the tendency towards state capitalism, can be clearly seen in its energy policy, its proposals for expansion of the scope and scale of commodity stockpiling, and its steps towards centralizing world trade. The necessities of a war economy have led the government to inaugurate a national energy policy through a network of state agencies, and the proposal to create a super agency headed by a national energy czar. The American state intends to dictate the price of energy, the kinds of energy to be utili­zed, and the quantities of energy to be allocated to the different regions, and to the various types of production and consumption. The energy policy’s emphasis on conservation is the cutting edge of the drive to restrict the consumption of all classes and strata (though primarily the working class), the brutal austerity which is basic for a war economy. The development of new sources of energy to both assure America’s energy ‘independence’ in time of war, and to make the other countries of the bloc totally dependent on the US, will proceed through the statification of the energy industry. Complete statification of energy is occurring in two ways. First, the American state directly owns most of the remaining energy resources of the country:

“The best prospects for oil and gas now lie offshore in federal waters. Coal production is shifting to the West, where the government controls most of the mineral rights, Even the nation’s uranium lies largely in public hands.” (Business Week, 4 April, 1977)

Second, the development of nuclear techno­logy and the infrastructure for coal lique­faction demands a state plan and state capital, as even the leading spokesmen for America’s monopolies realize:

“To develop and implement such technology on the necessary grand scale dictates major economic adjustments -- for instance much higher fuel prices and massive capital formation. Only the government seems capable of directing such a leviathan effort.” (Ibid.)

The Carter team is also considering a mass­ive expansion of the American government’s commodity stockpiles, by adding ‘economic’ stocks to the $7.6 billion strategic military reserve of 93 commodities. The stra­tegic stockpile is intended to ensure sup­plies in case of war. Economic stocks of key raw materials will permit the American state to shape domestic plans, and to put pressure on foreign producers to cut prices, through its capacity to release stockpiled commodities onto the market.

Finally, the American state is in the fore­front of the movement to cartelize world trade. In contrast to the international cartels which dominated the world market in the epoch of monopoly capitalism, and which were established by ‘private’ trusts, a new type of cartelization appropriate to the epoch of state capitalism and war eco­nomy is emerging. The cartels presently being organized to set and regulate the prices of important raw materials, and to determine the share of key markets to be allotted to the different national capitals, are negotiated and operated directly by the various state apparatuses.

Two types of cartels are being pushed by the Carter Administration. The first are commodity cartels which involve both exporting and importing nations, and which will determine the acceptable price range for a commodity and regulate the movement of prices through the use of buffer stocks in the hands of either the national govern­ments or the cartel. The US is now in the process of organizing such cartels for sugar and wheat, which may be the forerunners of cartels for other raw materials and agri­cultural products. Such state organized commodity cartels would attempt to stabilize raw materials prices, a basic element in the drawing up of an overall economic plan, and in counteracting the fall in the rate of profit, as well as facilitating a ‘cheap food’ strategy, which would lower the value of labour power and thereby smooth the way to a compression of the wages of the working class -- all of which are essential ingred­ients of the war economy.

The second type of cartel is a direct res­ponse to a shrinking world market, and in­volves state planning not for expansion, but for contraction of world trade. What is involved are agreements between exporting and importing states to assign quotas or shares of a national market for specific commodities to the several competing natio­nal capitals. The US has recently arranged what it euphemistically calls ‘orderly marketing agreements’ with Japan on special steels and TV sets (this latter will reduce Japanese exports to the US by 40%), and is now in the process of negotiating agreements to divide up world markets for textiles, garments, shoes and basic steel. These cartels represent Washington’s alternative to an orgy of protectionism and autarky on the part of each national capital within the American bloc, an organized and co­ordinated shrinking of markets which is intended to preserve the cohesion of the bloc under the impact of the world crisis.

As an inseparable part of its steps to con­solidate a war economy, the Carter Adminis­tration has brandished a new war ideology -- the crusade for ‘human rights’. In the epoch of imperialist world wars; when vic­tory depends primarily on production, when every worker is a ‘soldier’, an ideology capable of binding the whole of production to the state and instilling a willingness to produce and sacrifice is a necessity for capitalism. Moreover, in an era when wars are not fought between nations, but between world imperialist blocs, national chauvinism alone is no longer a sufficient ideology. As the bourgeoisie prepares for a new world butchery, the struggle for human rights is replacing anti-communism in the ideological arsenal of the ‘democratic’ imperialisms of the American bloc as they begin to mobi­lize their populations for war with the ‘totalitarian dictatorship’ of the Russian bloc (all the more so as countries like China which are being incorporated into the American bloc have ‘communist’ regimes and as the participation of ‘Communist’ parties in the governments of several West European countries is foreseen). Behind Jimmy Carter’s moralistic appeals for the universal recognition of human rights, American swords are being sharpened.

The organization of a fully developed war economy in the US is not taking place, however, without furious resistance on the part of many powerful bourgeois interests. In particular, the Mid-Western farm bloc and agri-business oppose what they perceive as a ‘cheap food’ strategy; the steel, textile, shoe and many other industries are militantly protectionist, seeing the govern­ment’s concern with the cohesion and stability of the world imperialist bloc as a betrayal of American industry; the South-Western oil and gas interests violently object to the Carter energy policy. All of these groupings are organizing to defend their particularistic interests by resisting the stranglehold of a leviathan state over the whole economy. Moreover, they are trying to mobilize the legions of small and medium capitalists (for whom state capital­ism is a death sentence) as well as the disenchanted middle classes to resist the tide of statification. Nonethless, it is the interests of the global national capi­tal -- which absolutely requires a war economy -- which will win out in any intra-­bourgeois struggle, and it is those factions of the bourgeoisie which most closely re­flect those interests which will ultimately dictate the orientation of the capitalist state and determine its policies.

Because of the ever-widening gap between the relatively increasing economic weight of the US and the lessening economic stren­gth of Europe and Japan, the US has the capacity to determine, to dictate, the eco­nomic priorities and orientation of other countries in its bloc. Moreover, with the intensifications of the crisis in America itself, the US will increasingly have to deflect the worst effects of the crisis onto Europe and Japan (within the limits that do not destroy the overall cohesion of the bloc). The US is now implementing a policy of putting Europe on rations. The manner in which American capital is imposing austerity on the bankrupt countries of Europe is through its capacity to grant or withhold the loans without which Europe faces economic ruin, and therefore to compel the sickmen of the continent to place control of their economies virtually in the hands of their American creditor. Unlike the 1920s when desperately needed American loans were largely provided by ‘private’ banks, today, -- under the prevailing conditions of state capitalism -- the bulk of the credits are channeled through state or semi-state institutions, like the Treasury, the Federal Reserve System, or the Washington controlled International Monetary Fund.

The plans of American capital on the one hand to drastically reduce consumption in Europe, and on the other hand to more firmly commit Europe to the imperatives of a war economy constructed on the scale of the whole American imperialist bloc, can be seen in the recent IMF negotiations for loans to Britain, Italy and Portugal. As a con­dition for a $3.9 billion loan, the IMF demanded that Britain severely reduce govern­ment spending and place strict limits on the growth of the money supply, in other words, the imposition of brutal deflationary measures. At the same time the IMF insisted that Britain guarantee that no broad or permanent import controls would be imposed and that no currency restrictions would be instituted, guarantees that eliminate the possibility of protectionist or autarkic measures which could splinter the bloc or jeopardize American interests. In the case of Italy, the IMF’s conditions for a $530 million loan were a start at dismantling the indexation system which automatically makes some adjustments in wages as prices rise, limits and controls over national and local government spending, and an IMF veto on expansion of the money supply. Portugal’s request for a $1.5 billion loan from the IMF was met by a demand for a 25% devalua­tion of the escudo so as to slash real wages and reduce imports (20% of which are foodstuffs); in the event, the Portuguese devalued by 15%, and the American vaults have begun to open.

As an integral part of its policy to assure the stability of the American bloc as a whole, the US aims to distribute the impact of the world crisis more evenly throughout its bloc (America aside), by imposing on West Germany and Japan a policy of aiding and propping up the economies of those European countries which are near collapse. Thus, the US is insisting that West Germany and Japan reflate their economies to provide markets for the weaker countries, and significantly reduce their exports -- this latter in part to be accomplished through an upvaluation of the mark and the yen. The rise in the value of the German and Japanese currencies will also help to stem the export offensive towards America, and reduce the competitiveness of the US’s two major commercial rivals. This policy has begun to bear its first fruits as the Fukuda government in Japan let the yen rise by more than 7% against the dollar between January and April.

While one of the bases of America’s strangle­hold over all the economies of her bloc is her overwhelming financial power, her ulti­mate control over vital energy resources is another. It is Washington’s Pax Americana in the Middle East that insures that Europe and Japan will have the oil on which the operation of their productive apparatus now depends. The US’s firm opposition to the development and spread of fast breeder nu­clear reactors which produce their own plutonium as a source of fuel is in part due to the fact that such technology could potentially make the European and Japanese economies independent of America as far as energy is concerned. In giving up the development of fast breeder reactors, how­ever, the US itself sacrifices nothing, since its supplies of uranium still make the utilization of nuclear power compatible with America’s goal of energy independence.

For Europe and Japan, though, nuclear energy which depends on uranium as a fuel condemns them to permanent absolute dependence on the US in energy matters.

While the US puts Europe on rations, and dictates austerity to the countries of its bloc, there is one area where America dem­ands a massive increase in output and spending: armaments. The sharpening of inter-imperialist conflict and the necessi­ties of a war economy has already led the US to insist that its NATO allies increase their military budgets. The European and Japanese economies will henceforth be in­creasingly organized for the production of guns not butte!

The need to impose a draconian austerity to accelerate the tendency towards state capitalism, to unleash an onslaught against the proletariat (under conditions of growing class struggle), and to adjust its policies to the dictates of American capital, have led the bourgeoisies of Europe and Japan into the jaws of a devastating political crisis. The nature of the tasks which these bourgeoisies must try to accomplish all dictate a course which, gradually or abruptly (depending on the speed with which a given economy collapses or on the acute­ness of the class struggle), will bring the left to power. In the present conjunc­ture, it is left governments dominated by the Socialist parties1, and based on the trade union organizations, or popular fronts which include the Stalinist parties, which are best adapted to the needs of the bourgeoisie.

Because it is not inextricably tied to ‘private capital’, to particularistic in­terests within the national capital, and to anachronistic factions of the bourgeoi­sie (which characterizes the right), the left can best impose the totalitarian and centralized control of the state over the whole economy, and the drastic reduction in the consumption of the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie, which are hallmarks of the war economy. Because of its working class electoral support and mass base, and its ‘socialist’ ideology, only the left -- faced with a combative proletariat which is becoming the axis of political life -- has a chance to derail the class struggle and to bring about the savage reduction of the proletariat’s standard of living, the in­tensification of its exploitation, and its ideological submission to the state -- on all of which the lethal success of the war economy depends. Because of its Atlanticism, its ‘internationalism’, the left (at least the Socialist parties and trade unions) is also best suited to further the consolida­tion of a war economy on the scale of the American bloc as a whole.

This convergence of a left government and the interests of American imperialism can be seen, for example, in the efforts of the US to impose different economic policies on the weaker and the stronger economies of its bloc. In the weaker economies (Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal), the US insists on austerity and deflation, resistance to which is crystallizing around the right parties linked to ‘private’ capi­tal and to the anachronistic and retrograde sectors of the bourgeoisie who need massive government subsidies, easy credit and refla­tion of the home market to stay afloat. In contrast, it is the left-of-centre and left parties which are prepared to accept the IMF’s ‘recommendations’ and impose the American diktat. Even the left’s policy of nationalization, which is integral to a war economy (such as nationalization of aircraft and shipbuilding in Britain, or nationaliza­tion of Dassault and the electronics monopolies proposed by the Programme Commun in France), will not damage American interests, and indeed can facilitate American control on a direct state-to-state level. In Germany and Japan, the US demands reflation, upvaluation of the currency and limitations on exports, all of which are generating considerable opposition on the part of factions of the bourgeoisie coalescing around the right parties which are extremely reluc­tant to take any steps to limit national competitiveness on the world market, and to adjust the interests of the national capital to the interests of the bloc. In contrast, it is the moderate left (the SPD in Germany, Democratic Socialists and Eda wing of the SP in Japan) which is most amenable to co­ordinating the interests of the national capital with the demands of America.

American capital clearly prefers Labour to the Tories in Great Britain, and the Social Democrats to the Christian Democrats in Germany. In Portugal, Soares and the Socialists are better adapted to American interests than Sa Carneiro and Jaime Neves. In Spain, Washington wants a government led by Suarez with the direct or indirect par­ticipation of Felipe Gonzalez and the PSOE, while a government led by Fraga Iribarne and the Alianza Popular would be intolerable. In France, a government based on Mitterand and the SP is preferred by the Americans to one led by Chirac. Even in Italy, an Andreotti-Berlinguer combination is better suited to American needs than a government led by Fanfani and the right-wing of the Christian Democrats.

The right, then, is more and more incapable of adopting the necessary economic measures imposed by the deepening crisis, as well as being inadequate to face the proletarian threat, and increasingly hostile to American interests, while the left is the only vehicle through which the bourgeoisie can realisti­cally try to establish a war economy in the present conjuncture. Yet this ineluctable movement of the bourgeoisie to the left seems to be contradicted by the outcome of recent elections in many of the countries of the American bloc. In a number of countries, there has been a very pronounced electoral trend to the right: victories of the right in general elections in Australia, New Zealand and Sweden in 1976; impressive gains for the CDU/CSU in the German general elec­tion that same year; the considerable shift to the right in Portugal between the April 1975 elections for a Constitutent Assembly and the Parliamentary elections a year later; sweeping victories for the Tories in both Parliamentary by-elections and local elections in Britain this year; the triumph of the Social Christians in Belgium’s general election this past April.

This electoral trend to the right is fuelled by a wave of bitterness and discontent on the part of small and medium capitalists, the petty bourgeoisie and the middle classes, all of whom have seen their standard of living drastically fall over the past few years. Because the capitalist state has hesitated to unleash too direct an attack on the proletariat out of fear of prema­turely sparking a generalized class war or even a mass strike wave for which it is not yet prepared, the middle classes -- more fragmented and not a direct threat to the bourgeois order -- have been the object of many of the first concerted austerity mea­sures. As a result, the middle strata and its frustrations have momentarily become the axis of politics in a number of countries, and this has provoked the present electoral renaissance on the right. However, to prevent the impending economic collapse and establish a real war economy, the bour­geoisie -- whatever its hesitations -- must quickly focus its attack directly on the proletariat and attempt to deflect the mounting class struggle this will unleash. And as the working class becomes the axis of politics, the electoral trend will soon reflect the basic course of the bourgeoisie: a left turn.

Yet even this short-term electoral shift to the right has not altered or even slowed the bourgeoisie’s resolute move to the left in the constitution of its governments (thereby again demonstrating the purely ornamental nature of Parliaments and the solely mystificatory character of elections in the epoch of capitalist decadence). Were the bourgeoisie looking for an opening to effect a governmental shift to the right (as the leftists insist), the recent electoral trend would have provided it. Instead, the bourgeoisie has largely dis­regarded the results of the elections in constituting or perpetuating a governmental team which expresses its present need to base itself on the left parties and the trade unions. Thus, in Britain, where a general election would almost certainly return a Tory government, the bourgeoisie is holding on until the electoral trend again shifts to the left, and meanwhile to avoid a premature election is propping up the Labour government with the votes of the Liberal Party. In Portugal, despite the line-up in Parliament, the bourgeoisie insists on a purely Socialist government. In Belgium, where the election results have made a right-of-centre Social Christian-Liberal government possible, the bourgeoisie instead is determined to constitute a left-­of-centre Social Christian-Socialist govern­ment with a powerful trade union base.

With the clear perspective of a turn to the left by the bourgeoisie we must now look at the nature of the Stalinist parties today. The participation of the Stalinists in government will increasingly become a nece­ssity for the bourgeoisies of some of the weakest European countries (Italy, France, Spain) inasmuch as the Stalinists are best equipped to impose the essential austerity measures on the working class and to derail the class struggle. However, Stalinist participation in the government provokes furious -- often violent -- opposition on the part of powerful factions of the national bourgeoisie and resistance and distrust on the part of the US. We must be clear about the real character of Stalinism, its dis­tinctive features as a bourgeois party, so as to understand what the sources of this opposition and distrust are, and to what extent they may impede the Stalinists’ accession to power.

First, the Stalinist parties are not anti national parties or agents of Moscow. All bourgeois parties (right and left), what­ever their orientation on the international arena may be, are nationalist parties.

“In the epoch of imperialism, the defence of the national interest can only take place within the enlarged framework of an imperialist bloc. It is not as a fifth column, as a foreign agent, but as a function of its immediate or long term interests, properly understood, that a national bourgeoisie opts for and adheres to one of the world blocs which exists. It is around this choice for one bloc or the other bloc that the division and internal struggle within the bourgeoisie takes place; but this division always takes place on the basis of a single concern and a single common goal: the national interest, the interest of the national bourgeoisie.” (Inter­nationalisme, no.30, 1948)

Nationalism, is, and always has been, the basis of the Stalinist parties, and when they opted for the Russian bloc in the 1940s when the division of Europe between the two world imperialist blocs was taking place, they were no more a fifth column of Moscow than the Social Democrats or Christian Democrats were a fifth column of Washington: what divided these bourgeois parties was the question of incorporation into which imperialist bloc would best serve the national capital’s vital interests.

In the present conjuncture, however, when a change of blocs by any of the Western European countries or Japan is hardly possible short of war or -- at the very least -- a dramatic and fundamental change in the world balance between the two imper­ialist camps, no faction of the bourgeoisie which realistically expects to come to power can seek incorporation into the Rus­sian bloc. In this sense “Eurocommunism” is the recognition by the Stalinists that the interests of their national capitals today precludes a change of blocs. The na­tionalism of the Stalinist parties in these countries now takes the form of support for protectionist responses to the deepening economic crisis, and a commitment to what is still only an embryonic tendency towards autarky. If this orientation on the part of the Stalinists does not call into question the incorporation of their countries into the American bloc, it nonetheless goes counter to the plans of American capital to more closely integrate the different coun­tries of the bloc in a mammoth war economy under the absolute control of Washington. Here, then, is one of the bases for America’s continuing distrust of the Stalinists, and her preference for the Socialist parties, for whom the vital interests of the national capital demand the most complete adjustment of national policies to the overall needs of the bloc.

But it is not its support for autarkic poli­cies -- which in any case it shares with the extreme right -- which is the most distinct­ive characteristic of Stalinism, and which accounts for the ferocity with which it is opposed by other factions of the national bourgeoisie. The Stalinist parties, whatever their present democratic and pluralist phraseology, are the exponents of the most complete and extreme form of state cap­italism, of the totalitarian and direct state control over every aspect of production and distribution, of the single party state, and the complete militarization of society. Un­like the other bourgeois parties (including the Socialists) the Stalinists have no ties whatsoever to ‘private’ capital. Whereas other factions of the bourgeoisie support a greater or lesser fusion of ‘private’ capital and state capital, Stalinists in power would mean the extinction of ‘pri­vate’ capital and with it all of the other bourgeois parties. This is the basis for the unrelenting fear and hostility of other bourgeois factions towards the Stalinists; and it explains many of the reservations of American imperialism, which still exercises much of its control over its ‘allies’ not yet directly on a state-­to-state basis, but through the links of ‘private’ capital -- links which Stalinism would shatter.

It is for these reasons that both the US and the other parties of the bourgeoisie in Europe and Japan are determined to keep a tight rein on the Stalinists, even as the worsening economic and political situation moves them closer to some kind of direct participation in the government in a vain effort to stabilize the crumbling bourgeois order. Yet as both the economic and poli­tical situation continues to deteriorate, and as the need for the most thoroughgoing war economy asserts itself, there will be more and more of a complete convergence of the vital needs of the national capital and the naked programme of Stalinism.

The Russian bloc

The permanent crisis of world capitalism condemns the Russian bloc to face a parti­cularly acute problem: its extreme weakness and enormous material disadvantages as it contemplates the intensification of the commercial struggle with the American bloc, and behind it the growing prospect of a military struggle for a redivision of the world market. The countries of the Russian bloc must try to compensate for the extremely low productivity of their labour power, the backwardness of their productive appara­tus, with a far greater dependence on the extraction of absolute surplus value than their competitors in the American bloc. Yet even the most drastic lowering of wages, massive speed-ups, and the extension of the working day -- the barrier to which can be seen in the resurgent combativity of the proletariat -- would not succeed in making Russian capital competitive with its rivals on the shrinking world market. Whilst it is true that surplus value is solely the product of the living labour newly added during the productive process of variable capital, both the mass and the rate of surplus value absolutely depend on the level of machinery and technology which the workers set in motion, on the constant capital en­gaged in the productive process. It is for this reason that the competitiveness of the Russian bloc is integrally linked to the acquisition of advanced machinery and technology, which under prevailing conditions can only be got from the American bloc -- by purchase or conquest.

One of the differences between the autarkic ‘socialism’ of Stalin and the mercantile ‘socialism’ of Brezhnev is that under condi­tions of an ongoing redivision of the world market and the establishment of new imper­ialist constellations (1939-1949), Stalin sought to overcome Russia’s backwardness first through the military conquest, looting, and shipment to Russia of the more advanced industrial plant of Germany, Danubian Europe and Manchuria, and then through the direct incorporation of these areas into the orbit of Russian imperialism; while under the momentary conditions of relative stabilization between the world imperialist blocs (at least as concerns the most industrialized areas), Brezhnev has tried to compensate for Russian back­wardness through trade and the massive purchase of Western technology. However, mercantile ‘socialism’ has now reached an impasse. Mounting trade deficits, which are the grim testimony to the continuing un-competitiveness of Russian capital on the world market, have made the purchase of technology from the American bloc com­pletely dependent on loans and credits. But, the burgeoning foreign debt of the Russian bloc, in conjunction with its trade deficits, is making a massive new round of loans too financially risky for western banks to undertake. To this must be added the politico-military factors which will increa­singly militate against a continuing flow of funds and technology from the American bloc to the COMECON countries.

The deepening economic crisis is intensi­fying economic competition between the blocs (particularly in the Third World, where Russia has a trade surplus, and where machines and technology bought from the West will be indispensable to her export offensive), and sharpening inter-imperialist conflicts. In response, American imperialism (as part of the consolidation of a war economy on the scale of its bloc) will ruthlessly subordinate short-term trade considerations to longer term political and strategic objectives, which will lead to a slackening of commercial exchanges between the blocs. As a result, conquest and war will finally be the only way for Russian imperialism to try to overcome the technical backwardness of its productive apparatus; and from the shambles of mercan­tile ‘socialism’ and its policy of detente, an up-dated version of the autarkic ‘social­ism’ of yesterday will again arise on Russian soil.

The present strategic and tactical superior­ity of the Warsaw Pact over NATO along the line that divides the two imperialist camps in Central Europe should not obscure the overwhelming material inferiority of the Russian bloc should it attempt to seize the West European industrial heartland. Marxism demonstrates the primacy of economic over politico-military factors in any clash be­tween capitalist states; in the final ana­lysis economic superiority must be trans­lated into military superiority, as the two inter-imperialist world wars demonstrated. The very superiority of the productive apparatus of the American bloc, which ultimately leaves Russian imperialism no choice but a war of conquest if it is not to be consigned to economic extinction by the American be­hemoth, is also the reason why American imperialism holds all the high cards in its game of death with its Russian rival. The Russian bourgeoisie faces the dilemma that to make war successfully you must first have economic superiority, while to achieve economic superiority in the epoch of capi­talist decadence you must first make war. The only way the Russian bloc can hope to tilt the balance somewhat as it is led to prepare for world war, is to compensate for its economic inferiority with a more efficient organization of its war economy, a more total commitment of all its resources -- human and machine -- to the direct necessi­ties of war production.

The extreme forms of state capitalism in the countries of the Russian bloc -- which are the result of their economic weakness -- should not lead us to conclude that a well organized war economy has already been established there. The chaotic situation in the production and distribution of food­stuffs, whose efficient organization is vital to a war economy so as to feed the producers and wielders of weapons as cheaply as possible, and so devote the bulk of the available labour, tools and raw materials to the production of the machines of war, will indicate the magnitude of the problem now faced by the bourgeoisie in the Russian bloc. The prevalence of small and ineffi­cient ‘private’ farms (85% of agricultural production in Poland) and ‘private’ plots on collective farms (as much as 50% of the income of the Russian Kolkhozian comes from the sale of crops from ‘private’ plots), as well as the flourishing free and black markets in foodstuffs, means that the state does not yet have the totalitarian control over Department II, the production of the means of consumption, or the distribution network, which is essential to a war economy. The subjugation of the peasantry and the complete control of the agricultural sector by the leviathan state, as well as the elim­ination of the free and black markets are formidable tasks that face the bourgeoisie of the Russian bloc over the next few years.

Even in industry, the quasi-totality of which is nationalized in the Russian bloc, there are significant obstacles to the consolidation of a war economy. The decen­tralization of industry and the autonomy of the enterprise, which was a concomitant of mercantile ‘socialism’, must first be eliminated if Department I is to be centrally organized around the goal of armaments production. Yet such an undertaking will generate clashes within the bourgeosie it­self as managers and directors of particular factories and trusts will try to preserve their prerogatives.

The need for a more unified and autarkic economic order (directed by Moscow) on the scale of the whole bloc is also exacerbating tensions within each national bourgeoisie over the precise manner in which the inter­ests of the national capital will be recon­ciled with the demands of Russian imperia­lism. Given the prevailing politico-military situation, no significant faction of the bourgeoisie in any of the COMECON countries can seriously challenge its nation’s incorporation into the Russian bloc. Nonetheless, there are serious divergences between those factions of the bourgeoisie in each country which seek to expand trade with the West and encourage the investment of Western capital, so as to stimulate the development of purely national industries, and other factions for whom the interests of the national capital demands the orientation of economic life more exclusively around the overall needs of the bloc and the construction of a unified war economy. The overwhelming politico-military weight of Russian imperialism in Eastern Europe will be directed to assuring that it is these latter factions which win out in this intra-bourgeois clash.

The enormity of the political crisis of the bourgeoisie in the Russian bloc however, really manifests itself in its very halting steps to contain the threat of a combative proletariat. The depth of the economic crisis and the necessities of a war economy require a drastic lowering of the already abysmal living standards and working condi­tions of the proletariat; yet the political apparatus of the bourgeoisie perfected during the depths of the counter-revolution when the working class was pulverized, is ill-adapted to the tasks of subjugating a pro­letariat which is launching increasingly bitter and militant struggles. The economic weakness of each national faction of capital has led to its quasi-total dependence on its police and military apparatus to maintain order. Moreover, the domination of Russian imperialism over its bloc -- in contrast to the situation of American imperialism -- has depended almost exclusively on military factors. Thus, in an historical conjuncture when too great a reliance on the direct physical subjugation of the proletariat risks provoking a generalized class war, when capital must first try to control the proletariat ideologically as a prerequisite to its later physical crushing, the bourg­eoisie in the Russian bloc has been incapable of adjusting the forms of its dictatorship to the requirements of the new balance of forces between the classes. Any relaxation of the directly repressive apparatus risks exacerbating the weakness of the state; too great a utilization of the repressive appar­atus risks igniting the proletarian flame. As a result the bourgeoisie in the Russian bloc is paralysed before its urgent task of attacking the proletariat.

Inter-imperialist antagonisms

If armaments production and the establishment of a war economy is the only way to prevent the breakdown of the capitalist productive apparatus, it is, nonetheless not an economic policy in itself (whatever important segments of the bourgeoisie may still think), but the preparation for a world conflagration, an expression of the inter-imperialist anta­gonisms which the death crisis of capital­ism is sharpening to the breaking point. The inexorable deepening of the world crisis has not only brought about an extraordinary heightening of tensions between the two imperialist blocs, but has also more clearly revealed the different ways in which Russian and American imperialism dominate the other countries and reservoirs of cheap labour-power. Because of her economic weak­ness, Russia’s domination of other countries depends almost exclusively on direct mili­tary occupation or at least the prospect of speedy and relatively unhindered inter­vention by her armed forces. Moreover, as a result of America’s still overwhelming naval superiority, the regions subject to the military control of Russian imperialism are effectively limited to the Eurasian land mass, to areas readily accessible to Russia’s land armies. This is both the key to Russian domination of Eastern Europe and Mongolia, as well as the inability of Russian imperialism to have more than a very tenuous hold over countries beyond the direct reach of her tanks. In contrast, the supremacy of the productive apparatus of American imperialism is such that it can economically dominate any part of the world. The only barrier to American economic domination is the military hegemony of Russian imperialism over a given area, which as we have seen is for strategic reasons (its naval inferiority) today still limited to areas contiguous to Russia itself.

Russia’s economic inferiority and the limits of her military reach are such that even when the faction of the bourgeoisie, armed and supported by Russia, triumphs in a localized inter-imperialist war and comes to power (Vietnam, Mozambique, Angola), this does not mean that the country unequivocally passes into the Russian bloc. Rather, the combination of the American bloc’s economic weight, which becomes relatively more pro­nounced as the world crisis strikes the weakest economies most furiously, and the strategic limitations of Russian imperialism often produce a period of oscillation be­tween the blocs. Vietnam’s quest for Amer­ican bloc investment, credit, and trade in a vain effort to reconstruct her shattered economy points to the inability of Russia to firmly incorporate even a regime whose very existence depended on Russian military aid into the Russian bloc. Mozambique’s continued economic dependence on South Africa, and Angola’s reliance on the American bloc for the extraction and sale of the oil and minerals which are the basis of her economic life, both indicate the enormous difficulties which Russia is having in trying to dislodge American imperialism from its African strong-points. Be­cause of its economic superiority, even the military defeat of the faction of the local bourgeoisie which it supported, is not in itself sufficient to break the stranglehold of American imperialism over a country; whereas because of its economic weakness nothing short of outright military occupa­tion is sufficient to assure the effective control of a country by Russian imperialism.

It is this economic and strategic superior­ity which is the basis for the continuing shift in the balance between the two imp­erialist camps in favour of the American bloc. The US is now in the midst of elim­inating the most important beachheads that Russian imperialism had established in its efforts to expand beyond the central Eur­asian heartland which is its core. Thus in the Middle East, Egypt and the Sudan are being politically, economically, and even militarily reincorporated into the American bloc, while Syria has already taken the first steps down this same path. Russian imperialism’s recent effort to win a domin­ant place in the Lebanon through the Pales­tinian-Muslim leftist front which it armed and diplomatically backed has been smashed by the very Syrian army -- prompted by Washington -- which Moscow had once so lavishly equipped. The military defeats in Lebanon and the weakening of Russian imperialism throughout the Middle East, have now lead the most powerful factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization to re­consider their pro-Russian orientation. Moreover, the US is now beginning to chal­lenge even the hitherto unquestioned Russian hegemony in Iraq. With the re-establishment of America’s almost total domination of the Arab world -- a domination which now embraces the ‘socialist’ as well as the royalist regimes -- nearing completion, the Carter Administration is now directing its attention to the imposition of an Arab-Israeli settle­ment, which would involve the erection of a Palestinian rump state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. American imperialism there­by hopes to establish an enduring Pax Amer­icana over the region and make the Middle East a solid barrier to the expansion of Russian imperialism, rather than the high­way for a Russian drive into Africa and South Asia which decades of internecine warfare had turned it into.

The bitter struggle between the two blocs for control of the Horn of Africa and the vital Bab el-Mandeb Straits which command the sea routes between Europe and Asia, is now entering a decisive stage. The appar­ent triumph of Russia in Ethiopia, where Colonel Mengistu’s regime has opted for Moscow and where Russian arms will permit an escalation of the barbarous war in Eritrea, as well as driving the Eritrean Liberation Front into dependence on American imperialism, may have as its counterpart a reorientation of Somalia towards the Ameri­can bloc. This and the growing influence of America’s client state, Saudi Arabia, over South Yemen is bringing about a change in the imperialist line-up around the Horn of Africa, which may well leave Russian imperialism with only a landlocked Ethiopia, important pieces (Eritrea, Ogaden) of which are being torn from her by avaricious neighbours and liberation fronts backed by the US. An independent American-backed Eritrea, an independent Djibouti occupied by France, and Somali and South Yemeni regimes being drawn into the American orbit by Saudi-Arabia, would (with Egypt and the Sudan now firmly in the American camp) make the Red Sea an American lake.

In India, the defeat of Indira Gandhi by the pro-American Janata coalition and the for­mation of a government headed by Morarji Desai is both forging new economic chains to bind New Delhi to Washington, and is bringing about the complete elimination of the politico-military links to Moscow (established in the course of the Indo-­Pakistani War), upon which Russian imperia­lism sought to challenge American hegemony in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. It is not the expansion of Russian imperialism, but the consolidation of the stranglehold of the American bloc over the Indian sub-continent that is taking place.

Meanwhile in the Far East, the incredible heightening of inter-imperialist antagonisms between Russia and China and the growing military build-up along their extensive frontier is also leading China into the American bloc, a process which the desperate state of her economy is accelerating. While the Carter Administration has perhaps yet to determine the precise nature of America’s commitment to China in the event of a Sino-­Russian war, the flow of arms from the American bloc to Peking and the budding Sino-Indian rapprochement (which most cer­tainly has Washington’s blessing) are unmistakable signs of the weakening of Russian imperialism on the Asian continent.

Washington’s initiatives in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, the Indian sub-continent and the Far East are intended to turn these regions into so many links in a ring of steel which the American bloc is trying to construct so as to confine Russian imper­ialism tightly within its Eurasian core. The success of this policy of American imperialism depends in large part on its capacity to stabilize these regions and attenuate the imperialist rivalries between the different states -- a stabilization of the barbarism into which the permanent crisis of capitalism has already thrust so great a proportion of humanity. The only course open to Russian imperialism if it is to have any possibility of challenging American imperialism for world dominion -- which is the only alternative to its economic extinction -- is to devote all its efforts to destabilizing these regions, fanning the flames of war through its poli­tical and military support to national liberation struggles and those factions of the bourgeoisie within each country for whom the American imposed imperialist status quo in their region is intolerable. Thus in the Middle East, Russia’s only hope of regaining a foothold is through a new Arab-Israeli war. On the Indian sub-continent, the expansion of Russian imperialism can only take place through a new Indo-Pakistani war -- even if this time Russia supports Islamabad, and tries to forge a Muslim bloc consisting of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan with which to challenge an American-backed India. It is just such a policy of destabilization that Russian capi­tal has undertaken in Southern Africa, where arms and money are going to the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia, to SWAPO in South West Africa, and to the emerging urban guerrilla movement in South Africa itself. The US, clearly recognising the danger which such a destabilization represents to its supremacy in this vital part of the world, is attempting to impose black majority rule in Rhodesia and South West Africa, and a system of power-sharing in South Africa, which is in­tended to place its imperialist domination on a firmer basis by providing it with the support of a black faction of the bourgeoi­sie. In all of these regions, however, Russia’s strategic limitations, though not preventing an active policy of destabiliza­tion, make direct military occupation -- the only real basis for Russian hegemony -- ex­tremely difficult.

There is one region, though, where the attempt of Russian imperialism to push outwards from its geo-political core, both gives the promise of yielding the advanced technology and machinery which are the sinews of war, and which is not subject to overwhelming strategic limitations: Europe. The one country in Europe where a Russian moves is likely, and which would not auto­matically precipitate a major war between the two imperialist blocs is Yugoslavia. The death of Tito will exacerbate all of the divisions within the Yugoslav bourgeoi­sie between factions favouring a pro-Russian orientation (the Kominformists) and those favouring a pro-American orientation for the national capital; between the dominant Serbian faction of the bourgeoisie and the growing nationalism of the Croatian and Slovene factions of the bourgeoisie. Russian imperialism may either seek to provoke a change of power in Belgrade or try to dis­member Yugoslavia by providing decisive material support for the establishment of independent Croat and Slovene states tied to Moscow. With its strategic and practical superiority in South East Europe, the spectre of a Russian march to the Adriatic looms large. The effects of such a move -- if it could be successfully accomplished -- would be to significantly alter the rapport de force between the blocs in Southern Europe, and to subject Italy and Greece to growing Russian pressure. To this must be added the growing tensions between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and over mineral rights in the Aegean Sea, which can provide Russian imperialism with the prospect of tearing the American bloc’s flank in the Mediterranean if Washington cannot quickly impose a stable solution. This concentra­tion of Russian pressure in South East Europe and Asia Minor indicates where the next flashpoint of inter-imperialist con­flict may be.

The class struggle of the proletariat

The deepening economic crisis, which threa­tens to paralyze the capitalist productive apparatus, and its manifestations in the sharpening of inter-imperialist antagonisms, impels the bourgeoisie to establish a war economy, and finally to prepare for a new world butchery. However, the proletariat everywhere bars the way to a war economy and to the world conflagration for which it is the indispensable preparation. The ideological and physical submission of the working class to the capitalist state is a necessary pre-condition for the constitu­tion of a full-fledged war economy. Yet today, the bourgeoisie confronts an undefeated, combative and increasingly class conscious proletariat.

This combativity of the working class was expressed by its militant response to the very first blows of the crisis which sig­naled the definitive end of the period of post-war reconstruction. The wave of fac­tory occupations which culminated in the general strike of 10 million workers in France in 1968; the hot autumn of 1969 in Italy during which industry was paralyzed by mass strikes and factory occupations; the anti-trade union strike by the Kiruna miners that same year, which shattered the more than three decades of “labour peace” which had made Sweden a paradise for capi­tal under its Social Democratic regime; the bitter struggles of the Limburg miners in Belgium in 1970; the violent strikes and pitched battles between tens of thousands of workers and police which spread through Poland’s industrial centres in the winter of 1970-71; the strike wave in Britain, which reached a peak with the general strike in solidarity with the dock-workers in 1972 ; the struggles at SEAT (Barcelona) in 1971 and at Vigo and Ferrol in 1972, which -- with their barricades and street battles with police and their factory assemblies -- marked the resurgence of the proletariat in Spain, were all so many hammer blows which left the bourgeoisie of the capitalist metropoles reeling, and clearly demonstrated that the growing economic crisis coincided with a course towards class war. As a result, if on the one hand, economic necessities made it absolutely imperative for the bourgeoisie to move quickly and decisively to crush the prole­tariat, on the other hand, political reali­ties, the rapport de force between the classes, dictated that the bourgeoisie try to avoid for as long as possible any direct confrontation with the working class.

By comparison with the years 1968-72, the next four years appear to represent a down­swing, a lull, in the class struggle of the proletariat. In fact, as the bourgeoisies of the metropoles having absorbed the first shock-waves of the crisis, desperately sought to displace its most devastating effects onto the weaker capitals, so the most intense confrontations between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie shifted to the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and China. Egypt has been gripped by waves of wild-cat strikes since 1974: the Helwan textile mills in 1975, the strikes which paralyzed the country’s three great indus­trial centres - Alexandria, Helwan and Cairo in April 1976, and the strikes and street battles which greeted the government’s announcement of price rises in basic foodstuffs in January of this year.

In Israel, violent protests were the workers’ response to huge price rises in 1975, and in November-December 1976, a strike wave affected 35% of the country’s work force in an assault on the Labour Government’s trade union impo­sed social contract. In Africa, in 1976, the proletariat launched massive strikes against the regimes of both ‘black’ and ‘white’ capital: in July the ports of Angola were crippled by strikes, which the MPLA bloodily repressed; in September, the aus­terity measures of Ethiopia’s Marxist-Lenin­ist junta provoked a general strike in the banking, insurance, water, gas and electri­city sectors, leading to violent confronta­tions with the Army: in South Africa both the mining and automobile industry were the scene of bitter strikes, while in Rhodesia the bus drivers in Salisbury paralyzed the city’s transit system for more than forty days, in the face of brutal police repression. In Latin America, the proletariat has responded to the crisis with more and more massive, violent and unified struggles: in Argentina, workers in the electric utilities cut off power in the ma­jor cities in the autumn of 1976, while in Cordoba, the automobile workers clashed with the police; in Peru semi-insurrectional strikes turned Lima into a battlefield both in 1975 and in 1976; in Bolivian tin mines, in Colombia’s plantations and textile mills and in the mill towns and iron-ore mines of Venezuela, the proletariat has engaged in bitter struggles. In China, 1975 and 1976 saw strikes generalize from industry to industry, grip whole provinces and take on semi-insurrectional proportions, as at Hangchow where a general strike lasted three months, involved attacks by workers on gov­ernment and party offices and the erection of barricades in working class districts, and required the use of 10,000 soldiers to bring under control. What took place in 1973-77 was not a slackening in the inten­sity of the proletariat’s resistance to the effects of the crisis but a momentary displacement of the epicentre of the class struggle to the peripheries of the capitalist world.

Moreover, even with respect to the capitalist metropoles, all talk of a gap between the depths of the crisis and the response of the proletariat, of the downswing in class struggle after 1972, must not obscure the fact that no political defeat of the proletariat has taken place, that in none of the centres of world capital has the bourgeoisie physically or ideologically crushed the working class.

Indeed, the apparent lull in the class strug­gle did not represent a diminution in the combativity of the class -- even provisional -- so much as a growing awareness on the part of workers of the ultimate futility of purely economic struggles. It is through their incapacity to defend even their ‘imme­diate’ interests through their often bitter economic struggles that the proletariat has been learning that it must confront capital and its state with directly political strug­gles, that it has been learning the neces­sity for the generalization and politiciza­tion of its struggles.

The wave of strikes that quickly spread from one end of Spain to the other in January-March 1976 and the violent strikes that erupted in Poland in June 1976 marked the beginning of a new phase of generalization and radicalization of proletarian struggles in the capitalist metropoles. The speed with which the struggles at Radom (Poland) and Vitoria (Spain) generalized from industry to industry, taking on an insur­rectional character, is indicative of the lessons of the struggle the class has al­ready learned and of the fury of the gath­ering proletarian storm. During the past year, the bourgeoisies of Italy, Britain, Portugal, Denmark and Holland have faced the first onslaughts of this new wave of workers’ struggle. But no mere enumeration of strikes or of countries affected can any longer provide an accurate picture of the real nature of the present moment, when the proletariat is the key to the turn in the world situation:

“The conditions are being slowly created for the international unity of the class; for the first time in history, the upsurge of workers’ struggles coincides in all countries of the world, both on the periphery (Africa, Asia, Latin America) and in the centre (North America, Europe).” (Accion Proletaria, April-May 1977)

Just as the reappearance of the open crisis in 1976 generated a wave of militant and combative proletarian struggles in the years which followed, so the new stage in the crisis, which is compelling the bour­geoisie to establish a war economy and which is leading the bourgeoisie to genera­lized inter-imperialist war, will itself become a factor in generating a growing recognition on the part of the working class of the necessity of directly political struggles. Thus the bourgeoisie’s imperious necessity to construct a war economy will become a significant factor in accelerating the course towards generalized class war.

The bourgeoisie is led to try to establish its war economy in obedience to the blind laws which determine its actions; while the bourgeois class is incapable of understand­ing the forces which propel it towards war, revolutionary marxists can clearly see what course the bourgeoisie will be compelled to take, and can understand the basic tendencies of capitalist economy and politics which the bourgeoisie can only dimly perceive. It is for this reason that the ICC can trace the basic political and economic perspectives which will face the capitalist system in the coming years. However, the class struggle of the proletariat as it becomes a directly political struggle is not produced by blind laws, but is a conscious struggle. Thus, if revolutionaries cannot predict when such struggles will erupt -- just because of this factor of consciousness which is their key -- they can, and must, by their political intervention in the class struggle, by carrying out their vital role of contri­buting to the generalization of revolution­ary consciousness throughout the class, bec­ome an active and decisive factor in the actual outbreak and development of the political struggles which will lead towards the generalized class war of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie which is now on the historical agenda.

Summer, I977

1 In Italy, were the Socialist Party is too weak, the necessary move to the left by the bourgeoisie must immediately proceed through the incorporation of the Stalinists into the government – directly or indirectly.

 

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Resolution on proletarian political groups

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The characterization of the various organi­zations who claim to defend socialism and the working class is extremely important for the ICC. This is by no means a purely theo­retical or abstract question; on the con­trary, it is directly relevant to the atti­tude the Current has towards these organi­zations, and thus to its intervention to­wards them: on whether it denounces them as organs and products of capital; or whether it polemicizes and discusses with them in order to help them evolve towards greater clarity and programmatic rigour; or to assist in the appearance of tendencies within them who are looking for such clarity. This is why it is necessary to avoid any hasty or subjective appreciation of the organizations the ICC comes up against and to define the criteria with which we approach these groups as precisely as we can, with­out resorting to rigid and formalistic schema. Any errors or precipitation here will mitigate against the fulfillment of the basic task of constituting a pole of regroupment for revolutionaries, and could lead to deviations either of an opportunist or a sectarian nature which would threaten the very life of the Current.

I. The revolutionary movement of the work­ing class expresses itself in a process of maturation of consciousness, a difficult and jagged process which is never linear and which goes through various fumblings and hesitations. It necessarily manifests itself in the simultaneous appearance and existence of a number of more or less deve­loped organizations. This process is based on both the immediate and historical exper­ience of the class, and has need of both if it is to be developed and enriched. It must appropriate the past gains of the class but at the same time it must be able to criticize and go beyond the limitations of these gains, an activity which is only possible if there has been a real assimilation of these gains. Thus the different currents which appear in the class can be distinguished by their greater or lesser capacity to assume these tasks. While the development of class consciousness involves a break from the ruling bourgeois ideology, the groups who express and participate in this development are themselves subject to the pressure of this ideology, which constantly threatens them either with disappearing or being absorbed by the class enemy.

These general characteristics of the process whereby revolutionary consciousness develops are even more marked in the decadent period of capitalism. While decadence has laid the basis for the destruction of the syst­em both from the objective point of view (the mortal crisis of the mode of production) and the subjective point of view (the decomposition of bourgeois ideology and the weakening of its hold on the working class), it has also set new obstacles and difficulties in the way of the development of consciousness by the proletariat. We are referring to:

-- the atomization experienced by the class outside periods of intense struggle;

-- the increasing totalitarian hold exerted by the state over the whole of social life;

-- the integration into the state of all the mass organizations -- parties and unions -- which in the nineteenth century were a terrain for the development of class consciousness;

-- finally, the added confusion coming from radical tendencies produced by the decomposition of official bourgeois ideology.

Today, in addition to these factors, we have to take into account:

-- the weight of the most profound counter­revolution the workers’ movement has ever gone through, which has led to the disappearance or sclerosis of past commu­nist currents;

-- the fact that the chronic crisis of the system has given rise to the historical reappearance of the proletariat has also led to the violent accentuation of the decomposition of various middle strata, particularly the student and intellec­tual milieu, whose radicalization has thrown all kinds of smokescreens over the effort of the revolutionary class to become conscious.

II. In this general framework for examining the movement of the class towards an aware­ness of its historic goals, we can observe three basic kinds of organizations.

First of all, the parties which were once or­gans of the class but have succumbed to the pressure of capitalism and have become def­enders of the system by taking on a more or less direct role in the management of nat­ional capital. With these parties, history teaches us:

-- that any return to the proletarian camp is impossible;

-- that as soon as they go over to the other camp, their whole dynamic is deter­mined by the needs of capital and they become expressions of the life of capi­talism;

-- that while their language and programme still contain references to the working class, to socialism, or to revolutionary positions, and though the positions of such parties are not always coherent in themselves, they are based on the general coherence demanded by the defence of capitalist interests.

Among these parties, we can mainly cite the Socialist Parties which came out of the IInd International, the Communist Parties which came out of the IIIrd International, the organizations of official anarchism and the Trotskyist tendencies. All these parties have taken their place in the defence of the national, capital as agents of law and order or as touts for the imperialist war.

Secondly, organizations whose working class nature is indisputable because of their ability to draw the lessons from the past experience of the class, to understand new historical developments, to reject all con­ceptions which have shown themselves to be alien to the working class, and whose posi­tions as a whole have obtained a high level of coherence. Even though the process whereby consciousness develops is never completed, even though there can never be a perfect coherence, and even though class positions need to be constantly enriched, we have seen throughout history the exis­tence of currents who, at a given moment, have represented the most advanced and complete, though not exclusive, expressions of class consciousness, and who have played a central role in the acceleration of consciousness.

In our relationships with groups of this type, who are close to the ICC but outside it, our aim is clear. We attempt to engage in fraternal debate with them and take up the different questions confronting the working class in order:

-- to achieve the greatest possible clarity within the movement as a whole;

-- to explore the possibilities of streng­thening our political agreement and mov­ing towards regroupment.

Thirdly, groupings whose class nature, unl­ike the first two, has not been settled in a clear way and who, as expressions of the complex and difficult process of class cons­ciousness, can be distinguished from the second kind of organization by the fact that:

-- they have not detached themselves so clearly from capitalist ideology and are more vulnerable to it;

-- they are less capable of assimilating either the past gains or the new develop­ments of the class struggle;

-- to the detriment of a solid coherence, there co-exists in their programme both proletarian and bourgeois positions;

-- that they are susceptible to contradic­tory tendencies towards, on the one hand, absorption or destruction by capital, and on the other hand towards a positive development.

With these groups, because they are sunk in confusion, the demarcation line between the proletarian camp and the bourgeois camp is extremely difficult to establish in a formal way, even though it does exist. For the same reasons it is difficult to classify these groups in a precise way. However, we can distinguish three broad categories:

1. More or less formal currents which come out of embryonic and still-confused move­ments of the class.

2. Currents who come from a break with org­anizations which have gone over to the enemy camp.

Both these groups are expressions of the general process of breaking with bourgeois ideology.

3. Communist currents which are degenerating, generally as a result of sclerosis and exhaustion, and who have an inability to relate their original positions to the contemporary situation.

III. Groups of the first type include such informal currents as the 1968 ‘March 22nd Movement’, ‘autonomous groups’, etc, all of them organizations which came out of the immediate struggle itself and thus without any historical roots or developed platform, but established on the basis of a few vague or partial positions lacking any global coherence and ignorant of the totality of the historic acquisitions of the class. These characteristics make these currents very vulnerable; this is most often expres­sed by their disappearance after a short time, or their rapid transformation into leftist camp followers.

However, it is also possible for these currents to engage in a process of clarifi­cation and of deepening their positions, an evolution which leads towards their dis­appearance as independent groups and the integration of their members into the poli­tical organization of the class.

In its relations with each of these currents, the ICC must intervene in order to encourage and stimulate a positive evolution of this nature, and to try to prevent their disap­pearance in confusion or their recuperation by capitalism.

IV. With regard to the second kind of group, we are only talking about currents who separate themselves from their parent organization on the basis of a break with certain points of the programme, and not in order to ‘safeguard’ so-called revolution­ary principles which are supposedly being betrayed. Thus there is nothing hopeful in the various Trotskyist splits which time and again propose to safeguard or return to a ‘pure’ Trotskyism.

Groups which have appeared on the basis of a break with the parent organization are fundamentally different from communist fractions who appear as a reaction to the degeneration of a proletarian organization. The latter base themselves not on a break but on a continuity with a revolutionary programme which is being threatened by the opportunist policies of the organization -- even if such fractions subsequently rectify and deepen that programme in the light of experience. Thus while communist fractions appear with a coherent, elaborated revolu­tionary programme, currents who are break­ing with the counter-revolution tend to base themselves on essentially negative pos­itions, on a partial opposition to the positions of the parent organization, and this does not add up to a solid communist programme. Breaking with a counter­revolutionary coherence is not enough to give them a revolutionary coherence. More­over, the inevitably partial aspect of their break is expressed by a tendency to hold onto a certain number of the practices of the parent group (activism, careerism, manoeuvrism, etc) or to take up symmetrical but no less erroneous practices (academicism, rejection of organization, sectarianism, etc).

For all these reasons, it is very difficult for these groups to evolve positively as groups. Their initial deformations are usually too strong for them to fully emerge from the counter-revolution, if they do not quite simply disappear. Dissolution is in the last analysis the most positive outcome because it enables the militants of the group to free themselves from their organic roots and thus to move towards a revolutionary coherence.

However, something which is a strong proba­bility is not an absolute certainty, and the ICC must guard against any tendency to totally reject such groups as hopelessly counter-revolutionary. This can only stand in the way of the positive evolution of such groups or of their militants. There can be a great difference in the develop­ment of such groups according to the nature of their parent organization. Groups who split from organizations which have a cohe­rent, well-founded counter-revolutionary programme and practice (like the Trotsky­ists for example) in general suffer the greatest handicap. On the other hand, groups who come out of organizations which are more informal and have a less elaborate programme (such as the anarchists), or who have betrayed the class more recently, have a better chance of moving towards revolut­ionary positions, even as groups.

Furthermore, as the crisis deepens, the gap between the radical phraseology of the leftists and their bourgeois policies be­comes more and more obvious, and this will tend to provoke a reaction by their health­iest elements, who were originally taken in by this phraseology; this will give rise to further splits of this kind.

In all these cases, while having an even more cautious attitude to these groups than to groups of the first type, and while guarding against any idea of having ‘joint committees’ with them, as the PIC advocated for example, the ICC must intervene actively in the evolution of such currents, criticize them in an open, non-sectarian manner in order to stimulate discussion and clarifi­cation within them and avoid repetition of past errors like the one which led Revolut­ion Internationale to write “we have doubts about the positive evolution of a group which comes from anarchism” in a letter addressed to Journal des Luttes de Classe, whose members later on founded the Belgian section of the ICC along with RRS and VRS.

V. The problem posed by communist groups who are degenerating is probably one of the most difficult to resolve and needs to be examined with great care. The fact that once you have gone from the proletarian camp to the bourgeois camp there can be no going back and that this passage takes place in one direction only, means that we have to be extremely prudent in determining the moment this passage takes place and in the choice of the criteria upon which we base this judgment.

For example, we cannot say that an organi­zation is bourgeois because it is acting not as a factor of clarification of class cons­ciousness but as a factor of confusion: any error committed by a proletarian organiza­tion and by the proletariat in general obviously benefits the class enemy, but even when an organization commits extremely serious errors we cannot say that it is therefore an emanation of the class enemy. The existence of bad soldiers in an army is undoubtedly a weakness which benefits the enemy camp. But does this make such soldiers traitors?

In the second place, we cannot say that an organization is dead as a proletarian organ as soon as it crosses one class frontier. Among the class frontiers, some have a particularly important influence on the overall coherence of the programme. To cross one of these therefore constitutes a decisive criteria: thus support for ‘national defence’ immediately places an organization in the camp of the bourgeoisie. However, if one erroneous position, even on a single point, can throw a certain light on the whole of a group’s programme, some positions, even if they signify a lack of communist coherence within a group, do not automatically prevent the group from also holding authentically revolutionary posi­tions. Thus some communist currents were able to make fundamental contributions to the clarification of the revolutionary pro­gramme, while continuing to hold some com­pletely false positions on some important points (for example, the Italian Left, which continued to hold very erroneous positions on the questions of substitutionism, the unions, and even the nature of the USSR).

Finally, one of the most important points to consider is the evolution of the group we are dealing with. Any judgment must be based on a dynamic and not a static analysis. Thus even though their positions may be the same there is a difference bet­ween a group that arises today which gives its support to national liberation struggles, and a group that was formed on the basis of the struggle against imperialist war but which does not understand the link between the two questions, and thus capitulates on the question of national liberation.

Although any new-born group which defends a counter-revolutionary position runs the risk of passing rapidly and as a bloc to the bourgeois camp, communist currents which have been forged in the historical struggles of the class, even though they might exhibit important signs of degenera­tion, do not evolve so rapidly. The extre­mely difficult conditions in which they were born have obliged them to don an organiza­tional and programmatic armour which is much more resistant to the blows of the ruling class. Moreover, it is generally the case that their sclerosis is in part the ransom they pay for their attachment and loyalty to revolutionary principles, for their distrust; of any kind of ‘innovation’, which has been for so many other groups the Trojan horse of degeneration; it is this distrust which has led them to reject any idea of opening their programme to new developments coming out of historical experience.

It is for all these reasons that, in general, only major events in the evolution of society, imperialist war or revolution, which are a decisive moment in the life of a political organization, enable us to finally determine whether an organization, as a body, has gone over to the enemy camp. Often, only such situations can resolve the question of whether the inability to understand certain aberrations is the re­sult of the blindness of proletarian ele­ments or of the coherence of the counter­revolution. It is generally at moments when there is no longer any room for ambiguities that a degenerating organization either proves its definitive passage into the enemy camp by openly collaborating with the bour­geoisie, or it remains within the proletar­ian camp by reacting in a healthy manner, thus showing that it is still a fertile soil for the development of communist thought.

But what is valid for the large organiza­tions of the class when they degenerate applies much less to small communist groups with a limited impact. While the first are received with flags flying by the bourgeoi­sie, for whom they will be playing a very important role, small communist groups in decay, unable to take on a real function for capital, are ruthlessly pulverized and die in the long and painful agony of sects.

VI. At the present time there are broadly speaking two currents which fall into the above category, which appear to be caught up in a process of sclerosis and decay: groups issuing from the Dutch and German Left on the one hand, and from the Italian Left on the other. Among these groups some have been able to resist the tendency to­wards degeneration better than others, not­ably Spartacusbond in the first case, and Battaglia Comunista in the second, to the extent that they have been able to break with many of the sclerotic positions. On the other hand, some groups are at a far more advanced stage of degeneration, for example Programme Communiste. With regard to this organization, whatever level of re­gression it has reached, there are not yet any decisive elements which allow us to say that it has already gone over as a body into the camp of the bourgeoisie. We must guard against any hasty judgment on this ques­tion, because this could stand in the way of helping in the evolution of elements or tendencies who may arise within the organi­zation in order to fight against its dege­neration, or to break from it.

With regard to all these groups it is a question of maintaining an open attitude, intransigently defending our positions and denouncing their mistakes, while demonstra­ting our willingness to discuss with them.

VII. In defending the ICC’s general atti­tude towards groups and elements who defend more or less confused positions, we have to bear in mind the fact that we are living in a period of an historical resurgence of the class struggle.

In periods of reflux and defeat, like the one we left behind us in the late sixties, the main concern of communist groups is to safeguard basic principles, which may mean isolating themselves from the contemporary milieu, so as to avoid being dragged into its logic. In such circumstances there is little hope for the appearance of new revo­lutionary elements: the difficult task of defending communist principles which are being endangered by the counter-revolution tends to be taken up by elements who have come out of the old parties and who have remained loyal to these principles.

In today’s period of resurgence, however, while giving the greatest attention to the evolution of communist currents originating in the last revolutionary wave, and to dis­cussions with them, our principle preoccupa­tion must be to avoid cutting ourselves off from the elements and groups which are the inevitable product of this resurgence of the class. We can really only fulfill our role as a pole of regroupment for them if we are able:

a. to avoid considering ourselves as the one and only revolutionary group that exists today;

b. to firmly defend our positions in front of them;

c. to maintain an open attitude to discus­sion with them, a discussion that must take place in public and not through private correspondence.

Far from being in contradiction with each other, firmness in our principles and open­ness in our attitude mutually complement each other. We are not afraid of discus­sion precisely because we are convinced of the validity of our positions.

 

Life of the ICC: 

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State and dictatorship of the proletariat

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Introduction

Before the experience of the revolution in Russia, marxists had a relatively simple conception of the relationship between the proletariat and the state in the period of transition from capitalism to communism.

It was known that this period of transition would begin with the destruction of the political power of the bourgeoisie and that this phase could only precede and be a prep­aration for a communist society in which there would be neither classes, nor political power, nor a state. It was known that dur­ing this period the working class would have to establish its dictatorship over the rest of society. It was also known that, since this phase still bore with it all the birthmarks of capitalism, especially material scarcity and the division of society into classes, there would inevitably be some kind of state apparatus; finally, largely thanks to the experience of the Paris Commune in 1871, it was known that this apparatus could not be the bourgeois state ‘conquered’ by the workers, that in its form and content it would be a transitional institution essentially different from all previous states. But as for the problem of the relationship between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state, between the working class and this institution inherited from the past, it was felt that the question could be answered quite simply: the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state in the period of transition are one and the same thing, the armed working class is identical to the state. In a way, the proletariat in the period of transition could take up Louis XIV’s famous dictum “L’Etat, c’est moi!”.

Thus, in the Communist Manifesto, this state is described as “the proletariat organized as the ruling class”; similarly, in the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx wrote:

“Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a politi­cal transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.”

Later, on the eve of October 1917, Lenin, locked in a struggle against social democ­racy, which had hurled itself into the mire of World War I by participating in the government of the belligerent bourgeois states, vigorously reaffirmed this concep­tion in State and Revolution:

“ ... (the marxists) recognize that after the proletariat has conquered political power it must utterly destroy the old state machine and substitute for it a new one consisting of an organization of the armed workers ...”

or again

“Revolution consists in the proletariat destroying the ‘administrative apparatus’ and the whole state machine, replacing it with a new one, consisting of the armed workers.”

From this it followed naturally that the state in the period of transition could only be the most complete and effective expression of the working class and its power. The relationship between the state and the proletariat appeared to be so simple because they were one and the same thing. The state bureaucracy? It would not exist, or it would not pose any major problems be­cause the workers themselves (even a cook, as Lenin said) would take over its functions. Could one seriously envisage the possibility of antagonisms or conflict between the wor­king class and the state on the economic level? Impossible: How could the prole­tariat go on strike against the state, since it was the state? How could the state impose anything contrary to the economic interests of the working class, since the state was the direct emanation of the class? It seemed even less possible to envisage any antagonism on the political level. Was the state not the highest expression of the dictatorship of the proletariat? How could it express any counter-revolutionary ten­dencies when it was by definition the spear­head of the proletariat’s battle against the counter-revolution?

The Russian Revolution shattered this sim­plistic viewpoint -- a viewpoint which was inevitably predominant in the workers’ movement of that time, since apart from the two months of the Paris Commune, the move­ment had never really confronted the prob­lems of the transition period in all their complexity.

Thus, after the seizure of power in October 1917, the state was called the ‘proletarian state’; the best workers, the most experien­ced fighters, were put in charge of the main organs of the state; strikes were forbidden; all decisions of the state organs had to be accepted as expressions of the overall needs of the revolutionary struggle. In short, the oft-proclaimed identity between the working class and the state was inscri­bed in the laws and the flesh of the new revolution.

But, right from the beginning, the neces­sities of social existence began to syste­matically contradict the premises of this identification. In face of the difficult­ies posed to a revolution that was being progressively smothered by its isolation from the international movement of the class, the state apparatus showed that it was neither a body identical to the ‘armed workers’, nor the highest incarnation of the dictatorship of the proletariat; it was a body of functionaries clearly distinct from the proletariat, and its innate tend­encies did not lead to the communist trans formation, but to conservatism. The bureau­cratization of the functionaries charged with the organization of production, dis­tribution, the maintenance of order, etc, took place in the very first months of the revolution; and no-one -- not even the lea­ders of the Bolshevik Party at the head of the state, who certainly tried to fight against it -- could do anything about it. Above all, since the state was ‘proletarian’, the state bureaucracy was not recognized as a counter-revolutionary force.

On both the economic and political levels, the gulf between the working class and what was supposed to be ‘its’ state grew wider and wider. As early as the end of 1917, economic strikes broke out in Petrograd; as early as 1918, the left communist tenden­cies denounced the state bureaucracy and its opposition to the interests of the working class; in 1920-1, at the end of the civil war, these antagonisms exploded openly in the Petrograd strikes and the Kronstadt insurrection, which was crushed by the Red Army. In short, in its struggle to main­tain power, the proletariat in Russia did not find that the state was the instrument it thought it would be. On the contrary, it was something that resisted its efforts and quickly transformed itself into the main protagonist of the counter-revolution.

Of course, the defeat of the Russian Revolu­tion was, in the last instance, the product of the defeat of the world revolution and not of the activities of the state. But the experience of the struggle against the counterrevolution in Russia showed that the state apparatus and its bureaucracy was neither the proletariat, nor the spearhead of its dictatorship, and still less an institution to which the armed proletariat had to subordinate itself on account of its so-called ‘proletarian’ character.

It is true that the experience of the prole­tariat in Russia was condemned to failure the minute it failed to extend internation­ally. It is true that the strength of this antagonism between the proletariat and the state was an expression of the weakness of the world proletariat and of the non­existence of the material conditions which would have allowed the proletarian dictatorship to flourish. But it would be illusory to think that the extent of these difficul­ties can entirely explain this antagonism, and that in more favourable conditions the identification between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state in the period of transition will still be valid. The period of transition is a phase in which the proletariat will confront a fundamental pro­blem: it will have to establish new social relations when, by definition, the material conditions for these relations to grow can only be instigated by the revolutionary activity of the armed workers. This prob­lem was particularly extreme in Russia, but in essence it was the same problem the wor­kers will confront tomorrow. The grave obstacles encountered by the proletarian dictatorship in Russia do not make this ex­perience the exception which confirms the rule about the identity between the prole­tariat and the transitional state. On the contrary, the Russian experience has shed a particularly sharp light on the inevita­bility and nature of the antagonism between the revolutionary power of the proletariat and the institution which has to maintain order during the transition period.

Since its foundations, the ICC, following the work of the Italian Left (Bilan) between the wars and the group Internationalisme in the forties, has taken on the complicated but indispensable task of developing, re­examining, and completing a revolutionary understanding of the relationship between the proletariat and the transitional state, in the light of the Russian experience (see nos. 1,3, & 6 of the International Review).

As part of this effort we are publishing here a letter from a comrade who reacted critically to the theses elaborated on this question in the resolution adopted at its Second Congress by Revolution Internationale, section of the ICC in France (see International Review no.8); the reply to this critique then follows.

Comrades E’s letter

To the extent that marxism is the scientific comprehension of the successive modes of social reproduction in the past, it is also a prediction of the fundamental stages to­wards the final social formation -- communism -- from the society we are living in now. Economic forms have transformed themselves in an uninterrupted process in the history of human society. But this process has taken the form of convulsions, of struggles in which the armed political confrontation of classes has broken the fetters holding back the development of new formations. This is the period of the struggle for power, which culminates in a dictatorship of the forces of tomorrow over the forces of yester­day (or vice versa until a new crisis breaks out). Socialist revisionism prior to World War I claimed that it had got rid of Marx and Engels’ theory of dictatorship, and it was Lenin who had the merit of setting this theory back on its feet: in State and Revolution he completely restored the marx­ist position by showing the need to destroy the bourgeois state. In perfect accord with marxist theory, Lenin thus set out a frame­work which made it possible to distinguish the successive phases in the transition from capitalism to communism.

Intermediary stage

Once the proletariat has conquered political power, it will, like all previous classes impose its own dictatorship. Being unable to abolish other classes at a single blow, the proletariat will set them outside the law. This means that the proletarian state will control an economy which in one sector is not only based on mercantile distribution, but also on private ownership of the means of production, whether through individuals or associations; at the same time, through its despotic interventions, the proletarian state will open the way to the lower state of communism. As we can see, contrary to RV’s assertions about the supposed complex­ities of Lenin’s conception of the state and its role, the essence of his position is very simple: the proletariat makes itself the ruling class and creates its own state organ, which differs in form from previous states, but which has essentially the same function: the oppression of other classes, violence concentrated against them for the triumph of the interests of the ruling class, even if these interests are those of humanity in the long term.

The lower stage of communism

In this phase, society will already be car­rying out the distribution of products to its members in a planned way; there is no need for money or exchange. Distribution is organized centrally without any exchange of equivalent values. At this stage there would not only be an obligation to work, but labour time would be accounted for and certificates attesting how much labour has been performed would be given out -- the famous ‘labour-time vouchers’. These would have the characteristic that they could not be accumulated -- any attempt at accumulation would be a pure loss, since an aliquot part of labour would receive no equivalent. The law of value would have been destroyed be­cause society “does not accord any value to its products” (Engels). After this second stage comes the higher stage of communism which we won’t go into here.

As we have seen, marxism sees the necessary pre-condition of the transition period to be an initial violent political revolution, whose inevitable outcome is the class dic­tatorship. By exerting this dictatorship through its despotic intervention and a monopoly of armed force, the proletariat will carry out the profound ‘reforms’ which will destroy the last vestiges of capitalism.

So far it seems that there are no disagree­ments. The difficulty comes in when you affirm that “the state has a historic nature which is anti-communist and anti-proleta­rian”, that it is essentially conservative, and that therefore the proletarian dictator­ship “cannot find its authentic and total expression in a conservative instrument par excellence, the state.” Here, if you will pardon the brutality of my words, we see anarchism coming through the window after being chased out the door. You accept the dictatorship of the proletariat but you for­get that ‘state’ and the exclusive dictator­ship of a class are synonymous.

Before criticizing more specifically some of the affirmations contained in the text, I want to return to the fundamental lines of the marxist theory of the state. For Engels every state is defined by a precise territ­ory and by the nature of the ruling class. It is thus defined by a place, the capital where the government meets; this government being for marxism “the executive committee for the interests of the ruling class”. In the transition from feudal power to bourg­eois power, we see the development of a poli­tical theory -- typical of bourgeois mystifi­cations -- which in all historic bourgeois revolutions has accompanied the passage from feudalism to capitalism. The bourgeoisie with its mystified consciousness claimed that it was destroying the power of one class not to set up the rule of another class, but to build a state based on the harmonious accord of ‘the whole people’. But in all revolutions a series of facts have highligh­ted the correctness of the marxist view of classes, that since the dictatorship of one class has always been accompanied by the violation of the liberty of other classes, violence directed against other classes, even terror, has always been an inseparable aspect of bourgeois revolutions.

In the proletarian revolution, one of the first acts to carry out is the destruction of the old state apparatus; once the class is in power it must do this without hesi­tation. This was the lesson Marx drew from the Paris Commune which on being installed at the Hotel de Ville opposed the state with its own state power and before being itself crushed, crushed even individual members of the enemy class by terror. And if there was any fault, it wasn’t that of being too ferocious, but of not being ferocious enough. (Marx)

From this important experience of the prole­tariat, Marx drew a fundamental lesson which we can’t ignore; that exploiting classes need political rule to maintain exploitation and that the proletariat needs it to do away with exploitation once and for all. The destruction of the bourgeoisie can only take place when the proletariat becomes the rul­ing class. This means that the emancipation of the working class is impossible within the limits of the bourgeois state. This has to be defeated in the civil war and its whole machinery dismantled. After the revo­lutionary victory, another historic form will arise until socialist society emerges and the state withers away.

After this brief affirmation of what are to me pillars of marxist theory on the state and on the passage from one society to another, and more specifically from capita­lism to communism, I will now deal with the present Resolution on the period of transi­tion. What is striking about this text is the contradictory character of some of the things it affirms.

On the one hand it affirms that “the politi­cal seizure of power over society by the proletariat precedes, conditions and guaran­tees the process of economic and social transformation”, but it doesn’t say that taking political power means setting up a dictatorship over other classes and that the state is and always was the organ of dictatorship by one class over another (even though it may be different in its character­istics -- functions, division of powers, system of representatives and so on -- accor­ding to the mode of production and the classes whose rule it stands for).

Moreover, when it is affirmed that “this whole state organization categorically excludes any participation in it by exploi­ting classes and strata, who are deprived of all political and civil rights”, it doesn’t point out that all the characteris­tics of this state, correctly expressed in other parts of the same paragraph and above all the part just mentioned (about the political representation of one class only), are not just formal differences but destroy all the basic characteristics of the bourg­eois state and prove the much-maligned identity between the state and the dictator­ship of the proletariat.

But on what basis can one affirm the absol­ute necessity for the proletariat not to identify its own dictatorship with the state in the period of transition? Mainly because it is asserted that the state is a conservative institution par excellence.

Here we are joining up with the anti-histori­cal viewpoint of anarchism with its opposi­tion to the state on principle. The anarchists base their convictions on the need to be free of the yoke of ‘authority’. RI doesn’t go that far, obviously, but just like the anarchists it judges the state to be conservative and reactionary no matter what social epoch or geographical region, no matter what direction it is oriented towards and thus no matter what kind of class rule it is the expression of, or the historical period in which that class rule is situated.

Marxism doesn’t see things in this way. For marxism the state is a different institution in different epochs, both in relation to its formal characteristics and its functions.

If we study history, marxist materialism teaches us that, in revolutionary epochs, as soon as a class has conquered power it stabilizes the kind of state organization which best corresponds to the pursuit of its class interests. The state then takes on the function of the revolutionary class that has set it up. In other words, having crushed the resistance of other classes by terror, its despotic interventions allow the productive forces to develop -- by casting down obstacles in the way, by stabilizing and imposing through a monopoly of armed force a whole framework of laws and relations of production which allow the productive forces to grow and correspond to the inter­ests of the new class in power. To give but one example, the French state in 1793 took on an eminently revolutionary role.

Another reason is expressed in the same paragraph of point C: “the state in the transition period bears all the marks of a class-divided society”. This is a very strange reason, because everything that comes out of capitalist society will bear its marks. Not only the state, but also the proletariat organized in the soviets, because it will have grown up and been edu­cated under the influence of the conservative ideology of the capitalist system. Only the party, while not constituting an island of communism within capitalism, is less marked by these stigmata because it is based on “a will and a consciousness which become the premises for action as a result of a general historical elaboration” (Bordiga). (These affirmations may seem a bit summary, but I will clarify them later on.)

To conclude, I will deal with the profound contradiction your conception leads to. You say “the proletariat’s domination over soci­ety is also its domination over the state and this can only be ensured through its own class dictatorship”. I will reply with the classic words of Lenin, who, in State and Revolution once again underlined the essence of the marxist theory of the state:

“The essence of Marx’s teaching on the state has been mastered only by those who understand that the dictatorship of a single class is necessary not only for every class society in general, not only for the proletariat which has overthrown the bourgeoisie, but also for the entire historical period which separates capita­lism from ‘classless society’, from communism. The forms of bourgeois states are extremely varied, but their essence is the same: all these states, whatever their form, in the final analysis is inevitably the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The transition from capitalism to communism certainly cannot but yield a tremendous abundance and variety of political forms, but the essence will inevi­tably be the same: the dictatorship of the proletariat.”

Thus from the marxist point of view, the state can be defined as an organ (different in form and structure according to the his­torical epoch, the class society, and the orientation it expresses) through which the dictatorship of the proletariat, based on a monopoly of armed force, will be exerted.

It is thus nonsense to talk about a state subjected to a dictatorship which is exter­nal to it, and which cannot therefore inter­vene despotically in economic and social reality in order to impose a definite class orientation on it.

E.


 

The ICC’s reply

Two ideas underlie comrade E’s critique: the first is the rejection of the affirma­tion that the “state is a conservative institution par excellence”; the second is the reaffirmation of the identity between the state and the dictatorship of the prole­tariat in the period of transition, since the state is always the state of the ruling class. Let us examine these two arguments more closely. E writes:

“(RI asserts that) the state is a cons­ervative institution par excellence. Here we are joining up with the anti-historical viewpoint of anarchism with its opposition to the state on principle. The anarchists base their convictions on the need to be free of the yoke of ‘auth­ority’. RI doesn’t go that far, obvious­ly, but just like the anarchists it judges the state to be conservative and reactionary no matter what social epoch or geographical region, no matter what direction it is oriented towards and thus no matter what kind of class rule it is the expression of, or the historical period in which that class rule is situated.”

Before considering why the state is indeed a “conservative organ par excellence,” let us reply to this polemical argument which integrates our position with that of the anarchists.

Our conception is said to “join up with the anti-historical viewpoint of anarchism” be­cause it draws out a characteristic of state institutions (their conservative nature) independently of the “geographical region”, the “class rule it is the expression of” and “the historical period in which that class rule is situated”.

But why is it ‘anti-historical’ to draw out the general characteristics of an institut­ion or a phenomenon throughout history, whatever specific forms it may take on in a given period? How can we use history to understand reality if we don’t know how to draw out the general laws which operate in different periods and specific conditions? Is marxism ‘anti-historical’ when it says that since society has been divided into classes “the class struggle is the motor force in history” whatever the historical period and whatever classes are involved?

We can see the need to distinguish what is particular and specific to each state in history (feudal state, bourgeois state, transitional state, etc). But how can we understand these particularities if we don’t know what generalities they are to be defined against? The ability to draw out the general characteristics of a phenomenon throughout history, throughout all the particular forms it may take on, is not only the basis of any historical analysis but is also a pre-condi­tion for understanding the specificities of any general problem.

From the marxist point of view one might challenge our view that it is a general law that the state has a conservative character, but one can’t challenge the very idea of trying to define the general historical character of a phenomenon. To do this would be to deny the possibility of any historical analysis.

It is also asserted that our position is close to that of anarchism because it is based on “opposition to the state in prin­ciple”. Let us recall what is meant by the anarchists’ opposition in principle to the state. Rejecting the analysis of history in terms of class and of economic determi­nism, the anarchists never understood that the state was a product of the needs of a class-divided society; they saw it as an ‘evil’ in itself, which, along with religion and authoritarianism, was at the root of all the evils of society (“I am against the state because the state is accursed” as Louis Michel put it). For the same reason they considered that there was no need for a period of transition between capitalism and communism, and still less for a state. The state could and had to be ‘abolished’, ‘forbidden’ by decree the day after the general insurrection.

What has this in common with the idea that the state, a product of the division of society into classes, has a conservative essence because it has the function of holding back class conflicts and maintaining them within the limits of order and social stability? If we stress the conservative character of this institution it’s not be­cause we advocate that the proletariat should have an ‘apolitical’, indifferent attitude to the state, or because we want to spread illusions about the possibility of making the state disappear by decree while class divisions continue to exist; it is in order to show why the proletariat, far from submitting unconditionally to the authority of the state in the period of transition -- as is suggested by the idea that the state is the incarnation of the dictatorship of the proletariat -- must sub­ject this apparatus to a permanent relation of force, to its own class dictatorship. What is there is common between this vision and that of the anarchists who reject en bloc the state, the period of transition, and above all the dictatorship of the prole­tariat? To assimilate this vision to that of the anarchists is simply to play with words in the interest of polemic.

But let us go to the heart of the problem. Why is the state a conservative institution par excellence?

The word conservative means that which opposes any innovation, that which resists any overturning of the existing order. Now the state, no matter what kind, is an institution whose essential function is precisely that of maintaining order, main­taining the existing order. It is the pro­duct of the need of every class society to provide itself with an organ which can maintain by force an order which can’t be maintained harmoniously and spontaneously because it is divided into social groupings with antagonistic economic interests. It thus constitutes the force which every act­ion aimed at overturning the existing order -- and thus every revolutionary action -- must come up against.

“The state is, therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without ... it is a product of society at a certain stage of development; it is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic inter­ests, might not consume themselves and society in sterile struggle, a power seemingly standing above society became necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of ‘order’; and this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state.” (Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State)

In this famous formulation of Engels, which explains the needs and functions fulfilled by the state, we find a clear statement of the essential aspect of this institution: “moderating the conflict” between classes, “keeping it within the bounds of ‘order’ and a few pages further on, “the state arose from the need to hold class antagon­isms within cheek”.

Since we know that the force which leads to revolutionary transformation is none other than the class struggle that it is this ‘conflict’, this ‘antagonism’ which it is the state’s task to ‘moderate’ and ‘hold in check’, then it is easy to understand why the state is an essentially conservative insti­tution.

In societies of exploitation, where the state is overtly the guardian of the inter­ests of the economically dominant class, the conservative role of the state in the face of any movement which challenges the existing economic order (of which the state is always, along with the ruling class, the beneficiary) appears quite clearly. However, this conservative character of the state is no less present in the state in the period of transition to communism.

At each stage of the communist revolution (destruction of the political power of the bourgeoisie in one or several countries, then throughout the world; collectivization of new sectors of production; development of the collectivization of distribution in the industrial centres, then in the advanced agricultural sectors, then in the backward ones, etc), and as long as the development of the productive forces has not reached a level which would allow each human being to participate in collectivized production on a world scale and receive goods from society “according to his needs”, as long as human­ity has not attained this stage of wealth which would finally allow it to do away with all forms of rationing and to unite in a human community -- at each stage society will have to resort to uniform social rules and laws, which will enable it to live in accord with the existing conditions of pro­duction without being torn apart by the con­flict between classes and while waiting to go on to a new stage.

Because we are dealing with laws which still express a stage of scarcity, that is a stage where the well-being of one still tends to be at the expense of another, these are laws which, while imposing ‘equality in scar­city’ will require an apparatus of constraint and administration which will make the whole of society respect them. This apparatus can only be the state.

If, for example, during this period of tran­sition we decide to freely distribute cons­umer goods in the centres of distribution, when there is still scarcity in society, the first few thousand who got to the centres would be able to satisfy their hunger, but thousands of others would be reduced to famine. Thus even an equitable distribution demands rules for rationing and thus ‘func­tionaries’: the state which “supervises and records” that Lenin talked about.

The function of this state is not a revo­lutionary one, even if the existing politi­cal order is that of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Its intrinsic function is at best to stabilize, regularize, and institut­ionalize the existing social relations. The bureaucratic mentality in the transition period (and there is no state without bur­eaucrats) is hardly going to be characteri­zed by a revolutionary devotion. It will inevitably tend to be the same as that of all functionaries: it will be concerned with maintaining order, the stability of the laws which it has the task of applying ... and as far as possible, with the defence of its own privileges. The longer scarcity makes the state necessary, the more the conservative force of this apparatus will grow, and with it the tendency for all the characteristics of the old society to re-emerge.

In the Communist Manifesto Marx wrote:

“The development of the productive forces is the absolute pre-condition (for commu­nism) because without it one is merely socializing poverty and this poverty will give rise to a struggle for necessities, so that all the old dross will come back to the surface.”

The Russian Revolution, where the proleta­riat had to remain isolated, condemned to the most terrible scarcity, was a tragic, practical demonstration of this insight. But it also showed that the “old dross” would re-emerge precisely where it was be­lieved that the dictatorship of the prolet­ariat had its true incarnation: in the state and its bureaucracy.

Let us cite a witness whose testimony is all the more significant in that he was one of the main defenders of the idea that the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transitional state were identical, Leon Trotsky:

“The bureaucratic authority was based on the scarcity of consumer goods and the resulting struggle of all against all. When there were enough goods in the shops, customers could come at any time. When there weren’t enough commodities the cus­tomers had to queue at the door. When the queue became very long, there had to be a policeman to maintain order. This was the starting point of the soviet bureaucracy. It ‘knew’ whom to give things to and who had to be patient...

.. (the bureaucracy) arose at the begin­ning as the bourgeois organ of the work­ing class. Establishing and maintaining the privileges of the minority, it natu­rally took the best for itself: he who gives out the goods doesn’t go short.

Thus society gave birth to an organ which, going far beyond its necessary social function, became an autonomous factor and a source of great danger to the whole social body.” (Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed)

Certainly the next revolutionary movement won’t undergo material conditions as disas­trous as those which existed in Russia. But the necessity for a period of transition, a period of struggle against scarcity and pov­erty on the scale of the planet, is no less inevitable than the emergence of a state structure. The fact that the proletariat will have at its disposal a greater reserv­oir of productive forces in order to create the material conditions for communist soci­ety will be a vital element in weakening the state and its conservative influence. But it will not eliminate this characteris­tic. Thus it is extremely important for the proletariat to assimilate the lessons of the Russian Revolution, and to see the transit­ional state not as the supreme incarnation of the dictatorship but as an organ which it must subject to its dictatorship and from which it must maintain its organizational autonomy.

A force for stabilization, not transformations

But, you say, history shows that the state takes on a revolutionary function when the class which runs it is itself revolutionary:

“... in revolutionary epochs, as soon as a class has conquered power it stabi­lizes the kind of state organization which best corresponds to the pursuit of its class interests. The state then takes on the function of the revolutionary class that has set it up. In other words, having crushed by terror the resistance of other classes, its despotic interven­tions allow the productive forces to develop -- by casting down obstacles in the way, by stabilizing and imposing through a monopoly of armed force a whole framework of laws and relations of pro­duction which allow the productive forces to grow and correspond to the interests of the new class in power. To give but one example, the French state in 1793 took on an eminently revolutionary role.” (Extract from E's Letter)

We can’t play with words here. To take on a revolutionary function and stabilize “a whole framework of laws and relations of production”....which “correspond to the interests of the new class in power” do not describe the same thing. From the moment when the struggle of a revolutionary class manages to establish a relation of force in society to its own advantage it is obvious that the legal framework, the state institution which has the function of stabilizing the existing relation of forces is obliged to translate this new state of affairs into laws and into interventions by the executive apparatus to make sure the laws are carried out. Any political action of any conse­quence in a society divided into classes, and thus headed by a state structure will be unable to attain its goal unless it is soo­ner or later concretized at the level of laws and state actions. Thus the state in France in 1793, for example, was obliged to legalize the revolutionary measures imposed by the actions of the revolutionary forces: execution of the King, law on suspects, and the terror against reactionary elements, requisitions and rationing, confiscation and sale of the goods of emigres, tax on the rich, ‘dechristianization’ and closing of the churches, etc. In the same way the sov­iet state in Russia took revolutionary mea­sures, like the consecration of soviet power and the destruction of the political power of the former ruling class, organization of the civil war against the White armies and so on.

But can we say that the state really took on the revolutionary function of the classes which set it up?

The question is whether these facts show that the state is only conservative when the ruling class is conservative and revo­lutionary when the latter is revolutionary? In other words, is it true that the state has no intrinsically conservative or revolu­tionary tendencies? If so it would simply be the institutional embodiment of the will of the politically dominant class, or to use Bukharin’s formulation about the state and the proletariat in the period of transition: “the collective reason of the working class ... has its material embodi­ment in the highest, all-embracing organiza­tion, its state power” (Economics of the Transition Period).

Let us look at these events a bit more closely, beginning with “the French state of 1793, by the measures it took, the most radical bourgeois state in history” (we will look at the Russian Revolution later).

The state of 1793 was the state of the Nat­ional Convention, set up at the end of 1792 after the removal of the monarchy by the Insurrectionary Commune of Paris and the terror it imposed: the Convention succeeded the state of the Legislative Assembly which had ‘organized’ the revolutionary war, but whose existence was put into question by the fall of the throne and the real power of the Insurrectionary Commune, whose dis­solution it tried in vain to proclaim (on 1 September the Legislative Assembly pro­claimed the dissolution of the Commune but had to revoke its decision on the same evening).

The Legislative Assembly had itself succee­ded the Constituent Assembly which, after proclaiming the abolition of seigneurial rights and adopting the universal declaration of the rights of man, had refused to proclaim the removal of the King.

Before seeing how the famous radical meas­ures of 1793 were taken, we have to say that the events leading from the conquest of power by the bourgeoisie in 1789 to the Convention of September 1792 don’t corres­pond to the simplistic description given by comrade E: “in revolutionary epochs, as soon as a class has conquered power, it sta­bilizes the kind of state organization which best corresponds to the pursuit of its class interests”.

In reality, as soon as the bourgeoisie con­quered political power in 1789, a long and complex process began, in the course of which the revolutionary class far from “stabilizing” the state it had just set up, found itself forced to systematically chal­lenge the state in order to be able to carry out its historic mission.

Hardly had the state consecrated the new relations of forces imposed by the most dyn­amic elements of society (abolition of seig­neurial rights by the Constituent Assembly after the events of July in 1789 in Paris, for example) than the institutional frame­work stabilized by the state’s action show­ed itself to be insufficient, and became a fetter on the new developments of the revo­lutionary process (like the Constituent’s refusal to proclaim the elimination of the King, and its repression of the popular movement).

If between 1789 and 1793 the revolution needed three state forms (each one having various governments), it is precisely be­cause none of these states were able to “take on the function of the revolutionary class that has set it up”. Each new step forward in the revolution thus took the form of a struggle not only against the classes of the ancien regime, but also against the ‘revolutionary’ state and its legalistic, conservative inertia.

The year 1793 didn’t bring with it a stabi­lization of “the kind of state organization which best corresponds to the pursuit of the bourgeoisie’s class interests”. On the contrary it corresponded to the high point of the destabilization of the state insti­tution. For real stabilization we had to wait for Napoleon with his juridical codes, his re-organization of the administration and his cry: “Citizens: The Revolution is fixed to the principles it began with. It is f finished!”1

And how could it have been any different? How could a genuinely revolutionary class avoid coming to blows with representatives of ‘order’ (even its own) in order to force it to transcend its administrative concerns, its juridical formalities, its preoccupations, in Engels’ words, with “moderating the conflict (between classes) ... keeping it within the bounds of ‘order’”?

To think that the state institution can be the ‘material embodiment’ of the revolutio­nary will of a class is as absurd as imagin­ing that a revolution can unfold in an ‘orderly’ manner. It means asking an organ whose essential function is to ensure the stability of social life to incarnate the spirit of subversion, a spirit which it is the state’s task to smother. It means asking a corps of bureaucrats to have the spirit of a revolutionary class.

A revolution is a formidable explosion of the living forces of society, who begin to take control of the destiny of the social organism, overturning without respect or hesitation all the institutions (even those created by the revolution) which stand in the way of the revolutionary process. The power of a revolution can be measured by the ability of a revolutionary class to avoid getting trapped in the legal prison of its initial conquests, to know how to deal as ruthlessly with the insufficiencies of its first steps as with the forces of the ancien regime. The political superiority of the bourgeois revolution in France to the English bourgeois revolution resides precisely in the ability of the former to avoid getting paralyzed by a fetishism of the state, to ceaselessly and pitilessly overturn its own state institutions.

But let us go back to the famous French state of 1793 and the measures it took be­cause it is the example comrade E gives to prove the ‘revolutionary’ capacities of state institutions; actually it is a stri­king example of just how powerless state institutions are in this field.

The truth is that the great revolutionary measures of 1793 were not taken on the initiative of the state, but against the state. It was the direct action of the most radical factions of the Parisian bour­geoisie, supported and often carried along by the immense agitation of the proletariat of the suburbs of Paris, which forced these measures to be carried out.

The Insurrectionary Commune of Paris was a body set up after the events of 9/10 August 1792 by the most radical elements of the bourgeoisie; it had at its disposal the armed force of the bourgeoisie, the Natio­nal Guard, and the armed sections, which were organs of the popular masses. It was this body, an organic expression of the revolutionary movement, which forced first the Legislative then the Convention -- whose accession it had provoked by terrorizing 90 per cent of the electors in the indirect system of universal suffrage to abstain from voting -- to carry through the most radical measures of the revolution. It was the Commune which provoked the fall of the King on 10 August 1792, which imprisoned the royal family in the Temple on the thir­teenth, which prevented itself from being dissolved by the state of the Legislative, which directly set up the revolutionary tribunals and the Terror of September 1792; it was the Commune which, in 1793, imposed on the Convention the execution of the King, the law on suspects, the proscription of the Girondins, the closing of the churches, the offical establishment of the Terror, etc, etc. And, to emphasize its character as a living force distinct from the state, it also imposed on the Convention the pre­eminence of Paris as “guide to the Nation and tutor to the Assembly”; the right of the “people” to intervene against “its representatives” if necessary, and, finally, the “right to insurrection”!

The example of Cromwell in England, dissolv­ing Parliament by force and putting a notice on the door saying ‘for hire’, is an expression of the same necessity.

If the events of 1792-3 show anything, it’s not that the state institution can be as revolutionary as the class which domi­nates it, but on the contrary that:

-- the more revolutionary this class is the more it is forced to come up against the conservative character of the state;

-- the more it has to take radical measures the more it is forced to refuse to submit to the authority of the state and to submit the state to its own dictatorship.

We said before that to take on a revolutio­nary function and to stabilize a whole framework of laws and relations of produc­tion ... which “correspond to the interests of the new class in power” are not the same. In revolutionary periods history has only resolved the difference between the two through a relation of force between the real revolutionary force, the class itself, and its juridical expression, the state.

Identifying with a stabilizing organ

Up to this point we have dealt with the conservative nature of the state on a gene­ral historical level. Returning to the period of transition from capitalism to communism we shall see just how much this antagonism between revolution and the state, embryonic or transient in past revolutions becomes much more profound and irreconcil­able in the communist revolution. Comrade E writes:

“The difficulty comes in when you affirm that ‘the state has a historic nature which is anti-communist and anti-prole­tarian’, that it is essentially conserva­tive, and that therefore the proletarian dictatorship ‘cannot find its authentic and total expression in a conservative instrument par excellence, the state’. Here, if you will pardon the brutality of my words, we see anarchism coming in through the window after being chased out the door.”

We will leave the polemical argument which calls our position an anarchist one: we’ve already dealt with this. Let us see why the proletariat can’t find its “authentic and total expression” in a conservative institu­tion.

We saw how during the bourgeois revolution there were moments in which, because of the conservative tendencies in the initial forms of its own state, the bourgeoisie was forced, through its most radical factions, to distance itself from the state institut­ion and impose its ‘despotic’ dictatorship not only on the other classes in society, but also on the state it had just set up.

However, the opposition between the bour­geoisie and the state could only be tempor­ary. The goal of the bourgeois revolutions, no matter how radical and popular they might be, could never be anything but the streng­thening and stabilization of the social or­der of which the bourgeoisie is the benefi­ciary. However great its opposition to the old ruling class might be, it only destabi­lizes society and the state in order to fix it more firmly later on, when it’s political power has been assured in a new social order, when it can develop its strength as an exploiting class without further hindrance.

Thus the revolutionary storm of 1793 was followed by the submission of the Insurrec­tionary Commune of Paris to the government of Robespierre’s Committee of Public Safety, then by the execution of Robespierre himself by the ‘reaction’ of Thermidor, finally end­ing up with the strong state under Napoleon, when the state and the bourgeoisie were fraternally intertwined in an absolute des­ire for order and stability.

In fact, the more the bourgeoisie’s system developed and consolidated itself, the more the bourgeoisie recognized its own reflection in the state, the guarantor of its privileges. The more the bourgeoisie became conservative the more it identified itself with its gendarme and administrator.

For the proletariat things are quite diffe­rent. The goal of the working class in power is neither to maintain its existence as a class nor to conserve the state, a pro­duct of the division of society into classes. Its declared objective is the abolition of classes and thus the disappearance of the state. The period of transition to commun­ism is not a movement towards the stabiliza­tion of proletarian power, but towards its disappearance. It flows from this not that the proletariat must not affirm its dictator­ship over the whole of society, but that it must use this dictatorship to permanently overturn the existing state of affairs. This movement of transformation has to con­tinue right up until the advent of communism: any stabilization of the proletarian revolu­tion means a reflux and the threat of death. Saint-Just’s famous saying, “those who make a revolution half-way are digging their own graves”, applies much more to the proleta­riat than to any other revolutionary class in history, because it is the first revolutionary class to be an exploited class.

Contrary to the ideas of Trotsky, who was unable to see the growth of the bureaucracy after 1917 as the main force of the counter­revolution, and talked about a ‘proletarian Thermidor’, there can be no ‘Thermidor’ in the proletarian revolution. For the bour­geoisie, Thermidor was a necessity which corresponded to its attempt to stabilize its own power. For the proletariat, any stabilization is not a culminating point or a success, but a weakness, and before long, a retreat in its revolutionary task.

The only moment when the stabilization of social relations can correspond to the inte­rests of the proletariat will be when the classless society has emerged. But then there will be no more proletariat, no more proletarian dictatorship, and no more state. This is why the proletariat can nev­er find in an institution whose function is to “moderate the conflict” between classes and stabilize the existing state of affairs “its authentic and total expression”.

Contrary to what happened with the bourgeoi­sie, the development of the proletarian revolution will not be measured by the streng­thening of the state, but on the contrary key the dissolution of the state into civil society, the society of free producers.

But the proletariat’s attitude to the state during the course of its dictatorship -- non-identification, autonomous organization in relation to the state, dictatorship over the state -- is different from that of the bourgeoisie, not only because for the first time the dissolution of the state is a neces­sity but also -- and without this such a necessity is but a pious wish -- because it is a possibility.

Divided by the private property and by the competition on which its economic rule is based, the bourgeoisie cannot engender for very long an organized body which incarnates its class interests outside the state. For the bourgeoisie the state is not only the defender of its rule over other classes, it is also the only place where it can unify its interests. Because of all the bourgeoi­sie’s private and antagonistic interests, only the state can express the interests of the whole class. This is why, although at a given moment, both in France and in Eng­land, the bourgeoisie could not do without the autonomous action of its most radical factions against the state it had set up in order to carry out its revolution, this state of affairs could not be allowed to persist for long. Otherwise it would have completely lost its political unity and strength; (witness the fate of the Insurrec­tionary Commune of Paris and its leaders once their dynamic revolutionary action had been accomplished).

The proletariat will not suffer from this impotence. Not having any antagonistic interests in its midst and finding its main strength in its autonomous unity, the proletariat can exist, united and powerful, without having recourse to an armed arbiter above itself. Its representation as a class can be found in itself, in its own unitary organs: the workers’ councils.

These councils can and must constitute the one and only organ of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In these councils alone will the proletariat be able to find “its authentic and total expression”.

The proletariat as a ruling class

Comrade E takes up Lenin’s positions in State and Revolution, which are themselves based on the writings and practical exper­ience of the proletarian movement. But he has done so by simplifying Lenin’s position in the extreme, by forgetting the political context in which it was written, and by leaving out the most important experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat: the Russian Revolution.

According to E, the greatest, richest moment in the history of the proletarian struggle hasn’t given the slightest reason to modify the formulations put forward by revolution­aries before October. The result is a gross simplication of the inevitable insufficien­cies of revolutionary theory prior to 1917, in an area where the only experience to go on was that of the Paris Commune. E writes:

“ ... the essence of his (Lenin’s) posi­tion is very simple: the proletariat makes itself the ruling class and creates its own state organ, which differs in form from previous states, but which has essentially the same function: the oppres­sion of other classes, violence concen­trated against them for the triumph of the interests of the ruling class, even if these interests are those of humanity as a whole.”

It is true that the essential function of the state has always been to maintain the oppression of the exploited classes by the exploiting class. But if you transpose this definition to the period of transition to communism, its insufficiency soon becomes apparent for two main reasons:

1. Because the class exerting its dictator­ship is not an exploiting class but an exploited class.

2. Because of the reason given above and because of the reasons we have already seen, the relationship between the prole­tariat and the state can’t be the same as it was with exploiting classes.

In State and Revolution Lenin was obliged to put forward this simple conception of the state, because of the polemic he was engaged in with Social Democracy. The latter, in order to justify their partici­pation in the government of bourgeois states, claimed that the state (and the bourgeois state in particular) was an organ of concil­iation between classes: from this they con­cluded that by participating in it and by increasing the electoral influence of work­ers’ parties you could transform the state into an instrument of the proletariat for the building of socialism. Lenin insisted that the state in class society was always the state of the ruling class, an apparatus for keeping that force in power, its armed force against other classes.

The thought of a revolutionary class, and especially that of an exploited revolutio­nary class, can never develop in the peace­ful world of scientific research. Since it is a weapon in its overall struggle, it can only express itself in violent opposition to the ruling ideology, the falsity of which it is constantly trying to demonstrate. This is why you will never find a revolutio­nary text which doesn’t take the form of a critique or a polemic in one way or another. Even the most ‘scientific’ parts of Capital were written in a spirit of critical strugg­le against the economic theories of the ruling class. Thus when we use revolutio­nary texts we have to see them in the con­text of the struggle they were a part of. Real, living polemic always leads to a polarization of thought around particular aspects of reality because they are the most important elements in a given struggle. But what is essential in one discussion not automatically essential in another. To take, word for word, formulations from a text dealing with a particular problem, and to apply them to other problems without situating them in their proper context usu­ally leads to aberrations; what was a neces­sary simplification in a polemic is, when transposed elsewhere, transformed into a theoretical absurdity. This is why exegesis is always an obstacle to revolutionary thought.

To transpose formulations from the polemic against Social Democracy for its participa­tion in the bourgeois state and its rejec­tion of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and replant them in the problem of the rela­tionship between the working class and the state in the period of transition to commu­nism, is an example of this kind of error. It was an error which was committed quite often by Marx, Engels and Lenin, and by all the revolutionaries who were united in struggle against the treason of Social Democracy during World War I. It was understan­dable prior to October 1917, but not today.

The experience of the Russian Revolution has shown that the relationship of the proletariat in power to the state is quite different from that of exploiting classes. The proletariat affirms itself as the ruling class in society by exerting its dictator­ship. But the term ruling class here has a very different content from when it is app­lied to past societies. The proletariat is the ruling class politically, but not econo­mically. Not only can the proletariat not exploit any other class in society; to a certain extent it remains an exploited class itself.

Economically exploiting a class means deri­ving benefit from its labour to the detri­ment of its own satisfaction; it means depriving a class of part of the fruits of its labour and thus preventing it from en­joying them. After the seizure of power by the proletariat the economic situation will have the following two characteristics:

1. In relation to human needs (even using a minimum definition of not suffering from hunger, cold, or curable diseases), scar­city will reign over two-thirds of man­kind.

2. The most essential elements of world pro­duction will be carried on in the indus­trial regions by a minority of the population: the proletariat.

In these conditions, the movement towards communism will demand an enormous effort in production, which will be aimed on the one hand at satisfying human needs, and, on the other hand, (and linked to this first neces­sity) at integrating the immense mass of the population into the process of produc­tion. The majority of the population is unproductive either because it carries out unproductive functions under capitalism (in the advanced countries); or because capi­talism has been unable to integrate them into social production (as with the majority of the third world). Now, whether we are talking about increasing production of con­sumer goods or about producing means of pro­duction in order to be able to integrate the unproductive masses (the peasantry in the third world won’t be integrated into socialized production with wooden or metal ploughs, but with the most advanced indus­trial techniques which have still to be created) -- in either case, the weight of this effort will be on the shoulders of the proletariat.

As long as scarcity exists in the world and as long as the proletariat remains a frac­tion of society (as long as its condition has not generalized to the entire population of the planet), the proletariat will have to produce a surplus of goods (both consumer and producer goods) from which it will only benefit in the long term. Thus we can see that not only is the proletariat not an exploiting class -- it will still be an exploited class.

In past societies, the state tended to identify itself with the ruling class and the defence of its privileges to the extent that this class was economically dominant, that is, benefiting from the maintenance of the existing relations of production. In a society of exploitation, the state’s task of maintaining order is inevitably the maintenance of exploitation and thus of the privileges of the exploiter.

But during the period of transition to com­munism, although the maintenance of the existing economic relations can in the short term be a way of preventing a regres­sion from what the proletariat has already achieved (and this is why there will inevi­tably be a state in the period of transi­tion), it also means the continuation of an economic situation in which the proletariat bears the brunt for the subsistence and development of society.

Contrary to what happened in the past when the politically dominant class was a class which directly benefitted from the existing economic order, during the dictatorship of the proletariat there will be no economic basis for a convergence between the state and the politically dominant class. What’s more, as an organ which expresses society’s need for cohesion and the need to prevent the development of class antagonisms, the state will inevitably tend to oppose the immediate interests of the working class on an economic level. During the Russian Revolution the state increasingly insisted on a greater and greater effort in production by the proleta­riat in order to meet the demands of exchange with the peasants or with the foreign powers. This state of affairs led right from the beginning to workers’ strikes being repres­sed which clearly showed how great an anta­gonism can arise between the proletariat and the state.

This is why the proletariat cannot see the state, in Bukharin’s terms, as “the material embodiment of its collective reason”, but as an instrument of society which won’t be ‘automatically’ subjected to its will, as was the case with exploiting classes once their political rule had definitely been assured; an instrument which it must cease­lessly subject to its control and dictator­ship if it doesn’t want to see it turn against it, as it did in Russia.

A dictatorship over the state

But, says the last argument of comrade E, a state which is subjected to a dictator­ship outside itself won’t have the means to carry out its role. If state and dictator­ship are not identical, there is no real dictatorship.

“You accept the dictatorship of the pro­letariat, but you forget that state and the exclusive dictatorship of a class are synonymous ... It is thus a nonsense to talk about a state subjected to a dictatorship which is external to it, and which cannot therefore intervene despotically in economic and social rea­lity in order to impose a definite class orientation.”

It is true that there cannot be a class dictatorship of any kind without the exis­tence of a state institution in society; first because the division of society into classes implies the existence of a state, secondly because any class in power requires an apparatus which will translate its power in society into a framework of laws and constraint: the state. It is also true that a state which does not have any real power is not a state. But it is wrong to say that class dictatorship is identical to the state and that “a state subjected to a dictatorship which is external to it” is “nonsense”.

The situation of dual power (that of a class on the one hand and of the state on the other) has, as we have seen, already existed in history, particularly during the great bourgeois revolutions. And, for all the reasons we have seen, it will be a neces­sity during the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Such a situation cannot last indefinitely without leading society into inextricable contradictions which will devour it. It is a living contradiction which must be resol­ved. But the way it is resolved differs fundamentally according to whether we are dealing with the bourgeois revolution or the proletarian revolution.

In the bourgeois revolution the situation of dual power is quickly resolved by an identi­fication between the power of the ruling class and the state power, which emerges from the revolutionary process strengthened and invested with supreme power over society, including over the ruling class.

In the proletarian revolution, on the other hand, it is resolved by the dissolu­tion of the state, the taking over of the whole of social life by society itself.

There is a fundamental difference here, which expresses itself in a different rela­tionship between the state and the ruling class in the proletarian revolution -- a difference not only of form but also of con­tent.

In order to see these differences more clearly, we have to try to draw a broad outline of the forms of proletarian power during the period of transition in so far as they have been revealed by the historic ex­perience of the proletariat. Without trying to go into the institutional details of this period -- because if there is one major characteristic of revolutionary periods, it is that all institutional forms can be red­uced to empty shells which the living forces of society fill up or overturn according to the needs of class struggle -- it is pos­sible to put forward the following general outline.

Tile direct organ of proletarian power will be constituted by the unitary organizations of the class, the workers’ councils. These are assemblies of delegates, elected and revocable by all the workers which include all those who produce in a collective fash­ion in the socialized sector -- workers of the old society and those integrated into the collectivized sector as the revolution develops. Armed in an autonomous manner, these are the authentic instruments of the proletarian dictatorship.

The state institution is constituted at the base by councils formed not on a class basis, not in relation to the place occupied in the process of production (the proleta­riat must forbid any class organizations except its own), but on a geographical basis. This means assemblies and councils of dele­gates of the population based on neighbour­hood, town, region and so on culminating in a central council which will be the central council of the state.

Emanating from these institutions will be the whole state apparatus responsible for maintaining order -- the army during the civil war, the whole body of functionaries responsible for the administration and man­agement of production and distribution.

This apparatus of gendarmes and function­aries will be more or less important, more or less dissolved into the population itself according to the development of the revolu­tionary process, but it would be an illu­sion to ignore the inevitability of their existence in a society which still has classes and scarcity.

The dictatorship of the proletariat over the transitional state is the ability of the working class to maintain the arms and autonomy of its councils in relation to the state and to impose its will on it (both on its central organs and its functionaries).

The dual power situation resulting from this will be resolved to the extent that the whole of the population is integrated into the proletariat and its councils. As abundance develops the role of the gend­armes and other functionaries will disappear, “the government of men” will be replaced by the “administration of things” by the pro­ducers themselves. As the power of the proletariat grows, the power of the funct­ionaries and the state will diminish, and the proletariat’s absorption of the whole of humanity trill transform its class power into the conscious activity of the human community.

But for such a process to take place, not only must the material conditions exist (in particular the world extension of the revo­lution and the development of the product­ive forces), but also the proletariat, the essential motor-force of this whole process, must know how to conserve and develop its autonomy and its power over the state. Far from being nonsense, the ‘external’ dic­tatorship over the state by the workers’ councils is the very movement towards the withering away of the state.

The Russian Revolution did not achieve the material conditions for this to happen. But the enormous difficulties it came up against highlighted the intrinsic tendencies of the state apparatus, which grew in strength the more these difficulties multiplied.

Immediately after October 1917 in Russia there were the workers’ councils, the pro­tagonists of October, and the state councils, the general soviets and their developing state apparatus. But, following the idea that the state could not be distinct from the dictatorship of the proletariat, the workers’ councils transformed themselves into state institutions by integrating themselves into the state apparatus. With the development of the power of the bureau­cracy, a result of the absence of the mat­erial conditions for the development of the revolution, the opposition between the pro­letariat and the state became more and more flagrant. It was believed that you could resolve this antagonism by as much as pos­sible putting the most experienced and res­olute workers, the members of the party, in the state apparatus instead of the functionaries. The result was not the proleta­rianization of the state, but the bureaucratization of the revolutionaries. At the end of the civil war, the development of the antagonism between the working class and the state led to the state’s repression of wor­kers’ strikes in Petrograd and then of the workers’ insurrection at Kronstadt, which demanded, among other things, measures against the bureaucracy and the recall of delegates to the soviets.

This does not mean that if only the prole­tariat had defended the autonomy of its workers’ councils from the state and had imposed its dictatorship over the state in­stead of seeing the latter as it’s “material embodiment” then the revolution would have been victorious in Russia.

The dictatorship of the proletariat wasn’t wiped out because of its inability to res­olve the problems of its relationship with the state but because of the failure of the revolution in other countries, which condem­ned it to isolation. However, its exper­ience of this crucial problem was neither useless nor a ‘particular case’ which has no significance for the proletarian movement as a whole. The Russian experience threw a vivid light on this question which was so terribly confused in revolutionary theory. Not only did the workers’ councils give a practical response to the problem of the forms of proletarian power; it also made it possible to resolve what appears to be a contradiction in the lessons Marx, Engels and Lenin drew from the Paris Commune. On the one hand these revolutionaries affirmed that the state was the embodiment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and on the other hand, they concluded from the exper­ience of the Commune that the proletariat must guard against “the harmful effects” (Engels) of this state by subjecting all its functions to the control of the proletariat. If the state is identical to the dictator­ship of the proletariat, why should the class show any distrust towards it? How can the dictatorship of a class have effects contrary to its own interests?

In fact, the need to clearly distinguish the dictatorship of the proletariat from the state and for the former to exert a dictatorial control over the latter can already be found in embryonic or intuitive form in the writings of revolutionaries be­fore October. Thus in State and Revolution Lenin was led to talk about a distinction between something which would be “the state of armed workers” and something else which would be “the state of bureaucrats”.

“Until the ‘higher’ phase of communism arrives, the Socialists demand the stric­test control by society and by the state of the measure of labour and the measure of consumption; but this control must start with the expropriation of the capi­talists, with the establishment of work­ers’ control over the capitalists, and must be exercised not by a state of bur­eaucrats but by a state of armed workers.”

And in another part of the same work, where he tries to make a comparison between the economy in the transitional period and the organization of the post under capitalism, he affirms the necessity for this body of functionaries to be controlled by the armed workers:

“The whole national economy organized like the post office, so that technicians, supervisors, accountants receive, like all functionaries, remuneration which does not exceed a ‘workers’ wage’, and all this under the control and direction of the armed proletariat. This is our immediate goal.” (our emphasis)

The Russian Revolution showed tragically that what appears as a theoretical contra­diction in revolutionary thought could be­come a real contradiction between the dic­tatorship of the proletariat and the transi­tional state: it showed clearly that “the control and direction” of the state by the armed proletariat is an absolute precondi­tion for the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

***********

Comrade E certainly considers that he is remaining loyal to the theoretical effort of the proletariat such as it was prior to October 1917, and in particular to Lenin’s State and Revolution which he has defended intransigently. But it is departing from the whole spirit of this effort when one re­fuses, almost on principle, to criticize these theoretical acquisitions in the light of the greatest experience of the dictator­ship of the proletariat in history. To conclude we can do no better than recall what Lenin wrote in State and Revolution about the attitude revolutionaries should have to this problem:

“Marx, however, was not only enthusiastic about the heroism of the Communards who, as he expressed it, ‘stormed heaven’. Although the mass revolutionary movement did not achieve its aim, he regarded it as a historic experience of enormous im­portance, as a certain advance of the world proletarian revolution, as a prac­tical step that was more important than hundreds of programmes and arguments. To analyze this experiment, to draw tactical lessons from it, to re-examine his theory in the light of it -- that was the task that Marx set himself.”

R.V.

1 And the French state went though further convulsions against the Restoration which followed the Napoleonic Empire, in 1830 and in 1848.

 

Life of the ICC: 

  • Contribution to discussion [74]
  • Life in the ICC [2]

The Meaning of the Second Congress of the ICC

  • 2365 reads

We are publishing here the major texts of the Second Congress of the International Communist Current. The Congress was mainly devoted to re-examining and confirming the general orientation of the ICC. It was a moment when the whole international organ­ization could draw up a balance sheet of its past activities and outline perspectives for the coming period.

The Second Congress vigorously reaffirmed the validity of the basic principles upon which the ICC was founded a year and a half ago:

* the political platform of the ICC

* statutes for an internationally centralized and unified revolutionary organization

* the Manifesto of the First Congress, which called on revolutionaries to be aware of their tasks in the decisive issues at stake in the present period of crisis and class struggle1

Only such a coherent set of principles can provide a firm basis for revolutionary activity, and the Second Congress gave itself the task of applying these principles to an analysis of the present political situation.

The texts of the Congress speak for them­selves, but their full significance can only be understood if it is seen as the result of the collective work of a revolut­ionary organization. The methodical elaboration of an overall perspective, as well as the translation of this perspective into an active intervention, necessitates the creation of a collective and organized framework. In this context the Congress was able to see the general growth of the organization in its eight territorial sections, in particular the development of the ICC’s work in Spain, Italy, Germany and Holland, as a confirmation of the orientat­ion that the Current has been defending and carrying out for some time. More important than mere numerical growth has been the ICC’s capacity over the last eighteen months to disseminate its analyses in ninety-five issues of its publications in seven languages, distributed nearly all over the world.

The texts here are also the fruits of a long and continuous political and theoretical effort in the ICC to develop its under­standing of the problems the class struggle will pose in the future, especially in the period of transition to socialism. These texts are the crystallization of a year and a half’s discussion both within the ICC and with other political currents. The attempt to constantly raise the political level of the ICC, in a homogeneous way which involves the whole organization and all its militants, has been and continues to be one of the most crucial aspects of our work, because it’s the only way that revolutionaries can contribute to theoretical clarification in the workers’ movement.

As part of both its organizational effort and theoretical research, the Second Congress attempted to come to a better understanding of the contemporary revolution­ary milieu, in order to further the ICC’s efforts towards regroupment. We thus put forward these documents in the light of recent important attempts to organize discussion between proletarian political groups. In May 1977, the Partito Comunista Internazionalista (Battaglia Comunista) called an international discussion conference2 in which the ICC participated. Other invited groups (such as the Communist Workers’ Organization and Fomento Obrero Revolucionario) were unfortunately unable to attend, while others (like Pour Une Intervention Communiste) refused to come, but the debate that took place on the present period and its implications for the class struggle, on the role of the unions and on the organization of revolutionaries, made it possible to eliminate misunderstand­ings, define areas of agreement, and see the reasons behind divergences. Following this limited but useful effort at clarification, the ICC welcomed a delegation from Battaglia Comunista to its Second Congress, where these comrades were able to carry on the debate in front of the whole Current. The develop­ment of the class struggle today is making the need for international contacts be felt in a much sharper way in the revolutionary milieu. In September 1977, several Swedish and Norwegian groups organized a discussion conference in which the ICC participated.

Another thing that has been verified by the experience of the last year or so is the failure of those who have theorized isolat­ion. Those who in 1975 rejected regroupment and even any contact with the ICC -- the PIC in France, CWO in Britain, and the Revolutionary Workers’ Group in the USA  - have long since fallen out amongst themselves, their anti-ICC association having ended in total sterility. The RWG dissolved after various modernist transmutations. Over the last year the CWO has reaped the fruits of the confused and sectarian fusion between Revolutionary Perspectives and Workers’ Voice: the collapse of its national ‘regroupment’ into two halves. Over the last summer, the remainder of the CWO has gone through a second split; this time those who left the CWO defend the necessity for regroupment, and in particular have ex­pressed a desire to initiate a discussion with the ICC in this regard3.

In this general context, we present the texts of the Congress, which deal with three main themes:

* A report on the international situation, which traces the evolution of the tendency towards state capitalism in both major blocs; in other words, the development of the war economy, which is capital’s response to the crisis and to inter-imperialist antagonisms which are moving from local wars to­wards a generalized conflict. We are trying to develop in the light of contemporary events, the analysis of the war economy made by the communist left in the 1930’s.

* A resolution on proletarian political groups, which attempts to define the various elements who make up today’s revolutionary milieu, elements which are very different from the mass parties of yesterday. The text situat­es the ICC in the more general context of the development of class conscious­ness, and underlines our desire to reject the sectarianism and exclusivity so dear to currents like the Bordigists. This resolution deals with political groups and not the discussion circles which arise in the working class. These ephemeral products, which are historical expressions of the weak influence revo­lutionary organizations have in the class today, will be examined more specifically in other texts.

* On the period of transition from capit­alism to communism, the reader will find two drafts synthesizing the level of discussion reached within the ICC. Although the orientation of the first text is agreed upon by the majority of the organization, the Congress decided not to take a formal vote on this question, considering that the most important thing now is to take the discussion further, and to do this publically. Our main aim is to go on with theoretical clarification, not only in the ICC, but also by encourag­ing other revolutionary currents and elements to make their contribution to this complex debate.

We present these documents today without any megalomania or any overestimation of the importance of this Congress. Communist minorities do not yet have an immediate impact on the general situation, but the development of analytical work and the setting up of an organizational framework with a long term perspective are a contrib­ution to and the best preparation for the decisive confrontations of tomorrow.

1 See International Review no. 5

2 See International Review no. 10, and the forthcoming pamphlet Texts of the International Conference (roneo-editions in French and English, and in French and Italian in a special issue of Prometeo)

3 The texts of this split and a discussion of their significance will be published in the next issue of International Review as well as in Revolutionary Perspectives (journal of CWO). We will also be publishing in the same issue the reply by the remainder of the CWO to our critique on them in nos. 9 and 10 of the International Review.

 

Life of the ICC: 

  • Life in the ICC [2]

1978 - 12 to 15

  • 4381 reads

  

International Review no.12 - 1st quarter 1978

  • 3668 reads
Contents of IR 12.

Some answers from the ICC

  • 2663 reads

As the text of the ex-CWO comrades points out, the fact that the CWO is feeling the need to ‘open’ itself to the outside world (which involves not only discussion with the ICC but a willingness to participate in international conferences, to open their pages to minority views and make an analysis of their own history) is a striking proof of the fact that in this period, it is impos­sible for revolutionaries to retreat into isolation and avoid the question of regroupment.

The Aberdeen/Edinburgh text goes more deeply into the contradictions in the CWO’s present orientation, and into an evaluation of its present and future perspectives, so we won’t dwell on this here. We will concentrate on the CWO’s general criticisms of the ICC. Although we cannot answer any of them in detail here, we can at least make a few observations which will define those areas which require further discussion and clari­fication. Taken in itself the CWO’s text demonstrates that the group still suffers from the same misconceptions and confusions which we examined in previous articles, that it still has a marked tendency to present an entirely distorted picture of the ICC’s positions; but the healthy aspect of this text is that it can and should serve as a stimulus to further public discussion between our organizations.

We will now deal with the specific areas of criticism the CWO puts forward.

1. Economics

The most significant point to be made here is that for the CWO, ‘economics’ is used as a cover for its sectarianism. This applies both to the way the CWO approaches the prob­lem of the economic foundations of capita­list decadence, and to the way they apply economics to their general political pers­pective. With regard to this first aspect, we can only reject the CWO’s assertion that our analysis of decadence, which draws a great deal from Rosa Luxemburg’s crisis theory, is “at variance with that presented by Marx in Capital”.

According to the CWO, Marx’s writings on the falling rate of profit are quite sufficient to explain the historic crisis of capitalism, and there is little further discussion to be had. As with many other questions, the CWO already holds the completed communist world-view. So anxious are they to avoid considering that there might be other sides to the problem, that they have begun to imply that the problem of saturated markets and overproduction has nothing to do with Marx but is an invention of Sismondi and Malthus, subsequently taken up by Luxemburg and the ICC (see the article on credit in Revolutionary Perspectives, no.8). Luxem­burg’s preoccupation with the problem of over-production is a variant of non-marxist ‘under-consumptionism’ (see RP, no.6). But if we go back to Marx and Engels we see that they considered the problem of over­production to be absolutely crucial in understanding capitalist crises. In Anti-­Duhring Engels insisted on the importance of seeing over-production as a fundamental, distinctive feature of the capitalist mode of production, at the same time castigating Duhring for confusing under-consumption with over-production:

“Therefore, while under-consumption has been a constant feature in history for thousands of years, the general shrinkage of the market which breaks out in crises as the result of a surplus of production is a phenomenon only of the last fifty years; and so Herr Duhring’s whole superficial vulgar economics is necessary in order to explain the new collision not by the new phenomenon of over­production but by the thousand-year-old phenomenon of under-consumption.”

Similarly, in Theories of Surplus Value, Marx attacks Say and Ricardo precisely for asserting that while there can be over­production of capital, over-production of commodities and a general glut of the mar­ket are not inherent tendencies in the capitalist process of accumulation.

“Over-production is specifically condi­tioned by the general law of the produc­tion of capital: to produce to the limit set by the productive forces, that is to say, to exploit the maximum amount of labor with the given amount of capital, without any consideration to the actual limits of the market or the needs backed by the ability to pay; and this is car­ried out through continuous expansion of reproduction and accumulation, and there­fore constant reconversion of revenue into capital, while on the other hand, the mass of producers remain tied to the average level of needs, and must remain tied to it according to the nature of capitalist production.” (Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part 2)

To develop these points adequately, the ICC plans to contribute further texts, including a reply to the CWO’s critique of Luxemburg’s crisis theory, which the CWO have frater­nally offered to publish in Revolutionary Perspectives. But for the moment it suff­ices to say that the ICC does not think that the CWO can make a constructive contribution to the debate on decadence if they continue to make inflated claims to defending the totality of marxist orthodoxy on the subject, while at the same time closing their eyes to a vital strand in the thought of Marx and Engels themselves.

Because Marx located two fundamental contra­dictions in capitalist accumulation -- the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, and the problem of realizing surplus value -- there are broadly speaking two theories of crisis that fall within the marxist frame­work: the one defended by Grossman, Mattick and the CWO which emphasizes the falling rate of profit; and the theory of Luxemburg which stresses the problem of the market. The ICC considers that the analysis elabora­ted by Luxemburg can more coherently explain the historical crisis of decadent capitalism and makes it possible to see how these two fundamental contradictions operate as aspects of a totality, although we don’t think that either Luxemburg or the ICC have provided any final answers. We think that this is a debate which must go on within the revolutionary movement today, and does not constitute a barrier to regroupment, parti­cularly because it is a problem for which there are no immediate answers.

The present class struggle also does not shed any direct light onto this problem, which is still one of the most complex theoretical questions facing revolutionaries. Confronting the reality of the crisis, the proletarian movement is forced to understand the inner dynamics of crisis-ridden capita­lism. But a firm political orientation based on the decadence of the system is the pre-condition for deepening this question in the practice of the workers’ movement. And it is here where the movement can stray from its path into either academicism and sectarianism or a crude immediatist activism, which treats theoretical questions as gospel affirmations, useless for ‘practice’. The ICC firmly believes that the question of economics is a crucial one for the proleta­riat, but that this question can only gain its relevance within the context of a cohe­rent international intervention, based on the regroupment of revolutionary forces.

At the same time, we have never said that there are no political consequences to be drawn from the different theories. In June 1974 when we debated this question with Revolutionary Perspectives (the precursor of the CWO) we presented what we felt to be the weaknesses of the Grossman/Mattick theory as an explanation for decadence, and the political implications of those weaknes­ses. At the same time we encouraged RP to try to demonstrate that the concept of deca­dence and the political conclusions which flow from it were not incompatible with the Grossman/Mattick theory.

There was no contradiction in what we said then, because while we think that different approaches to explaining the crisis do have political consequences, these consequences are rarely direct and never mechanical. Since marxism is a critique of political economy from the partisan standpoint of the working class, political clarity derives first and foremost from an ability to assimilate the lessons of working class experience. In the final analysis, an understanding of ‘economics’ comes from evolving a proletarian perspective and not the other way round. Marx was able to write Capital not because he was a clever man but because he was a communist, a pro­duct of the proletarian movement, of prole­tarian class consciousness which is alone able to grasp the historical finiteness of the capitalist mode of production. Unques­tionably a clearer understanding of the eco­nomic processes of capital is vital to an overall political clarity, but we reject the CWO’s sterile attempt to derive virtually all political positions from whether or not one holds the ‘falling rate of profit’ anal­ysis of the crisis. Thus in their text presented to the recent Milan conference and this most recent text, we find that everything from the ICC's ‘voluntarism’ and ‘organizational fetishism’, an alleged preoccupation with intervening at leftist meetings, our mistakes on the period of transition, etc, etc, can be directly traced to our ‘Luxemburgism’. This way of critici­zing political positions is based on a com­pletely false conception of where political understanding derives from which is the experience of the class and not the abstract contemplation of economics. It does not explain how groups (for example, the ICC and the PIC (Pour Une Intervention Communiste)) have similar economic analyses and widely differing political perspectives, and vice versa. It is ironic that the CWO should try to use a similar methodology as that of Bukharin in 1924-5, who attacked Luxemburg’s economic theories in order to liquidate the ‘virus of Luxemburgism’ from the Communist International, and to show how Luxemburg’s economic views led to ‘erroneous’ political positions, such as the rejection of national liberation struggles, the under-estimation of the peasantry, and by, implication, the denial of the possibility of ‘socialism in one country’ defended by Stalin!

2. The degeneration of the Russian Revolution

The CWO has failed to grasp the point of the ICC’s discussion on how to evaluate the degeneration of proletarian political groups. According to them, the ICC has evolved a ‘new line’, which is really noth­ing more than an attempt to strengthen our recruiting drive in the swamps of leftism. In fact the discussion that culminated in the ‘Resolution on Proletarian Political Groups’ at our Second Congress (see Inter­national Review, no.11) did not give rise to a new line, but to the clarification of a practice which was only implicit before­hand. The CWO has misunderstood the motive behind the debate and the methodology applied in it. Because we say that only crucial events like wars and revolutions can finally resolve the question of the class nature of former proletarian bodies, the CWO accuses us of ‘excusing’ Kronstadt and entertaining the idea that perhaps the Russian state had something proletarian about it until World War II. A cursory read­ing of any of the ICC texts can dispel these assertions. What we have been trying to get at is the complex and often painful way in which the workers’ movement has assimilated new lessons, like how the revolution in Russia was lost. The inevit­able lag between reality and consciousness meant that revolutionaries only became fully aware of the capitalist nature of the Rus­sian state and economy well after the prole­tariat had lost political power and the bourgeois counter-revolution had completely triumphed. This is why we insist that only major events in history -- even when ‘symbo­lic’ like voting for war credits or decla­ring for ‘socialism in one country’ -- can make it clear to revolutionaries at the time that former proletarian organs have definitely passed over to the enemy camp. It is important to see the difference bet­ween what can be understood from hindsight and what could be understood by revolutio­naries in the past. For example, Russia didn’t suddenly become an imperialist power in 1940; today it is possible to trace the imperialist tendencies of the Russian state back to 1921-2. The point is however that for revolutionaries of the thirties and forties, what had been a matter for polemic and debate within the workers’ movement, was decisively settled by events like Russia’s entry into World War II. These events showed beyond a shadow of a doubt that Russia was integrated into the imper­ialist world system, and that any defense of Russia meant participation in imperialist war, the abandonment of internationalism. With the Trotskyists and their defense of the ‘degenerated workers' state’, what had been a grave theoretical confusion culminated in the final crossing of class lines.

Why is it important to make the distinction between a grave confusion that can lead to the desertion of the proletarian camp, and the actual and definitive crossing of the class frontier? Why is it important to use extremely strict criteria for declaring the death of a proletarian organization? It is because any precipitous judgments mitigate against the possibility of convincing con­fused revolutionaries of the error of their ways; it means abandoning them to the bour­geoisie without a fight. This is a lesson which the CWO badly needs to learn. Accord­ing to them, the ICC is counter-revolutionary today because its confusions on the period of transition will lead it to act against the class tomorrow. Assuming for the sake of argument that the ICC does have serious confusions on this question, surely the task of any communist group would not be to write us off as hopeless counter-revolutionaries, but to try to fight against our errors in the hope that they won’t lead us into the capitalist camp in the future. Or does the CWO possess the foreknowledge which would make this effort a waste of time? In any case we hope that the CWO’s present resump­tion of discussion indicates a re-evaluation of its sense of responsibilities in this sphere.

3. The state

We will not take up the CWO’s assertions that “the ICC is guilty of a-historical moralizing on the issue of the state”. This accusation has been dealt with in the article ‘State and Dictatorship of the Proletariat’ in the International Review, no.11. We simply want to point out a glaring inconsistency in the CWO’s approach to this question. On the one hand they say that “the idea of a ‘state’ outside the workers’ councils is a reactionary anathema”, that is, that the state is the workers’ councils and nothing but. On the other hand they boldly affirm that “Sovnarkom, Vesenkha, the Red Army and the Cheka were class organs of the Russian workers’ state”. Either one thing or the other. The council communists were at least consistent on this. For them, the only proletarian organs in the Russian Revolution were the workers’ councils, the factory committees and the Red Guards; the Red Army, the Cheka, etc, were bourgeois institutions of the Bolshevik bureaucrats. The CWO, on the other hand, wants to advo­cate a state that is nothing but the workers’ councils, yet is quite prepared to call the Soviet State of 1917-21 a workers’ state.

But the Soviet State was emphatically made up not only of the workers’ councils, but also of non-proletarian assemblies like pea­sants and soldiers soviets, as well as administrative organs (Vesenkha, etc) and repressive organs (the Cheka, the Red Army) which were manifestly distinct from the workers’ councils. In fact the whole drama of the Russian Revolution and its inner demise was expressed by the progressive absorption of the workers’ councils by these state bodies. Here the CWO is still silent on the question posed in IR no.10: should the workers in their factory commit­tees and workers’ councils accept labor discipline from the various ‘necessarily evil’ state institutions set up to preserve social order in the post-revolutionary phase, or must the workers’ councils ensure a vigilant control over all these bodies?

The fundamental contribution of the Italian Left to deepening the marxist analysis of the state was to show how Marx and Engels’ intu­itions about the state being a ‘scourge’ were confirmed by the practical experience of the Russian Revolution. Thus Octobre wrote in 1938 that:

“... the state, even with the adjective ‘proletarian’ attached to it, remains an organ of coercion, and in sharp and perm­anent opposition to the realization of the communist programme. In this sense it is an expression of the capitalist danger throughout the development of the transition period ... the state, far from being an expression of the proletariat, is a permanent antithesis of the class ... there is an opposition between the dictatorship of the proletarian state and the dictatorship of the proletariat.”

As can be seen from the texts in IR, no.11, there is a discussion within the ICC today on questions such as whether the state in the transition period should indeed be cal­led a proletarian state, but it is clear that both the Resolutions presented to the Second Congress of the ICC have assimilated this crucial understanding, developed by the Italian Left, about the negative feat­ures of the transitional state. This is something which will prove to be a life or death question in the revolutionary period ahead, but it has not even been glimpsed by the CWO. Before declaiming about the ‘errors’ of the Italian Left on this ques­tion, we would ask the CWO to seriously reflect on the contribution made by frac­tions like Bilan, Octobre, and Internation­alisme, to the movement’s present under­standing of the state.

4. The Party

In IR, no.10 we asserted that the CWO had not grasped the lessons on state or party afforded by the Russian experience. The latest CWO text has the merit of stating very clearly what before had only been implicit in their writings: that the role of the communist party is to take and hold state power. While we profoundly disagree with this idea, we welcome the fact that the debate can now proceed on an unambiguous basis. In numerous texts we have tried to show why the assumption of state power by the Bolshevik Party was a determining factor in the degeneration of the party and the revolution as a whole, and why it is not the task of the political organization of the class to take power. The CWO, unable to understand any of this, thinks that for the ICC “the revolution could succeed when the majority of the class is not conscious of the need for communism”. Their position on the party reveals a deep misunderstanding of the way consciousness develops in the class. Not only do they hold to a parlia­mentary conception that communist conscious­ness can be measured by the willingness of the workers to vote for a party to run the state; they are also moving very close to the classical Leninist position that the workers’ councils are mere ‘forms’ in which the amorphous mass of the class is organized, and into which the party -- which is the communist consciousness of the class -- has the task of injecting a communist content. The CWO doesn’t see that class consciousness -- and thus communist consciousness -- deve­lops in the whole class and that the coun­cils are also an aspect of the development of communist consciousness. The party is the most conscious fraction of the class, it is an indispensable weapon in the gene­ralization of revolutionary consciousness, but it, clarity is always relative and it can never represent the totality of class consciousness. Once again the CWO emit have it both ways. On the one hand they correctly assert that a minority cannot substitute for the class in the taking of power, on the other hand they call on the workers to delegate state power to the party. But as the Russian Revolution showed, from the conception that the party repre­sents the class in power, to the party actually substituting itself for the class, there is only a thin line. And one sure sign of revolutionary consciousness develop­ing in the class tomorrow will be its refusal to invest political power, which it alone can wield, in the hands of a minority.

The CWO’s movement towards the idea that the party ‘holds’ or ‘represents’ the tota­lity of communist consciousness is also consistent with the idea that they themselves represent the entire communist movement today, that they possess the only communist platform in the world. The tragic conse­quences of this sectarian theory are well documented in the Aberdeen/Edinburgh text.

5. Theory

We have often pointed out that, given the slow and uneven development of the crisis and the class struggle today, the twin dan­gers facing revolutionary groups in this period are immediatism -- a tendency to over­estimate every partial struggle of the class -- and academicism -- a tendency to respond to inevitable lulls in the class struggle by retreating into ‘research’ for its own sake. The latter seems to be the danger confronting the CWO today. The CWO’s claim that the ICC is sliding towards a “journal­istic” approach to theoretical questions, towards “a running down of the need for historical and theoretical reflection” (Revolutionary Perspectives, no.8) is com­pletely false. We do not claim to have exhausted all areas of research -- in fact many have hardly begun, which is not very surprising given the extreme youth of the ICC and the revolutionary movement as a whole. But the CWO’s claim that we have lost interest in theoretical clarification simply does not stand up to an examination of the effort expressed by our publications over the last two years. Rather it is the reflection of the CWO’s own retreat into a self-appointed role as the sole guardians of communist theory, and in particular, as the ‘political economists’ of the revolutionary movement. The CWO has begun to jus­tify this stance -- and to explain its own inner decomposition -- by over-reaction to the relative slowness of the crisis and the lull in the class struggle after 1974 (a lull which has been limited mainly to the advanced countries). For them this means that both regroupment and intervention in the class struggle are extremely distant prospects for revolutionaries. But by ma­king a rigid separation between today and tomorrow -- almost as if we were living in a period of counter-revolution right now -- the CWO is ensuring that it will be organi­zationally and politically unprepared for the massive shocks and class conflicts which are maturing everywhere today. The need to achieve an active continuity between theoretical reflection, organizational consolidation and intervention in the class movement, is more than ever the task of the hour. This is the task the ICC has set itself, and a task that the CWO shows itself more and more incapable of achieving.

*********************

The CWO claims that the ICC is “caught in a cleft stick” by saying on the one hand that the ICC and the CWO share the same class positions and should work towards regroup­ment, while on the other hand pointing out their confusions. For us there is no contradiction here. We insist on the need for all communist groups to discuss with each other and work towards regroupment. But this does not mean hiding differences and engaging in premature fusions (in the manner of Revolutionary Perspectives and Workers’ Voice, as the Aberdeen/Edinburgh text explains). It means debating all differences to the full, in order to see which ones can be accommodated within a sin­gle organization, and which are more serious obstacles to regroupment. At the same time, regroupment can’t be based only on agree­ment on class positions. It also demands a common perspective for activity, a fraternal will to clarify and work together, a pro­found conviction of the need for unity in the revolutionary movement. The ICC directs its discussions on regroupment with the Aberdeen/Edinburgh comrades with this point clearly in mind. And, we hope, the time will come when we can again embark upon a similar process with the comrades of the CWO. Our only future is a common future.

ICC

Life of the ICC: 

  • Correspondance with other groups [20]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Workers Organisation [18]

The crisis in Russia and the Eastern countries

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Sixty years after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution, which shook the world to such an extent that the century-long domination of the bourgeoisie was under a real threat, demonstrations of armed work­ers in Red Square have been transformed into insolent parades of troops marching in step under the complacent gaze of their masters. The Russian bourgeoisie can contemplate its armory of death with a tranquil eye. Com­pared to what it has today the weapons used in the two imperialist carnages look like harmless toys. It can baptize its hellish arsenal with names like ‘October’ and ‘Com­munism’, and embellish its hideous class rule with citations from Lenin. And it can do all this to exorcize the specter of communism. Never in the sixty years since October 1917 has the power of the Russian ruling class seemed so sure, under the aegis of the latest tanks and the most ultra­modern missiles.

But the specter of communism is raising its head once again. World-wide the capitalist system is in crisis, posing the objective basis for the proletarian revolution. Al­though the Russian proletariat has been ground beneath the most ferocious counter­revolution capitalism has ever spawned, the economic sub-soil under the boots of the Russian ruling class is becoming more and more unstable. It is the crisis of capita­lism, and nothing else, which after fifty years of deadly silence, will re-awaken the Russian proletariat which will be led into the whirlpool of revolution by the workers of Eastern Europe.

In this initial article we intend to demon­strate the existence of the general crisis of capitalism in Eastern Europe by showing the particular form it takes in the Russian bloc.

*************************

A few years ago, to talk of an economic crisis in the Russian bloc, to say that the contradictions which undermine decadent capitalism are the same in the East as in the West, would give rise to incredulity or sarcasm among the trusted defenders of the ‘socialist countries’. You could also hear the respectable representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie in the West going into ecstasies over the fact that, while the rest of the world was already in crisis, the phenomena of economic crisis (falling growth rates, inflation, unemployment) appeared to be absent in these countries. How marvelous to find at last an oasis of economic calm, with such wonderfully regular patterns of growth: And just think -- a Russia that was semi-feudal before 1914 had now overta­ken the USA in the production of steel! This sort of thing won the envious admira­tion of the western capitalists and brought cries of jubilation to the Communist Parties and their ‘critical supporters’, the Trotsk­yists. But admiration and jubilation soon changed to disquiet: the economic crisis is over there as well: There is no magic potion in the witches’ cauldron of decaying capitalism, whether it goes by the name of ‘socialist planning’ or ‘Mao Tse-tung Thought’.

In the world press today there are more and more articles pointing out the phenomena of crisis in the Russian bloc. The represen­tatives of capital in Eastern Europe have been to Canassa to ask the West for more and more credit from the big international banks.1 And the Trotskyists, who have been playing second fiddle to the tune about ‘the uninterrupted development of the pro­ductive forces’ in the East, are suddenly struck dumb in their ‘critical support’ for these ‘societies in transition to socialism’. Today they are much happier making a big noise about ‘the democratic opposition’.

Why has this concert of eulogies about ‘socialist planning’ been reduced to a whis­per? In order to understand this, we have to go back to the past, to the appearance of the Five-Year Plans in the 1930s.

The so-called ‘immunity to crisis’ of the Russian bloc

1. The ‘Planning’ of Decadence

The great myth of the Russian bourgeoisie since the Stalinist period of the Five-Year Plans is the ‘immunity to crisis of the socialist world’. This is taken up by all the Stalinist and Trotskyist parties of the world when they advocate ‘radical’ measures like nationalizations and ‘the expropria­tion of private capital’.

Thus, according to them, the countries of the East and all the third world countries where there is more or less complete stati­fication of the economy constitute a ‘world apart’ in the capitalist world. The juridi­cal suppression of private ownership warr­ants the label of socialism, either ‘pure’ or ‘degenerated’. For the Trotskyists the one weakness of this ‘new system’ resides in the parasitism of the ‘bureaucracy’, which uses and abuses ‘socialist property’ for its own personal benefit. It will be enough for the workers to get rid of the ‘bureaucracy’ through a ‘political’ revolu­tion which doesn’t touch the ‘socialist’ economic base for the ‘betrayed revolution’ to be finally completed. Then the workers will really be able to enjoy all the bles­sings of ‘socialist property’. For the Trotskyists, the fact that Russia is a ‘workers’ state’ is proved by the economic miracle of the 1930s. According to the Trotskyists this is the miracle of socialism itself:

“Socialism has proved its right to con­quer, not in the countries of capital, but in an economic arena which covers one-sixth of the surface of the globe; not in the language of dialectics, but in the language of iron, cement and electricity.” (Trotsky, The Revolution Betrayed)

Such an assertion would be funny today if one didn’t know what really lay behind this ‘right to conquer’. More than ten million dead during the first Five-Year Plans2; the proletariat reduced to a state of physi­cal poverty worthy of the horrors of the primitive accumulation of capital at the beginning of the nineteenth century; the headlong march towards an imperialist war which cost seventeen million victims. Such is the balance sheet of this ‘brilliant development’ Trotsky enthused over. Never in the history of capitalism has the dia­lectic of ‘iron, cement and electricity’ uncovered the barbarism of the real dialec­tic of capital, the dialectic of blood and iron.

The fact that the growth of production indices has never been a sign of socialism is a truism which has to be repeated today after fifty years of Stalinist and Trotsky­ist lies. For marxism, the higher the indi­ces of production, the greater is the abso­lute and relative pauperization of the work­ing class, which is forced to sell a labor power which is devalorized the more accumu­lation gathers apace. When the Trotskyists talk about the growth of the productive forces, they ‘forget’ to say that in the real period of transition towards socialism -- that is when the proletariat exercises its dictatorship in a system which is still capitalist -- the growth of production ‘indi­ces’ (in so far as one can talk about ‘indices’) will take the form of the abso­lute and relative development of the consu­mer goods sector. The sector of production goods, on the other hand, is the sector par excellence of capitalism and its infernal cycle of accumulation. Socialism is not proportional to the development of Department I, it is inversely proportional to it. The very condition for communism is that the whole of production is orientated towards the satisfaction of social needs, even if a certain amount must be set aside for enlar­ged social reproduction. But, much more than an arithmetical relationship between these sectors, it is the growth of consump­tion which marks the progress the proletar­iat makes towards replacing exchange value with use value, until the law of value has completely disappeared. Although the Octo­ber proletarian revolution had the task -- with the limited means left over by the civil war -- of developing the consumer goods sector, the dialectic of ‘iron, cement and electricity’ meant an inversion of the ratio between the two sectors, to the benefit of Department I -- not that the figures show an absolute growth of consumer goods either. Thus in 1927-8 (before the Five-Year Plan) the relationship between the consumer goods sector and sector of producer goods was 67.2% as against 32.8%. In 1932, after the first Five-Year Plan, it was already 46.7% against 55.3%. On the eve of the war the consumer goods sector was no more than 25% of overall production. This proportion has remained identical ever since.3

Year

World Industrial Production

Means of Production

Means of Consumption

1917

100

38.1

61.9

1922

100

32.0

68.0

1928

100

39.5

60.5

1945

100

74.9

25.1

1950

100

68.8

31.2

1960

100

72.5

27.5

1964

100

74.0

26.0

1968

100

73.8

26.2

1971

100

73.4

26.6

Respective ratio of the means of production and means of consumption in the world volume of industrial production (in percentages).

This ‘right to conquer’ of capitalism in Russia, taken up by the most brutal counter­revolution in history, expressed itself in the ‘language’ of figures, so dear to Trotsky, by a 50 per cent fall in real wages between 1928 and 19364, by a trebling of the productivity of labor, in other words of the rate of exploitation. With such a rhythm of exploitation the USSR was obviou­sly able to surpass the industrial produc­tion of Britain and soon equal that of Ger­many on the eve of the war.

The Bordigists5 have seen in the rapid growth figures in heavy industry proof that this represented the development of a ‘young’ capitalism, which thanks to its ‘youth’ could not yet be contaminated by the general crisis of capitalism which was brin­ging down the whole world. In short, as with the Trotskyists, the Bordigists see the USSR as a ‘special case’. However, in a table which was reproduced in a recent Programme Communiste (see below) it appears that:

-- the highest rate of growth was not achie­ved in the period of the Five-Year Plans, but during the period of reconstruction: 1922-8: +23%;

-- the fall in the annual growth rate which manifested itself during the Five-Year Plans

-- thus in the midst of the world economic crisis -- followed the world-wide rhythm of the slowing-down of accumulation since the beginning of the century6: 1929-32: +19%; 1933-7: +17%; 1938-40: +13.2%.

As we shall see later, this fall has contin­ued even more markedly ever since.

 

Rate of growth of Russian industry

Period

Plan

Rate of growth: annual average

1922-28

Before the Plans

23.0%

1929-32

1st plan

19.3%

1933-37

2nd plan

17.1%

1938-40

3rd plan (3 years)

13.2%

1941-45

WAR

---

1946-50

4th plan

13.5%

1951-55

5th plan

13.0%

1956-60

6th plan

10.4%

1961-65

7th plan (7-year-plan 1959-65)

8.6%

1966-70

8th plan

8.4%

1971-75

9th plan

7.4%

1976-80

10th plan

6.5%

Calculations based on figures in Narodnoe Khoziaistvo SSSR.

How are we to explain, in spite of this declining rate of growth, the fact that there was still considerable growth in this, one of the weakest of the industrialized coun­tries? The Stalinists use this as irrefut­able proof of ‘the superiority of socialist planning over capitalism’. They ‘forget’ one little thing: the USSR began from an extremely low level (it only regained the 1913 level of production in 1928) and was able, without totally stagnating, to rein­force or at least maintain its production in relation to world production. But the immediate slowing down of the rate of accum­ulation after that shows that Russia was not able, by means of some kind of ‘primitive accumulation’, to achieve the rates of growth of the major capitalist countries at the end of the nineteenth century. In contrast to these countries, which went through a long period of accumulation with a regular growth in the rate of accumulation, the highest figures for Russia were reached over a period of four years; and this is according to offi­cial statistics. If we don’t use ‘optimis­tic’ figures, we would have to reduce the whole scale by 30 or 40 per cent.7

Despite all the state capitalist measures which it carried out at such a frenzied pace, the USSR did not escape the general crisis which followed the 1929 crash. The official figures, even though they are obviously in­flated by the Russian economists, cannot hide the reality of a fall in production; they show that the crisis was present in Russia and that it followed the same rhythm as the rest of the capitalist world.

What then was the reason for autarky? Was it that Russia was able to escape the bank­ruptcy of 1929? In fact Russia was in the same situation as the other countries, it faced the same difficulty in exporting and importing. By the end of the 1930s Russian foreign trade was one-third of what it had been in 1913.

 


Value of imports of the United States, of Europe and of the USSR from 1928 to 1938 (according to the League of Nations, Annuaires Statistiques).

The Five-Year Plans were financed at the price of raging inflation: from 1928 to 1933 the mass of money went from 1.7 billion rubles to 8.4 billion. In 1935 the ruble had to be devalued by 80 per cent (cf Bord­iga, Economic and Social Structure of Russia). The relative ‘imperviability’ of the Russian frontiers to world trade thus expressed itself in total bankruptcy; as it did with the Nazi economy on the eve of the war. But, the Trotskyists and Stalinists will say, Russia’s part in world production between 1913 and 1938 went from 4% to 12%; the indices of production trebled or quad­rupled in a few years. What was the reason for this ‘miracle’? It was the same as for the miracles achieved by Germany: ‘socialist’ Russia threw herself body and soul into the war economy. Goring’s “Guns not butter” was paralleled by Stalin’s prosaic saying “you can’t make casseroles when you’re making cannons”.

1 For the first time in the history of the Russian bloc, a country like Hungary was obliged to open all its bank accounts to the IMF, to prove its solvency and get the credit it needed.

2 According to Souvarine, when a census was made of the population of 1937, instead of the 170 million anticipated, only 147 million ‘socialist citizens’ (the 1928 figure) were found. After having liquidated the results and the ‘counter-revolutionary’ statisticians, another census in 1939 finally managed to find the 170 million. It’s difficult to know how, between the cemeteries and the concentration camps, these 23 million managed to reproduce themselves.

3 Figures taken from Annuaire Statistique du COMECON, 1971.

4 See L’URSS, Telle qu’elle est, by Yvon (1937), the testimony of a French worker who went to work in Russia and saw that the real monthly wage had fallen from 800kg of bread in 1924 to 170kg in 1935, finally settling at 260kg in 1937.

5 We are talking about Programme Communiste in France and Italy, and Il Partito Comunista in Italy. Both consider that capitalism in Russia only entered its ‘mature’ phase in the 1960s, after going through a ‘juvenile’ phase of expansion in the Five-Year Plans. Bordiga even saw Stalin as a ‘romantic revolutionary’ (sic) produced by a ‘tumultuous’ capitalist development.

6 See The Conflict of the Century, by Fritz Sternberg.

7 Souvarine, who examined many of the contradictory official declarations shows, “that not one figure has any precise meaning”.

 

Recent and ongoing: 

  • Economic Crisis [75]
  • Russia [77]

October 1917, beginning of the proletarian revolution (part 1)

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The bourgeoisie has celebrated the sixtieth anniversary of the proletarian revolution of October 1917 in its own way:

  • in Moscow, by parading its thermonuclear weapons and its latest tanks past the mummy of Lenin and a huge portrait of Brezhnev;

  • in the ‘Western’ countries by making a vast cacophony on television and in the newspapers, hailing the ‘great economic advances’ in the USSR, the ‘exemplary courage of its people’ in the fight against Hitlerism — with of course the usual reserves about Gulag, etc.;

  • everywhere by systematically making a travesty of the real meaning of October and portraying the monstrous Russian state as its true descendant. In fact, what capitalism has really been celebrating is not the October Revolution, but its death. The great ceremonies and celebrations all have the aim of exorcizing the spectre of a new October.

For the proletariat on the other hand, and thus for revolutionaries, the memory of October doesn’t require any ceremonies. They don’t need to bury it because for them it is still alive, not as the nostalgic image of a heroic past, but because of the experience it has given us, the hope it represents for the coming struggles of the class.

The ‘homage’ revolutionaries can render to October and its protagonists does not consist of funereal eulogies but of the effort to understand its lessons in order to fertilize these struggles. The International Review has already tried to begin this work ([1]), as have all the publications of the Current, and it is something which must be continued in a systematic manner. But this work can only have a meaning if one understands the real nature of the October Revolution, if one sees it and recognizes it as an experience of the proletariat — the most important up until now - and not of the bourgeoisie, which is the view of certain currents like the councilists. Otherwise October 1917 has no more value for the class than 1789 or February 1848, and certainly less than the Commune of 1871. It is for this reason that the precondition for really assimilating the lessons of October is the recognition and defence of its authentically proletarian character, and of the party which was its vanguard. This is the aim of the present article.

Questioning the Proletarian Character of October

When the revolution broke out in Russia, revolutionaries unanimously greeted it as the first step towards the world proletarian revolution, Already in 1914, Lenin had put forward this perspective: “In all the advanced countries, the war is putting the socialist revolution on the agenda.”

And throughout the war he continued to make this perspective more precise:

“It’s not our impatience or our desires, but the objective conditions brought about by the imperialist war which have led the whole of humanity to an impasse and faced it with the dilemma: either let millions more men die and annihilate European civilization, or transfer power in all the civilized countries into the hands of the revolutionary proletariat, carry out the socialist revolution.

“To the Russian proletariat has befallen the great honour of inaugurating a series of revolutions engendered through objective necessity by the imperialist war. But the idea of seeing the Russian proletariat as a revolutionary class elevated above the workers of other countries is absolutely foreign to us…It’s not any particular qualities, but solely particular historic conditions, which for what will probably be a very short time, have put it in the vanguard of the entire revolutionary proletariat.” (Farewell Letter to Swiss Workers, 8 April 1917).

Exactly the same perspective was shared by the other revolutionaries of that time - Trotsky, Pannekoek, Gorter, Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg. None of them had the idea that Russia was going through a ‘bourgeois revolution’. On the contrary, it was the struggle against this conception which separated them from the Mensheviks and the centrists à la Kautsky. Moreover, history soon showed that such an analysis necessarily led those who held it into the arms of the bourgeoisie and against the working class. In fact it became the position of the extreme ‘left’ of the bourgeoisie in its denunciation of the ‘adventurism’ of the Bolsheviks.

In the whole workers’ movement of the time, solidarity with the fight of the Russian proletariat went hand in hand not only with a recognition of the proletarian character of October, but also with an understanding of the need to generalize the essence of the Russian experience all over the world: the destruction of the bourgeois state and the seizure of power by the workers’ councils.

It was only in the wake of the terrible defeats the proletariat went through in the 1920s, particularly in Germany, and faced with the emergence in Russia of a society which dashed all their hopes, that a certain number of revolutionaries — like Otto Ruhle - began to abandon the position which had been unanimous in 1917. This was the time when ‘National Socialism’ in Germany was mobilizing the population for a new imperialist war, when anti—fascism was doing the same job in the democracies, and when ‘socialism in one country’ — really one of the most barbaric forms of capitalism — was being strengthened in Russia. Within certain revolutionary currents which had escaped the shipwreck of the Communist International, there began to be put forward a theory which saw the October Revolution as a bourgeois revolution of a ‘particular type’.

In 1934, ‘Theses on Bolshevism’ were published in the organ of the council communist movement (Raeterkorrespondenz, no.3 and International Council Correspondence). According to this text:

“7. The economic task of the Russian Revolution was, first, the setting aside of the concealed agrarian feudal system and its continued exploitation of the peasants as serfs, together with the industrialization of agriculture, placing it on the plane of modern commodity production; secondly, to make possible the unrestricted creation of a class of really ‘free labourers’, liberating industrial development from all its feudal fetters. Essentially, the tasks of the bourgeois revolution…

“9. Politically, the tasks confronting the Russian Revolution were: the destruction of absolutism, the abolition of the feudal nobility as the first estate, and the creation of a political constitution and an administrative apparatus which would secure politically the fulfilment of the economic task of the Revolution. The political tasks of the Russian Revolution were, therefore, quite in accord with its economic suppositions: the tasks of the bourgeois revolution.”

Here we find, almost word for word, the position of the Mensheviks, who were among the most dangerous enemies of the proletariat. The only noteworthy difference was that the latter concluded from their analysis that it was necessary to give power to the classic parties and institutions of the bourgeoisie (Cadets, Provisional Government, Constituent Assembly) while the ‘councilists’ argued that carrying out this bourgeois revolution was the task of ‘Bolshevism’.

Why is it that some of the revolutionaries who had greeted October 1917 as a proletarian revolution finally ended up with the analysis of the Mensheviks?

In his book written in 1938, Lenin as Philosopher, Anton Pannekoek clarifies this point. Referring to Materialism and Empirocriticism he says:

“It may happen that in a theoretical work there appear not the immediate surroundings and tasks of the author, but more general and remote influences and wider tasks. In Lenin’s book, however, nothing of the sort is perceptible. It is a manifest and exclusive reflection of the Russian Revolution at which he is aiming.

“Its character so entirely corresponds to middle—class materialism that, if it had been known at the time in Western Europe — but only confused rumours on the internal strifes of Russian socialism penetrated here — and if it could have been rightly interpreted, one could have predicted that the Russian Revolution must somehow result in a kind of capitalism based on a struggle." (Pannekoek, Lenin as Philosopher, The Merlin Press Ltd, 1975, p.97).

In brief, the ‘key’ to the nature of the Russian Revolution, which it was not possible to find in the face of the imperialist war of 1914, nor in 1917 in the middle of great class confrontations in Russia and all over the world, nor in the protagonists of the revolution, nor in their methods or their proclamations and appeals to the proletariat of all countries — this key was really contained in a philosophical work published in 1908 and translated into other languages in 1927, somewhat late, because:

“If this work and these ideas of Lenin had been known in 1918 among western marxists, surely there would have been a more critical attitude against the tactics for world revolution.” (ibid, p.102)

In fact, the real reason for this late discovery was not that the marxists’ lacked information about certain of Lenin’s philosophical conceptions but the enormous disarray which the counter—revolution had imposed on the revolutionaries themselves, on those rare militants who were attempting to preserve the principles of communism in the teeth of the storm. A disarray and a disappointment which, as we shall see, led them to abandon the marxist method which had allowed the revolutionaries of 1917, including the Bolsheviks, to understand the real nature of the revolution which had broken out in Russia.

Marxism and Fatalism

When one considers it closely, it can be seen that the councilist thesis was a restatement of an idea which had a lot of success in the bourgeois camp itself in the 1930s: i.e. that the regime in Russia was the necessary consequence of the October Revolution. The Stalinists were obviously the greatest defenders of this idea. For them, Stalin was the ‘genial continuator’ of Lenin’s work, the man who developed and applied “the greatest discovery of our epoch, the theory of the possibility of the victory of socialism in one single country” ([2]). But alongside the Stalinists, there was almost unanimous agreement that Stalin was indeed the son of Lenin, or rather that the terrifying state apparatus that had emerged in Russia was the rightful heir of October. The anarchists obviously proclaimed at the top of their voices that the barbaric police regime in Russia was the inevitable consequence of the authoritarian conceptions of marxism (on the other hand they didn’t consider that the entry of anarchists into an ‘anti-fascist’ bourgeois government was the inevitable consequence of their ‘anti-authoritarian’ conceptions). Democrats of all kinds announced that the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and the rejection of parliamentary institutions were the roots of all the evils that had befallen the ‘Russian people’. In general they warned the proletariat thus: “this is the result of any revolution, of any attempt to overthrow capitalism: a regime that is even worse!”

Obviously, the councilist conception did not have the aim of discouraging the working class from any attempt at revolution or of depriving it of its theoretical weapon, marxism. On the contrary, the councilists undertook this re-examination of their former analysis in the name of the communist revolution and marxism.

However, by posing the question on the basis that “if the Russian Revolution ended up in state capitalism, it’s because it couldn’t have given rise to anything else”, they borrowed one of the most fundamental ideas of the bourgeoisie: “what happened in Russia necessarily had to happen”. Either this affirmation was a tautology — the present situation is the result of different causes which have determined it — or it was a theoretical error which reduces marxism to a vulgar fatalism.

For fatalism, everything that happens is already written in the Great Book of Destiny. And when it takes the form of ‘common sense’ garnished with philosophical verbiage which is spouted out by university academics, it always has the function of preaching the acceptance of the existing order, with varying degrees of subtlety. But marxism has always fought against submitting to ‘reality’ in this way. Of course, against voluntarist and idealist conceptions, it affirms that men don’t make history “of their own free will under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under given and inherited circumstances with which they are confronted”, but Marx pointed out quite clearly that “men make their own history” (The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte). Concerning the possibility of a revolution, Marx wrote:

“No social order disappears before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have been developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society.” (Marx, Preface to the Critique of Political Economy)

This is why marxism has always opposed anarchism, for which ‘everything is possible at any time, providing men want it’. In his analysis of the failure of the Paris Commune, for example, Marx was able to point to the immaturity of the material conditions capitalism had developed in 1871. However, it would be wrong to think that all social events can be explained directly by these ‘material conditions’. In particular, the consciousness which men, or more precisely, social classes, have of these material conditions is not a simple ‘reflection’ of them, but becomes an active factor in transforming them:

“When a society has discovered the natural laws which regulate its own movement it can neither overleap the natural phases of evolution, nor shuffle them out of the world by decrees. But this much, at least, it can do; it can shorten and lessen the birth pangs.” (Marx, ‘Preface’ to Capital)

Historic events are the product not only of the economic conditions of society, but also of the totality of ‘superstructural’ factors, of a complex interaction between various determining elements, one of which is ‘chance’, i.e. arbitrary and unforeseen factors. This is why one cannot see history as the working out of a ‘destiny’ which has been fixed once and for all, the unfolding of a scenario which has been written in advance — for some by a ‘divine will’, for others in the structure and movement of atoms.

Just as nowhere written that the works of Marx were to justify one of the most barbaric forms of capitalist exploitation, there was no destiny for the Russian Revolution, whose existence can be proved by what the revolution finally became.

Obviously the councilists would not accept that they were fatalists. For them, their position is perfectly ‘marxist’ because it’s based on an analysis of the development of the productive forces. But the fact that they consider only this problem, and then only at the level of Russia (when even for the bourgeoisie the October Revolution was an event of world—wide importance), betrays a narrow, one—dimensional conception of marxism, almost a caricature of it. And it is with this caricature that they claim to be able to explain why state capitalism emerged in Russia: if the October Revolution ended up in capitalism it is because it was itself a bourgeois revolution. In other words, it was ‘destined’ to lead to the conclusion it arrived at…and so we see good old fatalism coming in through the window after officially being chased out the door!

In fact, the councilist view doesn’t just suffer from a good dose of fatalism. If followed to its ultimate consequences, it leads to the complete abandonment of marxism and of any revolutionary perspective.

The Implications of the Councilist Analysis

For councilism, as expressed in the ‘Theses on Bolshevism’, “The economic task of the Russian Revolution was … the setting aside of the … feudal system … (and) … to make possible the unrestricted creation of a class of really ‘free labourers’”. Although it is not really necessary to provide proof, it is still necessary to remember that in 1917 Russia was the fifth largest industrial power in the world; and in so far as the development of capitalism in Russia largely passed over the stage of artisan production and manufacture, Russian capitalism took on the most modern and concentrated forms (with over 40,000 workers, Putilov was the biggest factory in the world). For councilism, the bourgeois nature of the Russian Revolution can be explained by local conditions. This was partly true for the real bourgeois revolutions like the 1640 revolution in England and 1789 in France. The uneven development of capitalism made it possible for the bourgeoisie to come to power at different periods in various countries. This was also possible because the nation is the specific geopolitical framework of capitalism, a framework which, for all its efforts, it can never go beyond. But while capital was able to develop in ‘islands’ within the autarkic feudal society, socialism can only exist on a world—scale, making use of all the productive forces and networks of circulation created by capitalism. As early as 1847, Marx and Engels responded categorically to the question “will it be possible for this revolution to take place in one country alone?”:

“No. By creating a world market, big industry has already brought all the peoples of the earth, and especially the civilized peoples, into such close relation with one another that none is independent of what happens to the others the communist revolution will not merely be a national phenomenon but must take place in all civilized countries … it is a universal revolution and will accordingly have a universal range.” (Engels, Principles of Communism)

It is clear that what had already been grasped by revolutionaries in 1847 had to be, after the period of capitalism’s greatest expansion in the second half of the nineteenth century, the basis of any proletarian perspective at the time of World War I. The war showed that capitalism had completed its progressive task of developing the productive forces on a world scale, that it had entered its epoch of historic decline, and that consequently, there could be no more bourgeois revolutions. The only revolution on the agenda was the proletarian revolution all over the world, including Russia. This analysis was not only put forward by Lenin, that mind imbued with ‘vulgar materialist philosophy’, who is supposed to have wanted to turn the world communist movement into an apparatus for defending Russian state capitalism, but also by a revolutionary whom many have tried to set against the ‘bourgeois’ Lenin, and whose proletarian positions or knowledge of ‘things Russian’ have never been questioned by the councilists: Rosa Luxemburg. As she wrote at the time:

“Moreover, for every thinking observer, these developments are a decisive refutation of the doctrinaire theory which Kautsky shared with the government social democrats, according to which Russia, as an economically backward and predominantly agrarian land, was supposed not to be ripe for social revolution and proletarian dictatorship. This theory, which regards only a bourgeois revolution as feasible in Russia, is also the theory of the opportunist wing of the Russian labour movement, of the so—called Mensheviks, under the experienced leadership of Axelrod and Dan. And from this conception follow the tactics of the coalition of the socialists in Russia with bourgeois liberalism. On this basic conception of the Russian Revolution, from which follow automatically their detailed positions on questions of tactics, both the Russian and the German opportunists find themselves in agreement with the German government socialists. According to the opinion of all three, the Russian Revolution should have called a halt at the stage which German imperialism in its conduct of the war had set its noble task, according to the mythology of the German social democracy, i.e., it should have stopped with the overthrow of czarism. According to this view, if the revolution has gone beyond that point and has set as its task the dictatorship of the proletariat, this is simply a mistake of the radical wing of the Russian labour movement, the Bolsheviks. And all difficulties which the revolution has met with in its further course, and all disorders it has suffered, are pictured as purely a result of this fateful error.

"Theoretically, this doctrine (recommended as the fruit of ‘marxist thinking’ by the Vorwaerts of Stampfer and by Kautsky alike) follows from the original ‘marxist’ discovery that the socialist revolution is a national and, so to speak, a domestic affair in each modern country taken by itself. Of course, in the blue mists of abstract formulas, a Kautsky knows very well how to trace the worldwide economic connections of capital which make of all modern countries a single integrated organism. The problems of the Russian Revolution, moreover — since it is a product of international developments plus the agrarian question — cannot possibly be solved within the limits of bourgeois society.

Practically, this same doctrine represents an attempt to get rid of any responsibility for the course of the Russian Revolution, so far as that responsibility concerns the international, and especially the German, proletariat, and to deny the international connections of this revolution. It is not unripeness which has been proved by the events of the war and the Russian Revolution, but the unripeness of the German proletariat for the fulfilment of its historic tasks. And to make this fully clear is the first task of a critical examination of the Russian Revolution.

The fate of the revolution in Russia depended fully upon international events.” (Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution).

This is how one of the greatest marxist theoreticians posed the problem against the sophistries of Kautsky, the Mensheviks and … the councilists. Not only did Rosa Luxemburg put paid to the myth of ‘the immaturity of Russia’, she also provided the key to something the councilists have never been able to understand: the causes of the degeneration of the Russian Revolution which lay essentially on the failure of the world revolution, upon which “the fate of the revolution in Russia depended fully”.

In fact, by searching for the causes of the development of the revolution, and of the capitalist regime it ended up with, in Russia alone, the councilists turn their back on the objective foundations of internationalism. And even if their own internationalism cannot be put into question, in the end it could only be based on a kind of moral imperative. If you take their analysis to its logical conclusion, it leads to the idea that if the revolution had taken place in an advanced country (Germany for example) and had remained isolated, it would not have ended up in the same way as the Russian Revolution. In other words, it could have avoided the re—establishment of capitalism, which means that a victory over capitalism, the victory of socialism, is possible in one country. Just as councilism borrows from Stalinism the idea of a continuity between Lenin and Stalin, between the nature of the October Revolution and the nature of the regime that Russia ended up with, we can see that it also goes close to borrowing from Stalinism elements of one of its most important mystifications: ‘national socialism’. Thus the ‘marxist’ analysis of the councilists not only takes up the thesis of the Mensheviks and of Kautsky: it is also unable to avoid flirting with Stalin’s theory.

But this isn’t the only way the councilists’ analysis leads to an abandonment of marxism. One of the reasons why they see the Russian Revolution as a ‘bourgeois revolution’ is the nature of the economic measures taken from the beginning by the new power. Quite correctly, the councilists see that nationalizations and the dividing up of the land were bourgeois measures. They then rush to exclaim “you can see that this was a bourgeois revolution, because it took measures of this kind”. And against such measures, they put forward a truly ‘socialist’ policy:

“the taking over of the enterprises and the organization of the economy through the working class and its class organizations, the shop councils” (Theses on Bolshevism, Point 49). These are the kinds of measures the Russian Revolution would have adopted if it had been really ‘proletarian’; but for the councilists “The bourgeois character of the Bolshevik Revolution … could not be shown more clearly than in this slogan of control of production” (ibid, Point 47).

Here the councilists are not borrowing the foundations of their analysis from Kautsky or Stalin, but from Proudhon and the anarchists. Once again they are crossing out one of the most crucial teachings of marxism. For marxism, one of the fundamental differences between the bourgeois revolution and the proletarian revolution is the fact that the first took place at the end of a whole process of economic transformation between feudalism and capitalism, a transformation which was then crowned in the political sphere; whereas the proletarian revolution is necessarily the point of departure for the economic transformation between capitalism and communism. This difference is linked to the fact that, in contrast to the previous transformation, the transition to communism is not a change in the mode of property but the abolition of all property; it’s not the institution of new exploitative relations but the suppression of all exploitation. This is why, in contrast to previous revolutions, the goal of the proletarian revolution is not the establishment of a new form of class rule but the abolition of all classes; it is not the work of an exploiting class but, for the first time in history, the work of an exploited class. Capitalist relations of production developed within feudal society while the nobility had control of the state apparatus. The feudal power may have been a obstacle to the development of capitalism, but the latter was able to accommodate itself to it as long as capital had not advanced to the point where it had to overthrow the feudal order. The bourgeois revolution came as an almost ‘mechanical’ consequence of the extension of the capitalist economy, and its task was to eliminate the last barriers to the expansion of capital. In contrast to all this, communist social relations can in no way develop by little islands within capitalist society, when the bourgeois class still has control of the state. It is only after the destruction of the bourgeois state and the seizure of political power by the working class on a world scale that the relations of production can be transformed.

In contrast to previous periods of transition, the one between capitalism and communism will not be the result of an objective process independent of men’s wills; it will depend on the conscious action of a class which will use its political power to progressively eliminate the different aspects of capitalist society: private property, the market, wage labour, the law of value, etc. But this economic policy can really only be put into effect when the proletariat has defeated the bourgeoisie militarily. As long as this has not been definitively achieved, the demands of the world civil war will take precedence over the need to transform the relations of production in places where the proletariat has already taken power — and this is true whatever the economic development of such an area. In Russia the economic measures adopted by the new power - notwithstanding the errors that were committed, errors that were real and can teach us valuable lessons — are not the criteria for understanding the class nature of the October Revolution, any more than it was the economic measures taken by the Commune which conferred upon it its proletarian nature — and, as far as we know, neither the councilists nor the anarcho—syndicalists have ever questioned the proletarian character of the Commune. It never occurred to anyone that the reduction of the working day, the suppression of night work for bakery workers, the moratorium on rents or the depots at the Mont de Piet should be presented as ‘socialist’ measures. The greatness of the Commune was that, for the first time in the history of the proletariat, the class transformed a national war against a foreign power into a civil war against its own bourgeoisie; that it proclaimed and realized the destruction of the capitalist state and replaced it with the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e. elected and revocable delegates at all levels, wages for functionaries equal to an average workers wage, the replacement of the permanent army by the permanent arming of the workers, and the internationalist proclamation of the Universal Commune. It was these essentially political measures which made the Paris Commune the first international attempt by the proletariat to carry out its revolution. And it is for these reasons that the experience of the Commune has been such an invaluable source of study for the revolutionary struggle of generations of workers in all countries. October 1917 simply took up and generalized the main themes of the Commune and it was certainly no accident that Lenin wrote State and Revolution, in which he made a detailed study of the Commune, on the eve of October. Thus it’s not by analyzing every detail of what the October Revolution did or did not do on the economic level that one can understand its class nature. This can only be grasped by analyzing its political characteristics — the destruction of the bourgeois state, the seizure of power by the working class organized in soviets, the general arming of the proletariat and the impetus the new power gave to the international movement of the proletariat; the ruthless denunciation of the imperialist war, the call to transform it into a civil war against the bourgeoisie, the call for the destruction of all bourgeois states and the seizure of power by the workers’ councils in all countries.

Because it never understood the primacy of political problems in the first phase of the proletarian revolution, anarcho—syndicalism ended up betraying the proletarian struggle, by diverting it into the impasse of self-management and the collectives while it itself sent ministers to the bourgeois government of the Spanish Republic. Its whole standpoint — and that of the councilists when it falls into line with anarcho—syndicalism — turns its back on the socialist revolution because it localizes it within the limitations not just of a country, but of a region or isolated factories, it reduces socialist production, which by definition can only exist on an international scale, to a domestic matter.

Despite the value of many of the criticisms put forward by the Workers’ Opposition in 1921, in particular its denunciation of the bureaucratization of the state and the smothering of life within the party, the platform of the group was fundamentally erroneous in so far as it reduced the problem of the development of the revolution to an economic question, to the direct management of production by the workers, thus implicitly giving credence to the idea that it was possible to establish socialism in one country, that socialist progress could be made in Russia on its own at a time when the international revolution was going through a series of defeats. ([3])

Whatever errors Lenin may have made, he was quite right to attack the petty bourgeois, anarcho—syndicalist aspects of the Workers’ Opposition. It is no accident that, later on, the theoretical leader of the Workers’ Opposition, Kollontai, took Stalin’s side against the Left Opposition to defend the theory of socialism in one country.

Thus the partisans of ‘socialism in one factory’ join the partisans of ‘socialism in one country’ and the theoreticians of the ‘immaturity of objective conditions’ in Russia. And Kautsky, Stalin and the ‘comrade ministers’ of the CNT are not very good company for the councilists, however much they may denounce them.

In fact, the only way councilism could reconcile its analysis of the October Revolution with internationalism — and certain currents have already done this — would be to consider that the ‘objective conditions’ for the proletarian revolution were not ripe in 1917, not only in Russia, but on a world scale. But this means rejecting the analysis of the Mensheviks or of Kautsky only to take up that of the rightwing social democrats who used it to suppress the proletarian revolution in Germany. It is not a question of saying that all those who ended up with such an analysis are like Noske. It’s quite possible to fight in a proletarian struggle even though you consider it premature and desperate — as did Marx with the Commune. But that kind of analysis by proletarian elements leads to conclusions every bit as disastrous as those of councilism.

We don’t want to refute this analysis here ([4]) since that would take us outside the scope of the article. We will restrict ourselves to a few remarks.

In the first place, such a conception leads to the rejection of the idea that capitalism has been in its decadent epoch since World War I, an idea which was the crucial issue in the revolutionaries’ break with the IInd International. The ‘councilist’ analysis undermines all the theoretical foundations of the Communist International, which is where the Council Communists came from in the first place. It thus leads to the rejection of the main acquisitions of the workers movement during World War I and the revolutionary wave of 1917—23; or else it makes it necessary to base communist positions on completely different foundations, in particular, the positions which the Communist Left took up against the CI:

  • the rejection of parliamentarism, even the revolutionary kind;

  • the rejection of trade unionism;

  • the rejection of the idea of the mass party;

  • the refusal to support national liberation struggles or progressive sectors of the bourgeoisie.

If you reject the idea of the decadence of capitalism, you are necessarily led to the conclusion that all the policies of the workers’ movement in the nineteenth century and most of the analyses of Marx and Engels were incorrect, In such a view, the Communist League, the Ist International and the IInd International were completely wrong to support the setting up of trade unions, the struggle for universal suffrage, certain national liberation struggles, etc. At the end of the day you might as well admit that, apart from the general theoretical underpinnings, Proudhon and Bakunin were right against Marx and Engels; and since from a marxist point of view it’s difficult to separate a theoretical vision from political implications, it would then be logical to take the final step and reject marxism in favour of anarchism. If only the councilists, who see the October Revolution as bourgeois because objective conditions on a world scale were not ripe in 1917, had the courage to take this final step and openly declare themselves as anarchists! They would then have one last problem to solve: how to reconcile their analysis with a theoretical viewpoint which rejects the need for an objective basis for socialism and for which ‘the revolution is possible at any time’?

The rejection of the idea that capitalism entered into its decadent epoch in 1914 has other implications which can be summarized briefly as follows;

  • either the period of capitalist decadence is still to come, although looking at the catastrophes which have befallen society over the last sixty years it’s hard to imagine what the real decadence of capitalism would look like and to see how society could survive it;

  • or else capitalism, in contrast to previous societies, will never go through a period of decadence. Then you must draw the conclusion from this: either you abandon any perspective for socialism or you base that perspective on something other than the objective necessities of society at a certain stage of its development. This means abandoning marxism, making socialism a ‘moral imperative’ — and thus joining up with anarchism.

During the course of its history, the workers’ movement has confronted three main adversaries: anarchism last century, social democratic reformism at the beginning of the twentieth century, and Stalinism between the two world wars. These currents were all banded against the proletariat at a crowning moment of the counter—revolution: the war in Spain in 1936. It must be recognized that councilism, even though it was one of the healthiest reactions against the degeneration of the Communist International and was able to hold to class positions during the worst moments of the counter—revolution, achieved the rare exploit of taking up many of the basic analyses of these three currents, even when its viewpoint did not lead to the abandonment of any revolutionary perspective — which was the case with some of its best elements. These are some of the implications of rejecting the proletarian character of October 1917.

CA

FOOTNOTES

1. See: ‘The Epigones of Councilism’, International Review no.2; ‘The Degeneration of the Russian Revolution’ and ‘The Lessons of Kronstadt’, IR no.3; ‘Platform of the ICC’, IR no.5; ‘Contributions on Period of Transition’, no.6; ‘The Communist Left in Russia’ IR nos. 8 & 9; ‘Texts on the Period of Transition’, IR no.11.

2. Preface to Selected Works of Lenin by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism (Central Committee of the CPSU).

3. See the following articles: ‘Degeneration of the Russian Revolution’, International Review no.3 and ‘The Communist Left in Russia’, IR nos. 8 & 9.

4. See the ICC pamphlet ‘The Decadence of Capitalism’ and other ICC texts.

Deepen: 

  • Russia 1917 [78]

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1917 - Russian Revolution [13]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Proletarian revolution [14]
  • Revolutionary wave, 1917-1923 [15]

The difficult path to the regroupment of revolutionaries

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In September 1977 an international discus­sion Conference called by political groups in Norway (including Arbeiderkamp) and in Sweden (including Arbetarmakt and Interna­tionell Revolution) took place, with the participation of the Communist Workers Organization and the ICC. We will publish the text presented by the ICC to this Conference at a later date. This text underlines the necessity to clarify the questions of state capitalism and national liberation, which are at the centre of dis­cussions in Scandinavia, in order to draw out the perspectives for international regroupment.

At the present time there are three things which any aspiring revolutionary group must understand: first of all, that other groups exist, that it is not the one and only group, which must evolve in isolation; secondly, that the development of class consciousness necessarily involves the con­frontation of political positions in the revolutionary milieu throughout the world; thirdly, that this vital discussion must be organized, that it cannot carry on through hearsay but must have an adequate framework, determined by the need for a regroupment of revolutionary energies.

Thus it is necessary to draw out agreed posi­tions, but also to define points of disagree­ment between groups. Revolutionaries must have criteria for deciding what divergences can be contained within one organization. The ICC has always been convinced of the need to reject monolithism. The idea of demanding total agreement on everything at all times before constituting a revolutio­nary organization is an aberration of small sects; it has never been part of the wor­kers' movement. However, it is also neces­sary to recognize that there are limitations to the disagreements existing in a proleta­rian group. For all these reasons discussion must be organized in an effective way. It is in order to defend this point of view -- which seems obvious to us -- that the ICC is concerned to extend international discus­sion as widely as possible. The texts in this issue show that this concern has not always been understood. Nevertheless we can only continue the effort that revolutio­naries have been engaged in since Zimmerwald, the first years of the Communist Internat­ional, and the work of the Communist Left.

In 1933 the Italian Left, in no.1 of Bilan, issued an appeal for discussion and research to all revolutionary groups it considered to be close to it, while maintaining an exemplary firmness on programmatic positions. The Italian Left in those days was very different from its pale shadow, the PCI (Programme Communiste) today, whose megalo­mania about the party is no cover for its degeneration on political positions. The spirit of openness, the recognition of the need for rapprochement between revolutio­naries, dominated the work of Internationalisme in the 1940s, to give the example of a group which was the direct predecessor of the ICC. This concern has animated our Current since its beginnings, especially because we are living in a period of deep­ening crisis and class struggle.

It was with this concern for the confronta­tion of political positions that the Inter­nationalist Communist Party (Battaglia Comunista) called a Conference in Milan, and it was in the same spirit that the ICC went to this Conference and invited other groups to its own Congress. When we went to Milan, we insisted on Battaglia Comunista inviting other groups, including all those who have come out of the Italian Left. Did we call for an unprincipled ‘get-together'? Absolutely not: The ICC rejected the idea of inviting Trotskyist groups like Combat Communiste and stressed the need to put forward clear political criteria for such a Conference. At the same time we reject the idea of hiding behind small so-called ‘autonomous' groups, which come from who knows where and represent who knows what politically -- a method which Pour Une Intervention Communiste (PIC) seems to have fallen into. On the contrary, the ICC went to Oslo in September to meet with serious political groups. The letter we are pub­lishing here is a balance-sheet of this experience, and aims to show that revolut­ionaries don't discuss for its own sake or to ‘clarify' in a purely abstract sense, but in order to work concretely and consc­iously towards regroupment. Everything which goes in this direction is positive, despite all the obstacles in the way. Everything which turns its back on this is negative and only serves to accentuate the isolation and weakness of the re-emerging revolutionary movement.

ICC

From: The International Communist Current

To: The Participants in the ‘Non-Leninist Conference' in Scandinavia

Dear Comrades,

We are writing this letter to continue the political dialogue begun among the various groups at the Oslo Conference, to clarify the nature of the ICC's intervention and to draw the conclusions from this experience.

Right from the outset, the process of political clarification in Scandinavia has been a focus of attention for the ICC (‘0pen Letter to Arbetarmakt', see Internat­ional Review no.4 in 1975, visits to the various groups over the last two years, correspondence) because such a process implicitly concerns all revolutionaries and has much more than simply local repercuss­ions.

Internationalism is the very basis of the workers' movement; it evokes and epitomizes the substance of the world proletariat's struggle against capital, against exploit­ation and alienation. It is not at all a question of ‘linking up' separate national proletariats or even a simple matter of solidarity or mutual aid. Internationalism expresses the fundamental unity of the wor­king class, of the problems it faces in struggle, of its experiences and the lessons to be drawn. Internationalism is an expre­ssion of the goals of the communist progra­mme which, in our period of the decadence of capitalism, constitutes the only basis for a revolutionary movement anywhere in the world.

What is true for the working class as a whole is even more true for its revolution­ary elements. Contrary to the ‘non-interf­erence in internal affairs' typical of the bourgeoisie and its nationalist framework, there are no specifically ‘Scandinavian' political questions which are separate from the communist programme as a whole. There are no Scandinavian affairs which must be dealt with before ‘opening up to the outside'. The recognition of this fundamental fact determined the calling of the recent Oslo Conference.

The revolutionary movement does not have organizations determined by nationalities or regions but rather by different political currents of thoughts in the proletariat. The aim of a revolutionary organization is to contribute to the development of class consciousness in the working class through intervention based on clear political analyses. This aim can never be furthered by flattering national exclusiveness or self-containment. Political currents do not necessarily flourish homogeneously in one ‘homeland' and the development of a revolutionary regroupment in Scandinavia for example, cannot be carried through in isolation. It has to benefit from the reflection and experiences (and the errors, so as not to repeat them) of other revolut­ionary currents in history and today; it must draw on international contact and discussion not only with the ICC but with the Communist Workers Organization (CWO), Pour Une Intervention Communiste (PIC), Battaglia Comunista, Fomento Obrero Revolucionario -- that is to say, the main currents in the international revolutionary milieu today. It is in this spirit that the invitation was extended to the Oslo Conference and that the ICC understood its own need to participate in such efforts (also the May 1977 Conference called by Battaglia). We can only hope that such efforts will continue. In this general framework we would like to offer our thou­ghts on the Oslo Conference and the discus­sions.

First and foremost the Oslo Conference was an important step in coming to grips with certain fundamental political questions. The agenda contained discussion on state capitalism and on the nature of national liberation struggles in our period. Part­icipants at the Conference included not only the representatives from the various groups and circles in Norway and Sweden (Arbetarmakt, Arbetarkamp, Marxist Study Group, For Kommunismen, Internationell Revolution, Trondheim circle, etc) but also the delegations from the CWO and the ICC. In its aims and broad outlines this Conference (as the two previous ones held in Scandinavia) can indeed be seen as a manifestation of the general reawakening and questioning taking place in the working class today.

There were, however, several disparate and often contradictory concerns expressed during the Conference which we could broadly characterize as follows:

-- a militant will to clarify political perspectives so as to become an active factor in the class struggle; this concern was by and large the dominant one at the Conference;

-- a certain academic approach which consid­ered marxism as the object of university seminars;

-- a diffuse preoccupation with ‘individual fulfillment', with vestiges of the ‘total revolution' ideology of 1968.

This last rather vague concern, for example, was felt in the emphasis given by some to the idea that political conferences were not so much a place for collective confro­ntation of analyses and positions as, more important in their mind, an opportunity for individual edification and expression. A focus on individuals is aided and abetted by the ‘revolt in daily life' mystique and is partly responsible for the lack of collective structure and cohesiveness in some of the groups.

This low-key concern with the vestiges of libertarianism is perhaps a leftover from the origins of many of the groups which came from splits with the Anarchist Feder­ation. In any case, individual fulfillment in capitalism is an impossibility and almost all efforts to concretize the ‘total revolution' end up in a caricature of ‘liberated behavior'. In fact, revolutionary conferences are not held for indiv­idual self-expression or realization but to develop a clearer sense of political dir­ection, to allow for the most efficient elaboration and confrontation of ideas. In its most debilitating form the individ­ualistic conception leads to the notion that if one is bored or sleepy it is not necessary to come to meetings or discuss­ions for hours at a time. Every man for himself -- the breakdown of organized, collective action.

The ‘academic' approach on the other hand was more obvious and openly expressed. First there was the persistent suggestion to transform the Conference into a series of seminar groups, small workshops with group leaders -- a procedure typical of any respectable and ever so slightly progressive British-style university conference. This suggestion was all the more puzzling because of the small number of militants actually participating in the Conference. The invitation to the ICC originally specified that the ICC and the CWO would each be asked to deliver a two to three hour lect­ure followed by a question-and answer period -- in much the same way as a visiting foreign professor would be invited to give a talk on marxology or Kierkegaard's conception of the void. The ICC brought this point up in its correspondence and the plan was in fact changed. Then there was an unsettling insistence on certain types of subjects (‘what is capital' or the decline in the profit rate or the saturation of markets) thought more worthy of discuss­ion than other points too basely ‘political'. Finally, there was a disdain if not outright hostility expressed towards polemics, towards the confrontation of political positions in debate, which supposedly cloud the clean air of the disinterested scholar. Confronting positions was considered ‘superficial' or simply an exercise in ‘talking like a leaflet'.

Taken to its logical conclusions, this attitude leads to a rejection of the very aim of discussion: to draw political con­clusions and arrive at an overall orient­ation which determines the framework for intervention in the class struggle. No matter how much all revolutionaries today suffer from the organizational break with the workers' movement of the past due to the long years of counter-revolution, no matter how difficult it may be to retrace the historical and theoretical links of revolutionary marxism, this can never be an excuse for the abdication of political responsibility. However long a process of regroupment may take, in Scandinavia or elsewhere, the framework of discussion can never be ‘study for its own sake'; the regroupment of revolutionaries on a clear programmatic basis must be the explicit goal determining the content, form and pace of discussion. A study circle can indeed be a step towards political clarification provided it does not become an end in its­elf, for ‘ten years', or a fiction of self-edification which becomes completely alien to any revolutionary content.

It is not simply a question of criticizing certain academic ‘forms' of organization. To counter the insistence on the academic style study-workshop approach it would be enough for the comrades to get out of their shell and go to other conferences among revolutionaries elsewhere in the world or read the way conferences of revolutionary organizations proceeded in the past. No, it is not a question of form in itself but a broader question of method.

Marxism is a weapon in combat, an arm in the class struggle. It is not a neutral science. If we are all united in our desire to deepen our understanding of marx­ism, to apply it to the current situation, this can only be done as a committed militant revolutionary. The marxology churned out by the academics of bourgeois institutions is a denatured, meaningless recuperation of the content of historical materialism.

Concerning the reproach against polemics, in the marxist method there is necessarily the clash of social forces and the confr­ontation of political positions. The notion of a ‘neutral' expose of ideas is anything but marxism which all through the history of the workers' movement has developed precisely as criticism and pole­mic. Marx's Capital which seems to be a fixation point of certain preoccupations was written as a "Critique of Political Economy". Most of the major works of marxism, the positions which influenced the course of the class struggle, of the organizations of the proletariat, of the revolutionary wave itself were developed in the heat of polemic, the confrontation of political positions, in practice. There is no other marxism.

Furthermore, marxist revolutionaries have always realized that clarification is indeed a process which, although it has no ‘end', has a beginning. Where is the beginning for us today? Should we recap­itulate Marx's own path and begin with Hegel (and why not further back all the way to Plato to get a full idea of the evolut­ion of philosophy)? Should we begin with Quesnay and Smith and work up to the labor theory of value until we get to . . . 1977? Or should we rather begin as the ICC (and the CWO and the PIC) has done from the experience of the highest and most recent expression of proletarian consciousness, the left communist movement which broke from the degeneration of the IIIrd Inter­national? The criterion is obviously the situation facing the working class today. We are not in a period of social peace with endless vistas for intellectual maturity ahead of us. On the contrary, the pressure of reality imposes a working class resist­ance to the crisis of the capitalist system. Sporadic and episodic upsurges of revolt encounter powerful obstacles. In this context revolutionary elements are scatter­ed and isolation plagues even the organized groupings. What then are we to think of those who ‘have no clearly delineated positions' on the major problems facing class struggle today but who choose to spend their time scoring points in the decline of the profit rate vs the saturat­ion of markets debate?

Although these points of theoretical clar­ification can have important consequences on a general level, they are not and have never been (for Grossman, Mattick, Luxem­burg or Lenin) the determining factors for revolutionary regroupment or intervention. Comrades holding different theoretical positions on this question worked together in the same organization because agreement was first and foremost political, based on a common platform or programme. The theor­etical roots of the crisis are certainly an important subject which Marx and his successors have made a great effort to clarify for more than 100 years in the workers' movement. But this subject only has a meaning in the proletarian camp. The bourgeoisie can also find the confront­ation of different theories ‘interesting' and even ‘intellectually stimulating'. Without a clear delineation of a common class terrain, of a revolutionary perspec­tive, such discussion is tantamount to turning one's back on the vital political questions facing the workers' struggle today.

The fixations of academic-type concerns what­ever they may latch onto are in fact an expression of the hesitancy and resistance to militant commitment in class struggle on the part of elements who have not yet bro­ken with the student milieu. A smokescreen, a confession that class struggle seems ‘so very far away' ... On this point the liber­tarian and academic approaches do indeed converge.

Nevertheless, despite many difficulties, the militant concern for clarification dominated the conference. The discussions brought out the need for further clarification on:

1. State capitalism, a manifestation of the permanent crisis of capitalism in decadence, a tendency which exists in all countries today to one degree or another; this posi­tion was defended in its major tenets by many comrades from Scandinavia and by the CWO and the ICC.

This position was opposed to the ‘state-bureaucratic mode of production' theory defended by comrades from Arbetarmakt; their document, with the aid of quotations from Kuron and Modzelevski considers the Eastern bloc countries and Russia as neither capitalist nor socialist but a ‘third sys­tem' which is ‘progressive' in the absence of proletarian struggle.

2. The national question today which consti­tutes the practical application of the understanding of decadence and state capitalism; ‘national liberation struggles' are the spearhead of the capitalist preparation for generalized war and the formation of a solid revolutionary current in Scandinavia must be predicated on a firm rejection of any ambiguities about the progressive nature of state capitalism or nationalism.

It is in this sense that the ICC intends to continue debate, asking that the comrades of Arbetarmakt seriously consider the ambig­uities of their positions and the grave political implications of their support for national liberation struggles.

Political discussion at the Conference was very positive with a great effort being made by Scandinavian comrades to translate and facilitate debate. Many important deci­sions were made: to publish a bulletin (in English too) with the texts and report of the Conference to provide a framework for future organized discussion, the decision to invite other non-Scandinavian groups to future Conferences.

Revolutionary potential exists in Scandina­via but militant energies must release them­selves from the weight of academic and liber­tarian preoccupations. If some groups or circles were more representative in some ways of a certain approach, overall there is no real homogeneity within the Scandinavian groups. No one type of pre­occupation was the exclusive property of any one particular group. Some of the exis­ting groups have difficulty creating a collective sense of direction, assuming responsibility for regular publication, creating an organizational cohesion. When coherence is not clearly defined political­ly, there is little reason how or why it should be expressed organizationally.

Sooner or later the groups in Scandinavia must come to conclusions about political definition. Experience has shown, particu­larly in the last ten years that groups which do not manage to free themselves from academic or libertarian fixations rapidly fall into modernism and disappear. The list is all too long: Manifestgruppen, Kommunis­men and Basis in Scandinavia; ICO, Mouvement Communiste in France, For Ourselves in the US, etc. There seems to be ‘all the time in the world' ... and yet the same mistakes are made.

Comrades often wonder whether the process of clarification and the inevitable selec­tion it entails would not mean a drastic reduction in the number of militants, break­ing up the ‘togetherness' of confusion or ambiguity. It must be said that the impor­tance of regroupment on the basis of revo­lutionary principles goes far beyond a ques­tion of numbers in the immediate sense. But in fact, in the long run, clarification brings the only positive results even num­erically because inertia and slow decompo­sition (whether back into blatant activism or into less obvious forms of intellectua­lism) demoralizes and exhausts the comrades, especially the new ones. In the end, for lack of a sense of direction, the whole house of cards falls in.

The process of revolutionary regroupment to­day encounters many obstacles along the way. This is not surprising and the difficulties in Scandinavia are much the same as those faced by comrades elsewhere. Nevertheless obstacles must be recognized for what they are. In this sense, we regret that the Conference rejected the idea of setting up a coordinating committee (consisting of members of the different groups and circles in Scandinavia) which was to plan future efforts towards regroupment taking into account the points of agreement and the points still needing clarification.

In fact, at the end of the Conference, cer­tain comrades exasperated by the ‘overly political' aspects of the discussion or perhaps by the ICC or CWO ‘intrusion' in Scandinavian debates, suggested that the future Conference in January be held along different lines: the limitation of two participants only from any foreign group (this was a modification of a proposal for their complete elimination), the re-estab­lishment of the tutorial and workshop form of discussion, an agenda devoted solely to theories of crisis: decline in the profit rate and saturation of markets. This sug­gestion was substantially accepted in the last hour of the Conference despite another proposal from other comrades in Scandinavia who asked that the next Conference continue the gains of the present discussion by fur­ther clarifying the national question and discussing the role of revolutionaries in the class struggle.

The decision to discuss only economic theory (kapital logik) at the next Confer­ence -- and thus in the six-month prepara­tion period -- is tantamount to turning one's back on the vital issues of political definition, refusing to face the implica­tions of the discussion in September. The January Conference, as it is now conceived, is not a further step along the path of clarification but a detour, a manifestation of resistance to dealing with the very meaning of a common political platform and its crucial importance.

Isn't the limitation of ‘foreigners' really symptomatic of a fear of being ‘eaten up' by what are thought to be ‘rival' organiza­tions, a desire to preserve a Scandinavian identity and individuality in discussion?

The ICC considers that the January Conference plan in its present form constitutes a dispersion of revolutionary efforts, a detour which will fritter away potential energies. Considering that it is an enormous effort for us to travel so far for what we sincere­ly think is a detour: tutorial sessions on Luxemburg's Accumulation of Capital; consid­ering that it is impossible for us to inter­vene in Swedish or Norwegian or to under­stand these languages without an interpreter which would be almost impossible in small-group conversations; considering that our inevitable effort to put the debate onto a clearly political path will be met by even more virulent exasperation on the part of the elements who refuse this approach; it seems to us that an ICC presence at this particular Conference is useless both for you and for us. Concerning the agenda in January we refer you to the texts the ICC has written on this subject and more gene­rally to the contributions of many revolu­tionary currents today and to the classics of marxism. Concerning the crucial question of Scandinavian regroupment, a task which deeply affects revolutionaries wherever they may live, we ask you to reconsider your pre­sent orientation and to take up the sugges­tion to plan a more relevant Conference for which all the Scandinavian groups would pre­pare contributions on the agenda originally proposed: the national question and the role of revolutionaries, with the aim of explicit­ly moving towards regrouping forces before the impetus is lost.

Comrades, it is an illusion of bourgeois ideology to think that the problems of the world are ‘so far away' from Scandinavia. The deepening economic depression, the acce­leration of the war economy, the rise of class struggle, the obstacles to the devel­opment of class consciousness, the weakness of the revolutionary movement due to the legacy of the counter-revolution, all create the urgent need for the formation of a revo­lutionary current in the Scandinavian coun­tries which will be increasingly hard-hit by the world crisis. Despite the difficult­ies encountered by the groups in Scandinavia, the organization of the Conference corres­ponds to the beginnings of an answer to an objective need. As such, we hope that this initiative will be an encouragement to all revolutionaries. The intervention of the ICC is intended to help the process of clarification, not by flattery, ‘secret diplomacy' or subtle ‘tactics' but by clearly stating our point of view and criti­cizing conceptions which we consider incorr­ect. The decision rests with you and the ultimate responsibility is yours.

This letter is a contribution to the inter­nal bulletin you have set up. We hope to continue correspondence and contact with all the groups. Hopefully we will see you at future Conferences. We reiterate our invi­tation to any comrade to visit our sections any time and take this opportunity to thank you for your hospitality during our stay.

Fraternally and with communist greetings,

International Communist Current

12 November 1977

Life of the ICC: 

  • Correspondance with other groups [20]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Councilism [43]

People: 

  • Förbundet Arbetarmakt [79]

The CWO: past, present and future (Text by the Aberdeen and Edinburg seceders)

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Presentation

The following has been written by the comrades of Aberdeen and Edinburg sections of the Communist Workers' Organization, who left CWO last July. The text points to some of the crucial problems faced by the revolutionary movement today, namely, the question of regroupment and the task of revolutionaries. from this standpoint, the text is a poignant testimony of a negative experience of the present proletarian movement. The CWO, a revolutionary group in Britain, was formed in 1975 fundamentally as an ‘anti-ICC' organization and to provide an ‘alternative pole of regroupment' internationally. Its subsequent splits and sectarian evolution confirm that revolutionaries cannot evade their responsibilities to the re-emerging class struggle, to the crying need of the proletariat to create for itself afirm, coherent and active pole of revolu­tionary clarification. Being one of the most vital weapons of the class, the future party of the class can only be forged if today revolutionaries understand the need to "... become aware of the :immense responsi­bilities which they have, to abandon the false quarrels which separate them, to sur­mount the deceptive divisions which the old world has imposed on them" (ICC, Manifesto, 1976). This is the spirit which permeates the text of the ex-CWO comrades.

We are presenting this text as part of a continuous effort to broaden out the lessons that the proletariat can learn from this and similar experiences. It is the break in organic continuity with the revolutionary movement developed in the last proletarian wave (1917-23) which helps explain many of the hesitations and confusions on the cruc­ial question of regroupment. It is perhaps on this issue that the present movement shows the greatest immaturity, the greatest disorientation.

The text by the Aberdeen/Edinburgh comrades presented here is not a complete version.For reasons of space we were forced to delete the first sections, dealing mainly with general questions of class consciousness, the development of class lines by the hist­orical workers' movement, the way that the movement of history appears to the communist minorities and the confusions of the CWO on these theoretical and practical questions. The parts that are included deal more with the history of the CWO and its present and future orientation, drawing out some of the important lessons from this experience. The complete text can be obtained from: M. Gavin, 27 Ashvale Place, Aberdeen, Scotland; or from the address of the ICC in Britain, BM Box 869, London WC1V 6xx.

Finally, the introduction of the comrades themselves speaks eloquently for the whole approach and concerns of their document:

A statement from the seceders

"On 31 July 1977, the Aberdeen and Edinburgh sections of the CWO split from that organization. Ostensibly the reason for the split was disagreement over the class nature of the International Communist Current, the Aberdeen and Edinburgh members maintaining, in opposition to the rump of CWO, that the ICC were not only part of the communist movement but were in fact a pole of regroupment of that movement. The split, unfortunately, took place very speedily, long before the arguments had been given time to mature. This text is an attempt to re­dress that. What began as an empirical defense of the communist nature of the ICC has deepened and broadened into a theoretical analysis of the nature of the whole proletarian movement, the meaning and function of class lines and, most difficult of all, the question of organi­zation and the regroupment of revolutio­naries.

This document is a conscious effort to participate in and contribute to the pro­cess of clarification and regroupment which has been taking place internation­ally throughout the past few years. We have no doubt that the ICC is the focus of this regroupment. The text also attempts to locate the CWO's inability to participate in this process within a critique of the theoretical confusions of the CWO and its consequently erroneous practice. If the tone is sharp, that is in the nature of polemical works. The intent is fraternal. We write in the hope that the comrades who remain within the CWO will be able to overcome their political confusions and take their right­ful place within the communist movement."

We have no doubt that this discussion will strengthen the whole proletarian movement today, because the lessons have international implications as to how to lessen the inevit­able pangs that the proletarian resurgence will confront as it unifies its forces to finally annihilate the capitalist order.

ICC

The CWO: Past, Present and Future

Unable to understand the class movement and its political expressions the CWO has no basis for understanding its own past and in fact, throughout its history, has shown a marked reluctance to even try. By July 1977 in two successive splits, it had lost 75 per cent of its membership leaving only a rump of a few comrades and had lost virtually all contact with other political groups. Yet it is only now and with ‘reluctance' that, any public response has been made and even this attempt to deal with its own history has only been produced to forestall "hostile political tendencies already embarked upon the jobs". An account of the CWO's history is underta­ken here by us to substantiate our analysis that in theory and in practice the CWO is a fundamentally sectarian organization.

 

Prehistory

 

By the end of the sixties capitalism's post­war boom was grinding to a halt and the pro­letariat throughout the globe was beginning once again to take the offensive. The inev­itable reflection of this was the emergence of political fractions of the class strugg­ling to achieve clarity on their own nature and on the tasks facing them. Both the fractions which were to become the CWO (Revo­lutionary Perspectives and Workers' Voice) participated in this process. Although the article ‘Two Years of the CWO' in the latest Revolutionary Perspectives describes quite accurately the organizational outcome of this process -- the formation of the ICC and the fusion of RP and WV -- the political achievements of this process are completely ignored. Although the CWO choose to forget it, it was within this process that the fundamentals which communists defend today were first systematically elaborated in the present period; viz the concept of capita­list decadence and all the political conse­quences which flow from it and just as impor­tantly, the reaffirmation of the vital necessity of the existence of a single centralized class party. The central role which Revolution Internationale, now the French section of the ICC, and Internationalism, now the American section of the ICC, played in this process, is just not mentioned and neither is the debt which the CWO owes for its pre­sent level of clarity. For example, com­rades constituting RP entered the process with no clear concept of decadence, belie­ving that the Russian Revolution was bour­geois and having little understanding of the meaning and function of a communist organization. However, understandably, the CWO might find itself embarrassed if it were to acknowledge that the bulk of the class positions they defend today were der­ived largely from organizations they charac­terize as bourgeois. (Or are they only bourgeois now anal weren't then?) However, it would be wrong to portray the RP elements as playing nothing but a passive role in this process. All the fractions which part­icipated were more or less confused and to a greater or lesser degree all contributed. That is the reality of the proletarian movement that the CWO now chooses to deny.

The central focus of the process of clarifi­cation rapidly became the question of organi­zation and regroupment. The groups which were clearest on this, who understood the necessity of international regroupment around the emerging class lines, in theory and in practice, coalesced to form, initial­ly the International Tendency and eventually the ICC. That the IT/ICC was the pole of regroupment was initially clearly recognized by RP. "In this period the pole of coher­ence was undoubtedly WR and the Internatio­nal Tendency to which you belong" (letter from RP to WR, December 1974).

This same letter makes quite clear that RP's political genesis was not for the fundamen­tal purpose of taking up the totality of communist tasks in the way that the ICC had formed around class lines but was in fact an organizational device to facilitate entry into the ICC, though the contradictions in­volved in forming one organization in order to join another appear to have been missed by the members of RP:

"... On our subsequent decision to write a Platform together; this was undertaken as a step towards integration in the International Tendency. To quote from a letter we sent to WR (2 September 1974): ‘We are considering the possibility of beginning to relate to WR as a collective and to work towards fusion collectively'."

In other words, RP owes its very birth to an attempt to identify itself vis-a-vis the ICC. This passage also makes nonsense of the CWO's claim in ‘Two Years of the CWO' that it was ridiculous of the ICC "to claim to be the kernal of the future communist party" since at the beginning RP quite clearly recognized it as such.

However, very rapidly, RP began to discover ‘barriers' to the process of regroupment on which they had embarked. The main problems put forward were the question of the econo­mic foundations of decadence, the question of a rigorous analysis of the last revolu­tionary wave, particularly in Russia, the problem of the proletarian state in the period of transition and the question of proletarian ‘bastions' mediating with the international bourgeoisie. RP was not the only group which failed to grapple with the organizational question. Other groups also began to resist regroupment and to draw away from the ICC -- Union Ouvriere, PIC, WV, the Revolutionary Workers' Group (US), etc. In this situation RP began consciously to attempt to function as an alternative pole of regroupment. The only group succes­sfully attracted was WV. Fusion took place in September 1975 and the CWO was formed. Within a short but crisis-ridden year the CWO had split into its original two constit­uents. In ‘Two Years of the CWO' the explanation is stated to be: "In the context of a temporary relaxation of the crisis in early 1976, the re-employment of many of the members (WV) and a trickle of sectional strikes in Merseyside."

All this leading the Liverpool members back into their bad old ouvrierist ways! This account is not only a travesty of reality but is also a travesty of the clarity with which the CWO was once able to view the whole sorry business. "It was felt that the old WV had never accepted the politics of the fusion, rather they used RP as a shield against the ICC" (extract from minutes of CWO meeting no.5, 9 October 1976).

In other words, the original regroupment had been fundamentally different from the process of regroupment which had given birth to the ICC; instead its only function was an attempt to form an anti-ICC in the manner of the mediaeval anti-Popes. That the regroup­ment was profoundly not on the basis of a greater programmatic coherence than the ICC is proved in the words of the CWO itself, talking of the fusion meeting at which the Platforms of both WV and RP were discussed:

"In retrospect the two main areas of disagreement or incoherence ... 1. The Russian Revolution; 2. The economics of decadence can be seen as a symptom of lack of sufficient coherence." (Text by the Aberdeen section, ‘Crisis in the CWO')

The disagreement on Russia consisted of a general difficulty within WV of recognizing the Bolsheviks as a proletarian expression and in particular, one member didn't even accept the revolution itself as a proletarian event! The problem over economics was that by and large WV had no economic analysis; what there was had been cribbed from RP.

In Revolutionary Perspectives, no.8, the regroupment is described as taking place with ‘misgivings' on the part of RP. This is a pathetic description compared to the one already expressed by the CWO in ‘Crisis in the CW0'. In attempting to account for the crises which racked it: "We would argue that this was the result of ... a political dishonesty of almost unbelievable level on the part of RP."

All this was taking place at a time when the CWO were intransigently denouncing the ICC for their opportunism in regroupment and their alleged willingness to water down political agreement in order to expand! (It is to be noted that disagreements over anal­ysis of the Russian Revolution and over economics presented no barriers to regroup­ment in this case.)

With hindsight it is easy to see that the eventual disintegration was implicit in the fusion itself since the political dynamic of the new organization was essentially an unreal one. The focus of regroupment was not coherence on the class lines and the tasks of a communist group but mutual hos­tility to the ICC. Even before this regroup­ment took place the sectarianism implicit in RP began to take tangible shape. In February 1975 the ‘Open Letter to the ICC' (RP, no.8) was drawn up. In this letter the theoretical cul-de-sac RP was building for themselves first saw the light of day. RP's dividing lines which had hitherto been areas for discussion between communist groups were now characterized as ‘class lines'.

"For us it is a class line to advocate any state outside the workers' councils or to advocate anything but the with­drawal of proletarian bastions from the world market." (our emphasis)

and

"For us, Kronstadt, the March Action, Frontism, or the NEP, constitute the definitive demise of the IIIrd Interna­tional and any discussion that goes be­yond is a discussion with the counter­revolution." (original emphasis)

The final conclusion, the counter-revolutionary nature of the ICC was avoided however on the grounds that their ‘errors' were ‘subjective'. But in RP, no.4 in ‘The Convulsions of the ICC' the process reached its logical conclusion. The ‘errors' were no longer subjective and the ICC was decla­red to be a bourgeois organization on the grounds that:

a. they didn't regard 1921 as the final de­mise of the Russian Revolution;

b. being wrong on the class nature of the Trotskyist Left Opposition;

c. advocating that a revolutionary bastion mediate with the peasantry and the inter­national bourgeoisie.

and with that the trap clanged shut.

The logic made so explicit in the CWO's relationship with the ICC was implicit in its relationships with other groups. Not surprisingly by mid-1977, the CWO's isola­tion was, to all intents and purposes com­plete. It was this situation which formed the background to the events which led to the members of the CWO from Aberdeen and Edinburgh splitting from the, CWO and re­orienting ourselves towards the ICC. Inevi­tably this process was a difficult and pain­ful one. That is implicit in any split within the communist movement and also in any struggle for clarity. Our initial attempts to overcome the sectarian trap the CWO (with our help) had backed itself into were unavoidably hesitant and confused. The initial document ‘Class Lines and Organiza­tion' (see RP, no.8) which we produced for discussion within the CWO was an expression of this. It was basically an attempt to defend the communist nature of the ICC by trying to accommodate them within the total­ity of the CWO's monument of sectarianism. It was only with great difficulty that we became clear that the problem was not that the CWO had misinterpreted the ICC but that the CWO's model for understanding the com­munist movement and the function of class lines was at fault. By isolating that text and treating it in RP, no.8, in ‘Two Years of the CWO' as a finished product rather than as the first step in a process, the CWO conveniently managed to side step the political questions posed by the split.

Not only was the text an early expression of the process in which we were engaged but the split and the manner in which it took place were so also. The split occurred after only two meetings and one text from either side. With hindsight we can see that we were guilty of the very monolithism and rigidity with which we were indicting the CWO. It would obviously have been more valuable and productive to have attempted to remain within the CWO so that our subse­quent development could have occurred within the CWO instead of outside it and against it (though doubtless our expulsion would have been fairly rapid). In splitting with such rapidity we abdicated our respon­sibility to our comrades who remained.

CWO: The Present

The events of the past year and the increas­ingly isolated position of the CWO have obviously left their mark. Even before the latest split discussions were taking place to attempt to understand and overcome this isolation. The latest split has accelerated the process. However, lacking both the capacity and the willingness for self-analysis, the CWO's attempt to understand their decline and fall in RP, no.8 can only present a picture of a seemingly hostile world at which they stare with an equal mix­ture of self-righteous truculence and genuine bewilderment. We are presented with an explanation which is no more than a description:

"The second year of the CWO was marked by a tendency towards isolation caused by a. the departure of certain interna­tional contacts whose sympathies lay with the Liverpool ouvrierists (in Australia, USA); b. the success of the ICC in winning over wavering individuals who shared some of our views (eg Belgium); c. the increa­sing toll the lull in the crisis and class struggle took of revolutionary groups."

Their analysis of both splits is basically identical, locating the reason in a combina­tion of the immediate level of the crisis and the personal and political inadequacy of individual members. In Liverpool's case an outbreak of local strikes lured them back into their ouvrierist ways. But in any case they never really accepted the CWO's politics (see quote above from Group Report, no.5). In the case of Aberdeen/Edinburgh a downturn in the struggle produced demora­lization and an unwillingness to accept the political burdens (see ‘Two Years of the CWO', p.37). In any case Aberdeen/Edin­burgh never really accepted the CWO's poli­tics either: " ... it's clear that you have not rejected the CWO's positions; indeed, what is clear is that you have never under­stood many of them" (letter from the CWO to Aberdeen/Edinburgh, 19 September 1977).

(If nothing else, the discovery that in little more than a year 75 per cent of the members of the only communist organization in the world didn't really qualify for membership should give the CWO some food for thought.) In this way the CWO has attempted to theorize its isolation and disintegra­tion in terms which placed responsibility firmly outside the CWO itself. If the CWO admits responsibility at all for any of it, it is merely at the level of their ‘naivety' and "insufficiently thorough propaganda work" ... (RP, no.8, p.54). Never for a moment is the notion entertained that their situation might be due to the contradic­tions inherent in their theory and practice.

The logic implicit in the condemnation of the ICC as counter-revolutionary was, under the impetus of the latest split, developed explicitly by the CWO to what must be its end point. That is, to be part of the pro­letarian movement an organization must de­fend a body of class lines which amount to the totality of the CWO's Platform. (The CWO have on occasion stated that economics are not a class line but past practice seems to deny this or at least to suggest that it presents an insurmountable barrier to regroupment (see the PIC document in RP, no.8 and Milan document in a pamphlet on the Milan Conference called by Battaglia Comunista). Any organization failing to defend the totality of these positions is, by definition, bourgeois. Since, at the present, only the remaining members of the CWO defend this totality, logically all other political expressions are part of the counter-revolution. At a stroke the entire proletarian movement, struggling to achieve clarity, disappears into the ranks of the bourgeoisie. Only the CWO is communist; only the CWO is proletarian. Even their own origins must become nothing more than a series of bourgeois groups interacting in the early seventies to somehow magically produce a communist organization. That is the explanation for the isolation and impo­tence of the Communist Workers' Organization.

This lies in their fundamental misunderstan­ding of the meaning and function of class lines and that is the root cause of their inability to fully carry out the tasks of a communist organization. The CWO states, and we fully endorse, that the main tasks of a communist group are:

"1. The struggle for clarity about the nature of the class movement itself so that we may react back on the class by intervention to draw out and deepen those elements of the movement that tend to go beyond the framework of capitalism, and to hasten the class' self-clarification." (‘Crisis and Class Struggle', RP, no.3, p.15)

Undeniably the CWO produced a high level of political clarity and an impressive body of theoretical work and has consistently attemp­ted to intervene in the class via regular leafletting. But the ability of the commu­nist organization to play a meaningful part in the class struggle doesn't merely depend on the development of theoretical clarity. It is fundamentally underlaid and dependent on what the CWO states to be the other major task of a communist organization.

"2. Organizational preparation for the revolutionary period itself when the needs of the class will demand a single unified party across national frontiers and grouped around a coherent programme. This requires now (our emphasis) working internationally for regroupment on the basis of common practice and clear pro­grammatic agreement with those groups produced by the deepening crisis and the growing class activity." (Ibid)

And again,

"The CWO doesn't deny that regroupment of revolutionaries today is an important task of communists today ..." (Text of the CWO for the Oslo Conference, Septem­ber 1977.)

In the light of their contention that they are the only communists in the world how can this be taken seriously? With whom do they imagine they can regroup? The counter-­revolution? Having already set up a model which denies the existence of a proletarian movement outside their own Platform, how can the CWO possibly undertake the tasks which communists must perform within the proletarian movement? That is, how can they relate in a fraternal and constructive manner to other groups struggling for clarity in order to intervene and assist that struggle? If they cannot recognize the proletarian movement they certainly cannot function as a pole of coherence or regroupment within it. And let us be quite clear -- the only reason for struggling to function as a pole of coherence is for the purpose of regroupment.

Future

Even before the Aberdeen/Edinburgh split the CWO had decided on a more vigorous and outgoing policy towards the outside world in an effort to overcome their isola­tion. The fact that this must inevitably result in a heightening of the contradict­ion between their theory and practice is already in evidence. Thus we find in ‘A Reply to the Majority' (RP, no.8, p.54):

" ... we must relax our criteria for evaluating whether discussion with this or that group is ‘worthwhile'. If a group wishes to discuss with us it can only be because they see a common strand in our politics and that must be the basis on which we meet with them."

All political criteria, all political rig­orousness has been completely abandoned here in order to engage in debate. By this methodology the CWO could find itself in debate with virtually anyone. This is underlined even more brutally in the same paragraph.

"Thus we can only abandon the view in RP, no.4 that ‘ ... on no account can we debate with groups that defend some aspect of the counter-revolution'," (Ibid)

Let's not be mealy-mouthed about this. For the CWO a group which defends some aspect of the counter-revolution is, by their own definition, bourgeois. What a pitiful and painful position for a group which was once so clear on that very subject. What possi­ble dialogue can communists have with the bourgeoisie? Communists can have only one thing to say to the bourgeoisie -- and that is to demand that it leaves the stage of history or be destroyed. The policy of communists to the bourgeoisie can only be one of intransigent denunciation. The only possible gain that might accrue from the CWO's approach is the hope that they might be able to split individuals from the coun­ter-revolutionary groups which wish to debate with them, unless the CWO can pers­uade a bourgeois organization to become communist. That is a purely tactical approach and in complete contradiction to the political approach which communists are obliged to adopt towards the more or less clear fractions of the proletarian movement. Towards the latter, the aim and the obligation are to clarify the entire fraction so that it can take its place within a unified communist organization.

However, if the CWO's ‘new policy' for relations with the outside world must inevitably mean the destruction of its obligation to intransigently denounce the bourgeoisie, it also has a more positive and hopeful feature. It means that the CWO will refrain from intransigently denouncing their proletarian comrades also (albeit from reasons of oppor­tunism and dishonesty). Having opened up the possibility of dialogue with the bour­geoisie the CWO has necessarily opened up the possibility (inadvertently as it was) of dialogue with fellow communists and pro­letarians. That dialogue with anyone is impossible via denunciations, the CWO has learnt only too painfully over the past year. That the lesson has indeed gone home is evi­denced in their latest communication to the ICC ‘Some Questions for the ICC', Internatio­nal Review, no.12. Here the CWO mount a coherent attack on the specific positions of the ICC which they disagree with, but in order to keep the dialogue alive they have deliberately disemboweled the central thrust of their critique so that nowhere to be seen is the conclusion that the ICC is an arm of the bourgeoisie because of their analysis of the last revolutionary wave and the nature of the state in the period of transition. Instead the entire text is specifically situated within a debate taking place for the final purpose of regroupment.

By coming into existence RP implicitly posed the question: Can debates about the final end of the last revolutionary wave and the exact form of the dictatorship of the prole­tariat take place within a single organiza­tion? RP explicitly answered no!

With the publication of the ‘Open Letter to the ICC' in February 1975 the question changed to: Can such debates take place within the proletarian movement? Again RP (CWO) answered no!

The direct results of this fundamental sect­arianism were physical disintegration and political isolation. In now attempting to overcome this by changing their practice the CWO must inevitably highlight the contra­dictions in their theory. Hopefully the end result will be a resolution of their theoretical confusions. If not, the future can only hold for them either disintegra­tion or "the long slow agony of a sect", condemned to increasing isolation from the historic movement of the proletariat with only an obstructionist and confusion­ist role to play.

Comrades of the former

Aberdeen & Edinburgh sections of the CWO,

November 1977.

Life of the ICC: 

  • Correspondance with other groups [20]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Workers Organisation [18]

Some questions for the ICC (from CWO)

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Introduction

The following text ‘Some Questions for the ICC’ is a reply by the Communist Workers’ Organization to the text ‘Political Confu­sions of the CWO’ which appeared in the International Review, no.10. The ICC wel­comes it as a contribution to international discussion amongst revolutionaries, and more specifically, as an expression of the will­ingness of the CWO to resume political dia­logue with the ICC, despite the fact that the CWO has not changed its evaluation of the ICC as a ‘counter-revolutionary’ group. We are also publishing a reply to the specific points and criticisms put forward by the CWO in this text.

**********

The article ‘Political Confusions of the CWO’ (International Review, no.10), exhibits once again the ICC in a cleft stick of its own making. On the one hand we are told that the CWO and the ICC share the same class positions, while on the other a criti­que of our ‘confusions’ reveals us as ‘bor­dering on’ or ‘virtually’ substitutionist, Stalinist, and self-managed at the same time. Are these then, not class lines, but rather ‘confusions’ which are compatible with the positions of the ICC? Only wishful thinking (or opportunism) can bridge the gap between asserting on the one hand that we share the same class positions, and on the other that our confusions lead us to counter-revolut­ionary stances.1 Since few of your mem­bers outside the UK or USA can have had the chance to either study our positions, or our critique of the ICC, we thought it might prove useful to take up some of the points raised in the above article, and demonstrate the inconsistencies of the ICC. Once we have established the seriousness of our differences with you, we hope this will spur you to treat them more seriously than you have in the past.

1. Economics

The analysis of the ICC of the contradict­ions of capitalism is at variance with that presented by Marx in Capital. Despite its incomplete nature, and inevitable concentra­tion on nineteenth century capitalism, the basic content and method of Marx’s theory can be used to explain all the phenomena of the decay of capitalism.2 The CWO recognizes that abandoning Marx’s ideas leads to various theoretical and practical errors which render a group confusionist, or even lead it onto the paths of counter­revolution.3 Thus, for the CWO there is no problem as to why we analyze economics; to establish a sure bedrock for our posi­tions, and elaborate a political perspective. But what is the situation with the ICC? “We fully recognize the importance of dis­cussing this issue (ie economics - CWO) within the workers’ movement” (International Review, no.10, p.14). One cannot take such a statement seriously, since in the nine years since the foundation of the parent group of the ICC (ie Revolution Internatio­nale), the organization has never produced a public explanation and defence of its economic basis that has gone beyond journalistic assertions. The only text of any economic weight (The Decadence of Capi­talism) mentions Rosa Luxemburg, on whose theories the ICC claim to base themselves, only once. Despite its ‘importance’, eco­nomics is hardly a pressing issue for the ICC. Since, for the ICC, economics is very much a decorative addition to marxism, and cannot in itself lead to confusions or counter-revolution, this is in effect quite logical. Why waste time fighting for Luxem­burg’s economics (leaving aside for a moment their basic indefensibility4), since this, or other economic theories have no implica­tions?

If the ICC recognizes the ‘importance’ of discussing economics, why has it never done so in a serious fashion? More seriously, why is it ‘important’ to discuss ‘this issue’ if its political implications are minimal? What you seem to really recognize is (to avoid charges of being vulgarizers of marx­ism) the need to say that you recognize the importance of economics. We offer the ICC space in our journal, Revolutionary Perspectives, to reply to the text in no.6 ‘The Accumulation of Contradictions’, or ‘The Economic Consequences of Rosa Luxemburg’. In addition, we invite you to explain why it is important, in your view, to discuss economics.

2. Russia

Not only with Rosa Luxemburg’s economic theories is the ICC defending the indefen­sible; the same applies to its analysis of the decline of the revolutionary wave, and the ending of proletarian power in Russia. Presumably, the ICC must agree that in 1917 the working class actually held political power in Russia -- otherwise it is inconcei­vable that a proletarian revolution could have occurred. But, behind a smokescreen of vagaries, the ICC has never said when the working class finally lost this power. Now, if we agree that in 1917 the class did hold power, but that in 1977 it no longer does, so then it follows logically that somewhere along the line it lost this power. As we have explained many times, March 1921 was Thermidor5 (the NEP, Kronstadt, the United Front) after which there was nothing proletarian in the Russian state, the Bolshevik party, or the Communist Interna­tional. The defeat of the world revolution meant it was impossible for any other out­come to the heroic Russian experience. The ICC’s wish to avoid this conclusion forces it into many convolutions that are little short of breathtaking. To give but one example, Kronstadt, formerly a class line is now excused since the “principles” for dealing with such a situation hadn’t been tried and tested. Does the proletariat need to establish as a principle that its own massacre is counter-revolutionary?

Further problems arise for the ICC in dealing with the class nature of the tenden­cies in Russia associated with the butcher of Kronstadt, Trotsky. Why was the so-called left opposition an expression (how­ever degenerated) of the proletariat? No answer to this has ever been given, nor could it be if the ICC seriously examine the programme of the opposition and Trotsky. Incredibly, the only argument advanced has been that the opposition fought against the idea of socialism in one country. But here the ICC reveals themselves as poor legatees. How could the opposition, which died as an organized movement in 1923, have fought a theory that was not even pro­pounded till over a year later? Perhaps once again the ICC is simply a victim of its lack of awareness of the facts. Is it really the United Opposition of 1927 (Kame­nev and all) that we should be saluting, since it nominally opposed the ‘socialism in one country’ thesis of Stalin?

But anyway the idea that the proclamation of ‘socialism in one country’ meant that anything had changed as regards Russia or the Bolshevik party is doubly absurd. In the first place the adoption of this theory changed nothing in the policies of the Bolsheviks, the Comintern or Russia, which were as counter-revolutionary before as after its adoption; similarly they changed nothing as regards the position of the Russian working class. In the second place, your own ‘method’ cries out against Stalin’s theory as a dividing line. The rejection of ‘socialism in one country’ was not an ‘already established principle’. As you’ve noted, even poor old Marx had lapses in that direction (eg Civil War In France), while Lenin had specifically defended the possibi­lity of such an achievement in 1915 (cf The United States of Europe Slogan). So at best you might argue that after it had been tried and failed, socialism in one country became a class line, ie the late 1930s; in no way could it instantaneously become so when pro­pounded by Stalin. (Who anyway saw it exact­ly as Lenin saw NEP as a holding operation till the next wave of revolution in the west -- see Isaac Deutscher on this). So you can hardly brush aside NEP, and foam at socialism in one country -- which was its out­come, The ICC chops and changes its method according to the conclusions it wishes to come to. Stalin’s innovations, or the betra­yals of social democracy in 1914 are instan­taneously class lines, while Kronstadt, the United Front etc, only become so after they have been tried and found wanting.

If you abandon the idea of 1921 as Thermidor, there is no possibility of abandoning a defeatist position on Russia till 1940 when it entered the war. Indeed, if Russia had something proletarian about it, entering a war where it was attacked by Nazi Germany couldn’t change this, and we’d be forced even further back till 1944-5 when Russia became an imperialist power of significance, to avoid all defense of it. Indeed, the latest ICC publications show clear signs of heading in this direction, and proclaim that the defense of Russia was an unsettled question until 1940 (see International Review, no.10, p.14). The lessons we draw from the Russian experience crucially influ­ence what we advocate as the policies of the proletariat in the next revolutionary wave. As the ICC does not understand the former, it is unable to defend the latter.

3. The state

The ICC is guilty of a-historical morali­zing on the issue of the state that brings it close at times to anarchism and libera­lism. The former is illustrated by its view of the state as “essentially conserva­tive” and against ‘freedom’, while the lat­ter is shown by its view of the state as a ‘necessary evil’ which exists to reconcile or ‘mediate’ between classes. The ghosts of Kropotkin and John Stuart Mill haunt the publications of the ICC. But a marxist analysis of the state -- while it recognizes the common features in all state forms -- also breaks with such generalities as that which obsess the ICC and sees each historical state form as bearing specific features. “For a marxist, there is no such thing as a ‘state’ in general” (Karl Korsch, Why I am a Marxist).

To take as an example the Asiatic or despo­tic state; this was initially a revolutionary force, organizing the expansion of the productive forces, through the forcing of the scattered tribal producers into large scale public works. Similarly, the state of the absolutist period in Europe was a progressive alliance between the monarch and the bourgeoisie, to put down the war­ring feudal nobility (eg the Tudor monarchy in Britain). The ICC’s a-historical gene­ralities, which refuse to see what is speci­fic in each state-form, are illustrated in their approach to the absolutist state. In the Decadence Pamphlet we are told that this was a conservative organ, designed to prop up decaying feudal society, a reactionary phenomenon analagous to today’s strengthen­ing of the bourgeois state. True to the methodology of Luxemburg who fused all epochs of capitalism into capitalism ‘as such’, the ICC fuses all state forms into the eternally conservative state ‘as such’. Here we have idealism, the idealism of Platonic ‘forms’.

The working class state is thus not an ex­pression of the eternal essence of the state, but a specific weapon of class rule, design­ed to destroy the enemies of the proleta­riat politically. Outside of the class’s council-state there can be no organs of a political nature expressing the interests of hostile classes. There may exist assoc­iations on a technical/economic level under soviet supervision, or there may be created offshoots of the workers’ state through which it communicates with other strata, but the idea of a ‘state’ outside of the workers’ councils is a reactionary anathema. Indeed, in the past where all such class organs did develop, it was the task of com­munists and the class to destroy them. For example, the Constituent Assembly in Russia which was an expression of all ‘non-bourgeois classes’, especially the peasantry. Does the ICC now, like Rosa Luxemburg, criticize the Bolsheviks for dissolving the Assembly, which could have been a useful mediating force for avoiding the ‘excesses’ of war communism? In an attempt to turn the tables on the CWO’s idea that there can be a working class state, the text in International Review, no.10 accuses us of being silent on whether such institutions as the Sovnarkom, Vesenkhah, Red Army and Cheka were ‘class organs’ of the Russian workers’ state. Silent we have never been, and are not now; until the triumph of the counter­revolution they emphatically were so. The main weapon to destroy the counter-revolu­tion will not be mediations, but violence and terror.

In the Accumulation of Capital, Luxemburg sheds many tears over the fate of pre-capitalist tribesmen, artisans and peasants, yet (despite the ICC’s repeated assertions that her work is based on the law of value), the proletariat, whose extracted surplus value ensures the reproduction of capitalism, hardly merits a mention in the work, still less a tear. Lurking behind the ICC’s views on the state in the period of transition lays a similar liberal humanistic concern for non-proletarian strata and their fate. This leads to the advocacy (on a regularized basis) of political and economic concessions to the non-proletarian masses of the econo­mically backward areas of the globe. Cert­ainly the proletariat is a minority of the world’s population, but this is no argument for mediations or for the necessity of con­cessions. In the countries where the vast majority of the world’s industrial and agricultural output is concentrated the proletariat is a majority of the population, and other strata can be dealt with by force, repression or dispersal as appropriate. Who is to be mediated in the heartlands of capi­tal? The petty bourgeoisie like the shop­keepers? The professional strata, who can hardly be expected to act in other than an atomized fashion? A faulty class analysis that causes the ICC to put routine white collar workers into the ‘middle classes’ or even the petty bourgeoisie, leads to the view that such dubious elements will have to be kept at bay in their own organizations dis­tinct from those of the workers. But the speediest possible integration of such groups into productive work will be the surest safeguard against counter-revolution finding a base in their ranks. As for the millions of lumpenized human beings outside the advanced capitals, their only hope is to follow their own and the world proleta­riat into communism. Unlike the peasantry of the past they cannot even feed them­selves, and certainly pose no great threat to proletarian power. But should such a ‘state’ as the ICC foresees actually come into being, baptized in the holy water of avowedly communist groups, it would cert­ainly serve as a focus of counter-revolu­tion, overtly from non-proletarian strata, and covertly from capital itself.6

It is a fallacious argument (International Review, no.10, p.18) that since Bilan in the 1930s defended this position it cannot be a class line, as both the ICC and the CWO recognize Bilan as a proletarian group. If this view of the state is a class line, asks the ICC, why is Bilan not counter­revolutionary? But Bilan also defended the proletarian character of the trade unions, which for the ICC is a ‘class line’. It cannot be argued that it was only in World War II that this issue became clarified; as with the issue of the state this was settled in the revolution and counter-revolution of the years 1917-23. Leeway we can extend to groups in the depths of the counter revolution cannot be extended to groups emerging in a new pre-revolutionary situation. We can defend Bilan and say that the issue of the state is a class line, just as the ICC can defend them, despite the issue of the unions being a ‘class line’. Or will the trade unions become the next ICC ‘open question’?

4. The Party

The ICC finds it impossible to understand the views of the CWO on this issue and is horrified by what it sees as our ‘substitu­tionist tendencies’. What the ICC cannot grasp, is that like ‘autonomy’, substitu­tionism is a word to which it is impossible to ascribe any meaningful content. Let us try and unravel the gordian knot surrounding this non-issue.

‘Substitutionism’ is presumably meant to mean that a minority of the class attempts to carry out the tasks of the whole class. The term cannot apply to bourgeois groups; the minority rule of the bourgeoisie over the workers is not a substitution of the former for the latter, but a simple form of class rule. Thus the issue can only have meaning in relation to proletarian groups and indeed the ICC thinks that communist groups can cross class lines on the issue of ‘substitutionism’. We have to clearly distinguish between two separate issues here.

On the one hand there is the view, original­ly formulated by Blanqui and later endorsed to some extent by Lenin and Bordiga, that a communist minority, properly organized, can seize power on behalf of the working class, and hold power for them. This is certainly a confusion, but in no way can it be a class line. We want communism to avoid the annihilation of humanity, how we get it is beside the point; could it be achieved by Blanquist coups, or indeed by levitation, then that would be our programme. The issue is not a moral one. But since the conscious­ness and active participation of the class is necessary to defeat the enemies of the revolution, and construct a new society, such a view of minority tactics is simply a lamentable confusion.

The other side of the coin on the substitu­tionist question is at a more serious level. According to the ICC one of the ‘class lines’ on the issue of the state is that the poli­tical party does not aim at achieving power. Instead it contents itself with being an “active factor in the self-organization and self-demystification of the working class” (International Review, no.10, p.15), what­ever such a windy phrase is supposed to mean. If the majority of the class, through its experience, becomes conscious of the need for communism, and is prepared to fight for it, then they will mandate communists to the positions of responsibility within the class-wide organizations. One can at best talk of an insurrection, not a revolu­tion until there I is 'a communist majority in the class organizations. And these mandated communists do not come out of thin air; they are members of the communist par­ty (what else?). Therefore, at its victor­ious point, the insurrection will be trans­formed into a revolution, and majority sup­port for communism will be manifested by the class -- via the party in the councils -- holding power. The idea that the revolution could succeed while the majority of the class is not conscious of the need for com­munism, or while the majority of delegates to the councils are not communists, is pre­posterous. Such a conception robs the rev­olution of its vital aspect -- consciousness -- and reduces it to a spontaneist, counci­list act. At best this would be a doomed insurrection, not a revolution. Thus if the substitutionism of the party seeking to attain power is a class line, then the CWO has crossed this particular Rubicon long ago.

5. Theory

As the party has a vital role to fulfill, it needs to know what it is doing. Thus its programme, and how it is constructed (the­ory) is vital. Theory is not a hobby, or an embellishment of positions we already hold intuitively, but the onerous way -- we actually arrive at these positions. Nowhere is the decline of the ICC more marked than in its downgrading of theory, and the ten­dency for its work to become increasingly journalistic. As more and more issues are declared ‘open questions’ (and correspond­ingly more and more purveyors of counter­revolution branded as ‘confused’ proleta­rian groups7, we are assured that the tasks facing us are “basically concrete” (World Revolution, no.5, p.5) or that “matters of historical interpretation” like the death of the Comintern are “entirely irrelevant” (International Review, no.10, p. 17).

‘Practical’ tasks like intervention and regroupment cannot be separated from theory, from the elaboration of a coherent communist programme. We don’t write theoretical texts, or engage in polemics in order to give issues an airing, but to resolve them, so that regroupment can take place, and with it, intervention on a wider scale. The issue of regroupment cannot be posed in the abstract, divorced from political polemics; only if the discussion resolves the points at issue, does the existence of separate organizations become irrelevant. It is in this spirit that the CWO was in the past, and is now, prepared to debate with the ICC and in which we await answers to the ques­tions raised in this letter.

The Communist Workers’ Organization,

October 1977

1 According to the ICC, the CWO is heading towards ‘substitutionism’. Now, this according to them is a ‘class line’, or, to call a spade a spade, counter-revolutionary. Of course, such sectarian conclusions are never drawn from their own premises.

2 See ‘Economics of Capitalist Decadence’, in Revolutionary Perspectives, no. 2.

3 See ‘On the Implications of Luxemburgism’ in Revolutionary Perspectives, no. 8.

4 This statement is validated in ‘Economic Consequences of Rosa Luxemburg’ in Revolutionary Perspectives, no. 6

5 See ‘Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Russia’ in Revolutionary Perspectives, no. 4.

6 For our views on the transition period, see text of the same title in Workers’ Voice, nos. 14 and 15.

7 Class lines are drawn up to delineate bourgeois from proletarian groups. Any other conception debases and trivializes them. Thus, we can only oppose totally the ‘new line’ of the ICC which baptizes all sorts of confusionists and counter-revolutionaries as proletarian according to the most latitudinarian criteria. A framework which includes Programme Communiste (PCI) within the workers’ camp is incapable of excluding the SWP in Britain. Indeed, if class lines do not define a proletarian group, then the entire left is proletarian. Confused, opportunist, corrupt and utterly degenerated certainly, but still proletarian. This whole issue will be dealt with in a future issue of Revolutionary Perspectives; in the meantime our views are outlined in Revolutionary Perspectives, no. 8, ‘A Reply from the Majority’.

Life of the ICC: 

  • Correspondance with other groups [20]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Workers Organisation [18]

International Revieiw no 13 - 2nd quarter 1978

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Report on the world situation

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1. The crisis of capitalism is inexorably deepening. In 1975-6 there was an apparent recovery after the very sharp aggravation of 1974; 1977 has seen the return of all the basic problems. Although a few countries have managed to maintain a reasonable trade balance -- like Germany and Japan -- they have been unable to avoid either a stagna­tion of production or a rise in unemploy­ment. Other countries, like the US, have dealt with the fall in production better and have put a temporary stop to the rise in unemployment, but at the same time they have suffered a catastrophic trade deficit and the decline of their currency. And these factors only apply to the most developed and powerful countries, which are better equipped to face up to the crisis. The sit­uation of the other countries is desperate: inflation at more than 20 per cent, more and more serious unemployment, insurmount­able foreign debts. We can thus see the to­tal failure of all the economic policies applied by the bourgeoisie, whether neo-­Keynesian or monetarist, inspired by Harvard or the ‘Chicago school'. All they can do is try to console themselves by handing out Nobel prizes to the economists who are the most wrong about everything. The crowning moment of this was when France awarded an economist for his professional failures by making him head of the government. In rea­lity, the only perspective the bourgeoisie can put forward in the face of the crisis is a new imperialist war.

2. The ‘optimistic' sectors of the bourgeoi­sie are obviously trying to exclude the pos­sibility of such a perspective, or to lay the responsibility on the ‘evil warmonger­ing forces'. According to the pacifist viewpoint, an entente between the belliger­ents and even between imperialist blocs is possible and is something which should be striven for. In fact such a viewpoint is a typical expression of petty bourgeois humanism. The greatest objection that can be raised against it is not that it turns its back on reality but that it serves to maintain extremely dangerous illusions in the working class about:

-- the possibility of reforming and harmoni­zing capitalism;

-- the non-necessity of destroying it in order to put an end to the catastrophes it engenders.

Moreover, the idea that there can be a ‘peaceful' capitalism as against a ‘warlike' capitalism is an excellent basis for a war-mobilization of the ‘peaceful' countries against the ‘warlike' ones. At the moment the bourgeoisie is undertaking a major offen­sive on this very basis. This is particul­arly true in the Middle East, where the negotiations between Israel and Egypt are in no way a ‘victory for peace' as the Pope would have it, but simply a strengthening of the American position in preparation for future confrontations with the other bloc. More generally, all the noise about ‘Euro­pean security', ‘the rights of man' and Carter's ‘peace crusades' are simply ideo­logical preparations for such confrontations, as are all Russia's declarations about the need to support ‘socialism', ‘national independence' and ‘anti-imperialism'.

3. A ‘modern' revision of the pacifist con­ception is the one which considers that a generalized confrontation between the imper­ialist powers is no longer possible because of the development of armaments, in particu­lar of thermonuclear weapons which for the first time in history ‘favor the offensive to the detriment of the defensive', so that using them would lead to the destruction of all the bourgeoisies. What has to be said against such a conception is that:

-- it's not new: it was already used about poison gas and air warfare, so that on the eve of 1914 and 1939 ‘the end of wars' was being confidently predicted;

-- it presupposes a ‘rationality' in capita­lism and the ruling class which they don't possess;

-- it is based on the idea that wars are the result of the will of governments and not the necessary product of the contradic­tions of the system;

-- it leads to the possibility of a third alternative beyond war or revolution.

Besides the fact that this idea can serve to demobilize the working class by obscuring the dangers which face humanity in the absence of a proletarian response, it also adds grist to the mill of the whole bour­geois mystification which says "if you want peace, prepare for war!".

4. In fact the experience of over half a century has shown that the only obstacle to the bourgeois solution to the crisis -- imperialist war -- is the class struggle of the proletariat. Although war, because of the sacrifice it imposes on the exploited classes and the traumatic effects it has on the entire social organism, has given rise to revolution, it would be wrong to conclude that there is a parallel or simultaneous movement towards these two alternatives. On the contrary, the one is opposed to the other. It was because the working class was mobilized behind a warlike Social Demo­cracy, and thus ideologically defeated, that the bourgeoisie was able to go to war in 1914. Similarly, the victory of fascism and its alter-ego, the popular fronts, was the necessary precondition for war in 1939. On the other hand, it was class struggle and revolution which put an end to the war in 1917 in Russia and 1918 in Germany. At all times, the dominance of one or the other tendency is the exact reflection of the bal­ance of forces between the two main classes in society: bourgeoisie and proletariat. This is why the perspective for the present crisis is determined by the nature of this balance of forces. The capacity of capita­lism to impose its own solution to the cri­sis is inversely proportional to the capa­city of the working class to resist this and respond to the crisis on its own terrain.

The balance of forces between social classes

5. The present level of class struggle is characterized by a very clear gap between the depth of the economic crisis and the class's response to it. This gap is not an absolute which can be measured in an ideal schema such as: x amount of crisis equals y level of class struggle. It can only be understood in relative terms, by comparing the present level of class struggle with the struggles at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, when the crisis was much less violent than it is today.

Such a comparison can be made both in the quantitative sense -- by looking at the num­ber of struggles, and the qualitative -- by looking at the ability of the class to break out of the containment of the unions and reject capitalist mystifications. It is necessary to consider both these levels because there is no mechanical link between combativity and class consciousness, but at the same time the number of struggles is something which represents a certain level of consciousness, or which can favor the development of consciousness.

On the ‘quantitative' level, the comparison shows that for several years and particular­ly in 1977 there has been a marked diminu­tion in the number of strikes and in the number of workers involved. This could be shown by referring to a number of countries but it is particularly significant in France between 1968 and today and Italy between 1969 and today.

On the ‘qualitative' level, the comparison between the ‘rampant May' in Italy, which saw an explicit rejection of the unions by a large number of workers, and the present situation in Italy, where the unions control the workers to the point where they can drag them out on demonstrations against ‘extremists' -- such a comparison speaks for itself. A similar, though more recent evo­lution, has taken place in Spain. After a period of intense struggle in which the class developed forms of struggle like the assemblies which often went beyond the unofficial unions, and which showed tendencies towards generalization on the level of cit­ies and regions, there has been a much calm­er period in which the signing of an auster­ity pact has not provoked any major reac­tions, and in which the only major mobiliza­tions have taken place around mystifying themes like national autonomy. This has even happened in regions which had hitherto only been slightly affected by this virus.

6. At the moment the only countries which are going through major struggles are those in the peripheral zones of capitalism, under­developed or half-developed countries in Latin America (Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia), the Middle East and North Africa (Tunisia, Algeria). These struggles confirm the fact that, contrary to the theories which claim that these countries have to go through a phase of capitalist development so that a working class can emerge, these countries already have a proletariat capable of fight­ing for its own class interests -- in some cases to the point where the class has partially held back the threat of war on the local level. But the very fact that we have to look for important class struggles in the very places where the class is the least concentrated is a striking illustration of the fact that globally speaking, the class struggle is in reflux at the present time.

7. When it comes to explaining this gap bet­ween the level of the crisis and the level of the class struggle, certain currents like the FOR (Fomento Obrero Revolucionario), have a ready interpretation. For them, the crisis, insecurity, unemployment, weigh down on the combativity and consciousness of the working class, paralyzing it more and more and throwing it into the arms of the politi­cal forces of the bourgeoisie. In this con­ception there can only be a revolution against the system when it is functioning ‘normally', outside periods of crisis. This analysis can be refuted by pointing out that:

-- the crisis is not an ‘anomaly' in the func­tioning of capitalism; on the contrary, it is the truest and most significant expres­sion of its normal functioning; this was already the case in the ascendant phase and is all the more true in the epoch of deca­dence;

-- if you say that the working class only revolts when ‘things are going well' you are rejecting the historic vision of socia­lism as an objective necessity; either you go back to Bernstein and deny that there is any relationship between the collapse of the system and the revolutionary struggle, or you have to look for other factors that can provoke the struggle, such as a consciousness which is the fruit of education, or a ‘moral' revolt;

-- the whole history of the workers' move­ment teaches us that revolutions only come after crises (1848) or wars (1871, 1905, 1917) which are acute expressions of the crisis of society.

It is true that in certain historical cir­cumstances, the crisis has served to aggra­vate the demoralization and ideological sub­jection of the class (as in the 1930s) but this was at a time when the class was already defeated; the difficulties it encountered made things worse rather than radicalizing its struggle. It may also be true that cer­tain manifestations of the crisis, like unemployment, can momentarily disorientate the workers, but here again history teaches us that unemployment is also one of the most powerful stimuli to the class becoming aware of the bankruptcy of the system and revolting against it.

In the final analysis, not only is this con­ception false and incapable of dealing with historical reality; it also leads to the demoralization of the class, to the extent that it leads logically to the idea that:

-- the class must patiently wait for the system to get out of the crisis before it can struggle successfully;

-- during this time it must moderate its struggles, which can only end in defeat.

With this conception you are led (and what is worse, you end up saying this to the class) to renounce the revolution at the very moment when it's possible. You thus give up any revolutionary perspective.

8. In order to account for periods of reflux in the proletarian struggle, and thus for a gap between the crisis and the class struggle, marxism has already pointed to the uneven, jagged course of the class movement, which is different from that of the bourgeoisie. This is explained by the fact that the proletariat is the first revolut­ionary class in history which has no econo­mic power in the old society, no base upon which to found its future political rule. Its only strength is its organization and its consciousness, which are developed through struggle and are constantly threatened by the vicissitudes of the struggle and the enormous pressure exerted by bourgeois soc­iety as a whole. These characteristics explain the convulsive and explosive nature of proletarian struggle, whereas the develop­ment of the crisis has a much more even and progressive course.

The class struggle had the same characteris­tics last century but they are even more true in the period of decadence when the class has lost its mass organs, parties and trade unions. And this phenomenon was further amplified by the counter-revolution which followed the 1917-23 revolutionary wave and which led to the near total disappear­ance of the political organizations of the class and the loss of a whole arsenal of experience formerly passed down from one generation to the next.

These general and historic causes of the jagged course of the struggle must be supplemented by the particular conditions of the proletarian revival at the end of the 1960s if we are to understand the present characteristics of the class struggle.

The beginnings of the movement in 1968-72 were marked by a very powerful proletarian offen­sive which was a great surprise when one considers that the crisis was only just mak­ing itself felt, but which can be explained by:

-- the lack of preparation on the part of the bourgeoisie, which after decades of social calm had begun to believe that the revolt of the working class was a mere fairy tale;

-- the impetuosity of new generations of wor­kers who were entering into struggle with­out having been crushed like the previous generation.

We then saw a ‘coming to consciousness' and a counter-offensive of the bourgeoisie; this was helped by:

-- the slow development of the crisis; the deepening of the crisis did not immediately support or nourish the first wave of strug­gles, so that governments were able to con­vince workers that the ‘end of the tunnel' was in sight;

-- the youth and inexperience of the workers who participated in this wave of struggles and whose demands were vulnerable to fluctu­ations and the mystifications of the bour­geoisie.

For all these reasons, the sharp aggravation of the crisis in 1974, which expressed it­self essentially in the growth of unemploy­ment, did not immediately provoke a response from the class. On the contrary, to the extent that it hit the class when the prev­ious wave was on the decline, it tended to momentarily engender a greater disarray and apathy.

9. The counter-offensive of the bourgeoisie began to reveal itself clearly straight after the first movements of the class; its spearhead was the left factions of capital, those who have the greatest credibility among the workers. It consisted in putting forward a ‘left' or ‘democratic' alternative, the aim of which was to channel workers' dis­content into the struggle against ‘reaction', the ‘monopolies', ‘corruption' or ‘fascism'. Thus in a number of countries, especially those in which the class had been particu­larly combative, we saw the erecting of a mystification which attempted to prove:

-- that it doesn't pay to struggle;

-- that there must be a ‘change' if we are going to deal with the crisis.

This ‘change' took different forms in dif­ferent countries:

-- in Britain, the Labor Party came to power after the big strikes of 1972-3;

-- in Italy, there was the ‘historic compro­mise', destined to ‘moralize' political life when the PCI enters the government;

-- in Spain, the ‘democratic break' with the Francoist regime;

-- in Portugal, first ‘democracy', then ‘popular power';

-- in France, the Programme Commun and the Union of the Left which is going to put an end to twenty years of the ‘policies of big capital'.

In this work of mobilizing the working class behind capitalist objectives and thus of breaking the struggles of the class, the official left (communist and socialist part­ies) has been served faithfully by the lef­tist currents, who came along to provide a ‘radical' apology for the policies of the left (especially in Italy and Spain), when they themselves were not directly doing the same job.

10. After the first stage in the mobiliza­tion of the working class behind illusory objectives, the offensive of the bourgeoisie went on to a second stage which provoked demoralization and apathy among the workers

-- either because the illusory objective was obtained, or because there was a failure to attain it.

In the first case, the bourgeoisie pushed on with its mystifications by discouraging any struggle which might threaten to ‘com­promise' or ‘sabotage' the objective that had at last been attained:

-- in Spain, the workers must not ‘play the fascists' game', they must not do anything which might weaken this ‘young democracy' and bring back the hated old regime;

-- in Britain, the workers must not create problems for the Labor government, since this might allow the Tories back in and this would be ‘much worse'.

In the second case, the apathy of the class results from the failure of the objective put forward; the workers feel this as a def­eat, and this leads at first to disenchant­ment and demoralization. This demoraliza­tion is all the more intense because, con­trary to defeats encountered during real proletarian struggles, which serve as an apprenticeship in forging the unity and consciousness of the class, defeats on an alien class terrain (the real defeat being to have been led there in the first place) lead above all to a feeling of disarray and powerlessness, not to a determination to take up the struggle again. The clearest examples of this are probably Portugal and France. In Portugal the 25 November 1975 shattered the hopes of ‘popular power' which had been derailing workers' struggles for over a year; in France the split in the Union of the Left has put an end to five years of the Programme Commun, which from one election to the next has succeeded in almost totally anaesthetizing the combati­vity of the workers.

11. The fact that the class is plunged into apathy and disarray due to the failure to attain objectives for which it was mobilized, doesn't mean that the whole scenario had been planned by the different forces of the bourgeoisie in a deliberate and machiavell­ian way. In fact, although it leaves the proletariat in a demoralized state for a while, the failure of the bourgeoisie to attain its objectives runs the risk of lea­ding to ‘uncontrolled' workers' upsurges, since without reaching these objectives it becomes difficult to keep the class contained within capitalist institutions, especi­ally in the unions. And the bourgeoisie has no interest in such upsurges taking place because they are valuable experiences for the proletarian struggle. In fact, this failure to gain objectives which succeeds in demobilizing the class struggle is basi­cally the result of conflicts between diff­erent sectors of the ruling class, whether they arise over problems of internal poli­cies (vis-a-vis the middle strata, the pace towards state capitalism etc) or of foreign policy (more or less integration into the dominating bloc).

In Portugal, the elimination of the Carvalho faction, following that of the Goncalves faction, was the result both of resistance to the state capitalist measures advocated by these factions, and of the need to remain loyal to the US bloc, the Socialist Party being the most dynamic and effective expres­sion of this need.

In France, the origins of the SP/CP split reside in important differences over state capitalist measures (role of nationalizat­ions etc) and, even more, over foreign policy (degree of integration into the US bloc).

But in both cases, these aspects of bour­geois policy have been uppermost to the ex­tent that the class struggle is not in the forefront of the bourgeoisie's preoccupa­tions. Paradoxically, it is the success of ‘popular power' and the Programme Commun as methods of derailing the class struggle which have made them dispensable as government policies.

For the moment then, whether or not the per­spectives put forward have been realized, the counter-offensive of the bourgeoisie has borne fruit everywhere, almost totally silencing the class's response to the deep­ening crisis; this has left the bourgeoisie free to get on with its own policies of strengthening the state and developing the war economy.

The strengthening of the state

12. The strengthening of the capitalist state has been a continual process since the system entered its decadent phase. It operates in all spheres -- economic, politi­cal, social -- through the growing absorption of civil society into the Leviathan state. This process accelerates during periods of open crisis such as wars and the economic disintegration which follows reconstruction periods, as is happening now. But the most striking thing in recent months is the strengthening of the state's role as guard­ian of the social order, as the gendarme of the class struggle. This is how we must interpret the police and ideological appara­tus set up by the German government and its European partners after the Baader affair. We seem here to be dealing with a paradox:

-- on the one hand we are saying that the strengthening of the state has been made possible by the weakening of the class struggle;

-- on the other hand we say that the state is strengthening itself in order to face up to the class struggle.

Should we conclude that the state streng­thens itself at the same time as the class struggle? Or that its strength is inversely proportional to the class struggle?

In order to answer these questions we have to consider all the means which make up the strength of the state as the guardian of social order (ie excluding its economic role). These means are:

-- repressive

-- juridical

-- political

-- ideological

It is clear that these means can't be sepa­rated arbitrarily -- they interpenetrate each other and make up the super-structural tissue of society. But we have to look at their specificity if we are to understand how they are used by the class enemy. In fact, as the class struggle develops, the ‘technical' means of state power tend to get stronger:

-- better armed and more numerous forces of repression;

-- police measures;

-- juridical arsenal.

But at the same time, political and ideo­logical means tend to weaken:

-- to be seen in the political crisis of the bourgeoisie (‘the rulers can't go on ruling in the old way');

-- the working class breaks ideologically from the grip of the bourgeoisie (‘those at the bottom don't want to go on living in the old way').

The insurrection is the culminating point in this process when the state loses its grip on all these methods of control and can only confront the class struggle with its repressive forces -- which are them­selves partially paralyzed by the ideological decomposition in their ranks.

When we examine the strength of the state, we have to distinguish these formal aspects, which go in the same direction as the class struggle, from its real strength, which proceeds in the opposite direction.

13. The recent events around the Baader affair show a strengthening of the state on all levels, not only formal but real.

With regard to the technical means of repres­sion, these have been spectacularly streng­thened in recent months: special intervention squads of the German state, systematization of control at the frontier, massive police searches, close co-operation between differ­ent police forces, proposal for a ‘European judiciary area', etc.

On the political level, the German bourgeoi­sie has set an example to its European henchmen by setting up a ‘crisis general staff' grouping together rival political forces who have been able to overcome their differences in the face of ‘danger'.

But it is on the ideological level that the capitalist offensive has been most important. Taking advantage of a favorable balance of forces, the bourgeoisie has organized a whole campaign around terrorism aimed at:

-- justifying the police and judicial mea­sures;

-- getting public opinion used to seeing more and more state violence against the violence of the ‘terrorists';

-- replacing the old mystification ‘democracy vs fascism', which is a bit faded, with a new one, ‘democracy vs terrorism'.

14. In this offensive aimed at strengthening the police and ideological grip of the state, the bourgeoisie has made full use of the pretext supplied by the desperate behavior of elements of the decomposing petty bour­geoisie, vestiges of the student movement of the mid-sixties. But this does not mean that the cause of the strengthening of the state is the activity of a handful of terror­ists, or even that this wouldn't have taken place anyway without the terrorists. In fact the bourgeoisie is deploying its arsenal today essentially as a preventive measure against the working class, not against the gnat-like figures of the terrorists. And it is not by chance that it is the German bourgeoisie, particularly its Social Demo­cratic party, which stands at the head of the offensive:

-- Germany, both from the economic and geo­graphical point of view, occupies a key pos­ition in the evolution of the class struggle in the future;

-- until recently relatively spared by the crisis, Germany has now entered into econo­mic convulsions, particularly in the form of unemployment;

-- the SPD has an incomparable experience in repressing the working class; it played the role of ‘bloodhound' against the workers' insurrections after World War I and provoked the assassinations of the ‘terrorists' Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.

The essential lessons of the Baader affair are:

-- even before the working class, with the exception of a small minority, has under­stood the inevitability of violent class conflicts with the bourgeoisie, the latter has already set up a whole arsenal to deal with them;

-- the Social Democratic parties of Western Europe are a vital weapon in this arsenal despite, or rather because of their ‘huma­nist' and ‘socialist' language;

-- contrary to what happened in the ascendant epoch, ‘democratic' language today only serves to conceal a systematic state terror which only uses ‘democratic guarantees' when it is convenient;

-- in its deadly struggle against the work­ing class, capital is prepared to use any means whatsoever, even the most terrifying;

-- the period in which the ‘right to asylum' had any meaning is over; henceforward all capitalist nations, including the most ‘liberal', will make up an immense ‘planet without visa' for elements of the class driven out of their country.

The strengthening of the war economy

15. The war economy is not a new phenomenon: it has imposed itself on capitalism since the system entered its decadent phase, marked by the cycle of crisis, war, reconstruction, new crisis, etc. War is the culminating point in the crisis of society, and thus it's most significant expression, since it shows that capitalism can no longer survive except through successive rounds of self-destruc­tion. Because of this, the whole of social life, especially its economic infrastruc­ture, is dominated by war -- either the effects of one war or the preparation for the next. Thus the phenomenon of the war economy appeared in a generalized way in 1914, when we saw the mobilization of all the resources of the nation towards the production of arms, under the aegis of the state. After 1918, however, there was a certain reflux in this phenomenon: this was connected, on the one hand, to the social convulsions of the period, which pushed inter-imperialist rivalries into second place; and on the other hand, to the illusions of the bourgeoisie which believed in its own propaganda about a return to the ‘good old days'. But the phenomenon appea­red with even greater intensity than before during the 1930s, following the new round of acute crisis. It took on different poli­tical forms (fascism, Nazism, the New Deal, Popular Front, Plan de Man) but they were all orientated towards preparations for imperialist war and were all accompanied by the state exerting a more and more totalit­arian grip on the whole of social life. The phenomenon obviously reached its peak during World War II, but afterwards, in contrast to what happened after World War I, it did not take a significant step backwards. Even before the Axis was crushed, fierce inter-imperialist rivalries appeared within the victor's camp, culminating in the ‘cold war'. Ever since, the production of armaments on a massive scale has continued.

16. The permanent existence of a war econo­my should not be interpreted as a ‘solution' to the contradictions of capital, a radical change in the goals of production. This remains the production of surplus value and, contrary to certain tendencies, some of them in the workers' movement, for whom the war economy is an economic policy in itself, capable of leading the system out of crises and into a new era of growth and prosperity free of the danger of imperialist war, this kind of economy has no meaning outside of the direct preparation for war. It doesn't allow the system to avoid any of its economic impasses. It is true that arms production (and unproductive expendi­ture in general) have at certain moments in history allowed for a renewal of economic activity (for example, the policies of Hitler and Roosevelt); but this was only possible because of:

-- a considerable increase in the exploita­tion of the working class;

-- massive state debts; the state had to re­imburse the debts it had accrued, and a new war was one method (among others) of doing this, by making the conquered states pay.

In this sense, not only is the war economy no solution for the crisis or a way of avoiding war: it aggravates the economic situation and further strengthens the nec­essity of war. Thus, the fact that the war economy has continued since 1945 leaves capitalism today a narrower margin of maneuver than it had in 1929 in dealing with the crisis. In 1929, the relatively light burden of the war economy and the financial reserves of the states after the period of reconstruction made it possible for a temp­orary recovery to take place. Today on the other hand, after thirty years in which the war economy (not to mention wars themselves) has continued to play an immense role, such a policy can't have the same beneficial results, even though the war economy did make it possible to prolong the reconstruc­tion period to 1965; today all states are already deeply in debt. In particular, the fact that inflation has continued in an endemic manner since World War II as the result of these unproductive expenditures, and has taken on a violent form since the re-emergence of the open crisis, is a stri­king confirmation that the crisis of capi­talism today is expressing itself as a cri­sis of the war economy.

17. But the fact that the war economy has itself become a factor aggravating the cri­sis won't stop each state reinforcing it more and more; this is particularly true on the level of the bloc. Since the crisis of capitalism can only lead to war, each bloc has to prepare itself for war at all levels; in particular it has to subordinate the economy to the needs of arms production, which demands:

-- a greater and more totalitarian control of the productive apparatus by the state;

-- massive reduction in the consumption of all classes and social categories;

-- massive increase in the exploitation of the class which produces the bulk of social wealth-- the proletariat.

Here the present reflux in the class struggle has allowed capital to mount a new offen­sive against the proletariat's living stan­dards; this corresponds to the attempt of each national capital to improve its posi­tion on the world market but also to a new strengthening of the war economy and thus an acceleration of the course towards war.

Towards imperialist war or class war?

18. The present balance of forces in favor of the bourgeoisie and the resulting accel­eration of the course towards war could lead to the idea that this course has become domi­nant and that there are no major obstacles to the ruling class unleashing another round of imperialist carnage. In other words, the proletariat is already defeated and unable to prevent the free play of capital's forces. In such an analysis we are already on the eve of 1914 or 1939. Is this in fact the case? Is the proletariat today subordinated to capital to the same degree that it was in 1914 and 1939?

In 1914, despite the influence of Social Democracy on the workers, its electoral successes, the power of its unions -- things which were the pride of its leaders and many of its members -- and in fact because of all this, the working class was defeated, not physically, but ideologically. Opportunism had already done its work: the belief in a gradual movement towards socialism, and in a constant improvement of workers' living standards, the abandonment of any perspec­tive of a violent confrontation with the capitalist state, adherence to the ideals of bourgeois democracy, to the idea of a con­vergence of interest between the workers and their own bourgeoisie (for example, in colonial policy), etc. Despite the resistance of the left, this degeneration affec­ted the whole of Social Democracy, which had become an agent for containing the working class in the interests of capital, by obstructing its struggles, leading them into an impasse, and finally by spearhead­ing the chauvinist war hysteria. And des­pite local examples of workers' combativity like in Russia in 1913, despite the fact that certain socialist parties remained on a class terrain (as in Serbia etc), in an overall sense the working class was defeated, particularly in the most important countries` like Germany, France, Britain and Belgium, where the different expressions of opportun­ism (Bernstein's revisionism and Kautsky's ‘orthodox' reformism, Millerand's ‘minist­erialism', and the pacifist humanism of Jaures, trade unionism, Vandervelde's reformism) had completely demobilized the class and tied it hand and foot to the bourgeoisie. In the final analysis, and contrary to appearance, it wasn't the out­break of war in August 1914 which led to the collapse of the IInd International, but the opportunist degeneration of the workers' movement which made it possible for war to break out; this simply brought to light and completed a process which had been underway for a long time.

In 1939, when World War II broke out, the working class was in a much deeper state of distress than it had been in 1914. It was both ideologically and physically beaten. Following the great post-war revolutionary wave, the bourgeoisie waged a massive counter attack which lasted two decades and which consisted of three stages:

-- exhaustion of the revolutionary wave through a series of defeats in different countries, defeat of the Communist Left and its expulsion from the degenerating CI, construction of ‘socialism in one country' (ie state capitalism) in the USSR;

-- liquidation of social convulsions in the decisive centre of world events -- Germany -- through the physical crushing of the prole­tariat and the establishment of the Hitler regime; simultaneous with the definitive death of the CI and the bankruptcy of Trotsky's Left Opposition, which ended up in manoeuvrism and adventurism;

-- total derailment of the workers' movement in the ‘democratic' countries under the guise of ‘defending democracy' and ‘anti-fascism';

-- a new envelope for national defense. At the same time the complete integration of the CPs into the political apparatus of their national capitals and of the USSR into an imperialist bloc; liquidation of many revolutionary and left communist groups who were caught up in the cogs of capital, through the ideology of anti-fascism (parti­cularly during the war in Spain) and the ‘defense of the USSR', or who simply disappeared.

On the eve of the war, the working class was either completely subordinated to Sta­linist and Hitlerite terror, or derailed by anti-fascism; the rare communist groups who attempted to express a real political life were in a state of total isolation, a few unimportant islands in quantitative terms; Much less than in 1914 could there be any resistance to the unleashing of a second round of imperialist butchery.

19. Today many illusions still exist in the working class, especially electoral ones; there is still a certain trust in the ‘wor­kers' parties' (CPs, SPs); but this doesn't mean that the class has already been defeat­ed, either physically or ideologically.

Certainly, it has gone through physical de­feats as in Chile in 1973, but only in the peripheral zones of capitalism. On the ideological level, the present influence of the left parties can't be compared to the influence of social democracy in 1914 nor to that of the left in the 1930s; they have been working for capitalism for too long, they've participated too much in capitalist governments to be able to maintain the same illusions and enthusiasms among the workers. Moreover, the ‘anti-fascist' ideology has been largely used up already and its present-day variants like ‘anti-terrorism', despite their success right now, don't have the same potential. The Baader-Meinhof gang isn't going to provoke the same fear as Hitler's SS. War ideology, the need to deal with the ‘hereditary enemy' isn't deeply implan­ted today; it is extremely difficult to mobilize the young generation of workers behind such a cause (for example, the decom­position of US forces in Vietnam in the early seventies).

Globally, the conditions for beginning a new imperialist war are much less favorable to the bourgeoisie than in 1939 or even in 1914. And even if they were comparable to the conditions of 1914, we can still say that this wouldn't be enough for the bour­geoisie -- which is capable of drawing les­sons from history -- to unleash a war which might lead to another 1917. The long prep­arations for World War II, the systematic crushing of the class before it was unlea­shed, shows that after the experience of 1917, which made the bourgeoisie concerned for its very survival, the bourgeoisie would henceforward only begin a generalized war when it was absolutely certain that there was no chance of a working class reaction.

Today the bourgeoisie could only be sure of this after physically and ideologically crushing the proletariat. The perspective therefore remains not imperialist war but class war as the ICC has been arguing since the first class confrontations at the end of the 1960s.

20. So despite the present reflux, the historic perspective still points to a confron­tation between the classes; we must there­fore be ready for a new upsurge of proleta­rian struggle. And although it is impossible to predict the exact moment this upsurge will take place, we can still define some of its conditions and characteristics. The major precondition for a revival of class struggle is the class abandoning a good part of its illusions in the ‘solutions' put forward by the left of capital. This process already seems to be underway: either because the left, in power is getting more and more dis­credited, or because the failure of the perspectives put forward by the left is leading to a certain disenchantment with them. As we have seen, the loss of illusions does not necessarily allow the workers to regain their combativity straight away; in general, it causes a certain apathy. It is also not out of the question that the lost illusions will be replaced by new ones, especially by the more ‘left' factions of the bourgeoisie. This is why it would be imprudent to predict an immediate, general upsurge of struggles. However, these new illusions or the demoral­ization of the class won't be able to stand up to the inexorable advance of the crisis, to the aggravation of the proletariat's suf­fering, and to the growing discontent of the class that this will provoke. In particular, the persistent and massive extension of unem­ployment will give the lie to all the babblings about the ‘new' and ‘effective' ways of solving the crisis. Sooner or later, it is this economic pressure itself which will once again force the workers to struggle. And though it's difficult to establish what level of crisis will produce a new cycle of class struggle, it is possible to say that the next cycle -- and this is one of the criteria which will make it possible to recognize it and avoid confusing it with mere outbursts with no future -- will have to go beyond the last cycle, especially in the following two spheres: the autonomy of the struggle and the recognition of their international character. These are important because the way the bourgeoisie has kept things under control up till now is through the unions and the mystification of ‘defend­ing the national economy'. The next upsurge will therefore have to be characterized by:

-- a much clearer break from the unions than in the past, and the corollary to this: the tendency towards a higher level of self-organization (sovereign general assemblies, elected and revocable strike committees, co­ordination of these organs between the enter­prises of a whole town or region etc)

-- a greater awareness of the international character of the struggle, which could express itself in practice through movements of international solidarity, the sending of delegations of workers in struggle (not union delegations) from one country to another ...

To sum up, the situation today is like the eve of a battle which could go on for quite a time, which could be interrupted by violent but short-lived outbursts, and during which a whole subterranean process of maturation is going on -- the accumulation of a whole series of tensions and stresses which will inevitably explode into new, formidable class battles. These battles will probably not constitute the decisive revolutionary confrontation (and we will have to go through further bourgeois counter-attacks and new periods of temporary reflux); but compared to them the struggles in the late sixties and early seventies will seem like mere skirmishes.

ICC January 1978

Life of the ICC: 

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Marxism and crisis theory

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This text is not an attempt to deal with all the problems of the Marxist theory of crisis. It is aimed simply at providing a framework to the debate now opening up in the inter­national revolutionary movement; it does not claim to be an ‘objective' view of the debate, to the extent that it is committed to a particular interpretation of the origins of capitalist decadence, but it will hopefully be able to lay down certain guide­lines which will allow the discussion to proceed in a constructive manner.

The context of the debate

In a general sense, the renewal of discussion about the crisis of capitalism is a response to the material reality which has been with us since the end of the 1960s: the irrefut­able descent of the world capitalist system into a condition of chronic economic crisis. The warning signs of the mid-sixties, which took the form of a dislocation of the inter­national monetary system, have been superseded by the symptoms of acute distress affecting the very heart of capitalist prod­uction: unemployment, inflation, falling rates of profit, slow-down in output and trade. Not one country in the world -- including the so-called ‘socialist' regimes -- has escaped the deadly effects of this crisis.

During the 1950s and 1960s, many elements in the tiny revolutionary movement which managed to maintain a precarious existence through those long years of class quiet and economic growth were dazzled by the apparent ‘success' of the capitalist economy in the post-war period. Socialisme ou Barbarie, the Situationist International and others took this phase of relative prosperity at face value and declared that capitalism had resolved its economic contradictions, so that the preconditions for a revolutionary upheaval could no longer be sought in the objective limitations of the system, but purely and simply in the subjective ‘refusal' of the exploited class. The very premises of Marxism were called into question, and those groups who went on insisting that the capitalist system could not and would not escape a new round of open economic crisis were brusquely dismissed as ‘relics' of the outmoded communist left, vainly clinging to a fossilized Marxist orthodoxy.

Nevertheless a few small currents, descend­ants of the communist left, such as Internationalisme in France in the 1940s and 1950s, Mattick in the USA, Internacionalismo in Venezuela in the 1960s, doggedly stuck to their guns. They saw that the post-war boom was exactly that -- a product of the cycle of crisis, war, and reconstruction which charact­erizes capitalism in its epoch of decay. They identified the tremors of the mid-sixties as the first shocks of a new economic earth­quake, and they understood that the resurg­ence of workers' struggles after 1968 was not the simple expression of ‘order-takers' refusing to take any more orders, but the first response of the proletariat to the economic crisis and the deterioration of its living standards. A few years after 1968 it became impossible to deny that there was indeed a new world-wide economic crisis. The debates that took place after that were not, therefore, about whether or not there was a crisis, but about what this new crisis meant: was it, as some maintained, a purely temporary disequilibrium, a product of the need for a ‘restructuration' of the prod­uctive apparatus, of oil price rises, or of workers' wage demands -- or was it, as the direct precursors of the ICC argued, an expression of the irreversible, historic decline of capitalism, a new outbreak of capital's death agony which could only lead to world war or world revolution?

The inexorable deepening of the crisis, the recognition by the bourgeoisie itself that this is no mere temporary fluctuation, but something deeper and more disturbing, has settled this debate for the most advanced elements in the revolutionary movement. A process of decantation has taken place in which currents that attempted to deny that today's crisis is an expression of the decadence of capitalism have fallen by the wayside. For example, groups like the GLAT (Groupe de Liason pour L'Action des Travailleurs) in France, which has drifted into the most refined form of academicism, though not before quietly abandoning the idea that the crisis is caused by the class struggle.

Today the debate is no longer about whether the crisis is a sign of the decadence of capitalism. It is about the economic found­ations of decadence itself; and in this sense is already an expression of a whole process of clarification that has been going on over the last few years. The very fact that the debate is being approached at this level is the product of real progress in the revolutionary movement.

The importance of the debate

The understanding that capitalism is a decadent social system is absolutely crucial to any revolutionary practice today. The impossibility of reforms and of national liberation, the integration of the unions into the state, the meaning of state capit­alism, the perspective facing the working class today -- none of these fundamental points can be understood without locating them in the context of the historic period in which we are living. But while no coherent revolutionary group can do without the concept of decadence, the immediate importance of the debate about the economic foundations of decadence is less clear. We will try to deal with this question during the course of this text, but for the moment we want to deal with some of the mistakes that can be made here. Broadly speaking, it is possible to fall into three errors:

a. Denying the relevance of the question as being ‘academic' or ‘abstract'. One example of this can be seen in the old Workers' Voice group in Liverpool, which regrouped with Revolutionary Perspectives to form the Communist Workers' Organization (CWO) in 1975 and split away again a year later. One of the weaknesses of this group -- though not the most important in itself -- was its lack of concern with or understanding of the problem of decadence, beyond a vague affirm­ation that capitalism was in decline. This laid the group open to dangerous confusions; while still in the CWO, various elements in Liverpool began to develop a completely un-­materialist, moralistic view of the class struggle, while others quickly succumbed to illusions about the significance of local sectional strikes. In general, such attitudes of contempt for theory go hand in hand with an activist approach to political work.

b. Exaggerating the importance of the debate. At present this is a danger facing many groups in the communist movement, so we will deal with it at somewhat greater length. An example of this error is tile CWO, who not only considers that the tendency for the rate of profit to fall is the only explanation for capitalist decadence, but also relate all the alleged political errors of other groups to the fact that they explain decad­ence in a different way. For example, they consider that the activism of Pour Une Intervention Communiste(PIC) is a direct result of its ‘Luxemburgist' analysis (see ‘Text for the meeting of CWO and PIC' in Revolutionary Perspectives, no. 8), while as for the ICC, a whole host of its polit­ical shortcomings -- from its analysis of and relationship to the left to its errors on the transition period -- are the result of its defense of Luxemburg's theory of the crisis. Since political conclusions are seen to directly flow not merely from the concept of decadence, but the economic explanations for it, the CWO has developed the position that it is virtually impossible to regroup with organizations that analyze decadence in a different way. At the same time, an enormous emphasis is given in the work of the CWO to writing about ‘economics' to the detriment of other areas of concern for revolutionaries.

A similar tendency can be found in certain discussion circles emerging in different parts of the world, particularly in Scand­inavia. For many of these comrades, regular political activity and organization is impossible until one has a total grasp of the entire scope of Marx's critique of political economy. Since this is impossible, political activity is postponed indefinitely in favor of Capital study sessions or keep­ing up with the latest productions of the academic ‘Marxism' which is nourished by the universities of Scandinavia, Germany and elsewhere.

The perspective held by the comrades who over-emphasize the significance of economic analysis is based on a faulty understanding of what Marxism actually is. Marxism is not a new system of ‘economics' but a critique of bourgeois political economy from the standpoint of the working class. In the last analysis, it is this class viewpoint which makes it possible to have a clear grasp of the economic processes of capital­ism -- and not the other way round. To think that either political clarity and a proletarian class viewpoint can be derived from an abstract and contemplative study of ‘economics', or that it is possible to separate the Marxist critique of political economy from a partisan world view, is to abandon the fundamental premise of Marxism that being precedes consciousness and that collective class interests determine one's view of economy and society. It is to fall into an idealist caricature of Marxism as a pure ‘science' or academic discipline which exists in an area of abstraction far removed from the sordid, vulgar world of politics and the class struggle.

Just as Marx's critique of bourgeois polit­ical economy uncovered the fact that bourg­eois economic theories were, in the end, an apologia for the class interests of the bourgeoisie, so Marx's critique was ail expression of the class interests of the proletariat. The understanding of capital's imminent tendency towards collapse which appears in Capital and other works is an elaboration of the practical consciousness which flows from the historic being of the proletariat as the last exploited class in history, the bearer of a higher, classless mode of production. Only from the stand­point of this class can the transitory nat­ure of capitalism, and communism as the resolution of capital's contradictions, be grasped. Hence the proletariat preceded and produced Marx; and the general insights of the Communist Manifesto, with its ‘vulgar' political positions and polemics, preceded and laid the ground for the more developed reflections of Capital. And Capital itself, "this economic shit" as Marx called it, was seen as only the first part of a magnum opus which would deal with every aspect of social and political life under capitalism. Those who think that you must first understand every dot and comma of Capital before being able to understand or actively defend proletarian class positions are turning Marx­ism and history on their heads.

In Marx, there is no distinction between ‘political' and ‘economic' analyses, the one is a partisan, practical approach to the world, the other an ‘objective', ‘scien­tific' approach which can be applied by anyone -- leftist guru or academic pro­fessor -- who is clever enough to read thr­ough the volumes of Capital. This was the conception Kautsky and other theoreticians of the IInd International had of Marxism -- a neutral science developed by bourgeois intellectuals and brought to the proletariat ‘from outside'. For Marx, however, communist theory is an expression of the proletarian movement itself:

"Just as the economists are the scient­ific representatives of the bourgeoisie, so the socialist and communist are the theorists of the proletariat." (Poverty of Philosophy)

Capital, like all Marx's work, is the militant, polemical product of a communist, a fighter in the proletarian movement. It can be understood only as a weapon in the arsenal of working class struggle, a con­tribution to the self-clarification and self-emancipation of the class. How could Marx, who criticized radical bourgeois philosophy, like all philosophy, for merely interpreting the world, produce any other kind of work?

For Marx, the study of political economy was necessary to give a firmer basis, a more coherent framework to the political persp­ectives which derived from the struggles and experience of the working class. It was never seen as an alternative to political activity (indeed Marx was constantly break­ing off his studies to help organize the International), or as the unique fountain­head of revolutionary positions; it could not take the place of that which gave it its real substance: the historic consciousness of the proletariat.

Just as political clarity is based prim­arily on an ability to assimilate the con­tent of working class experience, so polit­ical confusions mainly express an inability to do so, or the actual intrusion of bour­geois ideology. Thus, the confusions of a Bernstein about the possibility of capit­alism surmounting its crises were not simply the result of Bernstein's inability to understand how the law of value worked; it reflected the growing ideological subordin­ation of Social Democracy to the interests of capital. And the revolutionary critique of reformism developed by Luxemburg and others was not based on the fact that the revolutionaries were ‘better at economics' than the reformists, but on their ability to maintain a proletarian class perspective against the encroachments of capitalist ideology.

c. Closely linked to the second error is the idea that the debate on economics either has been or will be finally resolved. This again implies that the economic processes of capitalism can all be understood prov­iding one is intelligent or scientific enough or devotes enough time to them. In fact, beyond certain fundamental ideas, particularly those which flow directly from the nature and experience of the proletariat, such as the reality of exploitation, the inevitability of crisis, the concrete sig­nificance of decadence, many of the ‘econ­omic' problems of Marxism can never be decisively settled, precisely because they do not all stand and fall by the actual experience of the class in struggle. This applies to the question about the driving force behind the decay of capitalism: the future experience of the class will not be enough to determine whether decadence began as a result primarily of the falling rate of profit, or the saturation of the market. This contrasts with other ‘unsettled' quest­ions of today, like the exact nature of the state in the period of transition, which will indeed be resolved in the coming rev­olutionary wave.

This should be enough to confirm that the debate on the actual ‘causes' of decadence cannot be declared closed, but it is also important to point out that Marx himself never elaborated a completed theory about the historic crisis of capitalism, and in fact it would be ahistorical to expect him to have done so, since he could not have grasped all the phenomena of a decaying capitalism in a period when it was still expanding across the globe. Marx put for­ward some general indications, some vital insights, but above all a methodology for approaching the problem. Revolutionaries today must take up this method, but -- precisely because Marxism is not a fixed doctrine but a dynamic analysis of a changing reality -- they cannot do so by laying false claims to an ‘orthodox Marxism' which has long spoken the last word on all aspects of revolutionary theory. In the end, such an attitude can only lead to a distortion of what Marx himself actually said. The CWO, for example, in their attempt to show that an analysis of decadence based on the falling rate of profit is the only Marxist one, have fallen into the trap of branding virtually any concern with the problem of overproduction of'commodities, of the mark­et, as having nothing to do with Marx, and of being a variety of underconsumptionism and other confusions put about by the likes of Sismondi and Malthus. But, as we shall see, the problem of overproduction is central to Marx's theory of crisis. If the debate on decadence is to be a fruitful one, it must abjure sectarian claims to orthodoxy and seek, first of all, to define the general framework in which a Marxist approach to the discussion can be undertaken.

The two crisis theories

There are not 1001 theories of crisis in the Marxist tradition. The decline of capitalism is not the product of capitalist greed, or the ‘triumph of socialism on one sixth of the planet', or of the exhaustion of natural resources. There are basically two explanations for the historic crisis of capitalism in this century, because Marx pointed to two basic contradictions in the process of capitalist accumulation: two contradictions which lay at the root of the cyclical crises of growth capitalism went through in the nineteenth century, and which would, at a given moment, impel the historic decline of capitalism, plunge it into a death crisis which would put the communist revolution on the agenda. These two contradictions are the tendency of the rate of profit to fall, given the inevitab­ility of an ever higher organic composition of capital and the problem of overproduct­ion, capital's innate disease of producing more than its market can absorb. Though he developed a framework in which these two phenomena were intimately linked, Marx never completed his examination of capital­ism, so that, in different writings, more or less emphasis is given to one or the other as the underlying cause of the crisis. In Capital Volume III, Part 3, the falling rate of profit is presented as a fundament­al barrier to accumulation, though the problem of the market is also dealt with here (see below); in his polemic against Ricardo in Theories of Surplus Value Volume II, the overproduction of commodities is seen as "the basic phenomenon in crises" (p.528). It is the unfinished character of this crucial area of Marx's thought -- some­thing, as we have said, determined not merely by Marx's personal inability to finish Capital, but by the limitations of the historic period in which he was living -- which has led to controversy with­in the workers' movement about the economic foundations of capitalism's decline.

The period following the death of Marx and Engels was characterized by relative econ­omic stability in the capitalist metropoles, and the headlong rush of the imperialist powers to annex the remaining unconquered parts of the globe. The question of the specific origins of capitalist crises tended to be pushed into the background by the heated debates between the revolutionaries and the reformists in the IInd International, the latter denying that capitalism had any fundamental barriers to its expansion, the former beginning to understand imperialism as a symptom of the termination of its ascendant phase. At that time, the ‘orthodox' Marxist theory of crisis, as defended by Kautsky and others, tended to concentrate on the problem of the market, but this was not systematized or related to the actual decadence of capital until Rosa Luxemburg published The Accumulation of Capital in 1913. This text remains the most coherent exposition of the thesis that capitalist decadence is, first and foremost, brought on by its inability to continually expand the market. Luxemburg argued that since the entire surplus value of total social capital cannot, by its very nature, be realized within the social relations of capital, capitalism's growth was dependent on its continual conquest of pre-capitalist mark­ets; the relative exhaustion of these markets towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centur­ies, hurl the entire world capitalist syst­em into a new epoch of barbarism and imperialist wars.

World War I brought home the reality of this new epoch, and the understanding that capitalism had entered a new stage, "the epoch of the disintegration and collapse of the entire capitalist world system" (Invitation to the First Congress of the Communist International, January 1919), was an axiom of the whole revolutionary movement of that time; but the CI did not adopt a unanimous position on the specific causes of capital­ism's disintegration. The main theorists of the CI, like Lenin and Bukharin, crit­icized Luxemburg and placed more emphasis on the falling rate of profit, but Lenin in particular was also influenced by the vagaries of Hilferding's theory of conc­entration, which is a kind of blind alley of Marxist thought, and the CI never elab­orated a complete theory of decadence. On the contrary, the CI's analysis of the new epoch was flawed by its inability to see that the entire world capitalist system was decadent, so that there could be no room for bourgeois revolutions or national lib­eration in the colonial regions.

The most coherent revolutionary minorities of that period, and in the period of defeat which followed, the left communists of Germany and Italy, tended to be partisans of Luxemburg's theory of crisis. This tradition links the KAPD, Bilan, Internationalisme, and the ICC today. At the same time, during the 1930s, Paul Mattick of the American Council Communists took up Henryk Grossman's criticisms of Luxemburg and his contention that capitalism's permanent crisis emerges when the organic composition of capital reaches such a magnitude that there is less and less surplus value to fuel the process of accumulation. This basic idea -- though further elaborated on a number of points -- is today defended by revolutionary groups like the CWO, Battaglia Comunista and some of the groups emerging in Scandinavia (though elements in the ICC also hold similar views). It can thus be seen that the debate going on today has real historic roots that go all the way back to Marx.

Marx, the market and the rate of profit

Two basic questions are posed by the debate on the economic foundations of decadence: are the ‘two theories' mutually exclusive; and do they lead to different political conclusions? We will look at the second question later on, but for the moment we have to examine a particular aspect of the first question: the denial by holders of the Mattick theory that Luxemburg's analysis has anything to do with Marx. If this is true, then to talk of a debate between the two positions is somewhat of an exaggeration.

In the last few years, the ‘rate of profit' theory has been taken up by a number of newly emerging revolutionaries, and one reason for this is that, at first sight, explanations based on the falling rate of profit seem to be more in line with what Marx put forward in Capital. Surely Marx was concerned with locating the crisis in ‘production' not ‘circulation'? Isn't it the bourgeoisie who are concerned with the ‘market problem'? Many of the comrades who pose these questions also take up the old war-cry of the ‘epigones' who attacked Luxemburg in 1913: Luxemburg's whole theory is based on a ‘misunderstanding' of Marx's scheme of expanded reproduction in Volume II of Capital. The problem of realization of surplus value posed by Rosa is a non-problem. A particularly virulent variety of this is in the text in Revolutionary Perspectives, no.6, where with their customary sectarian­ism the CWO accuse Luxemburg of totally abandoning Marxism.

The ICC will be answering this text at greater length soon, but for the moment we simply want to show why we consider Luxem­burg's theory to be fully in line with Marx's thought, and why an explanation of decadence based solely on the falling rate of profit obscures some crucial aspects of Marx's analysis. We can best enter this discussion through a quote from the text in RP, no.6, p.11. According to the CWO,

"Marx did not say that there would not be crises caused by temporary disprop­ortionalities between departments... but he did show that the central con­tradiction of the capitalist mode of production, its historical contradict­ion, could not be found in the process of circulation."

This statement entirely misses the point about what Marx had to say about crises. The idea that crises of overproduction are caused by ‘disproportionality' between departments -- that they are not rooted in the underlying social relations of capital but are merely temporary and contingent disruptions between supply and demand -- is precisely the thesis of Say and Ricardo which Marx attacks in Theories of Surplus Value Volume II. According to these bour­geois theorists, capitalist production perpetually creates its own market, so that general overproduction is impossible. In Marx's words:

"The conception...adopted by Ricardo from the tedious Say...that overprod­uction is not possible or at least that no general glut of the market is poss­ible, is based on the proposition that products are exchanged against products, or as Mill puts it, on the ‘meta­physical equilibrium of sellers and buyers', and this led to the conclusion that demand is determined only by prod­uction, or also that demand and supply are identical." (Theories, Volume II, p.493)

Or, as Marx puts it later, the Ricardians explain:

"...overproduction in one field by underproduction in another field... (which) means merely that if product­ion were proportionate, there would be no overproduction." (ibid, p. 532)

Marx denounces this as "a fantasy" and ins­ists that "the theory of the impossibility of general overproduction is essentially apologetic in tendency" (p.527). For Marx, overproduction is not merely a temporary interruption in an otherwise smooth process of accumulation. Such a harmony between supply and demand is, perhaps, theoretically possible in a society of simple commodity production, but not in a society based on the class relations of capitalism, on the production of surplus value. In fact:

"Overproduction is specifically cond­itioned by the general law of the prod­uction of capital: to produce by the limit set by the productive forces, that is to say, to exploit the maximum amount of labor with the given amount of capital, without any consideration for the actual limits of the market or the needs backed by the ability to pay; and this is carried out through the continuous expansion of reproduction and accumulation, and therefore const­ant reconversion of revenue into cap­ital, while, on the other hand, the mass of producers remain tied to the average level of needs, and must remain tied to it according to the nature of capitalist production." (ibid pps.534-5)

Marx elaborates further on the inherent limits of the capitalist market when he points out that:

"The mere relationship of wage-laborer and capitalist implies:

1. That the majority of producers (the workers) are non-consumers (non-buyers) of a very large part of their product, namely, of the means of production, and the raw material;

2. that the majority of producers, the workers, can consume an equivalent for their product only so long as they produce more than this equivalent, that is, so long as they produce surplus-value or surplus-product. They must always be overproducers, producers over and above their needs, in order to be able to be consumers or buyers within the limits of their needs." (ibid p.520)

Because of this ‘internal' limitation in the capitalist market, the ‘external market' must be continually expanded if capitalism is to avoid overproduction:

"... the mere admission that the market must expand with production is, on the other hand, an admission of the poss­ibility of overproduction, for the market is limited externally in the geographical sense, the internal mark­et is limited as compared with a mark­et that is both internal and external, the latter in turn is limited as compared with the world market, which however is, in turn, limited as each moment of time, (though) in itself capable of expansion. The admission that the market must expand if there is to be no overproduction is therefore an admission that there can be over­production. For it is then possible -- since market and production are two independent factors -- that the expan­sion of one does not correspond with the expansion of the other; that the limits of the market are not extended rapidly enough for production, or that new markets -- new extensions of the market -- may be rapidly outpaced by production, so that the expanded market becomes just as much a barrier as the narrower market was formerly.

Ricardo is therefore consistent in denying the necessity of an expansion of the market simultaneously with the expansion and growth of capital." (ibid. pps.524-5)

Marx returns to this point in the section dealing with the falling rate of profit in Capital Volume III:

"The creation of this surplus-value is the object of the direct process of production, and this process has no other limits than those mentioned above. As soon as the available quant­ity of surplus-value has been material­ized in commodities, surplus-value has been produced. But this production of surplus-value completes but the first act of the capitalist process of production -- the direct production process. Capital has absorbed so and so much unpaid labor. With the development of the process, which expresses itself in a drop in the rate of profit, the mass of surplus-value thus produced swells to immense dimensions. Now comes the second act of the process. The entire mass of commodities, ie the total pro­duct including the portion which repl­aces constant and variable capital, and that representing surplus value, must be sold. If this is not done, or done only in part, or only at prices below the prices of production, the laborer has indeed been exploited, but his exploitation is not realized as such for the capitalist...The conditions of direct exploitation, and those of realizing it, are not ident­ical. They diverge not only in place and time, but also logically. The first are only limited by the product­ive power of society, the latter by the proportional relation of the various production branches and the consumer power of society. But this last-named is not determined either by the absol­ute productive power, or the absolute consumer power, but by the consumer power based on antagonistic conditions of distribution, which reduces the consumption of the bulk of society to a minimum varying within more or less narrow limits. It is furthermore res­tricted by the tendency to accumulate, the drive to expand capital and produce surplus value on an extended scale. This is law for capitalist production, imposed by incessant revolutions in the methods of production themselves, by the depreciation of existing capit­al always bound up with them, by the general competitive struggle and the need to improve production and expand its scale merely as a means of self-preservation and under penalty of ruin. The market must, therefore, be contin­ually extended, so that its interrelations and the conditions regulating them assume more and more the form of a natural law working independently of the producer, and become ever more uncontrollable. This internal contrad­iction seeks to resolve itself through expansion of the outlying fields of production. But the more productive­ness develops, the more it finds itself at variance with the narrow basis on which the conditions of cons­umption rest. It is no contradiction at all on this self-contradictory basis that there should be an excess of capi­tal simultaneously with a growing sur­plus of population. For while a comb­ination of these two would, indeed, increase the mass of produced surplus value, it would at the same time inte­nsify the contradiction between the conditions under which this surplus value is produced and those under which it is realized." (Capital, Volume III, pps. 244-5, our emphasis)

Now, as Luxemburg explains in Accumulation when Marx talks about "expanding the outlying fields of production", or "foreign trade", he means expansion into and trade with non-capitalist areas, since, simply for the sake of his abstract model of accumul­ation, Marx treats the entire capitalist world as one nation, composed exclusively of workers and capitalists. Contrary to the assumptions of the CWO, who can't see how surplus value can be realized by such trade (Revolutionary Perspectives, no.6, pps.15-­16), Marx clearly recognized the possibility of such trade:

"Within its process of circulation, in which industrial capital functions either as money or as commodities, the circuit of industrial capital, whether as money capital or as commodity capital, crosses the commodity circ­ulation of the most diverse modes of social production. No matter whether commodities are the output of product­ion based on slavery, of peasants (Chinese, Indian ryots), of communes (Dutch East Indies), of state enter­prises (such as existed in former ep­ochs of Russian history on the basis of serfdom) or of half-savage hunting tribes, etc -- as commodities and money they come face-to-face with the money and commodities in which the industrial capital presents itself and enter as much into its circuit as into that of the surplus value borne in the commod­ity capital, provided the surplus value is spent as revenue; hence they enter into both branches of circulat­ion of commodity capital. The char­acter of the process from which they originate is immaterial." (Capital, Volume II, p.113)

Marx not only accepts the possibility of such trade; he also glimpses its necessity, since the process of trading with, destroy­ing, and absorbing pre-capitalist markets is none other than the way capitalism "continually expanded its market" during the ascendant phase.

"As soon as act M-MP is completed, the commodities (MP) cease to be such and become one of the modes of existence of industrial capital in its function­al form of P, productive capital. Thereby however their origin is oblit­erated. They exist henceforth only as forms of existence of industrial capital, are embodied in it. However it still remains true that to replace them they must be reproduced and to this extent the capitalist mode of production is conditional on modes of production lying outside its own stage of development. But it is the tenden­cy of the capitalist mode of production to transform all production as much as possible into commodity production. The mainspring by which this is accom­plished is precisely the involvement of all production into the capitalist circulation process. And developed commodity production is capitalist commodity production. The intervent­ion of industrial capital promotes this transformation everywhere, but with it also the transformation of all direct producers into wage laborers." (ibid. first emphasis ours).

Indeed, Marx had already shown in the Communist Manifesto how the very extension of the world capitalist market, while res­olving its crises in the short term, only deepened the problem of overproduction in the long term:

"The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented."

It can thus be seen that the problem of realization which Luxemburg analyzed in Accumulation was not a ‘non-problem', a misreading of Marx; on the contrary Luxem­burg's thesis is in essential continuity with a central theme in Marx's theory of crisis: viz, that capitalist production has inherent limitations to its own market and must therefore continually expand into new markets if it is to avoid a general crisis of overproduction. Luxemburg showed that the model of expanded reproduction in Vol­ume II of Capital is in contradiction to this understanding to the extent that it assumes the possibility of accumulation creating its own market. But Luxemburg also points out that this model is valid as a theoretical abstraction used to illustrate certain aspects of the process of circulat­ion. It was not intended to be seen as a model for real historical accumulation, or as an explanation of crises, and certainly not to ‘solve' the problem of overproduction. Nevertheless, Marx does appear to get caught in certain inconsistencies in the use he makes of this diagram, and Luxem­burg points these out. But the main point is that both Marx and Luxemburg were aware of the difference between abstract models and the real process of accumulation. No­thing could be further from the spirit of Marx than Otto Bauer's sterile attempt to prove ‘mathematically' that accumulation can proceed without any inherent barriers in the realm of the market, and that Rosa was mistaken because she hadn't done her sums properly. When it comes to misunderstanding Marx's diagram of expanded repro­duction, it is those who take it literally and ‘liquidate' the problem of realization who are departing from Marx's underlying concern, not Luxemburg. There is no getting away from the fact that, to take the diag­ram literally means that capitalism can indefinitely create its own market, some­thing Marx specifically denied.

This lands many of Luxemburg's critics in a contradictory position. Mattick for examp­le sees further into the problem of realiz­ation than the CWO. In his Crises and Theories of Crises (French edition, p.97), he points out that:

"...in the capitalist system there can be no proportionality between the div­erse sectors of production, nor a per­fect concord between production and consumption."

But, in the end, Mattick denies this insight, by arguing that capitalism does not have a fundamental problem of realization, because accumulation creates its own market:

"Commodity production creates its own market in so far as it is able to con­vert surplus value into new capital. The market demand is a demand for con­sumption goods and capital goods. Accumulation can only be the accumul­ation of capital goods, for what is consumed is not accumulated but simply gone. It is the growth of capital in its physical form which allows for the realization of surplus value outside the capital-labor exchange relations. So long as there exists an adequate and continuous demand for capital goods, there is no reason why commodities entering the market should not be sold." (Marx and Keynes, p.76)

Mattick is clearly wishing away the problem here. "In so far as it is able to convert surplus value into new capital..."; "so long as there exists an adequate and cont­inuous demand...". The question where this continuous demand is to come from is not answered, and Mattick is caught on the "merry go round" of "production for prod­uction's sake" which Rosa points out in Accumulation (p. 335). Luxemburg's critics often cite Marx saying that capitalist production is production for its own sake, but this passage has to be taken in context. Marx did not mean that capitalist production could solve its problems by investing in a huge pile-up of capital goods without any concern for society's capacity to consume the goods they will turn out:

"Besides, we have seen in Volume II, Part III that a continuous circulation takes place between constant capital and constant capital (even without considering any accelerated accumulat­ion), which is in so far independent of individual consumption, but which is nevertheless definitely limited by it, because the production of constant capital never takes place for its own sake, but solely because more of this capital is needed in those spheres of production whose products pass into individual consumption." (Capital, Volume III, p, 359 of Chicago translat­ion)

According to Mattick, there is no problem of an unrealizable fraction of surplus value, since ‘investment' in further accum­ulation of constant capital absorbs every­thing in the fullness of time. The crisis results only from an over-accumulation of constant in relation to variable capital, ie from the falling rate of profit. But as Rosa already pointed out in Accumulation:

"From the capitalist's point of view, the consumption of the workers is a consequence of accumulation, it is never its object or condition...And in any case, the workers can only consume that part of the product which corres­ponds to the variable capital, not a jot more. Who then realizes the perm­anently increasing surplus value? The diagram answers: the capitalists them­selves and they alone. And what do they do with this increasing surplus value? The diagram replies: they use it for an ever greater expansion of their production. These capitalists are thus fanatical supporters of an expansion of production for production's sake...the upshot of all this is not accumulation of capital but an increa­sing production of producer goods to no purpose whatsoever." (Accumulation of Capital, p.335)

This "purpose" of producing more producer goods must be a continuous expansion of the market for all the products of capital. Otherwise, by arguing that ‘investment' for its own sake solves the market problem, one is turning to the false solutions criticized by Marx in Capital:

"If it is finally said that the capit­alists have only to exchange and cons­ume their commodities amongst themsel­ves, then the entire nature of the capitalist mode of production is lost sight of...In short, all these object­ions to the phenomena of overproduct­ion...amount to the contention that the barriers of capitalist production are not barriers of production generally, and therefore not barriers of this specific, capitalist mode of product­ion." (Volume III, p.257)

Those who say that accumulation of constant capital solves the problem of accumulation are merely repeating the idea that the cap­italists can simply exchange their products among themselves, even though they do it for the ‘future' as it were, and not for immediate consumption. Sooner or later the constant capital they invest in must be able to find a real market for the goods it turns out, or the cycle of accumulation will break down. Because there is no way of avoiding this problem, we would argue that Luxemburg's insistence that the entire sur­plus value cannot be realized within the social relations of capitalist society is the only conclusion that can be drawn from Marx's rejection of the idea that capital­ist production creates its own market; that it is the only alternative to the Ricardian theory that overproduction crises are simp­ly accidental disruptions of a basically harmonious cycle of reproduction. The part­isans of Matticki's ‘rate of profit' theory are with Marx when they emphasize the imp­ortance of the falling rate of profit as a factor in the capitalist crisis, but they are with Say and Ricardo when they deny that the problem of realization is fundamental to the capitalist process of accumulation.

Two theories or one?

From what we have argued above, it is plain that there can be no Marxist analysis of the crisis which ignores the problem of the mar­ket as a fundamental factor in the capital­ist crisis. Even the argument, put forward by Mattick and others, that the overproduct­ion of commodities is a real problem, but only as a secondary effect of the falling rate of profit, avoids the real question posed by Marx and Luxemburg: the market for capitalist production being limited by the very wage labor-capital relationship. Both the falling rate of profit and the problem of the market are primary contradictions in capitalism. At the same time the two contra­dictions are closely linked, and mutually determine each other in a number of ways. The question is, what is the best framework for understanding how these two phenomena interact with one another?

We would argue that Mattick's analysis can­not provide such a framework to the extent that it denies the problem of the market; whereas Luxemburg's theory does not reject the falling rate of profit. It is true that in Accumulation she puts forward a model -- a purely abstract one, it should be noted -- which allows for the falling rate of profit to be "cancelled out" (p.338), and that in the Anticritique she says "there is still some time to pass before capitalism collap­ses because of the falling rate of profit, roughly until the sun burns out". These could be said to be expressions of Luxem­burg's underestimation of the problem, but there is nothing in her basic approach which rejects it; and indeed the Accumulation gives several examples of how the fall in the rate of profit interacts with the prob­lem of realization (see below).

The reason why Luxemburg emphasized the mar­kets problem as lying at the roots of decadence is not hard to find. As Marx pointed out, as a factor in capitalist crises the falling rate of profit is an overall tend­ency which expresses itself over long periods and has a number of counteracting influences; whereas the problem of realization is some­thing which can clog up the process of accum­ulation in a more immediate and direct way. This applies both to the conjunctural crises of the last century and the historic crisis of capitalism, since the absorption of the pre-capitalist milieu which had provided the soil for the continual extension of the mar­ket was a barrier which capital came up against well before its organic composition had swelled to such proportions that profitable production could no longer be maintained. But, as the Platform of the ICC points out:

"...the growing difficulty encountered by capital in finding a market for the realization of surplus value accentuates the fall in the rate of profit...from being a mere tendency, the fall in the rate of profit has become more and more concrete; this has become an added fet­ter on the process of capital accumul­ation and thus on the operation of the entire system."

The saturation of the market both aggravates the falling rate of profit (for example, increased competition over a shrinking mar­ket forces capitalists to renew plant before all its value has been used up), and removes one of its most important counteracting inf­luences: compensating for a fall in the rate of profit by increasing its mass, that is by expanding the volume of commodities prod­uced. This can only be a compensation as long as the expansion of the market can keep pace with this increased mass of comm­odities. When it can no longer do so, this compensation only makes matters worse, agg­ravating both the fall in the rate of prof­it and the problem of realization. A great deal of work and study needs to be done in this area, but while Luxemburg certainly did not solve all the problems here, the framework she elaborated does allow for the role of the falling rate of profit to be grasped more completely.

But perhaps the problem goes deeper? Per­haps, in the end, there is a basic contrad­iction in Marx's own thought? At first sight it would appear that the idea that the crisis results from too much unrealiz­able surplus value cannot be reconciled with the idea that the crisis is caused by a dearth of surplus value.

Although Marx never finally resolved this problem, there are elements in his work which enable us to see that the two contra­dictions are indeed parts of a dialectical whole. To begin with:

"Capital consists of commodities, and therefore overproduction of capital implies overproduction of commodities. Hence the peculiar phenomenon of econ­omists who deny overproduction of commodities, admitting overproduction of capital." (Capital volume III, p.256)

Once this has been grasped, it can be seen that the two contradictions necessarily act together in capitalist crises: on the one hand the overproduction of capital calls forth a decline in the profit rate because it involves an increase in the ratio between constant and variable capital; on the other hand this huge mass of constant capital produces a plethora of commodities which more and more exceeds the consuming power of this relatively diminishing variable capital (ie the working class). Goaded on by competition over a restricted market, capital and its capacity to spew out commod­ities grows huge and swollen, while the masses become poorer and poorer in relation to it; less and less profit is embodied in each commodity, less and less commodities can be sold. The rate of profit and the capacity for realization sink together, and the one aggravates the other. The seeming contradiction between having ‘too much' and ‘too little' surplus value disappears when it becomes clear that we are talking about capital as a whole, and that we are talking in relative, not absolute terms. For cap­ital as a whole, there is never an absolute saturation of markets, nor does the rate of profit sink to an absolute zero which dries up all available surplus value. In fact, as Luxemburg pointed out, at a certain mom­ent in the concentration of capital, the ‘excess' and ‘dearth' of surplus value can be the same thing viewed from a different standpoint:

"If capitalization of surplus value is the real motive force and aim of prod­uction, it must yet proceed within the limits given by the renewal of constant and variable capital (and also of the consumed part of the surplus value). Further, with the international devel­opment of capitalism the capitalizat­ion of surplus value becomes ever more urgent and precarious, and the substr­atum of constant and variable capital becomes an ever-growing mass -- both absolutely and in relation to the sur­plus value. Hence the contradictory phenomena that the old capitalist cou­ntries provide ever larger markets for, and become increasingly dependent upon, one another, yet on the other hand compete ever more ruthlessly for trade relations with non-capitalist countries. The conditions for the capitalization of surplus value clash increasingly with the conditions for the renewal of the aggregate capital -- a conflict which, incidentally, is merely a count­erpart of the contradictions implied in the law of a declining profit rate." (The Accumulation of Capital, p.367)

In other words, relatively less and less of the mass of surplus value produced is dest­ined for capitalization, but this is still ‘excessive' in relation to the effective demand. And this ‘less and less' surplus value (over and above the value which mere­ly replaces the initial capital outlay) is the result of the ever higher organic comp­osition of capital.

It thus becomes clearer that the two contr­adictions traced by Marx do not exclude each other but are two sides of one overall pro­cess of value production. This ultimately makes it possible for the ‘two' theories of crisis to become one.

Political consequences

We have tried to indicate that, in the final analysis, the ‘rate of profit' and the ‘mar­ket' problems can be theoretically reconcil­ed, although the Grossman-Mattick approach cannot do this as long as it ignores or downplays the problem of realization of surplus value. The weaknesses of Mattick's theory at the ‘economic' level also has, or rather implies, certain inadequacies at the level of political conclusions which derive from it. Although we must restrict ourselv­es here to a brief mention of these weak­nesses, and although we repeat our warning against mechanistically deriving political positions from economic analyses, this does not mean that there are simply no political consequences involved. These consequences take the form of tendencies rather than iron laws, and they are more pronounced in some than in others, but nevertheless, certain common characteristics do appear to be shar­ed by the different currents who take up Mattick's economic theory.

Beginning from an analysis of the falling rate of profit alone, it is extremely diff­icult to define the historical course of the capitalist crisis. This applies both to the retrospective identification of the onset of the decadent period, and to the analysis of the perspectives for the devel­opment of the crisis today. We would say that this is because Mattick's theory leaves a number of basic questions unanswered or answered inadequately, for example: if the falling rate of profit is the only real problem for capital, why should the division of the world amongst the imperialist powers and the creation of a world capitalist econ­omy have plunged capitalism into its hist­oric crisis? At what point did the organic composition of capital on a global scale reach a level when the counter-tendencies to the falling rate of profit could no long­er be offset? When in the future will the rate of profit be too low to prevent capital continuing to accumulate without another war? And why indeed has war become the mode of survival of capital in this era? We would say that none of these questions can be answered without bringing in the question of the market. But, failing to do this, Mattick can only give vague answers to these questions. There is no real consistency in his understanding of the present epoch. In the 1930s his writings indicate an underst­anding that the permanent crisis of capital was an immediate reality and that it could only be offset by world war. In his post­war writings, however, he seems to question whether capitalism had really entered a new epoch at the time of the Russian Revolution, implying sometimes that the historic crisis only began in 1929, while at other times hinting that the falling rate of profit will only create major problems for capital around the year 2000, so perhaps capitalism is not yet decadent at all! In short, with Mattick there is no consistent awareness of decadence as the period of crisis-war-recon­struction decisively inaugurated by World War I, or of today's crisis as the direct manifestation of that historical cycle and not just a temporary hiccough in a period of growth. This lack of clarity about what decadence actually is leads him to under­estimate the gravity of the present crisis and reinforces his tendency towards academ­icism, which goes all the way back to the 1940s. Since, in his view, the ‘real' crisis is a long way away, the prospect of major outbreaks of class struggle at the present time is not very bright. There can be little point, therefore, in engaging in militant political activity today.

The CWO, despite their reliance on Mattick's economic theory, have a much clearer understanding of decadence, the present crisis, and the political conclusions flowing from them. They have tried to demonstrate how the period opened up by World War I can be explained with reference to the falling rate of profit (especially in ‘The Economic Foundations of Capitalist Decadence' in Revolutionary Perspectives, no.2). This is a serious effort which requires a more det­ailed critique than can be attempted here. Such a critique would have to centre round certain crucial questions, such as: how coherent is their application of Mattick's economics to the framework of decadence they use? How far can decadence be analyzed on the basis of the falling rate of profit without bringing in the markets problem; and how coherent would the CWO's view of decad­ence be if they had not been influenced by other tendencies -- notably the ICC -- who do consider the problem of the market as fund­amental in the explanation of decadence? In other words: how far is the CWO's analysis of decadence a consistent continuation of Mattick's theory, and how much is it implic­itly or explicitly molded by a more unitary theory of decadence. What we have written above about the impossibility of ignoring the realization problem already indicates what our answer to these questions will be.

More important, perhaps, is to point out that, while not necessarily following Matt­ick into the extremes of academic withdrawal, the ‘falling rate of profit' school share a tendency to see the ‘real' crisis as being a long way away; since some of these comrad­es also exhibit a somewhat mechanistic con­ception of the link between levels of crisis and levels of class struggle, they generally conclude that the prospects for class strug­gle and revolutionary regroupment are also somewhat distant. Thus Battaglia Comunista only saw the present crisis emerge in 1971, and for them the resurgence of the internat­ional organization of the class will only take place sometime in the future; the CWO see both capital's preparations for imper­ialist war and the workers' preparation for class war as something ‘for tomorrow', when the crisis will have reached a new level. The regroupment of revolutionaries is post­poned in a similar way. Many of the Scand­inavian comrades, closer to Mattick and still cocooned to some extent by the ‘prosperity' of Scandinavia, continue to see the tasks of revolutionaries as ‘study' and reflection divorced from any militant activity. We don't think these ‘attentist' attitudes are accidental. They are linked to the short­comings of the Mattick theory, which finds it hard to show that decadence is indeed a permanent crisis, the result of the disappearance of the conditions which allowed for healthy capital expansion in the nineteenth century. The ‘Luxemburg' theory, by showing the diseased nature of all accumulation in this epoch, makes it easier to show the limitations of the period of reconstruction, and to understand that the crisis, the war economy and the class struggle are all very much realities of today. In fact we would say that the response of the class is alre­ady lagging behind the development of the crisis and the bourgeoisie's preparations for war. This does not mean that the crisis has hit rock bottom, or that war or revol­ution are on the immediate agenda, and that therefore we should embark upon a course of frenzied activism (like the PIC, whose inn­ate activism is reinforced by a faulty appl­ication of Luxemburg's crisis theory). Capital still has mechanisms for staving off the crisis, and a whole series of economic and social processes have to unfold before the crisis resolves itself in either war or revolution. Nevertheless, it is important to see that these processes are already underway, so that the tasks facing revolutionaries today are extremely urgent and can­not be put off until ‘tomorrow'. As Bilan put it, "Can tomorrow be anything else than the development of what is happening today?" (Bilan, no.36)

As Lukacs pointed out in his essay ‘The Marxism of Rosa Luxemburg', the validity of Luxemburg's accumulation theory as a contri­bution to the proletarian world view lies in the fact that it is based on the "category of totality", the specifically proletarian category of perception. The problem of accumulation investigated by Luxemburg is only a problem at the level of total or global capital; the vulgar economists who depart from the standpoint of the individual capital were unable to see that there was a problem at all. This ‘vulgarity' can be applied to Mattick to some extent; since he has a strong tendency to view each national capital in isolation .This distorted per­spective leads to a number of errors:

-- ambiguities about the possibility of nat­ional liberation, since small nations acc­ording to Mattick, can withdraw from the world market into autarky or the protection of the so-called ‘state capitalist bloc';

-- parallel to this, Mattick has asserted that Russia, China, etc are not wholly reg­ulated by the law of value and are not really imperialist, having no inner compunction to expand onto the world market. He has even called them ‘state socialist' societies.

These mistakes very much derive from an in­ability to see these nations as part of the whole capitalist world market. On this question again the CWO among others have gone well beyond Mattick, affirming the imp­ossibility of national liberation and that Russia and China are capitalist economies regulated by the law of value. Even so, their analysis contains a number of weaknesses which can be connected to their economic theory. Finding it hard to analyze part­icular phenomena from the standpoint of the whole, they show a certain inability to see state capitalism and the war economy as fundamentally determined by the national capital's need to compete on the world mar­ket; for them state capitalist measures are primarily a response to the falling rate of profit in particular industries whose high organic composition makes it necessary for the state to bail them out. But this is only a partial explanation, since the stake does this precisely to increase the compet­ivity of the entire national capital. In a similar vein is the CWO's idea that Russia, China etc can be termed ‘integral' state capitalisms whose development proves that "capital accumulation is possible in a closed system" (Revolutionary Perspectives, no.1, p.13). This ‘fact' allegedly refutes Luxemburg's economics, while the notion of ‘integral' state capitalism still leaves room for the idea that these economies are somehow ‘different' and need to be explained in a particular way. And the explicit or implicit claim that autarkic development is possible could have various political ram­ifications. On the national question, for example, the CWO has the right political conclusions, but it is worth asking how con­sistent their conclusions are with their economic analysis. Is Mattick's idea that underdeveloped nations could grow on the basis of their own internal market a more logical consequence of his economic theory?

We are not implying that the CWO has any fundamental confusions on the national ques­tion, nor that their explanation for the impossibility of national liberation does not have a coherence of its own. But any inconsistency today can open the doors to real errors tomorrow. And we would add that there are already noticeable weaknesses in the CWO's approach to the national question: a difficulty in seeing the voracious imper­ialist appetites of all national capitals today, even the smallest; and a pronounced pessimism about the perspective for the class struggle in the Third World. On the first point, they argue that only Russia and America can ‘really' act as imperialisms to­day, other national capitals being only pot­entially or tendentially imperialist. This obscures the reality of local inter-imperial­ist rivalries which have a role to play within the overall confrontation between the blocs, a reality strikingly confirmed by the recent conflicts in the Horn of Africa and South East Asia. On the class struggle in Third World countries, the CWO regularly make statements like "we can only expect positive developments...when the workers in the advanced countries have taken the rev­olutionary road, and given a clear lead" (Revolutionary Perspectives, no.6). Such a view belittles the importance of the present struggles of the Third World workers in the international development of class consciou­sness, and makes a rigid separation between today and tomorrow, advanced and backward capitals, which can only obscure our understanding. These inadequate analyses of imp­erialism and the class struggle are both rooted in the economic analysis which argues that only countries with a high organic composition of capital are genuinely imperial­ist, and only the proletariat in such count­ries has much importance. On both counts, we see a tendency to fragment both world capital and the world proletariat.

This tendency of the ‘rate of profit' theor­ists to view the problem from the standpoint of the individual and not global capital could have implications for the discussion on the period of transition. Thus, if cap­ital accumulation can proceed in one country, then why not envisage autarkic ‘communist' economies as well? At any rate, the CWO believes that proletarian bastions that have withdrawn from the world market can, temp­orarily at least begin building a communist mode of production. This misconception can only be coherently criticized from a persp­ective which sees capital and the world mar­ket as a totality; again we would say that Luxemburg's framework provides us with the theoretical tools for seeing why such isol­ated bastions could in no way escape the effects of the world market.

Having pointed these things out, we must make two important qualifications:

-- that these erroneous positions are linked mainly to a unilateral ‘falling rate of pro­fit' theory like Mattick's or the CWO's;

-- that even then they do not flow directly and inexorably from an erroneous economic framework.

When we look at the errors of a revolutionary group, it is important to examine the total­ity of their history and political positions. Many of the errors mentioned above have their roots in more fundamental experiences and misunderstandings: Mattick's academicism, for example, is based on a whole experience of the counter-revolution, which led him into a deep pessimism about the perspectives for class struggle, and a serious underestimat­ion of the need for revolutionary organizat­ion. The CWO's errors on regroupment and the present period are also to a large ext­ent the result of their difficulty in apprec­iating the question of organization, while their errors on the transition period are very largely due to an inability to learn the lessons of the Russian Revolution. Equally, in the ‘Luxemburgist' context, the PIC's activism, we would argue, is much more the result of a deep confusion about the role of revolutionaries than of their economic anal­ysis. We would say that errors on the level of economics tend to reinforce errors deriv­ing from the totality of a group's politics. Any incoherence in a group's analysis can open the door to confusions of a more general kind; but we are not dealing in irrevocable fatalities. Comrades who hold the ‘falling rate of profit' analysis do not necessarily have to assimilate all the organizational confusions of Mattick, the CWO, or Battaglia Comunista, or their misreading of the Russian Revolution. At the same time, organizational or other confusions -- like the sectarianism of the CWO -- can actually accentuate weaknesses in economic analysis. It is not hard to see, for example, that, the CWO's growing effort to deny the problem of overproduction is connected to their need to distinguish them­selves from certain other groups who hold a different view of decadence...Comrades who depart from a ‘falling rate of profit' anal­ysis can and must be able to develop a more global view which does not deny the problem of the market. Of course, we think that, in the end, this will lead them to become ‘Luxemburgists', but only an open and con­structive debate can really clarify this.

This allows us to come to a general conclu­sion about the importance of this debate. The debate is of considerable importance, because just as economic weaknesses can pave the way to or reinforce more general polit­ical errors, so a coherent analysis of the economic foundations of decadence will make our understanding of decadence and the pol­itical conclusions which derive from it that much stronger. The issue, therefore, must be discussed as part of the totality of comm­unist politics.

Having understood its importance as part of a more general coherence, the debate can be put in the correct perspective. Since an analysis of the economic foundations of dec­adence is part of a more global proletarian standpoint, a standpoint which demands an active commitment to ‘change the world', the discussion can never stand in the way of organized revolutionary activity. And since the political conclusions defended by revol­utionaries do not derive in a mechanical way from a particular analysis of economics, the discussion can never be a barrier to regroup­ment. As the ICC has always maintained, the debate can and must proceed within a unified revolutionary organization. Different econ­omic theories have not prevented revolution­aries in the past from joining together, and they need not do so today or in the future. Indeed, this is one of the questions that we shall probably still be debating some time after the proletariat has wiped capitalism off the face off the earth...

C D Ward.

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

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October 1917, beginning of the proletarian revolution (part 2)

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The first part of this article attempted to show how the nature of the Russian Revolution was determined, not by the particular char­acteristics of Russia at the time of the revolution, but by the overall development of world capitalism, whose passage into its epoch of historic decline was marked by the imperialist war in 1914. The objective conditions for the proletarian revolution existed internationally, and the Russian Revolution could only be part of this world revolution. Thus we rejected the theories of the ‘councilists’, for whom the Russian Revolution was a ‘bourgeois’ revolution. We showed that such an analysis led:

-- either to the conception held by the Mensheviks and Kautsky, which led to a bet­rayal of the working class;

-- or to the Stalinist conception of the pos­sibility of ‘socialism in one country’,

-- or to the anarchist conception which iden­tifies socialism with ‘self-management’ by workers in individual enterprises;

-- or to the conception of the right-wing social democrats for whom the proletarian revolution was not on the agenda in any country in 1917.

Finally we showed how the councilists’ anal­ysis led them to turn marxism on its head, even though they believed that this was the basis of their analysis.

************

In fact the aberrations of councilism are fundamentally the expression of the terrible weight, felt by all the revolutionary minori­ties of the class, of the longest period of counter-revolution which the working class has ever undergone. Confronted with the monstrous state apparatus which developed in Russia in the wake of the degeneration of the revolution and compelled -- unlike the Stalinists or even the Trotskyists -- to denounce the counter-revolutionary nature of this state, the various currents of the communist left found it very difficult to understand the origins and causes of what was happening in Russia in a situation of defeat for the class. But it would be wrong to think that the councilists were the only ones to lose their way in this difficult situation. Leaving aside Trotskyism whose theory of ‘Bonapartism’ was used to explain the phenomenon of Stalinism while justifying its continued defense of the Russian state, other currents of the communist left were also very confused on this question. Thus while the Italian Left, through its publica­tion Bilan, made many important contributions towards a correct understanding of post-­revolutionary Russia, it still remained im­prisoned for a long time by the conception of Russia as a ‘degenerated workers’ state’. However, one of the most important confusions in the left communist movement came with the elaboration of the Bordigist theory of the double revolution, which represented a part­ial return to the absurdities of the coun­cilist analysis.

Holy duality according to the Bordigist doctrine

“This is the explanation of the ‘degen­eration of the USSR’: the October Revolu­tion, when the communist proletariat seized power, could do no more than smash the remnants of feudalism which remained a barrier to the capitalist development of the productive forces. Political dictatorship of the proletariat with a capi­talist economy; this describes Russia at the time of NEP. With the help of the world revolution, the Bolshevik Party would have been able to suppress the mer­cantile economy, and afterwards introduce socialism. Isolated at the head of a formidable capitalist machine, stuck out on a limb, the Bolshevik Party was forced to submit to the mercantile machinery and become a cog in the process of capitalist accumulation.” (Programme Communiste, no.57, p.39)

One sees at once what distinguishes this Bordigist conception from the councilist one. For the latter, the economic and political aspects of the revolution are intimately connected: the installation of capitalism is marked by the coming to power of a party that councilism considers to be bourgeois. For the former, on the contrary, the two aspects are completely distinct: Bordigism recognizes the proletarian character of October on a political level, but it rejoins councilism by asserting that, on an economic level, it was a bourgeois revolution. More­over one could find many passages which demonstrate the convergence of the two analyses, Bordigist and councilist, even though Bordigism is very scornful of coun­cilism. For example:

“If it is permissible to talk of the ‘turning point’ of April 1917, it must be well understood that this is nothing to do with an advanced capitalist country giving way to a communist revolution: it marks no more than the decisive moment of a bourgeois and popular revolution, occurring in a feudal country in an advanced state of decay.” (Programme Communiste, no.39, p.21)

One might well be reading Pannekoek! And in fact the Bordigist conception of the ‘double revolution’ reveals itself as funda­mentally ambiguous. Its defenders are forced to contradict themselves from one article to another, if not from one phrase to another. Thus the above quotation is taken from an article entitled ‘The April Theses of 1917, Programme of the Proletarian Revolution in Russia’. In the same article we can find the following commentary on the second thesis:

“Lenin does not accord here any adjective to the word revolution, but we can do so without hesitation ... it was always a question of a bourgeois and democratic revolution, an anti-feudal and not a socialist revolution.”

In another article entitled ‘Marxism and Russia’ (Programme Communiste, no.68, p.20) we read, “For us, October was socialist”. Thus we can clearly and unambiguously sum­marize the Bordigist conception in the fol­lowing terms: the October Revolution was proletarian and not proletarian, socialist and not socialist. What opaque lucidity!

But the contradictions and incoherence which mark this conception of Bordiga and his epigones do not disturb the latter: they are used to it. On the other hand, what they really find hard to stomach is the fact that they are putting forward an interpreta­tion of the October Revolution which is directly opposed to that of Lenin. For according to the Bordigist credo, Lenin only made two mistakes in his life (and these were just ‘minor’, ‘tactical’ errors): on the question of the ‘united front’ and ‘revo­lutionary parliamentarism’. For the Bordigists:

“In April 1917, it was solely a question of recuperating the social forces of the anti-tsarist revolution, not to do more than had been attempted in 1905, but to remedy the fact that so far, less had been achieved; the program of the capitalist revolution under the democra­tic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasants had yet to be realized.” (PC, no.39, p.25)

For Lenin on the contrary, “the whole of this revolution (of 1917) can only be under­stood as one of the links in the chain of proletarian socialist revolutions, provoked by the imperialist war” (Preface to State and Revolution). Thus for Lenin it was a question of ‘doing more’ in 1917 than in 1905, whose objectives he had defined more modestly:

“This victory (the decisive victory over Tsarism) will still not transform our bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution. The democratic revolution has not come directly out of the frame­work of bourgeois social and economic relations; but this victory will none the less provide immense opportunities for the future development of Russia and the whole world.” (Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution)

One could find many other examples where Bordigist texts take up positions directly opposed to Lenin’s own conceptions. We will content ourselves with a single example:

“Thus the party of the proletariat must not reject the soviet, this historical form created in the bourgeois Russian Revolution…..They (the soviets) express what Lenin defined as the democratic dictatorship ….the particular form of the Russian anti-feudal revolution could not be the parliamentary assembly as in France, but a different organ based solely on the class of workers in the towns and the countryside.”

For Lenin, on the contrary:

“It is necessary only to discover the practical form which allows the proleta­riat to exercise its domination. This form is the soviet regime with the dicta­torship of the proletariat. The ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’: until now this phrase was Greek to the masses. Now, thanks to the spread of the soviet system throughout the world, this Greek has been translated into all the modern languages: the working masses have discovered the practical form of their dictatorship.” (Opening Remarks to the First Congress of the Communist International, March 1919)

“... the form of the dictatorship of the proletariat already worked out in reality, that is, the soviet power in Russia, the system of workers’ councils in Germany ... and other soviet institutions in other countries.” (‘Theses on Bourgeois Democracy and the Proletarian Dictator­ship’, First Congress of the CI)

It is not in order to hide behind the auth­ority of Lenin that we have drawn on these various quotations, but to show that even if Lenin himself made mistakes, even if his conception of October 1917 was, in some respects, ambiguous, the inanities put for­ward by Bordigism in the name of fidelity to the positions of Lenin, have actually nothing to do with Lenin’s conceptions.

Refutation of the ‘double revolution’

We will not repeat here what was said in the preceding article, where we showed that in Russia, as in the rest of the world, the bourgeois revolution was not on the agenda in 1917, since the material conditions for the communist revolution already existed on an international level. What was said against the councilist and Menshevik concep­tions applies equally to the conceptions of the Bordigists. However, it is necessary to refute certain confused ideas which arise from the notion of the double revolution.

In the first place, the idea that the proletariat would carry out the bourgeois revolution is false. Even though Marx could defend such an idea in 1848, and Lenin also took it up in 1905, there is no example in history of one class being able to substitute itself for another in the accomplishment of an historic task. A revolution is the act whereby the class which is the bearer of the new relations of production made necessary by the development of the productive forces, seizes political power. History has shown many times that the revolutionary class can­not achieve political domination until after, and in general until well after, the necess­ity and the material conditions for the revolution become apparent. This is the classic phenomenon, clearly demonstrated by Marxism, of the slow adaptation by the super-structure of society to changes in its infrastructure. In particular this phenomenon allows us to understand the occurrence of periods of decadence within society, when the old relations of production have become fetters on the development of the productive forces, while the class which is the bearer of new relations of production has not yet acquired sufficient power -- in particular political power -- to overthrow the old social order. Consequently, if a class is strong enough to seize political power, the economic and political tasks with which it is faced are those of developing its own relations of production, not substituting itself for the preceding historical class and accomplishing tasks which are in fact no longer on the agenda. The proletariat like the peasants and artisans could participate in bourgeois revolutions, but as an auxiliary force, never the main protagonist. It could even play an extremely active role in the radicalization of these revolutions, by giv­ing its support to the most energetic sections of the bourgeoisie. But when its own class interests became apparent, these were immediately opposed to those of all sections of the bourgeoisie, including the most radi­cal: for example, the Levellers against Cromwell during the English civil war; Babeuf against the Montagnards in the French revolution; and the Parisian proletariat against the provisional government in June 1848.

The other aspect to this notion of the ‘double revolution’ concerns the Bordigist understanding of the type of economic mea­sures that the proletariat can take at the start of the revolution. The Bordigists correctly criticize the Trotskyist idea that ‘unemployment benefits’ or ‘the elimination of private ownership from large scale indus­try’ are ‘socialist’ measures. For them these are nothing more than ‘welfare state’ measures in the first case, and ‘state capitalist’ measures in the second. The “socialist economy commences with the des­truction of capital” (PC, no.57, p.25). In this sense the Bordigists have understood that the economic measures adopted by the proletarian power in Russia were still capi­talist measures, and do not attempt to glor­ify them as ‘socialist’, as the Stalinists and Trotskyists do. However, the Bordigists’ error is revealed in the following passage:

“In the advanced countries, the dictator­ship of the proletariat will be able to embark at once on the planned production of physical quantities. In the other countries, while awaiting the extension of the revolution, the proletariat will manage capitalism, concentrating the productive forces as far as is possible in the hands of the state, at the same time as adopting measures to protect the wage-earning class, measures that would be impossible for a bourgeois party in the same circumstances. In all cases the seizure of power by the proletariat is nothing but the first stage of the world revolution, which must conquer or be con­quered. Either it will generate other revolutions and extend through revolutio­nary war; or it will perish in the civil war, or in the case where the proletariat has to manage a young capitalism it will degenerate into a bourgeois power.” (PC, no.57, p.36)

Now we have it! It is only “in the case where the proletariat has to manage a young capitalism” that the “revolution will degen­erate into a bourgeois power” (as if capita­lism, whose senility is an international phenomenon, could be ‘young’ in certain areas). Thus the revolution degenerated in Russia because it remained isolated in an only partially industrialized country (which PC wrongly defines as a ‘young’ capitalism). But if the revolution remained isolated in a heavily industrialized country it would not, following this line of reasoning, degen­erate, and the relations of production that were established there would cease to be capitalist. In other words, socialism would be possible in a single country, as long as the country in question was an ‘old’ capitalism. If pushed to their logical conclusion, the Bordigist conceptions, just as those of the councilists, lead to the Stal­inist thesis. The Bordigists must decide: either the “seizure of power by the prole­tariat is nothing but the first stage of the world revolution” in all cases, or only in certain cases. In fact the notion of the ‘double revolution’ seems finally to lead to a ‘double conception’: one which alternates between internationalism and nationalism.

In reality whatever the level of development of a country where the proletariat seizes power, it cannot hope to immediately adopt ‘socialist’ measures. It will be able to take a whole series of measures such as, the expropriation of private capitalists, equal remuneration, aid to the most under-privi­leged, free distribution of certain consumer goods etc, which can lead on to socialist measures, but which in themselves are per­fectly able to be recuperated by capitalism. While the revolution remains isolated in a single country, or a small group of countries, the economic policy which it can pursue is largely determined by the economic relations which this or these countries retain with the rest of the capitalist world. These relations can only be trade relations: the zone where the proletariat is in power must sell a part of its production on the world market in order to be able to buy, on the same market, all the indispensable goods which it cannot produce for itself. Because of this, the whole of the existing economy in this zone is still strongly characterized by the need to produce goods at the lowest possible prices in order to find buyers in competition with goods produced in countries where the proletariat has not yet seized power. This in turn must inevitably impose restrictions on the consumption of the work­ing class, restrictions whose purpose is not only to allow the future development of the productive forces (the indispensable basis of communism) but more prosaically, to acquire a surplus which can be exchanged on the world market and to preserve competitiveness. It is clear that the proletarian power must take all possible measures to safeguard it­self against the corrupting effects that this typically capitalist practice will inevitably produce in the zone of proleta­rian power and its institutions;1 but it is equally clear that persistence of these practices in the case of the continuing isolation of the revolution can only lead to the downfall of the proletarian power itself. And what is true for the strictly economic sphere, applies equally in the military sphere. Isolated, the revolution will have to deal with the attempts of capitalism to crush it. This means that from the day that the proletariat seizes power, many features of capitalist society will necessarily have to be maintained: armaments production which will depress the workers’ living standards and prevent the development of the material conditions for communism; the existence of an army which remains (even a ‘red’ army) an institution of a fundamentally capitalist nature: a machine whose function is to kill and coerce in an organized and systematic manner. Here also it is easy to understand the seriousness of the threat which these necessities will pose for the proletarian power. All this is equally applicable to an advanced as to a backward country. In fact, a heavily industrialized country is even more dependent on the world capitalist market. It would not be too absurd to suggest that the revolution, had it been isolated in a country like Germany, would have degenerated even more rapidly than in Russia. Thus it was not simply Russia’s backwardness which explains the capitalist nature of the econ­omic measures adopted in the first years of soviet power. If we examine those which would have been taken in Germany in the case of a proletarian victory we can see that they would have been very similar:

“1. Confiscation of all crown estates and revenues for the benefit of the people.

2. Annulment of the state debts and other public debts, as well as all war loans, except those subscribed within a certain limited amount, this limit to be fixed by the Central Coun­cil of the workers’ and soldiers’ councils.

3. Expropriation of the land held by all large and medium-sized agricultural concerns; establishment of socialist agricultural cooperatives under a uni­form central administration all over the country. Small peasant holdings to remain in possession of their pre­sent owners, until they voluntarily decide to join the socialist agricul­tural cooperatives.

4. Nationalization by the Republic of Councils of all banks, ore mines, coal mines, as well as all large industrial and commercial establishments.

5. Confiscation of all property exceeding a certain limit, the limit to be fixed by the Central Council.

6. The Republic of Councils to take over all public means of transport and communication.

7. Election of administrative councils in all enterprises, such councils to regulate the internal affairs of the enterprises in agreement with the workers’ councils, regulate the condi­tions of labor, control production, and, finally, take over the administ­ration of the enterprise.” (From the Program of the Spartacus League of the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), quoted from the article by Rosa Luxem­burg ‘What Does Spartacus Want?’ in the pamphlet Spartacus, Merlin Press.)

The major error of the Bordigists is to con­sider that the world is divided into differ­ent ‘geo-economic areas’: those where capi­talism has reached a mature or even a senile phase of development, and those where it is still ‘young’ or ‘juvenile’. Incapable of understanding that it is as a world system (and in this it differs from all past systems), that capitalism experienced an ascendant phase and then, since 1914, a decadent phase, they are equally incapable of understanding that, since 1914, the task of the proleta­riat is the same in all areas of the world: to destroy capitalism and install new relations of production. For the Bordigists there are some areas of the world where a ‘pure’ proletarian revolution is on the agenda and others where a ‘double revolu­tion’ is required. This schema implies that:

-- on the one hand, within a process of the socialist transformation of society, the tasks of the proletariat are conceived of as different in different regions. The pro­letariat in the advanced countries can adopt socialist measures straight away, while in the backward countries the proletariat must first devote itself to the development of capitalism in order to develop the condi­tions for socialism;

-- on the other hand, in the short term, the proletariat and revolutionaries must give their support to the various so-called ‘national liberation struggles’, which the Bordigists see as providing the basis for the development of ‘juvenile’ capitalism in these countries.

Recently we have seen the aberrations which arise from this latter implication of the Bordigists’ conception: apology for the massacres perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge on the population of Cambodia, which are des­cribed as ‘Jacobin radicalism’; participation in the Stalinist and Trotskyist chorus of praise for Che Guevara, that “living symbol of the democratic anti-imperialist revolu­tion ... shamefully assassinated by ... Yan­kee imperialism and its Latin American lack­eys” (PC, no.75, p.51), and various other instances of more or less critical support for this or that participant in recent inter-imperialist conflicts (Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique etc).

Concerning the first implication, it revives the absurd bourgeois idea that the proleta­riat in each country must, once it has seized power, ‘look after its own affairs’. In reality it is the whole world proletariat which must tackle all the economic problems existing in the various regions of the world, problems determined by the dual task faced simultaneously by the proletariat: to deve­lop the productive forces particularly in the backward regions and to progressively transform the relations of production in the direction of communism. Once it has taken power on a world scale, the proleta­riat has therefore no capitalist tasks of any sort to accomplish. It is within the framework of the socialist transformation of society that the proletariat begins to develop the productive forces, which are condemned to stagnation by the historical decadence of the capitalist mode of produc­tion. It is within this framework that the proletariat must eliminate the surviving vestiges of pre-capitalist society -- through the integration of the enormous strata of small-scale agricultural producers and arti­sans, which still constitute the vast majo­rity of the world population today, into associated production in the socialized sec­tor. And this takes place not only in the backward countries, but also in a number of important advanced countries like Japan, France, Italy and Spain, where smallholders still exist in their tens of millions, as well as agrarian workers languishing in social conditions close to feudalism. Why don’t the Bordigists talk about the ‘double revolution’ in these countries as well? Thus on the one hand their conception sets tasks for the proletariat in an advanced country where the revolution remains isola­ted which are far too ambitious. But on the other hand, it underestimates the histo­rical tasks which will face the world prole­tariat once it has taken power all over the world, by advocating capitalist development in certain countries, at a time when capita­lism everywhere has reached the end of the road.

In the first part of this article we saw how the councilists, after having saluted the achievement of October 1917, joined the social democratic and anarchist chorus of denunciation of the revolution. The Bordi­gists on the other hand, intransigently defend the revolution. They have an under­standing, which the councilists lack, of the primacy of political over economic aspects of the revolution, which is sometimes expressed very clearly:

“The October Revolution must not primarily be considered from the point of view of the immediate transformation of society …. of forms of production and of the economic structure, but as a phase in the international political struggle of the proletariat.” (PC, no.68, p.20)

But, unfortunately, the Bordigists show themselves incapable of rejecting the Menshe­vik assertions which were later taken up by the councilists. On the contrary, on the basis of a religious adherence to the analy­sis of Lenin (particularly on the national question, whose erroneous nature has been shown by more than half a century’s exper­ience), they are not able to understand the fundamental achievement of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, nor the significance of the experience of the October Revolution for the proletarian program. The October Revolu­tion must therefore endure, not only the lies and attempted recuperation of the bourgeoi­sie, not only the absurd denunciations made by the councilists, but also the well-meaning but disastrous analysis put forward by its most zealous defenders, the Bordigists.

Nature and role of the Bolshevik Party

A defense of the proletarian character of the October Revolution would not be complete if it didn’t also deal with the nature of the Bolshevik Party, which was one of its main protagonists. As with the revolution itself, the class nature of this party was in no doubt amongst any of the revolutionary currents of the day. It was only later on that the idea of a non-proletarian Bolshevik Party developed, other than for Kautsky and social democracy. The Theses on Bolshevism of the councilists are quite explicit on this question:

“Bolshevism, in its principles, tactics and organization, is a movement of the bourgeois revolution in a preponderantly peasant country.” (Thesis 66)

Although the Theses are somewhat contradic­tory:

“The Russian social democratic movement, in its professional-revolutionary leader-element constitutes primarily a part of the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie.” (Thesis 16)

Bourgeois, petty bourgeois or ‘state capita­list’, the different versions of the counci­list analysis all agree on one point: deny­ing any proletarian character to the Bolshe­vik Party. Before going any further and examining the reasoning behind this analysis, we should remind ourselves of some elementary facts about the origins and positions of Bolshevism, in particular the struggles it waged against other political tendencies:

Bolshevism appeared as a marxist current, an integral part of Russian social democracy, as such it fought successive battles:

1. Against populism and agrarian socialism.

2. Against legal marxism and the defenders of Russian liberalism.

3. Against terrorism as a method of struggle, defending instead the mass struggle of the working class.

4. Against ouvrierist economism which reduced the proletarian struggle to the level of economic demands within capitalism, defen­ding instead the global, political struggle of the proletariat, the histori­cal tasks of the class.

5. Against intellectualism, the intelligent­sia, those dilettantish, dubious camp-followers of the workers’ movement, and in defense of the idea of the militant commitment of revolutionaries within the class.

6. Against Menshevism and its support, under the guise of ‘marxism’, for the liberal bourgeoisie in the 1905 Revolution.

7. Against the ‘liquidators’ who, after the crushing of the 1905 Revolution, began to deny the necessity for the political organization of the proletariat.

8. Against the defenders of the imperialist war, for a genuine internationalism which clearly separated itself from mere humanist pacifism.

9. Against the Provisional Government which came out of the revolution of February 1917, against any ‘critical or conditio­nal’ support for the government, for the slogan ‘all power to the soviets’.

These points allow us to have a clearer idea of the Bolshevik Party than the one put for­ward by the councilists. In fact, the prac­tice of the Bolshevik fraction meant that in all circumstances it was fighting alongside the working class. This was particularly the case in the 1905 Revolution which shook Rus­sian society. The Bolsheviks took an active part in it:

-- in the struggle for the destruction of the Tsarist regime;

-- in the soviets, alongside the soviets;

-- in the insurrection, against the Men­sheviks who said that the workers should not have taken up arms.

It is true that the Bolsheviks’ analysis of 1905 (seen as a bourgeois revolution) was incorrect. But their position was an exact copy of Marx’s position in 1848 on the bour­geois revolution in Germany: they stressed the active and autonomous role of the prole­tariat in the revolution, instead of calling on it to trail behind the bourgeoisie. It is this which marks the class frontier, rath­er than the understanding that from now on bourgeois revolutions were no longer possible. The Bolsheviks’ analysis lagged behind reality, but since this was a turning point between two epochs, no-one in 1905 was aware that capitalism was on the eve of its historic crisis, its period of decline. It was not until 1910-11 that Rosa Luxemburg began to raise the question of a change in histori­cal perspective.

The activity and positions of the Bolsheviks were not only concerned with the problems that emerged in Russia. Along with the whole of Russian social democracy they were an integral part of the IInd International, within which they were part of the left wing on all the major questions under discussion. They stood against reformism, revisionism, and colonialism. In particular, they were in the vanguard of the struggle for inter­nationalism.

In 1907, at the Stuttgart Congress, Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg signed an amendment (subsequently adopted) which strengthened a somewhat timid resolution on war and which was to serve as the basis for the position of the internationalists in 1914:

“Should war break out in spite of this, it is their (the socialists) duty to intercede for its speedy end, and to strive with all their power to make use of the violent economic and political crisis brought about by the war to rouse the people, and thereby to hasten the abolition of capitalist class rule.”

In 1912, at the Extraordinary Congress in Basle, which dealt with the threat of imper­ialist war, the left wing called upon the workers to oppose national defense and ad­here to proletarian internationalism.

In 1914, the Bolsheviks were the first to get on their feet after the collapse of the International. They were the first to put forward the slogan which translated the Stuttgart and Basle resolutions into pract­ice: ‘turn the imperialist war into a civil war’. They were the first to understand the need to break not only with the social democratic chauvinists, but also with the ‘centrists’ like Kautsky, and to construct a new International free of the opportunism which had corrupted the IInd, and whose immediate task would be to prepare the socialist revolution.

In 1915, at the Zimmerwald Conference (5-8 September), Lenin and the Bolsheviks were at the head of the left, whose motion, written by Radek and amended by Lenin, stipulated that:

“The struggle for peace without revolu­tionary action is an empty, deceitful phrase; the only road to liberation from the horrors of war is the revolutionary struggle for socialism.”

This motion was rejected without being stud­ied, and in the end the left (8 delegates out of 38) rallied behind the manifesto written by Trotsky (the main animator of the ‘centre’, to which the two Spartacist delegates also adhered). While expressing serious reserves about it: “a timid, inconse­quential manifesto” (‘The First Step’ an article in Social Democrat, 11 October 1915). In order to defend its own position the left set up a ‘Permanent Bureau of the Zimmerwald Left’ alongside the ‘International Socialist Commission’. This Bureau was also animated by the Bolsheviks.

In 1916, at the Kienthal Conference (24 April), the Bolsheviks were once again at the head of the left, whose position was strengthened (12 delegates out of 43), mainly because the Spartacists came to the position of the left, which validated the stand it had taken at Zimmerwald.

In 1917, the preparation of the October Revolution was taken up by Lenin in his struggle against the imperialist war and for proletarian internationalism:

“It is impossible to slip out of the imperialist war and achieve a democratic non-coercive peace without overthrowing the power of capital and transferring state power to another class, the proletariat ...

The international obligations of the working class of Russia are precisely now coming to the forefront with particular force ...

There is one, and only one, kind of real internationalism, and that is -- working whole-heartedly for the development of the revolutionary movement and the revolutionary struggle in one’s own country, and supporting (by propaganda, sympathy and material aid) this struggle, this, and only this line, in every coun­try without exception.” (The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution, 10 April 1917)

“The great honor of beginning has fallen to the Russian proletariat; but it must not forget that its movement and its revolution are only a part of the world revolutionary proletarian movement, which is growing stronger and stronger every day, for example in Germany. We can only determine our tasks from this standpoint.” (Opening Speech at the Conference of April 1917)

In March 1919, the Communist International was founded in Moscow. Its fundamental task was summed up in the name it gave itself: World Party of the Communist Revolution. This was the culmination of the efforts of the Bolsheviks since Zimmerwald. It was the Bolshevik Party (now the Communist Party of Russia) which called the Congress; it was two Bolsheviks, Lenin and Trotsky, who wrote its two major texts: ‘Theses on Bourgeois Democracy and the Proletarian Dictatorship’ and the ‘Manifesto’. It was not only because the revolution had taken place in Russia that the two members of its Executive Commit­tee, Lenin and Zinoviev, had already been among the three members of the Permanent Bureau of the Zimmerwald Left. This was simply an expression of the consistent and irreproachable internationalism which the Bolsheviks defended until the reflux of the revolution led them towards the enemy camp. This is how Bolshevism acted in the convul­sions which shook capitalism at the begin­ning of the century. And there are still revolutionaries who think that this was a bourgeois current! Let’s examine their arguments.

1. The ‘substitutionism’ of the Bolsheviks

“The basic principle of Bolshevik policy -- the conquest and exercise of power by the organization -- is jacobinical.” (Theses on Bolshevism, Thesis 21)

“As a leader-movement of jacobinical dictatorship, Bolshevism in all its phases has consistently combatted the idea of self-determination of the work­ing class and demanded the subordination of the proletariat to the bureaucratized organization.” (Thesis 21)

Before going any further, and in order to rectify a few legends, let’s look at what Lenin had to say:

“We are not utopians. We know that an unskilled laborer or a cook cannot immed­iately get on with the job of state admin­istration. In this we agree with the Cadets, with Breshkovskaya, and with Tsereteli. We differ, however, from these citizens in that we demand an immediate break with the prejudiced view that only the rich, or officials chosen from rich families, are capable of administrating the state, of performing the ordinary, everyday work of administration. We demand that training in the work of state administration be conducted by class-conscious workers and soldiers and that this training be begun at once, ie, that a beginning be made at once in training all the working people, all the poor, for this work.”

“It goes without saying that this new apparatus is bound to make mistakes in taking its first steps. But did not the peasants make mistakes when they emerged from serfdom and began to manage their own affairs? Is there any way other than practice by which the people can learn to govern themselves and to avoid mistakes? Is there any way other than by proceeding immediately to genuine self-government by the people ... The chief thing is to imbue the oppressed and the working people with confidence in their own strength, to prove to them in practice that they can and must themselves ensure the proper, most strictly regulated and organized distribution of bread, all kinds of food, milk, clothing, housing, etc, in the interests of the poor .....The conscientious, bold, universal move to hand over administrative work to pro­letarians, will, however, rouse such unprecedented revolutionary enthusiasm among the people, will so multiply the people’s forces in combating distress, that much that seemed impossible to our narrow, old, bureaucratic forces will become possible for the millions, who will begin to work for themselves and not for the capitalists, the gentry, the bureaucrats, and not out of fear of punishment.” (Lenin, Can The Bolsheviks Retain State Power, October 1917)

These are the words of Lenin the ‘Jacobin’. “But”, some people will say “this was before the October Revolution; this language was pure demagogy and had the sole purpose of winning the confidence of the masses in order to take power in place of them. Afterwards, all this changed!” Let’s see what Lenin-Robespierre said after October:

“The venal bourgeois press can crow as much as it likes about the mistakes made by our revolution. We’re not afraid of mistakes. Men don’t become saints just because the revolution has begun. The toiling classes, oppressed, brutalized, forcibly kept in a state of misery, ignorance, and barbarism for centuries, can’t carry out a revolution without making any mistakes ... For every hundred errors we make and which cause such glee among the bourgeoisie and its lackeys (including our Mensheviks and Right Social Revolutionaries), there are ten thousand great and heroic acts -- all the more great and heroic because they are simple, invisible acts hidden in the daily life of a workers’ neighborhood or a remote village, because they are accomplished by men who are not used to shouting about their success from the rooftops ... But even if things were the other way round, even if for every hun­dred good actions there were ten thousand mistakes, our revolution would still be great and invincible, because for the first time it’s not a minority, not the rich or the educated, but the immense majority of the workers who are them­selves building a new life, and on the basis of their own experience, solving the arduous problems of organizing socialism.

“Each error in this work, which is being consciously and sincerely undertaken by tens of millions of simple workers and peasants in order to transform their lives, each one of these errors is worth thousands, millions of infallible ‘suc­cesses’ by the exploiting minority ... Because it is only through these errors that the workers and peasants can learn to build a new life, to do without the capitalists. Only by surmounting a thou­sand obstacles can they build the road which leads to the triumph of socialism.” (Letter to American Workers, 20 August 1918)

This might temper the usual image of Lenin as a sardonic bogeyman solely preoccupied with maintaining his own dictatorial power and “consistently combating the idea of the self-determination of the working class”. And one could cite dozens of other texts from 1917, 1918, 1919, expressing the same ideas. Having said this, it’s true that Lenin and the Bolsheviks had the erroneous idea that the seizure of political power by the proletariat meant the seizure of power by its party -- a schema deriving from the bourgeois revolution. But this idea was held by all the currents of the IInd Inter­national, including its left wing. It was precisely the experience of the Russian Revolution, of its degeneration, which made it possible to understand the fundamental difference between the proletarian revolu­tion and the bourgeois revolution. For example, to the end of her life in January 1919 Rosa Luxemburg, whose differences with the Bolsheviks on the organization question are well known, held the same erroneous idea:

“If Spartacus takes power, it will be with the clear, indubitable will of the great majority of the proletarian masses.” (Founding Congress of the KPD, 1 January 1919)

Are we to conclude that Rosa Luxemburg her­self was a ‘bourgeois Jacobin’? But what kind of ‘bourgeois revolution’ were she and the Spartacists fighting for in the industrial Germany of 1919? Perhaps she had this position because she had also been the lead­er of a party (the SDKP) which conducted its activities in the Polish and Lithuanian provinces of Tsarist Russia, ‘where only a bourgeois revolution was on the agenda’? However ridiculous such an argument might be, it’s no more so than the one which por­trays Lenin, who spent the major part of his life as a militant in Germany, Switzerland, France and England (ie the most developed countries of that time), as a ‘pure product of the Russian soil’, of the bourgeois revo­lution which this country is supposed to have been pregnant with.

2. The agrarian question

“The Bolsheviks ... perfectly expressed in their agrarian practice and slogans (‘Peace and Land’) the interests of the peasants fighting for the security of small private property, hence on capita­listic lines, and were thus, on the agrarian question, ruthless champions of small-capitalist, hence not socialist-proletarian interests against feudal and capitalist landed property.” (Thesis 46)

Here again, some basic truths have to be reasserted. If the Bolsheviks made mistakes on this question, we have to criticize their real position, as Rosa Luxemburg did in her pamphlet The Russian Revolution, and not a position invented in order to prove an argu­ment. This is what appeared in the ‘decree on the land’ put forward by Lenin and adop­ted at the Second Congress of Soviets on the very day of the October insurrection:

“1. Private ownership of land shall be abolished for ever; land shall not be sold, purchased, leased, mortgaged, or otherwise alienated.

All land, whether State, crown, mona­stery, church, factory, entailed, private, public, peasant, etc, shall be confiscated without compensation and become property of the whole peo­ple, and pass into the use of all those who cultivate it...

3. Lands on which high-level scientific farming is practiced -- orchards, plan­tations, seed plots, nurseries, hot­houses, etc -- shall not be divided up, but shall be converted into model farms, to be turned over for exclusive use to the state or to the communes, depending on the size and importance of such lands.

Household land in towns and villages, with orchards and vegetable gardens, shall be reserved for the use of their present owners, the size of the hold­ings, and the size of tax levied for the use thereof, to be determined by law...” (‘The Land Decree’, quoted in The Russian Revolution & The Soviet State 1917-21 Documents, ed Martin McCauley)

This is very different from a defense of “small private property ... on capitalist lines”. The latter was “abolished forever”.

These decrees were a concretization of the ‘Model Decree’ drawn up in August 1917 on the basis of 242 local peasant mandates. In his report Lenin explained:

“Some people will argue that the decree itself and the mandates were established by the Social Revolutionaries. Does it matter whose work it is? We, as a demo­cratic government, cannot evade the deci­sion of the rank and file of the people, even if we do not agree with it. In the fire of life, by applying it in practice, by carrying it out on the spot, the pea­sants themselves will come to understand what is right ... Life is the best tea­cher and will prove who is right; let the peasants starting from one end, and us starting from the other, settle this question.” (Lenin, Works, xxii, 23)

The position of the Bolsheviks was clear: if they made concessions to the peasantry, it was because they could not impose their program on them by force; but they didn’t renounce this program. What’s more, at the very time that the decree was adopted, the peasants had almost everywhere begun to divide up the land. As for the slogan ‘land to the peasants’, it was not the product of “ruthless champions of small capitalist ... interests”, but an attempt to expose all the bourgeois and conciliator parties, the Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, who were simply deceiving the peasants with promises of agrarian reform -- a reform which they had neither the intention nor the capa­city to implement. In this, these parties were simply confirming what Lenin and the whole marxist left had been saying for years: the bourgeoisie in the underdeveloped countries was no longer able to accomplish any ‘progressive’ historical tasks, in par­ticular the elimination of feudal laws and structures and the imposition of peasant property in land, as the bourgeoisie had done in the advanced countries at the begin­ning of capitalism. On the other hand, Lenin was wrong to think that these tasks, uncompleted by the bourgeoisie, could be taken in hand by the proletariat. If the bourgeoisie was unable to accomplish these tasks, it was because, historically, they were no longer realizable: they were no lon­ger demanded by necessity, by the development of the productive forces, and were in fact in opposition to the tasks facing society. And Rosa Luxemburg was right to stress that the dividing up of the land “piles up insur­mountable obstacles to the socialist transformation of agrarian relations” (The Russian Revolution).

Rosa Luxemburg called for “the nationaliza­tion of the large and middle-sized estates and the union of industry and agriculture.” But instead of denouncing the Bolsheviks as ‘defenders of small-capitalist ... interests’, she wrote quite correctly:

“That the soviet government in Russia has not carried through these mighty reforms -- who can reproach them for that! It would be a sorry jest indeed to demand or expect of Lenin and his comrades that, in the brief period of their rule, in the centre of the gripping whirlpool of domes­tic and foreign struggles, ringed about by countless foes and opponents -- to ex­pect that under such circumstances they should already have solved, or even tack­led, one of the most difficult tasks, indeed, we can safely say, the most diffi­cult task of the social transformation of society! Even in the West, under the most favorable conditions, once we have come to power, we too will break many a tooth on this hard nut before we are out of the worst of the thousands of complicated difficulties of this gigantic task!” (The Russian Revolution)

3. The national question

“The appeal to the international proleta­riat was only one side of a largely-laid policy for international support of the Russian Revolution. The other side was the policy and propaganda of ‘national self-determination’ in which the class outlook was even more definitely sacrifi­ced than in the concept of ‘people's revolution’, in favor of an appeal to all classes of certain peoples.” (Thesis 50)

It’s difficult to believe that, ever since its foundation in 1898, Russian social demo­cracy (and not only the Bolsheviks), follow­ing the lead of international social democ­racy, had adopted the slogan of ‘the right to national self-determination’, simply as a ‘tactic’ to defend a revolution that did not take place till 1917, and in a country and a way that no-one had foreseen. Are we to believe that Gorter and Pannekoek, who criticized Lenin’s positions on this ques­tion, had in mind the future defense of a ‘bourgeois revolution’ in Holland, when they made an exception in their analysis and cal­led for self-determination of the Dutch Indies?

As for sacrificing the ‘class outlook’, let us see what Lenin said in the middle of his polemic with Rosa Luxemburg on this question:

“Social democracy, as the party of the proletariat sees as its main positive task to cooperate in the free disposition, not of peoples and nations, but of the proletariat of each nationality. We have always unconditionally supported the closest union of the proletariat of all nationalities, and it’s only in particu­lar, exceptional cases that we can act­ively put forward demands for a new class state or for the replacement of the over­all political unity of the state by a looser federal union.” (Iskra, no.44)

Having established this -- and it’s worth pointing out that, most often, those who denounce Bolshevism as bourgeois, know even less about it than those who defend it to the letter -- it must be said that the ‘right to national self-determination’ must be categorically rejected, because of its erro­neous theoretical content and, even more, because experience has shown what this slo­gan has meant in practice. The ICC has devoted many texts to this question (espec­ially the pamphlet Nation or Class?), so it’s not necessary to go over it again here. But it is important to show what significance this slogan had for the Bolsheviks, to point out the fundamental difference between a mistake and a betrayal. Lenin and the majo­rity of the Bolsheviks, basing themselves on the interests of the world socialist revolu­tion, believed that it was possible to use the position of ‘the right to national self-determination’ against capitalism; and on this they were completely mistaken. But the renegades and traitors of all kinds, from the Socialists to the Stalinists, have used this position to develop their counter­revolutionary policies, to conserve and strengthen national and international capitalism. There’s the difference. But it has all the thickness of a class line.

It’s quite natural that renegades and trai­tors should try to camouflage themselves by using this or that erroneous phrase of Lenin's; but they arrive at conclusions com­pletely opposed to the revolutionary spirit which guided Lenin’s actions all through his life. But it's stupid for revolutionaries to help them by obliterating the differences between the scoundrels and Lenin, by claiming that they are just the same. It’s stupid to say that Lenin proclaimed ‘the right to national self-determination’, up to and including secession from Russia, in order to defend the national interests of the ‘bour­geois revolution’ in Russia. When we say that the ‘liberation’ of the colonial coun­tries, their formal ‘independence’, is not incompatible with the interests of the colo­nialist countries, we mean that imperialism can easily accommodate itself to this formal independence. But this in no way means that imperialism follows this policy bene­volently or indifferently. All the ‘libera­tions’ have been the product of internal struggles and clashes of interest between different bourgeoisies, of the international intrigues of antagonistic imperialist powers. Later on Stalin was to demonstrate, at the cost of rivers of blood, that the interests of Russia didn’t exactly correspond with the independence of the countries surround­ing it; on the contrary, these interests demanded the forceful incorporation of these countries into the Great Russian Empire.

To explain is not to justify. But those who, in order to condemn an erroneous posi­tion, make an amalgam between the right of peoples to separation and violent incorpora­tion, between Lenin and Stalin, understand nothing, and turn history into an amorphous, insipid porridge. Lenin saw the right to self-determination as a way of denouncing imperialism -- not the imperialism of other countries but the imperialism of ‘his’ own country, his own bourgeoisie. It’s undeni­able that this led to contradictions, as the following passage shows:

“The situation is very confused., but there is one point which allows everyone to remain internationalists; that is, that the Russian and German social democrats demand ‘freedom of separation’ for Poland, whereas the Polish social democrats will struggle for the unity of revolutionary action in their small country as in the big ones, without, in the present epoch (that of imperialist war), calling for independence for Poland.” (‘The Conclu­sions of a Debate on the Right of Nations to Define Themselves’, October 1916)

But as this passage also shows, the contra­dictions, the ‘very confused’ situation his analysis led to, was undeniably animated by an intransigently internationalist concern. At the time he wrote this text, the main counter-revolutionary force was social demo­cracy, the social imperialists as Lenin cal­led them, “socialist in words and imperia­list in deeds”. Without their aid capitalism would never have been able to drag the work­ers into the butchery of world war. These ‘socialists’ justified the war in the name of the national interests the workers were supposed to have in common with ‘their’ bourgeoisie. According to them, the imperialist war meant defending democracy and the workers’ freedoms and conquests, which were being threatened by evil ‘foreign imperia­lisms’. Exposing these lies, these false socialists, was the primary duty, the imperative task for every revolutionary. For Lenin, the right of peoples to self-determination was part of this preoccupation; not for the interests of Russia, but against the national interests of the Russian and international bourgeoisie. As for using this slogan to justify participation in the imper­ialist war, Lenin replied quite clearly:

“Whoever refers today to Marx’s attitude towards the wars of the epoch of the progressive bourgeoisie and forgets Marx’s statement that ‘workers have no fatherland’, a statement that applies precisely to the epoch of the reactionary, obsolete bourgeoisie, to the epoch of the socialist revolution, shamelessly dis­torts Marx and substitutes the bourgeois for the socialist point of view.” (Lenin, Socialism and War)

4. ‘Tactical’ internationalism

“But their revolutionary internationalism was as much determined by their tactic in the Russian Revolution as was later their swing to the NEP.” (Thesis 50)

“The only real danger threatening the Russian Revolution was that of imperialist intervention ... The problem of the active defense of Bolshevism against world impe­rialism consisted, therefore, in counter­attacking in the imperialist centers of power. This was brought about through the two-sided international policy of Bolshevism.” (Thesis 51)

“Thus the concept of ‘world revolution’ has for the Bolsheviks an altogether different class content. It no longer has anything in common with the inter­national proletarian revolution ...” (Thesis 54)

This another well-established legend about the Bolsheviks: their internationalism was just a ‘tactic’ aimed first of all at winning the confidence of the popular masses, who were tired of the war; and secondly at subor­dinating the whole world workers’ movement to a policy of defending the Russian capitalist state.

Concerning the first argument, we recall to the reader the positions the Bolsheviks took up well before the war broke out, par­ticularly at the International Congresses of 1907 and 1912. What’s more, the struggle against war in the conception of the Bolshe­viks had nothing to do with the positions of the pacifist bourgeoisie, which influen­ced certain sectors of the workers’ move­ment. Instead of calling on the belligerent states to make a ‘democratic peace without annexations’, instead even of simply calling for ‘a war against war’, they were the first in the workers’ movement to put forward the truly revolutionary slogan ‘turn the imper­ialist war into a civil war’, pitilessly denouncing all the illusions of pacifism. If their only concern had been to ‘win the masses in order to take power’, why did they need to take up slogans which isolated them from the masses, who were caught up in the idea of ‘fighting on till the end’ – at first in its chauvinist form, then in the guise of ‘revolutionary defencism’? And our Bolshevik-slayers reply: “because they foresaw that the masses, tired of the war and the misfortunes it brought, would turn to them in the end”. But then why didn’t Plekhanov, the Mensheviks, the Social Revo­lutionaries, Kerensky, all the bourgeois factions who also wanted to take power why didn’t they also call for ‘revolutionary defeatism’, ie explain that it was in the interest of the Russian workers that their country be defeated in the imperialist war? These currents should also have played the ‘internationalist’ card, since this was a real winner which didn’t conflict with the interests of Russian capital. After all, these people are supposed to have had the same basic interests as the Bolsheviks. Is the difference between the Bolsheviks and all these others, not a class difference, but simply a difference in clairvoyance, in intelligence? This is what the analysis of our professional detractors would imply. But then, how was it that all the advanced elements of the world proletariat (the Spartacists and the Arbeiterpolitik group in Germany, the elements grouped around Loriot in France, around Russel Williams or The Trade Unionist in England, Maclean in Scotland, in the Socialist Labor Party in the USA, the Tribunists in Holland, the socialist left or the socialist youth in Sweden, the ‘Narrows’ in Bulgaria, the ‘National Bureau’ and the ‘General Bureau’ in Poland, the left socialists in Switzerland, the elements around the ‘Karl Marx Club’ in Austria, etc) -- the great majority of whom were to be in the vanguard of the great class combats which followed the war -- how was it that all these elements (including the ‘future’ councilists) adopted or rallied to a position on the war identical or very close to the position of the Bolsheviks? Why did they collaborate with the Bolsheviks within the Zimmerwald and Kienthal left?

In general, councilism does not dispute the proletarian nature of these currents (and with good reason!). Why then argue that what separated the Bolsheviks from the Men­sheviks was simply a difference of ‘intelli­gence’, whereas the same opposition between the Spartacists and social democrats expres­sed a class difference? Germany, a much older, more powerful and tested capitalism than Russia, was unable to do what its much weaker rival succeeded in doing: produce a political current which was clever enough, as early as 1907 and especially in 1914, to put forward internationalist slogans which, at the given moment, would allow it to rec­uperate the discontent of the masses to its own advantage and to the advantage of the national capital. This is the logical con­clusion to this idea of ‘tactical’ interna­tionalism. And the paradox is even greater when we think that at Zimmerwald it was this bourgeois current which had the most correct position, whereas the proletarian Sparta­cists were sunk in the confusions of the ‘centre’. And when that great revolutionary, Rosa Luxemburg, wrote this confusion into her pamphlet against the war, The Junius Pamphlet,

“Yes, socialists should defend their country in great historical crises, and here lies the great fault of the German social democratic Reichstag group. When it announced on the fourth of August, “in this hour of danger, we will not desert our fatherland,” it denied its own words in the same breath. For truly it has deserted its fatherland in its hour of greatest danger. The highest duty of the social democracy towards its fatherland demanded that it expose the real back­ground of this imperialist war, that it rends the net of imperialist and diploma­tic lies that covers the eyes of the people. It was their duty ... to oppose to the imperialist war, based as it was upon the most reactionary forces in Europe, the program of Marx, of Engels, and Lassalie.”

it’s really surprising that it was the ‘bourgeois’ Lenin who dealt with her errors as follows:

“The fallacy of his argument is striking­ly evident, ….He suggests that the imperialist war should be ‘opposed’ with a national program. He urges the advanced class to turn its face to the past and not to the future! …. At the present time, the objective situation in the biggest advanced states of Europe is different. Progress, if we leave out for the moment the possibility of tempo­rary steps backward, can be made only in the direction of socialist society, only in the direction of the socialist revolution.” (On the Junius Pamphlet)

Finally, the theory of ‘tactical’ interna­tionalism leads one to argue that the posi­tion on imperialist wars was a secondary point in the proletarian program at that time, since it could quite easily be part of the program of a bourgeois party. This is quite wrong. In fact in 1914 the problem of the war was central to the whole life of capitalism. It uncovered all its mortal contradictions. It showed that the system had entered its epoch of historical decline, that it had become a barrier to the develop­ment of the productive forces, that it could not survive without successive holocausts, repeated and increasingly catastrophic muti­lations. Whatever conflicting interests divided the bourgeoisie of a given country, the war forced all these factions to mobi­lize themselves in defense of their common heritage: the national capital and its highest representative, the state. This is why, in 1914, there appeared a phenomenon which had seemed impossible only shortly before: the ‘union sacree’, which bound to­gether parties and organizations which had been fighting each other for decades. And though conflicts within the ruling class appeared during the war, they did not ques­tion the necessity to grab as much of the imperialist cake as possible; they arose only around the problems of how to go about this. Thus the bourgeois Provisional Govern­ment which took power after the February revolution did not abandon any of the objec­tives agreed upon in the diplomatic settle­ments between Tsarist Russia and the count­ries of the Entente. On the contrary, it was because it considered that the Tsarist regime was not conducting the war alongside France and England with sufficient determina­tion, that the Tsar was being tempted to break his alliances and come to an agreement with Germany, that the faction of the bour­geoisie which dominated the Provisional Government helped to get rid of Nicholas II. If the October Revolution had really been a ‘bourgeois revolution’, with the aim of more effectively defending the national capital, it would not have immediately proclaimed the necessity for peace, published secret diplo­matic agreements, renounced all the war aims which figured in them. On the contrary, it would have immediately taken the necessary measures to ensure a more efficient conduct of the war. If the Bolshevik Party had been a bourgeois party, it would not have been at the head of all the proletarian parties of the day, denouncing the imperialist war and calling upon the workers to put an end to it by making the socialist revolution. During an imperialist war, internationalism is not a secondary point for the workers’ movement. On the contrary it is the line of demarca­tion between the proletarian camp and the bourgeois camp. And this is only an illus­tration of a more general reality: internationalism belongs only to the working class. The proletariat is the only historic class which has no property of its own, and whose rule over society involves the disappearance of all forms of property. As such, it is the only class which can go beyond the ter­ritorial divisions (regional for the nobility; national for the bourgeoisie) which are the geopolitical expression of the existence of property, the framework within which the ruling class protects and defends its prop­erty. And if the constitution of nations corresponded to the victory of the bourgeoi­sie over the nobility, the abolition of nations will only be brought about by the victory of the working class over the bourgeoisie.

This leads us to the second argument which councilism puts forward to show that the internationalism of the Bolsheviks was just a ‘tactic’: that it was a slogan which aimed to subordinate the world workers’ movement to a policy of defending the Russian state, and that the Communist International, from its foundation, was simply an instrument of Soviet diplomacy. This idea is also put forward by Guy Sabatier of the group Pour Une Intervention Communiste in the pamphlet Traite de Brest-Litovsk 1918, Coup d’Arret a la Revolution. For this comrade (who doesn’t fall into the Menshevism of the councilists concerning the ‘bourgeois’ nature of the Russian Revolution):

“The IIIrd International was conceived with the immediate perspective of defend­ing the Russian state in all countries, as a support to diplomacy of the usual kind.” (p.32)

And though he admits that:

“several texts reflect the thrust of the international proletarian movement, like for example, the Manifesto ‘To the Prole­tarians of the Whole World’ written by Trotsky.”

Sabatier considers that:

“The appeal ‘To the Workers of all Coun­tries’ launched by the Congress was the most significant document concerning the real role this world organization was taking up behind a smokescreen of profes­sions of communist faith: the workers were first and foremost called upon to give their unreserved support to the ‘struggle of the proletarian state encir­cled by capitalist states’; and in order to do this, they were to use all means to put pressure on their governments ‘including, if need be, revolutionary means (sic)’. What’s more, this appeal stressed the ‘gratitude’ that was owed to the ‘Russian revolutionary proletariat and its leading party, the communist party of the Bolsheviks’, thus preparing the ground for the ‘defense of the USSR’, the cult of the party-state.” (p.34)

When you want to kill a dog, first of all say that it’s got rabies! It’s somewhat curious to think that the “most significant document” concerning the real role of the CI was a simple memorandum which Sadoul brought to the Congress as the declaration of the French delegation; it is fraudulent to present this text as an “appeal launched by the Congress” because it wasn’t even sub­mitted to ratification! Thus, it is through this quite secondary document that the CI is supposed to have revealed its essential task to the world proletariat; defending the Russian state. And yet the essential texts of the Congress (written by the Bolsheviks -- the ‘Manifesto’ by Trotsky, ‘Theses on Bourgeois Democracy and the Proletarian Dictatorship’ by Lenin, the ‘Platform’ by Bukharin and Albert, the ‘Resolution on the Position with regard to Socialist Currents and the Berne Conference’ by Zinoviev) defended the following positions:

-- denunciation of the Socialist parties as agents of the bourgeoisie and the absolute necessity to break with them;

-- denunciation of all the democratic and parliamentary illusions weighing on the workers;

-- the necessity to violently destroy the capitalist state;

-- the seizure of power by the workers’ councils on a world scale and the establish­ment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

And in none of these texts can one find any trace of an appeal to ‘defend the USSR’, not because it would have been wrong to call on the workers of other countries to oppose the support their governments were giving to the White armies and their direct parti­cipation in the civil war, but quite simply because this was not the main function of the CI, which conceived itself as “the instr­ument for the international republic of councils” and “the International of open mass action, the International of revolutio­nary realization, the International of the deed” (‘Manifesto’). Perhaps it could be claimed that Sadoul was being ‘remote-controlled’ or ‘manipulated’ by the Bolshe­viks, to show the workers their duty to ‘defend the USSR’, while they themselves took charge of creating the “smokescreen of professions of communist faith”. This would be further proof of the much-vaunted ‘duplicity’ of the Bolsheviks! But if such a hypothesis was true, it would still be necessary to explain why the Bolsheviks sho­uld have used such a ‘tactic’. If the real aim behind the foundation of the Inter­national was to mobilize the workers behind the ‘defense of the USSR’, would not the best way to achieve this have been to insert the slogan in the official texts of the Congress and to put all their authority be­hind it (an authority which was considerable among the workers of the whole world)? Can one seriously think that such a slogan would have more impact on the proletarian masses if it appeared in an almost confiden­tial manner in a secondary document presen­ted by a militant who was not very well known and who wasn’t even the official dele­gate (the representative of the Zimmerwald left was Guilbeaux)? The poverty of these arguments is further proof of the inconsis­tency of the thesis that the Communist Inter­national was, from the beginning, an instru­ment of Russian capitalist diplomacy.

No, comrade Sabatier! No, dear Bolshevik-slayers! The CI was not bourgeois at its foundation. It became bourgeois. But, at the same time, it died as an International, because there can never be an International of the bourgeoisie. A bourgeois revolution has never given birth to an International: the ‘bourgeois’ revolution of 1917 would be the one exception, and since the councilists, like the Stalinists, say that the October Revolution was no different from the so-called Chinese ‘revolution’ of 1949 (see Theses on the Chinese Revolution by Cajo Brendel), they should explain to us why the latter didn’t give rise to a new Inter­national.

And if the CI, from the very beginning, was nothing but a capitalist institution, it has to be explained why all the living forces of the world proletariat were regrouped within it, including those elements who later became the communist left. Wasn’t the CI’s Bureau in Western Europe led by Panne­koek and his friends? How could a bourgeois organism secrete these communist fractions which, in the midst of the most terrible counter-revolution in history, were the only ones to carry on defending proletarian principles? Are we to imagine that during the great post-war revolutionary wave mil­lions of workers in struggle, as well as all the most conscious and lucid militants of the workers’ movement, had simply come to the wrong door when they rallied to the Communist International? Councilism has an answer to these questions:

5. The ‘Machiavellainism’ of the Bolsheviks

“... the Bolsheviks have ... dropped slo­gans among the workers, eg that of the soviets. Determining for their tactic was merely the momentary success of a slogan which was by no means regarded as an obligation of principle on the part of the party with respect to the masses, but as a propagandistic means or a policy having for its final content the conquest of power by the organization.” (Thesis 31)

“The establishment of the Soviet state was the establishment of the rule of the party of Bolshevik Machiavellianism.” (Thesis 57)

Councilism didn’t invent this idea about the Machiavellianism of the Bolsheviks and of Lenin. The bourgeoisie invented it in 1917. After this, and following on from the anar­chists, the councilists added their voices to the choir. Let’s say straight away that such a viewpoint betrays a policeman’s con­ception of history, characteristic of exploi­ting classes for whom any social movement is simply the product of ‘manipulations’ or ‘ringleaders’. This conception is so absurd from the marxist point of view (and the councilists call themselves marxists) that we will limit ourselves to a few quotations and a few facts about the actions of the Bolsheviks to show how invalid it is. Was it out of ‘demagogy’ or ‘Machiavellia­nism’ that Lenin declared in April 1917:

“Don’t believe in words. Don’t be begui­led by promises. Don’t overestimate your strength. Organize yourselves in every factory, in every regiment and company, in every neighborhood. Work at organi­zing yourself day after day, hour after hour; work at it yourselves, because no-one can do it for you ... This is the essential content of all the decisions of our conference. This is the main lesson of the revolution. This is the main measure of success.

Comrade workers, we call on you to begin a difficult, important, tireless work, which will have to unite the conscious, revolutionary proletariat of all count­ries. This is the only road which can lead anywhere, which can deliver humanity from the horrors of war and yoke of capital.” (Introduction to the Resolution of the Conference of April 1917, Works, vo1.24)

“It is not a question of numbers, but of giving correct expression to the ideas and policies of the truly revolutionary proletariat ... It is better to remain with one friend only, like Liebknecht, (if) that means remaining with the revolutionary proletariat.” (The Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution)

Not only did the Bolsheviks say that it was necessary to be able to remain isolated; they effectively did so every time the work­ing class was mobilized on the terrain of the bourgeoisie.

But perhaps it was out of mere ‘demagogy’ that they found themselves alongside the class or at the head of the class when it was marching towards the revolution. All this was just ‘tactics’, and since 1903 they had been consistently deceiving everyone:

-- the Russian proletariat, so they could come to power;

-- the world proletariat, so that it could be used to defend this power;

-- the Russian peasants, who were given the land, the better to take it away from them afterwards;

-- the national minorities;

-- the Russian bourgeoisie;

-- the world bourgeoisie.

And in fact their ‘Machiavellianism’ was so great that they even achieved the tour de force of deceiving themselves ... Pannekoek discovered this when he wrote: “Lenin (who, however was a ‘pupil of Marx’) never unders­tood what marxism really was” (Lenin as Philosopher).

The development of consciousness in the proletariat

We have not undertaken this defense of the proletarian character of the Bolsheviks and the October Revolution in order to piously honor their memory. It’s because the whole conception of them as a bourgeois party or a bourgeois revolution represents a break with marxism, the essential theore­tical instrument of the class struggle with­out which the proletariat will never be able to overthrow capitalism. We’ve seen how the councilist or even the Bordigist conceptions of October 1917 lead to Menshe­vik or Stalinist aberrations. Similarly, any analysis of the Bolsheviks as a bour­geois party is a barrier to understanding the living process by which consciousness develops in the proletariat, a process which it is the task of revolutionaries to accel­erate, deepen and generalize. In order to do this they must understand this process as clearly as possible.

To those who say that the October Revolution was proletarian but that the Bolshevik Party was bourgeois, or who say that both were bourgeois but are unable to deny that:

“The Russian Revolution was an important episode in the development of the working class movement. Firstly, as already men­tioned, by the display of new forms of political strike, instruments of revolu­tion. Moreover, in a higher degree, by the first appearance of new forms of self-organization of the fighting workers, known as soviets, ie councils.” (Pannekoek, Workers’ Councils)

-- to all these people, we pose this question: in an event so important for the life and struggle of the class, how was class cons­ciousness expressed? Can it be that such an event wasn’t accompanied by any develop­ment of class consciousness? That the prole­tarian masses were on the move and giving rise to unprecedented forms of struggle and organization while suffering from the domination of bourgeois ideology in the same way as before? You only have to pose the question to see how absurd such an idea is. But then did this development of cons­ciousness take place in total silence? In which militants, newspapers, and leaflets was it expressed? Was it generalized throughout the class by telepathy or by the mere addition of millions of identical individual experiences? Is it possible that all members and sectors of the working class evolved in a homogeneous, uniform manner? Obviously not! But then, is it possible that the most advanced elements and sectors remained isolated, atomized, without trying to regroup in order to deepen their positions and intervene actively in the struggle and the general process of coming to conscious­ness? Obviously not! Which organization or organizations (in addition to the coun­cils which grouped the whole class and not only its most advanced elements) expressed this coming to consciousness and helped to enlarge and deepen it?

The Bolshevik Party? Some of the people, who think that this was a bourgeois party, think that ‘even so’, or in a ‘deformed way’, it did express this consciousness. Such an analysis is untenable. Either this party was an emanation of capitalism, or it was an emanation of the working class, or of some other class in society. But if it really was an emanation of capitalism (in whatever form) it couldn’t at the same time express the life of its mortal enemy, the proletariat. It could not regroup the most conscious elements of the class, but only its most mystified members.

The anarchist current? This current was very divided and heterogeneous. There was a huge gulf between someone like Kropotkin, who called for a struggle against ‘Prussian barbarism’, and someone like Voline who remained an internationalist even at the worst moments of World War II. As a whole, unable to organize itself, divided into its individualist, syndicalist and communist varieties, and despite the important audience that it had, anarchism was either left be­hind events or, up to October 1917, follow­ed an identical policy to that of the Bolsheviks. If the most conscious elements of the class could not regroup within the Bolshevik Party, it would have been even harder for them to have regrouped in the anarchist current.

The Left Social Revolutionaries? Here again, at its best, this current fought alongside the Bolsheviks: struggling against Kerensky’s Provisional Government, participating in the October insurrection, defending the soviet power. But it saw itself essentially as a defender of the small peasant and after 1917 it rapidly returned to where it had come from: terrorism. If the Bolsheviks weren’t militants of the working class, the Left Social Revolutionaries were even less.

Should we then look for the most advanced elements in the parties which participated in the bourgeois Provisional Government, the Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks? Per­haps some councilists think that the latter were the clearest from the proletarian viewpoint, since they borrowed their analysis from them?

In fact the councilist analysis is completely incapable of replying to any of these ques­tions; the only conclusion it can reach is that:

-- either the events of 1917 did not produce or express any development of consciousness in the class;

-- or that this consciousness remained comp­letely dumb, atomized and ‘individual’.

But these are not the only aberrations the councilist analysis leads to. We’ve seen that this analysis ‘demonstrates’ the bour­geois character of the Bolshevik Party by showing that it defended bourgeois positions on certain questions:

-- substitutionism

-- the agrarian question

-- the national question

Although, as we have seen, councilism attri­butes to the Bolsheviks positions they never held (at least up till 1917 and during the first years of the revolution), although it sees behind these positions a coherence which is quite opposite to the one they rea­lly defended, it is necessary to recognize the errors of the Bolsheviks and not hide them, as do the Bordigists for example. The Bolsheviks themselves were the first to admit their errors when they became aware of them. But what councilism refuses to admit is precisely that these positions were errors; for them, they are simply an illustration of the ‘bourgeois nature’ of the Bolshevik Party.

Note the systematic bias of the councilists: when, on any given point, the Bolshevik Party had the most correct position from a proletarian standpoint (the break with social democracy, destruction of the capita­list state, power of the workers’ councils, internationalism) this was just ‘by chance’ or because of ‘tactics’. On the other hand, when they had a position which was less cor­rect than that of other revolutionary cur­rents of the time (agrarian question, national question), this is proof of their ‘bour­geois nature’. In fact, using the criteria of the councilists, you are led to the con­clusion that all the proletarian parties of the time were part of the capitalist class.

For councilism, the IIIrd International, and the parties which belonged to it, were capi­talist organs from the beginning. What then are to think about the IInd Internatio­nal? On the various incriminating points, did it have a better position than the IIIrd International or the Bolsheviks? On the national question for example, and in parti­cular the Polish question which was at the centre of the controversy between Rosa Luxemburg and Lenin, what was its position? The answer is clear when we recall that Lenin based his position in this debate on the resolutions of the Congresses of the International, which Luxemburg had fought against so resolutely. On the seizure of power by the proletariat, the International considered that this was the task of the workers’ party: Lenin (or Luxemburg) didn’t invent anything here. On the other hand the Socialist parties weren’t all that clear about the need to destroy the capitalist state. We could give many more examples to show that the erroneous positions of the Bolsheviks were simply an inheritance from the IInd International. Therefore, follow­ing the councilists’ analysis, this Inter­national was also a bourgeois organ: poor old Engels, Luxemburg, Liebknecht, Pannekoek, and Gorter, who spent so many years as mili­tants inside an institution for defending capitalism! What’s more, it’s hard to see why the Ist International was any more ‘work­ing class’ than the one which followed it. Perhaps the presence within it of positi­vists, Proudhonists, Mazzinists gave it that breath of proletarian air which its successors lacked? Or should we go back to the Communist League to find a real prole­tarian current? Some councilists actually have this idea. We would recommend to them a re-reading of the 1848 Manifesto. They might get a shock to find that the class and the party are identified with each other and that the program of concrete measures it puts forward bear a strong resemblance to state capitalism. In the end, the counci­lists’ analysis leads to the interesting discovery that there has never been an organized workers’ movement. Or rather that such a movement only began with them. And further, there have never been any revolutionaries before them either. Marx and Engels? They were just bourgeois democrats. How else can you explain Engels’ position on the conquest of power through parliament in his 1895 introduction to The Class Struggle in France, or Marx’s speech on the same theme at the Hague Congress of 1872, or Marx’s telegram of congratulation to Lincoln, or the attitude of Marx and Engels during the 1848 revolution, when they moved away from the Communist League and got mixed up in Rhenan’s democratic movement ... ?

As with the Bordigists for whom there has been an ‘invariant’ ‘immutable’ program since 1848, the councilist analysis is com­pletely ahistorical because it refuses to admit that the consciousness and political positions of the proletariat are the product of its historical experience. The idea that any error, any bourgeois position held by a proletarian organization means that it is part of the capitalist class, presupposes the absurd idea that communist consciousness can exist straight away in a fully formed manner. This is completely alien to the marxist viewpoint. Class consciousness is the result of a long process of maturation in which theoretical reflection and practice are intimately linked, and in which the wor­kers’ movement stammers and struggles for­ward, stops, re-examines itself:

“... proletarian revolutions ... criticize themselves constantly, interrupt them­selves continually in their own course, come back to the apparently accomplished in order to begin it afresh, deride with unmerciful thoroughness the inadequacies, the weaknesses and paltrinesses of their first attempts, seem to throw down their adversary only in order that he may draw new strength from the earth and rise again, more gigantic, before them, recoil ever and anon from the indefinite prodi­giousness of their own aims, until a sit­uation has been created which makes all turning back impossible ...” (Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte)

Expressions of the disarray of a communist current during the most terrible counter­revolution in history, the councilist con­ceptions today seem to have become a refuge for skeptical academics (is it by chance that councilists like Paul Mattick, Cajo Brendel or Maximilien Rubel seem more inter­ested in writing, conferences or marxology than in animating communist political groups?). There’s nothing unusual in this: isn’t it typical of academic mandarins to have this attitude of judging history, of sitting in a high throne and, on the basis of a posteriori criteria, retrospectively condemning the errors or inadequacies of the proletariat and of revolutionaries, instead of drawing lessons from the past in order to fortify the struggle in the future? Councilism ‘discovered’ that the October Revolution and the Bolshevik Party were bourgeois after the event, using criteria established a posteriori and largely thanks to the experience of this ‘bourgeois’ October Revolution.

We’ve seen in this article and in other pub­lished in our International Review (especi­ally ‘The Degeneration of the Russian Revo­lution’ in no.3) that the existence of a capitalist regime in the USSR today can in no way be deduced from the backward state of the country in 1917, nor from the policies carried out by the Bolsheviks once they were in power, even though both have influenced the specific form capitalism has assumed in Russia and its ideological justification. We have seen that the degeneration and fail­ure of the revolution were not the result of the lack of ‘objective material condit­ions’: the latter existed because capital­ism as a whole had entered its epoch of dec­line. The causes of the failure of the revolution reside in the immaturity of the ‘subjective conditions’, ie the level of consciousness in the proletariat. Does this mean that the proletariat was premature to embark upon the revolution in Russia, that the Bolsheviks were wrong to push the class in this direction?

Only academic philistines and reformists could answer yes. Revolutionaries can only answer no. First because the only criteria for judging the level of consciousness in the class, its ability to face up to a situa­tion, are the action and practice of the class itself. And second because this level of consciousness can only be modified in action and through action, as Rosa Luxemburg wrote in her polemic against Bernstein:

“It will be impossible to avoid the ‘pre­mature’ conquest of state power by the proletariat precisely because these ‘pre­mature’ attacks of the proletariat consti­tute a factor, and indeed a very important factor, creating the political conditions for the final victory. In the course of the political crisis accompanying its seizure of power, in the course of the long and stubborn struggles, the proleta­riat will acquire the degree of political maturity permitting it to obtain in time a definitive victory of the revolution. Thus these ‘premature’ attacks of the proletariat against the state power are in themselves important historic factors helping to provoke and determine the point of the definite victory. Considered from this viewpoint, the idea of a ‘prem­ature’ conquest of political power by the laboring class appears to be a political absurdity derived from a mechanical con­ception of the development of society, and positing for the victory of the class struggle a point fixed outside and independent of the class struggle. (Reform or Revolution)

The only way the ‘premature’ seizure of power by the proletariat in 1917, its exp­eriences and errors (and thus those of Bolshevism) can be “an important factor of its final victory” is for the proletariat and above all the revolutionaries of today, to make a ruthless critique of these exper­iences and errors. One of the first to do this, even before the future councilists, was Rosa Luxemburg in her pamphlet The Russian Revolution. But this means we have to adopt the same attitude as hers against all the detractors of the October Revolu­tion and the Bolsheviks:

“To those who ... shower calumnies on the Russian Bolsheviks, we should never cease to reply with the question: ‘where did you learn the alphabet of your revolution? Was it not from the Russians that you learned to ask for workers’ and soldiers’ councils?” (Speech at the Founding Con­gress of the KPD)

“Whatever a party could offer of courage, revolutionary farsightedness and consis­tency in a historic hour, Lenin, Trotsky and the other comrades have given in good measure. All the revolutionary honor and capacity which western social democ­racy lacked were represented by the Bol­sheviks. Their October uprising was not only the actual salvation of the Russian Revolution; it was also the salvation of the honor of international socialism.”

“... theirs is the immortal historical service of having marched at the head of the international proletariat with the conquest of political power and the practical placing of the problem of the realization of socialism, and of having advanced mightily the settlement of the score between capital and labor in the entire world. In Russia the problem could only be posed. It could not be solved in Russia. And in this sense, the future everywhere belongs to BOLSHEVISM.” (Luxemburg, The Russian Revolution)

FM

1 Of course some brave spirits think that the proletariat cannot make any concessions once it has taken power (cf the pamphlet by Guy Sabatier Brest-Litovsk 1918, coup d'arrêt à la révolution). But unfortunately for these ‘pure’ hardliners, reality will rarely conform to the will of revolutionaries. In reality, we are dealing with a world where, for most countries, more than one quarter is destined for export to foreign markets, and an equivalent proportion of the economy is dependent on imported goods. In these conditions, to refuse to make any concessions in principle would mean for example, that the English proletariat would die of hunger a month after seizing power, since the population cannot be supported by British agriculture alone. It is likely that capitalism would attempt to overthrow the victorious proletariat in a single country through starvation and blockade, and it is not impossible that it could succeed if it was allowed to do so by the workers in other countries. But this does not mean that, for the sake of absurd principles, the proletariat should choose suicide rather than accepting indispensable goods from this or that country which chooses to put its own immediate commercial interests above those of class solidarity with world capitalism.

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1917 - Russian Revolution [13]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Zimmerwald movement [83]

People: 

  • Lenin [84]

Reply to the Internationalist Communist Party (Battaglia Comunista)

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For more than a year, the ICC and the Inter­nationalist Communist Party have been enga­ged in a political debate with the aim of transcending the sectarianism which still weighs heavily on the re-emerging revolutio­nary movement. As part of this joint effort, the ICC sent an important delegation to the international conference called by Battaglia in Milan last May1, and invited a delega­tion from Battaglia to participate in the work of the Second Congress of the ICC in July. We were thus rather surprised by the publication, immediately after this, of two articles in Battaglia Comunista entitled: ‘The Second Congress of the ICC: Disorientation and Confusion’ in which we are viol­ently attacked for “regressing and moving away from revolutionary Marxism” (Battaglia Comunista, nos.10-11, August/September 1977).

We have already commented on (in Rivoluzione Internazionale, no.10) the marked suspicious­ness of the comrades of Battaglia who see great ‘political novelties’ and innovations in certain draft resolutions which synthe­size positions which have constantly appear­ed in our press (in particular the Resolu­tion on Proletarian Political Groups which is a new version of the article ‘Proletarian Groups and Confused Groups’ which appeared, among other places, in Rivoluzione Inter­nazionale, no.8 and World Revolution, no.11).

Battaglia has been unable to deny the evid­ence and has tried to escape the question by saying that these published texts were not ‘official’. It’s a strange conception which sees published texts as unofficial and draft documents circulated for internal use as official. But leaving aside all other considerations, the positions under­lying the Resolution on the Period of Transition have been expressed not only in a number of articles, but in a Resolution adopted at the Second Congress of our section in France and published as such in the International Review, no.8. Was this also ‘unofficial’?

And in fact the great ‘novelties’ which appeared in the Congress have been at the centre of debate among communist organiza­tions for years; this debate has taken place through different publications and numerous international conferences. What is more, certain groups have used precisely these positions to break all contact with our organization, condemning it as ‘counter­revolutionary’. But for Battaglia all this work, progress and all those errors don’t exist or are just meaningless chit-chat: the discussion begins with their articles -- which are to a large extent a repetition of an analagous attack made by Programma Comunista two years ago.2

We are laying emphasis on this suspicious­ness not to annoy Battaglia but to point to the difficulties met by groups surviving from the old communist left when they try to participate in this debate at the same level as revolutionary groups produced by the recent re-emergence of the class struggle. But while some of these groups have chosen to remain silent, others, more capable of reacting, feel the necessity on all occasions to defend their conceptions vis-a-vis these minorities by adopting a ‘superior’ and inadequate attitude.3

Thus, while the attack launched by Battaglia is violent and superficial, it is itself a symptom of the fact that “the international revolutionary camp is in perpetual movement: regroupment and splits, a maze of polemics, meetings, collisions, show that something is moving” (Battaglia Comunista, no.13, October, 1977), a fact that we welcome. For this reason, we do not present this reply as one of those eternal ‘setting the record straight’ pieces aimed at ‘liquida­ting’ the adversary. On the contrary, it is a reaffirmation of our positions when they have been distorted, and a contribu­tion to redefining the framework in which the debate should go on -- a debate which must clarify what really underlies our differences, especially concerning the nat­ure and function of the proletarian party.

Revival of the class struggle and re-emergence of revolutionary positions

“There’s no point in referring to the groups affiliated to the ‘Current’, to their not-particularly revolutionary history ... In 1968 there were those who were mixed up with the leftists; in any case, so as not to lose their reputation, some people are today hiding behind fict­itious analyses, according to which 1968 was the beginning of the present crisis, an outbreak of big workers’ struggles, the first great response of the class to capital.” (Battaglia Comunista, nos 10-11)

To begin with, we would like to say that if Battaglia has accusations to make, it should make them openly, naming the accused and, above all, documenting their claims. Commu­nists have nothing to hide, including their own errors. Having said this, we would re­mind the rather incautious author of this article that during the events of May/June 1968, our present French section Revolution Internationale didn’t exist (the first ron­eoed issue came out in December 1968) so it didn’t have much chance of getting mixed up with the leftists. At the time there was only a small group of comrades in Venezuela who published the magazine Internacionalismo and collaborated on a workers’ bulletin Proletario with some other non-organized comrades and another left communist group, Proletario Internacional.

During the May events, Proletario Internac­ional allowed itself to get swept up in the general euphoria and, following the Situa­tionists, called for the immediate constitu­tion of workers’ councils:

“And to give an example, Proletario Internacional proposed that the different groups who made up Proletario (considered for the occasion as a sort of workers’ council) should dissolve into it.

All the participants in Proletario follo­wed on this glorious road, except Inter­nacionalismo. Proletario and its self-dissolved participants didn’t survive what they took to be the revolution. The reflux of the May movement led them into the void.” (Revolution Internationale, Bulletin d’Etude et de Discussion, no.10, p. 31)

Thus the few militants who were then defen­ding the positions the Current defends to­day, isolated geographically and beset by disarray and all kinds of illusions, were able to remain solidly attached to the course of history, even at the price of rem­aining isolated. But the events of May 1968 also gave rise to small groups of comrades in France and the US who were able to take up the positions of the communist left def­ended by Internacionalismo. Thus the found­ations for our international regroupment were laid down.

As for May A968, we do indeed recognize it as the first overt expression of the crisis which has inundated the capitalist world after the years of ‘abundance’. But Marxists didn’t need to see the crisis explode in an open way to be able to predict it:

“The year 1967 saw the fall of the Pound Sterling and 1968 the measures taken by Johnson ... We are not prophets and we do not claim to know how and when events will take place. But we are sure that it is impossible to stop the process which the capitalist system is going through with these reforms and other capitalist remedies, and that this process is lead­ing irremediably to a crisis.” (Internacionalismo, January 1968)

We were well prepared to recognize the cri­sis which was just beginning to show itself, and we did recognize it4, despite the laughter of those who talked about ‘the student revolt against the boredom of life’. Today they have stopped laughing.

Turin, Cordoba, Dantzig, Szezecin and all that followed have made it impossible to deny the evidence and Battaglia recognize that capitalism entered into crisis in ... 1971. In order to reject the proletarian nature of the 1968 events in France and the 1969 events in Italy, Battaglia recall how they ended tip and what sort of groupuscules dominated them. The councilists have been using the same method for decades to show that the October Revolution was a bourgeois revolution -- on account of how it ended up ... To deny the class nature of the strikes of those years by referring to the ‘opport­unist’ nature of the groups which led them, should lead one to reject the proletarian nature of the revolutions of 1905 and February 1917 because the majority of the soviets were against the Bolsheviks.

Battaglia points out quite rightly that the physical presence of the workers is no guarantee for the proletarian nature of a movement, and gives the example of the demon­strations for the anniversary of the libera­tion of Italy. But there is a big difference between a political demonstration which celebrates the triumph of the republican state over the class struggle and a wildcat strike, ie an expression of the class struggle. If the Italian Left had taught us only one thing, it would be that commu­nists support and participate in all prole­tarian struggles which take place on the terrain of the defense of the specific inte­rests of the working class, independent of the political nature of those who are dominating the strike.5

It is rather ironic that in their eagerness to justify the absence of the party in the struggles of 1969, the comrades of Battag­lia sin against themselves. In the polemics which preceded the split in the Internat­ionalist Communist Party in 1952 with the predecessors of today’s Programma Comunista, it was the latter who proclaimed the neces­sity not to participate in the general political strikes against American imperia­lism, given the fact that these movements were totally dominated by the Stalinists. And the comrades of the Damen tendency replied:

“The factory and shipyard groups must acquire the capacity (which they don’t yet have) to change the course of the agitation, to go against the spirit and orientation of this agitation ... After openly carrying out their responsibilities and expressing their political positions, they must leave the factory with the majority of the workers when they leave, stay when the majority stays. It’s not a question of conforming to a majority or a minority, but of the communist met­hod, of a basic principle -- being present when the working masses move, discuss and express their desires, which, as we know, are not always in accordance with their class interests ... The so-called Asti comrades (who didn’t participate in the strikes, ed note) are and remain scabs; I would add that if they had been there, their gestures would have provided an invaluable lesson -- it would have been a fine thing to see international­ists attacking other internationalists.”6

What should we conclude from this? That the participation of the class in demonstra­tions which are outside a class terrain is not sufficient to prevent one from ‘being with the workers’, whereas the inevitable immaturity and confusion which accompanies the class’s return to its own terrain are enough to prevent one from participating in the struggle?

This spectacular contradiction is only one example among many others. It is a conse­quence of the attempt to reconcile the myth of the infallible party with prosaic reality -- ie the fact that the party was not there at the rendezvous which it had been waiting for throughout the long years of social peace. It would be absurd today to proclaim our superiority because were able to ‘under­stand May’. But it’s even more absurd for those who saw the events of 1968-9 as a restructuration of capitalism led by the revolt of the petty bourgeoisie to declaim today about: “The real significance of this crisis which the party was the first (!) and only to see and describe”, (Battaglia Comunista, no.13),

Dogmatic invariance and revolutionary reflection

“Revolutionary Marxism, Leninism (as the rigid continuation of the tradition we adhere to) ... against those who, in ord­er not to get ‘sclerotic’, have a need for novelties, for continually harping on about the presumed lacks or ‘errors’ of Marxism-Leninism.”

In the enthusiasm of their polemic against us, Battaglia seem to be accepting the fam­ous Act for communist militants joining the organization, who are supposed to swear “not to revise, add or leave anything aside, to support, defend and confirm the whole as a monolithic bloc, and to do this with all one’s strength” (Bordiga, February 1953).

But in actual fact our ‘steely Leninists’ have made some ‘revisions’ and it was this which enabled them to defend an internatio­nalist and defeatist position during World War II:

“These theses (ie of Lenin), while arri­ving at entirely revolutionary conclu­sions, contain in their premises certain ideas which, if understood wrongly or, more important, applied wrongly, could lead to dangerous deviations and thus to serious defeats for the class ... The notion of class is essentially an inter­national one: this fundamental point in the Marxist conception was examined in a deeper way by Rosa Luxemburg, who, round about the same time as Lenin, arrived via another route at different conclusions, which went beyond those of Lenin ... Briefly, the problem Rosa raised and which conflicted with Lenin’s theses was the following: capitalism, as a world-wide whole, follows an essentially unitary path. Disagreements within it never des­troy the class solidarity which presides over the defense of its fundamental int­erests ... Already in 1914, Rosa was right against Lenin when she said that the epoch of national liberation struggles finished with the constitution of the great European states, and that in the decadent phase of capitalism all wars have a clearly imperialist character (whereas according to Lenin, national wars were still possible and revolutionaries had particular tasks vis-a-vis such wars). We don’t want to make an abstraction out of this, but it remains true that the situation opened up by the war in Africa luminously confirms Luxemburg’s thesis.” (Prometeo, clandestine, 1 November 1943)

Today Battaglia still defends the revolutio­nary position on so-called national libera­tion struggles; but to defend the position against Programma Comunista, whom do they refer to? To Lenin!:

“We must remind our self-proclaimed inter­nationalists what Lenin wrote about so-called ‘national wars’, in fact imperia­list wars ... Lenin insisted that in all wars, the only loser was the proletariat.” (Battaglia Comunista, no.18, December 1976)

In order to have their cake and eat it, to maintain revolutionary positions and Lenin­ist ‘authority’, Battaglia are forced to make Lenin say the opposite of what he said historically, and, among other things, to contradict what they themselves have said, as the quotation from Prometeo shows.

This inability to make a complete critique of the errors of the IIIrd International (in particular on the question of the party) means that even on questions where they have gone beyond the errors of the IIIrd Inter­national, Battaglia has never arrived at complete clarity. For example on the union question Battaglia recognizes that in the revolutionary wave the class will destroy the unions and that it is the task of commu­nists to denounce them as bourgeois now. But at the same time they say:

“(concerning the unions) to move away from the line put forward by Lenin is to fall right into the void ... the frame­work developed by Marx, Lenin and our­selves today remains fundamentally the same.” (Prometeo, no.18, p.9, 1972)

But if nothing has changed, why should the proletariat have to destroy its former organizations, the unions? If the union is ‘the same as ever’ why write in their Platform:

“The party categorically affirms that in the present phase of the totalitarian domination of imperialism, trade union organizations are indispensable to the maintenance of this domination.” (Plat­form of the Internationalist Communist Party, 1952; our emphasis)

The Battaglia comrades accuse us of falsi­fying their position on the Internationalist Factory Groups, which are in fact organs of the party, real transmission belts between party and class. In an article on the rec­ent Oslo conference (Battaglia Comunista, no.13) they even say that the Communist Wor­kers’ Organization has not understood the role of these groups. We think that this misunderstanding is so widespread -- mainly because of the real ambiguity of their role. We are told that they are organs of the party, but how can a party organ be based for the most part on elements who are not militants of the party itself? We are told that the transmission belts between party and class are these groups, and not the workers’ groups or centers of co-ordination which arise spontaneously. Fine. But if words have any meaning, the transmission belt in a motor is the element which ensures the mediation between two other elements (and in fact the Battaglia comrades do talk about ‘intermediary organisms’). But if an organ is an intermediary one, ie half way between the party and the class, how can it be an organ of the party? The Italian Left always opposed the International’s line on organizing the party on the basis of fact­ory cells, arguing that workers were mili­tants of the party just like any other and that only an organization based on territ­orial sections could guarantee the political militant activity of all its members. Batt­aglia seem to resolve the question in a Solomon-like way by advocating, alongside the territorial structure for all militants, an ‘intermediary’ sub-structure reserved for worker-militants. We don’t think this is a step forward.

For the same reason we don’t think it is a “merely intellectual concern” to see a contradiction between denouncing the unions as counter-revolutionary and working inside them, often as union delegates. The more such delegates are combative and devoted to the interests of the class, the more this will strengthen the workers’ illusions in the possibility of ‘using the unions’. That this is not just a pessimist’s moan but a real danger can be seen by the fact that, while having clear ideas on the Fact­ory Councils (Documents of the Italian Left, no.1, p.vii., January 1974), Battaglia has recently said:

“It’s a quite different matter at I.B. Mec in Asti where the participation of the workers is on a large scale. Why? why has the Factory Council at I.B. Mec in Asti acted independently for a long time, or rather acted on the basis of workers’ interests and not according to the arro­gant decrees of Lama and co?” (Battaglia Comunista, no.1, January 1977)

Battaglia thus ends up participating in the chorus which the extra-parliamentary left has been chanting for months: restore the life of the base structures of the unions, the Factory Councils, by counter-posing them to the evil ‘leadership’, ie Lama and co (see the assembly at the Teatro Lirico in Milan, ‘for a union of the Councils’).

If you wanted to indulge in the polemical methods of Battaglia, you could easily say that their only concern is to chase the union bureaucrats from their desks. But this is not true and we know it. On the contrary we think that these errors are the wrong answer to a relevant and fundamental ques­tion: the militant defense of revolutionary positions in the class, in its struggles. We don’t presume to have the truth in our pockets, but the positions we defend are not just “geometrical abstractions” developed in the rarefied atmosphere of the library. Based on the experience of the workers’ circles which arose out of the class strug­gle in Spain, Belgium,, France and elsewhere, these positions are anything but ‘intellec­tualisms’.

Proletarian political groups

“Put forward in a presumptuous manner (since we don’t know why the ICC has the right to take up the role of pure water in the great swamp of confusion made up by the groups of the communist left), this first document departs from a posi­tion ‘above’ all other groups: we are the truth, everything else is chaos.” (Battaglia Comunista, nos.10-11)

A group which imagined itself to be the sole repository of revolutionary truth would certainly be ‘imagining’ things. But if we re-read our Resolution on Proletarian Poli­tical Groups (International Review, no.11) we will find no such stupidities; the Reso­lution ends up precisely with the affirma­tion that we must “avoid considering our­selves as the one and only revolutionary group that exists today”. Far from claiming that we can never make mistakes, we say, “The ICC ... must avoid repetition of past errors like the one which led Revolution Internationale to write ‘we have doubts about the positive evolution of a group which comes from anarchism’ in a letter addressed to Journal des Luttes de Classe, whose members later on founded the Belgian section of the ICC along with RRS and VRS.” (International Review, no.11)

However we could give many examples of the errors of others ... For example, there are groups who claim to have reached perfect clarity, while others are only just beginn­ing to clarify their ideas:

“The tasks of revolutionaries are begin­ning to become clearer in all countries, both where they are organized in the party (Italy) and where they are still acting at the level of small groups in transition, or simply as isolated individuals.” (Prometeo, nos. 26-27, p.16, 1976)

Leaving aside the tone of mythological self-exaltation and the reduction to ‘small groups in transition’ of revolutionary orga­nizations based on a political platform like the ICC, CWO or PIC, we can see from this passage that, for Battaglia, the three other parties in Italy which claim descent from the Italian Left (Programma Comunista, Rivoluzione Comunista, Il Partito Comunista) are not revolutionary or are not parties! But the most striking thing is that, having annulled all traces of Programma Comunista, Battaglia describes as “absurd and ridicu­lous” our criticism of this organization in our Resolution on Proletarian Political Groups. What is our position?

“With regard to this organization, what­ever level of regression it has reached, there are not any decisive elements which allow us to say that it has already gone over as a body into the camp of the bour­geoisie. We must guard against any hasty judgment on this question, because this could stand in the way of helping in the evolution of elements or tendencies who may arise within the organization in order to fight against its degeneration, or to break from it.” (International Review, no.11)

We consider that Programma Comunista is a group which remains in the proletarian camp, and we are therefore open to discussion and political polemic with it. It’s not by chance that in our press we have deplored its display of contempt towards the inter­national conference called by Battaglia (Rivoluzione Internazionale, no.7, p.23). But we were extremely surprised, on finally receiving (after many requests) the list of organizations to which Battaglia had sent its ‘Appeal to the International Groups of the Communist Left’ for the Milan conference, when we found that neither Programma nor the other organizations claiming descent from the Italian Left were included on it. There are two possibilities here: either Battaglia didn’t send the Appeal to these organiza­tions, in which case this would have been an attempt by Battaglia to put itself for­ward on the international level as the only group descended from the Italian Left; or it did invite them, and, faced with their refusal, preferred not to name them. What­ever the case7, it shows that they have not understood that, in relation to political groups who remain on a class terrain, whatever their errors, it is necessary to: “maintain an open attitude to discussion with them, a discussion that must take place in public and not through private corres­pondence (International Review, no.11).

Above all, we must know how to avoid emotional reactions, polemical reprisals, obses­sions with formal questions. This is why our attitude to Programma has not changed just because they recently referred to us as “imbeciles”8.

Battaglia Comunista, the ICC and the CWO

“While the CWO, more seriously, shows that it is open to a critical deepening of these positions, and does not set it­self up as the final authority on commu­nism, the confusionists of the ICC take it upon themselves to pronounce on the confusion of others, including among confused groups the flower of leftist reaction, such as the Trotskyists.” (Battaglia Comunista, no.13)

In order to show us up as “last minute Marx­ists”, Battaglia think it a good idea to con­trast us with a more ‘serious’ group, the Communist Workers’ Organization. But in order to do this it has to attribute us with the erroneous positions of others.

Battaglia doesn’t seem to know that the CWO broke all relations with us in 1976 after defining us, not even as confused, but as counter-revolutionary9. The comrades of the CWO maintained this absurd position for nearly two years, refusing all discussion with us, despite our public proposals for debate (World Revolution, no.6, Internatio­nal Review, nos 9 & 10). This ultra-sectarian attitude has led it to a situa­tion of growing isolation and disintegration: first the split by the Liverpool sec­tion (the former Workers’ Voice), then the split by the Edinburgh and Aberdeen sec­tions, who called for an opening up of dis­cussion with the ICC with a view to inte­grating into the Current.

The remaining comrades of the CWO, even though they still describe us as ‘counter­revolutionary’, finally announced that “the article in International Review, no.10 was politically serious enough to constitute a re-opening of discussions, and that we were thus obliged to attempt once again to make the ICC understand the consequences of their theories” (Revolutionary Perspectives, no.8); and they also maintained a fraternal attit­ude when we were jointly defending revolu­tionary positions at the ‘Non-Leninist Conference’ in Oslo.

Concerning the Trotskyists, our Resolution is clear:

“Among these parties (which have gone over to the bourgeoisie) we can mainly cite the Socialist Parties which came out of the IInd International, the Commu­nist Parties which came out of the IIIrd International, the organizations of offi­cial anarchism and the Trotskyist tenden­cies ...

Thus there is nothing hopeful in the various Trotskyist splits which time and again propose to safeguard or return to a ‘pure’ Trotskyism.” (International Review, no.11)

But while we have never seen the Trotsky­ists as confused, there are unfortunately some who have taken them for revolutionaries: Battaglia Comunista invited two French Trot­skyist organizations to the Milan conference, Union Ouvriere and Combat Communiste; and for a long time they defended this invita­tion against our protests and our firm opposition to discussing with counter­revolutionary groups. This opposition was not only expressed verbally in a meeting with the EC of Battaglia, but also publicly in our press:

“We have criticized its lack of political criteria which has allowed invitations to be sent to the modernist Trotskyists of Union Ouvriere and Maoist-Trotskyists like Combat Communiste, who have no place in a conference of communists.” (International Review, no.8)

After all this you have to be pretty short­sighted to write that it’s we who don’t have clear ideas about the reactionary nature of Trotskyism.

The state in the period of transition

We don’t intend to enter here into a detai­led discussion of a subject as complex as it is vital for revolutionaries, or even to refute the facile simplifications put for­ward by Battaglia (this will be done during the further development of the discussion). We simply want to underline a few basic points and show the framework in which the discussion should take place.

For the Battaglia comrades the draft reso­lution presented by the International Bureau of the ICC is nothing but a negation of the dictatorship of the proletariat in favor of “an organ above classes”, the ‘logical consequence’ of which is to take up the idea of ‘everyone’s state’ defended by the parties of the left.

It is worth recalling here that similar accusations have been made by the CWO, to name but one. What is the balance-sheet of all these accusations today? This is what an important minority of the CWO was itself led to admit:

“(the) CWO claims the ICC favor the working class being subordinate to some ‘all class state’. If this were so then the ICC would have crossed class lines. In reality, if we follow the ICC texts on the period of transition, we find that in fact they defend the same class posi­tions as the CWO ... The ICC clearly states that only the working class can hold political power ... It is clear that only the working class can organize itself as a class; the only concession made as regards this is that peasants can organize on a geographical basis to allow their needs to be made known to the proletariat.”10

The thesis defended in the draft resolution and in many previous texts expresses the idea that the experience of the Russian Revolution has shown in a tragic manner that the dictatorship of the proletariat, the dictatorship of the workers’ councils, cannot be identified with the state, engen­dered by the persistence of class divisions in society after the revolution. It follows that “the dictatorship of the proletariat is not exerted through or in the state, but over the state”, and that this state, as Marxism has always insisted, can only be a ‘semi-state’ destined to wither away progres­sively, and for this reason a state deprived of a whole series of particular characteris­tics, such as the monopoly of arms.

Battaglia gets very indignant about this, “Well, well! The bourgeois state has a monopoly of arms, the state born out of the proletarian revolution does not” (Battaglia Comunista, no.12).

This gives the reader to understand that, according to us, the proletariat must frat­ernally share the arms with the old ruling class, in the name of a super-democratic ‘struggle for the monopoly’. In reality, the resolution says that the state won’t have a monopoly of arms for the simple reason that the class, by not identifying with the state, will not delegate to it this monopoly:

“The dictatorship of the proletariat over the state and society as a whole is based essentially:

-- on the fact that the other classes are forbidden to organize themselves as classes;

-- on the proletariat’s hegemonic partici­pation within all the organizations upon which the state is founded;

-- on the fact that the proletariat is the only armed class.” (International Review, no.11 )

Then Battaglia tries to present us as people blinded by a sort of phobia about the state: the result of “vestigial libertarian preju­dices”:

“ ... to see the principal cause of the degeneration of the October revolution as the negative effects of the state, as this document argues, is to fail to understand the Russian experience and to take effects for causes.” (Battaglia Comunista, no.12)

And Battaglia gets on with the not-too-­difficult task of pointing out the effect that encirclement, the reflux of the revolutionary wave, etc had on the revolu­tion. But to whom are they pointing this out? The ICC has always said that:

“Just as the Russian Revolution was the first bastion of the international revolu­tion in 1917, the first in a series of international proletarian uprisings, its degeneration into counter-revolution was also the expression of an international phenomenon -- the activity of an inter­national class, the proletariat.” (‘The Degeneration of the Russian Revolution’, International Review, no.3)

We have waged strong polemics against those who see the only cause of the degeneration as being the errors of the Bolshevik Party and its identification with the state. The Resolution says that the state was the “main agent”, ie instrument of the counter-revolu­tion, contrary to the expectations of the Bolsheviks, for whom the counter-revolution could only come through the destruction of the Soviet state by the white generals and the invading armies of world capital. How­ever, it was the Soviet state itself, rein­forced to the hilt in order to ‘defend the revolution’ which ended up strangling the revolution and the Bolshevik Party as a proletarian party.

In brief, for Battaglia the Resolution on the period of transition represents “a sud­den turning away from the path of revolutio­nary science”, and this is all the more serious because it has “no other justifica­tion than originality at an price” (our emphasis). Battaglia really isn’t doing too well here. Our discussion on the problems of the period of transition, the contributions which have been elaborated over a num­ber of years, are in direct continuity with the research carried out by the revolutio­nary minorities in the 1930s. This applies in particular to the Italian Left who put forward as a task for revolutionaries the resolution of the “New problems posed by the exercise of proletarian power in the USSR” (Bilan, no.l, November 1933), and who made a contribution on this question which, though not definitive, is still, for us, fundamental:

“But in the middle of the most terrible contingent difficulties, the Bolsheviks did not consider the Soviet state as ‘an evil inherited by the proletariat ... whose worse sides the victorious prole­tariat ... cannot avoid having to lop off as much as possible’ (Engels), but as an organism which could be completely identi­fied with the proletarian dictatorship, ie with the party ... Although Marx, Engels and above all Lenin had again and again emphasized the necessity to counter the state with a proletarian antidote capable of preventing its degeneration, the Russian Revolution, far from assuring the maintenance and vitality of the class organs of the proletariat, sterilized them by incorporating them into the state; and thus the revolution devoured its own substance.”11

One can certainly disagree with these posi­tions and/or with the conclusions drawn from them by the Gauche Communiste de France (Internationalisme) in the 1940s, and by us today: the existence of an open debate on this question in our organization is the best proof of this12. But to present all this work as nothing but a ridiculous con­cern with ‘originality’ is ample proof that Battaglia has been going through a process of sclerosis.

But as soon as the term sclerosis is used the Battaglia comrades feel the blood rush­ing to their heads, seeing it as an attempt of brand them as a bunch of old men with acute arteriosclerosis. But we don’t use the term sclerosis as an insult when we apply it to the groups surviving from older revolutionary currents, any more than we are making a eulogy when we note the agility of all those (Toggliati etc) who have leapt to the other side of the barricade with the greatest of ease. It is nevertheless true that a revolutionary group can’t bear the weight of fifty years of counter­revolution in the ranks of the working class without suffering any adverse conse­quences:

“ ... it is generally the case that their sclerosis is in part the ransom they pay for their attachment and loyalty to revo­lutionary principles, for their distrust of any kind of ‘innovation’, which has been for so many other groups the Trojan horse of degeneration13; it is this distrust which has led them to reject any idea of opening their program to new developments coming out of historical experience.” (International Review, no.11)

Thus, the Internationalist Communist Party was able to maintain a defeatist position during World War II, to a large extent be­cause it was able to denounce and go beyond Lenin’s positions on the national and colo­nial question, positions which had been tot­ally accepted by the Communist Party of Italy. But during the long period of social peace which followed the war, the process of sclerosis undermined much of the work of enriching class positions. While Programma Comunista thought it could resolve all prob­lems by calling for a return to all the old errors of the IIIrd International, Battaglia, as we have seen, has tried to reconcile the defense of class positions with a ‘rigid’ adherence to ‘Leninism’. For example, in an article on the Bolshevik Party which appeared in Prometeo (nos.24/25, p. 35, 1975), the author of the articles on the Second Congress of the ICC, alongside a correct polemic “against the conceptions which iden­tify the exercise of the dictatorship -- which must be done by the class and it alone -- with the dictatorship of the party,” attacks “above all conceptions based on bourgeois prejudices, such as those of Rosa Luxemburg, which hold that the dictatorship consists in the application of democracy and not its abolition”. We don’t think this is the place to reply to these simplifications and distortions of the criticisms of the Bolshevik experience which that great revo­lutionary made. What is more, a few years ago, Battaglia itself took on this task when it published Rosa’s The Russian Revolution as a pamphlet in Italian. At that time the authoritative pen of Onorato Damen affirmed that:

“The dictatorship of the proletariat of tomorrow, in whatever country it arises, will constitute a new experience, in that it will synthesize the revolutionary intuition and optimism of Luxemburg with the hard, implacable teachings of Lenin.” (The Russian Revolution, by Rosa Luxemb­urg, edizione Battaglia Comunista, no date)

But perhaps the author of the article did not know this and allowed himself to succumb to the pleasures of ‘originality at any price’ with regard to his own party. We can only say that this is one of those zig-zags typical of this so-called rigid ‘invariance’.

Debate between revolutionaries and ‘open questions’

“Thus according to the authors of the article (or of all the comrades of the ICC? We doubt it) the state in the period of transition is a question which it is necessary to discuss in a revolutionary organization with international aspira­tions ... What is so unacceptable is the ICC’s presumption that it is an interna­tional organization of revolutionaries. It would probably be better to call it an ‘international study group’ with whom, of course, we think we should collaborate, with the maximum assistance on our part.” (Battaglia Comunista, no.14)

Contrary to what Battaglia Comunista seems to think today the class frontiers which determine whether or not one is part of the proletarian camp were not all codified in the 1848 Manifesto. The Paris Commune of 1871 showed that the bourgeois state had to be destroyed, not changed; and capitalism’s entry into its decadent phase, marked by the outbreak of World War I, rendered all the old reformist tactics useless to the class. In the latter case, it is quite understand­able that revolutionaries at the time were not able to grasp the full significance of this qualitative change. But today, with fifty years of historical evidence, the rejection of these tactics has become a class frontier, the defense of which is the basis for any revolutionary organization. The ICC Platform, a single basis for join­ing the Current in all countries, has this function, and we invite anyone who wants to show that we are not an international organ­ization of revolutionaries to make a criti­que of our platform. It is within this pro­grammatic framework that it is permissible, and even necessary, to discuss all those problems which the historic experience of the class has not resolved. Like Bilan we think that the short exercise of power by the proletariat in Russia, far from con­firming all the old convictions of the wor­kers’ movement, has raised “new problems” which must be solved within a revolutionary perspective. Making a contribution to this solution is a task which animates all the militants of the ICC in this discussion, a discussion situated firmly within the frame­work laid down by the Russian experience (the dictatorship of the proletariat is not the dictatorship of the party etc). But this problem does not only concern the ICC; it is the concern of the whole revolutionary move­ment. This is why the debate is conducted in an open way, in front of the whole class, and why other revolutionary groups are invi­ted to take part in the debate.

This is why we have been able to take on the task of regrouping revolutionaries on an international scale -- a task which we have the ‘presumption’ to make our own. This is why we can undertake discussion with other groups without having to cheer ourselves up by saying that it is simply a question of giving assistance to harmless studies which lack any internal coherence.

The fact that we were able to publish in our international press a text by Battaglia Comunista14 which criticized us strongly is not the result of eclecticism or weakness:

“Far from being in contradiction with each other, firmness in our principles and openness in our attitude mutually complement each other. We are not afraid of discussion precisely because we are convinced on the validity of our positions.” (International Review, no.11)

We firmly insist that public discussion within proletarian organizations and between proletarian organizations is the patrimony of the workers’ movement and not of some International Institute of Social Studies. Thus, concerning the war in Spain, Bilan published texts of the minority which split away from the Fraction. We ourselves have published these texts by reproducing ex­tracts from Bilan on this question:

“It’s not any moral scruples which have motivated this choice; still less has a desire to stand above the debate (since we have an unequivocal position here) led us to publish the texts of the two ten­dencies. Politeness has nothing to do with it. We leave it to the heroes of imperialist wars to enjoy the great satisfaction of giving flowers to the vanquished enemy.

Political debate, for us, is not a ‘beau­tiful gesture’, a ‘touch of class’, some­thing which makes us special and dis­tinct. On the contrary it is an elemen­tary necessity which can in no way be set aside.”15

BEYLE

1 The documents and proceedings of this conference have been published in a roneoed pamphlet in French and English and in Italian as a special edition of Prometeo. Available in English from the address of World Revolution, and in Italian from PCI, Casella Postale 1753, Milan, Italy.

2 ‘L’ Insondable Profondeur du Marxisme Occidental’, Le Proletaire, nos. 203-4, October 1975.

3 This is the case of Battaglia of the groups coming from the Italian Left and for Spartacusbond of the Dutch Left (see ‘Spartacusbond Haunted by Bolsheviks Ghosts’, International Review no. 2)

4 See for example ‘La Crise Monetaire’ in Revolution Internationale, no. 2, Old series, February 1969.

5 Thus we solidarized with the Italian railway workers’ strikes of August 1975 despite the demagogic intervention of the autonomous unions (Rivoluzione Internationale, no. 3)

6 From interventions by Lecci and Mazzucchelli, reported in an internal bulletin of the Damen tendency, at the end of 1951.

7 Probably the latter, given certain ‘allusions’ by Programma:

“In any case, from time to time we receive appeals, we can’t say how convinced, and certainly not very convincing, for meetings on the basis of a very general program of struggling against opportunism.” (Programma Comunista, no. 12, July 1976)

8 See the article in Programa Comunista, no. 21, November 1977, which will be replied to in the next issue of Rivoluzione Internazionale.

9 See ‘Convulsions of the ICC’ in Revolutionary Perspectives, no. 4. According to these comrades our refusal to consider the Bolshevik Party and the whole Communist International as totally reactionary from 1921 on makes us “just one more group which bases itself on the counter-revolution of 1921”. The comrades of Battaglia Comunista who explicitly claim descent from the party of Livorno (1921) and the Rome Theses (1922) might ask themselves what the CWO thinks about that.

10 ‘Class Lines and Organization’, text of Aberdeen/Edinburg sections, published in Revolutionary Perspectives, no. 8, p. 41.

11 Bilan, no. 28, March-April 1936. For a history of the Italian Left in exile, see International Review, no. 9)

12 See the proposed counter-resolution on the state by some comrades in International Review, no. 11. Also in the same issue the critical letter sent by comrade E and the reply by R. Victor.

13 This is why we have always condemned the ‘juvenile’ suspiciousness of groups like Union Ouvriere, for whom “less than a year has been enough to theoretically and practically see through the formidable poverty of all the Bordigo-Pannekoek revisionists and their various critiques” (Union Ouvriere, December 1975). Their contempt for the old ‘mummies’ of the Communist Left is simply a contempt for the difficulties encountered by the proletariat in its effort to raise itself to its historic tasks. The miserable drowning of Union Ouvriere in the swamps of confusion after ‘less than a year’ is the best proof of this.

14 ‘Letter from Battaglia Comunista’, published in International Review, no. 8 with a long documented reply from us. Nearly a year has passed and we are still waiting for a reply….

15 Introduction to the texts on the split, Rivista Internazionale no. 1 (Italian edition)

Life of the ICC: 

  • Correspondance with other groups [20]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Battaglia Comunista [70]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Italian Left [37]

International Review no.14 - 3rd quarter 1978

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Africa, against the march towards world war: the international struggle of the working class!

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Introduction

In decadent capitalism the internal contra­dictions and conflicts of the system have only one possible outcome: war. There is no mystery about imperialist wars in our epoch. The lack of new markets to realize the surplus value incorporated in the com­modities turned out in the process of produc­tion has plunged the system into a permanent crisis: a bitter struggle for the possession of raw materials, for mastery of the world market, for control of the planet's strategic military zones. The more inter-imperialist antagonisms are exacerbated by the economic crisis, the more the capitalist states are compelled to strengthen their defensive and offensive military apparatus. Towards the end of the nineteenth century capitalism definitively reached the stage of imperialism and today all states are forced, in order to defend their own interests, to put them­selves under the tutelage of one or other of the two great powers: the US and Russia.

At the moment the wars are still local ones but in recent years the theatre of opera­tions has been extended from Indochina, now a hunting-ground for Russia and China (which has become the main representative of the western bloc in Asia), to the Middle East, that permanent abscess, and now Africa, which is rent into potential or actual war zones: Zaire, Chad, Rhodesia, South Africa, Angola, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia.

The recent events in Zaire are the most striking sign of the heating-up of inter-imperialist conflicts. The direct military intervention of France and Belgium was moti­vated by the economic and political inter­ests these countries still have in their former colonial empires, just as the French ‘blue caps' in Lebanon are just the old colonial army in disguise. It might seem tempting to compare Zaire with the imperia­list adventures of the 1960s, like Vietnam, and conclude that today's events are less grave, less grim, less dangerous. But this would be a bad mistake.

In fact, the intervention in Zaire, like the intervention in Chad, is part of a con­certed effort by all the NATO countries to counter the thrust of the Russian bloc. What's at stake is not one or two countries but the very policies of the imperialist blocs. (Having been forced to submit to the Pax Americana in the Middle East, Rus­sian imperialism is now attempting to break the American bloc's grip on Africa.) Ameri­can imperialism has replied with an important demonstration of how quickly it can act and how effectively the western bloc can collaborate in the face of such con­flicts.

When the Zaire events took place, all the countries of Western Europe gave support to the intervention and Washington even lent aero planes. On 5 June, the six coun­tries of NATO met in Brussels to study the situation in Africa and later, on 11 June, the ‘eleven' countries of the US bloc (including Iran, Saudi Arabia, the IMF, the World Bank and a commission of the EEC) studied the problem of financial aid in order to keep the Zaire economy afloat. Zaire is crippled by a foreign debt of 2.3 billion dollars and its gross national pro­duct has fallen by 5 per cent per year since 1976. Seven African countries have now participated in the force sent to defend Shaba; Morocco will be supplying the main body of troops to this unprecedented force. Even Egypt has given military support to Zaire, as it does in Chad.

The imperialist blocs reinforce themselves with each new conflict. We can now see clearly the correctness of our analysis when we wrote that:

"The war economy in the present epoch, however, is not simply established on a national scale, but also on the scale of an imperialist bloc. Incorporation into one of the two imperialist blocs -- each one dominated by a mammoth continental state capitalism: the US and Russia -- is a necessity which not even the bourgeoi­sies of formerly great imperialist powers like Britain, France, Germany and Japan can resist." (‘From Monetary Crisis to the War Economy', International Review, no.11, p.7)

The bourgeoisie has presented this new step towards open war as a ‘humanitarian' act to ‘save the whites', just as it launched the anti-terrorist campaigns in order to hide the strengthening of the state's repressive apparatus. Revolutionaries have a duty to take up an intransigent internationalist position against all threats of war, against all the ideological preparations for war. This is what the ICC has done in the declara­tion we're publishing here, denouncing both camps in the conflict, denouncing any attempt to hide the truth of these events behind the mystification of so-called ‘national libera­tion struggles' or by supporting the suppo­sedly ‘progressive' Russian bloc. Against the PCI (Bordigist) which wrote "the Pales­tinian, Lebanese, Chadian and Saharan figh­ters who have taken up arms against ‘our' imperialism are the brothers of the proleta­rians in the metropole struggling against the common enemy: the French imperialist state" (contained in a leaflet of 21 May in France), the ICC insists that:

"You can't fight against imperialism by choosing one or other of the antagonistic powers to support. All those who use this language are acting, consciously or unconsciously, as the backers of imperia­list war." (‘Against the March Towards World War: The International Struggle of the Working Class', ICC leaflet contained in this Review.)

The Palestinian, Chadian and Katanganese armies are the pawns of Russian imperialism while at the same time dependent on a part of the local bourgeoisie, just as the exped­itionary corps of the western bloc (the French Legionnaires, the Moroccan and other troops) serve American imperialism while also defending the interests of a part of the local bourgeoisie. The proletariat has no fatherland, it cannot support any kind of nationalist movement, neither in the third world nor in the metropoles. The working class lives and acts in the under-developed countries; in reality it was the working class that was being massacred in the mining town of Kolwezi by the contending armies. The working class cannot make alliances with nationalist movements. Its only enemy is the capitalist system all over the world. The international situation is getting sharper but only the proletariat can bring down the forces of imperialism. In June 1978, while the French and western expedi­tionary forces were doing their dirty work in Zaire and Chad, 50,000 workers in the arsenals of the French state went on strike against their conditions of exploita­tion. This capacity to thwart the murdering hands of capital is the only possible res­ponse the working class can have, in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Every day it is beco­ming clearer and clearer that the struggle against war is the struggle against capital.

The following declaration has been published in various languages in all the ICC's press. It was distributed as a leaflet during the events in France and Belgium.

ICC

Against the march towards world war - the International struggle of the working class!

Zaire. They say they're intervening for ‘humanitarian reasons'. They're lying:

All wars begin with this pretext. Atrocities? They ‘forget' about them when they can't use them as an excuse anymore. What did they have to say about the massacre of 600 refugees in Angola by South Africa?

‘Knights of civilization'? These para­troopers and legionnaires? They are the most brutal and bloody of all troops. They themselves have said it openly: ‘We're here to crush the Katanganese!'

The press, television and radio protest too much. They wouldn't be making so much noise if it wasn't so hard for them to do their job of hiding the truth. The only real reason for the Kolwezi operation is the interests of imperialism. The level of noise corresponds to the high stakes involved.

The intervention in Zaire marks a new step in the escalation towards a third world war!

Of course, this is nothing new. Since the end of World War II, the two imperialist blocs -- the USA and its lackeys, the USSR and its ‘brothers' -- have continuously confronted each other under the guise of ‘decolonisa­tion', ‘the right of nations to self-determination', ‘the defense of national integrity', ‘the struggle for democracy', or the ‘struggle for socialism'. They have turned the zones of conflict into a living hell for the peoples victimized by their ‘concern'. They've done this both through massive shipments of the most murderous weaponry to the local contestants or through direct intervention themselves. The whole planet is criss-crossed by these bloody massacres: Korea, North Africa, the Middle East, Vietnam, Biafra, Bengal, Cambodia.

Today, Africa occupies a privileged position on this infernal chess-board. Each bloc is putting its pawns forward. At the moment the two camps are drawn up as follows: under the Russian colors are Angola, Mozambique, Libya, and Ethiopia. Against them stand the pawns of the USA and its British, French and Belgian yes-men: South Africa and Zaire. The more world capitalism sinks into eco­nomic crisis, the more numerous and violent these conflicts become. Rhodesia, Sahara, Ogaden, Eritrea, Chad... the list of massacres is getting longer all the time. Today we have the intervention in Zaire. Why?

1. Because it illustrates the tendency of these conflicts to move closer to a vital centre of capitalism: Europe. Zaire is an important source of raw materials and an area of major capitalist penetration for Europe.

2. Because, despite the rows between the French and Belgian capitalist accomplices, this intervention represents a response from the whole American bloc to the defiance of the Russian bloc with its control over Angola.

3. Because no such expedition in recent years has seen such wide-ranging collabora­tion between the Western robber states in their preparation, execution and justifica­tion for the intervention. (American planes, British materials, Belgian and French troops, blessings from the EEC and so-called ‘Communist China'.)

4. Because the ideological campaign which has supported the military offensive is also unprecedented in its scope and in the hysteria it has tried to stir up.

For all these reasons, the intervention in Zaire is a fundamental step in the escala­tion towards world war.

The other liars of the bourgeoisie

Apart from those who have openly backed this expedition, some of the most hypocritical liars in the bourgeois cam are:

Those who protest against the intervention, not on principle, but because it didn't respect the diplomatic and constitutional rules. Fundamentally, they defend the same imperialist interests as their national capital.

Those who advocate pacifism, moral pressure, international conferences, action by the United Nations, and other schemes to ‘stop wars'.

Wars don't happen because of a few war-like or evil-minded governments. They are part of capitalism's way of life, especially since the beginning of the twentieth century. Ever since World War I, this system has only been able to survive through a hellish cycle of destruction, in which each period of reconstruction after one war simply prepares the ground for an even bigger crisis than the one before. A crisis which the bour­geoisie can only ‘solve' through an even more devastating and murderous war.

Just like the 1929 crisis, today's crisis has no solution. As with the 1929 crisis, the economic crisis today can only lead capitalism into another world butchery. This is proved day after day by the deter­ioration of the economic situation in all countries of the world, including the so-called ‘socialist' ones.

This is proved by the constant aggravation of conflicts all over the planet.

This is proved by today's intervention in Zaire.

To advocate pacifism is to advocate passivity and submission to capital's war-machinery. It simply opens the way to war.

Those who, speaking ‘in the name of the working class', offer the workers no alter­native than supporting the other imperialist bloc. You can't fight against imperialism -- which today is the way of life of every nation in the world -- by choosing one or other of the antagonistic powers to support. All those who use this language are acting, consciously or unconsciously, as the backers of imperialist war, no less than all the others.

What is the way out?

There is no way out within capitalism. This system must be destroyed before it destroys humanity.

Only one force in society can do this. That force is the working class. It's already shown this in 1917 in Russia and in 1918 in Germany. It alone can jam and paralyze the machine that's dragging the world towards a new holocaust. It alone has the power to abolish exploitation, oppression, classes and nations. It alone has the power to create a new society: socialism.

In order to do this, the workers everywhere must go onto the offensive against capitalism. In the countries where the class is being directly dragooned into these massacres, it must denounce the brutal chauvinism which is being thrust upon it in the name of ‘national liberation' and other lies. The only possible response is that of the Russian workers of 1917, the German workers of 1918:

1. fraternisation with the workers in uni­form of the other camp.

2. turning your guns against your own exploiters and governments.

3. turning the imperialist war into civil war.

In the countries of the Third World, where these imperialist wars are presently taking place, the proletariat has already begun to struggle on its own class terrain. There can be no way out except to carry this struggle forward.

In the centers of capitalism, particularly in France and Belgium, which are now in the front-line of the imperialist attack, it is the same. No way out for the workers except to renew the struggle against auster­ity and lay-offs. Why?

1. Because the intervention in Zaire and the attack on workers' living standards are part of the same offensive by capital.

2. Because, whether workers like it or not, they are already mobilized in the war effort. It's their exploitation which is paying for the growing military expenditure.

3. Because the only way of showing their internationalism, their solidarity with their class brothers directly hit by the war, is for workers in the heartlands of capital to fight against the common enemy that confronts them all. That enemy is their own national capitalist state.

4. Because, after the professional troops, it will be conscripts who will be sent to the slaughter. And the bourgeoisie won't stop there. Each step in the preparation for generalized war opens the way to the next step.

Workers of all countries, your class response can't wait. Renew the struggle begun in 1968. The struggle the bourgeoisie has temporarily managed to divert into the dead-ends of support for bourgeois democracy, ‘the left', electoralism and trade unionism.

Take up the battle cry of your class: the workers have no fatherland! Workers of the world unite!

International Communist Current

May 1978

Geographical: 

  • Africa [85]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Imperialism [86]

Unemployment and the class struggle

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Introduction

The unprecedented growth in unemployment over the last ten years is increasingly pos­ing the organization of the class struggle with the problem that a considerable part of the working class is no longer to be found at the point of production. But although this deprives them of that funda­mental weapon of struggle, the strike, it doesn’t mean that the unemployed have no possibility of struggling. On the contrary. While in the beginning unemployment tended to hit small and marginal enterprises, the weak sectors of the capitalist economy, it is now hitting whole sectors of the working class in the most concentrated sectors: tex­tiles, metallurgy, shipbuilding etc. Unem­ployment began hitting the class in a ‘sel­ective’ manner and this allowed the bour­geoisie to mount an attack on workers’ liv­ing standards while presenting unemployment as an individual or at most regional and sectional problem. But now, as it becomes longer and more frequent among growing num­bers of workers’ families (thus cutting the living standards of many more people who depend on workers’ wages), as it makes the labor force more and more mobile, the exten­sion of unemployment makes it possible for the working class to understand the means and goals of its struggle and to go beyond the divisions imposed by capital. In today’s period of rising class struggle, for the first time in history -- with the exception of 1848 -- we can see the perspective of a revolutionary wave coming as Marx envisaged: the proletariat’s assault on the bourgeois state is being prepared in a period of econ­omic crisis, of a relatively slow disintegra­tion of the capitalist system. The bourge­oisie has not mobilized and crushed the working class so that it can impose its ‘solution’ to the crisis: generalized war. One of the consequences of this situation is that the struggle against unemployment takes on a considerable importance. The struggle against this direct loss of the means of subsistence is going to be a vital factor in the preparation of the decisive confrontations that lie ahead. To some extent, the unemployed can act in these battles in an analagous manner to the sold­iers in the revolutionary wave which followed the 1914 war -- helping to unify and gener­alize the confrontation with the capitalist state. This is why it is so vital that the working class doesn’t fall into the many traps set by the bourgeoisie to maintain the unemployed as a distinct ‘category’, separated from the class as a whole. The following text attempts to reply to those arguments which seek to deprive the working class of a part of itself, of one of its own methods of struggle.

The general and worldwide overproduction which accompanies the crises of capitalism, particularly in its decadent epoch, throws a growing part of the working class outside of the productive process. Unemployment, in moments of acute crisis such as we are now going through, is going to get bigger and bigger and become one of the central preoccupations of the working class. It is thus essential for a revolutionary organiza­tion which intends to intervene in the wor­king class to clarify and understand the whole question of unemployment in the class struggle.

**********

1. The situation of unemployment is a neces­sary part of the condition of the working class. This is a class of ‘free’ workers, ie free from any ties to the means of pro­duction, from which they are separated and which confronts them as capital. This ‘freedom’ is in fact the worst kind of ser­vitude, because the workers can only survive by selling their labor power. In capitalism the specific norm of the association of lab­or with the means of production -- wage labor -- makes labor power a simple commo­dity like everything else, and the only commodity which the workers have to sell. Like all commodities, the commodity labor power can only be sold when the market is big enough; and since overproduction in rela­tion to the needs of the market is written into capitalist relations of production, the temporary or definitive non-utilization of a part of the labor force -- unemployment -- is an integral part of the condition which capital imposes on the working class. Be­cause of the particular character of the commodity labor power -- as a creator of value -- unemployment has always been an indispensable precondition for the well-functioning of the capitalist economy, since it makes a part of the labor force available for the enlargement of production while acting as a constant pressure on wage levels. In the period of capitalist deca­dence unemployment in all its forms takes on a considerable weight and becomes an expression of the historical bankruptcy of capital, its inability to carry on with the development of the productive forces.

2. Since unemployment is an aspect of the working class condition, unemployed workers are as much a part of the working class as the employed workers. If a worker is unem­ployed, he is potentially at work, if he is working he is potentially unemployed. The definition of the working class as a produ­cer of surplus value is not an individual question; it can only be understood as a social, collective definition. The working class is not just a sum of individuals, even though, in the beginning, capital created it as competing individuals. The proleta­riat expresses itself in the transcendence of the divisions and competition between individuals, forming a single collectivity with interests that are distinct from those of the rest of society. The division bet­ween unemployed workers and employed workers does not, any more than the other divisions between the various categories of workers, make them different classes. On the cont­rary, unemployed and employed workers have the same interests against capital. The class consciousness of the proletariat is not a sum of individual consciousnesses, and while it has its origins in the way the wor­kers are integrated into capitalist produc­tion, it is not connected in an immediate manner to this or that worker and his pres­ence in or absence from a place of produc­tion. Class consciousness develops in the whole class, and thus both among the unem­ployed and employed workers. In many cases the unemployed are the most resolute sectors of the proletariat in a frontal struggle against capital, because the situation of the unemployed concentrates in itself all the misery of the working class condition.

3. It is wrong to consider the unemployed as a distinct social category: the only fundamental divisions in society are class divisions, and these are determined by the place occupied in production. The situation of unemployment is linked to wage labor. Now, in the development of capitalist soci­ety, and in particular in its tendency to­wards state capitalism, capital has made more and more of the population wage earners, sometimes even to the point of paying sala­ries to the whole bourgeois class itself. One of the purest expressions of the deca­dence of capitalism is the fact that the managers of capital, the state functionaries and officers, are themselves hit by unemploy­ment. The situation of unemployment must therefore not be peculiar to the worker, and this is why the category of the unemployed does not represent anything in itself. It encompasses workers as well as members of the bourgeoisie and intermediate strata. This is why, as well as unemployment being a factor of demoralization on the unemployed worker because of isolation, the mass of unemployed can be used by the bourgeoisie for counter-revolutionary ends in periods when the class struggle does not put forward a proletarian answer to the crisis of capital.

4. As an integral part of the working class, the unemployed workers must integrate themselves into the struggles of their class. However, the possibilities of struggle open to them are very limited. On the one hand they are extremely isolated from each other, and on the other hand they don’t have the same means of practical action as the wor­kers in production (strikes etc). This is why unemployed workers only enter massively into struggle when the class struggle has become general. The integration of the unemployed into the struggle then becomes an important factor in the radicalization of the struggle, to the extent that, more than any other sector, the unemployed won’t have any immediate demands or reforms to win and will tend to wage their struggle against the whole society. The practical modalities of this integration into the general strug­gle and into the workers’ councils cannot be envisaged precisely: experience will pro­vide an answer and it’s not the task of revolutionaries to plan forms of organiza­tion for the class. When these forms arise, revolutionaries must understand their con­nection to the content of the struggle, but they can’t invent them in advance.

5. The fact that greater and greater masses of workers are thrown into unemployment with no real perspective of being reintegrated into production has various contradictory effects on the evolution of the class strug­gle. For an initial period, it weakens the cohesion of the class, dividing it into wor­kers inside and outside the factory. As well as using the threat of unemployment and the unemployed workers as a way of keep­ing wages down, thus creating an artificial hostility between employed and unemployed workers, capital uses all its forces to dis­perse this latter fraction of the class, to atomize them into mere individuals and drown them in a mass of ‘needy people’. In the subsequent period, given the impossibility of fully carrying out this operation and faced with the growing discontent of the unemployed workers, it becomes necessary to control them better; capital with all its party and union organs, ably assisted by the leftists, looks for means to encapsulate them, and so sets up special organs which dragoon them into a particular ‘class’ of declasses. Against this dual operation of dispersion and encapsulation, the working class can only affirm its unity, through the defense of its unitary historic and immediate interests, and through its constant, untiring effort towards self-organization.

6. The period of decadence, of the general historic crisis of the capitalist social system, has ended the possibility of a move­ment for the real, lasting amelioration of the workers’ condition and poses the need for the class to engage in a revolutionary struggle for its historic objectives. This has made it impossible for there to exist specific organs for the defense of the econ­omic conditions of the workers within capi­talism, like the unions used to be; today such organs can only be barriers to the class struggle, to the benefit of capitalism. This in no way means that the working class can no longer defend its immediate interests and organize itself for this struggle: it only means a radical change in the form of the struggle and of the organizations the class gives rise to: wildcat strikes, commit­tees elected by all the workers in struggle, the general assemblies in the factories -- all prefigurations of tomorrow’s general unitary organs of the class, the workers’ councils, towards which the proletarian struggle is leading.

What is true for the whole of the class is also true for the fraction of the class which finds itself out of work, ie outside the factories. Like the class as a whole, these millions of unemployed have to struggle against the miserable conditions capital imposes on them. Just as these miserable conditions don’t simply apply to the indivi­dual unemployed workers (even if this misery is felt most directly by individuals), but are an integral part of the conditions impo­sed on the entire working class, so the struggle of the unemployed is an integral part of the general struggle of the class.

The struggle of the class for wages isn’t a sum of struggles by each worker against his individual exploitation, but a general strug­gle against capital’s exploitation of the labor power of the whole working class. The struggle of the unemployed against miserable unemployment pay or rents or social services (gas, electricity, transport etc) has the same basic nature as the struggle for wages. Although it’s true that this doesn’t immediately show itself in a clear way, it is still based on the global struggle against the extraction of immediate or past, direct or indirect, surplus value which the working class has suffered and continues to suffer.

7. It is not true that the unemployed wor­kers can only participate in the class struggle by taking part in or supporting the workers at work (solidarity with and support for strikes). It is by directly defending themselves tooth and nail against the conditions capital imposes on them, in the place it makes them occupy, that the unemployed workers make their struggle an integral part of the general struggle of the working class against capital, and as such this struggle has to be supported by the entire class.

8. It is true that the situation of the unemployed workers outside the factories deprives them of one of the most important, classical weapons of the class struggle -- the strike -- but this does not mean that they are deprived of all means of struggle. By losing the factory, the unemployed gain the streets. Unemployed workers can and have struggled through street assemblies, demonstrations, occupations of town halls, unemployment exchanges and other public institutions. These struggles have some­times taken on the character of riots which can be a signal for a generalized struggle. It would be a grave error to neglect such possibilities. To a certain extent, the radical struggles of the unemployed can take on the character of a social struggle more easily and rapidly than a strike of workers in a factory.

9. In order to wage the struggle imposed by their conditions, the unemployed workers, like the rest of their class, tend to reg­roup themselves. Because of their dispersed situation, this need to regroup is relatively more difficult for them than for workers concentrated at the workplace, the factories. But beginning from the unemployment exchanges or the neighborhood where they meet each other, they do find ways to assemble and group together. Having a lot of ‘free time’ at their disposal, chased from their homes by boredom, misery or the cold, looking for contact with others, they end up claiming and getting public locals where they can meet. There thus arise permanent meeting places where conversations, reflections and discussions are transformed into permanent meetings. This is an enormous advantage for the politicization of these important masses of workers. It is of the greatest importance to counteract the maneuvers of parties and especially of the unions, who try to infiltrate these gatherings and make them appendages of the unions. These gath­erings, whatever they are called: group; committee; nucleus; etc, are not unions, if only for the reason that they are not struc­tured on the same model -- they don’t have statutes, membership cards and dues. Even when they form committees these are not permanent and are constantly under the con­trol of the participants who are always present, who assemble daily. In many ways, these are the equivalent of the general assemblies of struggling factory workers and, like the latter, are threatened by the maneuvers of the unions who try to control them, take them over and infiltrate them, the better to sterilize them.

10. The fact that the mode of existence of these groupings of unemployed workers is not the workplace, but where they live, their neighborhood, their commune, in no way changes their class nature, nor their social links with all other members of the class. These indestructible links are provided by the fact that these unemployed workers were at work yesterday and may return individually to work tomorrow, that there is a constant movement of workers joining the unemployed. Although unemployment is a fixed and irrev­ersible phenomenon of the crisis, this does not apply to every unemployed worker taken individually, but to the class as a whole. These links are also provided by the common life of workers at work and unemployed wor­kers, who may share the same incomes, be parents, friends etc. Finally, there are the links between the workers living in a neighborhood and those working in the fac­tories in that neighborhood. The diversity of particular and circumstantial conditions within the general unitary condition of the class can give rise to momentary and diverse forms of workers’ regroupment without calling into question their class character.

11. In the unitary organs of the class, which in the revolutionary period will be the centralized workers’ councils, there can be no question of excluding millions of workers because they are out of work. In one way or another they will necessarily be present in these unitary organs as they will in its struggles. Nothing allows us, not even the experience of the past, to stipulate in advance the form this participation will take, and a priori proclaim that it will not be through local groupings of unemployed. It’s exactly the same for the unemployed workers as for the workers and employees in small enterprises who will most probably be called upon to regroup on the basis of the localities of their workplaces in order to send their delegates to the central council of the councils in a town. In any case, it would be artificial and presumptuous to arbitrarily dictate in advance the particu­lar forms in which the workers will regroup. It’s up to revolutionaries to remain con­stantly attentive and vigilant so that all the formations which may appear can integrate themselves in the best way possible into the unitary organs and struggles of the class.

12. The fact that other elements coming from the petty bourgeoisie and other strata share the condition of unemployment doesn’t sub­stantially alter the problem of unemploy­ment and the unemployed. These elements tend to be a minority in the mass of the unemployed. In a sense, the entry of these elements or some of them into the mass of unemployed workers is a paradoxical method of their proletarianization. Where they come from sociologically and what they are about to become differs greatly. The petty bourgeois mentality which they bring with them into the mass of unemployed workers can certainly have a pernicious influence, but their influence is largely limited and mini­mized by more important factors like the class struggle and the balance of forces. They should not be given undue importance. After all, we find a similar problem when these elements end up among the workers at work. Everything depends on the state of the class, its consciousness and combativity, which make it able to lead and assimilate these elements. It’s the same in a war when masses of workers, instead of being unemplo­yed, are metamorphosed into soldiers and mixed up with elements from other classes. It would be a waste of time, and impossible, to look at each one in terms of his social origins. Unemployment is and will remain fundamentally a state imposed on the working class and as such is a problem of the working class.

ICC, March 1978

Recent and ongoing: 

  • unemployment and the classtruggle [87]

Terror, Terrorism and Class Violence

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International Review 14, 1978

Terror, Terrorism and Class Violence

INTRODUCTION

The formidable ideological campaigns of the European bourgeoisie on the subject of terrorism (the Schleyer affair in Germany, the Moro affair in Italy), fig leaves covering a massive strengthening of the terror of the bourgeois state, have made the problem of violence, terror and terrorism a major preoccupation for revolutionaries. These questions are not new for communists: for decades they have denounced the barbaric methods used by the bourgeoisie to maintain its power in society, the savagery which even the most democratic regimes unleash at the slightest threat to the existing order. They have been able to point out that the present campaigns are not really aimed at the gnat bites of a handful of desperate elements from the decomposing petty bourgeoisie, but at the working class, whose necessarily violent revolt is the only serious threat to capitalism.

The role of revolutionaries has thus been to denounce these campaigns for what they are, as well as showing the stupid servility of the leftist groups, for example certain Trotskyists, who spend their time denouncing the Red Brigades because they condemned Moro ‘without sufficient proof’ and ‘without the agreement of the working class’. But at the same time as they denounce bourgeois terror and affirm the necessity for the working class to use violence to destroy capitalism, revolutionaries have to be particularly clear:

·         about the real meaning of terrorism;

·         on the form of violence the working class uses in its struggle against the bourgeoisie.

And here it must be said that, even within organizations that defend class positions, there can be a number of erroneous conceptions, which see violence, terror and terrorism as synonymous, and which consider:

·         that there can be a ‘workers’ terrorism’;

·         that against the white terror of the bourgeoisie, the working class has to put forward its own ‘revolutionary terror’, which is in some ways symmetrical to bourgeois terror.

The Bordigist International Communist Party (Programme Communiste) has probably made the most explicit interpretation of this kind of confusion. For example: “The Marchais and Pelikans only reject the revolutionary aspects of Stalinism — the single party, dictatorship, terror which it inherited from the proletarian revolution . ..“ (Programme Communiste, no.76, p.87)

Thus, for this organization, terror, even when it’s used by Stalinism, is essentially revolutionary, and there can be an identity between the methods of the proletarian revolution and those of the worst counter—revolution which has ever descended upon the working class.

Moreover, at the time of the Baader affair, the ICP tended to present the terrorist acts of Baader and his companions as harbingers of the future violence of the working class, despite reservations about the impasse these acts represent. Thus in Le Proletaire, no.254 we read: “It is with this spirit that we have anxiously followed the tragic epic of Andreas Baader and his comrades who have participated in this movement, the movement of the slow accumulation of the premises for the proletarian awakening”, and further on: “The proletarian struggle will know other martyrs ...”

Finally, the idea of a ‘workers’ terrorism’ appears clearly in passages such as: “In sum, to be revolutionary, it’s not enough to denounce the violence and terror of the bourgeois state — you have to call for violence and terrorism as indispensable weapons in the emancipation of the proletariat.” (Le Proletaire, no. 253)

Against confusions of this sort, the following text attempts to go beyond mere dictionary definitions and the abuses of language accidentally committed by certain revolutionaries in the past, and to establish the difference in class content between terror, terrorism and violence, above all the violence the working class will have to use to emancipate itself.

CLASS VIOLENCE AND PACIFISM

To recognise the class struggle is straight away to accept that violence is one of the inherent, fundamental aspects of the class struggle. The existence of classes means that society is torn by antagonistic interests, irreconcilable conflicts. Classes are constituted on the basis of these antagonisms. The social relations between classes are necessarily relations of opposition and antagonism, i.e. of struggle.

To claim the opposite, to claim you can overcome this state of fact by good will, by collaboration and harmony between classes, is to leave reality. It’s completely utopian.

It’s not surprising that exploiting classes should spread such illusions. They are ‘naturally’ convinced that no other society, no better society, can exist than the one they rule over. This absolute, blind conviction is dictated by their interests and privileges. Their class interests and privileges are identified with the kind of society they rule over; they have an interest in preaching to the exploited, oppressed classes that they should renounce struggle, accept the existing order, submit to ‘historical laws’ which are supposed to be immutable. Ruling classes are both objectively limited and unable to understand the dynamism of the class struggle (of oppressed classes) and subjectively interested in making the oppressed classes give up their struggle, in annihilating the will of the oppressed through all sorts of mystifications.

But ruling exploiting classes are not the only ones to have such an attitude to the struggle. Certain currents have believed that it is possible to avoid class struggle by appealing to the intelligence and understanding of men of good will, in order to create a harmonious, fraternal, egalitarian society. This was the case, for example, with the Utopians at the beginning of capitalism. Contrary to the bourgeoisie and its ideologies, the Utopians had no interest in glossing over the class struggle in order to maintain the privileges of the ruling class. If they bypassed the class struggle it was because they didn’t understand the historic reasons for the existence of classes. They thus expressed an immaturity in understanding reality, a reality which already included the class struggle, the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. While expressing the inevitable lag of consciousness behind existence, they were a product of the theoretical groping of the class, of the effort of the class to become conscious. This is why they were justly seen as the precursors of the socialist movement, a considerable step forward in the movement which was to find a scientific and historical foundation in marxism.

It’s not at all the same case for the humanist and pacifist movements which have flourished since the second half of the last century and who claim to ignore the class struggle. These bring no contribution to the emancipation of humanity. They are simply the expression of petty bourgeois strata which are historically anachronistic and impotent, and which subsist in modern society, caught between the struggle of the proletariat and bourgeoisie. Their a-classist, inter-classist anti-class struggle ideology is the lamentation of a doomed class which has no future in capitalism nor in the society which the proletariat will establish: socialism. Lamentable and ridiculous, prey to absurd illusions, they can only obstruct the progress and will of the proletariat; and for the same reason they are eminently usable, and very often used, by capitalism, which will use anything it can get hold of as a weapon of mystification.

The existence of classes, of the class struggle, necessarily implies class violence. Only snivelling wretches or rank charlatans (like Social Democrats) can reject this. In general, violence is a characteristic of life and has accompanied its whole evolution. Any action involves a certain degree of violence. Movement itself is a product of violence because it is the result of a continuous break in equilibrium, deriving from the clash of contradictory forces. It was present in the first human groupings, and it doesn’t necessarily express itself in the form of open physical violence. Violence means anything involving imposition, coercion, a balance of force, threats. Violence means resorting to physical or psychological aggression; aggression against other beings, but

it also exists when a given situation or decision is imposed by the mere fact of disposing of the means to such aggression, even if these means aren’t actually used. But while violence in one form or another existed as soon as movement or life existed, the division of society into classes made violence a principal foundation of social relations, reaching its most infernal depths with capitalism.

Any system of class exploitation bases its power on violence, an ever-growing violence which tends to become the main pillar holding up the whole social edifice. Without it society would immediately fall apart. A necessary product of the exploitation of one class by another, violence, organized, concentrated and institutionalized in its most fully worked-out form in the state, becomes dialectically a fundamental precondition for the existence of an exploitative society. Against this increasingly bloody and murderous violence of the exploiting classes, the exploited and oppressed classes can only put forward their own violence if they want to liberate themselves. To appeal to the ‘humane’ feelings of the exploiters, like religious thinkers a la Tolstoy or Gandhi, or the rabbit-skinned socialist, is to believe in miracles; it’s asking wolves to stop being wolves and change into lambs; it’s asking the capitalist class to stop being a capitalist class and transform itself into the working class.

The violence of an exploiting class is an inherent part of its nature and can only be stopped by the revolutionary violence of the oppressed classes. To understand this, foresee it, prepare for it, organize it, is not only a decisive precondition for the victory of the oppressed classes, but will also ensure this victory with the least amount of suffering. Anyone who has the least doubt or hesitation about this is not a revolutionary.

 

THE VIOLENCE OF EXPLOITING AND RULING CLASSES: TERROR

We have seen that exploitation is inconceivable without violence; that the two are organically inseparable. Although one can conceive of violence outside of exploitative relations, exploitation can only be carried on through violence. They are to each other like lungs and air - the lungs can’t function without oxygen.

Like the movement of capitalism into its imperialist phase, violence combined with exploitation takes on a particular and new quality. It’s no longer an accidental or secondary fact: its presence has become a constant at every level of social life. It impregnates all relationships, penetrates the pores of the social organism, both on the general level and the so-called personal level. Beginning from exploitation and the need to dominate the producer class, violence imposes itself on all the relationships between different classes and strata in society: between the industrialized countries; between the different factions of the ruling class; between men and women; between parents and children; between teachers and pupils; between individuals; between the governors and the governed. It becomes specialized, structured, Organized, concentrated in a distinct body; the state, with its permanent armies, its police, its laws, its functionaries and torturers; and this body tends to elevate itself above society and to dominate it.

In order to ensure the exploitation of man by man, violence becomes the most important activity of society, which devotes a bigger and bigger portion of its economic and cultural resources to it. Violence is elevated to the status of a cult, an art, a science. A science applied not only to military art, to the technique of armaments, but to every domain and on all levels, to the organization of concentration camps and the installation of gas chambers, to the art of rapid and massive extermination of entire populations, to the creation of veritable universities of psychological and scientific torture, where a plethora of qualified torturers can win diplomas and practice their skills. This is a society which not only “sweats mud and blood from every pore”, as Marx said, but can neither live nor breathe outside of an atmosphere poisoned with cadavers, death, destruction, massacres, suffering and torture. In such a society, violence has reached its apogee and changed in quality - it has become terror.

To talk about violence in general terms, without referring to concrete conditions, historic periods, and the classes who are exercising the violence, is to understand nothing of its real content, of what gives it a distinct and specific quality in exploitative societies, and why there is this fundamental modification of violence into terror, which can’t be reduced to a simple question of quantity (just as, when talking about commodities, only a quantitative difference is recognized between antiquity and capitalism and not the fundamental qualitative difference between the two modes of production).

As a society divided into antagonistic classes develops, violence in the hands of the ruling class more and more takes on a new character: terror. Terror is not an attribute of revolutionary classes at the moment they accomplish the revolution. This is a superficial, purely formal view which glorifies terror as the revolutionary action par excellence. In this way you end up with the following axiom: the stronger the terror, the deeper and more radical the revolution. But this is completely negated by history. The bourgeoisie has used and perfected terror all through its existence, not just at the moment of its revolution (c.f. 1848 and the Paris Commune), but bourgeois terror reaches its highest points precisely when capitalism has entered into decadence. Terror is not the expression of the revolutionary nature and activity of the bourgeoisie at the moment of its revolution, even if it had some spectacular expressions in the bourgeois revolution. It is much more an expression of its nature as an exploiting class which, like any other exploiting class, can only base its rule on terror. The revolutions which ensured the passage from one exploitative society to another were in no way the progenitors of terror; they simply transferred it from one exploiting class to another. It was not so much to get rid of the old ruling class that the bourgeoisie perfected and strengthened its terror, but mainly to ensure its domination over society in general and the working class in particular. Terror in the bourgeois revolution was therefore not an end but a continuity, because the new society was a continuity in societies of exploitation of man by man. Violence in bourgeois revolutions was not the end of oppression but a continuity in oppression. That is why it could only take the form of terror.

To sum up, we can define terror as violence specific to exploiting classes, which will only disappear when they do. Its specific characteristics are:

1.    Being organically linked to exploitation and used to impose it.

2.    Being the action of a privileged class.

3.    Being the action of a minority class in society.

4.    Being the action of a specialized body, tightly selected, closed in on itself, and tending to elude any control by society over it.

5.    Reproducing and perfecting itself endlessly, extending to all levels, to all social relationships.

6.    Having no other raison d’etre than subordinating and crushing the human community.

7.    Developing feelings of hostility and violence between social groups: nationalism, chauvinism, racism and other monstrosities.

8.    Developing feelings and behaviour patterns of egoism, sadistic aggressiveness, vindictiveness; the daily unending war of each against all which plunges the whole of society into a state of terror.

 

THE TERRORISM OF PETTY BOURGEOIS CLASSES AND STRATA

The petty bourgeois classes (peasants, artisans, small shopkeepers, liberal professions, intellectuals) do not constitute fundamental classes in society. They have no particular mode of production or social project to put forward. They are not historic classes in the marxist sense. They are the least homogeneous of social classes. Even though their higher echelons draw their revenue from the exploitation of others’ labour and are thus part of the privileged, they are, as a whole, subjected to the domination of the capitalist class, which imposes its laws on them and oppresses them. They have no future as classes. In their higher echelons, the maximum they can aspire to is to integrate themselves individually into the capitalist class. In their lower ranks, they are implacably doomed to lose any ‘independent’ ownership of the means of production and to be proletarianised. The immense middle-of-the-road majority are doomed to vegetate, economically and politically crushed by the domination of the capitalist class. Their political behaviour is determined by the balance of forces between the two fundamental classes in society: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Their hopeless resistance to the pitiless laws of capital leads them to adopt a fatalistic, passive behaviour. Their ideology is the individualistic ‘get what you can’; collectively they indulge in all kinds of pathetic lamentations in the search for miserable consolation, in ridiculous and impotent humanist and pacifist sermons.

Materially crushed, with no future, vegetating in a completely restricted day-to-day existence, wallowing in mediocrity, they are in their despair prey to all kinds of mystifications, from the most pacifist (religious, nudist, anti—violence, anti—atomic bomb, anti—nuclear sects, hippies, ecologists) to the most bloodthirsty (Black Hundreds, pogromists, racists, Ku—Klux Klan, fascist gangs, gangsters and mercenaries of all kinds). It is mainly in the latter, the bloody ones, that they find the compensation of an illusory dignity. It is the heroism of the coward, the courage of the clown, the glory of sordid mediocrity. After reducing them to a most miserable condition, capitalism finds in these strata an inexhaustible source of recruitment for the heroes of its terror.

Although during the course of history there have been explosions of violence and anger from these classes, these explosions remain sporadic and never go beyond jacqueries and revolts, because they don’t have any perspective except to be crushed. In capitalism these classes completely lose their independence and serve only as cannon—fodder in the confrontations between factions of the ruling class, both inside and outside national frontiers. In moments of revolutionary crises and in certain favourable circumstances, the profound discontent of a part of these classes can serve as a force supporting the struggle of the proletariat.

The inevitable process of pauperization and proletarianisation of the lower strata of these classes is an extremely difficult and painful road to follow and gives rise to a particularly exacerbated current of revolt. The combativity of these elements, especially those coming from the artisans and declassed intellectuals is based more on their desperate conditions of life than on the proletarian class struggle, which they find difficulty in joining. What basically characterizes the members of these strata is their individualism, impatience, scepticism and demoralization. Their actions are more aimed at spectacular suicide than at any particular goal. Having lost their past position in society, having no future, they live in a present of misery and exasperated revolt against this misery; in an immediacy which is felt as an immediacy. Even if through contact with the working class and its historical future they can get inspired by its ideas in a distorted way, this rarely goes beyond the level of fantasy and dreams. Their real view of reality is a purely contingent one.

The political expressions of this current take on extremely varied forms, from individual action to different kinds of sects; closed conspiratorial groups plotting coups d’etat, ‘exemplary actions’ and terrorism.

What constitutes the unity in all this diversity is their lack of awareness of the objective, historical determinism behind the movement of the class struggle and of the historic subject of modern society, the only force capable of social transformations the proletariat.

The persistence of the expressions of this current is due to the permanent process of proletarianisation which takes place throughout the history of capitalism. Their variety and diversity is the product of local and contingent situations. This social phenomenon has always accompanied the historical formation of the proletariat and is mixed to a varying degree with the movement of the proletariat, into which this social current imports ideas and behaviour alien to the class. This is particularly true in the case of terrorism.

We must insist on this essential point and leave no room for ambiguity. It is true that at the dawn of the formation of the class, the proletariat’s tendency to organise itself had not yet discovered its most appropriate forms, and the class made use of a conspiratorial form of organisation - the secret societies which were a heritage of the bourgeois revolution. But this doesn’t change the class nature of these forms of organisation and their inadequacy for the new content - the class struggle of the proletariat. Very quickly the proletariat was led to break from these forms of organisation and methods of action, and to definitively reject them.

Just as the process of theoretical elaboration inevitably went through a utopian phase, so the formation of political organisations of the class had to go through the phase of conspiratorial sects. But we must not make a virtue out of necessity here and confuse the different phases of the movement. We have to know how to distinguish the different phases of the movement and the forms they give to rise to.

Just as utopian socialism at a given moment in the movement of the class was transformed from being a great, positive contribution into an obstacle getting in the way of the further development of the movement, so conspiratorial sects also became a negative sign, sterilising the progress of the movement.

The current which represented strata on the painful road to proletarianisation could no longer make the slightest contribution to an already developed class movement. Not only did this current advocate the sect form of organisation and conspiratorial methods, thus falling further and further behind the real movement, like a woman at the menopause; they were led to push these ideas and methods to an extreme - a caricatured level - the end point of which was the advocacy of terrorism.

Terrorism is not simply the action of terror. To say that is to leave the discussion at a purely terminological level. What we want to show is the social meaning and differences underlying these terms. Terror is a system of domination, structured, permanent, emanating from exploiting classes. Terrorism on the other hand is a reaction of oppressed classes who have no future, against the terror of the ruling class. They are momentary reactions, without continuity, acts of vengeance with no tomorrow.

We find a moving description of this kind of movement in Panait Istrati and his Haidoucs in the historical context of Rumania at the end of the last century. We find it in the terrorism of the Narodniks and, though it appears in a different way, with the anarchists and the Bonnot gang. They still have the same basic nature - the revenge of the impotent. They never announce anything new, but are the desperate expression of an end - their own end.

Terrorism, the impotent reaction of the impotent, can never overcome the terror of the ruling class. It is a gnat biting the elephant. On the other hand, terrorism has often been exploited by the state to justify and strengthen its own terror.

We must absolutely denounce the myth that terrorism serves, or could serve, as a detonator of the proletarian struggle. It would be rather peculiar to find that a class with a historic future needs to look to a class without a historic future to detonate its struggle.

It is absolutely absurd to claim that the terrorism of the most radicalised strata of the petty bourgeoisie has the merit of destroying the democratic mystification in the working class. That it can destroy the mystification of bourgeois legality. That it can teach the working class about the inevitability of violence. The proletariat has no lesson to draw from radical terrorism except to distance itself from it and reject it, since the violence contained in terrorism is fundamentally situated on a bourgeois terrain. An understanding that violence is necessary and indispensable will be drawn by the proletariat from its own existence; its own struggle; its own experience; its own confrontations with the ruling class. This is class violence, which is different in nature and content, in form and method, from the terrorism of the petty bourgeoisie and the terror of the ruling class.

It is quite certain that, in general, the working class will have an attitude of solidarity and sympathy - not towards terrorism which it condemns as an ideology, a method, and a mode of organisation - but towards the elements who are drawn into terrorism. This is so for obvious reasons:

1.    because elements drawn into terrorism are in revolt against the existing order of terror that the proletariat aims to destroy from top to bottom.

2.    because, like the working class, elements drawn into terrorism are victims of the cruel exploitation and oppression of the capitalist class and its state, the mortal enemy of the proletariat. The only way the proletariat can show its solidarity with these victims is by trying to save them from the executioners of the state terror, and by attempting to draw them away from the deadly impasse of terrorism.

 

THE CLASS VIOLENCE OF THE PROLETARIAT

We do not have to emphasise here the necessity for violence in the class struggle of the proletariat. This would be kicking open doors because, ever since the Equals of Babeuf, this has been demonstrated in theory and in practise. It is also a waste of time repeating, as though it were a new discovery, that all classes have to use violence, including the proletariat. By limiting yourself to these truisms - almost banalities - you end up with the empty equation: “Violence equals violence”. You establish a simplistic and absurd identification between the violence of capital and the violence of the proletariat, and gloss over the essential difference: that one is oppressive and the other libratory.

To go on repeating the tautology that “violence equals violence”; to go on demonstrating that all classes use violence; to go on showing that this violence is essentially the same, is as intelligent as seeing an identity between the act of a surgeon performing a caesarean section to bring new life into the world and the act of a murderer killing his victim by plunging a knife into his stomach, simply because both use similar instruments – knives - on the same object - the stomach - and because both use an apparently similar technique in opening up the stomach.

The most important thing is not to go on shouting, “Violence, violence”, but to underline the differences. To show as clearly as possible why and how the violence of the proletariat is different from the terror and terrorism of other classes.

We are not establishing a distinction between terror and class violence for terminological reasons, or out of a sense of revulsion for the word ‘terror’, or because of squeamishness. We do so in order to draw out more clearly the differences in class nature, form and content which lie behind these words. Vocabulary always lags behind fact and a lack of distinction in words is often the sign of an insufficiently elaborated thought which can lead to further ambiguities. For example, there is the word ‘social democrat’ which in no way corresponded to the revolutionary essence - the communist goals - of the political organisation of the proletariat. It is the same thing with the word ‘terror’. You sometimes find it in socialist literature, even in the classics, tacked on to the words ‘revolutionary’ and ‘proletariat’. We must guard against the abuses that can be committed by literal citations of phrases without putting them in their context or without looking at the circumstances in which they were written and against whom they were written. This can end up distorting the real ideas of their authors. It has to be stressed that in most cases these authors, while using the word terror, took great precautions to establish the basic difference between that of the proletariat and that of the bourgeoisie, between the Paris Commune and Versailles, between revolution and counter-revolution in the Civil War in Russia. If we think it is time to distinguish these two terms it is in order to get rid of the ambiguities involved in identifying them - an ambiguity which sees only a difference in quantity and intensity, not a class difference. And if it was strictly a question of a change in quantity, for marxists who use a dialectical method, this still leads to a change in quality.

In repudiating terror in favour of the class violence of the proletariat we aim not only to express our class hostility to the real content of exploitation and oppression which lies in terror, but also to get rid of casuistic and hypocritical niceties about how ‘the end justifies the means’.

Those unconditional apologists of terror, those Calvinists of the revolution - the Bordigists, have disdain for the question of forms of organisation, of means. For them only the ‘goal’ exists and all forms and means can be used indifferently to attain this goal. “The revolution is a question of content, not of forms of organisation”, they repeat endlessly. Except, of course, for terror. Here they are quite categorical: “No revolution without terror. You’re not a revolutionary if you won’t kill children.” Here terror, considered as a means, becomes an absolute precondition, a categorical imperative of the revolution and its content. Why this exception? We could also ask other questions from the other way round. If questions of means and forms of organisation are of no importance to the proletarian revolution, why shouldn’t the revolution be carried out through the monarchical or parliamentary form?

The truth is that to try to separate form and content, means and ends, is absurd. In reality, form and content are intrinsically connected. An end cannot be achieved by any means. It requires specific means. A given means is only applicable to a given end. Any other approach leads to sophistic speculations.

When we reject terror as a mode of existence of the violence of the proletariat, it is not for some moral reason, but because terror, as a content and method, is by nature opposed to the aims of the proletariat. Can the Calvinists of the revolution really believe, can they really convince us, that the proletariat can make use of concentration camps, the systematic extermination of whole populations, the installation of a huge network of gas chambers, even more scientifically perfect than those of Hitler? Is genocide part of the ‘Programme’ of the ‘Calvinist Road to Socialism’?

We have only to recall the points we made about the main characteristics of the content and methods of terror to see at one glance the enormous gulf between terror and the proletariat:

1.    “Being organically linked to exploitation and used to impose it”. The proletariat is an exploited class and struggles for the elimination of exploitation of man by man.

2.    “Being the action of a privileged class”. The proletariat has no privileges and fights for the abolition of all privileges.

3.    “Being the action of a minority class in society”. The proletariat represents the immense majority of society. Some may see this as an expression of our ‘incorrigible penchant for the democratic principle’, the principle of majority and minority, but it is they who are obsessed by this problem - and what is more, for them minority acts held in horror by the majority are the criterion for revolutionary truth. Socialism cannot be realised if it is not based on historical possibility and does not correspond to the fundamental interests and will of the immense majority of society. This is one of the key arguments of Lenin in State and Revolution, and also of Marx when he said that the proletariat cannot emancipate itself without emancipating the whole of humanity.

4.    “Being the action of a specialized body”. The proletariat has inscribed on its banner the destruction of the permanent army and the police, and the general arming of the people; above all of the proletariat. “...tending to elude any control by society over it”. As an objective, the proletariat rejects all specialization, and because it is impossible to realise this immediately the class will insist that specialists are under the complete control of society.

5.    “Reproducing and perfecting itself endlessly...”. The proletariat aims to put a stop to all this and begins to do so as soon as it takes power.

6.    “Having no other raison d’etre than subordinating and crushing the human community”. The aim of the proletariat is diametrically opposed to this. Its raison d’etre is the liberation of human society.

7.    “Developing feelings of hostility and violence between social groups; nationalism, chauvinism, racism, and other monstrosities”. The proletariat will suppress all these historical anachronisms which have become monstrosities and barriers to the harmonious unification of humanity.

8. “Developing feelings and behaviour patterns of egoism, sadistic aggressiveness, vindictiveness; the daily unending war of each against all...”. The proletariat will develop quite new feelings - of solidarity, collective life, fraternity, ‘all for one and one for all’, the free association of producers, socialised production and consumption. And while terror “...plunges the whole of society into a state of terror”, the proletariat will call upon the initiative and creativity of everyone, so that in a general state of enthusiasm they can take their life in their own hands.

The class violence of the proletariat cannot be terror because its raison d’etre is to do away with terror. To consider them the same is to play with words. The hand of a murderer drawing his knife isn’t the same thing as someone who stops the murder being committed. The proletariat cannot resort to the organisation of pogroms, lynchings, schools of torture, Moscow Trials, as methods for realising socialism. It leaves these methods to capitalism, because they are part of capitalism, they are suitable to its ends and they have the generic name of TERROR.

Neither terrorism before the revolution nor terror after the revolution can be weapons of the proletariat in its struggle for the emancipation of humanity.

M.C.

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The crisis of Russia and the Eastern countries (part 2)

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The weakness and senility of state capitalism in the East

Unlike the Trotskyists who drape a golden chasuble over the naked body of the capita­list economy in the East, militants of the communist left like Mattick or the GLAT1 recognize the reactionary character of state capitalism. They don’t give it a ‘pro­gressive’ label by invoking the theory of the ‘third system’, like Socialisme ou Barbarie and its present-day offshoots in Solidarity. For example, we fully endorse the article which appeared in Lutte de Classe, January 1977, when it affirms clearly that “the contradictions which hurl capitalism into crisis are not the privilege of either the advanced or the underdeveloped countries of this planet. They are inherent in state capitalism, as the example of the USSR shows ...”. This position is certainly clearer than the gratuitous assertion -- com­pletely in contradiction with the reality of Russian state capitalism -- made by Paul Mattick when he claims that “state capita­lism is not ‘regulated’ by competition and crises”. By failing to see the destructive role of competition and crises in capitalism in general, and especially by denying their effects in the East, Mattick can only end up by rejecting the objective possibility of a proletarian revolution. This is why, at a time when the bourgeoisie all over the world is taking more and more state capita­list measures, nationalizing key sectors of the economy, it is important to define the nature of state capitalism, in order to show that it is merely a palliative and not a ‘solution’ to the general crisis of capitalism.

1. What is state capitalism?

The fact that state capitalism has most often been associated with Russia and its bloc, or with China, has given rise to the idea that the more or less complete take­over of the economy by the state is a pecu­liarity of these countries. The apparent absence over a long period of the classical manifestations of the crisis -- unemployment, overproduction, brutal falls in production -- seemed to confirm this false idea of a ‘world on its own’.

In fact, far from being a historical enigma, this phenomenon is part of the ‘natural’ evolution of capitalism2; ‘natural’ in the sense that this mode of production has been obliged to dominate all social rela­tions in an increasingly violent and totali­tarian way. In the nineteenth century cer­tain capitalist nations which, for historical and geographical reasons, had been accumula­ting capital over a long period, were able to follow the ‘natural’ laws of the capitalist economy. But towards the end of the century, the growing number of capitalist nations meant that the state had to inter­fere more and more with these ‘natural’ laws. When Engels wrote Anti-Duhring he was already aware that liberalism and the struggle against the Moloch-state so dear to the liberal theoreticians of the nine­teenth century had had their day:

“The modern state, no matter what its form, is essentially a capitalist mach­ine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal personification of the total nat­ional capital. The more it proceeds to the taking over of productive forces, the more does it actually become the national capitalist, the more citizens does it exploit. The workers remain wage-workers -- proletarians. The capita­list relation is not done away with. It is rather brought to a head.”

This analysis of Engels, which the Trotsky­ists are so careful to ‘ignore’, is a posthu­mous blow against their theory of the ‘wor­kers’ state’. It is an unequivocal condem­nation of all their ‘transitional programs’ and plans for the nationalization of private capital. The state is the machine of exploi­tation par excellence: when our latter-day Duhrings, the leftists, try to outbid the traditional left in their calls for natio­nalizations, they are simply calling for the strengthening of this capitalist machine.

The Bordigists unconsciously participate in this when they see the states engendered by national liberation struggles as ‘progressive’ factors, products of the bourgeois revolution. They don’t understand that the bourgeois states which came out of the bour­geois revolutions of the past only represen­ted historical progress to the extent that they allowed for the free development of the productive forces, that they stood aside and enabled new historical forces to grow. But the increasing hypertrophy of the capi­talist state from the end of last century on, far from expressing a new qualitative expan­sion of the productive forces, reflected the growing compression of the productive forces within the framework of the nation state. Two world wars have proved that the swelling of the state is directly proportional to the destruction of the accumulated produc­tive forces. The fact that these new ‘liberated’ states have to take over the whole of social life is proof of the weak­ness of the economies in these areas; and this is why these states have to subject their proletariats to the most ferocious exploitation and repression.

a. Weakness of Russian state capitalism

It would be quite wrong to limit the pheno­menon of state capitalism to the so-called ‘socialist’ states. From Internationalisme3 to the ICC, revolutionaries have pointed out that we are dealing with a general phen­omenon all over the world -- a tendency -- but one which can never be fully realized because of the impossibility of absorbing all the remaining non-capitalist sectors. This is why it’s wrong to talk about a fully-formed or economically ‘pure’ state capitalism in the East, which is burdened with a feebly centralized artisanal and agricultural sector (kolkhozes, small plots of land, etc), or to say that the West has a system of ‘private capitalism’ because of the relative weakness of the state sector. The tendency towards state capitalism is not a question of percentages, as though a country becomes ‘state capitalist’ when it goes beyond a fateful 50 per cent mark of state control. When Mattick, in Marx and Keynes, defines the American economy as a ‘mixed economy’ diametrically opposed to the ‘system’ of Russian state capitalism, he loses sight of the existence of this general tendency.

Mattick and others are taken in by appear­ances and define capitalism in terms of two antagonistic forces (‘private’ and ‘state’ capitalism) because they only see the juridical forms which capital takes on. State capitalism is fundamentally the res­ult of the growing fusion between capital and the state. This fusion is not the same as the juridical form it takes on and which is often the mystified form of its real con­tent. It is the degree of concentration and centralization of capital at the level of the state which determines the reality of this fusion. The classical capitalism of the nineteenth century tended to become more and more concentrated internationally, beyond its original frontiers. But while capitalism is a world system it can only develop in the framework of competition between nation states. Thus, when imperialism began to develop at the end of the nineteenth century, the tendency towards international concentra­tion was blocked: the concentration and cen­tralization of capital gravitated more and more around the nation state, the only force capable of defending capital in an economic war of one against the rest. The tendency towards state capitalism expressed itself most clearly in World War I, among all the belligerents, weak and small. Although still relatively weak up until the crisis of 1929, the tendency was particularly striking in the great imperialist states, where capital had already reached a high level of concentration and centralization, for example, the US and Germany during World War I -- the Germany which Lenin saw as a model of state capitalism for Russia. The ability of US capital to transform its whole productive apparatus into a war econ­omy during World War II shows that the strength of state capitalism is itself deter­mined by the strength of the economy which underlies it.

This does not mean that state capitalism is a higher form of capitalism, “a rationaliza­tion of the process of production” (Bukharin, Economics of the Transition Period). The permanent crisis since 1914 has shown that you can’t ‘rationalize’ a system whose survi­val through the cycle of crisis-war-recons­truction shows that it has become totally irrational. The ‘rationalization’ of capi­talism is a contradiction in terms. Simi­larly the planning of the economy under state capitalism can only be the planning of the anarchy which has characterized capi­talism from the beginning.

The very strength of American state capita­lism resides in its capacity to push the crisis out onto the world market through its state organs (the International Monetary Fund, International Bank of Reconstruction and Development etc).

What about Russian state capitalism? How does it differ from American state capita­lism? As we have seen the existence of pri­vate capitalism is not in contradiction with the existence of state capital, and vice versa. Only the Stalinists and Trotskyists could see the American state as a ‘prisoner of the monopolies’, weakened by their occult powers. These apologists for the dictator­ship of the Russian state obviously cannot understand that the political strength of a state is all the greater when it is based on a powerful economic substructure. As has been shown by Marxists in the past, beginning with Engels, the development of joint stock companies, then cartels and trusts, do not lead to the weakening of the state; on the contrary it ends up with a state monopoly excluding all the others and directly subordinating them to its control.

While this process took place in a largely gradual manner with the great capitalist powers (Germany, USA, Japan), it was dif­ferent in Russia and the Eastern countries. Here the process was realized through the violent dispossession of most of the private owners, the state becoming the exclusive owner of the means of production. The state had to intervene despotically in the economy in order to make up for the congenital weak­ness of a bourgeoisie incapable of carrying through the concentration and centralization of capital. Thus the state swelled to huge proportions on a weak economic foundation, absorbing civil society without really dominating it.

Although in some ways state capitalism has reached its most complete form in Russia, with this total absorption of civil society, this fusion of economics and politics, it has only been achieved at the price of a growing anarchy in the relations of produc­tion, which are only formally dominated by the state. The gigantic waste involved in an anarchic system of planning, which is incapable of really centralizing and concen­trating the capital accumulated, shows that this fusion between capital and the state has been realized more at the legal level than in reality.

2. The myth of ‘scientific’ planning

The Eastern countries are an illustration of the growing irrationality of the capita­list system as a whole. Since the 1930s, the bourgeoisie has believed that it would be possible to develop production and con­sumption in a regular and harmonious manner by ‘deciding’ production quotas in advance. Precise statistical methods and specialized planning bureaux would make it possible to foresee the future and thus avoid sudden catastrophes like 1929. All the capitalist schemes from the De Man Plan to the Stalin­ist Plans nourished this illusion. The war was to destroy this illusion; after 1938 all the capitalist countries from the USA to the USSR which had adopted these planning methods fell back into the crisis.

The post-war period gave new life to this dream of discovering the Anti-Crisis Philo­sopher’s Stone, in the form of ‘econometric’ theories in the West and ‘scientific calcu­lation’ in the East; but this was because the expansion of reconstructed markets was effectively ‘planning’ the economy. Today once again it is the crisis which is planning the economy. We saw this in the previous article when we showed that the continuing fall in production indices reflects the grow­ing contradictions of accumulation. The fall in the rate of growth to the 4 per cent envisaged in the annual Plans of the COMECON countries up to 1980 shows that such Plans are merely passive reflections of the real situation. The Russian planners can’t be conscious agents of production; they don’t determine production, they simply put for­ward indices decided upon by tendencies outside their control.

What is this ‘planning’ if it doesn’t have any real basis? The title of a pamphlet published by the Novosti press agency, Major Options for the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-80 gives us an answer. Planning under state capitalism doesn’t mean attaining definite objectives, but putting forward options: This means that the planning is aimed not at achieving a splen­did mathematical growth but at regulating the existing proportions between the producer goods sector and the consumer goods sector; this has to take into account a. the class struggle, which makes it difficult to cut consumer goods production too brutally; b. the need to constantly reinforce the arma­ments sector and thus Department I. What state capitalism can’t achieve through expan­sion it tries to provide through fluctua­tions in the proportions between the two sectors, through giving priority as to how much capital should be invested in this or that sector, this or that branch of industry.

This in no way means that capitalist anarchy has been suppressed in these ‘priority’ sectors. On the contrary, the realization of the Plan’s objectives in a given branch is done at the expense of a permanent wastage of raw materials. The commodities produced at a very low value are sometimes so poor in quality that they are unusable: “In other countries (than the USSR) pro­duction is usually extended over the whole month, but here it can only begin on the fifteenth or twentieth day of the month, when all the material has arrived. The factories then have to meet 80 per cent of the demands of the Plan (the quotas) during the last ten or fifteen days. In such conditions, no one worries about quality. Only quantity counts.”

From the standpoint of capitalist laws, the Russian economy is a perfect example of irrationality in the division of labor, productivity and profitability. This sit­uation is reflected in the ritualistic dec­larations of the leaders of Russian capital:

“In the existing enterprises production must be increased, without augmenting the workforce and even by reducing it. But it is no less important to improve the organization of labor, to eliminate time-wasting and raise the level of discipline in production.” (Kosygin, at the Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU)

It takes someone like Ernest Mandel to see some sort of ‘rationality’ in the permanent anarchy of the Eastern European economies. According to him, in contrast to western planning, “Soviet planning is real planning” (Marxist Economic Theory). For the Trotskyists any lie is permissible in the defense of the ‘socialist’ character of the ‘workers’ states’.

3. Weakness of the state capitalist economy in the East

In Eastern Europe, and even more in Russia, the only sector of the economy which has any real vitality is the armaments industry. “It is easier to produce an atomic bomb or isotopes than transistors or biochemical medicines” as a Russian physicist has said (quoted in The Russians by Hedrick Smith). It is the only sector where production is really controlled. It has better materials, higher productivity and higher wages to stimulate the effort to achieve higher qua­lity. It is the only sector where the con­centration and centralization of capital by the state is a reality, because this is a vital question for the very existence of the Russian imperialist bloc4.

This strength of the Russian war economy, which proved itself in World War II against German capital, is not a reflection of the strength of the economy as a whole; it is inversely proportional to it.

But for the Russian war economy to be really effective and capable of confronting the US war economy, it’s not enough for arma­ments production in the Russian bloc to equal that of the other bloc. The fact that the Russian armaments sector represents 20 per cent (officially) of the GNP of the USSR, as against 10 per cent in the USA, clearly shows the weakness of the Soviet economy.

Despite a commonly held conception that was particularly in vogue at the time of the ‘Liberman reforms’, state capitalism does not suffer from a hyper-centralization and hyper-concentration of the units of produc­tion. Exactly the opposite is the case. The growing hypertrophy of planning bureaux in the COMECON countries is precisely the result of the weakness of the economic sub­structure; it does not signify a movement towards a greater centralization of capital, since this is fundamentally “the concentra­tion of already-formed capitals, the transc­endence of their individual autonomy, the expropriation of capitalist by capitalist, the transformation of many small capitals into a few capitals which are already existing and functioning” (Marx, Capital, Volume I). The Russian statistics show that state capitalism often exists on the purely theoretical level (and this also applies to the other countries of the bloc, except East Germany which inherited the high level of concentration of the pre-war German economy): on 1 January 1974, Russian industry included 48,578 state-owned auto­nomous enterprises, each one functioning as a centre of accumulation, with its own accoun­ting system and financial autonomy. The part played by large-scale enterprises rem­ains small except for pilot projects in petrochemicals and electro-metallurgy (Elektro-sila in Moscow has 20,000 workers). In 1973, 31% of industrial production was carried out by 1.4% of the enterprises (660); to obtain the same percentage in the USA, only fifty enterprises are needed (Fortune, May 1974). Despite the setting up of the famous ‘industrial unions’ which regroup small enterprises in larger units, in a given branch of industry in 1974-5 fifty American enterprises could, according to Fortune, produce as much as 5000 Russian enterprises!

But more important than the level of techni­cal concentration, which is a product of, rather than a condition for, enlarged accu­mulation, is the fact that the state capita­list countries of the Eastern bloc suffer from a purely formal domination over labor. Apart from in the pilot projects, what we see is the extensive utilization of labor power based on the size of the workforce used (or rather, wasted in the general anarchy) rather than an intensive development of the productivity of labor, which has been the basis of modern capitalism since the end of the last century. While the exploitation of the proletariat is just as ferocious in the East as it is in the West, it doesn’t take the same form. What capitalist exploitation gains in the USSR and COMECON by the lengthening of the work­ing day (up to ten to twelve hours), by the quantitative mobilization of the workforce, it loses in intensity, and thus, from the capitalist point of view, in efficiency5. Last century it was the orientation of capi­tal towards the relative extraction of sur­plus value which allowed capitalism to achieve a more and more totalitarian domina­tion over living labor. The dictatorship of capital over labor, which is achieved at the political level in Russia through the terrorist violence of the state, is only formally achieved at the economic level. This is why the Russian capitalists are for­ever warning against the perils of lax atti­tudes at work. As Marx said last century, “while the production of absolute surplus value corresponds to the formal domination of labor by capital, the production of rel­ative surplus value corresponds to the real domination of capital” (Marx, Capital).

Reflecting the general crisis of capitalism since 1914, Russian state capitalism has to confront the open crisis in a weak, anachron­istic condition, which accentuates the econo­mic gap between the two competing blocs. Thus in 1973 output per inhabitant in the USSR was almost that of an underdeveloped country -- Russia was 25th in the world ranks in this field: Russia only participates in 4 per cent of international trade, about the same as Holland. Although its position on the world market is a question of life or death for each national capital in the face of the crisis, for the last twenty years COMECON has only participated in 10 per cent of world trade, less than West Germany. If we also note that the agricultural sector still mobilizes between 25 and 40 per cent of the active population in the COMECON countries, we can have some idea of just how bankrupt state capitalism is in the East. The general bankruptcy of capitalism today is also and above all the bankruptcy of state capitalism, which is a hopeless res­ponse to the general decadence of the sys­tem, and which takes the irrationality of capital as the very basis of its existence.

4. The end of illusions

a. The mercantile illusion

At the end of the 1960s, the Russian bloc tried to ‘resolve’ its crisis by modernizing its productive apparatus and thus increasing its exports on the world market, given the limitations of the COMECON market. The Liberman reforms did not stop the continual fall in the rate of profit in the enter­prises; this went from “a monetary accumula­tion of 45.1% in 1960 to 31.7% in 1973”, the fall in the rate of profit haling recov­ered somewhat in 1971 (V. Vassilev, Ration­ality of the Soviet Economic System).

At the price of a considerable indebtedness, the countries of COMECON tried to import technology and invited the industrialized countries to install ultra-modern factories. The Eastern countries had the illusion that if you modernized your capital you could transform this ‘thrust to the East’ by western capital into a ‘thrust to the West’ by the commodities of COMECON. Since 1975 the capitalist world has had to abandon this idea: not only has the West reduced its capital exports to the East for economic and strategic reasons (the growing insolvency of COMECON, resumption of the cold war); the East has also had to resign itself to a diminution of its exports to western markets. Despite resorting to the palliative of dumping, the contraction of international trade is an irreversible phenomenon which can’t be overcome by importing technology. Even the countries whose exports are orientated to­wards the West have had to modify their export policies and reorientate their trade towards the East.

Contrary to what the GLAT say (Lutte de Classe, February 1977) the present crisis does express itself in the East as the pro­duct of the saturation of markets, even if the effects of this are concretized in the tendential fall in the rate of profit. One must deny reality to say that “the USSR is the experimental proof of the absurdity (!) of all theories which seek the origins of the crisis of capitalism in the insuffi­ciency of demand or any other form (?) of lack of outlets”. State capitalism in the Russian bloc is not in crisis because it isn’t producing enough accumulated capital: state capitalism is a gigantic accumulation of constant and variable capital devalorized not only by the endemic anarchy of production but by the weakness of the markets through which it could be realized. Like the GLAT, state capitalism had the illusion that it was stagnating because it wasn’t producing enough capital6. But the underproduction of capital, ie of commodities, is, on a global scale, simply the corollary to over­production. Underproduction in a given national capital is the result of the ten­dency towards overproduction of the more developed capitals in the face of the con­traction of the market. Polish capital, for example, produces too many ships in relation to the world market’s capacity to absorb them; it thus finds itself obliged to underproduce vis-a-vis its own productive capacities. This is the whole point of planning in the countries of the East: capital attempts to avoid the brutal collapse threatened by the contraction of the world market by adapting its productive apparatus to the rhythm of this collapse. Only socialism will be able to put an end to this infernal dialectic of over-and-­underproduction, since it is the unlimited growth of the needs of humanity and thus of the production of use values aimed at meeting these needs. Only socialism will end the mercantile illusion which is plunging humanity into barbarism.

b. The reinforcement of the Russian bloc

While the brutal aggravation of the crisis has accelerated the tendency towards aut­arky in the COMECON countries, it has also led to an increase in trade inside COMECON. What the COMECON planners refer to politely as the ‘international socialist division of labor’ and the ‘development of specializa­tion’ is in reality the economic, political and strategic reinforcement of the domina­tion of Russian capital. In order to deve­lop and strengthen its war economy against the US bloc, Russia has adopted symmetrical measures:

“In July 1975, in Bucharest, the COMECON countries decided (sic) that nine billion roubles would be jointly spent between 1976 and 1980 in order to help realize Soviet resources in raw materials.” (L’Integration Economique a 1’Est’, Notes et Etudes Documentaires, 8 March 1976)

To give an idea of how Russia is exploiting its ‘fraternal countries’, such a measure would mean that Czechoslovakia would have to devote at least 4 per cent of its overall investments to it. These measures, ratified by the different CPs, as at the Ninth Congress of the East German Party, show clearly that Russia is going to impose rationing on its satellites. Although COMECON countries like Poland and Hungary managed to diversify their production and trade in the 1960s, they now find themselves more and more obliged to accept the stranglehold of Rus­sian capital on all branches of their indus­try (multinational chemicals in Poland, etc); thanks to its monopoly of raw materials, Russia has a great potential for blackmail. For such purposes Russia has its own IMF, the International Investment Bank7 which, through the medium of the transferable rou­ble, allows it to be the real paymaster; while at the same time the increasing price of Russian energy, though less expensive than in the West, has considerably augmented the satellites’ debts to the USSR.

So, what Russian state capitalism has been unable to achieve through detente with the West and the modernization of its productive apparatus, it is now trying to achieve by force, by pushing the weight of the crisis onto its allies. Not only are the Dubcek economic policies of ‘facing both ways’ definitely out, with the return to the fold of those unruly children, Poland and Hungary; also finished is the whole illusion of detente and ‘peaceful coexistence’ between the blocs, as theorized some time ago by Kruschchev.

c. The end of ‘Goulash Socialism’ illusion

The resurgence of the class struggle in the 1970s in Poland, the fear that the workers’ insurrection in the Baltic would contaminate the other COMECON countries, pushed the bourgeoisie of these countries to augment the consumer goods sector, albeit at the price of plunging the economy into debt by importing the necessary goods or blocking prices of basic consumer products. The bourgeoisie in all these countries tried to convince the workers that the scarcity of the 1950s was now just a memory and that the alliance between imported coca-cola (canned in Russia) and the local goulash would lead to a real rise in living standards.

The crisis, the strengthening of the Russian bloc by pushing the crisis onto all the COMECON countries, the growing importance given to investments in heavy industry, have modified this situation. Despite the bour­geoisie’s justifiable fear of fresh workers’ riots, all the Plans up until 1980 envisage a clear reduction in real wages:

PERCENTAGE ANNUAL GROWTH OF WAGES


Poland

Hungary

East Germany

Czechoslovakia

71-75

7.2

3.4

3.7

3.4

76-80

3-3.4

2.7-3

?

2.5-2.8

SOURCE: ‘L’ Europe de L’Est en 1976’, Notes et Etudes Documentaires, 9 Septemb

We know that after the riots at Radom and Ursus, Poland had to revise its policy of attacking the living standards of the workers, cancelling the rises in food prices Nevertheless the last two years have seen capital continuing to attack the class through repeated price rises. The weight of these sacrifices is going to get heavier and heavier, particularly in the ‘People’s Democracies’, to which Russia has begun to export the effects of the crisis. This doesn’t mean that Russia will give up dir­ectly attacking ‘its’ working class. On the contrary: the prodigious development of military expenditure in Russia in order to cope with the strategic advance of the US bloc; the emergence of an aggressive global policy in the Middle East and Africa in particular; the necessity to pay a high price to keep its more distant allies in its own camp (Cuba, Vietnam) -- all of this is weighing more and more heavily not simply on the economies of the bloc but on the shoul­ders of all the workers of COMECON. The theory of a ‘labour aristocracy’ in the big imperialist countries, bought off by their own bourgeoisie, is as far as the Russian proletariat is concerned a sinister joke which only Third Worldist fanatics and avid defenders of ‘small nations’ could take seriously.

d. The explosive contradictions of the Russian bloc

The proletariat of the Eastern countries is perhaps even less willing than any other section of the class to be mobilized for imperialist war, to be sacrificed on the altar of ‘socialism’. It is a proletariat which has experienced the ferocious reactions of a bourgeoisie which has shown itself to be quite pitiless in the defense of its system (Hungary 1956, Poland 1970); while today, capital’s attacks on its living stan­dards are pushing it below the minimum guar­anteed wage which state capitalism has main­tained up till now. Even if state capitalism is now trying to build up food stocks by investing massively in agriculture, these are not to be understood as preventative measures against famine but as the establish­ment of reserve stocks to nourish the armies which one day will be thrown into an imperialist war.

At the same time, in order to face up to the US bloc on the world market, the Russian bloc must increase its productive capacities, which means increasing the rate of exploita­tion of the workers. In 1976 however “there was a slowing down of the rate of growth in productivity, imports and investments” (NED, 9 Sept 1977). This means that capital in the COMECON countries is unable to moder­nize its productive apparatus. The period of importing western technology is over. In order to make its existing capital more pro­fitable -- particularly because of the weak­ness of its fixed capital -- it must not only reduce the real wages of the workers, but also reduce the number of workers, which means opening the door to unemployment. This is at least a temptation for capitalism in the eastern countries; but giving in to this temptation also means risking further class upsurges, upsetting the fragile stability which these countries have maintained since the war through policies of full employment.

The combativity of the proletariat in these countries remains intact. The class move­ments which have appeared in Eastern Europe, albeit in a dispersed fashion, from Radom to Karl-Marx-Stadt and the Romanian coal basin show up the fragility of the ideologi­cal preparations for imperialist war in the Russian bloc. Carter’s campaign for ‘human rights’ is much more pernicious and effect­ive than the idea of the ‘socialist father­land’.

Finally, the strengthening of Russia’s economic grip on the COMECON countries has only formally strengthened the cohesion of COMECON. The dues Russian imperialism demands of its allies are too heavy to pay, the economic and political advantages of being in the bloc are too few compared to the benefits offered by the US bloc. The stability and solidity of the bloc are far from guaranteed. As can be seen by the echo Carter’s campaign has had in the ‘People’s Democracies’ (Charter ‘77, inter­nal oppositions in East Germany and the Party itself, ‘democratic’ opposition in Poland), the strengthening of the bloc has been accompanied by the accentuation of centrifugal tendencies which can weaken the cohesion of the bloc.

As the contradictions of the Russian bloc accumulate, it is up to revolutionaries to evaluate the balance of forces between the classes, ie the objective conditions for the outbreak of the world revolution in Eastern Europe.

5. Political crisis and class struggle

The development of state capitalism in Eastern Europe has simplified the political framework within which the life of capital takes place. The victory of the USSR in this part of Europe has led to profound political changes: the establishment of the one-party system, the elimination of the pro-American social democratic peasant and liberal parties. Although officially other parties continue to exist alongside the state party, such as the Polish peasant party or the christian-democratic and libe­ral-democratic parties in East Germany, they are simply appendages to the party-state. Their anachronistic existence is the reflec­tion not of a western-type pluralism, but of the subsistence of a large peasant or reli­gious sector, which is important without constituting a force for opposition. The same phenomenon exists in the USSR where the Russian Stalinist party co-exists with other ‘Communist’ or ‘national’ parties who are supposed to represent not particular social groups but ‘nationalities’ (Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians etc).

Despite these particularities, the violent establishment of state capitalism in these countries has led to the one party system. What could not be truly realized on the economic level -- the fusion of capital with the state -- has taken place on the political level. The existence of such parties is the purest expression of the decadence of the democratic form of the bourgeois dictator­ship. Last century the subsistence of clas­ses left over from older modes of production (nobility, peasantry) obliged the bourgeoi­sie to coexist with and accommodate itself to these archaic forces within the state. The bourgeoisie’s growing domination over the state finally eliminated such forces. In the period of capital’s decline, the instability of the system’s economic base has compelled the bourgeoisie to do away with the ‘liberties’ which mask its class dictatorship; in this epoch the bourgeoisie has tended to fuse completely with the state, the last bastion of its power. This tendency towards the disappearance of the formal content of democracy has gone furthest where the capitalist class is weakest, where its economic base is most feeble: in the third world and Eastern Europe. The strengthening of state totalitarianism in the West shows that this tendency is not only universal but irreversible. Only the relative strength of capital in the more developed countries has allowed it to tolerate the existence of parties representing the backward strata of capital. Democracy has ceased to be a functional mechanism for capital; its only role is one of mystification (democratic ‘freedoms’, ‘free’ elections, etc). The weakness of capitalism in the East, the weakness of a bourgeois class which is cons­tituted in the state in an inorganic manner, deprives it of the luxury of the democratic opium for calming the suffering of a poverty-stricken working class. The capitalist class has to fuse directly into the state with the police and army, via the single party which functions as the general staff of capital.

It would be a major error to believe that the concentration of the capitalist class into one unit, its total fusion with the state, have eliminated the internal contra­dictions of the bourgeois class and done away with political crises within its ranks. The bloody purges inside the ruling Stalin­ist parties over the last forty years show that state capitalism does not bring with it a consolidation of the ruling class. Purges, coups d’Etat, settlings of accounts remain the back-cloth to the political life of the bourgeoisie. But the divergent interests within the ruling class are no longer expressed through a multiplicity of parties; they appear within the single party itself, and this has the effect of increas­ing the instability and fragility of the state. Hungary 1956 was the most striking example of this -- the party was split in two between the Rakosi faction and the Nagy faction. State capitalism, a response to the permanent economic crisis of the system, also involves a permanent political crisis of the bourgeoisie, which is imprisoned with­in the totalitarian state and often finds itself strangled by the very single party system which it set up to preserve its rule.

The open crisis of capitalism today has simply made this reality stand out more starkly: thus we have seen the elimination of Kruschchev, the Prague spring, the replace­ment of Gomulka by Gierek. The political crisis is tending more and more to come out into broad daylight; it is moving away from shady duels between rival cliques and is now manifesting itself openly in public. This simply reflects the growing accumulation of contradictions within each national capi­tal in the bloc. The austerity imposed by Russian capital not only threatens social cohesion in the ‘People’s Democracies’: it is far too heavy a burden for the congenit­ally feeble bourgeoisies of these countries. But, unable to find the outlets they need in the West, they have no option except to return to the fold of COMECON.

Over the last few years, especially since Carter’s campaign about the ‘rights of man’ and after the hopes raised in certain intel­lectual circles by the Helsinki agreements, we have seen in the USSR, Poland, East Ger­many and Czechoslovakia the appearance of opposition groups, both inside and outside the ruling parties, calling for ‘democratic freedoms’ and political pluralism. In the USSR this opposition is limited essentially to intellectual circles which call for grea­ter freedom of thought in their work, and to the nationalist opposition against ‘Great Russia’ in the non-Russian republics. In the ‘People’s Democracies’ these two forms tend to be combined: intellectuals calling for ‘freedom’ are more or less openly supported by factions of the bourgeoisie hoping to dis­tance themselves economically and politically from the ruinous ‘friendship’ of the Russian bear.

In a country like Poland the resurgence of class struggle, the impossibility of crush­ing the fierce resistance of the Polish proletariat through the totalitarian power of the state, has given rise to an army of opposition groups or circles which claim to ‘defend the workers’, like Kuron’s Workers’ Defense Committee. These are the elements who bring tears of joy to the eyes of the Trotskyists and other advocates of the ‘re-establishment of workers’ democracy’. These good pilgrims of ‘democratic freedom’ even go so far as to talk about “the extra­ordinarily subversive character of the call for democratic freedoms in Eastern Europe” (Stalinisme et Libertes en Europe de 1’Est, Cahier Rouge, no. 2, Serie Pays de 1’Est) . Subversive? Let’s hear from one of the representatives of this ‘democratic’ current, Lipinski:

“A political system that lacks any mech­anism for continuous adaptation, a rigid system that destroys criticism, which does not respect the fundamental freedom to criticize, such a system is not effective.” (Interview with Nouvel Observateur, 15 May 1976)

Maintaining the cohesion, the ‘effectiveness’ of the capitalist system -- this is the ‘sub­versive’ program the Trotskyists have once again discovered in a bourgeois current.

It is difficult to know what echo such groups have among the workers: although they have none at all in the USSR where the activity of the intelligentsia only meets with dis­trust, in Poland they seem to have had a greater impact on the workers’ milieu8. However, such attempts to set up an opposi­tion do not mean that ‘democratic’ regimes are on the agenda in Eastern Europe. The crisis of capitalism can only accentuate the totalitarian character of the state; strengthen its stranglehold on the whole of society. Capital’s tightening grip on the social organism can only be relaxed moment­arily when social conflict breaks out: such a relaxation can only be temporary and is in fact a preparation for further repressive measures to break the resistance of the proletariat. The ‘democratic’ opposition in Poland is simply the corollary, the com­plement, to the reinforcement of the dictat­orship of the capitalist state concentrated in the single party. Adam Michnik, a repre­sentative of the Workers’ Defense Committee, cynically expressed this a short time ago: “To postulate a revolutionary overthrow of the dictatorship of the party, to organize actions with this aim, would be both unreal­istic and dangerous” (Esprit, January 1977). The growing domination of its allies by the USSR leaves this opposition with no choice but to be the loyal opposition within state capitalism, to tacitly or resignedly accept the reality of the Russian bloc.

Outside of its function of locally diverting the discontent of the workers into campaigns and signatures against repression, the ‘democratic opposition’ has little chance of gaining an echo if it threatens the domi­nation of Russian imperialism and proposes a break with the bloc (Charter ‘77 in Czechoslovakia). In no way can these groups be transformed into real opposition parties. All they can do is co-exist alongside the ruling party for as long as the national capital and the USSR see fit to allow them. This is the policy which Polish capital followed in 1956: once the discontent of the workers was exhausted and the regime was stabilized, the opposition groups that had arisen disappeared with or without open repression.

*************

East or West, the proletariat has no ‘free­doms’ to defend or any ‘friends’ to count on. The only freedom the proletariat demands is the freedom to destroy this rotten system. Arms in hand, the proletariat will seize hold of the freedom to organize itself and struggle for the destruction of capital; it will take the liberty of denying the freedom of the bourgeoisie to exploit it. This basic Marxist truth, which Lenin defended incessantly against all the ‘democrats’ and ‘friends’ of the proletariat, applies more than ever to Eastern Europe.

From the insurrection in Saxony and Berlin in 1953 to the explosion in Hungary 1956 and the struggles in the shipyards of the Baltic in 1971, the proletariat of Eastern Europe has shown that it is not separate from the world proletariat, but one of its detachments. Through its combativity and heroism it has shown that the possibility of a proletarian revolution in Eastern Europe is not a utopia dreamed up by a few ‘archeo-marxists’.

Certainly the proletariat of Eastern Europe has to overcome many obstacles before rediscovering the path that led to October 1917:

-- the ruthless, totalitarian hold of the state, which atomizes the class more than anywhere else;

-- the crushing of the Russian proletariat, which destroyed all organizational continuity with the revolutionary wave of the 1920s;

-- the difficulty for the class to draw the lessons from its struggles once they have subsided, owing to the absence of revo­lutionary political organizations.

The upsurges of the class in Eastern Europe show that it is easier for the proletariat to express its combativity and extend its struggle in these countries than in Russia, where the struggle is much weaker and dis­persed both in time and space, taking the form of totally isolated local explosions. Because state capitalism in these countries is the expression of the weakness of capital, they will more and more become weak links of world capital in the face of the proletariat.

However, the central role of the West Euro­pean proletariat in the international class struggle, its concentration, the emergence since 1968 of revolutionary political organizations, secreted by the class in order to draw the lessons of its struggles, its more developed historical class consc­iousness -- all these factors will make the West European proletariat a decisive cata­lyst for the workers of Eastern Europe, enabling the combativity which has been accumulating since 1971 to be transformed into a conscious revolutionary energy which can bring down the iron dictatorship of capital on a world scale.

Ch.

1 GLAT – Groupe de Liaison pour l’Action des Travailleurs. Write to Renee Togny, BP 62009, 75421, Paris, Cedex 09, France.

2 It goes without saying that no evolution of a historical phenomenon is predetermined, because men make their own history. It is the survival of capitalism after the 1917-21 revolutionary wave which has allowed this phenomenon to develop.

3 Organ of the Gauche Communiste de France. See Revolution Internationale, Bulletin d’Etudes et de Discussion, no. 8

4 This is so much the case, that in the factories working for the civil sector, certain assembly lines do work for the army with first-class materials which are rigorously tested from their arrival at the factory to their transformation into military equipment. For example, in contrast to the proverbial mediocrity of automobiles sold on the civil market, the vehicles reserved for army and party personnel have a special robustness (mentioned in Smith, The Russians).

5 The dominant form of wage labor in Russia is piece work (two-thirds of the workforce). This form so widespread in the early days of industrial capitalism, is typical in a weak capital and reflects a low productivity of labor.

6 See for example, the complex of truck factories in Kama, a gigantic accumulation of capital imported from the west, and a gigantic fiasco. After several years of work (roads, buildings etc), by 1975 around 100,000 of the trucks planned had not been produced.

7 This can be no help to the most debt-ridden countries, Poland, Hungary. This is so much the case that these two plus Czechoslovakia have recently officially made it known that they would like to receive loans from the IMF. Since the IMF is an organ of US capital, it goes without saying that this could only happen if these countries joined the other bloc. The strengthening of Russia’s hold over its satellites shows that such a project is completely illusory.

8 Thousands of Polish workers signed the Workers’ Defense Committee petition.

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • State capitalism [89]
  • Stalinism, the Eastern bloc [90]

Massacre of workers in India

  • 2846 reads

Introduction

The following unsigned leaflet was recently sent to the ICC by an unknown source in India. We are reprinting it because it re­lates to an important and tragic episode of the class struggle in India. This event has lessons for the whole international proletariat. The massacre of the workers at the Swadeshi textile mill in Kanpur will remain for many years a brutal testimony of capitalist barbarism, and it will remind all workers of the only brutal answer capitalism can offer to humanity in this epoch.

The massacre at Kanpur is only one of a num­ber of acts of brutal repression by the ‘democratic’ Desai regime. In recent months, demonstrating workers, students, and pea­sants have been cut down by the police in many parts of India: in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Tamil, Bihar, and Punjab, etc.

The Kanpur massacre also is similar to the mass killings of nearly 200 workers, their wives and children in the ‘Aztra’ sugar mill in Ecuador last October. Just like in Kanpur, the army there if not the police, dished out the only consistent policy of capital today when confronted with militant workers: cynical and bloody repression. Recent events in Peru, Nicaragua, etc confirm this trend which inevitably accompanies the proletarian resurgence in the Third World. In India the re-emergence of the working class was announced by the huge railway strike of 1974 which the Gandhi regime could only crush with the most extensive repres­sion (25,000 workers were thrown in jail) and with the most heinous connivance of the unions and government. The Janata regime was brought in in 1976 to replace the ‘dic­tatorship’ of Gandhi and bring the workers under control with the promise of ‘democracy’ and ‘human rights’; but almost as soon as it came to power the Desai government was met with a massive wave of wildcats in the tex­tile industry, and the ferment in the class has not stopped since then: dockers in Bom­bay, Kajhara miners, government employees and many others have fought bitter strikes, often outside of union control, and frequ­ently dealt with in the same bloody way as the Kanpur strike described in this leaflet. The Indian workers have paid many lives for the privilege of learning what lies behind the facade of Janata democracy: the terror of the bourgeois state.

But the leaflet contains certain weaknesses, inevitable in a recently awakened interna­tional proletarian movement. These are ref­lected in the statements the leaflet makes criticizing the ‘revolutionary’ leaders of the working class movement for their respect of legalism and supposed class collaboration with the Janata regime. Similarly, it fails to recognize that the divisive role of the unions is the result of the unions being organs of state repression within the working class. The so-called ‘working class’ Communist Party (M) and the other assorted leftist organizations are capitalist parties which fully support the needs of state capi­talism and economic austerity. They are not ‘betraying’ anybody nor do they ‘collaborate’ with capitalism. They are part and parcel of the political apparatus of capitalism, just like the unions. If they speak a ‘work­ing class’ language, they do so to better mystify the workers. But in real life they contribute to the physical repression of the proletariat by duping it, dividing and isola­ting it, all in the name of the ‘national interest’. The leaflet’s strength assuredly rests somewhere else. In its unconditional and poignant defense of the murdered workers, and its elemental appeal to the internatio­nalism of the working class: Workers of the World Unite. It is for this that this leaf­let brings with it a breath of fresh air from the Indian sub-continent. And it will serve as an inspiration for revolutionaries and their class everywhere.

At a time when the world is more than ever being ravaged by inter-imperialist blood­baths dressed up as ‘national liberation wars’; when revolutionaries in the advanced capitalisms are being told that they must support these national wars because the working class ‘doesn’t exist’ in the third world, because such wars can pave the way to a ‘progressive capitalist development’; this leaflet tells us very clearly that there is a working class in the Third World, that it is already fighting its own autonomous struggle, and that in that struggle it con­fronts the same enemies as the workers of the metropoles: democracy, the left parties, the unions, and above all, the nation state, whose historical bankruptcy in all parts of the world is starkly underlined by its rec­ourse to terror and massacre against the proletariat.

Janata ‘democracy’ and the working class

December 6, 1977: 1:50 p.m.:

About 1,000 workers of the Swadeshi Cotton Mills, Kanpur, gherao (surround) two officers to demand payment of wages held up for 51 days.

3:30 p.m.:

Large contingents of armed police and the Provisional Armed Constabulary (PAC) surround the mill from all sides.

3:50 p.m.:

Police open fire without any warning.

5:30 p.m.:

Over 150 workers are dead, hundreds injured, 237 arrested.

December 6, 1977 will go down in the workers’ history as black tuesday, the day on which capital launched an armed and open war on the working class, the day of cold-blooded butchery, the day of a workers’ Jalianwala Bagh.

The scene of the blood-bath will be remem­bered: Swadeshi Mills, one of India’s largest textile mills, whose 8,000 workers are having to pay for a crisis they did not create by being forced to forego pay­ment of their wages.

At least the number, if not the names, of the workers who were killed by police bullets will be remembered. And the murderers’ names will be remembered too, above all those of the Janata leaders and Ministers who sanctioned and justified the firing.

None of this will be forgotten because December 6 was the day of the most barbaric and cold-blooded butchery of Indian workers since Independence. The exact numbers of workers shot dead will probably never be known since the dead bodies flung into the Ganges and the Batwa rivers will never be traced or identified, nor those reduced to ashes in the boilers of the mill. The total it appears could easily be as high as 200. While officialdom blacked out the news completely, the ‘free’ press has remained silent.

What exactly happened at Swadeshi?

We give below the police version and the facts reported by hundreds of workers, eye­witnesses and a few independent journalists.

Police claim: The firing was resorted to because the violent workers were killing the two gheraod officials -- production manager Sharma and chief accountant Iyenger; and they viciously attacked the police when they tried to intervene. Superinten­dent of Police, Rai is supposed to have been knocked unconscious.

The facts: The officers were gheraod in the compound of the mill, near a fountain, whereas their dead bodies were found in a small room upstairs. The three to four persons who were seen dragging the two officers upstairs had never before been seen in the mill premises. A newspaper of Kanpur has reported that Sharma was heard shouting to the police to stop firing and that the officers were alive after the firing had started. A weekly claimed that the officers were killed by the police afterwards to find a good reason for their own orgy of murder. The CID has so far failed to furnish any proof of the involve­ment of any worker in the killing of the officers. It is also believed that the two officers knew too much about the black deeds of the management which had hired some agents (the three to four persons referred to above) to do away with them.

According to the report of a number of news­papers, the Superintendent of Police Rai was not seriously injured. Sarin, the security officer of the mill, has stated to a magazine, that Rai “walked out of the mill on his own and was not carried”.

Police claim: The firing lasted “at the most five or ten minutes”. Only twelve workers were killed and some twenty-odd injured.

The facts: The firing started at 3:50 p.m. and ended around 5:30 p.m. At least 150 workers were killed and well over a hundred injured. Owners of shops bang opposite the mill gates testify to the police firing full blast till close to 5:30 p.m.

Workers who survived claim they were forced to load the dead bodies of their fellow workers on the trucks. They say they loaded “scores of bodies”.

(Five weeks after December 6, the authorities finally started making the due payments to the workers. 238 workers never came forward to collect their wages. Where are the 226 workers gone, allowing for the official admission of 12 deaths?)

The police fired inside the mills and also outside, indiscriminately and in all direc­tions. An eight year-old boy named Pappu and a twelve year-old boy were shot. They were both standing in their bustee, a good 100 yards away from the mill gate. Sign­boards of shops and houses were punctured by bullet marks. A one kilometer stretch of road was completely blocked by the police for three days to wipe off all traces of their savagery. However, the shutters of Arvind Cloth Stores still carried bullet marks. A correspondent of Aaj, a daily of Kanpur, was beaten up and his camera snatched while he was trying to take photo­graphs outside the mill on the evening of December 6.

All evidence forces us to the conclusion that the police claims are false and base­less and that the firing was not provoked by “workers’ violence”. The firing was also “illegal”, according to India Today, a prestigious magazine, not known to have left-wing sympathies. The police did not even go through the necessary steps of lathi-charge, tear-gassing, rubber bullets Sbefore opening fire. Where is the place for procedural niceties in the handbook of barbarism?

Why this cold-bloodied butchery of Swadeshi workers?

The backdrop to the massacre is the present crisis of the textile industry in India in general, the particular ‘resolutions’ to this sought by the Jaipuria management of Swadeshi with the sympathy and support of both the Congress and the Janata regimes, the experience of the Kanpur workers (Kanpur is not unique in this respect) with their trade unions and the recent history of the workers’ growing militancy and attempts at self-organisation. The period of the Emergency was, of course, a general license to the capitalists to ‘discipline’ labor and to step up the rate of exploitation of workers. Jaipuria took a further step and, since August 1975, kept wages of workers pending for 45 to 60 days. While the wages of workers in this way became an additional amount of interest free capital for him, to the tune of Rs.500,000-600,000, workers were forced to live on borrowed money, with interest rates going up to 120% per annum in many cases.

Since September 1975, workers have had to gherao management no fewer than six times, simply to ensure payments of wages, long after they had been due. It may be mentioned in passing that in none of these cases was there any case of workers attempting murder of any official. In the course of these tortuous battles for mere survival, the workers came to lose faith in the concilia­tion machineries of the state on the one hand, and those trade unions of ‘theirs’ who proved incapable of breaking out of the bounds of ‘bourgeois legality’ to carry the movement forward.

The most important of these gheraos was that of October 26, 1977 of the mill secre­tary, Agarwal. The gherao lasted 53 hours, and was only lifted when the workers’ demand was conceded. While ostensibly a struggle for overdue wages, the real significance of the gherao lies in the exemplary class-unity of the workers and their militant combativity. On the day of the gherao, workers armed themselves with stones, brickbats, iron-rods and above all, chlorine gas cylinders. The mill was surrounded from all sides by the workers making it impos­sible for the armed police to carry on their job as usual, to break the gherao. The workers threatened to explode the gas cylinders if the police made any attempt to break up the gherao. For 53 long hours, the armed might of the state stood still, helpless, humiliated and paralyzed.

The response of the trade unions (most of the national unions of India have their units in Swadeshi) to this degree of class preparedness was to tell the workers to ‘call off the gherao’ warning them ‘not to provoke the state too much’. Workers of Swadeshi had had more than their share of the pathetic politics of negotiations, arbitrations, compromise, resolutions and delegations. On this occasion, they beat up the trade union leaders and chased them away. It is noteworthy that, alongside the gherao, the workers took charge of production in their own hands, and the organization of food supplies etc to the workers involved in the gherao.

This victory of the Swadeshi workers in October created history in Kanpur. In one single swoop of militant activity, workers had simultaneously challenged the capital­ists, the state and their ‘own’ institutions of the past, now hopelessly enmeshed within the grooves of “responsible” unionism and “bourgeois legality”.

It is this demonstration of their capacity for self-organization and militant combativity, that the real roots of the December 6 massacre lie. The working class challenge had put the wheels of the state’s repressive apparatus in motion. Just a few days after October 26, the Home Secretary and the DIG (the police of UP) in an interview on Lucknow television, had warned that the government is prepared to take ‘definite steps’ to prevent the recurrence of the Swadeshi incident at ‘any cost’. On November 29, hired goons attempted to convert a minor quarrel between two workers into a communal riot to break the unity of the workers. The opportunity for ‘definite steps’ did present itself fin­ally, to take ‘definite steps’ at a ‘counter-demonstration’ staged against the example of October. It is even held in certain sections that though a real anger of workers prompted the workers into the gherao of December 6, the gherao could well have been stage-managed to deal with the workers when they were totally unpre­pared. Because of a power breakdown in Kanpur, only 1,000 workers were in the mill that afternoon as against a workforce of 8,000.

(Since the massacre of December 6, the factory has been under an illegal lockout which continues till today...March 3rd. Even the ‘Socialist minister’, George Farnandes, is reported to have said that it would take at least one to two more months to start the mill again. After 15 January, wage dispersals were begun in the presence of hundreds of policemen armed with sub-machine guns inside the factory and the main road outside. Wages paid some ninety days after they were due have dis­appeared in the squaring of past loans. The situation of workers and their families is extremely precarious. As reported above, 238 workers never ‘reported’ to collect their wages for obvious reasons. A one-man commission set up by the government to enquire into the firing has come to the conclusion that the firing was totally justified. If anything, it is a bit criti­cal of the Dy. Magistrate for not having ordered the firing a bit earlier. At the same time, a Citizen’s Rights Committee in Delhi has come out with its challenging once again, all the contentions of the officialdom. The Chief Minister of UP has continued to flatly refuse even the holding of a judicial enquiry.)

Janata ‘democracy’ and the working class

Undoubtedly, the butchery of the Swadeshi workers has no parallels in the history of the Indian working class movement. But this naked repression cannot be seen as an exceptional case unique to Swadeshi. Nor is it simply an act of a trigger happy District Magistrate. It is only the most naked demonstration of the increasingly repres­sive attitude of the Janata regime to the working class movement. Ever since it got itself installed in power, it (Janata) has explicitly stated that gheraos will not be tolerated, agreements arrived at through gheraos will not be honored, definite steps will be taken to prevent the occurrence of gheraos, etc. Not only that, in the last eleven months, at the instigation of the Janata regime, police have opened fire even on ordinary strikes that were ‘lawful’ even in the eyes of ‘bourgeois law’. Dilli-Rajhara mines (M.P), IISCO and Bokaro (Bihar), Sahibabad and Lucknow (U.P.), Muland (Maharashtra) are some examples of this. Scores of workers have lost their lives and hundreds have been badly injured. In the villages, where agricultural labor is much less organized, the repressive machinery has been even more ruthless. According to official admission, in Bihar state alone, police have opened fire on agricultural workers eight times in which eleven people have lost their lives. Armed to their teeth, the landed interests in the countryside have declared an open war on the wage-earners.

It is a further demonstration of the ‘democratic character’ of the Janata regime that the repression is at its maximum pre­cisely in these states where the Janata regime holds power. A ‘mini-MISA’(?) was introduced in M.P. to crush the impending struggle of the power supply workers. In the strike of 80,000 secondary school teachers of U.P., 23,000 have been imprisoned while some 5,000 have lost their jobs? A legislation to suppress the working class movement, ‘disguised’ as a law to deal with criminals is on the point of being passed in Bihar.

Riding the wave of mass discontent against the regime of the ‘garibi hatao’ (remove poverty) party, the Janata catapulted itself into power, posing as the ‘party of demo­cracy’. It was necessary to give some meaning to its slogans. It restored the formal right to strike, scrapped the Compul­sory Deposit Scheme and restored the 8-1/3% minimum bonus for one year. The Janata regime could afford to be ‘sympathetic’ to the working class movement so long as it could believe that the workers’ struggle is merely for ‘democracy’ and a ‘free’ atmosphere for its exploitation; that it is struggling merely to re-establish those terms of its wage slavery that obtained prior to the proclamation of the Emergency. It is becoming increasingly clear today that the struggle of workers is not for this or that condition of its wage-slavery, but the very uprooting of the system based on wage-slavery. The revolutionary struggle of the working class is not simply for capitalist democracy, but an end to capitalism and with it capitalist democracy based on exploitation.

The rhythm, with which the class character of the working class movement and its revolutionary aim becomes explicit, is the rhythm with which the ‘democratic character’ of the Janata regime stands exposed, its class character becomes clear too. However opposed the Janata regime may have been to the Congress, in its slogans of democracy, in the recent strike of the Maharastra State government employees, the Janata Prime Minister and the Congress Chief Minister confronted the struggle from a united plat­form. While the Maharashtra unit of the Janata, with its eyes fixed on the coming elections, supported the strike, its Presi­dent was openly demanding that workers getting ‘fair’ wages should be prohibited from going on strike. Whatever wage can be ‘fair’ for the slavery under capital?

Today the language and the politics of the Janata regime are changing very rapidly. Today there is talk of banning strikes, maintaining provisions of the Preventive Detention Act, cutting of wages, etc.

For the ‘champions of democracy’, the constitution, the legislature and the industrial courts are the ultimate judges of the ‘legitimacy’ of the demands and the forms of struggle of the workers. For the working class every form of struggle is ‘legitimate’, including and in particular that which stands to put an end to the very ‘legitimacy’ of bourgeois society. It is equally clear to the working class that when it suits its interests, it takes little effort for the champions of capital to throw aside the veil of legality and democracy. How much does it take for the defenders of capital to reframe laws in the ‘parliament of the people’, after all? The imposition of the Emergency, the argu­ment of retention of Preventive Detention by the present Home Minister, the massacre of the Kanpur workers, the introduction of the ‘mini-MISA’ in M.P., are just a few of the recent examples.

The ‘socialist left’ of the Janata Party

It is worth asking why the ‘left’ within the Janata is silent in the fashion of the deaf monkeys of Gandhi, on this ruthless killing of the Swadeshi workers. The re­pression of the working class and agricul­tural laborers is increasing continuously and these Gandhian-socialists choose to remain silent? It is becoming clear that the Janata-left is today forced to play the same role vis-a-vis the working class movement that in the past the ‘progressive’ and the ‘socialist’ sections of the Congress did...churning out ‘left’ schemes for the exploitation of labor, while the ‘right’ continues its operations.

The ‘communist’ left and the working class

Matters don’t end there only. Some questions need to be addressed to the established ‘Communist’ parties as well. Intervening in the debate in Parliament on the Swadeshi incident, Jyotirmoy Besu, of the C.P.M. claimed that the Swadeshi incident was the result of a deep-seated conspiracy on the part of agent provocateurs of a certain political party to defame the Home Minister and to defeat the Chief Minister of U.P. in the coming elections (Times of India, December 8, 1977). According to a worker of Swadeshi, a C.P.I. leader, Harbans Singh, in a public speech in Kanpur called the Swadeshi workers ungrateful. (In obvious reference to the October gherao and beating up of trade union leaders by workers.)

Of course, the bourgeoisie always understands the militancy of the working class as the result of a conspiracy of some ‘anti-social’ elements. Has the ‘revolutionary’ leader of the working class movement arrived at the same standpoint? If the demands of its class situation and experience in the context of the national and international crisis of capital, require that the working class movement break from the bounds of ‘legal’ forms of struggle to shift the struggle on to its own class terrain, and the leadership remain entrapped in the politics of the past, what do they expect from the workers? Naturally, initiatives by the class towards its class unity must appear to the erstwhile leaders as ‘dis­loyalty’.

Admittedly, the papers of these parties have denounced the killings in Swadeshi. The question is what is denunciation and resolutions going to amount to? Is it not clear that, if this ruthless treatment by the state of a section of the class goes unchallenged by the Kanpur workers and the Indian working class movement, it can only end in shifting the balance of class forces decisively in favor of capital and its representatives? How much more time is required for the realization to come that any illusion by the working class in any representative of capital, can only have the most disastrous consequences for the working class movement? To what end, and for how long, this alliance with this or that section of the bourgeoisie?

There is only one way out for the working class today. Against its division within dozens of unions, the establishment of its class unity and on the basis of this class unity, a militant challenge to the Congress, the Janata regime, and every other repre­sentative of the bourgeoisie. It is also becoming clearer in the last few months that if only discreetly and sporadically, sections are emerging within the class who are alive to the historic task facing their movement. The struggle of the Swadeshi workers of Kanpur was not the result of a “deep conspiracy” but an initial moment in its historic preparation for a revolution­ary challenge to the entire bourgeois order. In this respect it is integrally a part of the new phase of the international movement of the working class. In this coming period, only those can play a revolutionary role who can grasp the inner dynamics and the revolutionary content of the class’ aspirations.

Workers of the world unite!

Geographical: 

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People: 

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May ’68: Resurgence of the proletarian struggle

  • 2361 reads

 

May 1968 -- first sign of the crisis and of the reawakening of the proletariat;

 

May 1978 -- deepening of the crisis and the rise of the class struggle.

This succinct formula, which summarizes the whole evolution of the last ten years, allows us both to affirm our own position and refute all the interpretations and scribb­lings of the left and leftists about the real meaning of May 1968. Because May 1968, far from being an accident of history, a gratuitous revolt, was in fact one of the first reactions of the working class to the reappearance of the crisis of capitalism.

************

I. The events of May 1968

Ten years ago, on 3 May, a meeting which drew a few hundred students took place in the inner courtyard of the Sorbonne in Paris. This meeting had been organized by the UNEF (student union) and the March 22 Movement formed at Nantes University a few weeks before. There was nothing very exci­ting in the theoretical speeches of the leftist ‘leaders’, but there was a persis­tent rumor: “Occident is going to attack us”. An extreme right wing movement thus gave the police an excuse to officially ‘intervene’ between the demonstrators. It was an attempt to put an end to the student agitation, which had been building up for several weeks at Nanterre. The students had a number of reasons for being fed up: among other things they were protesting against the university hierarchy and calling for greater individual and sexual freedom in the internal life of the university.

And then the ‘unthinkable’ happened: the agitation continued in the Latin Quarter for several days. Every evening it mounted a bit higher. Each meeting, each demonstra­tion attracted more people than the prev­ious one: ten thousand, thirty thousand, fifty thousand. The confrontations with the forces of order grew more and more violent. Young workers joined the battles in the streets, and despite the openly declared hostility of the PCF which heaped abuse upon the ‘enrages’ and the ‘German anarchist Daniel Cohn-Bendit’, the CGT -- in order to avoid being completely by-passed -- was obliged to ‘recognize’ the spontaneous general strike. Ten million strikers shook the torpor of the Fifth Republic and sig­naled the reawakening of the proletariat in a most remarkable way.

The strike unleashed on 14 May at Sud Avia­tion extended itself spontaneously and, right from the beginning, took on a radical character in comparison to the kinds of actions which had been imposed by the unions until then. The strike was near general in the key metal-working and transport sectors. The unions were left behind by a movement which by-passed their traditional policies and which straight away took on an unlimited and often rather imprecise character, as Informations Correspondance Ouvrieres (ICO) pointed out:

“At the base there were in fact no precise demands. Obviously everyone was for higher wages and a shorter working week. But the strikers, or at least a majority of them, were aware that these gains would be rather precarious: the best proof of this is that they never resolved on any joint action. The real motive for the strike was clearly summed up on the boards stuck to the gates of the small factories in the Parisian suburbs: “We’ve had enough!”. (‘The Generalized Strike in France: May/June 1968’, ICO, no.72, July 1968)

In the confrontations which took place, an important role was played by the unemployed, the ones the bourgeoisie called ‘declasses’. But these ‘declasses’, these waifs and strays, were in fact pure proletarians. The workers and unemployed who have already worked are not the only proletarians -- those who have been unable to get any work at all are also proletarian. They are products of the epoch of the decadence of capitalism, of over­production and the over-productivity of men and machines. Massive youth unemployment is a symptom of the historical limits of capitalism, which is incapable of integra­ting the new generation into the process of production.

But the unions wasted no time in regaining control of this movement, which had erupted outside the unions, and to some extent agai­nst them, because it broke with the usual methods of struggle advocated by the unions. On Friday, 17 May the CGT distributed a leaflet which stated very clearly the limits it intended to put on its actions: on the one hand, traditional demands linked to a Matignon-type agreement and guaranteeing the existence of union sections in the enterprises; on the other hand, a change of government, ie elections. Although they had shown distrust of the unions before the strike, had started it over the head of the unions, and extended it on their own initia­tive, the workers nevertheless acted through­out the strike as though they found it quite normal that the union should be given the job of bringing it to its conclusion.

But despite its limits, the general strike gave an immense impetus to the worldwide revival of the class struggle. After an uninterrupted series of defeats following the crushing of the 1917-23 revolutionary wave, the convulsions of May-June 1968 were a decisive turning point, not only in France, but in Europe and the whole world. The strike not only shook the ruling establish­ment but also its most effective bastion, the one that is most difficult to throw down: the left and the unions.

II. A crisis of youth?

Once the initial surprise and panic had died down, the bourgeoisie rushed to find an explanation for these disturbing events. It is hardly surprising that the left should use the phenomenon of the student agitation in order to exorcise the real specter looming up in front of a frightened bourgeoisie -- the proletariat. Or that these social convulsions should be reduced to an ideological quarrel between the generations. May 1968 is presented to us as the result of youthful disenchantment with the modern world. Thus the French sociologist Edgard Morin declared in an article published in Le Monde, 5 June 1968:

“First of all, this was a whirlpool stir­red up by a struggle between the genera­tions (the young against the senile, youth against adult society) but at the same time it provoked a class struggle, a revolt of the dominated, the workers. The struggle between young and old sounded the toxin for a struggle between workers and authority, (the bosses and the state).”

The same kind of explanation was given by the Liege anarchist paper Le Libertaire which said:

“If they reject structures and responsi­bilities, it is because they distrust an adult world in which democracy is betrayed. With them we’re seeing an extraordinary return to the utopian socialism of the nineteenth century.” (Le Libertaire, no.6, June 1968)

As for the International Communist Party, in its organ Le Proletaire of May 1968, it explained the causes of the movement as fol­lows:

“A number of motives are mixed up in all this ferment -- among them the war in Vietnam and the demand for direct student participation in the ‘running of the university’, ie for reforms of the structure.”

Among the innumerable analyses published on the May events, some explain that the factory occupations which suddenly multi­plied across the whole country were a res­ponse to the occupation of the Sorbonne by the students. The workers on strike were imitating the Parisian students. Others, like ICO, refer to the Fifth Republic’s political inability to understand the problems of youth:

“The weak link of French capitalism is undoubtedly its young people and the problems they are posing to a ruling class which can’t even perceive them, because it’s so imprisoned in a political practice in which promises take the place of action, and immobilism and respect for the power of money replace dynamic solutions.”

III. The integration of the working class?

All these ‘analyses’ and explanations empha­size the spectacular role of the student movement and attempt to minimize the role of the working class, going so far as to deny that the working class has any revolutionary role to play:

“It is vital to say strongly and calmly that in May 1968 the industrial proleta­riat was not the revolutionary vanguard of society; it was its dumb rearguard.” (Coudray alias Cardan alias Castoriadis in La Breche)

This is no accident. The bourgeoisie, with its accredited ideologues and with the help of various fringe utopians, has always tried to mask the reality of capitalist exploitation. It’s always done everything it could to divert the working class from developing its consciousness, using all kinds of mysti­fications to demobilize and demoralize the proletariat. The attitudes and explanations which seek to negate the revolutionary nat­ure of the proletariat have their source in the leftist intelligentsia, crushed and pul­verized by the decline of world capitalism. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Stalinist sympa­thizers of the Institute for Social Research (Marcuse, Horkheimer, Adorno) began to lay down the framework used today by the ‘radi­cal’ theoreticians who have been recuperated by the bourgeoisie; these ideologues claimed that ‘advanced’ or ‘modern’ capitalism had eliminated the differences between society’s economic base and its superstructure. Impli­citly this notion means that the working class has been ‘bought off’ by a capitalism which itself suffers no fundamental economic contradictions. It follows that the contra­dictions of capitalism have moved from the base to the superstructure. Thus the criti­que of everyday life assumed a preponderant importance for these ideologues. Marcuse analyzed the various aspects of consumer society, explaining that although the citizen would be assured of comfort from now on, he would be denied any right to exercise free­dom and responsibility, any ability to pro­test. In a word he would be deprived of nearly all his human dimensions, hence the title of his book One Dimensional Man. For Marcuse the student revolt was one of the first signs of man rebelling against a mach­ine which negated him because it took away his freedom and any control over his own actions:

“This revolt isn’t directed against the misfortunes of this society, but against its benefits. It’s a new phenomenon uni­que to what can be called the opulent civilization. We must have no illusions, but neither must we be defeatist. It would be pointless to wait for the masses to join the movement and participate in the process. Things have always begun with a handful of intellectuals in revolt.”

Marcuse asserted that the consumer society was particularly adept at integrating rebel­lions. It produced ‘slaves’ who were all the more enslaved because they were not aware of their oppression. In particular the working class was no longer a revolutio­nary force because all its demands had been accepted and assimilated by society. The only ones who remained revolutionary were the intellectuals who had a critical enough spirit to see that the opulent society was a trap and the marginal elements who didn’t enjoy its ‘benefits’.

IV. The reaffirmation of the revolutionary nature of the proletariat

“The proletariat is dead. Long live the Provotariat!” cried the young marginals of Amsterdam. A premature funeral. The May-June movement set things straight about the real nature of the proletariat: against the conception of a humanity acting on the basis of eternal and inexplicable ideals, the pro­letariat advances the notion of societies divided into economic classes and evolving as a result of economic struggles. The revo­lutionary project can only be defined by a class, ie by a part of society defined by its specific position within the relations of production. This class is the working class, “The antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is a struggle of class against class, a struggle whose highest expression is total revolution”, wrote Marx in The Poverty of Philosophy. The specifi­city of the proletariat in relation to other classes in society lies in the fact that it represents the living force of associated labor. It is when society enters into an economic crisis that classes reveal their true historical nature. Because of its sit­uation as a collective producer, the prole­tariat cannot envisage an individual solu­tion to the economic crisis. Placed at the heart of production, creating the essential wealth of society, working in an associated manner, having only a collective relation­ship to the means of production, the indus­trial proletariat is the only class in soc­iety which can understand, desire and carry out the collectivization of production. The essence of capitalist social life is the struggle for surplus value between those who create it and those who consume it and use it. The motor of the proletariat’s activity is this battle against the extrac­tion of surplus-value, against wage labor. As long as capital exists, the entire acti­vity of the proletariat is and will remain determined by the fundamental antagonism bet­ween itself and capital. Communism is a real possibility because of the objective contradictions of the capitalist system and because they correspond to the movement of the proletariat. Concrete historical condi­tions determine which of these possibilities are real ones in a given period, although the choice between the various objective conditions always depends on the conscious­ness, will and activity of the workers.

V. The student movement

It’s obvious that May 1968 was marked by the decomposition of many of the values of the ruling ideology, but this ‘cultural’ revolt was not the cause of the conflict. In his Preface to a Critique of Political Economy Marx showed that:

“With the change of the economic founda­tion the entire, immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed. In considering such transformations a distinc­tion should always be made between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, relig­ious, aesthetic or philosophic -- in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out.”

All the expressions of ideological crisis have their roots in the economic crisis, not the other way round. It is the state of crisis which indicates the real direction things are taking.

The student movement was certainly an expres­sion of the general decomposition of bourgeois ideology, the warning signal of a much deeper social movement, but precisely because of the place the university and its component elements occupy in the system of production, they only rarely have any connection with the class struggle. It would be wrong to think that student riots with barricades and battles with the police are a recent discov­ery. Ever since the Middle Ages the history of all the great European universities has been marked by violent incidents and an intense political activity. The boycott of courses was ‘invented’ eight centuries ago. In the twelfth century, students reproached their teachers with having not moved forward since the days of Charlemagne, just as the rebels of 1968 denounced a university which was still based on the model set up by Napoleon. A campus before the name existed, the student city of Corbeil, which grouped together 3,000 students outside Paris, was at the beginning of a phenomenon of ‘contes­tation’ in 1104. What is more, when you look back in history, you notice that the students of today have not gone as far as some of their predecessors. In 1893, for example, the students attacked the Police Prefecture. The students, however, are not a class, not even a social stratum. Their movement is not a class movement. The de­mands put forward by the students are linked to the existence of the bourgeois division of labor and to capitalist society in gene­ral. This movement can never have a histor­ical and economic vision of the objective development of the contradictions of society. Some of the German or French students bel­ieved that they could open the door to the revolutions of the twentieth century by imitating the communes and barricades of the nineteenth century. But the student revolt put most of its hopes on the ‘radical’ mod­els of state capitalism, from Cuba to Chile, from China to Portugal, and in any case quickly exhausted itself. The already existing leftist sects, Trotskyist, Maoist or anarchist, found their ranks temporarily swollen with new militants, the anti-authori­tarians of yesterday, mystified or insecure about their inability to realize their petty bourgeois dreams. At the extremes of isola­tion and despair, the most marginal elements went into terrorism.

May 1968 demonstrated the intimate relation­ship between social conflicts and economic deterioration, between the decomposition of the ruling ideology and the crisis of the economy. In this sense, May 1968 was not an unexpected occurrence, a sort of histori­cal accident. The strikes and riots were simply a response to the first symptoms of the new phase of the world capitalist crisis.

VI. The crisis of capitalism

Marx explained how capital could only sur­vive by periodically destroying the excess capital created in periods of overproduction, in order to rejuvenate itself and attain still higher rates of expansion: “however these catastrophes which regularly regener­ate capitalism are repeated on an ever-greater scale and end up provoking the vio­lent overthrow of the system.” In the mas­sive destruction undertaken with the aim of once more reconstructing, capitalism dis­covers a dangerous, provisional, but tempor­arily effective solution to the problem of the market. Thus, in World War I, there wasn’t ‘enough’ destruction: military opera­tions directly affected an industrial sec­tor which represented less than a tenth of world production. The self-destruction of Europe during World War I was accompanied by a growth of 15 per cent in American pro­duction. But by 1929 world capitalism was again plunged into crisis. As if the lesson had been learned, the destruction in the Second World War was much more intense and extensive. But still, when the period of reconstruction after World War II began, capitalism had long since ceased to grow through “brusque expansionist thrusts”. For decades, the productivity of labor had grown too quickly to be contained within capitalist relations of production. For thirty years the productive forces had been crashing repeatedly and with increasing vio­lence against the “fetters which hold back their development”, savagely devastating the whole of society. Only the misery and bar­barism of these years of growing depression could explain the dazzling economic growth which took place in the reconstruction period.

This growth certainly dazzled those who saw themselves as being “at the highest level of revolutionary consciousness”, the Situatio­nist International. In a work published in 1969, ‘Enrages and Situationists in the Occupation Movement’, the SI wrote “no ten­dency towards economic crisis was in sight ... the revolutionary upsurge did not come out of an economic crisis ... what was attac­ked frontally in May was the capitalist economy functioning well.”

At the end of 1945, US commodities allowed production in Europe to start up again, part of Europe’s debts being paid by yielding its enterprises to American companies. But after 1955? The USA stopped its ‘free’ aid, the US balance of trade was positive whereas, for the majority of the other countries, it was negative. American capital continued to be invested more rapidly in Europe than in the rest of the world, which steadied the balance of payments in these countries, but which soon put the US balance of payments into disequilibrium. This situation led to the growing indebtedness of the American treasury, while the dollars invested in Europe or the rest of the world left the world in debt to the US. In the early 1960s this external debt went above the gold res­erves of the American treasury, but the non-covering of the dollar wasn’t enough to put the USA in difficulty as long as the other countries were still in debt to the US. The US could thus continue to appropriate the capital of the rest of the world while pay­ing in paper. This situation was reversed with the end of reconstruction in the Euro­pean countries. This was expressed by the ability of the European economies to throw onto the world market products that could compete with American products. Towards the mid-sixties the commercial balance of most of the formerly assisted countries grew positive whereas, after 1964, the US trade balance deteriorated more and more. As soon as the reconstruction of the European countries was completed, the productive apparatus showed itself to be too prolific in the face of a saturated world market; the national bourgeoisies were forced to increase the exploitation of their proleta­riats in order to cope with the exacerbation of international competition.

France didn’t escape this situation and in 1967 the French economy had to go through a capitalist restructuration: rationaliza­tion, improved productivity, which could only lead to a growth in unemployment. Thus, at the beginning of 1968, unemployment went beyond the 500,000 mark. Partial unemploy­ment affected numerous factories and provo­ked a reaction from the workers. A number of strikes broke out, limited and contained by the unions, but expressing a definite malaise (see ICO). The threat of unemploy­ment was particularly strong in the generation produced in the post-war demographic explosion.

In connection with this unemployment, the bosses were attempting to lower workers’ living standards. The bourgeoisie and its government mounted an attack on living and working conditions. At this time, France, with its gold reserves, still occupied a privileged position in the world exchequer, but in the general asphyxia that was affec­ting the world economy, this position was soon lost, and the French bourgeoisie had to go through some spectacular political changes. Thus, in all the industrial coun­tries, in Europe as well as in the US and Russia, unemployment was growing impercept­ibly, the economic perspective was becoming more somber, international competition was becoming more acute. At the end of 1967 Britain had to devalue the pound in order to make its products more competitive. But this measure turned to nothing as a whole series of other countries devalued their currencies. The austerity measures imposed by the Labor government of the day were particularly severe: massive reduction in public expenditure, withdrawal of British troops from Asia, a wage freeze, the first protectionist measures. The US, the main victim of the European offensive, reacted strongly, and at the beginning of January 1968, Johnson announced a series of economic measures; and in March 1968, in response to the devaluation of rival currencies, the dollar too fell. This was the economic situation prior to May 1968. It was not yet an open economic crisis but the signs were there for those who wanted to understand the real situation.

VII. The lessons of May 1968

We can thus reaffirm that the events of May 1968 mere the result of the reemergence of the economic crisis of capitalism. Instead of making an apology for May 1968, revolut­ionaries must be able to draw the lessons from these events, emphasizing both its strengths and weaknesses. Although it was the first response of the proletariat to the crisis, May 1968 was not a revolutionary situation. Among its many weaknesses was the total inexperience of the workers in struggle. Although there was a real deter­mination in the struggle, due essentially to the fact that this was a proletariat which had not gone through the defeats of the counter-revolution and the Second World War, the victory of the bourgeoisie was facilitated by the workers’ lack of experience.

The spontaneous movement of the class quickly became immobilized, allowing time for the unions to regain control, and for the bour­geoisie, once its fear had subsided, to go onto the offensive. Paradoxically, in appearance at least, the strikers themselves offered the bourgeoisie the means for regai­ning control, by occupying the factories. The unions managed to transform the occupa­tions from a clumsy, incomplete expression of the radicalization of the workers into a weapon for defending law and order. What did the strikers want to do when they occu­pied the factories? First and foremost, to ensure that the strike would be total, to show their determination through mass action, and thus to avoid dispersal. But by skillfully exploiting the corporative limitations of the movement -- expressed precisely by the workers shutting themselves up in their enterprises -- the unions deliberately impri­soned the workers in the factories, thus ensuring that a near-general movement remai­ned fragmented and divided. The streets were forbidden to the workers, as were con­tacts with other enterprises.

Fifty years of organic break with the wave of struggles in the 192Os, and the absence of a clear, coherent revolutionary minority capable of synthesizing the lessons of the past, weighed heavily on the balance of class forces. But despite the limitations of the proletariat’s actions in May 1968, this expression of proletarian life was enough to topple all the Marcusian theories. The post-1968 period saw the disintegration of the modernist school into various sects who have since wandered into the void. How­ever, reactionary ideas die hard, and the bourgeoisie has been obliged to carry on its work of mystification with more appropriate ideologues.

To state baldly that the proletariat is integrated into capitalism when millions of workers are on strike doesn’t get you very far. But it’s still important for the bour­geoisie to demoralize the working class, to distort the historical significance of its activity, to obscure the relationship between the working class and its vanguard.

VIII. The post-May confusions

Since the fundamental weapons of the prole­tariat in its struggle against capitalism are its consciousness and its self-organiza­tion, in its decisive confrontation with capital the working class expresses this dual necessity, on the one hand through its general, unitary organs, the workers’ coun­cils, and on the other hand through politi­cal organizations, proletarian parties, which regroup the most advanced elements of the class and which have the task of generalizing and deepening the development of consciousness, of which they themselves are an expression. In trying to deal with this question, we have seen the appearance of two theories which express a lack of confidence in the revolutionary action of the proleta­riat: Leninism and autonomism. In both these conceptions, the class and its politi­cal organizations are two independent entities, external to one another.

Leninism proclaims that the class is ‘trade unionist’ and gives primacy to the party, whose main function is to struggle against this autonomy or spontaneity and thus to direct the class. For the autonomists, any attempt by the most conscious elements of the class to form organizations distinct from the unitary organs of the class neces­sarily leads to the setting up of an organi­zation external to the class and its inte­rests. Henri Simon, former leading light of ICO, clearly expressed this position in a work called ‘The New Movement’:

“The appearance of the autonomous move­ment has led to the evolution of the con­cept of the party. In former times, the Party, as a ‘leadership’ saw itself as the revolutionary vanguard, identifying itself with the proletariat. It saw it­self as a ‘conscious fraction’ of the proletariat, who had to play a determining role in the raising of ‘class conscious­ness’, the high level of which would be the essential sign of the formation of the proletariat as a class. The modern heirs of the Party are well aware of the difficulty of maintaining such a position; so they entrust the party or the group with the very precise mission of making good what they consider to be any defi­ciencies in working class activity. This gives rise to groups specialized in inter­vention, liaison, exemplary action, theor­etical explanation, etc. But even these ‘groups’ can no longer exercise the hier­archical function of specialists in the general movement of struggle. The New Movement, that of workers and others in struggle, considers all these elements, the old groups like the new, to be of exactly equal importance as their own actions. They take what they can borrow from those who come to them and reject what does not suit them. Theory and practice appear now to be no more than one and the same element in the revolu­tionary process -- neither can precede nor dominate the other. No one political group has thus an essential role to play.” (Liaisons, no.26, December 1974. Avail­able in English in Solidarity Pamphlet, no.51. )

The autonomy of the working class has noth­ing to do with the workers rejecting all parties and political organizations, no mat­ter where they come from, or with the autonomy of each fraction of the working class (by factory, neighborhood, region or nation) from the other -- in a word, with federalism. Against those conceptions, we insist on the necessarily unitary, world­wide, and centralized character of the work­ing class movement. At the same time, the incessant effort of the working class to become conscious of itself gives rise to political organizations which regroup its most advanced elements. These organizations are an active factor in the deepening, the generalization, and the homogenization of consciousness within the class. While the autonomy of the proletariat, ie its inde­pendence from the other classes in society, is expressed through its own general, unit­ary organs, the workers’ councils, it is also expressed on the political, programma­tic level through the struggle against the ideological influence of other classes. The lessons of half a century of experience since the 1917-23 revolutionary wave are clear: the unitary organs of the class can only exist in a permanent way in moments of revolutionary struggle. They then regroup the entire class and are the organs through which the proletariat seizes power. Outside of such periods, in the various struggles of resistance against exploitation, the unitary organs formed by the working class -- strike committees based on general assemblies -- can only exist during the struggles themselves. On the other hand, the political organizations of the class, since they are expressions of the continuing effort of the class to develop its consciousness, can exist in the different phases of the strug­gle. The basis of their existence is neces­sarily an elaborated and coherent program, the fruit of the whole experience of the class. This question is completely evaded by Leninism which sees only one motor for the proletariat’s action: the party. A party which, whatever the circumstances, can set the proletariat in motion. The Trotskyist leader Krivine summed up this view when he wrote:

“For the revolutionary explosion of May 1968 to have succeeded, all that was lacking was a well-implanted revolutio­nary organization, recognized by the mass of workers. Lenin saw this as the indis­pensable subjective condition for the maturation of the revolutionary crisis. Such an organization would have ensured that all the struggles converged and extended themselves. It would have put forward slogans that could have advanced the struggle, such as the unlimited general strike, leading inevitably to slogans calling for the seizure of poli­tical power. If May 1968 didn’t succeed, if it was only a ‘general rehearsal’, it is precisely because such a party didn’t exist ...”

The same idea is put forward by the Bordi­gists of Programme Communiste who in their manifesto on the general strike distributed in June 1968 called on the proletariat to organize itself under the banner of the party and to create red trade unions:

“This will prepare the workers, under the leadership of the world communist party, by chasing from their own ranks the var­ious prophets of pacifism, reformism and democratism, by impregnating the union organizations with communist ideology and making them transmission belts for the organ of political direction -- the party ...”

These ideas introduce a qualitative separa­tion into the class struggle of the prole­tariat: the ‘political’ struggle on the one hand, which is external to the ‘economic’ struggle on the other hand. The movement from economic to political can only take place through the mediation of the party. In this conception the struggle of the proletariat can only develop through the ideology and initiative of the party. For the defenders of this position, it’s logi­cal to say that the proletariat can only express itself when the party exists: thus Battaglia Comunista denies the proletarian character of the May-June strikes because they were not led by the Party! (See Texts and Proceedings of the International Conference, Milan, 1977, pp. 56-58. )

Thus, between the ‘economic’ and ‘political’ class struggle, between the defense of class interests and the revolution, there is no continuity, it is not one movement which transforms itself by radicalizing itself, but there is only the mediation provided by the party. Instead of seeing the revolutio­nary movement as a process of breaking from the forms of the capitalist economy, Lenin­ism sees these forms as the historic, mate­rial basis for socialism, which is seen to be in continuity with them.

Against these conceptions, we insist that the proletariat makes its history within the limits imposed by the economic and soc­ial development of a given situation, within definite conditions; but it is still the proletariat which makes its history, and it does this through its praxis which is the dialectical link between past and future, and which is both cause and effect of the historical process. There is thus an objec­tivity, an obligation, in the action of the class, not an idealistic movement. The struggle for better working conditions (wages and hours) is an immediate necessity for the working class. The struggle of the proletariat, as we understand it, is first of all a struggle to resist the effects of the accumulation of capital, an attempt to prevent the depreciation of labor power brought about by capitalist development. The act of resisting capitalist exploitation is the basis, the motor-force, for the revo­lutionary action of the working class. But what gives this struggle all its real impor­tance, which goes beyond the specific dem­ands of the struggle, is the new reality which it can inaugurate: during the course of the resistance against exploitation we see the appearance of association, which momentarily puts an end to division and atomization and annuls the effects of competition. The unfolding dynamic of the struggle is what opens the way to the confrontation between bourgeoisie and proleta­riat on a political level. It is thus a question of extending, prolonging, organizing this real movement towards communism. This is the task of the organs which are created when the class acts in a collective manner -- allowing for the association of workers, strengthening solidarity. This is a vital element in the development of proletarian class consciousness.

Revolutionaries intervene in this process in order to clarify the meaning of the struggle, putting forward the general goals of the movement and helping it to go beyond partial demands; they participate in the organizations of the class, defending the most adequate forms of action for extending the movement. As the Communist Manifesto says, the communists are the most resolute elements in the struggle, and have a deci­sive role to play through the clarification they bring to the movement, but this has nothing to do with any power of decision, which for us remains in the hands of the unitary organs of the class. Revolutiona­ries, a product of the class movement, are the most conscious elements of the class, and their consciousness is constantly strengthened by the class movement; at the same time they accelerate the maturation of this movement through the theoretical clari­fication they carry out.

 

Conclusions

 

Although the defeat of the proletarian move­ments of the late sixties and early seventies has allowed the bourgeoisie to regain the initiative through the unions and parties of the left, and thus to bring the world’s attention to the capitalist solution to the crisis -- a new world war -- it remains the case that the working class has not been crushed, and that the class movements which have developed all over the world are the result of the perspective opened up by May 1968: the response of the working class to the increasingly severe crisis of capitalism; the inevitable deepening of the crisis; the radicalization of the proletarian struggle through periods of advance and retreat; the culmination of all this in the revolutionary upsurge of the working class.

FD

Geographical: 

  • France [93]

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1968 - May in France [94]

A caricature of the Party: the Bordigist Party

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The development of class consciousness, which is absolutely indispensable to the emancipation of the proletariat, is a con­stant and unceasing process. It is deter­mined by the social being of the proletariat, the class which alone bears within it the resolution of the insoluble contradictions of capitalism, the last of all class-divided societies. The historic task of forever doing away with the class antagon­isms that rend human society can only be accomplished by the workers themselves. The consciousness of this task can’t be ‘impor­ted’ or ‘inculcated’ into the proletariat from outside; it is the product of its own being, its own existence. It is the econo­mic, social, and political situation of the proletariat in society which determines its practical activity and its historic struggle.

This incessant movement towards the develop­ment of consciousness is expressed by the proletariat’s effort to organize itself, and through the formation of political groups within the class, culminating in the consti­tution of the party.

It is this question, the constitution of the party, which is dealt with in a very long article in Programme Communiste, the theor­etical organ of the International Communist Party. The article is entitled ‘On the Road to the Compact and Powerful Party of Tomor­row’ and can be found in Programme Commun­iste, no.76, March 1978. We should say first of all that the habitually bombastic language of the Bordigists, the turns and detours through numerous pages leading back to the point of departure, the kicking of open doors, the repetition of assertions instead of argumentation, make it extremely difficult to get to the real questions at issue. The technique of proving an asser­tion by citing one’s own previous assertions, which are themselves based on previous assertions -- and so on till you get dizzy -- can of course prove a continuity of asser­tion but it can never be a valid method of demonstration. In these circumstances, and despite our firm desire to deal with the assertions which express the Bordigist posi­tion on the party -- which we consider erro­neous and which have to be fought – it’s impossible to completely avoid going from the assertions in this article to a number of other problems.

A propos the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left

It must come as quite a surprise to the majority of Programme Communiste’s readers, and probably to the majority of the ICP’s own members, to learn all of a sudden that “despite its objective (?) limitations, the ‘Left Fraction in exile’ is part of the history” of the Italian Left, and is even referred to as “our Fraction in exile bet­ween 1928 and 1940” (Programme Communiste, no.76). On this point, Programme Communiste has hitherto accustomed us to its great reserve, its marked silence, and even its reproachful attitude towards the Fraction. How else are we to understand the fact that, in over thirty years of existence, the ICP -- which has spared no effort to reproduce the texts of the Left from 1920-26 in its papers, theoretical journals, pamphlets, and books -- has not found the time or the means to publish a single text by the Frac­tion, which published the Bulletin d’Informa­tion, the journal Bilan, the paper Prometeo, the bulletin Il Seme and many other texts? It’s not simply a matter of chance that Programme Communiste contains no reference to or mention of the political positions defended by ‘our’ Fraction, that it never quotes from Bilan. And certain comrades of the ICP, having vaguely heard people talking about Bilan, have argued that the Party no longer claims any continuity with the acti­vity of the Fraction and the writings of Bilan, while other comrades of the Party don’t even know Bilan ever existed.

Today the ICP has suddenly discovered the ‘merit of our Fraction’, a very limited merit, it’s true, but enough for the ICP to at least raise its hat. Why today? Is it because the gap in organic continuity (a phrase much appreciated by the ICP) between 1926 and 1952 has become a bit embarrassing and it’s now time to plug the gap as best they can, or is it because the ICC has talk­ed so much about the Fraction that it has become impossible to keep silent about it any longer? And why situate the Fraction between 1928 and 1940 when it didn’t dissolve (mistakenly) until 1945 in order to be integrated into the ‘Party’ which had finally been reconstituted in Italy? (This was after the Fraction had denounced the Italian Anti-Fascist Committee in Brussels and expelled its promoter Vercesi -- the same Vercesi who, without any discussion, was admitted into the ICP, and even into its leadership.) Is it out of ignorance or is it because, during the war, the Fraction developed even further the orientation begun by Bilan before the war -- notably on the Russian question and the question of the state and the party -- a development which would highlight even more clearly the distance between Programme Communiste and the positions defended by the Fraction? In any case, the ‘merit’ verbally accorded to the Fraction is rapidly counter­balanced by severe criticisms:

“The impossibility of breaking out of what might be called the subjective circle (?!) of the counter-revolution led the Fraction into certain weaknesses, for example on the national and colonial question, or on the question of Russia, not so much in the appreciation of what it became, but in the search for a way of exercising the dictatorship in a way different from the Bolsheviks ... a way that would, in the future, prevent a repetition of the cata­strophe of 1926-27; and also, to a certain extent, on the question of the Party or the International ... (the Fraction) also wanted to wait for the return of a mass confrontation with the forces of the enemy before reconstituting the Party.”

If the ability to remain loyal to the revo­lutionary foundations of Marxism in a period of defeat is unquestionably meritable, what was particularly meritable about the Frac­tion, what distinguished it from other groups of the period, was precisely what Programme calls its ‘weaknesses’. As the Fraction put it:

“The framework of the new parties of the proletariat can only arise from the pro­found understanding of the cause of defeats. And this understanding can endure neither censorship not ostracism.” (‘Introduction’, Bilan no.1, p.3)

For those who think that the communist program is something ‘complete and invariable’, who have transformed Marxism into a dogma and Lenin into an untouchable prophet, the fact that the Fraction dared (Brr, it sends chills up your spine!) to investigate in the light of reality, not the foundations of Marxism, but the politi­cal and programmatic positions of the Bolshe­vik party and the Communist International -- this goes beyond the bounds of toleration. To say that the re-examination -- within the framework of communist theory and the com­munist movement -- of political positions which played a part in past defeats “can endure neither censorship nor ostracism” is the worst kind of heresy, a ‘weakness’ as Programme would call it.

The great merit of the Fraction, in addition to its loyalty to Marxism and the positions it took up on the most important questions of the day -- against the united front advo­cated by Trotsky, against the popular fronts, against the infamous mystification of anti-fascism, against collaboration in and sup­port for the war in Spain; its great merit was to have dared to break with the method which had triumphed in the revolutionary movement, the method which transformed theory into dogma, principles into taboos, and stifled all political life. Its merit was to have called revolutionaries to debate and discuss, which led it not to ‘weaknesses’ but to being able to make a rich contribu­tion to the revolutionary project.

The Fraction, with all the firmness it had in its convictions, was modest enough not to claim that it had resolved all problems and responded to all questions:

“In beginning the publication of this bulletin, our Fraction doesn’t believe that it is presenting definitive solu­tions to the terrible problems posed to the proletariats of all countries.” (Bilan, no.1)

And even when it was convinced that it had responded to a question, it didn’t demand that others simply ‘recognize’ these res­ponses, but called on them to examine them, confront them, discuss them:

“It (the Fraction) does not intend to appeal to its political precedents to demand that everyone accept the solutions to the present situation which it advo­cates. On the contrary, it calls upon revolutionaries to subject the positions and basic political documents which it defends to the test of events.” (Ibid) And, in the same spirit, it wrote:

“Our Fraction would have preferred this work (the publication of Bilan) to have been carried out by an international organism, because we are convinced of the necessity for political confrontations between those groups who represent the proletarian class in various countries.”

In order to appreciate fully the enormous distance between the Fraction’s idea of the relationship that should exist between communist groups, and the idea held by the Bordigist party, it’s enough to compare the above quote from Bilan with a quote from Programme. Thus speaking about their own group which is weighed down with the title of ‘Party’, Programme Communiste writes:

“Is this just a ‘nucleus of the Party’? Certainly it is if one compares it to the ‘compact and powerful party of tomorrow’. But it is a party. It can only grow on its own basis, and not through the ‘confrontation’ of different points of view, but through battling against those ideas which appear to be ‘close’.” (emphasis by Programme) (Programme Communiste, no.76, p.14)

As a spokesman of the ICP said recently at a public meeting of Revolution Internatio­nale in Paris:

“We haven’t come here to discuss with you or confront our point of view with yours, but simply to put forward our position. We come to your meeting in the same way as we do to a meeting of the Stalinist party.”

Such an attitude isn’t based on firmness of conviction, but on complacency and arrogance. The so-called ‘complete and invariant pro­gram’ of which the Bordigists claim to be the heirs and guardians is simply a cover for the most profound megalomania.

The more a Bordigist is beset by doubts and incomprehensions, the less firm are his convictions; and so he feels the need more than ever to rise up from his bed in the morning, kneel with his forehead to the ground, beat his chest and invoke the lita­nies of Islam “Allah is the only God and Mohammed is his prophet”. Or as Bordiga said somewhere “To be a member of the Party, it’s not necessary that everyone understands and is convinced, it’s enough to believe and obey the Party.”

This is not the place to go into the history of the Fraction, its merits and its faults, the validity and errors in its positions. As it said itself, it was often doing no more than groping for clarity, but its con­tribution was all the greater because it was a living political body, which dared to open up debate, to confront its positions with those of others; because it wasn’t a sclerotic and megalomaniac sect like the Bordigist ‘Party’. So whereas the Fraction could rightly claim continuity with the Italian Left, the Bordigist party is commit­ting a gross abuse by talking about ‘our Fraction in exile’.

The constitution of the Party

The indispensable party of the proletariat is constituted on the solid foundations of a coherent program, of clear principles, of a general orientation which allows it to give a detailed response to the political problems emerging from the class struggle. This has nothing in common with the mythical ‘complete, immutable, invariant Program’ of the Bordigists. “In each period, we see that the possibility of constituting the party is determined on the basis of previous experience and the new problems which the proletariat has to face” (Bilan, no.1, p.15).

What is true for the program is equally true for the living political forces which physically constitute the party. The party is not, of course, a conglomeration of all sorts of groups and heterogeneous political tendencies. But neither is it the ‘monoli­thic bloc’ the Bordigists talk about and which has never existed except in their own fantasies:

“In each period where the conditions exist for the constitution of the party, for the proletariat to organize itself as a class, the party is founded on the following two elements: 1. An awareness of the most advanced position the prole­tariat has to take up, an understanding of the new paths it has to follow; 2. the increasing demarcation of the forces which are capable of acting for the proletarian revolution.” (Bilan, no.1)

To recognize oneself and none other, on principle and a priori, as the only force acting for the revolution, isn’t a sign of revolutionary firmness; it’s the attitude of a sect.

Describing the conditions in which the 1st International was founded, Engels wrote:

“The very events and vicissitudes of the struggle against capital, the defeats even more than the victories, could not help bringing home to men’s minds the insufficiency of their various favorite nostrums, and preparing the way for a more complete insight into the true condi­tions of working class emancipation.” (Engels, ‘Preface to the English Edition of the Communist Manifesto’, 1888)

Reality has nothing to do with the mirror in front of which the Bordigist ‘Party’ spends most of its time and which reveals nothing except its own image. The reality behind the constitution of the party throughout the history of the workers’ movement has been the simultaneous convergence and demarcation of the forces capable of acting for the revolution; otherwise we’d have to conclude that there has never existed any party ex­cept the Bordigist party. A few examples: the Communist League which was joined by Marx, Engels, and their friends was the old League of the Just, and was made up of var­ious groups in Germany, Switzerland, France, Belgium and England after the elimination of the Weitling tendency. The 1st Interna­tional involved both the elimination of socialists like Louis Blanc and Mazzini and the convergence of other currents; the IInd International was based on the elimination of the anarchists and the regroupment of the Marxist Social Democratic parties; the IIIrd International came after the elimination of the Social Democrats and regrouped the revolutionary communist currents. It was the same with the Social Democratic party in Germany which came out of the party of Eisenach and the party of Lassalle; and with the Socialist Party in France which emerged out of the party of Guesde and Lafargue and the party of Jaures; same again with the Social Democratic party in Russia, which arose on the basis of the convergence of groups that had been isolated and dispersed all over the towns and regions of Russia, but which also involved the elimination of the Struve tendency. We could give many more examples of the constitution of the party in history, showing the same phenomenon of elimination and convergence. The Commu­nist Party of Italy itself was constituted around the Abstentionist Fraction of Bordiga and Gramsci’s group after the elimination of Serati’s maximalists.

There are no criteria which are absolutely valid and identical in all periods. The whole point is to know how, in each period, to clearly define what are the political criteria for convergence, and what are the criteria for demarcation. This is precisely what the Bordigist ‘Party’ doesn’t know; in fact this party was constituted without criteria and through a vague amalgam of forces: the party constituted in the North of Italy, groups from the South which inclu­ded elements from the partisans, the Vercesi tendency in the Anti-Fascist Committee in Brussels, the minority expelled from the Fraction in 1936 for its participation in the Republican militias during the war in Spain, and the Fraction which had been prema­turely dissolved in 1945. As we can see, Programme Communiste is in a particularly good position to talk about intransigence and organic continuity and to give lessons about revolutionary firmness and purity! Its denigration of any attempt at confronta­tion and debate between revolutionary commu­nist groups isn’t based on firmness of principles or even on political myopia, but simply on a concern to safeguard its own little chapel.

What’s more, this ‘terrible’ -- in fact purely verbal -- intransigence of the Bordi­gists against any confrontation and (a fort­iori) against any regroupment, which they denounce in advance and without any criteria as a confusionist enterprise, varies (sorry about the invariance) according to the mom­ent and their own convenience. Thus in 1949, they launched an “appeal for the international reorganization of the revolu­tionary Marxist movement”, an appeal repea­ted in 1952 and 1957, in which we find the following:

“In accordance with the Marxist viewpoint, the communists of the Italian Left today address an appeal to the revolutionary workers’ groups of all countries. They invite them to retrace a long and diffi­cult route and to regroup themselves on an international and strictly class basis...”1

But it is vital to be able to distinguish between the Bordigist party and any other organization; one would be making a huge mistake to think that what’s permissible for the party, which has exclusive guardianship over the complete and immutable program, could be permissible for a purely mortal organization of revolutionaries. The party hath its reasons which reason knows not, and cannot know. When the Bordigists call for an ‘international assembly’, this is solid gold, but when other revolutionary organiza­tions call for a simple international con­ference for contact and discussion, this is obviously the worst kind of dross; it’s the ‘merchandizing of principles’, a confusio­nist enterprise. But isn’t it really because the Bordigists are now more than ever stuck in their sclerosis and are afraid of con­fronting their uncertain positions with the living revolutionary currents which are evolving today; isn’t that the reason why they would rather turn in on themselves and remain isolated?

It would be worthwhile to recall the criteria put forward for this ‘assembly’ and reaffir­med again in the recent article (mentioned in the beginning of this article):

“The Internationalist Communist Party proposes to comrades of all countries the following basic principles and postulates:

1. Reaffirmation of the weapons of the proletarian revolution: violence, dictatorship, terror ...

2. Complete rupture with the tradition of war alliances, partisan fronts, and ‘national liberations’ ...

3. Historical negation of pacifism, fede­ralism between states and ‘national defense’ ...

4. Condemnation of common social programs and political fronts with non-wage earning classes ...

5. Proclamation of the capitalist charac­ter of the Russian social structure (“Power has passed to the hands of a hybrid and shapeless coalition of internal interests of the lower and upper middle classes, semi-independent businessmen and the international capitalist classes”?:?) ...

6. Conclusion: disavowal of any support for Russian imperial militarism, categorical defeatism against that of America ...”

We have cited the six chapter headings, which are followed by commentaries develop­ing the points, too long to be reproduced here. We don’t want to discuss these points in detail now, even though their formulation leaves a lot to be desired, notably on terror as a fundamental weapon of the revolution2, or this subtle nuance in the conclusion about the attitude towards America (defea­tism) and Russia (disavowal), or this cur­ious -- to say the least -- definition of the power in Russia, which isn’t called plain state capitalism but a “hybrid coalition of interests of the lower middle classes ... and the international capitalist classes”. We could also mention the explicit absence of other points in these criteria, in part­icular the defense of the proletarian charac­ter of October or the necessity for the class party. What interests us here is emphasizing that these criteria do constit­ute a serious basis, if not for an immediate ‘assembly’, then at least for contact and discussion between existing revolutionary groups. This is the orientation that the Fraction used to follow, and it’s one we are carrying on with today: it was the basis for last year’s international meeting in Milan.

But the Bordigists, eclipsed by their invar­iance, don’t need anything of the sort today... because they’ve already constituted the party (“miniscule but still a party”).

But wasn’t this Appeal signed by the ICP at the time, naive readers will ask? Yes ... but this was still only the Internationalist Communist Party and not yet the Internatio­nal Communist Party -- a subtle nuance. But wasn’t this International Communist Party an integral part of the Internationalist Communist Party of the time, didn’t it even claim to be its majority? Yes, ... but it was only just completing its constitution; another nuance. But doesn’t it refer to this Appeal as a text of the Party today? Yes, ... but ... but ... but ...

While we are on this point, can we be told, once and for all, since when has this “val­iant miniscule party” existed? Today -- though it’s not clear why – it’s a la mode to say that the party was only constituted in 1952 and the article cited above insists on this point3. However the article also cites “fundamental texts” from 1946 -- the Platform dates from 1945 and other crucial texts from 1948, 1949 and 1951. These texts, all of them as ‘fundamental’ as the other, where do they come from exactly? From a Party, a group, a fraction, a nucleus, an embryo?

In reality, the ICP was constituted in 1943, after the fall of Mussolini, in the North of Italy. It was ‘reconstituted’ a second time in 1945 after the ‘liberation’ from German occupation in the North, which allo­wed the groups which had meanwhile been constituted in the South to integrate them­selves into the organization which existed in the North. It was in order to integrate itself into this party that the Italian Fraction of the Communist Left almost unanimously decided to dissolve itself. This dissolution as well as the proclamation of the ‘Party’ provoked sharp discussions and polemics within the International Communist Left; in France this led to a split in the French Fraction of the Communist Left, in which only a minority agreed with the policy of the Party and separated itself from the majority. The majority declared its opposi­tion to the precipitous dissolution of the Italian Fraction, categorically and publicly condemned the proclamation of the Party in Italy as being artificial and voluntarist, and pointed out the opportunist political basis of the new Party4. At the end of 1945 the First Congress of the Party took place. The Congress published a political Platform and nominated the central leader­ship of the Party, and an international Bureau composed of representatives of the ICP and the French and Belgian Fractions. The article in Programme itself refers to “‘Elements for a Marxist Orientation’, our text of 1946”. . In 1948 we had more pro­grammatic texts of the Party, and others followed. In 1951 the first crisis in the Party broke out, culminating in a split which left two ICPs, both claiming to be the continuators of the old Party, a claim which Programme has never given up.

Today a new date is invented for the consti­tution of the Bordigist party. Why? Is it because it wasn’t until 1951 that:

“Our current was able to attain, thanks to the continuity of its struggle, the critical awareness needed to defend a line that was truly general and not circumstantial ...”

thus allowing it to:

“ ... constitute ourselves into an organized critical awareness, into a militant body acting as a Party.”

(Quoted from the same article ‘On the Road to the Compact and Powerful Party of Tomorrow’, Programme Communiste, no.76)

But then where were Bordiga and the Bordi­gists between 1943-45 and 1951? What hap­pened to the Programme which has been invar­iable since 1848? Did they lose it during these years, did they have to wait until 1951 to “attain the critical awareness” which had allowed them to constitute the ‘Party’? But hadn’t they been organized since 1943-­45 as members, leading members of the ICP? It’s difficult, very difficult, to discuss such a serious question with people who mix up all their terms, who don’t know how to distinguish between the period of gestation and the moment of birth, who don’t know who they are and what stage they’ve reached, who call themselves ‘The Party’ while defen­ding the necessity to constitute the Party. How are we to take seriously people who, according to what’s convenient at a given moment, fix the moment of birth in 1943, 1945, 1952 or perhaps at an undetermined date in the future?

It’s the same with the date of the constitu­tion of the ICP as it is with the Left Fraction in exile. They are accepted or rejected according to what’s convenient. But, whatever the date, concerning the constitution of the Party, “we can say straight away that it was not carried forward by an ascendant movement but, on the contrary, preceded it by a long way.”

This seems clear. The constitution of the Party is in no way conditioned by an ascend­ant movement of the class struggle, but “on the contrary, precedes it by a long way”. But why this rush then to add that it’s nec­essary to “prepare the true Party ... the compact and powerful Party which we are not yet.” In sum, a Party which ... prepares the Party! In other words, a Party which isn’t a Party: But why is it that this Party, which possesses the complete and invariant program, which has attained the necessary, organized critical awareness -- why isn’t this the ‘true Party’? What’s missing? It’s certainly not a question of the number of militants, but to say that the “Party under construction” recognizes that it is “in the process of being born” and isn’t complete because “the class party is always being built, from its appearance to the time it disappears” (emphasis in the text) (Programme Communiste, no.76) is quite clearly just juggling with words; it avoids giving the answer that’s required by glossing over the question itself. It’s one thing to say that ovulation is a pre­condition for a future birth, quite another thing to claim that ovulation is the act of birth, the actual emergence of a living being. The inspired originality of Programme consists in making two different things identical. With such a form of special pleading you can prove anything and square any circle. The need to constantly develop and strengthen the party when it really exists doesn’t prove that it already exists, just as the need to develop and strengthen a child doesn’t prove that the egg is already a child; it’s simply that in certain precise conditions the egg can become a child. The problems posed to one differ greatly from the problems posed to the other.

All this sophistry about the Party existing because it’s under constant construction, and the constant construction by a Party which already exists, is used to surrepti­tiously introduce another Bordigist theory: the real Party and the formal Party. This is another sophism which distinguishes bet­ween the real Party, a pure ‘historic’ phan­tom which doesn’t necessarily exist in reality, and the formal Party, which does actually exist; in reality but which doesn’t necessarily express the real Party. In the Bordigist dialectic, movement, isn’t a state of matter and thus something material; it’s a metaphysical force which creates matter. Thus the phrase in the Communist Manifesto “the organization of the proletariat into a class, and consequently into a poli­tical party” becomes in the Bordigist world-view “the constitution of the Party makes the proletariat into a class”. This leads to contradictory conclusions and also shows a scholastic form of argument: either one affirms -- against all evidence -- that the Party has never ceased to exist since it first appeared (let’s say since Babeuf or the Chartists); or, departing from the obvious fact that the Party has not existed for long periods of history, one concludes (like Vercesi or Camatte) that the class has momentarily or definitively disappeared. The only thing that is constant in Bordigism is its movement from one pole of scholasti­cism to the other.

For the sake of clarity we can pose the question in a different way. The Bordigists define the Party as a doctrine, a program, and a capacity for practical intervention, a will to action. This rather summary defi­nition of the Party is now completed by another postulate: the existence of the Party is not linked to, in fact must be com­pletely independent of, the conditions of a given period. Now, of these two foundations of the Party -- the program and the will to action -- the first, the program, we are told, has been complete and invariant since the Communist Manifesto of 1848. Here we are confronted with an obvious contradic­tion: the Program, the essence of the Party, is complete, but the Party, the mater­ialization of the Program, is in perpetual constitution. More than that even -- at times it has purely and simply disappeared. How can this be, and why?

The Communist League dissolved itself and disappeared in 1852. Why? Had the found­ers of the Program, Marx and Engels, gone and lost the Program? Perhaps one could accuse them of losing the will to action, by referring to the split they engineered against the minority of the League (Willitch-­Schapper), their denunciation of the volun­taristic activism of this minority. But wouldn’t this be going from one absurdity to an even greater absurdity? What other explanation can we give to this dissolution except -- whether the Bordigists like it or not -- that it corresponded to a profound change in the situation? Engels, who knew what he was talking about, explained the disappearance of the League thus:

“The defeat of the Parisian insurrection of June, 1848 -- the first great battle between Proletariat and Bourgeoisie -- drove again into the background, for a time, the social and political aspira­tions of the European working class. Thenceforth, the struggle for supremacy was again, as it had been before the revolution of February, solely between different sections of the propertied classes; the working class was reduced to a fight for political elbow-room, and to the position of extreme wing of the middle class Radicals. Wherever indepen­dent proletarian movements continued to show signs of life, they were ruthlessly hunted down. Thus the Prussian police hunted out the Central Board of the Communist League, then located in Cologne. The members were arrested, and, after eighteen months imprisonment, they were tried in October, 1852. This cele­brated ‘Cologne Communist trial’ lasted from October 4th till November 12th; seven of the prisoners were sentenced to terms of imprisonment in a fortress, vary­ing from three to six years. Immediately after the sentence, the League was form­ally dissolved by the remaining members. As to the Manifesto, it seemed thence­forth to be doomed to oblivion.” (Engels, ‘Preface to the English Edition of the Communist Manifesto of 1888’)

This explanation does not seem to convince our Bordigists, who can only find it com­pletely superfluous since for them the Party was never really dissolved -- it contin­ued to exist in the persons of Marx and Engels. In order to prove this they cite a whimsical extract from a letter from Marx to Engels, and, as at other times when they find it convenient, they transform a word, the end of a phrase, into an absolute truth, an invariant and immutable principle5. Between the dissolution of the League in 1852 and the birth of the International in 1864, did anything happen that was important to the existence of the Party? For the Bordigists, absolutely nothing; the progra­m was still invariant, the will to action was present, Marx and Engels were there, and the Party was with them. Nothing of any great importance happened. But this does not seem to be the opinion of Engels who wrote:

“When the European working class had recovered sufficient strength for another attack on the ruling class, the Interna­tional Workingmen’s Association sprang up.”(Engels, Ibid)

Programme writes in its article that “the revolutionary Marxist party is not the product of the movement in its immediate aspect, ie its phases of ascent and reflux.” Here it simply falsifies the debate -- either out of incomprehension, or intentionally -- by introducing this little word product emphasized in the text. Certainly the need for a party isn’t the result of a particular situation but of the general historic situa­tion of the class (this is something you learn in an elementary course in Marxism and really doesn’t require any great knowledge). The controversy is not about this, it’s about whether or not the existence of the Party is linked to the vicissitudes of the class struggle, whether specific conditions are necessary if revolutionaries are to effectively -- and not just in words -- assume the tasks incumbent on the Party. It’s not enough to say that a child is a human prod­uct to conclude from this that the condi­tions necessary for it to live -- air to breathe, food to nourish it, someone to care for it -- are automatically given. Without these conditions, the child is irredeemably condemned to die. The party is an effective intervention, a growing impact, a real infl­uence in the class struggle, and this is only possible when the class struggle is in the ascendant. This is what distinguishes the party and its real existence from a fraction or a group. This is what the ICP has not understood and does not want to understand.

The Communist League was constituted at the time of rising class struggle which preceded the revolutionary wave of 1848, and, as Engels’ quote shows, it disappeared with the defeat and reflux of these struggles. This is not an episodic fact but a general one which has been verified throughout the history of the workers’ movement, and it could not be otherwise. The Ist Internatio­nal emerged “when the European working class had recovered sufficient strength for another attack on the ruling class” (Engels). And we fully endorse the words of the General Council’s Reporter to the First Congress of the International, responding to the attacks of the bourgeois press: “It’s not the Inter­national which unleashes the workers’ strikes, it’s the workers’ strikes which give this strength to the International.” In its turn, as had been the case with the Communist League, the International didn’t survive for long after the bloody defeat of the Paris Commune. It perished shortly afterwards, despite the presence of Marx and Engels and the ‘complete and invariant program’.

In order to demonstrate the opposite of what we have just been saying, the article vainly resorts to the “practical verifica­tion ... that there are whole areas (like England or America) where social struggles of an extraordinary vigor have developed even though the Party didn’t exist there at all.” This is an argument which proves nothing, except that there is no mechanical link between the struggles of the class and the secretion of the party, or that there are other factors which counteract the pro­cess towards the constitution of the party; that in general there’s a gap between objec­tive conditions and subjective conditions, between the existing being and the develop­ment of consciousness. For the argument to have some validity, Programme would have to cite cases where the opposite has happened, ie examples of the party being constituted outside of countries and period where the class struggle was in the ascendant. But there are none. The one and only example (let’s not waste time with the Trotskyist IVth International) they can cite is the ICP. But that’s another story, the story of the frog who wanted to be as big as a bull. The ICP has never been a party other than in name.

After the examples of the Communist League and the Ist International, we have the example of the IInd International and its infamous demise, and even more the constitu­tion of the IIIrd International and its ignoble end in Stalinism. These examples are a definitive vindication of the thesis defended by the Italian Fraction, a thesis which we subscribe to wholeheartedly: the impossibility of constituting the party in a period of reflux in the class struggle6. Programme’s view is naturally quite different: the reconstitution of the class party must take place “before the proleta­riat has raised itself from the abyss into which it has fallen. It must be said that this rebirth must of necessity, as has alw­ays been the case, precede this revival of the proletariat” (Programme Communiste, no.76).

We can understand why the article refers with such emphasis to Lenin’s What Is To Be Done? especially to the part about the trade unionist consciousness of the working class. Because what underlies the whole line of reasoning in the article is not so much the overestimation of the role of the party and the Bordigists’ own tendency towards megalomania, but a crying under­estimation of the class’s capacity to become conscious, a profound lack of confidence in the class, a barely-hidden distrust of the working class and its ability to understand the world:

“If the future scientifically foreseen by the Party is certain and inevitable for us materialists, this isn’t deter­mined by any ‘maturation’ of conscious­ness about its historic mission within the class, but because the class will be pushed by objective determinants, before knowing about it, without knowing how to struggle for communism.” (Programme Communiste, no.76)

Throughout the article you can find such distrustful compliments to the working class: a brutal, brutalized mass which acts without knowing or understanding, but which, fortunately enough, will be led by a party which understands everything, which personi­fies understanding. But allow us to juxta­pose this stifling distrust with the fresh air of old Engels’ judgment:

“For the ultimate triumph of the ideas set forth in the Manifesto Marx relied solely and exclusively upon the intellec­tual development of the working class, as it necessarily had to ensue from united action and discussion.” (Engels, ‘Preface to the German Edition of the Communist Manifesto’, 1 May 1890)

Any comment on this would be superfluous. Let’s go on. In the view of the Bordigists, the reconstitution of the Party -- completely detached from concrete conditions -- requires theoretical maturity and the will to action. Thus the article makes the following judg­ment of the Fraction:

“If it (the Fraction) was not yet the Party but only a prelude to it, this wasn’t because of a lack of practical activity but rather because of its insufficient theoretical work.”

Well, that’s their judgment. But what would the article accept as sufficient theoretical work? No doubt the restoration, the reappropriation, the conservation of the complete and invariant program. Above all, without any examination of past positions, without searching for answers to new prob­lems. This is the kind of work which the article reproaches the Fraction for carry­ing out, this is what it sees as its grave weaknesses. These museum keepers who have raised their own sterility into an ideal would like it to be believed that Lenin, like them, did nothing except ‘restore’ the completed theory of Marx. Perhaps they would like to meditate on what Lenin had to say about theory:

“We in no way take Marx’s doctrine for something complete and untouchable; on the contrary we consider that he simply laid the foundation stones of the science which socialists must take forward in all directions if they don’t want to be left behind by life.”7

The article this quote is taken from is precisely entitled ‘Our Program’.

And how do our popes of Marxism measure the degree of theoretical maturity? Are there any fixed measures? If they’re not to be arbitrary, measures must also be measured and there’s no better way of doing that than by verifying this theoretical maturity in the light of the concrete political posi­tions one defends.

If this is the way to measure maturity, if it’s the main criterion for constituting the Party, we can say calmly but with all the necessary conviction that the Bordigists ought not to have constituted the Party in 1943, 1945, and especially not in 1952. They would do much better to wait for the year 2000. Everyone would benefit from that, in particular the Bordigists.

We can’t say exactly how the ‘compact and powerful Party of tomorrow’ will be consti­tuted, but one thing is certain today, and that is that the ICP isn’t it. The drama of Bordigism is that it wants to be what it isn’t -- the Party -- and doesn’t want to be what it is: a political group. Thus it doesn’t accomplish, except in words, the tasks of the party, because it can’t accomplish them; and it doesn’t take on the tasks of a real political group, which to its eyes are just petty. As for its political matur­ity: to judge by its positions, and by the pace with which things are developing, there’s a good chance that it will never reach its destination, because with every step forward it takes, it takes two or three steps backward.

MC

1 Programme Communiste, nos. 18 & 19 of the French edition. Also published as pamphlet in English.

2 See our article ‘Terror, Terrorism and Class Violence’ in this issue of the Review, where this subject is dealt with more fully.

3 Le Proletaire, no. 268, 8-12 April, is even more explicit when it writes: “… its characteristic theses of 1951 which constitute its act of birth and the basis for joining it.”

4 See L’Etincelle and Internationalisme, publications of the Gauche Communiste de France until 1952.

5 It’s high time to put an end to this incredible abuse which some people make of quotations, making mean all kinds of things. This is particularly true with the Bordigists concerning Marx’s idea of the Party. It might be worthwhile asking them to reflect on and explain this somewhat surprising and enigmatic phrase from the Communist Manifesto: “The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working class parties.”

6 We know that Bordiga was to say the least reluctant to participate in the constitution of the Party and that he yielded half-heartedly to the pressure exerted on him from all sides to associate himself with it. Vercesi, in turn didn’t wait long to publicly question the correctness of setting up a Party. But the wine had been poured, it only remained to drink it. we find an echo of his reticences in the ‘Draft Declaration of Principles for the International Bureau of the (new) International Communist Left’ which he wrote and published in Belgium at the end of 1946. Here we find that “The process of transforming the Fractions into Parties has been determined in broad outlined by the Communist Left, according to the schema which holds that the party can only appear when the workers have begun a movement of struggle which supplies the raw materials for the seizure of power,” (cited in Programme)

7 Lenin, an article written in 1899 and published in 1925. Complete Works, p. 190, translated from the Spanish edition.

Life of the ICC: 

  • Correspondance with other groups [20]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary organisation [5]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Bordigism [95]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • Italian Left [37]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Party and Fraction [50]

People: 

  • Programme communuste [96]
  • Bilan [97]

International Review no.15 - 4th quarter 1978

  • 3543 reads

The course of history

  • 4077 reads

IR15, 4th Quarter 1978         

The course of history

how is it that the ICC can talk about the intensification of inter-imperialist antagonisms today, while at the same time asserting that, since the end of the 1960s, bourgeois society has been in a period of rising class struggle? Isn’t there a contradiction between warning against the danger of war in Africa and the Middle East, and the analysis which holds that the economic crisis has opened up a new course towards proletarian struggle, towards a decisive confrontation between the classes? Are we living through re-run of the 1930s, with generalized war looming on the horizon, or is there a revolutionary perspective in front of us?
    This is a question of considerable importance. In contrast to the idle, feckless thought of social spectators, dynamic revolutionary thought can’t be satisfied with a ‘little of this’ and a ‘little of that’, all mixed up in a sociological sauce with no direction. If marxism only provided an analysis of the past for us to be able to say “well, we’ll see...”, it would be of little use.
    Social action, class struggle, demands an understanding of the forces involved, it demands a perspective. The action of the proletariat differs  according to its consciousness of the social reality in front of it, and to the possibilities offered by the balance of forces. The organized intervention of revolutionaries in the development of class consciousness also differs, if not in its basic content, then at least in its expression, according to the response given to the question: “are we going towards war, or towards a revolutionary confrontation!”
Marxist theory is not the dead letter of the Stalinist hangmen or of the academics; but it is the most coherent attempt to theoretically express the experience of the proletariat in bourgeois society. It is within the framework of marxism – not simply reappropriating it, but actualizing it – that revolutionaries can and must respond to the question of today’s balance of forces between bourgeoisie and proletariat, between war and revolution.

THE HISTORIC PERIOD OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY

In the first place, the perspective for class struggle is not an immediate question of days or years. It presupposes a whole historical development. During the course of its development, the capitalist mode of production, by destroying the economic, material bases of feudalism and other pre-capitalist societies, has extended its relations of production and the capitalist market across the entire planet. Although capitalism aspires to be a universal system, it comes up against the internal economic contradictions of its own way of functioning, which is based on exploitation and competition. Once it had effectively created a world market and developed the productive forces up to a certain point, capitalism was no longer able to surmount its cyclical crises by extending its field of accumulation. It then entered into a period of internal disintegration, a period of decline as a historical system, and ceased to correspond to the needs of social reproduction. In its period of decadence, the most dynamic system history has ever seen has unleashed a state of generalized cannibalism.
    The decadence of capitalism is marked by the aggravation of its inherent contradictions, by a permanent crisis. The crisis finds two antagonistic social forces confronting each other: the bourgeoisie, the capitalist class, living from surplus value; and the proletariat, whose interests as an exploited class, by forcing it to oppose exploitation, provide the only historical possibility of going beyond exploitation, competition and commodity production: a society of freely associated producers.
    The crisis acts on these two historically antagonistic forces in a different way: it pushes the bourgeoisie towards war and the proletariat towards the struggle against the degradation of living conditions. As the crisis develops, the bourgeoisie is forced to take refuge behind the concerted force of the nation state, in order to be able to defend itself in the frenzied competition of a world market that has already been divided up between the imperialist powers and can no longer extend itself. World imperialist war is the only possible outcome of this competition at international level. In order to be able to survive, capitalism has had to go through the deformations of its final stage: generalized imperialism. The universal tendency of decadent capitalism towards state capitalism is simply the ‘organizational’ expression of the demands of these imperialist antagonisms. The movement towards the concentration of capital, which at the end of the nineteenth century was already expressing itself in the form of trusts, cartels, and then multi-nationals, has been counteracted and transcended by the tendency towards statification. This tendency doesn’t correspond to a ‘rationalization’ of capital; it is a response to the need to reinforce and mobilize the national capital in a semi-permanent war economy, a state totalitarianism which envelops the whole of society. The decadence of capitalism is war – constant massacre, the war of all against all.
    Unlike last century, when the bourgeoisie strengthened itself by developing its domination over society, the bourgeoisie today is a class in decline, weakened by the crisis of its system whose economic contradictions bring only wars and destruction.
In the absence of a victorious proletarian intervention, a world revolution, the bourgeoisie cannot offer us any ‘stability’: on the contrary, it can only offer a cycle of destruction on an ever-growing scale. The capitalist class has no unity or peace in its own ranks; it has only the antagonism and competition engendered by relations of exchange and exploitation. Even in the ascendant period of capitalist development revolutionaries opposed the reformist ideas of Kautsky and Hilferding, according to which capitalism could evolve into a supra-national unity. The socialist left and Lenin in Imperialism, Highest Stage of Capitalism denounced this chimera of a world-wide unification of capital. Although the productive forces tend towards breaking out of the restricted framework of the nation, they can never do this because they are imprisoned by capitalist relations of production.
    After World War II a new version of this theory of supra-nationality was developed by Socialisme ou Barbarie for whom a ‘new bureaucratic society’ was beginning to create this worldwide unification. But ‘bureaucratic society’ doesn’t exist: the general tendency towards the statification of capital is neither a new mode of production nor a progressive step towards socialism as certain elements of the workers’ movement may have believed at the time of the first world war. As the expression of the exacerbation of rivalries between national factions of capital, state capitalism isn’t the realization of any kind of unity: on the contrary. The national capital is forced to regroup behind the great powers of the imperialist blocs, but not only does this not eliminate rivalries within the bloc, it further accentuates international antagonisms at the level of confrontation and war between the blocs. Only when it has to face up to its mortal enemy, the revolutionary proletariat, is the capitalist class able to realize a provisional international unity.
    Faced with the proletarian menace, unable to respond to the demands of the exploited class with a real amelioration of its living standards, indeed forced to impose an even more ferocious exploitation and a mobilization for economic, then military war, its capacities for mystification more and more used up, the bourgeoisie has to develop a hypertrophied police state, a whole apparatus of repression from the unions to concentration camps, in order to maintain its domination over a society in decomposition. But just as world wars express the decomposition of the economic system, the reinforcement of the repressive apparatus of the state shows the real historical weakness of the bourgeoisie. The crisis of the system undermines the material and ideological bases of the power of the ruling class, leaving it no way out except massacre.
In contrast to the bourgeoisie’s collapse into the bloody barbarism of its decline, the proletariat in the decadent epoch represents the only dynamic force in society. The historical initiative is with the proletariat; it alone has the historical solution which can take society forward. Through its class struggle, it can hold back and ultimately stop the growing barbarism of decadent capitalism. By posing the question of revolution, by ‘transforming the imperialist war into a civil war’, the proletariat forces the bourgeoisie to answer it on the battlefields of the class war.

WHAT PERSPECTIVE FOR TODAY ?

We have posed the question whether in the course of a period of rising class struggle, there can be an expression and even an aggravation of imperialist antagonisms; we can clearly answer in the affirmative. The bourgeoisie contains within itself the tendency towards war, whether it’s conscious of this or not. Even when it’s preparing for a confrontation with the proletariat imperialist antagonisms continue to exist. They depend on the deepening of the crisis and don’t originate in the action of the proletariat. But capitalism can only go all the way to generalized war if it has first mastered the proletariat and dragooned it into its mobilizations. Without this, imperialism cannot reach its logical conclusion.
Between the crisis of 1929 and the second world war, capitalism took ten years, not only to set up a war economy sufficient for its destructive needs, but also to complete the physical crushing and ideological disarmament of the working class, which was dragooned behind the ‘workers’ parties’ (Stalinists and Social Democrats), behind the banners of fascism and anti-fascism, behind the Union Sacree. Similarly, before August 1914, it was the whole process of the degeneration of the 2nd International and of class collaboration which prepared the ground for the treason of the workers’ organizations. World war doesn’t break like lightening in a blue sky; it follows the effective elimination of proletarian resistance.
If the class struggle is strong enough, it’s not possible for generalized war to break out; if the struggle weakens due to the physical or ideological defeat of the proletariat, then the way is open to the inherent tendency of decadent capitalism: world war. After this, it is only during the course of the war, as a response to unbearable living conditions, that the proletariat will be able to return to the path of class struggle. There is no way of getting round this: you cannot ‘make the revolution against the war’, answer the mobilization decrees with a general strike. If war is on the verge of breaking out, it is precisely because the class struggle has been too weak to hold the bourgeoisie in check, and there can be no question of selling the proletariat illusions about this.
    Today, workers cannot ignore the gravity of the expressions of imperialist rivalry, the seriousness of the balance of forces between bourgeoisie and proletariat. If World War II was simply a continuation of World War I, and the third a continuation of the second, if capitalism only goes through period of ‘reconstruction’ as intervals between wars, the present destructive capacity of the system gives us little hope in the possibility of an upsurge of the proletariat during the course of a third holocaust. It is quite probable that the destruction would be so great that the possibility of socialism would be put off indefinitely if not  forever. The stakes are thus being played for today and not tomorrow; the working class will rise up in response to an economic crisis, not a war. Only the proletariat, by struggling on its class terrain against the crisis and the deterioration of its living standards, can hold back the bourgeoisie’s constant tendency towards war. It is in the present period that the balance of forces between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will decide whether we are going towards socialism or the final collapse into barbarism.
    Thus if we point out the seriousness of the confrontations between the blocs today, it is in order to unmask the hideous reality of the capitalist system, which we have learnt about through sixty years of suffering. But this general, necessary warning in no way signifies that the perspective today is towards world war or that we are living through a period of triumphant counter-revolution. On the contrary, the balance of forces has tilted in
favour of the proletariat. The new generations of workers haven’t suffered the same defeats as the previous ones. The dislocation of the ‘socialist’ bloc as well as the workers’ insurrections in the eastern bloc have considerably weakened the mystifying power of bourgeois Stalinist ideology. Fascism and anti-fascism are too used and the ideology of the ‘rights of man’, which is being given the lie from Nicaragua to Iran, isn’t enough to replace them. The crisis, coming after the deceptive prosperity of the post-war reconstruction, has provoked a general reawakening of the proletariat. The wave of struggles between 1968 and 1974 was a powerful response to the beginnings of the crisis, and the combativity of the workers has left no country untouched. This rebirth of workers’ combativity marks the end of the counter-revolution, and is the touchstone of today’s revolutionary perspective.
    There has never been a simplistic, unilateral social situation. Inter-imperialist antagonisms will never disappear as long as the capitalist system is still alive. But the combativity of the workers is an obstacle, the only one today, to the tendency towards war. When there is a downturn in the class struggle, inter-imperialist antagonisms accelerate and become sharper. This is why revolutionaries insist so much on the development of the autonomous struggle of the working class, on wildcat strikes which break out of the union jail, on the tendency towards the self-organisation of the class, on the workers’ combativity against austerity and the sacrifices demanded by the bourgeoisie.
The crisis in its ever-descending course, leads the decomposing capitalist class to war. On the other hand, it pushes the revolutionary class into sporadic, uneven explosions of struggle. The course of history is the result of these two antagonistic tendencies: war or revolution.
Although socialism is a historical necessity, because of the decadence of bourgeois society, the socialist revolution is not a concrete possibility at every moment. Throughout the long years of the counter-revolution the proletariat was defeated, its consciousness and its organization too weak to be an autonomous force in society.
    Today, on the other hand, the course of history is moving towards a rise in proletarian struggles. But time presses; there is no fatality in history. A historical course is never ‘stable’, fixed for all time. The course towards the proletarian revolution is a possibility which has opened up, a maturation of the conditions leading to a confrontation between the classes. But if the proletariat doesn’t develop its combativity, if it doesn’t arm itself with the consciousness forged in its struggles and in the contributions of the revolutionaries within the class, then it won’t be able to respond to this maturation with its own creative and revolutionary activity. If the proletariat is beaten, if it is crushed and falls back into passivity, then the course will be reversed and the ever-present potential for generalized war will be realized.
    Today, the course is towards the development of the class struggle. Because the working class isn’t defeated, because all over the world it is resisting the degradation of its living conditions, because the international economic crisis is wearing down the dominant ideology and its effects on the class, because the working class is the force of life against the cry of ‘viva la muerte’ of the bloody counter-revolution – for all these reasons, we salute the crisis which, for a second time in the period of capitalist decadence, is opening the door of history.

JA

 

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The state in the period of transition

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The International Review of the ICC has on several occasions dealt with the question of the period of transition from capitalism to communism. It has published at least ten texts which have in particular gone into the problem of the relationship between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the state in the period of transition. The idea that these two notions are not identical has appeared in the following texts: ‘Prob­lems of the Period of Transition’ and ‘The Proletarian Revolution’ (IR, no.1); ‘The Period of Transition’ and ‘Contribution to the Study of the Question of the State’ (IR, no.6); ‘The State and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat’ and ‘The Communist Left in Russia’ (IR, no.8); ‘The Political Confusions of the CWO’ (IR, no.10) ; ‘Draft Resolution on the State in the Period of Transition’ (Second Congress of the ICC) and ‘State and Dictatorship of the Proletariat’ (IR, no.11). This idea has often been considered as scandalous and ‘absolutely foreign to Marx­ism’ by a number of revolutionary elements, who have rushed forward brandishing that famous quote from Marx in Critique of the Gotha Program where he says that, during the period of transition, “the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.”

The following text is a new contribution on this question. It aims in particular to establish that the non-identity between state and dictatorship of the proletariat is in no way ‘anti-Marxist’; on the contrary, although it may go against certain formulae by Marx and Engels, it is wholly within the framework of Marxism.

Nature and function of the state

At the heart of Marx’s theory of the state is the notion of the withering away of the state.

In his critique of Hegel’s philosophy of the state, with which he began his life as a revolutionary thinker and militant, Marx not only fought against Hegel’s idealism which held that the idea was the point of depart­ure for all movement (making the “idea the subject, the real subject, or properly speaking, the predicate” in all cases, as he wrote in Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the State), he also vehemently denounced the conclusions of this philosophy, which made the state the mediator between social man and universal political man, the reconcilia­tor of the split between private man and universal man. Hegel, noting the growing conflict between civil society and the state, wanted the solution to this contradiction to be found in the self-limitation of civil society and its voluntary integration into the state, for as he said, “it is only in the state that man has an existence which conforms with reason” and “everything that man is, he owes to the state and it is there that his being resides. All his value and spiritual reality, man only has them through the state”(Hegel, Reason in History). Against this delirious apology for the state Marx said “human emancipation is only completed when man has recognized and organized his own forces as social forces, so that social force is no longer separated from himself in the form of political force”, ie the state (from The Jewish Question).

Right from the start Marx’s theoretical work took up a position against the state, which was a product, an expression of, and an act­ive factor in, the alienation of humanity. Against Hegel’s strengthening of the state, and its absorption of civil society, Marx resolutely stood for the withering away of the state as synonymous with the emancipa­tion of humanity, and this fundamental notion would be enriched and developed throughout his life and work.

This radical opposition to the state and the announcement of its inevitable withering away weren’t the product of Marx’s personal geni­us, even though it was Marx who put forward the most rigorous analysis, the most coher­ent demonstration of this. This problem was there in the reality of the epoch, and it was in this same reality that the first germs of an answer began to come to the sur­face with the appearance and struggle of a new historic class: the proletariat. How­ever great Marx’s own contribution and merits, he simply made theoretically coherent the movement of the proletariat that was unfolding in reality.

At the same time as he fought against Hegel’s idealism and apology for the state, Marx equally rejected all the ‘rationalist’ theories which sought to base the state on ‘critical reason’ or those theories which rejected it in the name of a moral principle like Stirner and Bakunin.

A historical product of the development of the productive forces and of the division of labor -- which led to the break-up of prim­itive communist society -- the new society based on private property and the division between antagonistic classes necessarily gave rise to this superstructural institu­tion, the state.

The expression of a historic situation in which society has entered into an irreduc­ible state of contradiction and antagonisms1, the state is at the same time the indis­pensable institution for maintaining a cer­tain cohesion, a social order; an institution for preventing society from destroying itself completely in sterile struggles, and for im­posing this social order (by force) on the exploited classes. This order is the econ­omic domination of an exploiting class in society; the state is the guardian of this class and it is through the state that the economically dominant exploiting class acc­edes to the political domination of society. The state therefore is always the emanation of exploiting classes and, as a general rule, of the immediately predominant class. The state originates from this class, a fraction of which specializes in state functions.

From what we have just said it follows that the fundamental role of the state is to be the guardian of the established economic order.

When new exploiting classes arise, represent­ing the new productive forces which have developed within society to the point where they have entered into contradiction with the existing relations of production and so demand a change in them, they come up against the state, which represents the last bastion of the old society. The revolutionary dynamic is always situated in civil society, in the newly rising classes, never in the state as such. It is thus essentially an instrument of social conservation. To say that the state is conservative or revolutionary acc­ording to the state of the class which dom­inates it, to put these two moments on the same level, to make a parallel between them, is to gloss over the problem of the fundamental character of the state, its essential function. Even when the revolutionary class has conquered the state by force, reconstr­ucting it in order to adapt it to its needs and interests, it doesn’t change the essen­tially conservative nature of the state, or give it a new revolutionary nature. And this for two reasons:

-- first, that the new state is simply the result, the culmination of a transforma­tion which has already taken place else­where, in the economic structure of society. The new state simply registers and conse­crates an existing fact.

-- secondly, the fundamental task of the new state is not to rid itself of the vestiges of the old, already defeated classes, but above all to defend the new social order against the threat of new exploited classes, to ensure their subjugation. It’s impor­tant not to confuse the appearance of the state with its underlying reality.

Some people, basing themselves on this or that event which has taken place at moments of social crisis and revolution, think that you can ascribe a dual nature to the state, conservative and revolutionary at the same time. They cite, for example, the acts of the Convention and the Terror directed ag­ainst the feudal aristocracy, the internal and external war during the French revolu­tion, the support given at certain moments to the bourgeoisie by the monarchy in France, the policies of Peter the Great in Russia, etc. Against this, we would like to point out that:

1. The exception only proves the rule.

2. You can’t see and understand the course of history and its fundamental laws through purely circumstantial spectacles -- like you can’t measure the distance be­tween galaxies with a ruler.

3. It’s not our task to study and explain in a detailed way every separate event (that would be phenomenology) but to explain their general pattern, to draw from them a general set of laws.

4. We are studying the state in history, not the history of the state. We’re not stud­ying each moment, each day of its existence, but the existence of the state itself, which corresponds to a definite, limited historical era; the era of the division of society into classes. Throughout this historic era, the fundamental function of the state has been to maintain an existing social order. Maintain, keep up, guard -- all these are ways of saying con­serving as against creating. It’s the passive as opposed to the active, the static as opposed to the dynamic.

5. Against whom does the state ensure the defense of the existing order? Which social forces threaten the social order2? One possible reply; the old ruling classes.

These old classes have been defeated and overcome above all in the economic sphere. The revolution simply consecrates this defeat, it doesn’t determine it. That’s why Marxists could speak of such political revolutions as ‘palace revolutions’; the real transformation having already taken place in the entrails of society, in its underlying reality, the economic struct­ure.

Another important observation; the revo­lutionary movement never breaks out from inside the existing state; even the pol­itical revolution breaks out in civil so­ciety against the state. And this is be­cause it’s not the state which revolution­izes society, but revolutionary society which modifies and adapts the state. The new state arises after the event of the revolution; it may undertake some spectacular measures against members of the old ruling class, but this never goes very far or lasts for very long. The old ruling class continues to exist and its members continue to occupy an important place in the state apparatus, often a preponderant place. This is proof that the old ruling class is not the great threat it’s claimed to be, that the strengthening of the state is not mainly dir­ected against this class (which is the supposed evidence for the state’s revolu­tionary nature). This is an enormous over-estimation of the state, which by and large is not borne out by history. The basic threat to the existing order comes not from the defeated classes but from the oppressed classes and new rising historic classes -- the first in a constant manner, the second potentially -- who pres­ent this mortal danger, against which the existing order has need of the state, this concentrated force of coercion and repre­ssion.

The state is not so much a barricade against the past as one against the fut­ure. It is this which makes its defense of the present (conservatism) a function closer to the past (reactionary) than to the future (revolutionary). In this sense one can say that while classes rep­resent productive forces in development, the state is the defender of the relations of production. The historical dynamic always comes from the first the fetters from the second.

6. As for the examples of the supposedly progressive or revolutionary role played by the French monarchy, Peter the Great, etc., it is clear that the state was led to carry out progressive acts not because this was inherent to its progressive na­ture but in spite of its conservative na­ture, under the pressure of new progress­ive forces. The state can’t completely avoid the pressures coming from civil society.

It is a fact that the suppression of serfdom and the development of capitalist industrialization in Russia was carried out under the Tzars, just as industrial­ization in Germany was carried out by the Prussian Junkers, and in France under Bonapartism. This doesn’t make these regimes and states revolutionary forces; the latter two, Germany and France, were born directly out of the counter-revolu­tion of 1848-51.

7. As for the argument about the dual nature of the state -- counter-revolutionary and revolutionary at the same time -- it is no more serious than the argument put forward in defense of the unions, which sees them as having a working-class na­ture as well as a bourgeois nature, be­cause here and there they defend this or that worker. You could equally well talk about the dual nature of the CRS (French riot police) because from time to time they save people from drowning. In fact every time someone doesn’t know how to argue they naturally resort to this ‘dual nature’ idea.

These few remarks don’t add anything substan­tial, but are necessary to show up the inan­ity of the objections, and to make our under­standing of the conservative function of the state more precise.

We must be extremely careful not to fall into the confusion and eclecticism which holds that the state is both conservative and rev­olutionary. This would turn reality on its head and open the door to Hegel’s error which makes the state the subject of the movement of society.

The thesis of the conservative nature of the state, which is above all concerned with its own conservation, is closely and dialectic­ally linked to the notion that the emancipa­tion of humanity can be identified with the withering away of the state. The one high­lights the other. By glossing over the for­mer you obscure both the theory and the real­ization of the necessary withering away of the state.

A failure to understand the conservative na­ture of the state inevitably has as its cor­ollary a failure to insist on the fundamental Marxist idea of the withering away of the state. The implications of this are extreme­ly dangerous.

What is even more important, and concerns us first of all, is to show that the state -- old and new -- has never been and can never be, by definition, the bearer of the move­ment towards the abolition of the state. Now, we have seen that Marx’s theory of the state identifies the movement towards the elimination of the state with the movement towards the emancipation of humanity; and, since the state can’t be the subject of its own elimination, it follows that by its very nature it can’t be the motor or even the instrument of human emancipation.

Marx’s theory of the state also shows the inherent tendency of the state and “that fraction of the ruling class which makes it up and which forms itself into a separate body” to “free” themselves from civil soc­iety, to separate themselves, to “raise (themselves) above society” (Engels). With­out ever achieving this completely and while continuing to defend the general interests of the ruling class, this tendency is never­theless a reality and opens the way to new contradictions, antagonisms and alienations, which Hegel already saw and noted and which Marx took up; above all the growing opposi­tion between the state and civil society, with all its implications. This tendency in turn explains the numerous social convul­sions in the riding class itself, the diff­erent varieties of state forms existing in a given society, and their particular rela­tionship with society as a whole. This ten­dency to make itself independent of society means that self-conservation is a major pre­occupation of the state, and further reinforces its conservative nature.

With the development of class society in its succeeding forms, the state develops and strengthens itself, pushing its tentacles into every sphere of social life. Its num­erical mass grows proportionally. The up­keep of this enormous parasitical mass is maintained through a growing levy on social production. By raising taxes directly and indirectly, which it does not only from the incomes of the working masses but also from the profits of the capitalists, the state even enters into conflict with its own class, which wants a state that is strong but also cheap. For the men of the state apparatus, this external hostility and their common interests give rise to a response of defense and solidarity, an esprit de corps which solidifies them into a caste of their own.

Of all the state’s fields of action, coer­cion and oppression are its most character­istic functions. For this purpose it has an absolute exclusive monopoly of armed force. Coercion and oppression are the raison d’être of the state, its very being. It is the specific product of them, endlessly reproducing, amplifying and perfecting them. Complicity in massacres and terror is the most solid cement for the unity of the state.

With capitalism we reach the culminating point of the entire history of class society. Although this long historical march, traced in blood and suffering, has been the inevit­able tribute humanity has had to pay for the development of the productive forces, the latter today have reached the point where this kind of society is no longer necessary.

In fact its survival has become the greatest fetter to the further development of the productive forces, even endangering the very existence of humanity.

With capitalism, exploitation and oppression have reached a paroxysm, because capitalism is the condensed product of all previous societies of exploitation of man by man.

The state in capitalism has achieved its des­tiny, becoming the hideous and bloody monster we know today. With state capitalism it has realized the absorption of civil society, it has become the manager of the economy, the boss of production, the absolute and undis­puted master of all members of society, of their lives and activities; it has unleashed terror and death and presided over a generalized barbarism.

The proletarian revolution

The proletarian revolution differs radically from all previous revolutions. While all revolutions have in common the fact that they are determined by and express the revolt of the productive forces against the rela­tions of production of the existing order, the proletarian revolution expresses not simply a quantitative development but poses the necessity for a qualitative, fundamental change in the course of history. All the previous modifications which took place in the development of the productive forces were contained within the historic epoch of scarcity, which made the exploitation of la­bor power an inescapable necessity. The changes they brought about did not diminish exploitation but made it more intense, more rational, extending it to greater and great­er masses of the population. They assured a more advanced expropriation of the instru­ments and the products of labor.

In the dialectical movement of human history they make up one and the same period, that of the negation of the human community, that of the Antithesis. This fundamental unity means that the different societies which have succeeded each other in this period appear, whatever their differences, as a progressive continuity. Without this con­tinuity it would be impossible to explain events as contradictory and incomprehensible at first sight as:

-- the long survival of the political domin­ation of classes who have long since lost their economic domination; the ability of these classes to accommodate themselves to the needs of the new exploiting class.

-- the long social survival of old classes and the active role they continue to play in the new society.

-- the possibility of the new victorious class collaborating with or incorporating the old defeated class.

-- the possibility for new ruling classes to maintain or reintroduce modes of exploit­ation which they had long ago fought ag­ainst and defeated. For example the slave traffic carried on and defended by capit­alist Brtainn until the second half of the 19th Century.

-- the alliances of factions of the bourgeois­ie with the nobility, and against their own class.

-- the military support bourgeois Britain gave to the feudal Vendee against the bourgeois revolution in France. The mil­itary alliance of bourgeois Britain with all the feudal countries against the rul­ing bourgeoisie in France. The long all­iance between this same Britain and the ultra-reactionary regime of Tzarism. The support given by this first, most developed capitalist nation to the slave-hold­ing South against the industrial, progress­ive bourgeoisie of the North during the American Civil War.

This explains why the revolutions of this era have been mere transfers of the state machine from one exploiting class to another and very often social transformations which take place even without a political revolu­tion.

It is quite different with the proletarian revolution because it is not in continuity with the problems posed by scarcity, but is the end of scarcity of the productive forces; its problem is not how to make exploitation more effective but how to suppress it; not how to reinforce oppression but how to des­troy it for good. It is not the continuity of the Negation, but the Negation of the Negation, the restoration of the human comm­unity on a higher level. The proletarian revolution can’t reproduce the characteris­tics of the previous revolutions we’ve just mentioned, because it is in radical opposi­tion to them, both in content, form and means.

One of the fundamental characteristics of the proletarian revolution is -- as opposed to previous revolutions, and bearing in mind the level of development of the productive forces -- that the necessary transformations can’t take place with long gaps from country to country. The whole world is straight away its theatre of operations. The prolet­arian revolution is international or it is nothing. Having begun in one country it must extend itself to all countries or quick­ly succumb. Other revolutions were the work of minority, exploiting classes against the majority of the toiling masses; the prolet­arian revolution is that of the immense maj­ority of the exploited against a minority. Being the emancipation of the immense major­ity in the interests of the immense majority, it can only be realized by the active and constant participation of the immense major­ity. It can in no way take previous revolu­tions as its model because it is opposed to them on every point.

It has the task of overturning all the exist­ing structures and relations, beginning with the total destruction of the superstructures of the state. In contrast to previous revo­lutions which simply completed the economic domination of the new class, the revolution of the proletariat -- a class which has no economy of its own -- is in its first act a political revolution which, through revolu­tionary violence, opens up and ensures the process of total social transformation.

The dictatorship of the proletariat

As the Communist Manifesto showed, the bour­geoisie has not only created the material conditions for the revolution, it has also produced the class that will be its grave­digger, the subject of the revolution; the proletariat. The proletariat is the bearer of this radical revolution, because it is a “class with radical chains”, a class which is the “negation of society”, which in Marx’s terms embodies all the sufferings of society, against which “no particular wrong, but wrong generally is perpetrated”, a class which has nothing to lose but its chains and which can’t emancipate itself without emancipating the whole of humanity. This is the producer class, the class of associated labor par excellence. This is why the proletariat is the only class which can solve the hitherto insurmountable and unbearable contradictions of class society. The proletariat’s hist­orical solution is communism. The depth of this historic change and the impossibility of any measures in this direction being ta­ken within capitalism -- which means that the revolution is the pre-condition for it -- demands the replacement of capitalist class rule by the rule of the proletariat. The proletarian dictatorship is undoubtedly linked to this rule, but there’s more to it than that. “Dictatorship”, wrote Lenin, “means an unlimited power, based not on law but on force”3. The idea of force linked to the dictatorship is not new; what interests us is the first part of this phrase, which contains the idea of an “unlimited power”. Lenin stressed this a great deal; “...this power recognizes no other power, law or norm no matter where they come from”4. Part­icularly interesting is this other passage where he talks about the dictatorship of the proletariat as something more than just force:

“This question is always posed by those coming across the word dictatorship for the first time in a new context. People are only used to seeing it in the sense of police power and police dictatorship. To them it’s strange that there could be a power without any police, a dictatorship which isn’t a police dictatorship”5.

This was the power of the Soviets which Lenin exalted so much and which created “...new organs of revolutionary power; workers’, sol­diers’ and peasants’ soviets, new authorities in the town and countryside” and which were based neither on the “force of bayonets” nor on “the commissariat of police” and which “had nothing in common with the old instru­ments of force”6. Wasn’t this dictator­ship also founded on force and coercion? Yes, of course, but what’s important is to distinguish its novel quality. Whereas the dictatorship of former classes was essen­tially directed against the future, against human emancipation, the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship “of the peo­ple against the oppression of the police or­gans of the old power”. This is why it must be based on something more than just force.

“The new power, this dictatorship of the immense majority, can only maintain it­self with the aid of the broad masses, only by inviting in the freest possible way the masses as a whole to participate in this power. Nothing hidden, nothing secret, no formal rules and regulations ...it is a power which is open to every­one’s view, which does everything under the eyes of the masses, which is access­ible to the masses, which emanates direct­ly from the masses; it is the direct or­gan of the popular masses, without any intermediary”7.

We have here not a description of communism, where the problem of power doesn’t exist, but of the revolutionary period in which power occupies a central place. It’s the question of the power of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. In Lenin’s writings we see what the dictatorship of the prolet­ariat has to be, and we also find the essence of the Marxist idea of the withering away of the state. In the same vein Engels could write:

“Gentlemen, do you want to know what this dictatorship looks like? Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.”

The dictatorship of the proletariat is the unlimited power of a class freely and fully exercising its creative powers; it’s the taking over -- without intermediaries -- of its own destiny and the destiny of society as a whole, bringing in its wake the other labor­ing classes and strata. The proletariat cannot delegate this power to any particular formation without abdicating its own emanci­pation, because the “emancipation of the proletariat can only be the work of the proletariat itself.”

The capitalist class, like other exploiting classes in history, united in the goal of exploitation, is itself divided into mutua­lly hostile factions with divergent inter­ests, and it can only achieve unity in the rule of a particular faction, the faction which runs the state. The proletariat has no hostile, divergent interests within it­self. It finds its unity in its goal, com­munism, and in its unitary class organs, the workers’ councils. It is in itself and from itself that it derives its unity and strength. Its consciousness is dictated by its exis­tence. The process whereby it becomes cons­cious is expressed by the appearance within it of currents of thought and of political organizations. These can sometimes be the bearers of alien class ideologies, or they can be extremely important and precious expressions of a real awareness of the pro­letariat’s historic class interests. The communist party represents the clearest frac­tion of the class, but it can never claim to be the class itself or to replace it in the accomplishment of its historic tasks. No party, not even the communist party, can claim a ‘right’ to neither lead nor a particular power of decision within the class. The power of decision is the exclusive attribute of the unitary organizations of the class and their elected and revocable organs; this power cannot be alienated to any other orga­nism without the risk of gravely altering the functioning of the class’s organizations and the accomplishment of their tasks. This is why it’s inconceivable that the directing organs of the unitary organizations be en­trusted, even by a vote, to this or that grouping. This would be to introduce into the proletariat the practices and modes of operation of non-proletarian classes.

All political formations who recognize the autonomy of the working class in relation to other classes, and its unlimited hegemony over society, must have full freedom of action and propaganda in the class and in society, since “one of the preconditions for the development of consciousness in the class is the free circulation and confronta­tion of ideas within it” (Marx).

Some people might see this conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat as an expression of ‘democratism’. Just as they take the bourgeois revolution as a model for the proletarian revolution, they take the dic­tatorship of the bourgeoisie as a model for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Because the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie is the state and nothing but the state, they take the state which inevitably arises in the period of transition, after the victory of the proletarian revolution, for the dictator­ship of the proletariat, making no distinc­tion between the one and the other. They pay no attention to the fact that the bour­geoisie has no other unitary class organ except the state, whereas the proletariat creates unitary organs which regroup the whole class: the workers’ councils. It is through the councils that it makes the revo­lution and defends it afterwards, without dissolving them into the state. The unlimited power of the councils: this is the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is exerted over the whole of society, inclu­ding the semi-state of the transition per­iod. The Marxist notion of the semi-state or Commune-state escapes them completely and all they retain of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the generic word ‘dicta­torship’, which they identify with the strong state, with state terror. What’s more they identify the dictatorship of the class with the dictatorship of the party, the latter dictating its laws by force on the class. This view can be summed up as: a single party seizes the state, uses terror to subordinate the unitary organs of the class -- the councils -- and the whole soviet system of transitional society. Such a dictatorship of the proletariat resembles, like two drops of water resemble each other, the fully formed totalitarian capitalist state -- the Stalinist or fascist state.

The so-called arguments about the need to reject any reference to majorities and minori­ties, reduced to a ridiculous question of 49% and 51%, are just sophisticated juggl­ings, an empty phraseology, a superficial radicalism which glosses over the real problem. The point isn’t that the majority is always right. The point is that the proletarian revolution cannot be the work of a minority of the class. This isn’t a question of formalism, but of the very essence and content of the revolution, i.e. that the class “organizes its own forces as social forces” (Marx) and doesn’t separate them as external, independent forces. The accomplishment of the revolution is thus inseparable from the effective and unlimited participation of the immense majority of the class, from their self-activity and self-organization. This above all is the dicta­torship of the proletariat. This doesn’t go along with the strengthening of an all-powerful state, but with the weakening of the state; this is a state amputated at birth by the unlimited power and will of the proletariat.

The dictatorship of the proletariat goes together with the concept of the withering away of the state, as Marxism from Marx to the Lenin of State and Revolution has always affirmed. It’s not the state which makes the dictatorship, but the dictatorship of the proletariat which tolerates the inevit­able existence of the state and guarantees the process of the withering away of the state.

The state in the period of transition

The difference between Marxists and anarch­ists isn’t that the former conceive of socialism with the state and the latter a society without a state. On this point there is complete agreement. It’s rather with the pseudo-Marxists of social democracy, the heirs of Lassalle who yoked socialism with the state, that this difference exists, and it’s a fundamental one (cf Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Program and Lenin’s State and Revolution). The debate with the anarchists centered round their total misun­derstanding of the need for a transition period: as good idealists they foresaw an immediate, direct leap from capitalism to communist society8.

It is absolutely impossible to deal with the problem of the state after the revolu­tion if you haven’t already understood that “between capitalist society and communist society lies the period of revolutionary transformation of the one into the other” (Critique of the Gotha Program); if you haven’t understood why this period takes place not before but after the victory of the revolution, or why it is radically dif­ferent from previous transition periods; if you haven’t understood the fact that after destroying the rule of the capitalist class, there will still exist huge masses of the laboring population who are profoun­dly anti-capitalist but not pro-communist, and that there can be no question of exclu­ding them from political life and active participation in the organization of society.

Only if you begin from these objective, historical realities, not from the state in itself, can you understand: 1. the inevit­able emergence of the state; 2. its funda­mental difference from other types of state; 3. the necessity for the proletariat to have an active attitude towards it, in order to progressively limit its functions and ensure that it withers away. Let us look at these points more closely.

1. The inevitable emergence of the state

a. More than in other revolutions, the prole­tariat will encounter ferocious resistance from the defeated capitalist class. It should be stressed that in the act of revo­lution, i.e. chasing the capitalist class from its ruling position and destroying its state apparatus, the proletariat will rely solely on its class power, i.e. its own organs, without needing any kind of state. The living breath of the revolution will demoralize and disorganize the permanent army, which is mainly made up of workers and peasants, the majority of whom will go over to the revolution. But once it has been defeated, the bourgeoisie, mad for revenge, will begin to resist, regroup its forces, reconstitute a selected army of volunteers and mercenaries, and will unleash a pitiless counter-revolutionary war and terror. Faced with a war organized with all the military arts and techniques created by the bourgeoi­sie, the proletariat cannot simply put for­ward its own armed masses, but will be for­ced to build a regular army, which incorpor­ates not only workers but the whole popula­tion. War, reprisals, systematic coercion against the threats of the counter-revolution -- these are the first necessities giving rise to a state institution.

But however important are the requirements of the military struggle, the need for coer­cion against the counter-revolution -- which during the civil war may well take preced­ence over all other tasks -- it would be a simplistic error to think that this was the only or essential reason for the emergence of a state. The simple fact that the state will survive well after the period of civil war is ample proof of this.

For the same reason it is important to remember the difference between this state and previous states, which directed their coercion mainly against the rising classes, whilst accommodating themselves to the old ruling classes. It is exactly the opposite with the state in the period of transition: coercion is not used against rising classes -- for none exist -- but against the former ruling class with whom there can be no collaboration.

b. Society in the period of transition is still a society divided into classes. Marx­ism and history teach us that no class society can exist without a state, not as a mediator, but as an indispensable institu­tion for maintaining a necessary cohesion which prevents society from tearing itself apart.

Moreover, if it’s both possible and indis­pensable for the proletariat to deprive the old ruling class -- a small minority -- of its political rights, it would be a pure nonsense, highly prejudicial, and totally impossible, to exclude the great mass of non-proletarian, non-exploiting strata from political and social life. These masses will be intensely interested in all the economic, political and cultural problems of the immediate life of society. The proletariat cannot ignore their existence or exert systematic coercion against them during the revolutionary trans­formation. It has to have a policy of ref­orms towards them, a policy of propaganda, of incorporating them into social life, without dissolving itself into them or abdicating its mission and its hegemony -- the essentials of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The necessary incorporation of these masses takes the form of that particular institu­tion, the Commune-state, which is still a state. It is essentially the existence of these classes, their slow dissolution and the imperious necessity to incorporate them, which makes the emergence of a state inevit­able in the period of transition to socialism.

c. In addition to the above two reasons there is the need for the centralization and organization of production and distribution, relations with the outside world etc: in a word the administration of a public life completely overturned by the revolution -- the administration of things which society has not yet separated from the government of men.

These three factors act together to deter­mine the emergence of the state after the revolution.

2. The fundamental difference between this state and previous states

Analyzing the Commune, Engels said that this was no longer really a state. Trying to show the profound differences with the classical state, Marx, Engels and Lenin gave it various names: Commune-state, semi-state, popular state, democratic dictatorship, revolutionary dictatorship, etc. All these names highlight what distinguishes it from previous states.

Above all this state is distinguished by the fact that for the first time it is the state of exploited classes, not exploiting classes. It is the state of the majority in the inte­rests of the majority against a minority.

It is not there to defend new privileges but to destroy privileges. It uses violence not for the purposes of oppression but to prevent oppression. It is not a body rais­ing itself above society but is at the ser­vice of society. Its members and functio­naries are not nominated but elected and revocable, its permanent army is replaced by the general arming of the people, it replaces oppression with a maximum of demo­cracy, i.e. freedom of opinion, criticism, and expression, and most important of all it is a state which is withering away. But it is still a state, the government of men, because it is an institution of a society still divided into classes, even though the last one.

According to Lenin, this transitional state won’t be like the states: “the bourgeoisie has created everywhere, from constitutional monarchies to the most democratic republics”, but it will conform “to the lessons of the Paris Commune and the analysis Marx and Engels made of it” ... “This is the kind of state we need ... this is the road we must follow so that it is impossible to establish a police or an army separated from the people.”

Lenin did not confuse the state with the dictatorship of the proletariat because this state was simply “the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat anal poor peasants.” Certainly, Lenin said, “democracy is also a form of state which will have to disappear when the state itself disappears, but this will only happen with the definitive victory of socialism, with the establishment of full communism.”

And Lenin defined the role of the proletariat after it had “demolished” the bourgeois state: “the proletariat must organize all the exploited elements of the population so that they themselves can directly take in hand the organs of state power, themselves form the institutions of this power.”

These lines were written at the beginning of March 1917, hardly a month after the February Revolution. This theme, the taking over of the state by “all exploited elements of the population” was developed by Lenin in dozens of articles, particularly in State and Revolution. And we can say again “this is the kind of state we need” and which the revolution will give rise to.

3. The necessity for the proletariat to have an active attitude towards the state in order to ensure that it withers away

We’ve looked at the tremendous gulf which separates the transitional state -- which as Engels said is no longer a state in the old sense -- from all others; but Engels still called it “a scourge” inherited by the prole­tariat; he warned the proletariat of the need to be on guard against this “scourge”. What does this mean?

Marx and Engels highlighted the measures which the Paris Commune immediately felt the need to take against the semi-state, notably the revocability of delegates and the limitation bf functionaries’ wages to the average workers’ wage, in order to limit its more pernicious tendencies. Lenin never ceased to recall these measures, show­ing how important for him was the danger of bureaucratization even in a Commune-state. The Paris Commune, limited to one town and only lasting two months, didn’t have much chance to show the dangerous sides of the semi-state. We can only admire the amazing political perspicacity of Engels, who managed despite this to show the need to be on guard against the “scourge” aspects of the post-­revolutionary state.

The October Revolution, which took place in an immense country with a population of over 100 million and lasted a number of years, was to be a quite different experience. This experience was a tragic confirmation of what Engels said about the state as a scourge -- in fact it went beyond what he could have imagined in his worst nightmares.

When, following Marx, Engels and Lenin, we list the distinctive characteristics of this state, we are talking about what it should be rather than what it actually, is. In it­self it carries a heavy burden of evils inherited from previous states. It is up to the proletariat to be extremely vigilant towards it. The proletariat can’t prevent it from emerging, nor avoid the necessity to use it, but in order to do so it must, as soon as it appears, amputate its most pernicious aspects, in order to be able to subordinate it to its own ends.

The state is neither the bearer nor the active agent of communism. Rather, it is a fetter against it. It reflects the present state of society and like any state it tends to maintain, to conserve the status quo. The proletariat, the subject of the social transformation, forces the state to act in the direction it wants to go. It can only do this by controlling it from within and dominating it from outside, by depriving it of as many of its functions as possible, thus actively ensuring the process of its withering away.

The state always tends to grow dispropor­tionately. It is the ideal target of career­ists and other parasites and easily recruits the residual elements of the old decomposing ruling class. This is what Lenin meant when he talked about the state as the reconstitu­tion of the old Tsarist apparatus. This state machine, as Lenin said, “tends to escape our control and go in the opposite direction from the one we want it to go.” Lenin could not find words strong enough to protest against the enormous abuses committed by the representatives of the state against the population. This was not only done by the old crowd of Tsarism who infested the state, but also by the personnel recruited from among the communists, for whom Lenin invented the phrase komtchvanstva (communist riff-raff).

You cannot fight against such developments if you think they are accidental. In order to fight them effectively, you have to go to the heart of the matter, recognize that they have their root in this scourge, this inevitable survival, this superstructure, the state. It is not a question of lamenting, of throwing your hands up in the air and kneeling powerlessly in front of a fatality. Determinism is not a philosophy of fatalism. But nor is it a question that by will alone society will escape the need for a state. This would be idealism. But, while we must recognize that the state is imposed on us as an “exigency of the situation” (Lenin), as a necessity, it is important not to make a virtue out of this necessity, to make an apology for the state and sing eulogies to it. Marxism recognizes the state as a neces­sity but also as a scourge, and poses to the proletariat the problem of taking mea­sures to ensure that it will wither away.

Nothing can be gained by coupling the word state with word proletariat or worker. You cannot resolve the problem by changing the name -- you only gloss over it by aggravating the confusion. The proletarian state is a myth. Lenin rejected it, recalling that it was “a workers’ and peasants’ government with bureaucratic deformations.” It’s a contradiction in terms and a contradiction in reality. The great experience of the Russian Revolution is there to prove it. Every sign of fatigue, failure or error on the part of the proletariat has the immediate consequence of strengthening the state; con­versely each victory, each reinforcement of the state weakens the proletariat a little bit more. The state feeds on the weakening of the proletariat and its class dictator­ship. Victory for one is defeat for the other.

Neither can anything be gained by wanting the unitary organs of the class, the workers’ councils, to be the state. To proclaim the central committee of the workers’ councils as the state shows the craftiness of the promoters of this idea, but also their ignor­ance of the real problems posed by reality. Why burden the name council with the name state, if they are synonymous and describe the same thing? Is it out of love for the pretty word ‘state’? Have these radical phrasemongerers ever heard of the workers’ councils being called a scourge, or of the need for them to wither away? By proclaiming the councils as the state they exclude and forbid any participation by the non-proleta­rian toiling classes in the life of society, a participation which, as we have seen, is the principle reason for the emergence of the state. This is both an impossibility and an absurdity9. And if, in order to escape this absurdity, you try to get these classes and strata to participate in the workers’ councils, it will be the latter that will be altered and lose their nature as the autonomous, unitary organs of the proletariat.

We also have to reject the idea of structur­ing the state on the basis of different social categories (workers, peasants, liberal professions, artisans etc) organized separately. This would be to institutiona­lize their existence and take Mussolini’s corporate state as a model. It would be to lose sight of the fact that we are not talk­ing about a society with a fixed mode of existence, but of a period of transition. It is not a question of organizing classes but of organizing their dissolution. The non-exploiting population will participate in social life as members of society, through the territorial soviets, and only the proletariat, as the bearer of communism, as well as ensuring its hegemonic participa­tion in and direction of social life will be organized as a class through its workers’ councils.

Without entering into details, we can put forward the following principles for the structure of the transitional society:

1. The whole non-exploiting population is organized on the basis of territorial soviets or communes, centralized from the bottom up, and giving rise to the Commune-state.

2. The workers participate in this soviet organization, individually like all mem­bers of society, and collectively through their autonomous class organs, at all levels of the soviet organization.

3. The proletariat ensures that it has a preponderant representation at all levels, but especially the higher levels.

4. The proletariat retains and maintains complete freedom in relation to the state. On no pretext will the proletariat subor­dinate the decision-making power of its own organs, the workers’ councils, to that of the state; it must see that the opposite is the case.

5. In particular it won’t tolerate the inter­ference of the state in the life and activity of the organized class; it will deprive the state of any right or possi­bility of repressing the working class.

6. The proletariat retains its arms outside of any control by the state.

It only remains for us to affirm that the political party of the class is not a state organ. For a long time revolutionaries did not hold this view, but this was a sign of the immaturity of the objective situation and their own lack of experience. The experience of the Russian Revolution has shown that this view is obsolete. The structure of a state based on political par­ties is typical of bourgeois democracy, of the bourgeois state. Society in the transi­tion period cannot delegate its power to political parties, i.e. specialized bodies. The semi-state will be based on the soviet system, on the direct and constant partici­pation of the masses in the life and functio­ning of society. This implies that the masses can at any time recall their represen­tatives, replace them, exert a constant and direct control over them. The delegation of power to parties, of whatever kind, reintro­duces the division between power and society, and is thus a major barrier to its emancipa­tion.

Moreover, the assumption of or participation in state power by the proletarian party will, as the Russian experience shows, profoundly alter its functions. Without entering into a discussion on the function of the party and its relation to the class -- which raises another debate -- it is enough here to say that the contingent demands of the state would end up prevailing over the party, mak­ing it identify with the state and separate itself from the class, to the point of opposing the class.

To conclude, one thing must be clear once and for all -- when we talk about autonomy, we mean the autonomy of the class in rela­tion to the state, not the autonomy of the state. The state must be subordinate to the class. The task of the proletariat is to preside over the withering away of the state. The precondition for this is that the class does not identify with the state.

MC

1 “…. political power is precisely the official summary of the antagonisms in civil society” (Marx, Poverty of Philosophy)

2 We deliberately exclude the question of external threats, i.e. country to country; this is a real problem but in this context can only get in the way of clarifying what we’re trying to answer here: the role of the state in the historical evolution of societies.

3 Lenin, The Victory of the Cadets and the Tasks of the Workers’ Party, 28.3.06).

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 As often happens with idealism, it is only radical when engaging in abstract speculation, falling into the worst opportunism when it comes to concrete practice. This didn’t escape the anarchists. Their fierce ‘anti-statism’, based on willful ignorance of the needs of the historic situation, led them directly to integrate themselves into (and even more fiercely defend) the ‘Republican’ bourgeois state in the 1936-9 war in Spain.

9 The Workers’ Opposition fell into a similar error when it called for the state to be run by the unions, and Lenin correctly called this an anarcho-syndicalist conception.

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Period of Transition [19]

Spain 1936: The Myth of the Anarchist Collectives

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The Spanish collectives of 1936 have been presented by the anarchists as the perfect model for revolution. According to them they allowed worker self—management of the economy, meant the abolition of bureaucracy, increased the efficiency of work and — wonder of wonders — they were “the work of the workers themselves ... led and oriented at all times by libertarians” (in the words of Gaston Leval, a bitter defender of anarchism and the CNT).

But not only the anarchists offer us the ‘paradise’ of collectives. Heribert Barrera — in 1936 a Catalan Republican, now a deputy in the Cortes - praises them as “an example of the mixed economy respectful of both liberty and human initiative” (!!!) while the Trotskyists of the POUM teach us that “the work of the collectives gave a deeper character to the Spanish revolution than to the Russian revolution”. In addition, G. Munis and the comrades of the FOR invent illusions about the “revolution­ary” and “profound” character of the collectives.

For our part, we find ourselves obliged, once again, to be spoilsports; the 1936 collectives were not a means for the prol­etarian revolution, but an instrument of the bourgeois counter-revolution; they were not the “organization of the new society”, but the last resort of the old which defend­ed itself with all its savagery.

In saying this, we are not trying to demor­alize our class. On the contrary; the best way to demoralize them is to make them struggle using false models of revolution. The very condition for the victory of their revolutionary aspirations is to free them completely from all false models, from all false paradises

What were the collectives?

In 1936, Spain, completely overtaken by the economic crisis which since 1929 had shaken world capitalism, went through particularly serious convulsions.

Every national capital suffered three types of social upheavals;

  • that coming from the fundamental contra­diction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat;
  • that stemming from the intense conflicts between distinct fractions of the same bourgeoisie;
  • that which produced the confrontation between imperialist blocs which each country had as the background to their share of political influence and markets.

In the Spain of 1936 those three convulsions came together with a bestial intensity, bringing Spanish capital to an extreme situation.

In the first place, the Spanish proletariat - still not defeated, unlike what had happened to their European brothers — posed an energetic struggle against exploitation, marked by extraordinary escalation in general strikes, revolts and insurrections which caused great alarm among the dominant class.

In the second place, the internal conflicts among the latter were growing daily. A backward economy, torn by formidable disequi­librium and as a result consumed with grea­ter intensity by the world crisis, is the best soil for the outbreak of conflicts bet­ween the bourgeoisie of the right (landowners, financiers, the military, church, all under Franco) and the bourgeoisie of the left (industrialists, urban middle classes, trade unions etc, directed by the Republic and the Popular Front).

Finally, the instability of Spanish capita­lism, made it easy prey for the imperialist appetites of the moment, which, stimulated by the crisis, needed new markets and new strategic positions on the road to domination. Germany and Italy found their pawn in Franco and hid behind the masks of ‘tradition’ and the ‘crusade against communism’ while Russia and the western powers — then brothers — found their bastion in the Republic and the Popular Front protected behind the screens of ‘anti— fascism’ and the ‘fight for the revolution’.

It is in this context that Franco’s revolt broke out on the famous 18 July 1936, which signified for the working class the culmina­tion of the super—exploitation and repression initiated by the Republic since 1931. The response of the working class was immediate and tremendous: the general strike; insurrec­tion; the arming of the masses and the expropriation and occupation of enterprises.

From the very first moment, all the bourgeoi­sie’s forces of the left, from the Republican parties to the CNT, tried to trap the workers into the snare of the ‘anti-fascist struggle’ and within that snare, to convert the expro­priation of enterprises into an end in it­self, in order to make the workers return to work with the illusion that the enterprises were theirs, that they were ‘collectivized’.

But the insurrectionary days of July demon­strated to society that the workers’ struggle was not just against Franco, but at the same against the Republican state; the wor­kers went on strike, expropriated factories, armed themselves as an autonomous class to initiate an offensive against the whole capitalist state both Francoist and Republi­can. In order, therefore, to successfully pursue the insurrectional strike, the wor­kers could not simply expropriate the enter­prises and form militias and leave it at that but they had to simultaneously destroy the Francoist army as well as all the Repub­lican political forces (Azana, Companys, CP, CNT etc). Secondly, the class had to totally destroy the capitalist state raising over its ruins the power of the workers’ councils.

However, the key to the proletarian collapse and its recruitment into the barbarism of the civil war was in the Republican forces - above all the CNT and the POUM - who were able to stop the workers from taking the decisive step - THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CAPITALIST STATE — and who imprisoned the workers in the ‘collectivization of the economy’ and the ‘anti-fascist struggle’.

Catalanists, Popular Front, the POUM and above all the CNT managed to lock up the workers in the simple expropriation of enterprises, labelling these actions as ‘Revolutionary Collectives’. By remaining within the capitalist state, by leaving it intact, these actions not only became use­less to the workers but they became the means for their super—exploitation and control by capital: “As the power of the state remained in­tact, the Generalitat of Catalonia could calmly legalize the workers’ expropria­tions and join the chorus of all the ‘workers’ currents’ who had deceived the workers with the mystifications of expro­priation, workers’ control, land reform, depurations, maintaining however a crimi­nal silence about the terribly effective reality which was not so apparent, the existence of the capitalist state. That is why the workers’ expropriations were integrated within the framework of state capitalism.” (Bilan)

And thus we see that the CNT, which had never called for the spontaneous workers’ strike of 19 July, nor had ever called for the taking up of arms, immediately called for a return to work, and end to the strike, in other words to obstruct the workers’ assault on the capitalist state with the excuse that the factories were ‘’collectivized’. Gaston Leval in his book Libertarian Collec­tives in Spain reasons for us thus: “At the beginning of the fascist attack, the struggle and the state of alert mobi­lized the population for five or six days, at the end of which the CNT gave the order for the resumption of work. To prolong the strike would have been against the interests of those same workers who took responsibility for the situation.”

Those beautiful ‘libertarian’ collectives which were a “revolution more profound than the Russian Revolution” - as the POUM always said — justified the return to work, the end of revolutionary will, the subjection of the workers to war production. In the conditions then of convulsion and extreme breakdown of the capitalist edifice, the radical facade of the collectives was the last resort to make the workers work and to save the exploitative order, as Osorio Gallardo (a royalist and rightist politician) has frankly recognized: “Let’s make an impartial judgement. The collectives were a necessity. Capitalism had lost all its moral authority and the owners could not give orders nor did the workers want to obey. In such a distres­sing situation either industry would lie abandoned or the Generalitat would seize it, establishing a soviet form of communism.”

At the service of the capitalist economy

When we are told that the collectives were a model of ‘communism’ of ‘workers’ power’, that they were ‘a revolution more profound than the Russian’ we have to laugh; the quantity of information, facts and testimo­nials which speak to the contrary is over-whelming. Let’s see:

1. A large number of collectivisations were made with the agreement of their own bosses. Referring to the collectivization of the chocolate industry of Torrente (in Valencia) Gaston Leval, in the book cited above, tells us: “Motivated by the wish to modernize pro­duction (?) as much as to overcome the exploitation of man by man (sic), the CNT called an assembly on the first day of September 1936. The management were invited to participate in the collective as well as the workers. And they all agreed to come together to organise production, and life, on completely new bases.”

The ‘completely new bases’ of life held up the pillars of the capitalist regime, as for example if we look at the Barcelona tramways collective: “Not only did (the collective) accept payment to the creditors of the company of debts which had been contracted, but also they dealt with the shareholders who were summoned to a general assembly.” (Leval, ibid)

Was this the profound revolution, which res­pected outstanding debts and the interests of shareholders? A strange way to organize production and life on completely new bases!

2. The collectives played into the hands of the unions and bourgeois politicians in the reconstruction of the capitalist economy:

  • they served to concentrate firms: “We have taken charge of very small companies with an insignificant number of workers, without a trace of union acti­vity, whose inactivity threatened the economy.” (Newsheet of the Wood Industry Union, CNT, Barcelona 1936)
  • they rationalized the economy: “As a first step we have established industry’s financial stability by organi­zing a General Council for the Economy, where each branch has two delegates. Excess resources will serve to help the industries in deficit so that they receive primary materials and other elements of production.” (CNT, Barcelona 1936)
  • they centralized surplus value and credit in order to channel them according to the necessities of the war economy: “In every collectivized company, 50 per cent of profits will be earmarked for the conservation of their own resources and the other 50 per cent will pass to the control of the regional or local Economic Council to which they correspond.” (State­ment of the CNT on Collectives, Dec. 1936)

As can be seen, not one cent of the profits to the workers. But that’s all right! Gaston Leval justifies it with the greatest cynicism: “We can rightly ask why the profits are not divided among the workers, to whose efforts they are owed. We reply: because they are reserved for the aims of social solidarity.” ‘Social solidarity’ with exploitation, with the war economy, with the most terrible misery!

3. Collectives held themselves back from foreign capital in Spain; according to the POUM, “in order not to worry friendly coun­tries”. We translate that as: to subordinate themselves to the imperial powers which supported the Republican side. Marvellous and profound revolution!

4. The organs which gave birth to and direc­ted the collectives (trade unions, political parties, committees) were fully integrated into the capitalist state: “The factory committees and the control committees of the expropriated factories are transforming themselves into organs for the activation of production, and because of that, their class significance becomes blurred. We are not dealing here with organs created in the course of an insurrectional strike in order to destroy the state, but organs oriented towards the organization of war, an essential condition to allow the survival and rein­forcement of the said state.” (Bilan)

As for parties and unions, not only were the forces of the Popular Front integrated into the state, but the more ‘workerist’ and ‘radical’ organizations were too; the CNT participated in the Economic Council of Catalonia with four delegates, in the govern­ment of the Generalitat with three ministries and in the central government at Madrid with another three. But not only did they participate to the full at the top of the state, but also at the base itself, town by town, factory by factory, neighbourhood by neigh­bourhood. Republican Spain saw hundreds of mayors, councillors, administrators, police chiefs, military officials, who were ‘liber­tarians’...

But these forces were not only an integral part of the state through their direct par­ticipation in it. It was the entire body of politics which they defended that made them flesh and blood of the capitalist order. That philosophy which secured the action of the collectives at all times was ANTI—FASCIST UNITY, which justified the sacrifice of wor­kers at the war front and super—exploitation in the rearguard. Gaston Leval explains to us clearly this policy which, among others, the CNT supported: “We have to defend those liberties — so relative but so worthy as they were — represented by the Republic.”

Gaston Leval ‘forgets’ the ‘worthy’, workers’ ‘liberty’ which was represented by the Republican repression against workers’ strikes (remember Casas Viejas, Alto Llobregat, Asturias etc). “It was not a question of making a social revolution, nor of implanting libertarian communism, nor of making an offensive against capitalism, the state or political parties; it was an attempt to stop the triumph of fascism.” (Gaston Leval)

But then why the devil do the CNT, anarchists and co. criticize the Spanish CP? Because they defend the same programme! Their pro­gramme is in fact the same: it is the defence of capitalism behind the humbug of anti—fascism!

5. The ‘revolutionary, ‘anti-capitalist’, ‘libertarian’ etc. nature of the collectives was conveniently endorsed by the capitalist state, who recognized them through the Collectivizations Decree (24 October 1936) and co-ordinated them by the constitution of the Economic Council. And guess who signed both decrees? It was Senor Tarradellas, today the brand new president of the Generalitat of Catalonia!

It is unavoidable to conclude that the collectives didn’t mean even the minimal attack on bourgeois order, but that they were a form which the latter adopted in order to reorganize the economy and to main­tain exploitation at a moment of extreme social tension and enormous radicalization which did not allow them to use the traditio­nal methods: “Faced with a class conflagration capita­lism cannot even as much as think of hav­ing recourse to the classic methods of legality. What menaces it is the INDEPENDENCE of the proletarian struggle which is a condition for the next revolu­tionary epoch leading to the abolition of bourgeois domination. As a consequence capitalism must reknit the web of its control over the exploited. The threads of this web, which before were the magis­tracy, the police, the prisons, are changed in the extreme situation of Barce­lona, into Militia Committees, socialized industries, workers unions, vigilante patrols, etc.” (Bilan)

The implantation of the war economy

Having once seen the collectives’ nature as capitalist instruments we begin to see the role which they play, which was to implant within the workers a draconian war economy that would facilitate the enormous expense and drain on resources which the imperialist war, unleashed in Spain between 1936—9, involved.

Briefly, the war economy meant three things:

  • militarization of labour
  • rationing
  • channelling all production towards one exclusive, totalitarian and monolithic end: WAR

The cover provided by the collectives allowed the bourgeoisie to impose upon the workers a military work discipline, the extension of the working day, the creation of free extra hours of work...

A bourgeois journalist sings delightedly of the ‘atmosphere’ prevailing in the Barcelona Ford factory: “We did not hear any discus­sions, nor even controversies. The war came first, and for that they were working and worked incessantly ... optimistic and satis­fied, it did not matter to them that their Committee — made up of worker comrades like themselves - might establish rigid targets and determine more hours of work. What was important was to vanquish fascism.”

The collectives’ statutes clearly defined the implantation of the militarization of labour: “Article 24: all are obliged to work without time limit according to what is needed for the good of the collective; Article 25: every collectivist is obliged, apart from the work he normally may be assigned, to help where his help is needed in all urgent or unexpected work.” (Jativa Collective, Valencia)

In the collectives’ ‘assemblies’ more and more the methods of the barracks were imposed ‘democratica1ly’. It was agreed to organize a workshop to which the women would go to work instead of wasting their time gossiping in the streets... “It has just been decided that in each workshop there would be a woman delegate who is to take charge of controlling the girl apprentices, who, if they fall short twice without a reason will be expelled without any appeal” (Tamarite Collective, Huesca).

Regarding rationing, a Catalan periodical of the period explains to us shamelessly the ‘democratic’ method of imposing it upon the proletariat: “In all countries citizens are obliged to save everything from precious metals to potato skins. Public authority demands this rigorous regime ... But here in Catalonia the government is quiet because it has no need to ask, it is the people who completely spontaneously carry out voluntar­ily and consciously a rigorous rationing.”

The first law of the ‘ultra—revolutionary’ Council of Aragon (Durruti and other satraps) was “For purposes of supplying the collectivists there will be established a rationing system.” These rationings, imposed by “revolutionary means” and “consciously accep­ted by the citizens” meant indescribable misery for the workers and for all the popu­lation. Gaston Leval without shame acknowledges: “In the majority of collectives there was almost always a lack of meat, and frequently even of potatoes” (op_cit).

Finally, the barracks discipline, the ratio­ning which the bourgeoisie imposed using the collectives as a front, had only one end: to sacrifice all economic and human resources to the bloody god of imperialist war:

  • in the Mas de las Matas Collective (Barce­lona) and following a proposal by the CNT we read: “The wine warehouse installations were adapted to make 96% proof alcohol, indispensable for medical use at the Fronts. The purchase of clothes, cars, etc destined for consumption by the collectivists was also limited, but these resources would not be used as luxuries, but for the Front.”
  • in the Alicante collectives: “The govern­ment, recognizing the progress made by the collectives in the province gave responsi­bility for armaments production to the unionized factories of Alcoy, for cloth to the socialized textile industry and for shoes to the Elda industry, also in liberta­rian hands, with the aim of arming, clothing and shoeing the troops” (Gaston Leval, ibid).

The collectives as instruments of super-exploitation

The most palpable demonstration of the anti—worker character of the sinister anar­chist ‘collectives’ is that through them the Republican bourgeoisie reduced to unbearable limits the working and human conditions of the workers:

  • Wages — these were reduced between July 1936 and December 1938 by a face value of 30%, while the reduction in their purchasing power was much more: more than 200%;
  • Prices - went from 168.8 in January 1936 (1913 being 100) to some 564 in November 1937 and 687.8 in February 1938.
  • Unemployment — despite the enormous squandering of people at the Fronts which reduced the total amounts of unemployed, the rate went up some 39% between January 1936 and November 1937.
  • The working week - climbed to 48 hours (in 1931 it was around 44, in July 1936 the Generalitat, in order to calm the class struggle decreed a 40—hour week, but after a few weeks it disappeared off the map with the excuse of the war effort and ‘collectivization’). The number of free extra hours increased the working day by another 30%.

It was precisely the so—called ‘workers’ forces’ (CP, UGT, POUM and especially the CNT) who clamoured with more earnestness for the super—exploitation and the impoverish­ment of the workers’ situation.

Peiro, hack of the CNT, wrote in August 1936 “For the needs of the nation a 40—hour week is not enough, in fact it could not be more inopportune.” The CNT slogans were among the more ‘favourable’ to the workers: “War, produce, sell. Nothing of wage demands or of demands of any other type. Everything has to be subordinate to the war. In all production which may have direct or indirect relation to the anti—fascist war it is not possible to demand that the bases of work, salary or working day be respected. Workers cannot ask special remunerations for the extra hours necessary for the anti—fascist war, and must increase production to a level above that of the period before the 19 July.”

The PCE screamed: “No to strikes in democra­tic Spain; not one idle worker in the rear—guard.”

Naturally, the collectives, as an instrument of ‘workers’ power’ and ‘socialization’ in the hands of the state were the excuse which made the workers swallow this brutal reduc­tion in their living conditions.

Thus in the Graus collective (Huesca): ”girls will not be paid a wage for their work, given that their needs are already covered by the family wage.”

In the Hospitalet collective (Barcelona): “Understanding the need for an exceptional effort we will reject the increase of 5 per cent in wages and the reduction of the work­ing day decreed by the government.” More popish than their own government!

Conclusions

Looking back at this sad historical exper­ience which the Spanish proletariat suffered, denouncing the great myth of the collectives with which the bourgeoisie was able to deceive them, it is not a question of intel­lectualism or erudition. It is a vital necessity to avoid falling again into the same trap. To defeat us, and to make us swallow measures of super—exploitation, of unemployment, of sacrifice, the bourgeoisie uses deception: it will disguise itself as ‘worker’ and ‘popular’ (in 1936 the bourgeoi­sie made calluses on their hands and dressed as workers); the factories were proclaimed ‘socialised’ and ‘self-managed’; it calls for every type of interclassist solidarity such as the banner of ‘anti—fascism’, the ‘defence of democracy’, ‘anti—terrorist struggle’... it gives to the workers the false impression of their being ‘free’, of their controlling the economy, etc. But behind so much democracy, ‘participation’, and ‘self—management’, there hides intact, more powerful and strengthened than ever, the apparatus of the bourgeois state around which the capitalist relations of production maintain themselves and worsen in all their savagery.

Today, when the fatal laws of a senile capitalism are leading it towards war, it is the ‘smile’ , the ‘confidence in the citizens’, the ‘most profound democracy’, self—management: this is the great theatre through which capitalism asks for more and more sacrifices, more and more unemployment, more and more misery, more and more blood on the battle fields. From the punished are born the wise. The ‘collectives’ of 1936 were one more of the fraudulent models, one more of the para­dises, one more of the beautiful illusions through which capitalism dragged workers to defeat and slaughter. The lesson of those events must serve the proletarians of today to avoid the traps which capital will hold out to them, and in so’ doing enable them to advance towards their definitive liberation.

EF

(Translated from Accion Proletaria, no.20, 1978)

History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1936 - Spain [35]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • "Self-management" [40]

Resolution on terrorism, terror and class violence

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In the previous issue of the International Review we published a text on terrorism, terror and class violence, which attempted to trace the basic orientation for the ICC’s intervention on this issue in its various publications. The text was a general res­ponse on the one hand to the ideological and police offensive of the bourgeoisie and on the other hand to the various conceptions currently defended in the revolutionary move­ment as a whole in the face of recent terror­ist actions. The text we are publishing here in the form of a resolution underlines and deepens the different points developed in the previous text, with the constant preoccupation of more precisely defining the nature of the liberating, emancipatory violence of the proletariat.

The resolution doesn’t seek to give precise and detailed answers to all the concrete problems that are and will continue to be posed to the working class in the course of its revolutionary activity -- an activity that goes from the first reawakening of the class struggle to the period of revolutionary transformation, via the insurrection and the seizure of power. Neither does the resolu­tion deal with the way the bourgeoisie directly uses terrorism. Its aim is to provide a framework, a general conception which will allow us to approach these prob­lems from a proletarian standpoint which gets away from simplistic statements such as “violence is violence”, “violence is terror”, “to say that violence isn’t terror is pacifism”, etc -- the whole casuistry about “the end justifying the means” as the previ­ous text points out. The aim of this resolu­tion is to show:

-- that pacifism has no real existence, and can only be an ideology. At best it is the expression of intermediate social strata theorizing their own impotence, their inabi­lity to offer a real opposition to the bourgeoisie and its state; but it is always used by the bourgeoisie in the exercise of its domination over the working class and society as a whole;

-- that terror is the expression of ruling, exploiting classes; when the material basis of their rule begins to founder, their class violence becomes the crux of social life;

-- that terrorism is typical of the impotent revolt of intermediate social strata, never a method or detonator of the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat;

-- that the form and content of the emancipa­tory violence of the working class can never be assimilated with ‘terror’;

-- finally, to show where the real strength of the working class resides: in the cons­cious, collective, organized strength of the immense majority of the class, in its capacity to undertake the revolutionary transformation of social relations.

Moreover, the text shows that if there is one area where the mutual relationship bet­ween ‘means and ends’ is particularly vital, it’s the area of the revolutionary violence of the proletariat. This implies that what is underlying the present discussion on terrorism, terror and class violence is the very nature of the proletarian revolution.

*****************

1. It is absolutely false to present this problem in terms of a dilemma between terror or pacifism: pacifism has never had any real existence in a society divided into classes and antagonistic interests.

In such a society, the relations between classes can only be regulated by struggle. Pacifism has never been anything except an ideology; in the best of cases, a mirage coming from the feeble, impotent ranks of a class with no future, the petty bourgeois­ie; in the worst of cases, a mystification, a shameful lie put about by the ruling classes in order to divert the struggle of the exploited classes and make them accept the yoke of oppression. To reason in terms of terror or pacifism, to say that the alternative is between one or the other, is to fall into a trap and give substance to this false dilemma. It is the same with another trap built on an equally false dilemma: war or peace.

It is vital that our discussions avoid this false dilemma; by replacing reality with fantasy we would be turning our backs on the real problem that confronts us: the class nature of terror, terrorism and class violence.

2. Just as putting forward the false dilemma between terror and pacifism avoids the real problem, equating these different terms also glosses over the issue. In the first case the problem is evaded by re­placing it with a false dilemma; in the second case the problem itself is denied and so appears to dwindle away. But it would be astonishing for Marxists to think that classes so different in nature as the bourgeoisie and the proletariat -- one the bearer of exploitation, the other the bearer of emancipation, one the bearer of repression, the other of liberation, one which stands for the maintenance and per­petuation of the divisions in humanity, the other for its unification in a human community, one representing the reign of necess­ity, scarcity and poverty, the other the reign of freedom, abundance, the flowering of man – that these two classes could have the same way of behaving, the same methods of acting.

By establishing this identification you can avoid everything that distinguishes and opposes these two classes, not in the clouds of abstract speculation, but in the reality of their practice. By equating their practices you end up establishing an identity between the subjects themselves, between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It would be an aberration to say on the one hand that we are dealing with two classes by essence diametrically opposed to each other, while on the other hand maintaining that these two classes have in reality an identical practice.

3. To get to the heart of the question of terror, we have to leave aside quarrels about words, in order to uncover what lies behind the words. In other words, the content and practice of terror and what it means. We must begin by rejecting the idea that there can be any separation between content and practice. Marxism rejects both the idealist vision of an ethereal content existing outside material reality, and the pragmatic vision of a practice devoid of content. Content and practice, ends and means, without being identical, are never­theless moments in an indissoluble unity. There can be no practice distinct from or opposed to its content, and you can’t question a content without ipso facto questioning its practice. Practice necess­arily reveals its content, while the latter can only express itself in practice. This is particularly evident at the level of social life.

4. Capitalism is the last society in history to be divided into classes. The capitalist class bases its rule on the economic exploitation of the working class. In order to ensure this exploitation and intensify it as far as it can, the capit­alist class, like all exploiting classes in history, resorts to all the means of coercion, oppression and repression at its disposal. It does not hesitate to use the most inhuman, savage and bloody methods to guarantee and perpetuate exploitation. The more it is confronted with internal diff­iculties, the more the workers resist exploitation, the more bloodily the bourg­eoisie exerts its repression. It has developed a whole arsenal of repressive methods: prisons, deportations, murder, concentration camps, genocidal wars, and the most refined forms of torture. It has also, of necessity, created various bodies specialized in carrying all this out: police; gendarmes, armies, juridical bodies, qualified torturers, commandos and para­military gangs. The capitalist class devotes an ever-growing part of the surplus value extracted from the exploitation of the working class in order to maintain this repressive apparatus; this has reached the point where this sector has become the most important and flourishing field of social activity. In order to defend its class rule, the capitalist class is in the process of leading society to ruin and threatening the whole of humanity with suffering and death.

We are not trying to paint an emotional picture of capitalist barbarism; it is a prosaic description of its actual practice.

This practice, which impregnates the whole of social life and all relations between human beings, which penetrates into the pores of society, this practice, this system of domination, we call -- terror. Terror is not this or that episodic, circumstantial act of violence. Terror is a particular mode of violence, inherent to exploiting classes. It is concentrated, organized, specialized violence, planned, developed and perfected with the aim of perpetuating exploitation.

Its principal characteristics are:

a. being the violence of a minority class against the great majority of society;

b. perpetuating and perfecting itself to the point of becoming its own raison d’être;

c. requiring a specialized body which always becomes more specialized, more detached from society, closed in upon itself, escaping all control, brutally imposing its iron grip on the whole population and stifling any hint of criticism with the silence of death.

5. The proletariat is not the only class to feel the rigors of state terror. Terror is also imposed upon all the petty bourgeois classes and strata: peasants, artisans, small producers and shopkeepers, intellect­uals and the liberal professions, scientists and students; it even extends itself into the ranks of the bourgeois class itself. These strata and classes do not put forward any historical alternative to capitalism; worn out and exasperated by the barbarism of the system and its terror, they can only oppose it with acts of despair: terrorism.

Although it can also be used by certain sectors of the bourgeoisie, terrorism is essentially the mode of action, the practice of desperate classes and strata who have no future. This is why this practice, which tries to be ‘heroic and exemplary’, is in fact nothing but an act of suicide. It offers no way forward and only has the result of supplying victims to the terror of the state. It has no positive effect on the class struggle of the proletariat and often acts as an obstacle to it, inasmuch as it gives rise to illusions among the workers that there can be some other way forward than the class struggle. This is why terrorism, the practice of the petty bourg­eoisie, can be and often is exploited judiciously by the state as a way of derail­ing the workers from the terrain of the class struggle and as a pretext for streng­thening the terror of the state.

What characterizes terrorism as a practice of the petty bourgeoisie is the fact that it is the action of small, isolated minorities which never raises itself to the level of mass action. It is conducted in the shadows of little conspiracies, thus providing a favorite hunting ground for the underhand activities of agents of the police and the state and for all sorts of manipulations and intrigues. Terrorism begins as the emanat­ion of individualistic wills, not as the generalized action of a revolutionary class; and it ends up on a purely individualistic level as well. Its actions are not directed against capitalist society and its instit­utions, but only against individuals who represent this society. It inevitably takes on the aspect of a settling of scores, of vengeance, of a vendetta, of person against person and not a revolutionary confront­ation of class against class.

On a general level, terrorism turns its back on the revolution, which can only be the work of a definite class, which draws in the broad masses in an open and frontal struggle against the existing order and for the trans­formation of society. What’s more it is fundamentally substitutionist, placing its confidence only in the voluntarist action of small active minorities.

In this sense we have to reject the idea of a ‘workers’ terrorism’ which is presented as the work of detachments of the proletariat, ‘specialists’ in armed action, or which is supposed to prepare the ground for future battles by giving an example of violent struggle to the rest of the class, or by ‘weakening’ the capitalist state by ‘prelim­inary attacks’. The proletariat can delegate certain detachments for this or that immed­iate action (pickets, patrols, etc) but these are under the control of the movement as a whole; within the framework of this movement the resolute actions of the most advanced elements can serve to catalyze the struggle of the broad masses, but this can never be done through the conspiratorial and individualistic methods that characterize terrorism. Terrorism even when practiced by workers or groups of workers, cannot take on a proletarian character, just as the fact that the unions are made up of workers does not make them organs of the working class. However, terrorism should not be mixed up with acts of sabotage or individual violence perpetrated by workers at the point of production. Such acts are fundamentally expressions of discontent and despair, above all in periods of reflux, during which they can in no way act as det­onators to the struggle; rather, in a period of resurgence, they tend to be integrated and transcended in a collective, more conscious movement.

For all these reasons, terrorism in the best sense of the term (in the worst it can be openly directed against the workers) can never be the mode of action of the prolet­ariat; but the proletariat never puts it on the same level as terror, since it does not forget that terrorism, however futile its actions are, is a reaction, a consequence provoked by the terror of its mortal enemy, the capitalist state, and that it is also the victim of this terror.

Terrorism, as a practice, is a perfect ref­lection of its content: the petty bourgeois classes from which it emanates. It is the sterile practice of impotent classes who have no future.

6. The last exploited class in history, the proletariat carries within itself the sol­ution to all the divisions, contradictions and impasses with which this society is burdened. This solution is not only a response to its own exploitation but applies to the whole of society, because the prolet­ariat cannot liberate itself without liber­ating the whole of humanity from the divis­ion of society into classes and the exploit­ation of man by man. This solution, a freely associated and unified human comm­unity, is communism. From its birth the proletariat has carried within itself the germs of this community, it has personified certain characteristics of this reborn humanity: as a class deprived of all private property, as the most exploited class in society, it is opposed to all exploitation; as a class unified by capital in associated productive labor, it is the most homogen­eous, unified class in society -- solidarity is one of its foremost qualities and is felt as the deepest of its needs; the most oppressed class, it fights against all oppressions; the most alienated class, it bears within itself the movement to end alienation, because its consciousness of reality is not subject to the self-mystif­ication dictated by the interests of exploiting classes. Other classes are subject to the blind laws of the economy, whereas the proletariat, through its conscious action, will make itself master of production, suppress commodity exchange and consciously organize social life.

Although it will still bear the marks of the society it has emerged from, the proletariat will have to act with a view to the future. It can’t take the activity of previous ruling classes as a model for its own activ­ity, because it is the categorical antithes­is to these classes both in its being and in its practice. The rule of previous classes was motivated by the defense of their privileges; but the proletariat has no privilege to defend and it rules in order to suppress all privileges. For the same reasons, previous ruling classes shut them­selves behind insuperable caste barriers, whereas the proletariat is open to the incorporation of all other members of soc­iety into itself, in order to create a single human community.

The struggle of the proletariat, like any social struggle, is necessarily violent, but the practice of its violence is as dis­tinct from that of other classes as are its projects and its goals. Its practice, including the use of violence, is the action of huge masses, not of a minority; it is liberating, the midwife of a new harmonious society, not the perpetuation of a perman­ent state of war of one against all and all against one. Its practice does not aim to perfect and perpetuate violence, but to banish the crimes of the capitalist class and immobilize it. This is why the revol­utionary violence of the proletariat can never take on the monstrous form of terror, which characterizes the rule of capital, or the form of the impotent terrorism of the petty bourgeoisie. Its invincible force resides not so much in its physical and military force, still less in repression, but in its capacity to mobilize the whole mass of the class and to integrate the maj­ority of the non-proletarian laboring classes and strata into the struggle against capitalist barbarism. It resides in the development of its consciousness and its capacity to organize itself in a unified autonomous way, in the firmness of its convictions and the vigor of its decisions.

These are the fundamental weapons of the practice, the class violence of the prolet­ariat.

Marxist literature sometimes uses the term terror instead of class violence. But when we look at the whole of the Marxist trad­ition we can see that this is more a matter of an imprecise formulation than a real identification of ideas. Moreover, this imprecision derives from the profound impression made by the great bourgeois revolution of 1789. But in any case it is high time to erase these ambiguities which lead certain groups, like the Bordigists, to make an extreme caricature of the exalt­ation of the Terror, turning this monstros­ity into a new ideal for the proletariat.

The greatest firmness and the strictest vigilance don’t mean the setting up of a police regime. Although physical repression against the counter-revolutionary attempts of the bourgeoisie may prove indispensable, and even though there is a danger of the proletariat being too lenient or weak in the exertion of violence, it will have the same preoccupation as the Bolsheviks in the first years of the revolution, that is to guard against any excesses and abuses, which run the risk of distorting its own struggle and making it lose sight of its final goal. It is the more and more active participation of the broad masses, the development of their creative initiative, which alone can guarantee the power of the proletariat and the final triumph of socialism.

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East Germany: The Workers’ Insurrection of June 1953

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The text we are publishing here on 17 June 1953 is not attempting to satisfy a taste for funereal commemorations. For a long time now the bourgeoisie has been trying to exorcise the phantoms which have appeared to haunt its period of decline. These phan­toms are the proletarian revolutions, the revolutionary movements which it has crushed and whose fateful return it fears so deeply, if not in the immediate future, then in the fitful dreams of a ruling class. It tries therefore to conjure away its superstitious terror of ‘fateful dates’ by commemorating past events in its own way, by giving them a second burial. The first time round it unleashes all its military and ideological forces against the working class when it threatens the basis of its rule; the second time round it falsifies the class content of the workers’ struggle, transforming it into a vulgar struggle for the ‘fatherland’, ‘democracy’ or ‘freedom’.

This is what the bourgeoisie east and west has been trying to do with the 1953 uprising: the former portraying the struggle of the East German workers as a struggle against ‘Stalinist excesses’; the latter portraying it as a struggle for ‘pluralist, parliamen­tary democracy’. Each faction of the world bourgeoisie is trying once again to assassi­nate the proletariat of East Berlin and Saxony, by disfiguring, or slandering its struggle, transforming it into its opposite, or purely and simply denying it.

Revolutionaries don’t turn the struggle of the proletariat into a cult-object or some­thing for purely academic study. For them, the struggles of the past are always present. That is why the struggle of the past is not something to be commemorated, but a weapon for future struggle, an incitement to revo­lutionary action. The events of 1953 are part of us, because they are a moment in the historic struggle of the proletariat for its emancipation. They are striking proof of the capitalist nature of the eastern bloc countries, which the Trotskyists pre­sent as ‘socialist’. They demonstrate that the most ruthless dictatorship of capital, wielded through a totalitarian state, does not put an end to the class struggle. That struggle will continue as long as society is still divided into classes, as long as exploitation exists. In 1953 the proleta­riat was reacting to an intensification of its exploitation and thus gave a clear answer to the Trotskyist and Stalinist lies about the ‘workers’ socialist state’. The workers of East Germany, even before the Hungarian workers in 1956 and the Polish workers in 1970 showed that the machine guns of the police and the army were of the same brand as the ones which cut them down in 1918-20 in Berlin and Budapest. After the insurrection of the East German workers, the myth of the ‘socialist states’ began to founder in the consciousness of the world proletariat.

But more than anything else, the workers of East Germany, despite being crushed, showed that they are only force capable of over­throwing capitalist exploitation. Despite their illusions in the ‘democratic’ west -- the mystifying corollary to the iron dicta­torship of the capitalist state in the east -- they demonstrated the possibility of a future proletarian revolution in the Russian bloc. Within days, the country was covered in strike committees and factory committees. Only the weight of a triumphant counter-revolution permitted the interven­tion of the Russian army and the isolation of the East German proletariat from the workers of West Germany and other European countries.

Today, the period of counter-revolution which isolated, weakened and derailed the proletarian struggle is over. May ‘68 proved that the proletariat of Western Europe was not ‘integrated’; the workers’ riots in Poland in December 1970 and January 1971 proved that the class struggle continues and that the events of 1953 weren’t accidental or the mere product of the ‘Stalinization’ of these countries. It is the world crisis of capitalism which, both in the east and the west, is pushing the workers to resist exploitation.

Despite all the sirens in Poland (KOR, comm­ittee for the defense of imprisoned workers) or in Czechoslovakia (Charter 77) who try to show the workers that they should struggle for a ‘free nation’ alongside the rest of the ‘people’, the workers of the eastern bloc countries can only integrate themselves into the international struggle of the prole­tariat. Isolated yesterday, tomorrow the workers of all countries, united in revolu­tionary struggle in spite of all capital’s ‘iron curtains’, will storm the heavens.

At the end of the second imperialist world war, the governments of all countries promised the workers peace and lasting prosperity. Today, more than thirty years later, we find ourselves once more in the middle of an international economic crisis, which, east and west, is massively attack­ing the living standards of the working class. In the face of a growing dearth of markets, soaring inflation, mass unemploy­ment and impending bankruptcy, capitalism is forced to follow the path traced by its internal contradictions; this path leads to generalized inter-imperialist struggle, to a third mass slaughter in our century.

In West Germany, the bourgeoisie and espec­ially its extreme factions (such as the Maoists, the Trotskyists and the neo-­Fascists) are putting forward the goal of an united, independent, democratic and even ‘socialist’ Germany as a solution to the ‘German’ part of the world crisis. We will understand the meaning of this ‘national independence and unity’ when we remember that the Bonn Government has made 17 June and the defeat of the East German workers, the day to celebrate the goal of German unity. In reality there is no solution, to the crisis of decadent capitalism, which proceeds in a vicious cycle of crisis -- war-reconstruction-new crisis, and will continue in this manner until humanity has finally been destroyed. Precisely because the only way out of this barbarism is the world proletarian revolution, the vital task of revolutionaries is to examine the past experiences and struggles of our class, so that the defeats of yesterday may become the victory of tomorrow.

The so-called ‘socialist’ countries of Eastern Europe arose as a result of the imperialist re-division of the world brought about by World War II. The slogan of the holy war against fascism was nothing but the lie which the western and Russian bourgeois­ies ended up using to mobilize their workers in the fight for more profits, markets and raw materials for their capitalist masters. The Allies love of democracy did not prevent Stalin, for example, from doing a deal with Hitler at the beginning of the war, through which Russia was able to seize large areas of Eastern Europe1.

As it became increasingly clear that the Allies were going to win the war, the conflict of interests within the ‘democrat­ic camp’ itself, and especially between Russia on the one hand and Britain and America on the other, became greater. The Russians received only the minimum of military supplies from the west, and Brit­ain even wanted to open up the Second Front against Germany in the Balkans instead of in France, in order to prevent the Russians occupying Eastern Europe.

What kept this united front of gangsters together was the fear that the war, partic­ularly in the defeated countries, might, as in World War I, be ended by an outbreak of class struggle. The brutal bombing raids of the Allies on German cities were aimed at crushing the resistance of the working class. In most cities the workers’ cities were obliterated, whereas only 10 per cent of industrial equipment was destroyed2.

The growing resistance of the workers, which in some cases led to uprisings in concentration camps and factories, and the dissatisfaction of the soldiers(such as the desertions on the Eastern Front, which were countered by mass hangings), were swiftly crushed by the occupying powers. This pattern was followed everywhere. In the east, the Russian army stood by while the German forces put down the sixty three day long Warsaw Rising, leaving 240,000 dead. Similarly, the Russian army was responsible for restoring order and social peace in Bulgaria and elsewhere in the Balkans. In the west, the CPs joined the post-war governments in France and Italy, in order to break the flickering strike movements and social unrest there. The Italian CP in power was supporting the same: democratic allies who mercilessly bombarded the Italian workers who were occupying the factories towards the end of the war.

The ‘Soviet’ occupiers began to exercise an organized plunder of the East European territory under their control. In the Soviet Occupation Zone (SBZ) of East Germany, the dismantling of industrial equipment for transportation back to the Soviet Union amounted to 40 per cent of the industrial capacity of the SBZ. The Sowjetinen en Aktiengesellschaften (SAGs, Soviet stockholding companies) were found­ed in 1946 and two hundred firms in key industries, including for example the massive Leuna Works, were taken over by the Russians. In some areas, at the end of the war, the workers themselves repaired and began operating the factories and such factories were especially eagerly taken over. In 1950 the SAGs constituted the following proportion of the East German economy: “more than half of chemicals, a third of metallurgical products, and about a quarter of machine production.”(Staritz, Sozialismus In Einer Halben Land, p.103).

A large proportion of these profits went to the Russians directly as reparation payments. The GDR was committed to reparation payments to the USSR up until 1953-4, until it became clear that the reparations were damaging the Russian economy itself3. The decimated East German economy paid the bill through a brutally rising exploitation of the working class. The proletariat was forced in this way to help finance the reconstruction and expansion of the Soviet war economy. Stalin never explained why the working class and the ‘Workers’ State’ in Germany should have to pay for the crimes of its exploiters.

This consolidation of Russian imperialism’s economic power in East Germany and Eastern Europe was accompanied by the coming to power of pro-Russian factions of the bourgeoisie. In the SBZ, the Stalinists of the KPD came together with the Social Democratic murderers of the German Revol­ution, to form the Sozialistische Einheits Partei (SED). Its immediate post-war goals had already been expressed clearly shortly before the war began: “The new democratic Republic will deprive Fascism of its material basis through the exprop­riation of fascist trust capital, and will place reliable defenders of democratic freedoms and the rights of the people in the army, the police forces and the bureau­cracy” (Staritz, p.49).

Strengthening and ‘democratization’ of the army, the police, the bureaucracy... such were the lessons which these good bourgeois ‘Marxists’ had drawn from Marx, from Lenin, from the Paris Commune.

Then, three years after the war had ended, came the announcement that the building of ‘socialism’ had now begun. A miraculous ‘socialism’ this, which could be construct­ed upon the corpses of a totally crushed and defeated proletariat. It is interesting to note that between 1945-8 not even the SED pretended that the state capitalist measures they were putting through had anything to do with socialism. And today, leftists of all descriptions who propagate the idea that nationalization equals socialism, prefer to ‘forget’ the high degree of statification present in the East European countries even before the war, and especially in those countries most renowned for their ‘react­ionary’ governments, such as Poland and Yugoslavia. This centralization of the economy under the direction of the state had proceeded during the German occupation4.

In fact, the famous declaration of the ‘building of socialism’, along with the economic, political and military tightening ups which took place in Eastern Europe after 1948, was the direct result of a hardening of the global conflict between the American and the Russian blocs.

“The Two-Year Plan, (measured on the 1949 standing) foresaw a rise in production of 35 per cent until 1950, reckoned with a rise in labor productivity of 30 per cent, a 15 per cent growth in the total wage mass, and a 7 per cent sinking of the costs of Public firms. The aim of the SED was thereby to raise work productivity twice as fast as wages. The means to these ends were seen by the planners above all in the improvement in the organization of work, the intro­duction of ‘correct norms’ and in the struggle against absenteeism and carelessness at the workplaces.”5

The rise in wages after 1948, insofar as they took place at all, were merely the result of piece rate norms and ‘productivity achievements’, or in other words they were the result of higher levels of exploitation. This was the period of the Hennecke move­ment (the East German equivalent of Stakhanovism) and of an iron discipline in the factories imposed by the unions. But even so these small wage rises became more and more an intolerable burden for the economy and had somehow to be cut. The economically weaker Eastern Bloc, less and less able to compete with its American-led rivals, was forced, in order to survive, to squeeze super profits out of the proletariat and to invest in the heavy industries (or more precisely, in those industries conn­ected to the war economy), to the detriment of the infrastructure, the consumer goods sector, etc. This situation, which required the immediate and centralized control of the economy by the state, pushed the bourgeoisie into making a frontal attack on the living standards of the working class.

The response of the proletariat came in a wave of class struggle which shook Eastern Europe between the years 1953-6. The movement began in early June 1953 with demonstrations by workers in Pilzen, Czechoslovakia which led to clashes with the army. These were immediately followed by the rising in the GDR and by the revolt in the massive Vorkutz labor camps in Russia in July of the same year. This movement reached its climax in 1956 with the events in Poland, and then in Hungary, where workers’ councils were formed.

It has been estimated that the real wages in East Germany in 1950 were half the 1936 level. (C. Harman, Bureaucracy and Revolution, p. 80). In July 1952 the SED announced the opening of a new period of ‘the accelerated construction of socialism’, by which was meant a further increase in investment in heavy industry, a greater increase: in productivity and a greater increase in production norms. It was clearly intended to speed up the post-war reconstruction. In the spring of 1953 at a time when the unions in West Berlin were having difficulty in controlling the combativity of the building workers, the government in East Berlin was stepping up a full-scale campaign to increase the production norms generally, and particularly on the building sites. On 28 May it was announced that 60 per cent of the workers on the huge building sites in Stalinallee had ‘volunt­arily’ raised their norms (this is the language of ‘socialist’ realism). The effects of the nationwide production campaign on the working class were already beginning to show. That same month strikes took place in Magdeburg and Karl Marx Stadt. In response the government pro­claimed a general norm rise of 10 per cent for 5 June.

Becoming frightened by the mood among the workers, an anti-Ulbricht grouping within the SED leadership6, and apparently with Kremlin backing, pushed through a reform package aimed at gaining the support of the middle classes. This group even began to suggest an easing-up policy as regards the question of the production norms.

But such maneuvers came too late to prevent a proletarian eruption. On 16 June the building workers took to the streets and marched calling out other workers. Finally the demonstration made for the government buildings. The general strike called for the following day paralyzed East Berlin and was followed in all other important cities. The struggle was organized by strike comm­ittees elected in open assemblies and under their control -- independent of the unions and the party. Indeed the dissolut­ion of the party cells in the factories was often the first demand of the workers. In Halle, Bitterfeld and Merseburg, the industrial heartland of East Germany, strike committees for the entire cities were elected, which together attempted to coordinate and lead the struggle. These committees assumed the task of centralizing the struggle and also temporarily organizing the running of the cities.

“In Bitterfeld, the central strike committee demanded that the fire brigade clear the walls of all official slogans. The police continued to make arrests; whereupon the committee formed fighting units and organized the systematic occupation of the city districts. The political prisoners of the Bitterfeld jail were released in the name of the strike committee. In contrast the strike committee ordered the arrest of the town mayor.” (Sarel, Arbeiter gegen den Komrunismus)

All over the country the party headquarters were occupied or burnt down, jails broken into and prisoners freed. The repressive apparatus of the state was paralyzed. The only help for the government was Russian tanks. In East Berlin 25,000 Russian troops and 300 tanks crushed the resistance of workers armed only with sticks and bottles. In Leipzig, Magdeburg and Dresden order was restored within a few hours. In other areas it took longer. In East Berlin strikes were still taking place three weeks later.

Because of the speed with which the workers took to the streets, generalizing the struggle and taking it straight to the political level, above all because the need to openly confront the state was understood, the proletariat was able to paralyze the repressive apparatus of the East German bourgeoisie. However, just as the rapid spread of the strike across the country was able to prevent the effective use of the police against the workers, in the same way, an international extension of the civil war would have been necessary in order to counter the threat of the ‘Red Army’. In this sense we can say that, taking place as it did in the depths of the worldwide counter-revolution following the defeat of the revolutionary wave of 1917-23, the East German workers were defeated because of their isolation from their class brothers abroad, east and west. In fact, the weight of the counter­revolution placed political barriers more terrible than the bayonets of Russian imperialism against the extension of the movement from a revolt to a revolution. The links binding the class to its own past, its experiences and struggles, had long been smashed by Noske, Hitler and Stalin -- the bloody heroes of reaction -- by concent­ration camps and mass bombings, by demoralization and by the destruction of its revolutionary parties (the murder of Liebknecht and Luxemburg, the political decimation, of the KAPD). Having suffered for so long under the Fascist and Stalinist one party states, the workers believed that parliamentary democracy might protect them against naked exploitation. They called for parliament and free elections. They sent delegations to West Berlin, asking for help and solidarity from the state and the unions there, but in vain. The West Berlin police and the French and British troops were posted along the borders of the city with East Berlin to prevent any movements of solidarity between workers of east and west. The unions in the west turned down the suggestion to call a solidarity strike, and warned the East European workers against illegal actions and adventurism. The workers called on the Russian army to remain neutral (not to interfere in internal German affairs -- according to the strike committee of Halle and Bitterfeld). They learned a hard lesson: in the class war there is no neutrality. The workers wanted to get rid of Ulbricht and Co, not realizing that one Ulbricht would simply be replaced by another, and that it’s not a question of overthrowing this or that government but of destroying the world capitalist system which hangs like a stone around our neck. They didn’t understand the need to central­ize the struggle politically at the level of workers’ councils which would smash the bourgeois state.

The Stalinist DKP and the West German Maoists are of the opinion that 17 June was a fascist rising organized from Bonn and Washington. They thereby demonstrate once again their anti-proletarian nature. The working class will have to fling such currents (or others such as that of ‘Comrade’ Bahro, who is so eager to demo­cratize East German state capitalism and his beloved ‘Workers’ State’ in order to preserve law and order) onto the scrapheap of history.

The logic of such currents is illustrated by a leaflet which the Maoist KBW brought out for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the events in the GDR. These self-appointed watchdogs of Stalinist purity argue thus: the ‘fact’ that the rising was ‘supported’ by the West German government proves that it could have been nothing else but an attempted fascist putsch. In fact the western bourgeoisie supported this uprising in exactly the same way as for example the unions support strike movements: in order to lead them into dead-ends and defeat.

“The facts show that the people who were perpetrating their dirty work on 17 June were in fact powerless, precisely because they were not ‘brave workers’ but rather provocateurs, imperialist slaves without the backing of the working class, who began to run like hares when the Red Army, at that time an army of the working class, opposed this attempted counter-revolutionary coup.” (KBW leaflet, 15 June 1978)

Well there you are, it’s all as easy to explain as that: but even so, these parrots of the counter-revolution still find it necessary to mumble about the mistakes of Uncle Walter (Ulbricht) and the confusions of the workers. But how did it come about that three years after this first fascist adventure, the Hungarian working; masses would fight Stalin’s tanks with home-made mollies? And why do the workers attack their ‘own’ army so often and so fiercely? And why did these ‘brave workers’ not lift so much as a finger to rescue ‘their state’ and ‘their revolution’ during the famous bloodless Kruschchev counter-revolution so talked of in Maoist circles?

The conditions of class struggle under decadent capitalism determined that the workers in East Germany in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956 would in their conflicts with the system be immediately confronted by the might and hostility of the world bourgeoisie. The fraudulent goals of ‘democracy’ and German ‘unity’ held up by western propaganda complemented the action of the ‘Red Army’ in defeating the prolet­ariat. In its manipulation of lies the bourgeoisie of the older capitals proved once again to be the true masters. Their strategy consisted of: 1. bringing the workers’ struggles to an end as fast as possible and especially by preventing the movement from spreading across the border to the west; 2. by diverting the movement onto the bourgeois terrain (a struggle for democracy, freedom, etc) the west hoped to extend their influence inside the Russian bloc. However, the ideology of the western bourgeoisie was directed first and foremost against its own proletariat. All this talk about the low living standards and lack of freedom of ‘the people’ in the east is being employed, and especially today, in an attempt to use democracy to break the res­istance of the workers to austerity and a total war economy. The ideological inter­vention of the western bloc in 1953 was especially important; for by contributing to the political disarming of the prolet­ariat it even helped the Stalinists to stay in power.

In 1956 in Poland and Hungary, nationalism was the most powerful weapon slowing down and dissolving the resistance of the workers. Only some months after the slaughter of the workers in Poznan, the Polish CP was actually in the position of being able to arm the population of Warsaw in order to defend the fatherland against the Russians. By contrast the government in East Berlin felt itself partly threat­ened by German nationalism, since this nationalism embodied the threat from the west; the great fear of being devoured by Bonn. Precisely for this reason, the unification of all classes in order to defend the national capital against the Russians was excluded from the beginning, the very existence of the GDR being depend­ant on the power of the Russians. Incap­able of utilizing any means of mystification, the SED allowed itself to be rescued by foreign tanks and democratic blab-blab.

The working class never abandons the class struggle, it never was and never could be a class for capital. Confronted with the lies of the bourgeoisie and its left fractions -- which incessantly reproach the class with militarism, aristocracism, racism, etc -- confronted with a conception which only sees the class as cowardly, resigned and defeated, revolutionaries defend the under­standing that the heart of class society today is the contradiction between wage labor and capital, which confront each other in a situation of permanent hostility determined by the material conditions of their existence. Because the proletariat possesses no economic power within the society the destruction of capitalism can therefore only be a political action, an exercise of revolutionary consciousness anal will by the army of labor. It was preci­sely due to a lack of experience and con­sciousness on the part of the class and its revolutionary minorities that the October Revolution failed. In the same way, all the attempts of the forties and fifties to resist capitalism failed because of the deep confusion and demoralization which followed the defeat of the October Revolut­ion.

The Council Communists, for example Daad and Gedachte in Holland, reached the pinn­acle of idealism when they assert that the events of 17 June 1953 proved once more the boundless power of the mass spontaneity of the proletariat, a concept which they oppose to the necessity for a class party. However, just as foreign to Marxism is the typical notion of the Bordigists who are determined to explain each and every defeat by the absence of the revolutionary party. Because the proletariat’s very nature is that of an exploited and revolutionary class, it enters the struggle spontaneously. However, in order to be able to defend itself and to confront capital, it is essential that the proletariat organize and lead its struggles as consciously as possible. The class forges its weapons, its organs in the very flames of the class struggle itself. With these organs it turns its immediate struggle onto the terrain of its own class interests, ie the fight for communism. In revolutionary confrontations the mass of workers organize themselves in councils which coordinate and launch its offensives and temporary retreats, and which prepare for the day of the uprising. In this way the class goes beyond its own spontaneity and becomes a single, united, indivisible revolutionary power.

In fact, the Council Communists and the Bordigists are posing the question in the wrong way. It is neither the Councils nor the Party ‘alone’, but rather, that which is indispensable for the victory of the Revolution is the conscious self-organization of the class! The formation of the party and the Councils are two separate and fundamental moments in this process of the self-organiz­ation of the class. No single struggle of the workers, and even less one taking place in the depths of the counter-revolution, will be victorious simply because someone has ‘founded the world party’. The world party is not simply a collection of principles; even less is it the work of some diseased sect taking its own dreams for reality. The world party of tomorrow signifies the militant and disciplined self-organization of the most combative and conscious elements of the class who, during the struggles of the proletariat play a vital and dynamic role in the endeavors of the class to organize itself and to grasp the tasks which face it as a class. The party, a product of the class struggle, does not emerge spontan­eously from it, but rather its existence is prepared by long years of organized theoret­ical and practical work. We are now engaged in this preparatory work.

Although the absence of revolutionary minorities in the struggles of 1953-6 is a symptom of the weakness of the class during this period, the appearance and strength­ening of such minorities since 1968 shows us that a new period of class struggle has now opened before us. The strikes in East Berlin and Karl Marx Stadt and likewise the riots in Wittenberge and Erfurt which took place recently are announcing the fact that a new era of class struggle and social crisis has arrived in the GDR. In Eastern Europe, we have seen the first brave efforts of the workers to resist the crisis (Poland, Rumania). If they did not attain a highly politicized level, these revolts did leave an essential heritage to the world proleta­riat: giving the lie to the theories which proclaimed the integration of the proletariat into state capitalism in the east which calls itself a workers’ paradise; proving the international unity of the workers’ class struggle against capital in all its forms. Today the world bourgeoisie is becoming more and more aware of the need to subordinate its own internal conflicts to the general goal of defeating the proletariat and is strengthening itself to this end.

Because of the necessity for the imperialist powers to work towards war, the bourgeoisie is preparing itself especially for civil war, because only defeated workers make good soldiers.

This new offensive of the bourgeoisie to crush us and then send us off to war must be answered by the working class of east and west. 25 years after the revolt of the workers in East Germany we oppose to the swindling unity of the bourgeoisie the unity and solidarity of the workers and revolutionaries of all countries.

Krespel

1 One could fill an entire book with quotations from Stalinists concerning the conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. Star functionary Ulbricht wrote in February 1940: “Whoever intrigues against the friendship between the German and Soviet peoples and will be branded a lackey of English imperialism.” And the declaration of the KPD from August 1939: “The entire German people must be the guarantee of the observation of the non-aggression pact”, which even gives the ‘German people’ the opportunity to “force Hitler to give up his imperialist war policy.”

2 The Allies tried to avoid excessively damaging the industrial complexes because they intended to take them off back home with them after the war.

3 Precisely because the Russians had so thoroughly plundered the GDR, they were depriving themselves of many important commodities which the East Germans, with their well-trained working class, could very easily and cheaply have provided.

Another reason for scrapping the reparation payments was the danger of social instability, which became quite clear after 1953.

4 The situation in Czechoslovakia in 1945 shows us the truth of this state capitalist development, which had been set in motion even without the Stalinists and the ‘Workers’ Parties’. According to Bennes, the conservative head of state at the time: “The Germans simply took control of all main industries and all banks … If they did not nationalize them directly they at least put them into the hands of big German concerns … In this way they automatically prepared the economic and financial capital of our country for nationalization … To return this property and the banks into the hands of Czech individuals or to consolidate them without considerable state assistance and without new financial guarantees was simply was simply impossible. The State had to step in.” (Chris Harman, Bureaucracy and Revolution, p. 27)

5 Staritz, p. 107. The author forgets here that a growth of the total wage sum of 15 percent does not signify a wage rise of 15 percent but rather first and foremost an increase in the number of workers.

6 Involved was the grouping around Franz Dahlem. With every political crisis in the Eastern Bloc there emerge fractions of the bourgeoisie out to ‘democratize’ or change something or other, in order to avoid a confrontation with the proletariat. In 1956 it was Gomulka in Poland and Nagy in Hungary. In 1968 it was Dubcek in Czechoslovakia. Today it is exactly the same with the Opposition in Poland, the civil rights leaders in Russia, the Charter ’77 in Czechoslovakia, and Bahro, Havemann, Biermann and friends in the GDR.

Geographical: 

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History of the workers' movement: 

  • 1953 - East Germany [100]

On the National Question: Reply to Solidarity

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The following text ‘Third Worldism and Cardanism’ was originally written for publi­cation in the Scandinavian revolutionary milieu. Comrades in Oslo had informed us of their intention to publish the Solidarity text ‘Third Worldism or Socialism’ and had asked us to write a critique of the text which would be published along with it. As far as we know, the Oslo comrades’ project has not reached fruition, but we still think that it is worthwhile to publish the text in our Review. The revolutionary elements in Scandinavia -- like other newly emerging currents in America, India, or Hong Kong -- have been strongly influenced by the coun­cilist and libertarian ideas which the British group Solidarity typifies. The issues dealt with in this critique -- the meaning of capitalist decadence, the func­tion of ‘national liberation struggles’, the class nature of the Russian Revolution -- are all questions which today’s young revo­lutionary tendencies find particularly hard to comprehend, cut off as they are from the theoretical advances already made by the communist fractions of the past. Again and again the same questions are posed, by com­rades who know nothing of the existence of others who have posed exactly the same questions. “True Cuba or China is capita­list -- but surely there is something progres­sive in the economic development that has taken place in these countries?” Or else “Russia is capitalist today -- surely this means that 1917 was a bourgeois revolution?” And although these questions often form part of a process leading towards clarifica­tion, this process often gets blocked by the intervention of more established political currents who eagerly seek to incorporate these confused questions into a more elabo­rate -- and even more confused -- theoretical framework. Such is the role of Solidarity with its theory of the ‘new bureaucratic capitalism’, or, at the opposite end of the spectrum, of the Bordigists with their fantasies about the ‘young capitalisms’ of the third world, and the ‘double revolution’ (ie bourgeois and proletarian) of October 1917. In this text we are confronting these theoretical aberrations with the clear, historical, universal vision defended by Luxemburg at the time of World War I, or by Bilan during the 1930s: that in the epoch of capitalism’s decay there can be no more bourgeois revolutions anywhere in the world; that the proletarian revolution is on the historical agenda in all countries.

The text deals briefly with the origins of Solidarity and of Cardan’s ideas, which are typified in works like Modern Capitalism and Revolution and The Crisis of Modern Society. Beginning as a positive break from Trotskyism, both Solidarity and Cardan’s group Socialisme ou Barbarie, burdened still with many conceptions inherited from Trot­skyism, have been unable to withstand the test of time and events. Socialisme ou Barbarie had the good sense to disappear before the re-emergence of the world capita­list crisis could expose its theory of a ‘crisis-free’ capitalism for the empirical and impressionistic contrivance it always was, and before the group had completely abandoned any pretense of defending a class outlook on the world. But Solidarity’s continued existence in today’s period has simply highlighted the contradictions and absurdities of the group’s ideas. Written before Solidarity’s fusion with another libertarian group (Social Revolution, a split from the fossilized Socialist Party of Great Britain), our text already points out a tendency in Solidarity which seems to have accelerated since the fusion: the progressive abandonment of class politics and the adoption of the standpoint of the ‘autonomous individual’. And as our article ‘Solidarity/Social Revolution: A Marriage of Confusion’ (in World Revolution, no.19) explains, this move towards individualism and the politics of alternative life styles is accompanied by a rapid evolution towards the positions of leftism pure and simple on crucial questions like the unions and anti-fascism. Theoretical incoherence always leads towards opportunism in practice, towards the betrayal of fundamental principles.

In publishing this text we hope to make a contribution to the theoretical and politi­cal evolution of the revolutionary currents which are now springing up from California to Bombay, from Oslo to Hong Kong. In contrast to Socialisme ou Barbarie and Solidarity, the majority of these currents has not come out of the counter-revolutio­nary swamp of Trotskyism and has arisen in period which is far more favorable to the development of communist groups than were the somber years of the 1950s and early 1960s. Thus there is every hope that they can avoid repeating the mistakes of the past -- and, in doing so, become part of the revolutionary future.

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A critique of Solidarity’s views on the ‘third world’ and the Russian revolution

The Solidarity pamphlet Ceylon: the JVP Uprising of Apri 1971, contains an appendix entitled ‘Third Worldism or Socialism?’, which has also appeared in Solidarity’s Vietnam: Whose Victory? pamphlet. Solidar­ity’s views on so-called national liberation struggles appear in that appendix in what is perhaps their most coherent treatment. The appendix also contains some brief comments on the Russian Revolution. We will attempt to deal here with Solidarity’s opinions on these two vitally important issues in the hope that this will stimulate further discus­sion in the revolutionary movement today.

I. The question of ‘bourgeois revolutions’ in the backward areas of world capitalism

The appendix states that “any bureaucracy, given favorable conditions can ‘solve’ the bourgeois tasks in the Third World.” It also points to the “new ruling classes in the process of formation” in the Third World which have set in motion the drive towards the ‘primitive accumulation’ of capital within their own national frontiers. These “belated bourgeois revolutions” Soli­darity also contends, allow for “higher consumption levels and welfare programs” for the masses.

In 1919 the Communist International asserted that capitalism had entered into its epoch of decadence, the era of world proletarian revolution or inter-imperialist war. But for Solidarity this is the epoch of ‘modern capitalism’ where everything is possible including “belated bourgeois revolutions” and endless economic progress for capitalism as a whole. The International Communist Current upholds the orientation of the IIIrd International today1. In the light of the last fifty years of counter-revolution and inter-imperialist war, it should be plain that internationally the capitalist class became a completely reactionary class as the period of capitalist decadence came into being with World War I. The epoch of bourgeois revolutions, the epoch of the ascendancy of capitalism as a progressive system of human reproduction, ends with the first imperialist war. Wars of ‘national liberation’ in this century have therefore become the arenas of world imperialist confrontation, testing-grounds for further global imperialist war, and the open grave for countless workers and peasants. Today, bourgeois revolutions are impossible. Only the communist revolution can lift humanity to an era of new progress and development.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the bourgeois revolution was an historical possibility. Such revolutions, as Marx was able to see, were progressive political movements helping to unleash the enormous productive forces of ascendant capitalism. These revolutions irresistibly tore asunder old pre-capitalist and feudal fetters on social progress. From local, regional, and national markets, the bourgeoisie expanded its system in leaps and bounds to create the world market and the world proletariat. Indeed, the most progressive function fulfilled by the young bourgeois order was its creation and consolidation of the world market. But by 1914 this market had become saturated in relation to the growing produc­tive capacity of the global system. From then on the system entered its age of decline, a period of permanent crisis and cyclical imperialist war, a period characterized by the unceasing growth of waste production and preparations for further war.

It is also wrong to talk of ‘primitive accumulation’ in the backward areas of capi­talism today. Such a stage in the develop­ment of capitalism was a progressive moment in the destruction of feudalism and the creation of the proletariat on a world scale. Primitive accumulation is thus a historical component of ascendant capitalism. It can­not take place again during the epoch of capitalism’s decadence. It is nonsense to speak of imperialism and primitive accumu­lation taking place at one and the same time in a system which has created a global capi­talist market. The objective conditions for socialism not only exist already on a world scale, but they have been in existence for over fifty years. Only the defeat of the proletarian wave of struggle of 1917-23 allowed for the bestial counter-revolution of Stalinism and its many other state capi­talist variants such as Maoism and Castroism. These counter-revolutionary movements did not unleash the productive forces nationally or internationally. They did not open up new horizons for humanity as the American and French Revolutions of 1776 and 1789, or even the European Revolutions of 1848 did. Rather they have appeared as expressions of the victory of the counter-revolution over the proletariat. Stalin’s Five-Year Plans and Mao’s collectivizations were not historically progressive; they were inevit­able once the proletarian alternative to decadent capitalism -- world revolution -- was crushed by the bourgeoisie including its left-wing forces, the Stalinists. Only the proletarian revolution is progressive for humanity today. Any other ‘revolution’ is basically the convulsion of a faction of the bourgeoisie reacting to the crisis, imperia­list war, and the reed to statify the economy. And since the entire world economy is bound today within completely putrid relations of production, any statification of the national economy (or what Solidarity calls ‘primitive accumulation’) is simply the strengthening of such outmoded relations of production at a national level. For all these reasons, the Weimar Republic, for example, was not the ‘belated’ German bourgeois revolution. On the contrary, it represented the destruc­tion of the proletarian revolution in Germany, the massacre of more than 20,000 proletarian militants in the period between 1918 and 1919. The victory of the world counter­revolution can never be confused by revolu­tionaries with a period, gone forever, in the ascendancy of capitalism.

Despite the banalities of economic ‘experts’, material progress is not measured by increa­ses in output, by the creation of more fac­tories, full employment nor even by an apparent growth in the size or education of the working class. Today, such technocratic myths serve only to hide the gangrenous bloating of the waste-production sector. In other words, the development of the means of destruction doesn’t increase the amount of use values which can be productively consumed in the process of capitalist accumulation. For global capital, including the backward sectors of the world economy, waste production and military expenditure constitutes a sterilization of surplus value. A brief examination of the ‘economic pro­gress’ achieved by Solidarity’s ‘belated bourgeois revolutions’ will show that there has been no such material progress in those countries. Economic decay has continued in such places and if anything the contradic­tions in their societies have become more brutal, more intolerable. China, Cuba, Vietnam, etc have huge state expenditures geared towards waste production and a war economy; China spends more than 30 per cent of its national produce in armaments. These countries cannot escape the laws of the sys­tem anymore than a European country or Russia and America can. Everywhere the proletariat faces austerity, hidden or open unemployment, increased exploitation, greater police repres­sion, inflation and savage wage cuts. Every­where the proletariat is being forced to obey the dictates of a system veering more and more towards imperialist war, towards full-blown barbarism. So much for Solida­rity’s ‘higher consumption levels’ and ‘welfare programs’.

The Ist International could support Lincoln in the North’s struggle against the slave-holding South during the American Civil War; similarly the workers’ movement of the last century supported Elements of the ‘Jacobin’ petty bourgeoisie in Italy, Poland and Ireland in their struggles against feudalism and absolutist reaction. Why was this the case? The reason is completely overlooked by Solidarity in its appendix. At that time, the proletariat was still struggling within the social context of an economically progressive system. As such the working class could support specific capitalist tendencies without losing its own class autonomy. Capital as a whole was not pitted solely against the proletariat. The struggle against feudalism waged by the bourgeoisie and supported by the proletariat liberated capitalist relations of production and in so doing strengthened the proletariat in preparation for its own revolution in the future when capitalism had outlived its historically progressive role. In present-day conditions, this strategy only leads the working class to massacre, since the bourgeoisie everywhere is pitted foremost against the proletariat. Capitalism is a world system today. Feudalism was vanqui­shed by the rise of capitalism in its ascen­dant period. In an epoch of world imperia­lism there can be no bourgeois revolution against feudalism. National liberation in the Third World today does not signify the struggle of rising capitalism against pre-capitalist or feudal modes of production, but inter-imperialist struggle waged at the level of a particular national capital. To claim, as Solidarity does, that ‘bourgeois revolution’ can happen today but that the proletariat should not support the bourgeoi­sie in its ‘struggle’ is totally absurd. When bourgeois revolutions against feudalism were possible, the proletariat could and did support them. Today, the reason why the proletariat cannot support any faction of the bourgeoisie is because capitalism has completed its historic mission. What’s on the historic agenda now is the communist revolution.

However, since Solidarity argues that ‘bourgeois revolutions’ are possible today in underdeveloped countries, what is the basis of its opposition to the regimes which emerge from such ‘revolutions’? After all Solidarity agrees with the claims made by these governments that economic development has taken place as a result of the ‘revolu­tion’. Solidarity is even willing to flatter such governments by calling them ‘Jacobin’ or bourgeois revolutionaries. But by forsaking a materialist analysis of the develop­ment historically of capitalism, Solidarity is left only with moralism when it sets about to oppose such regimes. Its opposition is purely idealist and utopian. Hence Solidarity pours scorn on the ‘belated bour­geois revolutionaries’ when it writes about Ceylon or Vietnam or China, while at the same time admitting that they are fulfilling a progressive and inevitable historical task in developing further the productive forces of capitalism. But if this were true, then there would be nothing ‘belated’ about the rise of Mao, Castro, or Allende. In fact their rise would be quite timely for capital. Furthermore, this whole epoch could justi­fiably be characterized as one of the ‘per­manent bourgeois revolution’, promising an eternal development of capitalist society until such time as the last Patagonian vill­age engages in ‘expanded reproduction’, having finished its ‘own’ primitive accumulation.

In Solidarity’s view there is therefore a strange separation between economic reality and class struggle. For Marxists, capita­lism must become a decadent social system before the world proletariat can struggle directly for communism. If capitalism can continue to develop economically, if ‘bela­ted bourgeois revolutions’ can occur today, then the communist revolution is not only objectively impossible but subjectively impossible in the minds of the whole prole­tariat, until such time as capital ended this progressive evolution. But for Solidarity it is quite irrelevant whether or not capitalism is or is not decadent as a system of economic reproduction. The sub­jective awareness of the ‘order-takers’ is all that is important. If the ‘order-takers’ want revolution, then revolution there will be even if that means that the proletarian revolution is taking place simultaneously with the bourgeois revolution in some other part of the globe! If they were logical, then Solidarity should take up the position that proletarian revolution was possible anytime, even in the nineteenth century. If the objective conditions of capitalist decadence today do not matter then why should the objective conditions of capitalist development in its ascendant phase matter either?

In the eyes of the Marxist movement, however, the proletarian revolution obeys historical necessity. The proletarian revolution is on the historical agenda only when capita­lism world-wide has entered into its era of decline and decay.

In Solidarity’s view, capitalism has a comp­letely autonomous political superstructure independent of its economic foundations. Cuba, China, Russia, have all developed ‘economically’ but ‘politically’ the reper­cussions of these ‘belated bourgeois revo­lutions’ are considered negative and reactionary. But the truth is that there’s a real interconnection between the economic decay of the world capitalist system and its political decay. The ‘economic progress’ of the many ‘liberated’ backward countries like China, North Korea or Vietnam impresses scribes like Myrdal and Cajo Brendel, but revolutionaries must understand the real content of such ‘progress’. We have already mentioned the chronic waste production of these economies, and the fact that they are police states. The need of the bourgeoisie in this epoch, especially in these regimes, to brutally repress the proletariat expres­ses the deep weaknesses of such regimes, both on the economic and political level. Such regimes have to compete militarily in order to survive on the world market. With the exception of Russia (itself a dominant imperialist power, if weaker than the US), such regimes can have only a fragile and precarious existence, bandied from one imperialist bloc to the other. It is com­pletely impossible for these regimes to gain any national independence. Whenever such areas have been used as arenas of inter-imperialist struggle (as in ‘heroic’ Vietnam), they have only served to strengthen the imperialist might of one or other of the two imperialist blocs. National liberation struggles (sic) never ‘weaken’ imperialism as the leftists (and Solidarity in its Vietnam pamphlet) claim. The American bourgeoisie is as secure an imperialist power today as it was prior to the Vietnam War. It is equally absurd to talk about the ‘bourgeois revolutions’ in the Third World developing the productive forces pro­gressively in such countries. None of these ‘liberated’ national capitals have reached even near the level of labor productivity of the advanced countries. Instead of the arbitrary and local comparisons that the apologists for such regimes go in for, a real comparison would be between the economic productivity of the advanced countries in relation to that achieved by the ‘national liberation’ regimes today. Rather than mea­suring Mao’s China up against the Kuomin­tang’s, a real comparison would be to mea­sure it up against the economic levels of the advanced sectors of capitalism. The constrictions of the capitalist relations of production on the advanced western econo­mies (with their 22 million unemployed, idle plant and raging inflation) is the same restriction which is strangling the Chinese economy today. It is the very fetter which will keep the productivity of labor extremely low in China in comparison to the developed countries, just as Stali­nist Russia has never managed in the last fifty years to reach the level of labor productivity of the advanced capitalist countries in the west. From this concrete standpoint, one sees that the gap between the more developed sectors and the backward ones of world capital increases inexorably every year, on a geometric scale. And the advanced countries faced with the decadence of the whole system, head toward another global imperialist war, and drag all the ‘liberated’ nations with them, towards barbarism.

The question of the backward areas of capi­talism can only be posed on the global scale. Solidarity, like the Mensheviks and similar Social Democratic tendencies before it, bases its whole perspective on the iso­lated example of a national economy. Accor­ding to Luxemburg’s analysis made at the beginnings of this epoch, the future of the backward areas of capitalism was insolubly linked to the decadence of the whole system. Today, after two world wars, after the establishment of a permanent war economy, after more than fifty years of protracted economic and social decay in the wake of a defeated international revolution, it is impossible to take seriously the bizarre fantasies of Paul Cardan and his ‘Modern Capitalism’, the proclamation of the eternal development of capitalism. For the prole­tariat the question of whether the system is ascendant or decadent has been forever answered by the barbaric cycles of crises-wars and reconstructions of this century. And as the international proletariat re­emerges into the political arena, after having suffered the worst counter-revolutio­nary period in its history, only the blind will continue to speak of the ‘belated bourgeois revolution’ when faced with the first stirrings of the second revolutionary wave of this century.

II. The Russian Revolution

The other main confusion within the appendix published by Solidarity lies in the remarks the group makes about the Russian Revolution. These remarks reveal Solidarity’s profound confusions about this vital episode in the history of the workers’ movement. We read: “ ... the ‘permanent revolution’ in Russia ... both began and ended as a bourgeois revolution (in spite of the proletariat’s alleged ‘leading role’ in the unfolding of the process).” Amazingly, this old Menshe­vik confusion is presented by Solidarity as a great discovery. But unfortunately for Solidarity, this great ‘innovation’ had no basis in reality when the Mensheviks first said it, and neither has it today.

Many anarchist tendencies, along with the Social Democrats, have rejected the Russian Revolution. This is not surprising in view of their rejection of Marxism. Indeed, in the case of Solidarity, although it never had defended Marxism, it felt nevertheless obliged to reject the experience of the proletariat’s October Revolution in order to join in the libertarian chorus. The main litany in this chorus has been the assertion that Stalinism equaled Leninism which equaled Marxism. By means of this formula, the libertarians start with the counter-revolution and equate it with the thought and action of the working class. By looking at the counter-revolution and rejecting what they understand of it, Soli­darity then goes on to reject both the practical experience and theoretical weapon of the class struggle. They reject not only the workers’ experiences in the Russian Revolution, but also the entire revolutio­nary period of struggle between 1917 and 1923: workers’ uprisings, the movement of the workers’ councils, the regroupment of revolutionaries in the IIIrd International and the clarification which came out of its first Congresses, and the understanding which flowed from the struggles waged by the left-wing of the Communist International against its degeneration when the world revolution entered into reflux. Was all this so much adventurism, merely the conse­quence of the Russian ‘bourgeois revolution’ as the Mensheviks proclaimed? Was the Russian ‘bourgeois revolution’ on the hist­orical agenda during this epoch of imperia­list decay, during the epoch of wars and revolutions, during the epoch of the deadly struggle between world capitalism and the international proletariat? Had the revolu­tionaries who regrouped around the cry “Turn the imperialist war into a civil war against capitalism” been misguided utopians or even cunning Machiavellians out to gain power for themselves at the expense of the imper­ialist war effort? Was the entire Russian experiment in the dictatorship of the proletariat -- tentative as it was -- of workers’ councils, and autonomous proletarian activity, simply a delusion, something best forgotten by today’s working class?

Is the final failure of the Russian Revolu­tion identical to the evolution of the proletariat’s consciousness in 1917, when it became conscious of the need to destroy the bourgeois state of Kerensky, an event which made the dictatorship of the proleta­riat a living reality in a revolutionary epoch? That the working class was not able to extend its power internationally is evi­dent. And it is equally evident from any reading of the documents of the early years of the Communist International and the writings of the Russian revolutionaries of that period that it was recognized in the workers’ camp that continued isolation of the Russian Revolution would end in defeat for the proletarian bastion. In a subjec­tive sense, the confusions of the proletariat, reflected in its political minorities inclu­ding the Bolshevik Party, ultimately doomed the Russian Revolution and the revolutionary wave as a whole to failure. But it seems a sterile hindsight and a curious fatalism to say that both February and October 1917 very concretely doomed the proletarian revolution (in Russia and internationally) from the beginning. And this is what Soli­darity claims in its appendix on the Russian Revolution. One can see death already in a newborn baby, and perhaps on this Kierkegaard is more appealing than Marx. But historical processes depend upon the active and conscious intervention of class forces which cannot be understood like a medieval mystery play. What the proleta­riat lacked in 1917-23 was sufficient exper­ience and clarity as to the needs thrust upon it by the advent of the new epoch. It was being catapulted onto a new historical plane just as it emerged from the carnage of the first imperialist war. It attempted to destroy capitalism, but it failed on that occasion. But no revolutionaries would have asserted at the time that all was lost from the start! Those who claimed then that only a ‘bourgeois revolution’ was on the agenda, like Plekhanov did in Russia and Ebert and Noske did in Germany, either sought to excuse the execution of the revolutionary proletariat or became its butchers themselves.

It is from the experience of the working class in that period with all its negative as well as positive lessons, that revolutio­naries are able to draw fundamental lessons for our class today. For example, the lessons about the reactionary role of the trade unions, of reformism, of parliamenta­rism, frontism, anti-fascism, national liberation struggles etc. Therefore, the Russian Revolution constitutes for revolu­tionaries and for the whole revolutionary class, the most important event of that enormous revolutionary wave which engulfed the capitalist world from 1917 to 1927. To dismiss this experience of the proletariat, as Solidarity so naively does, is indeed to cut oneself off from the history of the proletariat. For us, this would be to deny our very substance as a historic part of the struggle of the working class. For Solida­rity, which more and more claims to repre­sent the viewpoint of the ‘individual’, this heavy historical responsibility towards understanding the experience of the prole­tariat is of less and less interest.

Solidarity will sooner or later reach the end of its long negative evolution and dis­appear as many similar confused groups have. Solidarity’s incoherent positions are a result of their incapacity to break fully with their leftist past. Like the French group Socialisme ou Barbarie, which held similar ideas and dissolved in 1967, Soli­darity came from a split in post-war Trotskyism. Believing themselves to be ‘innova­tors’, these tendencies never attempted to establish a continuity with the traditions and lessons defended by the left communist fractions (Italian, German and Dutch Lefts). Thus they never completely broke with the counter-revolution. They could not see, for example, that their ‘innovations’ were out­worn conceptions or misunderstandings long since refuted by the revolutionary movement. Their whole arrogant outlook was based on a fragmentary, individualist critique of the counter-revolution. Hence Socialisme ou Barbarie could still defend the idea of a Leninist party, and defend national libera­tion struggles and ‘union work’. Gradually anarchist conceptions akin to those of Stirner, of Proudhon, began to permeate their activities. Solidarity and similar groups began to defend what they called ‘self-management’, and more and more it was unclear whether the proletariat was the communist class in our epoch. These confu­sions were rationalized by the strong influ­ence of bourgeois sociology, and soon the ‘innovators’ of Socialisme ou Barbarie and Solidarity began to defend the ideas of renegades like Burnham, Rizzi and other bourgeois academics like Marcuse and Bell who proclaimed that the proletariat was dead, and that the ‘bureaucracy’ was a new social class which disproved Marxism.

Although Solidarity’s initial break with Trotskyism revealed a healthy effort of clarification, it showed also the near impossibility of a healthy development of a whole tendency arising from the capitalist political apparatus. Today, when the prole­tariat is re-emerging on a world-wide scale, the ideas of Solidarity will appear more and more cynical and anachronistic. Side by side with that re-emergence, the present, revolutionary movement will also contribute to the demise of Solidarity’s ideas. Indeed, the present movement is forced to mercilessly criticize all confusions which stem from the counter-revolution. And it is forced to do so by the very demands of the communist revolution, which require the greatest clarity and coherence as a precondition for revolutionary practice. The incapacity to say what is and what is not, the inability to learn lessons from the past, a political spinelessness and impotence, all these are characteristics of a dying political tendency. Solidarity shares all these crippling defects. If the present revolu­tionary movement were to benefit from any lasting contribution by Solidarity, that would be the fast cessation of Solidarity’s sterile existence.

J.McIver

1 See the recent ICC pamphlet Nation or Class? for a comprehensive Marxist analysis of ‘national liberation struggles’.

The author of this critique was a participant to the drafting of Solidarity’s ‘Thirdworldism or Socialism’ many years ago. Today, in the ranks of the International Communist Current, this comrade can appreciate the attraction that Solidarity’s ideas can have in the present revolutionary movement. The hope is therefore not only that a further discussion continues on these topics, but that the new revolutionaries acquire the necessary clarity to confront outworn concepts which can only be obstacles to revolutionary activity. Without that necessary clarity the goal that they defend will never become ‘hard as steel, clear as glass’ (Gorter).

 

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • The national question [42]

People: 

  • Socialisme ou Barbarie [101]
  • Cornelius Castoriadis [102]

1979 - 16 to 19

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International Review no.16 - 1st quarter 1979

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Iran: Crisis, Revolt and Workers’ Strikes

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More than ten thousand deaths in one year; day after day, month after month, endless demonstrations, unceasing repression; the whole country paralyzed by the quasi-general strike by oil workers, by hospital, bank, transportation and newspaper workers; warn­ings and even threats by the great powers; evacuation of foreign personnel; endless comings and goings between the army, the Shah, the religious opposition and the National Front: all these events have shown up the social decomposition, the political crisis, the paralysis of Iranian capital. They are also the illustration in one country of the characteristics and perspectives of the present situation of world capitalism as a whole.

The world crisis

On the economic level, the myth of Iran, which for a longtime was put forward as an example of a developing nation (the Shah promised that it would be fifth in the world league table by the end of the century), has collapsed like a house of cards.

In 1973, for the first time, the chronic foreign deficit of Iran was paid off, and in 1974 exports exceeded imports by 52 per cent. This led many to believe that Iran was ‘tak­ing off’ economically, as was supposed to be the case with Brazil. At last, it was said, a third world country is showing that it is possible to break out of underdevelop­ment. But the illusion was quickly dissi­pated when the export surplus fell to 23 per cent in 1975. In fact, dependent as it was on oil for 96 per cent of its exports, Iran was simply benefiting from the purely conjunctural quadrupling of oil prices. This had nothing to do with profiting from the sale of a product which had suddenly become ‘rare’ on the market, as all the noise about the ‘oil shortage’ tried to make us believe. It was the result of a price rise which was favored by the USA and its big companies, who wanted to bring some order to a market over-saturated with black gold, so that they could defend their own profits. Through the price rise, the USA, itself one of the main oil-producing nations, was increasingly able to put its allies and competitors -- Europe and Japan -- on rations. This made American production more competitive on the world market, while making its allies pay for the arming of the oil producing countries (with Eurodollars supplied to OPEC through oil purchases).

The ‘new wealth’ of the oil-producing coun­tries was soon battered down under the hammer blows of bitter competition on the world market, the result of overproduction in all areas, including oil. Iran had to moderate its grandiose ambitions and concentrate its efforts on the vital sectors of the national economy. The ‘take off’ of Iran had had its day: it wasn’t a youthful surge of health for the national economy but a brief flicker in the general agony of world capitalism. From now on there was no question of pros­perity any more: all that was left was a growing debt incurred through massive pur­chases of ultra-sophisticated arms and ready-built factories which the bourgeoisie never really managed to use properly.

On the political level, the Iranian bourgeoi­sie -- its power based entirely on the army, the only force in an underdeveloped country capable of providing the state with a mini­mum of cohesion -- now had a smaller and smaller margin of maneuver. The monarchy of the all-powerful Shah wasn’t a form of backward, anachronistic feudalism which the bourgeoisie could get rid of in order to make progress. It was a form of concentrated state capitalism, resulting from the histo­ric, structural weakness of the national capital. The evolution of Iran has been based on the attempt to ‘modernize’ the eco­nomy and pare down the archaic sectors of the productive apparatus. It has been oriented entirely towards the war economy: arms and oil have been the only real areas of ‘development’ and profit. This is an irreversible evolution.

No policy of the bourgeoisie today can call into question the preponderant role of the army and the orientation of the national economy around the one meager resource that it does have within the world market. Under such a regime, so characteristic of under­developed countries, everything has to be imported and ‘business’ gets done with money supplied by exports, with all that this implies in deals, frauds, diversion of funds, etc. This gives rise to oppositions within the bourgeoisie, but none of them can really question the source of revenues and the overall functioning of the system. No policy of the bourgeoisie can really be against the elimination of non-profitable sectors of the productive apparatus, because that’s the only way of avoiding further bankruptcy.

For these reasons, there is no really stable, long term alternative to the crisis which has provoked such ferment among all classes and strata of the population. In the last analysis, the only thing the bourgeoisie can offer the poverty-stricken insurgent masses are machine guns and massacres. The only thing that can be done by the opposi­tion forces from the mullahs to the National Front is to dispute over how to use the state and the army to do the one thing that the whole bourgeoisie needs: getting the economy going again.

The idea of a ‘1789 Revolution’ in Iran, which is being put forward by the whole propaganda machine at the service of a crisis-ridden bourgeoisie, is just a decep­tion. When the entire world capitalist system is in crisis, there’s no room for prosperity and development within the frame­work of capitalism. The history of Iran over the last fifty years has been entirely marked not by feudalism (if that were the case then the bourgeoisie today could offer a progressive way forward) but by capitalist decadence, by the counter-revolution which followed the revolutionary wave of 1917-23 and the division of the world which came after the Second World War. When the Coss­ack General Reza Khan, father of the present Shah, took power in 1921 and proclaimed him­self emperor in 1925, the epoch of bourgeois revolutions had long been over. The regime was installed with the blessing of the Allies on the ruins of world war and on the defeat of the international proletariat. The regime tottered during World War II because of its leanings towards the Axis powers, but was put back on its feet by the western victors after the Yalta agreement between east and west. Order was restored to the advantage of the west, which supported the Shah against Mossadegh, whose nationalism wasn’t sufficiently bent to western interests.

The present crisis in Iran is from all points of view -- historical, economic, political -- an integral part of the world crisis of the capitalist system.

Social decomposition, political crisis and workers’ struggles

By hitting at the whole means of subsistence of the classes and strata who compose Iran­ian society, the crisis has led to the dis­location and decomposition of social life. More and more forced to hang on to the things that simply keep it in power, the bourgeoisie can offer no material remedies to this situation. On the contrary, the bourgeoisie is forced to throttle wages and jobs, to slash subsidies to the unemployed workers and sub-proletarians, to cut down on jobs for students, on the profits of small traders, on unprofitable investment. Social contradictions thus break out openly. On the one hand, within the ruling class it­self, the resort to corruption, rackets and ‘bakshish’ by the governing clique has kind­led the anger of those excluded from the centers of power. On the other hand, pov­erty increases and the mass of pauperized elements swell larger and larger, aggrava­ting their discontent and forcing them to revolt. When all these conditions converge and the population is faced with a state power that is identified with a narrow cli­que, the mass uprising is that much more determined and extensive. The more the foundations of class rule are weakened by the crisis, the more cruelly and arrogantly the domination is imposed.

As with the movement against the Somoza dic­tatorship in Nicaragua, in Iran mass anger and recrimination have crystallized against the Shah, his family, his political police. As in Nicaragua, the whole ‘people’ has been regrouped in demonstrations demanding the departure of the tyrant, and the regime has again and again replied with military repres­sion, which has littered the streets with corpses (in Tehran last September 3-5,000 were killed in one da). But when the workers’ strikes broke out, first in the oil industry and then in other sectors, the bourgeoisie had to give in to the workers’ wage demands (rises of up to 50 per cent) in order to get production going again. In order to ensure this, the army was sent into the oil towns, martial law was installed, meetings were forbidden and the ‘ringleaders’ of the strikes arrested. But strikes then broke out against repression, against the army, blocking production once again, and giving a new impulse to the whole social movement.

This time, contrary to what happened in Nicaragua, the attack on the symbol of capi­talist rule was backed up by a movement which paralyzed the very foundations of that rule. The demand for the Shah’s departure, which at the beginning was a pious wish used in the maneuvers of the mullahs and the National Front, and to which the government’s response was just more repression, became a vital question for the bourgeoisie as soon as its profits were threatened by the strikes. Distinct from the ‘people’, the working class showed that it had the capa­city to resist the attacks of the bourgeoi­sie. Alongside the demands of classes and strata with widely differing, interests and motivations -- the ruined merchants of the bazaars, capitalists sucked dry by the Shah’s clique, poverty-stricken sub-prole­tarians, students with no future, the indeci­sive and fluctuating petty bourgeoisie -- the working class began to defend its own collective, material interests, while at the same time concretizing the aspirations of all the pauperized strata of society.

The petty bourgeoisie and the intermediary strata are scattered in a multitude of part­icular interests and, by themselves, can only end up submitting to capital or revolt­ing desperately against it. The working class on the other hand, grouped as a collec­tive body at the heart of capitalist produc­tion, can mount a real resistance to poverty and repression, and thus open the way to the only historic alternative: the destruction of capitalism. It is this reality which is unfolding in Iran despite the smokescreen of appeals to Allah and his prophet Khomeini, or the wheelings and dealings of the Natio­nal Front.

“(the working class) has no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old, collap­sing bourgeois society itself is pregnant.” (Marx, Third Address of the General Council of the IWA on the Paris Commune of 1871)

This movement accentuated the political crisis and broke the fragile equilibrium of the Iranian state. The state first responded to its difficulties with open repression. The Shah received repeated support from the USA, and even after the September massacre President Carter continued to talk about the ‘liberal’ nature of the regime, thus showing that all his talk about ‘human rights’ is nothing but hot air. The USSR maintained a benevolent neutrality. The British Minister of Foreign Affairs (David Owen) pledged firm support to the Shah. China also gave its support with the visit of Hua Kao Feng. Everyone believed that the only hope was in the Shah’s regime and his army. No one had any alternative proposal. But the growing ‘chaos’ pushed the bourgeoisie to look for other options. France, the best agent of western foreign policy, was already keeping the religious opposition under its wing and had given a warm welcome to Ayatollah Khomeini after his expulsion from Iraq. The Shah freed members of the National Front from prison. But any attempt to restore order can only be based on the support of the army; this is why the government has had to resort to martial law, and the opposition has had to issue repeated calls to the army to go over to its side. At the same time, the bourgeoisie has had to find some way of justifying itself in front of the population, of rallying together those fractions of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie who are neutral, passive or opposed to corruption. That’s why it has been looking for ‘men of integrity’ who haven’t compromised them­selves with the regime. Ayatollah Khomeini and the National Front have kept up the radical facade which is needed to prevent things getting out of hand, crying louder and louder for the departure of the Shah and the end of his regime. At the very same moment, the National Front was supplying the man most likely to start the ball rolling -- Bakhtiar -- and Ayatollah Khomeini was setting up an oil commission in order to ask the workers to go back to work in the interests of ‘popular consumption’.

This is no easy task as long as the ‘people’ are still in the streets. And when the wor­kers are mobilizing and organizing themselves, the appeals of the opposition -- even the most credible and resolute ones -- can rebound back in its face. Thus, the workers were effectively controlling essential supplies. The army had to intervene to stop this and the Ayatollah said nothing about it. For these phantoms of the past, ‘the people’ is just an empty word used to serve the natio­nal interest. If it has any meaning for the proletariat, it can only refer to the wor­kers’ solidarity with all the poverty-stricken masses, and real solidarity can only be based on the autonomous power of the working class. It can never have the same meaning it has for all the humanists, demo­crats, and populists, who offer their ser­vices for the defense of the national capi­tal and see the ‘people’ as a mass to be manipulated for their own ambitions.

This illustration of the political crisis shows that the bourgeoisie in Iran -- as will more and more be the case all over the world -- has no way out of its crisis. The bour­geoisie’s ‘political men’ can more and more be seen as men of transition, as technicians who, as far as the needs and possibilities of the bourgeoisie allow, act as a cover for the real men of the bourgeoisie -- the men of the army, the police and all the other repressive forces of the state. In Iran, the alternative isn’t Khomeini or the army or Sandjabi or the army: as long as the capitalist state exists, the army will always be there, with Khomeini, Sandjabi or the Shah. The change of governmental teams can only be a new mask for the army and its role of containment, because it’s the only force the bourgeoisie can base its power on. Historically, the only two forces who will confront each other in a decisive manner are the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the army and the workers.

In the immediate future, the bourgeoisie will try to deal with the working class by dissolving it into the whole population, demobilizing the class in order to perpet­uate the dictatorship of capital. All the political discussions and maneuvers within the bourgeoisie -- government, opposition, army -- is aimed at controlling the revolt, at getting the workers and the insurgent population to make a distinction between the Shah and the state; thus they have shown their willingness to get rid of the Shah in order to protect the state.

“The revolution until the Shah leaves” was the cry of the Tehran demonstrators. If the overturning of the Imperial throne is enough to bring the workers’ struggle to an end, the bourgeoisie will do everything it can to arrive at that point, to make the workers believe that the overthrow of the monarchy is the final goal of their movement.

For the bourgeoisie, no real perspective is opening up, either in the short or long term. The overthrow of the monarchy and the creation of a new government mean only the perpetuation and acceleration of the same conditions of crisis, misery, war and repression.

For the proletariat in the long term, the perspective is the destruction of the system through the communist revolution, which will come about through the extension and generalization of its struggle throughout the world, above all in the big industrial concentrations. The struggle of the working class in Iran is a moment in this general struggle. It isn’t limited to Iran; it’s a struggle which has opened up new experiences of the possibility of extending and generalizing the struggle; new experiences of class organization, of the relation of the working class to the poverty-stricken masses. It has shown to the proletariat of the whole world that, in a country situated in the front line of inter-imperialist antagonisms, the working class can forestall the attacks of the bourgeoisie.

For the working class in Iran, the immediate danger is that it will allow its interests to be diluted into those of the whole population by entering into an unnatural union with a particular faction of the bourgeoisie. Such an alliance could only bring more repression and exploitation. But the strength of the class is its capa­city to keep fighting on its own class terrain.

MG

Historic events: 

  • Iran 1978 [103]

Geographical: 

  • Iran [104]

The Second International Conference of Groups of the Communist Left

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IR 16, 1st Quarter 1979

In the second fortnight of November, the second Conference of communist groups met in Paris, to continue the work of the first, which took place in Milan during May, 1977, at the initiative of the Internationalist Communist Party (Battaglia Comunista). It is not our intention in this article to give a detailed account of the debates at this Conference. These will be the subject of a special pamphlet, to appear shortly in English, French and Italian, in order to allow all revolutionary militants to follow the effort at clarification undertaken through the confrontation of the groups participating at the Conference. More modestly, we propose in this article to outline what in our eyes is the great significance of this Conference, especially in the present situation. At the same time we want to reply to the thoroughly negative attitude that certain groups have decided to adopt towards this Conference.

First of all, we should underline the fact that this Conference was better prepared and better organized than the first, both politically and organizationally. Thus the invitation to the Conference was made on the basis of precise, political criteria: it was addressed to all those groups who:

1. Adhere to and defend the fundamental principles which presided over the proletarian revolution of October 1917 and the constitution of the IIIrd International in 1919, and on the basis of these principles aim to constructively, in the light of experience, criticize the political positions and practices elaborated by the CI;

2. Reject without any reservations the existence in any country of socialist regimes or workers’ governments, even those described as degenerated; make no class distinction between the countries of the Russian bloc or China and the countries of the western bloc and denounce any call to defend these countries as counter-revolutionary;

3. Denounce the Socialist Parties, the Communist Parties and their acolytes as parties of capital;

4. Categorically reject the ideology of ‘anti-fascism’ which establishes a class frontier between fascism and democracy or which calls on the workers to defend or support democracy against fascism;

5. Proclaim the necessity for communists to work for the reconstruction of the party, the indispensable weapon for the victory of the proletarian revolution.

Any worker will understand simply by looking at these criteria that this is not just lumping together all ‘willing souls’, but concerns truly communist groups who distinguish themselves clearly from the flora and fauna of leftism: Maoists, Trotskyists, etc, as well as from modernists and other bleating ‘anti-party’ councilists.

These criteria are certainly not enough to establish a political platform for regroupment, but are perfectly sufficient for knowing whom to discuss with and in what framework, so that the discussion can be really fruitful and constitute a positive step forward.

Furthermore, as an improvement on the first Conference, the agenda for the debates was established long before the Conference itself, thus allowing each group to present its views in texts written in advance, making the debates at the Conference clearer. The agenda was as follows:

1. The evolution of the crisis and the perspectives it opens for the struggle of the working class.

2. The position of communists towards so-called ‘national liberation’ movements.

3. The tasks of revolutionaries in the present period.

This agenda makes it clear that the Conference had nothing in common with the learned gatherings of academic apes, of sociologists and economists gargling with ‘theory’ in the abstract. A militant concern presided over the conference, seeking to draw out a greater understanding of the present world situation, of the worldwide crisis of capitalism, and the perspectives it opens up from the standpoint of the proletariat, as well as the resulting tasks of revolutionary groups within the class.

It was with this framework and spirit that a dozen groups from various countries were invited. Most responded favourably to the initiative, even if some were unable to attend for various reasons at the last moment. This was the case with Arbetarmakt from Sweden, Organization Communiste Revolutionnaire Internationaliste d’Algerie from France and II Leninista from Italy. However, we should note that four groups totally refused to participate. These were Spartacusbond from Holland, Pour Une Intervention Communiste (PIC) from France and the two International Communist Parties (PCI Programma and PCI Il Partito Comunista) from Italy.

It is not without interest to examine more closely the arguments put forward by each of these groups and the real motives behind their refusal. For Spartacus group is against any idea of a party. The very word party makes their hair stand on end. This group, born at the end of World War II, in vain lays claim to the tradition and continuity of the Dutch Left. At most, it can lay claim to Otto Ruhle seasoned with Sneevliet – but certainly not to Gorter or Pannekoek, neither of whom ever denied the necessity for the communist party. Spartacusbond is the self-confessed, senile end of the Council Communist current, turned into a little sect, folded in on itself, extremely isolated and daily isolating itself even further from the international workers’ movement. Its refusal to attend the Conference simply demonstrates the definitive exhaustion of the pure councilist current, as it increasingly mingles and integrates itself with the leftist tide. It is the sad end of an irreversible evolution produced by a long period of counter-revolution.

The attitude of the PIC is somewhat different. After agreeing in principle, it went back on its decision on the eve of the first Conference in Milan, considering that in the present circumstances it would be “a dialogue of the deaf”. For the second Conference, its refusal, on principle, was based on a refusal to participate in ‘Bordigo-Leninist’ conferences. Here again, we are seeing a precise evolution. When, five or six years ago, several comrades left Revolution Internationale to form the PIC group, they based their separation on the reproach that RI didn’t intervene enough. Leaving aside the verbal activism of the PIC, which has led them to all sorts of ‘conferences’ and ‘campaigns’ (sic!) – the latest always more artificial than the one before – it has become obvious today (as we always insisted it would) that the real debate was not intervention or non-intervention but what kind of intervention, on what terrain, and with whom. Thus the PIC, which from time to time gives itself over to ‘conferences’ with all kinds of semi-anarchist groups and elements, or with phantom groups of ‘autonomists’, conferences which end each time in a fiasco, is thoroughly well placed to talk about a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ when it comes to discussions between real communist groups. And this is not all. Returning from its unhappy attempts to set up an anti-ICC current with Revolutionary Perspectives, Workers’ Voice and the Revolutionary Workers’ Group (USA) (the last two of which have since disappeared without trace), the PIC, somewhat cool now towards groups of the communist left, has fallen in with elements of the socialist left and has participated in the group which initiated the reopening of the old left socialist review Spartacus, under the direction of its founder Rene Lefeuvre. In this review – whose pages are stuffed with the glorification of the Republican army of the Spanish war of 1936-39; with the great deeds of ‘anti-fascism’, the active promoter of the second world butchery; with warm praises for Marceau Pivert, for the PSOP (the pre-war PSU) and for the POUM; with the adulation and tender memories of the heroic Trotskyist actions in the war-time Resistance – the PIC finds itself at ease and takes part in editing it. Its delicate nostrils, unable to bear the horrible odour of ‘Bordigo-Leninism’, dilate voluptuously at the perfumed incense of left socialism and anti-authoritarianism. In this farmyard of social democracy [1] [105] they PICk about, entirely at their ease. They even allow themselves, from time to time, the pleasure of making ‘radical’ critiques and playing the role of ultra-revolutionary naughty children. It is true that the review Spartacus is very open, very broadminded. But being broadminded is not always a virtue! The unity that glues together the Spartacus team is a gut reaction against Bolshevism, which they deliberately and cunningly mix up with Stalinism. The ‘left’ socialists never waited for the appearance of Stalinism before denigrating the Bolsheviks, and combating the October revolution and communism in the name of ‘democratic socialism’. In the name of anti-Bolshevism, the left socialists have always been the wretched tail of Social Democracy, of the Scheidemanns and Noskes, the Turatis and the Blums. But it doesn’t worry the PIC to walk hand in hand with them. The PIC doesn’t use the arsenal of the Left Communist tradition to look for a serious critique of the positions of Lenin and the Bolsheviks; but instead they go PICking about in the dustbins of the Tsarist or Kerensky consulates, or in the dung heaps of left socialism. In its anti-Bolshevik frenzy, the PIC forgets that, whatever our differences with the Bolsheviks, they can’t change our judgement of social democracy – either right or left – for there is an impassable gulf separating communists from social democracy. It is a gulf based on allegiance to two world-class enemies, the communists belonging to the proletariat, the social democrats to the bourgeoisie.

Even if there were no other lessons, this one lesson we owe entirely to Lenin and the Bolsheviks. So it is not by accident, but because they have forgotten this lesson, that the PIC declines to stir from their feathered nest in the depths of the columns of Spartacus and refuses to discuss with ‘Bordigo-Leninists’. One might ask whether it is their visceral ‘anti-Leninism’ that makes the PIC cuddle up to the left socialists, or whether it’s rather their leaning towards left socialism and leftism that makes the PIC so ferociously ‘anti-Bolshevik? Or perhaps both at once? One thing remains sure: that the PIC finds itself located somewhere between Lenin and the left socialists, in other words, it is violently anti-Bolshevik (an example of its verbal radicalism) and it collaborates with the left socialists (an example of its opportunism in practice).

Not the least humorous part of the whole sorry tale is the article published in Jeune Taupe criticizing the group Combat Communiste. In this article the PIC ‘scolds’ Combat Communiste for their less than total break with the Trotskyists, and, on this particular occasion (doing something once is not a mortal sin) reminds them: “As Lenin said at Zimmerwald with regard to the Social Democrats (they are) outside the camp of the proletariat and so inside that of the bourgeoisie. It is impossible, if we are to have a minimum of consistency, to consider them as comrades, and still less to fight beside them” [2] [106](our emphasis). So the PIC is not completely amnesic even if it is a bit weak in the head. When it comes to admonishing Combat Communiste they remember quite well that: “for him (Lenin), the Social Democrats were enemies of the class and he called for a break with them. Thus the IIIrd International was to be constituted on the basis of opposition to any attempt to reconstitute the IInd” [3] [107]. Excellent memory! But you would think the PIC never looked at itself in the mirror. Unless, the break they consider indispensable with Trotskyism becomes less obvious when it comes to collaborating with the left socialists. We remain in agreement with the conclusion of the quoted article: “The years to come, which must see the resurgence of the proletariat on the stage of history, as the subject of its own future, will not tolerate the slightest theoretical confusion. What is today inconsistent and fanciful will tomorrow become mortally dangerous and counter-revolutionary. Now is the time to be definite and choose your camp” [4] [108]. Exactly! Absolutely correct! Should we draw the conclusion that the PIC, in refusing to come to the Conference for fear of contamination by the ‘Bordigo-Leninists’ while remaining calmly in the ranks of Spartacus, has already chosen its camp? The near future will tell us. [5] [109]

As for the two Bordigist PCIs, they did not deign to make their refusal known directly, but contented themselves with publishing an article in each of their respective presses, the one more denigrating and mocking than the other. When one calls oneself ‘International Communist Party’, one stays aloof and one doesn’t lower oneself to reply to others who are merely groups. Hell with it! One has one’s dignity to consider, even if one is only a little group, divided and sub-divided into three or four International Communist Parties, who take no notice of each other!

Originating, after Bordiga’s death, from an obscure split with the Programma organization, the Florentine group, in the strict Bordigist tradition whereby there can only ever be one party existing anywhere in the universe at one time, simply proclaimed itself to be the ‘International Communist Party’. This mighty ‘International Communist Party’ of Florence is clearly in a good position to rundown what they call the “wretched party builders” [6] [110]. How can we reassure these touchy types that no-one at the Conference was after what they consider as their exclusive property? Nobody at the Conference posed the problem of the immediate constitution of the Party, or even of a unified organization, for the simple reason that all the groups were perfectly aware of the immaturity of such a project. To think that the class party is decreed into existence simply by the will of a few militants and in no matter what conditions is to understand nothing of the problem. This voluntarist and idealist conception of the party, decreeing itself no matter when, independently of the conditions and development of the class struggle has nothing to do by the reality of the party as a living organism of the class, which appears and develops only when the conditions are present for it to effectively assume the tasks proper to it. The Bordigists’ juggling with terms like the ‘formal Party’ and the ‘historic Party’ serves only to cover their total ignorance of the difference between fractions or groups and the party, their non-comprehension of how the party is actually formed.

The conception of the nature and function of the party has raised many passionate debates in the marxist movement. It’s enough to recall the divergences between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, between the Bolshevik party and the German Left, between Bordiga and the Communist International, between the Italian Fraction from Bilan and the PCI as it was reconstituted at the end of World War II. It remains today a subject for discussion and precision within the left communist movement. Any group from some small provincial town is free to declare itself one fine day ‘the unique world party’ – there’s no law to prevent it. But to go from there to really being the party and believing in it, indicates a mild touch of megalomania. But for the Bordigist current, there can be no question of discussing their conception of the unique and monolithic Party, which takes power and exercises its dictatorship in the name of the proletariat, even against the will of the class. As Il Partito warns us: “Whoever opposes this conception or does not accept this programmatic and organizational discipline is placed outside the camp of the Left”. Useless to tell them that this conception is far from that of Marx and Engels, who didn’t amuse themselves by incessantly proclaiming themselves as ‘the Party’, or of Rosa Luxemburg, or even of Lenin, or of Bilan, or of the Italian Left in general; such a conception belongs lock, stock and barrel to Bordigism. And, let it be said without fear of excommunication, this is not our conception either.

It’s understandable that the Bordigists want to avoid any discussion and confrontation of positions with other communist groups. They don’t even discuss amongst themselves (organic centralism won’t allow it). For no sect dares to put into question the dogma of its invariant Bible. Their only argument is which one of their numerous parties will be the Party, universally recognized as such. These arguments bear a strange resemblance to those in a lunatic asylum, where each of the inmates considers himself the real, the One and Only Napoleon!

The Florentine Party, the last cast-off of the split before last, is not any the less ferocious. Offended that anyone should dare to invite them to the Conference, they hurl their warning like a thunderbolt: “these missionaries of unification, political groups of various traditions, are trying willy-nilly to constitute a political organization objectively against the Left and the Revolution”. Leaving aside the intended ‘missionary’ insult, we repeat once again that the Conference never posed the discussion on unification as an objective. No one is deafer than he who doesn’t want to hear. The hour has not yet struck for the unification in one party of the different communist groups existing today. But we think it’s high time that the communist groups came out of their hibernation, which has lasted only too long. During the last five decades, the counter-revolution has had the upper hand, not only over the class, but inevitably also over the international communist movement, which has severely reduced in size and influence. Few groups of the Communist Left have resisted this avalanche and survived. And those that have been able to survive have been deeply scarred by this whole process, which has developed in them a reflex of sectarian isolation, a defence mechanism of closing in on themselves.

Another reflex was to retreat forwards, putting a good face on a bad state of affairs, which was translated into the artificial construction of Parties. The Trotskyists were past masters of this game before World War II and the Bordigists have taken it up since then, carrying it even further and, as is their custom, pushing it to the absurd. In these conditions, the constitution of the Bordigist Party became a march in the opposite direction to reality, which could only run into defeat after defeat. The development of class struggle is a powerful factor in the process of homogenization in the class, and thus also in the organization of communists – the party; and it’s equally true that a period of reaction and counter-revolution is a factor in the process of the atomization of the class and the dispersion of the organization of the class. The Bordigist Party could not escape from this law – hence the process of incessant splits within its ranks.

We know that Bordiga was more cautious as to whether the immediate constitution of the Party in 1945 was well-timed. It was the same for Vercesi, who, two years later openly challenged the decision to set up the Party, in line with the critique that he himself had developed ten years earlier in Bilan against the initiatives of Trotsky. But at least for Trotsky the constitution of the Party was a correct conclusion based on an incorrect analysis. Trotsky saw in the France of the Popular Front and in the Spanish Civil War “the beginning of a revolutionary upsurge” which implied the necessity to immediately constitute the Party. The Bordigist Party can’t even claim a false analysis. This is why it has developed an aberrant theory that completely detaches the constitution of the party from any link with the real situation of the proletarian struggle. In his pyramidic conception of the Party, even Bordiga (who sat at the top of the pyramid) remained nonetheless based on the class of which he was the direct product. In the dialectic of today’s Bordigists, by contrast, the Party rests suspended in mid-air, as if it had been levitated, completely detached from the real movement of the class: it can be constituted even if the class is undergoing the worst conditions of defeat and demoralization – all it needs is its theoretical understanding and its will. With every little Bordigist group thus turning its back on the experience of the working class, turning up its nose at its lessons, and proclaiming itself as the Unique Reconstituted World Party, it’s not surprising that they understand absolutely nothing of the significance of a period of rising class struggle, of the process that this necessity implies, of the tendency towards the regroupment of revolutionaries. So the Bordigists continue to march against the tide.

Yesterday they went up when the escalator was going down, today they step down when the escalator is going up. Twenty years ago, they hurled calls for the regroupment of revolutionaries into the desert. Today, when it appears possible, they don’t cease to denigrate it, shutting themselves up, along with their ‘dignity’ in the isolation of their cocoon. Any idea of discussion amongst revolutionaries is for them pure blasphemy, not to mention regroupment that, it seems, can never be anything but “the constitution of a political organization objectively against the left and the revolution”. Are we really to believe that they are that ignorant of the real, rather than the mythical, history of the revolutionary movement? Weren’t the Communist League, the Ist, IInd, and IIIrd Internationals, and all the workers’ parties, all constituted through a process of encounter and discussion amongst the scattered groups, in a converging movement towards a political and organizational unity? Didn’t Lenin’s Iskra advocate this process so as to leave behind the dispersed ‘circles’ and give birth to the Russian Party? Did the (late) constitution of the Italian Communist Party at Livorno follow any different path? And wasn’t the precipitous reconstruction of the PCI after World War II, also the product of meetings between various groups?

The PCI of Florence ends its article with the complaint: “It is tiresome to have to periodically attend such miseries.” Basically they are right; they have quite enough misery on their own plate without having to look for it elsewhere.

Only slightly different – as regards the basis of its arguments – is the reply from the second PCI (Programma). What makes it especially distinguished is its grossness. The article’s title, ‘The struggle between the Fottenti and Fottuti’ (literally, the struggle between the fuckers and the fucked) indicates already the stature that the Programma PCI gives itself – which really is hardly accessible to anyone else. Are we to believe that Programma is so saturated in Stalinist habits that they can only imagine the confrontation of positions among revolutionaries in terms of ‘rapists’ and ‘raped’? For Programma, no discussion is possible among groups who base themselves on the firm ground of communism; in fact it’s especially impossible among such groups. One may, if it comes to the crunch, march alongside Trotskyists, Maoists and such like in a phantom soldiers’ committee, or sign leaflets with these and other leftists for ‘the defense of immigrant workers’, but never can one consider discussion with other communist groups, or even among the numerous Bordigist Parties. Among these groups there can only be a rapport de force, and if they can’t be destroyed, their very existence must be ignored! Rape or impotence, such is the sole alternative that Programma wants to offer the communist movement, the sole model for relations between its groups. Not having any other conception, they see this vision everywhere and gladly attribute it to others. An international conference of communist groups cannot, in their eyes, have any other objective than splitting off a few members from another group. And if Programma didn’t come, it’s certainly not for lack of desire to ‘rape’, but because they were afraid of being impotent.

In vain does Programma heap a string of sarcasms on the criteria that served as a framework for inviting the groups. Would they have preferred the absence of any criteria? Or would they have preferred other criteria, and if so, which ones if you please? The criteria which have been established aim to set out a framework which would allow a discussion between groups tracing their origins in the Communist Left, while eliminating anarchist, Trotskyist, Maoist and other leftist tendencies. These criteria form an organic whole, and can’t be separated from each other in the way that amuses Programma so much. They don’t claim to be a platform for unification, but – more modestly – a framework to indicate with whom and on what basis to carry on discussions. But for Programma, you can only discuss with yourself, for fear of being impotent in a confrontation of positions with other communist groups. Programma takes refuge in ‘solitary pleasure’. This is the virility of a sect – and its only means of satisfaction.

Programma severely remonstrates against those who call into question “the method used by the Bolshevik party to pose the relationship between the communist party and the working class”. But whatever Programma thinks, this ‘method’ isn’t an untouchable taboo and is something that can be discussed. This is how it’s always been in the communist movement, and, besides, this ‘method’ hasn’t gained anything by being turned into the outlandish caricature that the Bordigists have made of it. And when Programma cries “Yes, the International broke with Social Democracy, but even before that it had broken with all childish, spontaneist, anti-party, illuminist, and, from the ideological point of view, bourgeois versions”, it is rewriting history to suit itself. The groups invited to the first, founding Congress of the IIIrd International were infinitely more heterogeneous than Programma pretends. At this Congress you could find anyone from anarcho-syndicalists to thinly-veneered left socialists. The only precise points in all this confusion and lack of cohesion were: 1. the break with Social Democracy and 2. support for the October Revolution. It was only after this that the breaks began, and it’s also the case that they were directed essentially against the Left (though not always in a coherent way), while the door was left wide open for the left Social Democrats and other opportunists. Since when have the Bordigists exalted and applauded the opportunist degeneration of the Communist International? The theses of the Second Congress on revolutionary parliamentarism, on the conquest of the unions, on the national and colonial question; the policy of holding conferences with the IInd and 2½ Internationals – all of these were so many signposts in the decay of the Communist International. This is the orientation that the Bordigists glorify now that they’ve declared themselves to be a new International Communist Party. Isn’t this “making a real mockery of your own adherents” as Programma’s article points out so well?

Programma violently accuses us of being ‘anti-party’. This is a pure Bordigist invention, which contains as much truth as the PIC’s accusation that we are ‘Bordigo-Leninists’. None of the groups at the Conference called into questions the necessity for the party. What is open to question is what kind of party – what is its function and what must be the relationship between party and class. It’s absolutely untrue that either the First Congress of the CI or the 21 Conditions have provided a complete and definitive answer to these problems. The history of the CI, the experience of the Russian Revolution, the degeneration of the Communist Parties – all of this confronts revolutionaries in today’s period of rising class struggle with the urgent task of giving a more precise response to these questions. The Bordigist conception of an infallible, omniscient, all-powerful Party seems to us to be closer to a religious viewpoint than a marxist one.  With the Bordigists, as with the monotheist religion of the Hebrews, everything is turned on its head. God (the Party) is not a product of human consciousness: it’s Jehovah (the Party) who chooses His people (the class). The Party is no longer the expression of the historic movement of the class; it’s the Party that brings the class into existence. It’s not God in the image of man, but man in the image of God. We can understand, therefore, that in the Bible (Programma) such a unique God (Party) doesn’t speak to His people, but “orders and commands” at every moment. He is a jealous God. He can, if he wants, accord everything to His people – paradise and immortality. But He will never admit that man can eat the fruit of the tree of knowledge. Consciousness, all consciousness, is the exclusive monopoly of the Party. That’s why this God, the Party, demands full confidence, absolute recognition, total submission to His all-powerful will. When the slightest doubt or question is raised, He becomes the severe God of retribution, punishment and revenge (“unto the tenth generation”) – the God of the Kronstadt massacre, which the Bordigists defend today and for the future. The terrifying God of the Red Terror – this is the Bordigist model of the Party and it’s this model that we reject.

Bordigism has not built the international party. What it has done is to have invented a mythology of the party, in which the myth is much more consistent than the party. What above all characterizes this party-myth is its profound contempt for the class, which is denied any consciousness and any capacity for becoming conscious. This mythological conception of the party, this phantom party has today become a real obstacle to the effort to construct the world party of tomorrow. We are saying quite sincerely and without any polemical spirit that the Bordigist groups now find themselves at a crossroads: either they will commit themselves honestly, without any spirit of ‘fottenti et fottuti’, without ostracism, to the task of confrontation and discussion in the re-emerging communist movement, or they will condemn themselves to isolation and irrevocably transform themselves into a small, sclerotic, and impotent sect.

The Conference also had to witness a theatrical performance by the group FOR (Fomento Obrero Revolucionario, Spain and France). After giving its full support to the first Conference in Milan, and agreeing to come to the second and contribute by a text and in the discussions, the FOR retracted its position at the beginning of the Conference, on the pretext that it disagreed with the first point on the agenda, i.e. the evolution of the crisis and its perspectives. The FOR defends the idea that capitalism is not in an economic crisis. The present crisis, they say, is simply a conjunctural crisis of the kind capitalism has known and overcome throughout its history. Because of this it doesn’t open up any new perspectives, above all it doesn’t pave the way to any resurgence of proletarian struggle. Rather the opposite is the case. On the one hand the FOR defends the thesis of a ‘crisis of civilization’ totally independent of the economic situation. We can see in this thesis the vestiges of modernism and situationism. This isn’t the place to demonstrate that, for marxists, it’s absurd to talk about decadence and the collapse of an historical mode of production and simply base this on its super-structural and cultural manifestations, without any reference to the economic infrastructure, even going so far as to assert that this infrastructure, fundamental to any society, is flourishing and growing stronger than ever. This is an idea closer to the vagaries of Marcuse than to the thought of Marx. Thus the FOR bases its revolutionary activity not on objective economic determinism but on subjective voluntarism, a trait common to all the contestationist groups. But we must ask ourselves: were those aberrations the fundamental reason for the FOR’s withdrawal from the Conference? Not at all. Its refusal to participate at the Conference, its withdrawal from the debate, is above all an expression of the spirit of the little chapel, the spirit of ‘everyone for themselves’ that still strongly impregnates the groups of the communist left. It is a spirit which only be overcome by the development of the class struggle and the development of consciousness in the revolutionary groups themselves.

Breaking with this spirit of isolation, of turning in on oneself – the heritage of fifty years of counter-revolution; showing the possibility and the necessity of establishing contacts and discussion between revolutionary groups – this was the most positive thing in the work of the Conference.

In Milan there were only two groups; at this second Conference in Paris there were five groups from several countries [7] [111]. We think that this is a very important step and one that must be followed up. The Conference didn’t give birth to a hypothetical unification, or an ephemeral Party, because this wasn’t the immediate objective of the Conference. The Conference didn’t even adopt any joint resolutions. It confirmed the existence of a number of real divergences, and even more of the incomprehension and misunderstandings that exist in the revolutionary milieu. This should in no way discourage us because we have never sown the illusion that there already exists a unity of positions and points of view. This unity cannot fall from the sky. It can only be the fruit of a long period of discussions and confrontations between revolutionary groups within a context of rising class struggle. It thus depends equally on the willingness and capacity of these groups to break with the spirit of the sect, to know how to persevere in this difficult task and work towards the regroupment of revolutionaries.

The debates at the Conference – which can be read in the forthcoming pamphlet on the proceedings – showed many inadequacies, gaps and confusions, both in the analyses and the perspectives put forward by the various groups. But it also showed that meetings and discussions can lead to positive, even if very limited, results. It demonstrated something that Engels was always saying – that he and Marx saw the further development of the workers’ movement coming about through discussion.

The Conference showed a unanimous desire to continue this effort, to prepare and prepare more effectively new conferences, and to enlarge them to other groups coming from the left communist tradition and conforming to the criteria established. This is an extremely limited project and we are well aware that it offers no guarantees of success. In any case, history tells us that there are no absolute guarantees. But what we are sure of is that there is no other road to the regroupment of revolutionaries, to the constitution of the world communist party, that indispensable weapon for the victory of the proletarian revolution. The ICC is determined to follow this road without any reservations, with all its conviction and all its will.

MC.



[1] [112] “For there is no organizational or programmatic continuity for a non-fossilized revolutionary to lay claim to” (Jeune Taupe, no.23, p.10). ‘No continuity’ declares the PIC: that’s why it’s fallen so passionately into the welcoming arms of the socialist left.

[2] [113] The article ‘Combat Communiste’, in Jeune Taupe, no. 23.

[3] [114] ibid

[4] [115] ibid

[5] [116] On this point, the Spartacus group of Holland shows so little interest in the movement outside its own country, that it thought that the invitation to the PC International (Bordigist) was addressed to the PC of Italy (Stalinist). A small error, but one which was used as an additional ‘reason’ for abstaining from the Conference!

[6] [117] Title of an article in II Partito Comunista, no. 48, August 1978.

 

[7] [118] The five groups participating in the Conference were the ICC, PCI – Battaglia Comunista (Italy), Communist Workers’ Organization (UK), Nucleo Comunista Internazionalista (Italy) and Fur Kommunismen (Sweden).

Deepen: 

  • 1970s and the International Conferences of the communist left [64]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Battaglia Comunista [70]
  • Communist Workers Organisation [18]
  • Conferences of the Communist Left [69]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • International Communist Current [6]

The rise and fall of Autonomia Operaia

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Introduction

The events of the last year have focussed a great deal of attention on the milieu of 'Workers' Autonomy', especially in Italy: in fact it has become a new devil incarnate for the bourgeois press. But events have also shown that the 'autonomous milieu' has lost any motivation to refer itself to the working class. Today people talk about the 'Area of Autonomy' rather than Workers' Autonomy. The milieu has turned into a somewhat grimy froth composed of all kind of petty-bourgeois fringe groups, from students to street theatre performers, from feminists to marginally employed teachers, all of them united in exalting their own 'specificity' and in frantically rejecting the working class as the only revolutionary class of our epoch. Within this swamp, the 'proletarian' autonomists distinguish themselves by taking a harder line on the great political questions of the day: should we use Molotov cocktails for defensive or offensive purposes? Should the P.38, that mythic master-key to communism, be aimed at the legs of the cops, or higher up?

However, within this process of utter degeneration, there has been a reaction by those elements who have held onto a more 'classist' standpoint, an attempt to criticise the more confusionist and interclassist conceptions of the movement. But while we have to encourage these efforts, we also have to warn against the serious danger of these elements thinking that these confusions are simply an incidental loss of direction and that all they have to do is start the whole thing over again.

This article deals essentially with Workers' Autonomy in Italy, since it's there that the movement has really developed. But its conclusions are also applicable to others who are hunting for that new political gadget, 'Autonomy', which now has its partisans all over the place (see for example 'Rupture Avec CPAO', available from Revolution Internationale). In this contribution to the discussion, we have analysed the theoretical bases of Workers' Autonomy, showing how they are founded on a rejection of marxist materialism and how they left the door open to all the degeneration which followed. In its future struggles, the proletariat will rediscover the political content of its genuine class autonomy through a radical critique of the Workers' Autonomy movement and all its errors.

*****

When capitalism entered into its decadent phase, the expressions of working class struggle underwent profound changes. It was no longer possible to wage long drawn-out struggles, sometimes lasting for years, to obtain improvements like the 8-hour day. In a system which no longer had anything to offer, it was no longer possible to obtain real improvements. In the period of decadence workers' struggles are therefore characterised by unforeseen and often extremely violent outbreaks, followed by long periods of apparent calm during which new explosions are building up.

In Italy, it was particularly hard to understand the discontinuous nature of the workers' response to the crisis, precisely because of the extraordinary continuity of the struggles which opened with the 'Hot Autumn' of 1969, carried on in 1970-71 with the 'Rampant Autumn', and ended up with the convulsions of Autumn '72 to March '73 (the FIAT-Mirafiori occupation). In this final period of struggle, the extra-parliamentary groups clearly showed themselves to be the guard-dogs of capital's guard-dogs (i.e. the unions), losing a good deal of the influence which they had acquired in 1969 in the most combative sectors of the class.

"The conventions of 1972-3 were from this point of view the extreme limit for these groups, after which all they could do was simply survive." ( , No. 50, November 1973)

The autonomous factory groups had their origin in the extreme distrust many workers felt towards these groupuscules, but this distrust did not lead to a really political opposition to them. However diverse were the motives of the groups and individuals who made up the autonomous milieu, they all had one point in common: the tendency to put the workers' point-of-view at the centre of their preoccupations. However, it was precisely in its attempt to arrive at a working class conception of political struggle that the autonomous milieu met with its most striking failure. While the great majority of autonomous workers' groups have either disappeared or - even worse - been transformed into empty names, we have seen an incredible development of an 'autonomous movement' which, far from being working class, has one unifying theme: the negation of the working class as the fundamental axis of their concerns.

Feminists and homosexuals, students anxious about the disappearing mirage of a little job in local administration or teaching, 'alternative' artists plunged into crisis because no-one will buy their wares, all of them form a united front to defend their 'specificity', their precious autonomy from the stifling working class domination which reigns in the extra-parliamentary groups (?!!!). Contrary to what is written in the bourgeois press, these marginal movements do not represent the Hundred Flowers of a revolutionary spring: they are simply some of the thousand and one purulent snares of this degenerating society. Over this last year this process of degeneration has reached such a pitch that some of the more 'classist' elements have been forced to distance themselves somewhat from the autonomous movement as a whole and to begin to make a critique of past experiences. Although these attempts are positive, they have profound limitations: what they are actually doing is denouncing only the most criticisable positions of marginalism and offering their own 'classist' alternative as genuine proletarian positions. But at no time have they really questioned the foundations of the 'Area of Autonomy'.

The aim of this article is therefore to settle scores with the theoretical foundations of Autonomy and show how marginalism, even of a 'working class' variety, is not simply its bastard, degenerated offspring, but actually represents its logical and inevitable conclusion. In order to do this we will analyse the theory of the 'crisis of leadership' which is at the root of all the political positions of 'L'Area dell'Autonomia'.

The origins of the 'crisis of leadership': the rejection of marxist economic catastrophism

Although the long period of prosperity at the end of the nineteenth century gave rise to a whole number of theories about a gradual transition from Capitalism to socialism simply by raising the consciousness of the workers, the system's entry into its decadent phase with the first world war was the historic confirmation of the old 'catastrophic' formulations of Marx on the inevitable collapse of the commodity economy. It became clear that there was only one alternative for humanity: revolution or reaction, and that the revolution "is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the proletariat as a whole, may imagine for the moment to be the aim. It is a question of what the proletariat actually is and what it will be compelled to do historically" (Marx and Engels, The Holy Family). This is why, after the defeat of the revolutionary wave of the 1920s and the passing of the Communist International into the counter-revolution, the surviving revolutionary groups continued to defend the marxist principle that "a new revolutionary wave will only come out of a new crisis" (Marx). However, the absence of a proletarian revival after World War II along the lines of Red October - and the period of capitalist 'health' during the reconstruction period dispersed these small fractions, condemning most of them to disappear.

As products of this period came new theories which claimed to have gone beyond the marxist vision of crises; thus the Socialisme ou Barbarie group in France insisted that capitalism had transcended its economic contradictions (note 1 [119]). The anti-marxist conclusions of Socialisme ou Barbarie were propagated by a whole series of groups, one of the best known being the Situationist International.

May '68 was the swan-song of this position. The reappearance of the workers' movement onto the scene of history at a time when the economic crisis had not yet fully developed led these unfortunates to believe that the movement had no economic base:

"As for the debris of the old non-Trotskyist ultra-leftism...now that they've recognised that there was a revolutionary crisis in May, they've got to prove that there was an invisible economic crisis in the spring of '68. Without fear of ridicule they've been wheeling out tables about the rise in unemployment and prices". (Internationale Situationniste, No 12, December 1969).

The theoreticians of the 'society of the spectacle' could only see the crisis when it really became spectacular...But marxists have never needed to wait for things to become so obvious that they hit the front pages and penetrate the minds of bourgeois notables before they are able to recognise and greet the imminence and significance of a new crisis. Even though they were a long way from the centres of the capitalist world, a handful of 'ultra-leftist' comrades in Venezuela were able to write in their journal Internacionalismo in January 1968:

"The year 1967 saw the fall of the Pound Sterling and 1968 the measures taken by Johnson...we are not prophets and we do not claim to know how and when events will take place. But we are sure that it is impossible to stop the process which the capitalist system is going through with these reforms and other capitalist remedies, and that this process is leading irremediably to a crisis. Similarly the inverse process, the development of class combativity which is now generally taking place, will lead the proletariat towards a direct and bloody struggle for the destruction of the bourgeois states".

The eruption of the working class onto the historical stage after 1968 made it impossible for the partisans of the 'revolutionary carnival' to speak in the name of the class: in 1970, the SI dissolved itself in an orgy of mutual expulsions. After that, the periodic explosions of revolt which expressed the decomposition of the petty bourgeoisie were unable even to produce another Situationist International. They ended up in nothing but folklore.

Voluntarism in working class colours and the 'crisis of leadership'

The re-emergence of the class onto the scene of history and the disappearance of the Situationists and other contestationists, made it necessary to renew the theory that capitalism could control the crisis, taking the new realities into account. Instead of simply denying the possibility of crisis (how could you do this now?) the active side of the theory was re-evaluated: given that capitalism could control the economic crisis, what had opened the door to a real economic crisis was a crisis in this control itself, caused by the action of the workers (note 2 [120]).

This theme, which had already been present in the last texts of the Situationists alongside pastoral poems about the critique of daily life, became axiomatic in the positions of the new social-barbarians, who now saw themselves as 'marxist' and 'working-class'. It is significant that in France the abortive attempt to create on this basis a 'Gauche Marxiste pour le Pouvoir des Conseils des Travailleurs' in 1971, came out of the group Pouvoir Ouvriere, itself a 'marxist' offshoot of Socialisme ou Barbarie.

In Italy these positions were expressed mainly by the group Potere Operaio and we will therefore analyse its ideas (note 3 [121]).

The group based itself on the recognition of the omnipotence of the "theoretical brain of capital", experienced manipulator of a society without crises: "after 1929, capital learned how to control the economic cycle, to rid itself of the mechanisms of crisis, to avoid being crushed by them and to use them in a political manner against the working class". They therefore put forward this solution: "The strategic object of the workers' struggle - more money and less work - launched against the development of capital, has verified the theorem we began from ten years ago: the introduction of a new concept of the crisis of capital, no longer a spontaneous economic crisis, caused by internal contradictions, but a political crisis provided by the subjective movements of the working class, by its demand struggles" (note 4 [122]).

Having denied that "a new revolutionary wave will only come out of a new crisis", it was still necessary to explain why this subjectivity of the workers had decided to revive in 1968-69 and not, for example, in 1954 or 1982. Their explanation for the origin of this cycle of struggle reveals all of Potere Operaio's incomprehension, or rather ignorance, of the history of the workers' movement.

The defeats of the 1920s, the expulsion and then the extermination of revolutionary comrades by the Communist International when it went over to the counter-revolution - none of this exists for Potere Operaio, since it all took place outside the limits of the factory. For P0 the crucial thing was the introduction of the assembly line, which "de-qualified all workers and pushed back the revolutionary wave". It was only in the 1930s that the historic organisations of the class found themselves "inside the project of capital", and this because they had not understood the restructuring of the productive apparatus which took place on the basis of the economic theories of Keynes. Having posed the question in this way, having rejected the historic experience of the class, there was no point in asking why it was only in 1968 that the workers learned "that a new society and a new life were possible, that a new, free world is being opened up by the struggle". It was enough to reply: "Where are the objective conditions that will enable the subjective political will, once it is organised, to reach the revolutionary goal?" (PO no. 38-39, May 1971). This organisational proposition that PO was making to the advanced workers was based on an absolute distrust for the real autonomy of the working class, which was seen as soft wax in the hands of the Party - which (great consolation this) was "inside the class": "We have always fought against those opportunists who call spontaneity 'spontaneism', instead of admitting their own impotence, their own inability to lead and to bend this spontaneity into an organisational project, into a party leadership." (P0 no. 38-39, p4, our emphasis).

At the centre of P0's contradictions is the fact that, when it talks about the Party as a fraction of the class, it does not mean the organisation which regroups, around a clear programme and thus on a clear political basis, the most conscious elements formed by the workers' struggle, whatever their social origin. It is talking about a layer, a percentage of the class, which from a sociological point-of-view belongs directly to the "mass worker" and is the "mass vanguard in the struggle against work". Against the Bolshevik Lenin, the Menshevik Martov defended the thesis that "every striker is a member of the party". The 'Bolsheviks' of PO have revamped Martov: "Every hard striker is a member of the party". The party is simply a big base committee and its only problem is to achieve the hegemony of the 'mass worker' over the passivity and resistance of certain layers of the class.

In order to revive the workers, you have to hand them a fully worked out organisational plan: "Why has the union still got control of the running of the struggle? Simply because of its organisational superiority. We're dealing with a problem of management. A problem of achieving a minimum of organisation, a way of running the struggle which is credible and acceptable". When you superimpose the party over the combative fractions of the class, it is inevitable that, when this combativity enters a reflux, the party will more and more substitute itself for the class, in a "completely subjective" course towards asceticism and militarism.

Formation of 'L'area dell'autonomia' and dissolution of Potere Operaio

The workers' struggles of autumn '72, ending up with the occupation of FIAT-Mirafiori in March '73, led on the one hand to a loss of credibility of the leftist groupuscules among the workers (and thus to the extension of the autonomous organs) and on the other hand to an internal crisis in PO. The hyper-voluntarist militarist line was criticised, because it theorised that "the military structure was the only one capable of fulfilling a revolutionary role, thereby denying the class struggle and the political role of the workers' committees". (PO no 50, November 1973).

However, this denunciation failed to get to the theoretical roots of this degeneration; it was more a reaffirmation of P0's theses than a critique of them.

What was actually happening was that the old theory was being renewed, in order to explain why the crisis was getting worse in all countries despite the absence of workers' struggles. Before, they had talked about the crisis being provoked by the vanguard. Now they took up the thesis that had a better chance of success: the idea that the crisis had been deliberately provoked by the capitalists. "The capitalists create and eliminate the economic crisis whenever they think it is necessary, always with the aim of smashing the working class ('From Struggle to the Creation of the Autonomous Workers' Organisation' by the Autonomous Assemblies of Alfa-Romeo and Pirelli and the Struggle Committee of Sit-Siemens, May 1973).

Once again, we see a refusal to draw up a balance-sheet of the historic experience of the proletariat. In fact these people boasted about "justifiably laughing at the party-form developed by the Third International". Now, when the working class reflects on its own past, it does not do it in order to laugh or cry but in order to understand, its errors, and, on the basis of this experience, to draw up a class line, a demarcation from the enemy class. The revolutionary proletariat does not 'laugh' at the "outmoded Marxism-Leninism of Stalin" in order to glorify the 'new' Marxism-Leninism of Mao Tse-Tung: it denounces both of them as arms of the counter-revolution. This is precisely what our neo-autonomists did not want to do: "From this point-of-view, we reject any dogmatic (?!) distinction between Leninism and anarchism: our Leninism is that of State and Revolution, and our Marxism-Leninism is that of the Chinese Cultural Revolution" (PO, no. 50, p3)

What, in conclusion, is the role of revolutionaries? "We must be capable of reuniting and organising the strength of the working class, but we must not substitute ourselves for it" (4). This phrase represents the insurmountable limit beyond which Autonomia Operaia has never been capable of going: i.e. condemning as substitutionist only those conceptions according to which the revolution is made by deputies with reforms or by 'militarised' students with Molotov cocktails. In fact substitutionism means any conception which denies the revolutionary nature of the working class, with all that this implies. When you say that the task of revolutionaries is to organise the class, you are denying the capacity of the class to organise itself in relation to all the other classes in society. The workers' councils of the first revolutionary wave were created spontaneously by the proletarian masses: what Lenin did in 1905 was not to organise them but to recognise them and defend the revolutionary positions of the party within them.

If "the organisation, the party, is today founded in the struggle", once the struggle is over how can you justify the survival of this party without falling into substitutionism? The political vanguard, revolutionaries, are not regrouped around this or that struggle but around a political programme. On the basis of this programme, and as products of the struggle, they become an active factor in the struggle; but they neither depend on the ups and downs of the movement, nor try to make up for these ups and downs with their well-intentioned 'organisational' work. The inability to see that the class and the revolutionary organisation are two distinct but not antagonistic realities is at the base of all substitutionist conceptions, all of which end up identifying party and class. If the Leninists identify the class with the party, the autonomists (unconscious descendants of a degenerated councilism) simply reverse things by identifying the party with the class. This inability is the symptom of an incomplete break with the leftist groups, and this is expressed strikingly by the Autonomous Assembly of Alfa-Romeo, which ended up theorising a division of tasks, so that the political groups would carry on the political struggle (i.e. political and civil rights, anti-fascism - in a word the whole arsenal of anti-working class mystifications) while the autonomous organs would get on with the struggle in the factories and offices. All this is logical for those who think that: "the capacity to get Valpreda out of prison by the vote will be a moment in the victorious struggle against the bourgeois state (!)" (Alfa-Romeo, workers' paper of struggle, 1972-73, by the Autonomous Assembly, October 1973).

As we have seen, Autonomia Operaia began on a slightly more confused basis than PO, even though the changing situation demanded much greater clarity. All these proletarian efforts which expressed, in a confused way, a healthy reaction against the miserable practices of the leftists, were and are destined to go round in circles and lose themselves if they remain within this confused framework.

Balance sheet of a defeat

"In Italy the 1973 March days at Mirafiori were the official sanction for going on to the second stage of the movement, just as the days at the State Square were the first phase. Armed struggle, put forward by the proletarian vanguard in the mass movement, is a higher form of workers' struggle...the duty of the party is to develop this new experience of attack in a molecular, generalised and centralized form". (P0 November 1973).

With these words, full of smug illusions in the "formidable continuity" of the Italian movements, P0 announced its own dissolution into the 'area of autonomy' and the imminent centralisation of this area as the "fusion of the subjective will and the capacity to break out of the cycle of struggles dominated by the bosses and unions, in order to impose the initiative of the attack". (PO no. 50, 1973)

As we can see the label has changed but the illusion of altering the direction of the workers' struggle by sheer will is hard to die. Alas for these illusions, Mirafiori 1973 was not the spring-board for an extens ion to a new level of armed struggle but the last shockwave of a movement that was about to enter into a long period of reflux. How are we to explain this interruption in the continuity of the Italian movement? By remembering that it is a typical product of the workers' struggle today, a struggle which takes place in the framework of a decadent capitalism, a system no longer able to ameliorate the living conditions of the workers. In the present period even the crumbs given out during the reconstruction 'boom' after the second world butchery have been taken back; the open economic crisis is making the situation worse and worse.

After the first real collapse of the Italian economy - which happened precisely in 1973 - the already narrow margin of manoeuvre within which the unions could ask for wage rises was squeezed in an even more draconian manner (at this point came the shattering of all lingering illusions about the possibility of a combative trade unionism, independent of the parties, and about the role of the factory councils). More and more often, even long and violent strikes ended up without any of the workers' demands being obtained. In sum, the workers discovered through defeat after defeat that, from now on, defending their living standards meant directly attacking the state, of which the unions were simply a cog. In describing this phase, which despite differing particularities occurred in all the industrialized countries, we have often said that it was as if the working class was retreating in the face of new obstacles, in order to be able~ to take up the fight more effectively later on. These years of apparent passivity were actually a period of subterranean maturation, and only those who believed that this reflux was eternal were likely to be disillusioned. It is true that the difficulty of defending their living conditions can disorientate and demoralise workers, but in the long term it can only hurl them back into the struggle, with a hundred times more anger and determination.

In the face of the reflux, the 'autonomists' had essentially two kinds of answers:

  1. the voluntarist attempt to counterbalance the reflux, through an increasingly frenetic and substitutionist activism.

  2. the gradual displacement of the factory struggle towards other, supposedly 'superior' areas of struggle.

The ambitious project of centralising the 'Area of autonomy', which PO had tried to carry through by setting up a National Coordination, foundered on this gradual differentiation between the 'hardliners' and the 'alternative' elements. These two lines led to the development of the two symmetrical deviations, terrorism and marginalism, which ended up blending together again.

Without trying to make an in-depth analysis of these two 'threads' - which we certainly shall be doing in future - it is still important to show that they are the logical development of their ouvrierist origins, not their negation.

"When the workers' struggle pushes capital into crisis, onto the defensive, the workers' organisation must already have solid, technically prepared instruments (our emphasis) for extending, strengthening and pushing forward the class' will to attack...stirring up, organising the uninterrupted revolution against work, determining and living through sudden moments of liberation ... Such is the task of the workers' vanguard. This is our conception of the dictatorship." (4)

As we have already seen, P0 is clearly defending the positions which form the basis of the terrorist 'line'.

  1. On the one hand, the idea of the crisis being imposed by the class struggle.

  2. On the other hand, the conception of revolutionaries as technical organisers of the class struggle; this is why they had to "arrive at a certain type of organisation" in order to be credible to the working class and to be able to rival the unions for the 'management' of the struggle.

As the post '68 wave of struggle ebbed away, a good technician of guerrilla warfare in the factories had to know more and more 'tricks' in order to lead his workmates towards the promised land. Thus was born the mystique of the 'workers' inquiry'; this meant the vanguard making a study of 'the structure of the factory and the productive cycle in order to discover their weak points. All you had to do was touch these weak points and you could block the whole cycle and screw up the bosses. But, as usual, what was good about this was not new, and what was new wasn't any good. The idea of hitting' without warning, at a moment that is most prejudicial to the bosses and involves the least trouble for the workers, is not really an idea at all. It is a practical discovery by the class and has a precise name: wildcat strike. What is new here is the idea (and yes, this is just an idea) that wildcat strikes can be programmed by the vanguard. This is a contradiction in terms.

It could be said in response that this is true, but if you do not know the factory, you can not unite the struggle of different sectors, you'll get lost, etc... Very true, but it is hardly the case that, for example, paint shop workers learn to go to the body plant or the press shop thanks to nocturnal studies by a few militants. It is in the course of its struggle that the class finds the practical solution to the problem of gates and railings: knocking them down.

This point, which seems to be a secondary one, shows clearly that this technico-military conception is looking at the class struggle from the wrong angle. The unification of the struggle does not come about because in each shop there are comrades with a plan of the factory imprinted in their brains. It is the necessity to get out of the blind alleys of sectoral struggles which compels the class to go beyond the obstacles which stand in the way of the unification of the struggle. When the workers go en masse to call out the workers of other factories, the fundamental thing is not knowing where the exit is, but the understanding that only the generalisation of the struggle can lead to victory. In reality, the most formidable obstacles are not gates and railings, but the obstacles inside the class, the bourgeois demagogy which gets in the way of the maturation of class consciousness. The real wall to be broken down is the one built day after day by the union delegates, by the activists of the 'workers' parties and groupuscules. It is the invisible but solid wall which encloses the proletariat inside the 'Italian people' and separates it from its class brothers all over the world. It is the chain which ties the class to the needs of an ailing national economy. Unmasking the demagogic and extremist disguises of these obstacles, denouncing their counter-revolutionary nature - this is the specific role of revolutionaries inside and outside the factory, this is their indispensable contribution to the forging of class consciousness and unity that will knock down a lot more walls than the ones around FIAT (it is clear that this has nothing in common with the idea that revolutionaries are the 'advisors' of the class, since in order to carry out these tasks they have to have an active function in the proletarian movement).

Today it is a commonplace to see criticisms of the Red Brigades in the publications of Workers' Autonomy; the Red Brigades 'exaggerate' their militarism, they are cut off from the masses, etc... But the Red Brigades have simply gone to the logical extremes of voluntarism in the impossible attempt to answer the new difficulties faced by the class movement with a 'qualitative leap' by the vanguard. It is certainly no accident that the criticisms of the Red Brigades by Workers' Autonomy have never gone beyond their habitual opportunist lamentations about the premature character of certain actions. The fact that these criticisms never reach the essential questions has its roots in the very theories of Workers' Autonomy:

"A 'classical' insurrectional theory is no longer applicable in the capitalist metropoles. It has shown itself to be outmoded, like the interpretation of the crisis in terms of the economic collapse...armed struggle corresponds to the new form of crisis imposed by workers' autonomy just as the insurrection was the logical conclusion of the old theory of the crisis as an economic collapse". (PO March 1973).

You can not reject marxist in the name of the subjective will of the masses, and then seriously try to criticize those who, having proclaimed themselves to be the 'fighting party', try to accelerate the course of history by bringing a bit of their own 'will' to the masses. The militarism of the Red Brigades is simply a coherent and logical development of the ouvrierist activism of the much-vaunted 'workers' inquiries'.

It remains only to be said that, in recent months, all this coherence and foresight has not stopped the Red Brigades from pursuing through communiqués and appeals those youngsters seduced by the 'party of the P.38', but also, having gone over to armed struggle, have not felt the need to enter the Red Brigades. Some might talk about apprentice sorcerers who cannot control the forces they have so imprudently unleashed. But nothing could be more wrong: this inability to control the metropolitan pistoleros is blinding proof that all this is not due to the 'exemplary action' of the Red Brigades, but to the inexorable advance of the economic crisis, which is throwing broad layers of the petty bourgeoisie into the depths of despair.

The 'iron detachments of the armed party', the 'wild dogs' of the P.38 can not impose anything, for good or ill. It is the logic of facts which has imposed itself on them, and the same logic will sweep them aside.

Marginalism - outside the class struggle, outside history

While the 'hardliners' were militarising themselves in order to substitute themselves for the reflux in the movement in the factories, the main part of the autonomous movement went off looking for other, more practical roads to communism. No sooner said than done: the movement is not really in reflux - it is about to attack on another flank, in order to disorientate the bosses! And so we come to that magic place, the 'territory', the 'new dimension of Workers' Autonomy'. In fact, the displacement of the struggle onto the 'social level' in no way led to the expansion of the workers' initiative from the factory to the territory. The struggle against price rises, rents, neighbourhood struggles in general, could only be based on the whole population of the neighbourhoods. A 'self reduction' of electricity payments put forward by workers' families alone would be an absurdity, and would get nowhere. Far from extending the autonomy of the working class, this movement could only drown the class in the petty bourgeoisie and the population in general. This much-vaunted 'generalisation of the struggles' was actually the transformation of the workers' struggle in defence of their material conditions into a citizens' struggle for 'rights'.

The historic reality of explosions of proletarian struggle is quite different: they do not immerse themselves in popular, inter-classist committees. The proletariat, through its own internal class dynamic, finds in crucial moments of struggle the strength to go beyond the suffocating limits of the factory, to show the bosses and their lackeys a picture of the future, when there will be no 'return to order'. Petrograd 1917, Poland 1970, Britain 1972, Spain 1976, Egypt 1977: it is always in the big working class concentrations that we see the unification of the collective body of the proletariat and the splitting-up of the 'united people' into two distinct and antagonistic camps. The logic of the various 'autonomous' movements, however, was the progressive dilution of the factory struggle into petty bourgeois and marginal struggles.

From the territory as the 'area of recomposition of Workers' Autonomy' to the young proletarian circles, from workers' power to the 'metropolitan Indians': the trajectory is well-known. Each layer of the petty bourgeoisie thrown into turmoil by the crisis suddenly became a 'fraction of the class' and began waving the flag of its own 'autonomy'. We will just look at one example: feminism. In Italy, the 'mass development' of feminism, as with all the marginal movements, was linked to the 'crisis of the (leftist) groups', to the disappointment brought about by the reflux in the class struggle. All of a sudden communism was no longer going to descend like the holy spirit onto the foreheads of the workers of FIAT-Mirafiori.

Like all idealist conceptions, feminism believes that ideologies determine existence and not the other way round. That is why it thinks it is enough to negate, to refute imposed roles, and that this will throw bourgeois society into crisis. When you try to apply this to the class struggle, it gives rise to a false interpretation (for example: it is the refusal to work which brings about the crisis) which can easily become a purely reactionary ideology. We thus end up with each 'oppressed' stratum in society affirming its own autonomy, in order to challenge the 'capitalist leadership' of society.

It is no accident that the 'new way of making politics' discovered by the feminists mainly consists of small 'consciousness-raising' groups!! It is the destiny of each 'category' of bourgeois society (blacks, women, youth, homosexuals, etc.) to be totally powerless in the face of history, to be totally incapable of developing a historical consciousness. They can only end up taking refuge in the secure 'self-consciousness' of their own misery. If the proletariat is the revolutionary class of our epoch, it is not because it has been convinced of this by socialists and has got used to the idea, but because of its practical situation at the centre of capitalist production.

"If the socialist writers attribute this historic role to the proletariat, it is not because, as Critical Criticism claims, we see the proletarians as gods. On the contrary...it is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the proletariat as a whole, may imagine for the moment to be the aim. It is a question of what the proletariat actually is and what it will be compelled to do historically." (Marx and Engels, The Holy Family).

The fact that women are not a social stratum capable of waging a class struggle is due to the fact that they are neither a class nor a fraction of a class, but simply one of many categories which capital opposes one against the other (races, sexes, nations, religions) in order to dilute the central contradiction which only the proletariat can resolve:

"(the proletariat) cannot liberate itself without suppressing its own conditions of existence. It cannot suppress its own conditions of existence without suppressing all inhuman conditions of existence of the present society." (Marx and Engels, The Holy Family).

Precisely because it addresses itself to women, i.e. to a category which the crisis will inevitably split along class lines, feminism has shown itself to be a second-rate mystification as far as capital is concerned. It is incapable of derailing large numbers of workers from the class struggle. In order to have some sort of use, feminism has to get shuffled into the pack of capitalist mystifications whose trump card is the 'left-wing, popular alternative', the only mystification that can really derail the proletariat today.

The future of all these marginal movements has already been decided. During the first world butchery, the English Suffragettes suspended all agitation and responded enthusiastically to the appeals of the bourgeois state to safeguard the higher interests of the nation. Thus they volunteered to do the work of the men who had been sent to the front. A no less repulsive role will be reserved for the modern suffragettes of capital.

Understand right away and begin again: but begin what?

The events of recent months have shown that the danger of not taking your critique to the roots is not something that we have invented. In a text distributed in Milan and called significantly 'Understand Right Away and Begin Again', it says:

"If anyone had illusions about the 'immediate' and 'linear' character of the confrontation, all that is finished today. Many sectors of the class movement were thrown into the struggle when they were still raw and full of 'insurrectionary' illusions, and with sudden, spontaneous forms of struggle that were incapable of posing the real problem of the confrontation. The structure of the state is not going to be instantly swept away, as if it were just a ghost. The masses - comrades! - do not mobilise themselves overnight at the stroke of a magic wand." (our emphasis. Leaflet signed by various workers' committees and Maoist committees)

Facts are stubborn, as Marx said, and the realisation of this situation - like the realisation that the leftist groups are the guard-dogs of democratic legality - is beginning to impose itself within the movement. But the danger is the illusion that you can understand everything straight away, and begin again tomorrow morning. "The weight of dead generations lies like a nightmare on the minds of the living". It is not enough just to recognise that certain errors have been made. Only through a radical critique of their own past will the healthier elements of Workers' Autonomy be able to free their hearts and minds of the obsessive spirit of ouvrierism.

When discussing with militants of Workers' Autonomy, one always ends up at the same point: "That's true, you're right, but what can we do now?" Comrades, the ambiguity immediately disappears if, as part of the vanguard, you take up all your responsibilities to the class. And this can only be done with a clear programme and a militant organisation. But a programme is not a trade union platform put forward as an alternative to this years' 'social contract'. It is a political platform which clearly marks out the class frontiers established by the historical experience of the proletariat. Understand right away? But for a long time, Workers' Autonomy supported 'Red' China, the struggle of the anti-imperialist peoples, etc...And now that China has been unmasked, now that terror reigns in 'liberated' Cambodia, how does Workers' Autonomy react? Quite simply - it just doesn't talk about these things. Comrades, if you do not understand these things, if you do not manage to integrate all these 'mysterious' facts into a coherent set of class positions - on state capitalism, national liberation struggles, the 'socialist' countries, etc. - you are building on sand and you are deceiving the proletariat.

Our aim is not to quote the classics and pontificate. It is to work tenaciously at what is today the fundamental task of revolutionaries: international regroupment to prepare the decisive struggles of the future. Carrying out such a task does not mean chasing militants to strengthen our ranks. It means making our own contribution in an organised, militant way, and stimulating the still confused and hesitant process of clarification taking place in the class movement. It is this clarification which will strengthen the ranks of the revolutionary minority. We ,have no short-cuts to offer: they do not exist. Anyone who believes that you can trade-in a co-ordination of base committees for a revolutionary party had better think again. Too much time has already been wasted.

Beyle

Notes

  1. A split from Trotskyism in the 1950s. Back [123]

  2. For an analysis of the marxist interpretation of the crisis, see our pamphlet The Decadence of Capitalism. Back [124]

  3. We are not saying that Potere Operaio is a direct descendant of Socialisme ou Barbarie. But what is interesting is the fact that the positions which the militants and sympathizers of P0 always understood to be the product of the reawakening class struggle, are simply an ouvrierist version of the old degenerating positions which flourished on the defeat of the working class. However, we should remember that PO was the only Italian group to express, even if it was in a very confused way, the reawakening of the workers' struggle. Its unfortunate end should not make us forget that other groups ended up in parliament. Back [125]

  4. The quotes are taken from the pamphlet Alle avanguardie per il Partito, written by the national secretariat of P0 in December 1970. Back [126]

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Economic theories and the struggle for socialism

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This text is in response to an invitation to defend the economic analyses of the ICC in the pages of Revolutionary Perspectives (journal of the Communist Workers’ Organiza­tion (CWO)). We do not propose here to enter into the tangled web of misrepresenta­tion and confusion which forms the CWO’s ‘critique’ of the economic analyses of Luxemburg and the ICC: more detailed respon­ses to the issues raised by the CWO and others will appear in future issues of the International Review. Here we want to con­centrate on the main accusations leveled by the CWO at the ICC, and ‘Luxemburgist economics’ in general.

I. The ‘law of value’

Above all, there is the assertion, constantly reappearing in the texts of the CWO, that Luxemburg’s theory of the saturation of mar­kets “abandons Marxism and the theory of value”. Maybe the CWO feels that by repea­ting this astonishing claim often enough it will actually become true. However, the authoritative language with which the CWO banishes Luxemburg from the realm of Marxism cannot hide the true significance of these claims: the profound misunderstanding, on the part of the CWO, of the ‘theory of value’ and its role in Marxist economic analysis.

The CWO claims that Luxemburg “abandoned value theory by asserting that the fall in the rate of profit could not be the cause of the capitalist crisis”1. But the inevitability of crises and the historical necessity for socialism is to be explained not simply by this or that tendency of capi­talist production, such as the falling rate of profit, but by the Marxist understanding of value production itself.

The determination of the value of commodit­ies according to the labor time contained within them is not specific to Marxism. As is well known, this conception was the central feature of the work of the most important classical bourgeois economists, up to and including Ricardo. But the Marxist understanding of value is diametrically opposed to that of the bourgeois economists. For the latter, the capitalist system of commodity production, and the exchange of commodities according to their value, is a harmonious social relationship which expres­ses the equality of humanity in the equal exchange, by free individuals, of the pro­ceeds of human labor. Value production thus ensures the just distribution of the wealth of humanity. Underlying this is the concep­tion of value production as the natural form taken by human labor. As Luxemburg put it, “just as the spider produces its web from its own body, so laboring man (according to the bourgeois economists) produces value.” The production of exchange value (of commodities for sale on the market) is seen as identical with the production of use value (production directly for the satisfaction of human needs). Just as all societies of the past were based on value production, so assuredly will be those of the future.

Against the bourgeois vision of not only the ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’ but also the ‘eternity’ of capitalist society, the Marxist understanding of value produc­tion is based on the contradiction between the production of exchange value and the production of use value. According to Marxism the production of exchange value is neither the natural, nor eternal form of human production. It is a specific his­torical form of production which character­izes a society whose aim is production for its own sake, as opposed to and, inevitably, at the expense of the direct satisfaction of human needs. Production of exchange value in the form of generalized commodity produc­tion is therefore a mechanism not of equal but unequal exchange, whose function is the expropriation of value from the working class (and also from the small-scale capita­list and independent producers, the petty bourgeoisie) for the purpose of the accumu­lation of capital: the restriction of con­sumption for the purpose of the development of the means of production.

This corresponds to the needs of humanity at a certain stage of development, but at a certain point the production of exchange value, the concentration of the energies of humanity towards the single overriding aim of the development of the means of production, places increasing social restric­tions on the rational utilization of the means of production. It must give way to a new society: socialism, production directly for human needs, where the potential abun­dance created by capitalism is transformed into social reality: the material well-being of the whole of humanity.

But not only the historical necessity for socialism, but also the means by which it is to be achieved, is derived directly from Marxist value theory: if the aim of value production is the restriction of consumption in favor of the development of the means of production, then the means by which this is accomplished is, and can only be, the exploitation of the working class. In the bourgeois conception of value, the exchange of commodities allowed the whole of humanity to benefit from the development of the pro­ductive forces. Marx showed that the oppo­site is the case: the fundamental social and economic relationship within capitalism, the capital-labor relationship, in which labor power itself is transformed into a commodity, enshrines the permanent impoverishment of the working class. The greater the develop­ment of the productive forces, the greater is the exploitation of the working class, and the more limited are the possibilities for the working class to enjoy the potential abundance created by the development of the productive forces. The contradiction between use value and exchange value, between the material potential of capitalist production and the social restrictions to the realiza­tion of this potential, is expressed in the growth of class antagonisms, and above all in the struggle between the producer of wealth, the proletariat, and the representa­tive of capital, the bourgeoisie. The objec­tive necessity for socialism is mirrored by the subjective necessity for the proletariat to seize control of the means of production from the bourgeoisie: only the proletariat, through its own emancipation, can liberate humanity.

The Marxist ‘labor theory of value’ is thus not primarily an economic model of capitalist accumulation, but above all, a social and historical critique of capitalism. To be sure, Marxism alone permits the elaboration of models of this kind. But socialist prin­ciples are not derived from such a model. On the contrary, such a model can only be derived from an analysis whose premise is the understanding of the historical neces­sity for socialism contained in the Marxist theory of value.

How then do we define a value analysis in Marxist terms? The basic principles of Marxist value theory are to be found, not in the detailed analyses of for example Capital, Vol. III, but in the revolutionary program of the proletariat, set out by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto: these are first of all the historical transience of capitalism and the historical necessity for socialism on a world-wide scale, and secondly, the revolutionary nature of the working class.

II. The ‘falling rate of profit theory’ as an abstract critique

To define a value analysis, as the CWO does, in terms of adherence to an economic model based on an abstraction from one partial aspect of capitalist development (the tend­ency for the rate of profit to fall) actually denudes Marxism of its revolutionary content. For it replaces the social and historical critique of capitalism enshrined in the Mar­xist law of value, by a purely economic critique. The interaction of social classes is replaced by the interaction of economic categories, which in themselves explain neither the historical necessity for socialism nor the revolutionary nature of the working class.

Marx’s understanding of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall is based on the understanding that labor is the source of all value. Capital investment can be divided into two categories: variable capital, ie human labor power, and constant capital, ie raw materials, machinery and other fixed capital; but while the value of constant capital is merely transferred to the commodi­ties which are produced, the variable capital yields an additional value which forms the capitalist’s profit. But with the develop­ment of capitalism, the organic composition of capital (ie the ratio of constant to variable capital) tends to rise, and there­fore the rate of profit (ie the ratio of profit to total investment) tends to fall. As the productivity of labor rises with the development of industry, a greater and grea­ter proportion of the capitalist’s expendi­ture is devoted to raw materials and increasingly sophisticated machinery, and the value-producing component of his invest­ment, human labor power, falls in proportion.

In RP, no.8, the CWO attempts to show, following the analyses of Grossman and Mattick, that at a certain point the global value of “constant capital will be so large that the surplus value produced will be insufficient to fund further investment”2. This is the core of all analyses which like the CWO’s attempt to understand the capita­list crisis solely in terms of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. Such analy­ses admit that this tendency can and does pose immense problems for the individual capitalist, but they also insist that this aspect is considered to be entirely secondary to the main problem of the profitability of global capital. As Mattick says in his commentary on the work of Grossman which forms the basis for the CWO’s own analysis, “to understand the action of the law of value and accumulation we must first disre­gard these individual and external movements and consider accumulation from the point of view of total capital”3.

In this analysis, as the quote from RP suggests, the cause of the crisis is thus seen as an absolute shortage of surplus value on a global level. Here we can see at once the consequences of abstracting from the real world of capitalist development, and looking at capitalism solely in terms of the relationship between abstract economic cate­gories like constant and variable capital. The individual capitalist, in the real world, needs a certain mass of surplus value to invest if his investment is to yield returns at the required level of profitability. But the level of profitability and the mass of surplus value required are determined entire­ly by his competitive struggle with other individual capitalists. If he cannot produce at levels of profitability equivalent to or greater than his competitors, he faces certain extinction. And with the develop­ment of industry, the rate of profit tends to fall, while the mass of surplus value required for investment at competitive levels of profitability increases all the time. But if one disregards this competitive struggle, how can one determine the point at which global capital is unable to produce ‘enough’ surplus value to invest at the required level of profitability? In a theoretical capitalist world without competi­tion this question becomes meaningless, since the factor which determines the ‘required level of profitability’, the competitive struggle itself, is absent.

In his abstract model of capitalist accumu­lation, Grossman assumes that the required level of profitability for global capital is one which allows constant capital to grow each year by 10% and variable capital by 5%. When the rate of profit falls much below 10% this growth becomes impossible and, according to Grossman, the crisis begins.

Of course it is quite clear that once the rate of profit f alls much below 10% then you can’t go on increasing constant capital by 10% and variable capital by 5% for very long. We don’t need a statistical table to understand that. But why this should pose an insoluble problem for global capital re­mains obscure. Despite the impressive statistical gloss of Grossman’s analysis he fails completely to show what terrible cala­mity would befall capitalism if constant capital grew by only 9% and variable capital by 4%. Or for that matter if the figures were 8% and 3%, or 3% and 1%!

Of course the actual figures in Grossman’s tables are purely fictitious. But the tables attempt to describe the “inner law of capi­talist development” by showing that when the global rate of profit and thus of accu­mulation falls below a certain level, the whole process of production is disrupted, and a period of economic convulsions begins.

According to Mattick there are two reasons why the fall in the rate of accumulation leads to a crisis for global capital. First of all because it causes unemployment -- if the rate of growth of variable capital falls below a certain level it is unable to keep pace with the growth in population. Secondly, because if the rate of growth of constant capital falls below a certain level the “productive apparatus cannot be renewed and expanded to keep pace with technical progress”4. This obsession with economic categories thus leads finally to the conclu­sion that the cause of the capitalist crisis is a technical inability to satisfy the needs of continued accumulation, and thus the needs of humanity. But nothing could be further from Marx’s own analysis, which sees the crisis in terms of the social contradictions arising from capitalism’s increasing techni­cal ability to satisfy these needs.

On an abstract, global level, divorced from the social reality of capitalism, the fall in the rate of profit does not in itself threaten capitalism. The fall in the rate of profit and thus the fall in the rate of accumulation in exchange value terms simply reflects the growth in labor productivity which means that although the wealth of society is growing more and more rapidly in terms of use values, ie the material elements of production and consumption, this growth depends less and less on the growth of employed labor. Since labor is the source of all value, the surplus value extracted from the working class, and thus the rate of profit and accumulation tends to fall, despite the continuing growth of production in material terms. The ultimate conclusion of this tendency would be fully automated production, the exclusion of the laborer altogether from the process of production. At this point, even with a fantastic growth in the output of commodities, the rate of accumulation would be zero, ie production would be stagnant in exchange value terms. Of course this hypothetical point will never actually be reached. But it serves to illu­strate the fact that the fall in the rate of accumulation expresses, not the inability of capitalism to produce enough surplus value, but the fact that the growth of production depends less and less on the extraction of surplus value. It expresses the tendency of the capitalist mode of pro­duction “towards the absolute development of the productive forces, regardless of the value and surplus value they contain” (Marx, Capital, Vol. III).

So much for the inability of the productive apparatus “to keep pace with technical progress”. If this tendency was the only ‘contradiction’ of capitalism, capitalism could, through the rational distribution of surplus value, continue forever with a falling rate of profit, and an ever-growing ability to satisfy the needs of humanity -- both in terms of the abundance of commodities and also the physical well-being of humanity, since in this situation the ‘growth of unemployment’ would merely represent the increase in leisure time as a dynamic capitalism freed itself from the necessity of reliance on human labor for the production of commodities. This would apply whether the rate of profit in global terms was 10%, 5%, 1% or even less! In this sense Luxemburg was perfectly correct when she stated that “there is still some time to come before capitalism collapses because of the falling rate of profit -- roughly until the sun burns out” (Luxemburg, The Anti- Critique).

In point of fact this rational distribution of surplus value is, in general terms, the aim of Keynesian economics, an analysis based explicitly on the recognition of the falling rate of profit.

“In Keynes’ view, capital stagnation expresses the capitalist’s inability or unwillingness to accept a decreasing profitability ... Keynes came finally to the conclusion that the duty of ordering the current volume of investment cannot be safely left in private hands.” (Mattick, Marx and Keynes)

Keynes did not see why falling profitability should pose insoluble problems for capitalism. But what Keynes’ bourgeois vision prevented him from understanding was how the social foundations of capitalism prevent the kind of rational distribution of surplus value that he advocated. The aim of capitalism, as Marx pointed out is “to preserve the self-expansion of existing capital, and to promote its self-expansion to the highest limit” (Marx, op cit). We are concerned, therefore, not with the rational distribu­tion of surplus value on a global scale, but with the attempts of each individual capital to maximize its own surplus value. The origins of the crisis are to be found not primarily in the global relation between constant and variable capital, but in the social relationship between individual capi­tals, whose competitive struggle for surplus value finally prevents the realization of surplus value on a global scale.

The CWO, while obsessed with the abstract and in fact fictitious trend towards an absolute shortage of surplus value on a global level, tends to minimize the competi­tive struggle between individual capitals. Instead the CWO emphasizes the various mechanisms, such as credit and international loans, which allow capitalism to mitigate somewhat the worst effects of the competitive struggle5. This concern with the possible development of a ‘supra-national’ capital which can transcend the framework of the state is, as we shall see, a common feature of those analyses based exclusively on the falling rate of profit and the accompanying tendency towards the centralization of capital. This conception consigns the inevitable collapse of capitalism (brought about by the falling rate of profit) to a dim and rather uncertain future, while ignoring, or even denying, the main factor which, in the real world of capitalist accumulation, propels the system towards crisis and decay: the competitive struggle between individual capitals.

III. The falling rate of profit theory as an historical critique

The ‘individual’ capital may be a large conglomerate, or the modern state capitalist economy. Today it might seem that with the integration of separate national economies into the overall economies of the imperialist blocs, we can see the emergence of a capi­talist unit which transcends even that of the national economy. But in reality this represents not so much the emergence of an international planned economy within the imperialist blocs, as relations of force between the various national capitals within each bloc, and the economic and military domination of the two most powerful economies within the two blocs, ie Russia and America. But in any case the point is that the centralization of capital on the level of the nation or even that of the imperialist bloc does not represent in any sense a movement towards a real supra­national capitalist economy: on the contrary it represents, in the emergence of imperialist antagonisms of an even greater scale, the inability of capitalism to ever transform itself into a single world economy. It is this inability which in the final analysis leads to the destruction of capitalism.

In this sense what Luxemburg wrote in What is Economics? is even more applicable today:

“While the innumerable units -- and today a private enterprise, even the most gigan­tic is only a fragment of the great econo­mic structure which embraces the entire globe -- while these units are disciplined to the utmost, the entity of all the so-called ‘national economies’, ie the world economy, is completely unorganized. In this entity which embraces oceans and. continents, there is no planning, no consciousness, no regulation, only the blind clash of the unknown, unrestrained forces playing a capricious game with the economic destiny of man. Of course even today, an all powerful ruler dominates all working men and women: capital. But the form which this sovereignty of capital takes is not despotism but anarchy.” (Luxemburg, What is Economics?)

In the historical development of this ‘anarchy’ we can nevertheless determine a consistent trend: from the absorption of individual capitals by large conglomerates in the competitive struggle, to the fusion of these conglomerates into national monopo­lies and the progressive consolidation of all national capital into a single state capital defended by the military power of the state. At the same time capitalism was invading-the furthest corners of the world, destroying the old pre-capitalist social relations and replacing them with its own. By the eve of World War I, the ‘mature’ capitals of Europe and America had entirely divided up the world between themselves; in the struggle of the colonial powers for the control of the world market, economic competition gave birth to that monstrous offspring -- imperia­list war.

Since 1914 -- the era of permanent crises and imperialist war -- the weaker imperialist powers have been destroyed in the holocaust of world war, and today finally capitalism has reached the culmination of its develop­ment -- the confrontation of two major imperialist powers, their tutelar states grouped around them in rival blocs. And while the productive potential of humanity is greater than ever, the means of produc­tion are dedicated to the development of new and terrible means of destruction, while more than half of humanity slides deeper into starvation and destitution. For the working class, even the meager com­pensation in terms of ‘consumer goods’ for the long years of open crisis and war, for the ever-growing intensity of exploitation, for the continuing insecurity of daily exis­tence and the inhumanity of work under capi­talism -- even this meager compensation is progressively lost as unemployment and austerity become the order of the day. The logical conclusion of the anarchy of capita­list production is shown to be the destruc­tion of humanity itself.

How are revolutionaries and the working class to understand this development and the situation they find themselves in today? Not through the dry erudition of Hilferding, nor the mathematical tables of Grossman, nor in the bland assurances of the CWO that our day will come when the rate of profit falls to this or that level, although of course “we are still a long way off from such a situation”, but ... through the living historical analysis of Rosa Luxemburg! What­ever the flaws of Luxemburg’s analysis it had the great merit of being based on the understanding that a Marxist analysis, an analysis based on the Marxist theory of value, is above all a social and historical analysis. For the general laws of capitalist development elaborated by Marx is not capi­talist development itself, but the framework for an understanding of capitalist develop­ment in the real world. An analysis which confines itself within the narrow limits of economic categories is as inadequate for an understanding of the development of capi­talism, as it is for an understanding of the general, historical necessity for socialism.

To illustrate this let us take just one fea­ture of modern capitalism, the most important single characteristic of modern capitalism for the working class to understand: the qualitative difference between the crises of growth of nineteenth century capitalism and the crises of decay of twentieth century capitalism. Clearly this does not arise from different global rates of profit during the two periods, but from the different histori­cal conditions in which the crisis occurs.

Of course an analysis based on the tendency for the rate of profit to fall does not in itself prevent an historical analysis of this kind. We can see this concern with the historical development of capitalism, with the social restrictions of capitalist devel­opment, in one of the best analyses, contem­porary with Luxemburg’s, based on this tendency -- that of Bukharin in Imperialism And World Economy:

“There is a growing discord between the basis of the economy which has become worldwide and the peculiar class struct­ure of society, a structure where the ruling class (the bourgeoisie) itself is split into ‘national’ groups with contra­dictory economic interests, groups which, being opposed to the world proletariat, are competing amongst themselves for the division of the surplus value created on a world scale ...

The development of the productive forces moves within the narrow limits of state boundaries while it has already outgrown these limits. Under such conditions there inevitably arises a conflict, which given the existence of capitalism, is settled through extending the state frontiers in bloody struggles, a settlement which holds the prospect of new and more grandiose conflicts ...

Competition reaches the highest, the last conceivable stage of development. It is now competition of state capitalist trusts in the world market. Competition is reduced to a minimum within the bound­aries of the ‘national’ economies, only to flare up in colossal proportions, such as would not have been possible in any of the preceding epochs.” (Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy)

The analysis of the CWO, and also those of Mattick and Grossman, in which the historical conditions of capitalist development are only a peripheral element, clearly mark a regres­sion from this social and historical analysis of Bukharin, which is quite obviously closely related to the description of the anarchy of capitalist production in What is Economics? Nevertheless even in Bukharin’s analysis there is still a certain inadequacy. Bukharin sees imperialist war as an inevitable out­come of capitalist development. But it is also, to a certain extent, seen as part of the process of capitalist development, a continuation of the progressive expansion of capitalism in the nineteenth century:

“War serves to reproduce definite rela­tions of production. War of conquest serves to reproduce these relations on a higher scale ... (imperialist) war cannot halt the development of world capital ... on the contrary it expresses the greatest expansion of the centralization process .., in its influence on economic life, the war in many respects calls to mind industrial crises, differing only from the latter by a greater intensity of social convulsions and devastations.” (our emphasis) (Bukharin, ibid)

In Bukharin’s analysis war is thus the trad­itional cyclical crisis of capitalism expan­ded and intensified to the nth degree. But imperialist war is much more than this: it reflects on the contrary the historical impossibility of capitalist development. The First World War was not simply a new histori­cal form of the cyclical crisis: it inaugur­ated a new era of permanent crisis in which war is not merely the logical outcome of capitalist development, but the only possible alternative to proletarian revolution.

We can see Bukharin’s error repeated in the analysis of the CWO: “Each crisis leads (through war) to a devaluation of constant capital, thus raising the rate of profit and allowing the cycle of reconstruction -- boom, slump, war -- to be repeated again”6. Thus for the CWO, the crises of decad­ent capitalism are seen, in economic terms, as the cyclical crises of ascendant capitalism repeated at a higher level.

Let us look at this point more closely. If this were in fact the case, we would clearly expect to see the same characteristics to be present both in the periods of reconst­ruction following world wars and in the periods of economic expansion following the cyclical crises of the nineteenth century. Now there are certain superficial similari­ties between the two periods. Levels of production, for example, have greatly increa­sed, at least in the period following World War II. This is because labor productivity has continued to increase throughout the period of decadence: the technical develop­ment of the means of production has not ceased for an instant, nor could it unless capitalist production came to a complete halt. The same applies to the process of capital concentration which has continued uninterrupted from the very beginning of capitalism to the present day.

But capitalist production does not come to a total halt with the onset of decadence. It continues and will continue until capi­talist society is overthrown by the prole­tariat. We have to be able to account for the specific form taken by capitalist produc­tion during its decadent period -- in the absence of the proletarian revolution -- namely, the cycle of crisis, war, reconstruc­tion etc, and particularly we must be able to account for the period of rapidly rising production that took place after World War II. But first and foremost our analysis must be able to account for the impossibility of any progressive capitalist development throughout the entire period of capitalist decadence, not only during wars and crises, but in the periods of reconstruction as well.

To clarify this let us look at the most important characteristics of the progressive period of capitalist expansion during the nineteenth century:

-- first of all the numerical growth of the proletariat: the absorption of a growing proportion of the world’s population into wage labor;

-- secondly, the emergence of new capitalist powers, like America, Russia and Japan;

-- thirdly, the growth of world trade, in the sense that non-capitalist and ‘young’ capitalist economies played an increasingly important role.

In short capitalist development in the nine­teenth century was expressed by the internationalization of capital: more and more of the world’s population were integrated into the process of the development of the means of production made possible by capitalist social relations. It was for this reason that the revolutionary movement in the nineteenth century supported the struggle to establish capitalist relations of produc­tion in the underdeveloped areas, not only in the colonial countries, but also in such countries as Germany, Italy and Russia, where archaic social or political conditions threatened to arrest the process of capitalist development.

We can see that in decadent capitalism none of these characteristics are present7:

1. In the developed areas the increase in the proletariat has not kept pace with the increase in population. In some areas, such as Russia, Italy and Japan, non-capita­list strata have been absorbed into the proletariat, but this growth has been insignificant compared with the global trend towards the exclusion of large sectors of the world population from all economic activity whatsoever. This trend is expressed in the historically unprecedented growth of mass starvation and destitution during the past sixty years.

2. No new capitalist powers have emerged during this period. Of course some indust­rial development has taken place in the underdeveloped countries, but in general the economic gap between the old capitalist economies and the economies of the ‘third world’, even the most fortunate in terms of natural resources such as China, has widened at an increasing rate. For example, as we pointed out in the Decadence of Capitalism: “from 1950-60 (the highpoint of post-war reconstruction) in Asia, Africa and Latin America the number of new wage earners in every hundred inhabitants was nine times lower than in the developed countries.”

3. Parallel to this the underdeveloped nations’ share of world trade has not grown but tended to decline since 1914.

Thus in terms of the internationalization of capitalist production, the period since 1914 has been at the very least one of economic stagnation. Moreover this is the most meaningful way of looking at capitalist development, since the most important thing is to understand why economic development has been almost entirely restricted to the small group of nations which were already major economies before 1914; and in more general terms to understand the immense discrepancy between the levels of accumulation which would appear to have been possible during this period, if only the global rate of profit is taken into account, and those which have actually been achieved. One need only consider the extent to which the produc­tive forces have been devoted to the various forms of waste production (arms, advertizing, planned obsolescence etc) which do not con­tribute to the accumulation of capital, or at the immense reservoir of ‘hidden’ produc­tive potential that is revealed during world wars, to gain an idea of the magnitude of this discrepancy.

If according to the CWO, imperialist war, by raising the rate of profit, provides the con­ditions for a new period of capitalist devel­opment, why have all the characteristics of progressive capitalist development been absent since 1918? If on the other hand the CWO recognizes, and this is in fact the case, the qualitative change in the nature of capitalist development since 1914, what are the economic causes of this?

We have already shown that the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, considered as an abstract, global tendency, cannot explain the historical limitations of capitalist development. But neither can the historical analysis put forward by the advocates of the ‘falling rate of profit theory’ which sees decadent capitalism as a continuation of the cyclical crises of the nineteenth century -- except that competition is no longer between individual capitalists, but between rival state capitalist economies -- account for the restriction of economic development since 1914. In fact once we have disposed of the erroneous conception that the crisis is caused by an absolute shortage of surplus value, it is clear that an analysis based solely on the tendency for the rate of pro­fit to fall leads to exactly the opposite conclusion: war should, as Bukharin implies, lead to a new period of vigorous economic growth, the creation of new fully developed capitalist economies and the integration of vast sectors of the non-proletarian strata into capitalist production. In Bukharin’s later work, Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital, the logical conclusion of his earlier analysis is stated explicitly: just such a vision of a dynamic post-war capita­lism “revealing the staggering wonders of technological progress” is used to justify the abandonment of revolutionary politics by the decaying IIIrd International. The CWO, which does not admit that this is also the logical conclusion of its own analysis, claims that Bukharin’s “wretched political conclusions” are a “non-sequitor” to his economic analysis. But Lenin had clearly shown in his introduction to Imperialism and World Economy the dangerous political consequences of this type of analysis:

“Can one, however, deny that in the abst­ract a new phase of capitalism to follow imperialism, namely a phase of ultra-imperialism (ie an international unifica­tions of national ... imperialisms which ‘would be able’ to eliminate the most unpleasant, the most disturbing and dis­tasteful conflicts such as wars, political convulsions etc) is ‘thinkable’? No. In the abstract one can think of such a phase ... There is no doubt that the development is going in the direction of a single world trust that will swallow up all enterprises and all states without exception ... in practice however he who denies the sharp tasks of today in the name of dreams of soft tasks of the future becomes an opportunist.” (Lenin, ‘Introduction to Bukharin’ in Imperialism and World Economy.)

Here Lenin is expressing the theoretical inadequacy of contemporary ‘orthodox’ Marx­ist economics, which was the basis of both Bukharin’s and Lenin’s own analyses, to explain the political reality which confron­ted the proletariat: the decadence of capi­talism, and the new era of wars and revolu­tions. To provide a theoretical, economic explanation of this political reality was the task Luxemburg had set herself in The Accumulation of Capital. But this required an analysis which took account of the other fundamental contradiction of capitalist production: the contradiction of the market.

IV. Luxemburg’s analysis

As capitalism develops the productive forces, the working class is only able to consume a smaller and smaller proportion of the grow­ing output of commodities. In its simplest possible terms, this is the ‘markets theory’ on which Luxemburg bases her analysis. In this sense Luxemburg’s analysis flows direc­tly from the Marxist understanding of value production which we outlined at the beginning of this text: the ‘markets problem’ arises directly from the fundamental characteristic of capitalist production: “the restriction of consumption for the purpose of the devel­opment of the means of production”.

We have already shown elsewhere that the ‘markets problem’ plays a central role in Marxist theory8. In fact the two aspects of the capitalist crisis are both reflec­tions of the same underlying trend: the rising organic composition of capital. This not only leads to the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, but also tends to lead to the contraction of the market. This is because the working class can only consume commodities equal to the total value of its wages, and the growth of labor productivity (ie the growing organic composition of capital) means that total wages are equiva­lent to an ever-decreasing proportion of total output.

These two tendencies do not however at first constitute an insoluble problem for capita­lism. The fall in the rate of profit pro­vided the impetus for the elimination of small-scale or backward capitals, and their replacement by large-scale technologically advanced capitals which could compensate for the falling rate by a rising mass of profit. The contraction of the ‘home market’ on the other hand propelled the ‘geographical’ extension of capitalism as the search for new markets led to the destruction of pre-capitalist areas of production and the open­ing up of new areas for capitalist develop­ment.

These two tendencies are quite clearly inter­related9 . The falling rate of profit imposes the necessity on each capitalist to reduce the wages of his workforce to the maximum possible extent, which further res­tricts the internal market for capitalism as a whole and propels its expansion into outlying areas of non-capitalist production. The saturation of markets imposes the neces­sity on each capital to sell its commodities at the lowest possible prices, which further exacerbates the problem of profitability and stimulates the concentration and rationaliza­tion of existing capital. Together they account for the characteristic features of capitalism in its ascendant phase: the rapid technological development of the means of production, and at the same time the rapid expansion of capitalist relations of produc­tion to the farthest corners of the globe.

We do not have the space here to describe in detail the role played by non-capitalist markets in the development of capitalism. But the crucial importance of these areas lays in the opportunity they provided for capitalism to enter a relationship of exchange (exchanging commodities of all kinds for the raw materials vital for contin­ued accumulation) with economies which because they did not produce on the basis of profitability provided an outlet for the capitalist surplus without threatening the home market. It is important to understand that capitalism could not use any peasant or tribal community as ‘third buyers’ for its surplus commodities. Only well-developed pre-capitalist economies, such as those of India, China or Egypt, which could offer goods in exchange for the capitalist surplus were really able to fulfill this role. But this process itself (as Luxemburg shows vividly in Section Three of The Accumulation of Capital) inevitably led to the transforma­tion of these economies into capitalist economies which could no longer provide an outlet for the surplus production of the capitalist metropoles, but on the contrary depended on the further extension of the world market for their own survival. It was in these circumstances that capitalism turned its attention to the unexplored regions of the world such as Africa. But the new markets created in the colonial struggle for these economic wastelands were insignificant compared to the markets demanded by the rapid growth of world capitalism.

According to Luxemburg, it is at this point, when no further significant areas of non-capitalist production exist which can prov­ide new markets to compensate for the con­traction of the existing capitalist market, that the ascendant period of capitalist development comes to an end and the period of decadence, of permanent crisis, begins. The two tendencies which once provided the impetus for capitalist accumulation become a vicious circle which forms a barrier to capitalist accumulation. The search for new markets becomes a ruthless competitive struggle in which each individual capitalist is forced to reduce profit margins to a min­imum in order to compete on a shrinking world market. Profitable production increasingly becomes impossible, not only for back­ward and inefficient capitals, but for all capitals, regardless of their levels of dev­elopment. Wages are more and more ruthlessly cut in the search for profitability. But as wages fall and investment declines the markets contract at an increasing rate, red­ucing still further the possibility for profitable production.

The two most important aspects of our analysis which have been summarized above are:

-- first of all, that it is the saturation of the world market which is the historical turning point between the ascendant and decadent periods of capitalist development;

-- secondly, that the permanent crisis of decadent capitalism cannot be understood without taking the two interrelated aspects of the crisis, the saturation of the world market and the tendency for the rate of profit to fall into account.

In fact we can say plainly that all the contradictions caused by the falling rate of profit could be resolved by a rise in the rate of exploitation, as Mattick admits when he states that “a situation in which exploi­tation cannot be increased enough to offset the tendential fall in the rate of profit is not foreseeable”10, if the resulting crisis on the level of the markets did not further exacerbate the problem of profitability.

In fact to deny that overproduction is a contradiction inherent to capitalism means, in effect, to proclaim the immortality of the system. Ironically this point is made quite clearly by Grossman, writing about Say, the bourgeois economist:

“Say’s theory of markets, that is the doctrine that any supply is simultane­ously a demand and consequently that all production, in producing a supply creates demand, led to the conclusion that an equilibrium between supply and demand is possible at any time. But this implies the possibility of the unlimited accumu­lation of capital and expansion of produc­tion, as no obstacles exist to the full employment of all the factors of produc­tion.” (Grossman, ‘Marx, Classical Politi­cal Economy and the Problem of Dynamics’ (part 2), in Capital and Class, no.3.)

On the other hand, the markets problem could be resolved by increasing investment to absorb otherwise unsalable surpluses, as Mattick for example maintains: “So long as there exists an adequate and continuous de­mand for capital goods, there is no reason why commodities entering the market should not be sold”11 if the falling rate of profit did not impose on this new investment levels of profitability which would further exacerbate the problem of the markets.

This interrelationship between the two aspects of the crisis is implicit in Luxem­burg’s analysis. For despite the claim made by the CWO that Luxemburg does not take the tendency for the rate of profit to fall into account, her entire analysis is based on the restriction of the market caused by the rising organic composition of capital (and thus the falling rate of profit). Marx’s diagrams of expanded reproduction (capital accumulation) in Capital, Vol II, show that each year the entire surplus value produced, in terms of produce and consumer goods, is reabsorbed as new ele­ments of production (constant and variable capital). It is on the basis of these dia­grams that the CWO and others claim that there is no markets problem so long as accumulation continues at a sufficient rate. But these diagrams do not take into account the rising organic composition of capital. Luxemburg shows that when this is taken into account it is the process of accumulation itself which, by constantly reducing variable capital relative to constant capital, creates the problem of overproduction.

The constant need to reduce expenditure of variable capital means that new investment, far from solving the existing problem on the level of the market (by realizing existing surplus value) exacerbates the problem at an even greater rate than before.

The CWO also claims that Luxemburg abandons Marx and value theory by “looking outside the value-labor relationship, beyond the realms where the law of value reigns supreme, in order to find her saturated markets, her failure of the consumer”12. But it should be clear from all that we have said above that this is either a misunderstanding or a deliberate falsification of what Luxem­burg was saying. The expansion of capita­lism into outlying pre-capitalist areas of production is seen as a solution to the problem of the saturated market in existing areas of capitalist production. It is through the ‘geographical’ extension of capitalism that new markets are created to compensate for the contraction of the home market.

In this Luxemburg was following Marx’s own conception, as we have already shown in ‘Marxism and Crisis Theory’ in International Review, no.13. Where Luxemburg goes beyond Marx is the determination of the historical limits of this process of the “expansion of outlying fields of production”. But in this way she also determines the historical limits to capitalist accumulation itself, the historical conjuncture at which the tendency for the rate of profit to fall and the contraction of the market cease to be a spur to capitalist development, and become twin aspects of a mortal crisis which con­demns capitalism to an ever-deepening cycle of declining profitability and contracting markets, whose outcome is the single alternative: war or revolution, barbarism or socialism.

V. Economic theories and the struggle for socialism

When the CWO asserts that Luxemburg’s econo­mic analysis leads to serious political confusions, which lead eventually to ‘anti­communist’ positions, we can thus answer quite simply by saying that Luxemburg pro­vided not only the first, but also the clearest economic explanation for the single most important political issue which has confronted the proletariat for the past sixty years: the historical and global deca­dence of capitalism. It is upon the clear understanding of decadence as a permanent reality of contemporary capitalism, that all the positions defended by today’s revolutionary minorities depend.

None of the analyses based solely on the falling rate of profit have so far been able to account for this reality. Grossman’s mathematical tables purport to show how, eventually, the long-awaited moment will arise when capitalism is unable to function because of an absolute shortage of surplus value, but he was completely unable to re­late this abstract model to the real world, where other forces had already propelled capitalism into an epoch of irreversible decline. Mattick, who in discussions with the ICC has maintained that the final crisis of capitalism might not occur for another 1,000 years, has finally admitted in his later works (for example, Critique of Marcuse, Merlin Press) that his economic analysis does not lead to any definite conclusions about the future of capitalism. Both Mattick and Grossman, moreover, maintain that the state capitalist economies of Russia and China are immune from the effects of the crisis -- Grossman remained a committed supporter of Stalinist Russia to the end of his life. The CWO, despite its political understanding of decadence as both a global and permanent phenomenon, has an economic analysis which also pushes the collapse of capitalism into the indefinite future. This leads them to the absurd, contradictory posi­tion that capitalism is decadent and yet... “the end of capitalism is not in sight”13.

We do not have space in this text to discuss any further the serious political dangers which accompany this underestimation of the depth of the present crisis. But all this reminds us uncannily of the contemporary critics of Luxemburg, the “little Dresdener experts” of nineteenth century orthodox Marxism ... who as capitalism plunged head­long towards World War I, speculated on the possibility of a new era of a ‘peaceful capi­talism’ -- while strictly adhering to Marxist orthodoxy by maintaining that ‘eventually, sometime in the future, capitalism will collapse because of the falling rate of profit’.

Of course not everyone who adheres to the falling rate of profit theory follows these renegades into the ranks of the counter­revolution. As we have shown a correct political analysis doesn’t flow directly from an economic analysis: it depends on the contrary on keeping a firm grasp of the fundamental tenets of Marxism -- the historical necessity for socialism and the revolutionary nature of the working class.

Equally the class interests of the proleta­riat are not derived from economic analyses, but directly from the experience and the lessons of the class struggle. It was on this basis that Lenin and Bukharin were able, despite the limitations of their economic analysis, to defend the interests of the world proletariat in 1914. On the other hand a ‘Luxemburgist’ analysis does not in itself guarantee adherence to revo­lutionary political positions: two post­war ‘Luxemburgists’ for example, Sternberg and Lucien Laurat, were, politically, supporters of the counter-revolutionary social democrats.

But if we reject the mechanical relation­ship between economic analysis and political positions, this does not mean that we see economics as simply a “decora­tive addition to Marxism” as the CWO claims. On the contrary we recognize that a coherent economic analysis is a vital factor in prole­tarian consciousness: by welding together all the lessons of proletarian experience into a single unified world view, it can enable the proletariat to understand, and thus more decisively confront the many problems which it will encounter on the long path to communism.

Obviously, we still have a long way to go before we can completely understand the development of capitalism since 1914, and particularly since 1945. As we stated at the beginning of the text, these points will be taken up by future texts in the Inter­national Review. But we re-affirm that, for all the reasons stated above, only a ‘Luxemburgist’ analysis can provide a cohe­rent explanation of the political reality which confronts the proletariat today.

To sum up, we reject the analysis of the CWO, based exclusively on the tendential fall in the rate of profit, since:

-- it is a partial analysis which cannot in itself account for the economic forces which lead to the collapse of capitalism. As an abstract theory it leads logically to the conclusion that capitalist production can continue indefinitely;

-- as a consequence of this it leads to a serious under-estimation or even denial of the depth and the consequences of the present crisis.

We earnestly suggest that the comrades of the CWO abandon trying to show how far away we are from the end of capitalism, peek out for a moment from the pages of Capital Vol. III and the abstract analyses of Grossman and Mattick, and turn their attention to the present crisis which is unfolding in the world about them, and its political implications for the proletarian struggle and the revolutionary movement.

For ourselves, we undertake to continue the important work of economic analysis. In particular we set ourselves the following two tasks:

-- to develop our analysis of capitalism since 1914 and particularly since 1945 to situate the present crisis within the framework of the permanent crisis of capi­talism since 1914;

-- to expose all those theories, which have arisen both outside and within the proleta­rian camp, which deny the reality of the present crisis, consign the crisis of capi­talism to the distant future, or claim that the contradictions of capitalism can be overcome within the framework of the state capitalist economy, or the ‘workers' state’.

We take as our framework the Marxist under­standing of economics outlined by Rosa Luxemburg in 1916:

“In Marxist theory, economics found its perfection, but also its end as a science. What will follow, apart from the elabora­tion of Marxist theory in details -- is only the metamorphosis of this theory into action, ie the struggle of the international proletariat for the institution of the socialist economic order. The consummation of economics as a science constitutes a world-historic task; its application in organizing a planified world economy. The last chap­ter of economics will be the social revo­lution of the world proletariat.” (Luxemburg, What is Economics?)

R. Weyden

1 See ‘The Accumulation of Contradictions’, in Revolutionary Perspectives, no. 6, p. 7.

2 ‘Credit and Crisis’, in RP, no. 8, p. 20

3 Mattick, The Permanent Crisis, Henryk Grossman’s Interpretation of Marx’s Theory of Capitalist Accumulation.

4 Mattick, ibid.

5 ‘Credit and Crisis’, RP, no. 8.

6 ‘Accumulation of Contradictions’, RP, no. 6, p. 18.

7 See the ICC pamphlet The Decadence of Capitalism for a more detailed description of the following points.

8 See ‘Marxism and Crisis Theory’ in International Review, no. 13.

9 In fact it would be remarkable if this were not the case since Marxism has always understood that the production of value and its realization (sale) are two interrelated aspects of the same process. Crises in the production process itself are reflected at the level of exchange and vice-versa. When the CWO condemns Luxemburg because she sees the crisis arising in the ‘secondary area’ of distribution, they have clearly forgotten the long struggle of Marx and Engels against “vulgar socialism (which) has taken over from bourgeois economists the consideration and treatment of distribution as independent of the mode of production” and against, as Engels put it more bluntly, “the nonsense which comes of writing on economics without so much as having grasped the connection between production and distribution.” (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program, and Engels, Anti-Duhring)

10 Mattick, Marx and Keynes.

11 Mattick, ibid.

12 RP, no. 6, op cit, p. 17.

13 RP, no. 8, op cit, p. 28.

Life of the ICC: 

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Notes on the history of the Dutch Left part 1

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We want to present in this article some notes on the history of the Dutch Left in order to demonstrate the Marxist nature of this fraction of the Communist Left which detached itself from the degenerating IIIrd International. Today the Bordigists especially still make the same old accus­ation against the Dutch Left -- that it was part of the anarchist current. But, alas, they are not the only ones who, through ignorance or a lack of translated texts by the Dutch Left and a lack of analysis of its development from a communist point of view, accuse the Communist Left of an old anti-Marxist ‘idealism’1. There are also the councilists who claim to be the continuators of the Dutch Left and implic­itly support this falsification of the fundamentally Marxist nature of ‘their origins’. With them the falsification is more subtle: first of all there is a falsification of Marxism itself in order to give it an anarchist content, and then the texts of the Dutch Left are cleverly mis­represented by twisting them to make them agree with this ‘reconstituted’ Marxism.

Was Marx an anarchist?

Cajo Brendel, a member of the Dutch coun­cilist group Daad en Gedachte and known internationally as a theoretician of coun­cilism and a ‘specialist’ of the history of the Dutch Left2, has expended great efforts to find anarchist quotes ... in Marx and Engels. In order to prove his thesis that “the proletarian revolution hasn’t a political character but a social character”3, he quotes Engels who said: “The social revolution ... is completely different from the political revolutions that we’ve seen up till now”. (our emphasis). Regarding what Brendel calls “the differences between the bourgeois political revolution and the proletarian social revolution” he refers to Marx’s texts: Critical Notes on ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform By a Prussian’4. In fact when Cajo Brendel quotes from this it is interesting to “take account of this literary quackery” which Marx mentions in the article. What exactly did Marx say?

“A ‘social’ revolution with a political soul is either a composite piece of nonsense, if by ‘social’ revolution the ‘Prussian’ (or our heir of the Dutch Left Cajo Brendel - FK) understands a ‘social’ revolution as opposed to a political one ... Every revolution dissolves the old order of society; to that extent it is social. Every revol­ution brings down the old ruling power; to that extent it is political.

All revolution -- the overthrow of the existing ruling power and the dissolution of the old order -- is a political act. But without revolution socialism cannot be made possible. It stands in need of this political act just as it stands in need of destruction and dissolution. But as soon as its organizing functions begin and its goal, its soul, emerges, socialism throws its political mask aside”.

Paraphrasing Marx, we will conclude by asking our ‘Dutchman’ if he does not feel an obligation towards his readership to abstain provisionally from any historical journalism on Marxism and the Dutch Left, so that he can start to reflect on his own anarchist positions?

Luckily we don’t need to write as many pages to demystify the errors of our ‘Dutchman’ as Marx had to write for the article on the ‘Prussian’. Throughout his life Marx and Marxists after him have def­ended the political nature of the prolet­arian revolution, not as an end in itself, nor to talk again about “the revolutions we’ve seen up till now”, but because:

“... it follows that every class which is struggling for mastery, even when its domination, as in the case of the prol­etariat, postulates the abolition of the old form of society in its entirety and of domination itself, must first conquer for itself political power in order to represent its interests in turn as the general interests, which in the first moment it is forced to do”. (Marx, The German Ideology)

The program of the proletarian revolution was clearly defined in the ideological struggle against ‘German ideologues’ and anarchism (see the conclusions of the Poverty of Philosophy) as being a political program. The attempt of Brendel to contribute anarchist theses to Marxism is obviously ridiculous.

Was Dutch Left anarchist?

But perhaps the Dutch Left had some anarch­ist positions? It is clear that certain councilist positions contain anarchist elements. But that isn’t true for the Dutch Left when it existed as part of the International Communist Left until after the Second World War.

The Dutch Left was formed as a left wing of the young Social Democracy of the Nether­lands which firmly combated the remnants of anarchism in Domela Nieuwenhuis5. However, let’s be clear: although Domela Nieuwenhuis left Marxism to defend an idealistic anti-parliamentarism he never left the camp of the working class, as his inter­nationalist positions against World War I and for the October Revolution demonstrate. But contrary to Domela Nieuwenhuis, the Dutch Left based its proletarian internationalism on a Marxist analysis. That is why its con­tributions are still today acquisitions for the working class, for the communist program of the future world proletarian party. But Gorter, Pannekoek, Canne Meyer and all the other representatives of the Dutch Left were not disciples of Domela Nieuwenhuis as one might imagine if one did not know the history of the workers’ movement in the Netherlands. It is quite a different matter when a Daad en Gedachte member who does come from anarchism reproaches the Dutch anarchist Anton Constandse for having betrayed internationalism in World War II6. Such behavior will not surprise Marxists: you only reproach anarchism if you still have illusions in it.

If one studies the positions of Gorter and Pannekoek within Dutch Social Democracy, it is clear that, against Troelstra’s leader­ship, they defended a revolutionary parl­iamentarism on the agrarian question (1901) and on the question of support for confess­ional education (1909). During the mass strikes in 1903 the Left accused the lead­ership of Social Democracy of breaking the combativity and will of the Dutch workers by their hesitant attitude. The Dutch Left didn’t at the time pose this as a false choice between anarchism and reformism but correctly as a choice between reform or revolution. In 1909 Pannekoek understood that “the highly contradictory nature of the modern workers’ movement”, being at the same time reformist and revolutionary, was due to the fact that capitalism, of which the proletariat is a product, was simult­aneously expansive and destructive, just as the Communist Manifesto had asserted when it defined capitalism as a system in constant expansion, developing the product­ive forces more and more7. Pannekoek clearly condemned both reformism, which “ruins class consciousness so painfully acquired”, and anarchism, which “rejects slow and painstaking work and isn’t capable of applying a revolutionary spirit to the developing combativity of the class”8. Thus the anti-parliamentarism defend­ed by the Dutch Left in the decadent period of capitalism after 1914 had nothing to do with the prior anti-parliamentarism of Domela Nieuwenhuis, who completely ignored the ascendant period of capitalism and the reforms which the working class could obtain in that period.

It wasn’t the Dutch Left which denied the socialist nature of Social Democracy; it is Daad en Gedachte, a councilist group par excellence, which defends this anarchist position in its pamphlet breaking with the Spartakusbond (Was de Sociaal Demokratie ooit Socialistisch?, Amsterdam, 1965). You can look in vain in this pamphlet for a reference to the left opposition in Social Democracy.

In 1909 the left opposition could no longer remain within the party because the supp­ression of its organ Tribune had been called for. It therefore left the SDAP (see the table at the end of the article for abbreviations) and formed a Marxist party, characteristically called the ‘Sociaal Demokratische Partij’. The SDP, through the intermediary of Lenin in the International Socialist Bureau, asked to be accepted into the IInd International; and at the Congress of Copenhagen of 1910, the International accepted it. Clearly the SDP wasn’t anarchist! You could even say that the SDP was closer to the positions of the Kautskyite ‘center’ than Rosa Luxemburg, who was openly fighting against the revis­ionism of the SDAP. But after the 1910 debate in Social Democracy on the mass strike, Herman Gorter defended the same positions as Karl Liebnicht, Franz Mehring, Karl Radek, Rosa Luxemburg and ... Anton Pannekoek, who was active in Germany at that time.

Proletarian internationalism

Before World War I Pannekoek, through his intense involvement in the debates going on in the German Social Democratic Party, was the most prolific representative of the Dutch Left. His polemic against Kautsky is well known and was taken up by Lenin in State and Revolution. Gorter, too, was involved in the international debate during World War I with his pamphlet Imperialism, Would War and Social Democracy.

“Against imperialism, against the polic­ies of every state: the new International Party. Against both the action of the masses. Such is the period we are living in today. The reflection of this thought, its materialization into acts that must be the new International”.

From then on, proletarian internationalism became the fundamental axis of the Dutch Left:

“The most important change with the deepening and worsening of relations between capital and labor produced by imperialism ... is that the whole international proletariat, including the proletariat of Asia, Africa and the colonies, can now fight against the whole world bourgeoisie. And this struggle can only be led in a united way”.

At the end of World War I Gorter and Pann­ekoek began to intervene in the international debates on the tactics of the young communist parties. When the SDP was called the Communist Party of the Netherlands (the 2nd party to be called ‘Communist’) Gorter already had disagreements with the Wijnkoop/Van Ravesteyn leadership in the party because of its defense of the ‘democratic’ imperialism of the Entente9, its opportunist collabor­ation with the anarcho-syndicalists10 and its hesitation vis-a-vis the preparations for a new International11. Although Gorter had welcomed the October Revolution and the role played by the Bolshevik Party, he criticized their policy of land distrib­ution and the ‘right of nations to self-determination’. Throughout Gorter’s pamphlet on the world revolution there is a defense of the international character of the proletarian revolution.

“The war can only happen and can only be pursued because the world proletariat is not united. The Russian Revolution, betrayed by the European and German proletariat, is proof that any revolution will only be a failure if the internat­ional proletariat does not revolt as one body, as an international unity against world imperialism.” (Gorter, The World Revolution)

Gorter and Pannekoek were particularly involved in the German communist movement. When the opposition in the KPD, the majority of the party, was expelled in keeping with the “most corrupt practices of the men of the old Social Democracy” (Pannekoek), they chose the opposition camp which formed the German Communist Workers’ Party (KAPD) in 1920. In September 1921 the Dutch KAP was formed.

By then the leadership of the IIIrd Inter­national and the Bolshevik Party was supp­orting the tactics of the Levi leadership in the KPD(S), and of Wijnkoop and Van Ravesteyn in the Dutch CP. The latter became Moscow’s most faithful followers. The Dutch Left, on the contrary, remaining faithful to the proletarian program of the world revolution, became one of the repres­entatives of what Lenin called the ‘ultra-left’ opposition to the leadership of the Comintern. Basing itself on an analysis of the decadence of capitalism, the German and Dutch Lefts defended an international revolutionary policy against the opportunist tactics of parliamentarism, frontism and syndicalism proposed by the Comintern. We are assuming that the positions of the German and Dutch communist Lefts on parl­iamentarism and unions are well-known in the international revolutionary milieu12, through the texts from the twenties republished in recent years. In the following section of this article we will limit ourselves therefore to the question of the party, in order to underline a part­icular characteristic of the Dutch Left: its understanding of historical materialism. We will look at the strong and weak aspects of this understanding and the theorization of the weak points by councilism.

The question of the Party

It is often said that the Dutch Left was an anti-party, anti-leaders, anti-politics current. Against the councilists’ fetishism about words and against the Bordigists’ scholastic apologetics about the party, we must underline that the Dutch Left defined the term party differently according to the period; and furthermore that Gorter, Pann­ekoek and the GIC (the Group of Internat­ional Communists in the thirties) had nothing to do with Ruhle and his anti-party position.

The Dutch Left didn’t become the subject of criticism and even of insults and ridicule by the leaders of the IIIrd International because Pannekoek and Gorter changed their position on the role of communist parties; but because the International changed its positions at its Second Congress with the ‘21 Conditions for Membership’, which stipulated that communists, among others, should militate inside the unions and use elections and parliament in order to conq­uer the broad masses. This was a manifest­ation of the decayed remnants of the past period, of reformism, the stamp of the leaders of the 2-1/2 International. In this period the CI and its parties were being transformed; from being instruments of communist propaganda and agitation they were being drilled into a strongly central­ized body which claimed that it could ‘lead’ the masses towards the revolution through opportunist tactics. The dissolut­ion of the Amsterdam Bureau marked an important moment in this evolution. The International was following the example of the Bolshevik party; not the Bolshevik party as it had been at the time of the October Revolution, but the Bolshevik party as it was by 1920 -- a state party which had already begun to subordinate the soviets. Pannekoek wrote:

“The reference to Russia, where the communist government has not only not retreated when the broad masses have been diverted and demoralized, but has on the contrary firmly wielded the dictatorship and defended it with all its strength, cannot be applied here. Over there it wasn’t a question of conquering power: that situation had already been settled, the proletarian dictatorship had all the modalities of power at its disposal and could not abstain from using them. It is in the period before November 1917 that we can find the real lessons of the Russian example. Then, the communist party had never said or thought that it must take power and that its dictatorship would be identical to the dictatorship of the laboring masses. It declared time and time again that the soviets, represent­atives of the masses, would take power; the party must define the program, struggle for the program and when finally the majority of soviets recognize this program as theirs, only then would it take power. The executive organs of the communist party naturally gave a strong support to all this work.” (Pannekoek, Der Neue Blanquismus, 1920)

Faced with the stagnation in the world revolution, Pannekoek and Gorter thought that the road to victory could not be shortened by acting as a revolutionary minority in place of the whole class. The defeat of the power of capital in the industrial countries, the defeat of its ideological domination over the conscious­ness of the proletariat, could only come about through propagandizing the ends and means of the proletarian struggle in the period of decadence, and not by the opport­unist use of forms of struggle from the ascendant period, nor by putchism. Such was the content of the KAPD’s program13. This concern to form a vanguard of the proletariat based on clear communist positions, whose task was to actively defend and diffuse these positions in the struggle, was always the position of the Dutch Left.

FK

Abbreviations:

SDAP : Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiderspartij (Social Democratic Workers’ Party of Holland).

SDP : Sociaal-Democratische Partij (Social Democratic Party of Holland).

KPD : Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Communist Party of Germany)

KAPD : Kommunistische Arbeiter Partei Deutschlands (Communist Workers’ Party of Germany).

GIC : Groep van Internationale Communisten (Group of International Communists)

1 Leaflet by Programme Communiste

2 Nearly all studies of the Dutch Left are directly or indirectly based on information and interpretations given by C. Brendel

3 C. Brendel, Revolutie en Contrarevolutie in Spanje, Baarn 1977, p. 188

4 This article was written by Marx in 1844, appeared in Vorwarts in Paris.

5 Bricanier writes about Domela Nieuwenhuis in Pannekoek et les Conseils Ouvriers, EDI Paris, p. 42: “The socialist movement in Holland, at least at the beginning, had more of a ‘French’ character, ie more based on anarchism than on Marxism. Its inspiration was a man of great talents, the former pastor Domela Nieuwenhuis … he was elected as a deputy with the sole aim of using the parliamentary tribune for propaganda for the social democratic movement.”

6 Daad en Gedachte, April 1978, p. 10.

7 Pannekoek, ‘Die Taktischen differenzen in der Arbeiterbewegung’, Hamburg, 1909. In French ‘Les Divergences Tactiques au sein du Mouvement Ouvrier’, published in part in Bricanier, Pannekoek et les Conseils Ouvriers, p. 64.

8 Ibid. p. 66.

9 Like the PCI (Programme) today, Wijnkoop/Van Ravestteyn only attacked ‘their’ own imperialism – German imperialism, to which the majority of the Dutch bourgeoisie rallied (Holland wasn’t directly involved in First World War).

10 The anarcho-sysndicalist workers were anti-German and pacifist, which led the SDP to take up opportunist positions on proletarian violence.

11 The Wijnkoop/Van Ravesteyn leadership preferred to take up a sectarian attitude towards the Kienthal conference.

12 These texts aren’t available in Dutch.

13 Texts of KAPD have been published in French in the book La Gauche Allemande, La Vielle Taupe, Paris 1973. See also Revolutionary Perspectives 2 and 4 for KAPD texts in English.

Political currents and reference: 

  • Council Communism [22]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • German and Dutch Left [23]

People: 

  • Gorter [130]
  • Pannekoek [131]
  • Cajo Brendel [132]

International Review no.17 - 2nd quarter 1979

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France: ‘Longwy, Denain show us the way’

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We shouldn’t be surprised about the silence of the international press about the violent confrontations between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie which have been going on in France for the last three months. Revolutionaries, and the Bolsheviks in particular, have always denounced the “abominable corruption of the press”, whose function in a period of class struggle is to obstruct any movement of proletarian solidarity by lies and, even more effectively, by silence. A huge noise about ‘peace in the Middle East’; silence about the violent confrontations between workers and police.

The French and international bourgeoisie is right to fear the return of the specter of international class struggle:

-- at the end of 1978: for several months, a total strike by the Iranian workers, whom Bazargan and Khomeini have only got back to work with great difficulty;

-- November/December: steelworkers’ strikes in the Ruhr, West Germany;

-- January/February 1979: British lorry drivers’ strike, followed by other strikes in the hospitals and car industry; the workers obtained up to 20-30% wage increases; at the time of writing, the strike movement isn’t yet extinguished;

-- February 1979: strike by the Renault workers in Valladolid, Spain. In March, metal workers strike in Bilbao;

-- March 1979: strikes which begin to go outside the unions in Sao Paolo, Brazil. More than 200,000 metal workers holding general assemblies.

It would be a serious mistake to see these simul­taneous confrontations as mere skirmishes pro­longing the wave of 1968-73, simply because the workers aren’t really questioning the trade unions or extending their struggles. We must be able to recognize this simultaneity and combativity as the first signs of a much broader movement that is in the process of maturing. The determined violence of the bourgeoisie’s attack on the proletariat is pushing the class into struggle. The workers of France and elsewhere are more and more feeling that “it’s time for action, not words” in the face of a cynical, ruthless ruling class which is waging a ‘hale and hearty’ economic war by laying-off workers, repressing them more and more openly, exploiting, humiliating, and mutila­ting them at work, getting them ready for the sup­reme mutilation: imperialist war.

This revival of class struggle, these symptoms of a new wave of struggle are unfolding before our eyes. Of course, it’s still at an embryonic stage. It’s not taking the form of generalized explosions like in 1968/69. But what it lacks in a spectacular appearance it makes up for in depth, by striking its roots into all layers of the proletariat. No-one can deny any more that the proletariat is the only key to the historic situation. The journalists and sociologists have had to bury the ‘student movement’ and timidly admit that the working class is not a myth, but a living reality.

Certainly, this is a slow, subterranean movement, but it’s a determined one. The proletariat is throwing itself into the heat of the struggle with its head held high. It is responding blow for blow to a slow, but inexorable crisis. Long and difficult battles await the international proletariat, battles that will be even more decisive than the ones going on now.

What are the lessons to draw from the confrontations in France?

In order to break through the silence and the lies of the bourgeoisie, we will give a precise, chronological account of the confrontations in Lorraine and the North, before drawing out lessons and perspectives for the near future.

“It’s time for action, not words”

After 1971, the French proletariat gradually fell into a state of apathy. The Left with its Programme Commun promised the workers mountains and miracles. Year after year, the unions dragged the workers into dead-end demonstrations, sectoral strikes, 24-hour strikes, shut them up in factory occupations, locked out the bosses, and amused them with attempts at self-management, as at LIP. The unions carefully acted as safety-valves while waiting for the great day when the Commu­nist Party and Socialist Party would come to power. The political crisis within the Left, their declarations in favor of sacrifices from 1975 onwards, gradually eroded some of the workers’ illusions. The failure of the Left in the elections of March 1978 signed the death warrant of the Programme Commun and, little by little, persuaded the workers that it was time to return to the path of struggle. Bitter strikes -- though still controlled by the unions -- broke out in the summer of 1978 in the arsenals, among air traffic controllers at Moulinex, and among the immigrant workers at Renault-Flins.

Barre’s so-called ‘restructuration’ plan was the decisive factor in setting light to the discontent that had been seething in the class for several years. The plan aimed at 30,000 lay-offs per month, at a time when unemployment was already at 1.5 million. Wage limits, price rises; in December, a savage increase in workers’ contribu­tions to social security; reduction or suppression of some unemployment benefits. The French work­ing class was hit by one economic hammer blow after another. Almost all layers of the class were affected: workers in the banks and insur­ance companies, television workers, teachers. But for the first time, the heart of the working class was being hit by the bourgeoisie’s offen­sive: shipyard workers, steelworkers threatened with 30,000 lay-offs in the coming year. This is what the bourgeoisie cynically calls its “policy of skimming off manning levels”.

In recent years, the workers in the peripheral, low concentration sectors have not reacted very strongly, or have done so in isolation. But the attack on the heavily concentrated steelworkers of the North and Lorraine was a decisive step in the bourgeoisie’s offensive against the whole working class. The unions, quite naturally, accepted the measures of the capitalist state by negotiating levels of unemployment. The French bourgeoisie, arrogant and self-confident, then added political violence to economic violence: systematic truncheoning of striking workers, forceful ejection of workers occupying factories.

Gradually the workers became aware that by aban­doning the union-guarded factories and hitting the streets, they would gain the freedom to act; that in order to push back the attacks of the bourgeoi­sie they had to go out and confront the state without any hesitation. Going outside the unions, they got involved in violent class confrontations. Surprised by their own audacity, the workers gradually grew bolder.

From November to mid-January, these confrontations began slowly and then began to gather pace.

17 November 1978: at Caen1 a union-led parade ended up in a confrontation with the police; the unions denounced ‘uncontrolled elements’ and ‘autonomes.

20 December 1978: at Saint-Nazaire (the biggest naval shipyard in France) the bosses were locked up in the offices. The police intervened. Confrontations.

21 December 1978: at Saint-Chamond (in the Saint-Etienne region) a small factory, occupied by striking workers, was taken over at night by the police who ejected the strike picket and replaced it by vigilantes (men hired by the bosses to ‘protect’ their firms); in this region, which is heavily affected by unemployment, the news spread like wildfire; in the morning about 5,000 workers from Saint-Chamond, from Saint-Etienne and from Rive de Giers, threatened to attack the factory being guarded by armed vigilantes. These vigilantes took refuge on the rooftops and were only to be saved by the joint intervention of the unions and the police; the factory has since been re-occupied by the workers.

The announcement of 20,000 lay-offs in the steel industry, planned for by Barre, accelerated the process begun in December 1978. There was nothing to hope for: the lay-offs would take effect in January 1979. The determination of the bourgeoi­sie increased the determination of the workers, who no longer had anything to lose, especially in Lorraine and the North, where the steelworks are the sole means of earning a livelihood.

As a prelude

4 January 1979: in Nancy, capital of Lorraine, a demonstration of 5,000 workers turned into violent confrontations with the CRS (police specially trained for repression). In Metz on the same day, the workers tried to seize the sub-prefecture (the police headquarters) guarded by the police.

17 January 1979: in the Lyon region, the second biggest industrial concentration in France, the director of PUK (Pechiney Ugine Kulmann, chemi­cals), was locked up by the workers and freed by the CRS. At the same time, strikes were spread­ing through the insurance companies in Paris, Bordeaux, and at Pau in the South-West.

Denain, Longwy, Paris

Denain and Longwy rapidly became the symbol of the workers’ counter-offensive. The closing of the USINOR steelworks, which completely dominate these two towns, with no chance of finding any other work and all this to be carried out in a few weeks -- pushed the workers to react quickly and violently, particularly because the police repression was so violent.

26 January 1979: in Denain, the USINOR steelwor­kers burnt the dossiers of the tax-collectors and were savagely truncheoned by the police.

29/30 January 1979: Then came the violent confron­tations in Longwy near the Belgian-Luxemburg border. A region in which the workers don’t exactly see themselves as natives of the Lorraine. Italians, Spaniards, Belgians, North Africans etc, all work in the local industry. Still the CGT (the Stalinist controlled union) called on them to save the country from the grip of German steel trusts! This time the steelworkers clearly went outside the unions and attacked the police commis­sariat, following an occupation by the police of a factory where the workers had locked up four directors. It was left to the Communist Party Mayor of the town to get the workers back to work: “Don’t respond to violence with violence. Go back to your places of work”. The workers replied: “Next time we’ll be properly equipped” (ie to attack the commissariat).

All through February and in early March there were daily confrontations, during which the unions tried to divide the movement and derail it towards nationalist objectives (the CP’s campaign against ‘German Europe’; the CP’s commando attacks on ‘foreign trains’ and coal), as well as denigra­ting it by denouncing the combative workers who escaped their grip as ‘provocateurs’ and ‘uncontrolled elements’.

2 February 1979: in the port of Dinard in Brittany, striking firemen demonstrated and managed to break through a CRS cordon.

6 February 1979: in the Lorraine iron-mining basin, in Briey, the CP-held town hall and the sub-prefecture were occupied by the workers, who confronted the police. In Denain on the same day, the USINOR offices were ransacked. The unions had great difficulty getting the workers to leave.

7 February 1979: Longwy. Occupation of the sub-prefecture. Confrontations with the police.

8 February 1979: Nantes, an Atlantic Port, the starting point of the factory occupation movement in 1968; demonstrations, confrontations, amidst attempted assaults on the sub-prefecture.

9 February 1979: Following the call of the unions, the Denain steelworkers went to Paris, but the unions were unable to prevent confronta­tions with the CRS occurring on the outskirts of Roissy airport.

Almost at the same time, a strike began of radio and TV technicians in the Societe Francaise de Production. The technicians had just received 450 letters of dismissal. The strike lasted over three weeks. The SFP technicians tried to make contact with the Lorraine steelworkers. On the same day, a one-day total stoppage (‘ville morte’) was held in Hagondage, the Lorraine steelworks, called by the unions.

13 February 1979: Ransacking of the USINOR offices in Denain. In Grenoble in the South-East, con­frontations between firemen and the police. At this point, the unions -- which were trying to control the movement by calling for demonstra­tions and regional strikes on the 16th – weren’t even able to control their own members. Young CGT workers said “... at the moment, the unions are having a hard time standing their ground. What’s more, we no longer feel that we’re union­ized. We’re acting by ourselves.” Or as a CP militant at Longwy confirmed bitterly: “We’ve begged them, we’ve run after them. There’s nothing we can do”. The CGT -- unlike the CFDT, which was able to follow the movement with more subtlety -- was reduced to pouring out torrents of nationalist garbage: “1870, 1914, 1940: it’s enough. Lorraine will not be tied to the big German concerns”. What was the response of the workers? In Nantes on 8 February, the workers demonstrated with the cry: “Down with the bourgeoisie!”.

Seeing the movement spreading across several regions, the unions tried to isolate the steelworkers of the North and of Lorraine by calling for a regional general strike for the 16 March. They hoped that the other workers wouldn’t move and everything would be nicely buried. Unfortunately for them!

16 February 1979: the trade union demonstration ‘degenerated’. In Sedan, the workers built barricades and fought the police for six hours. Confrontations in Roubaix.

20 February 1979: Rouen. Confrontations between strikers and the police. The CGT denounces ‘uncontrolled elements’.

Was this workers’ violence going to be organized by the workers themselves, asked the unions anxiously? “What we’re worried about now is that the lads will organize amongst themselves and carry out actions without warning us, because they know that they can’t count on our support”. The unions’ fears proved real.

20 February 1979: at Paris the strikes in the PTT (post office) began in several centers from the suburbs to the provinces. The strike spread slowly and only lasted a few days in the affected centers, but the workers were very combative and showed a great suspicion towards the unions. For the first time, we saw delegations of postal workers from the Parisian suburbs, themselves go to look for solidarity in the other centers in order to disrupt them. The failure of the 1974 postal strike was not forgotten: the conscious­ness of the workers had matured. The slogans appearing were: “Yesterday Longwy, today Paris”, "Less moans, more action”. The postal workers got the idea of coordinating the strike between every center. The unions did all they could to nip in the bud any coordination of independent struggles and bring it under their control. The postal workers went back to work at the beginning of March, but the idea of coordination was an essential acquisition of this struggle.

21 February 1979: occupations of the Longwy TV station by CFDT steelworkers. The continued operation of this station while the SFP workers were still on strike was a provocation, just as much as the lies and abuse it was pouring on their struggle. The journalists were locked-up and would only be released after an intervention by the CFDT central office. The workers showed a real hostility to these bourgeois scribblers.

A journalist was angrily ‘corrected’ by a worker several days later.

22 February 1979: in Paris, the employees of the Bourse (the stock exchange), occupied the Temple of Capital along with striking bank workers. After jostling the union steward they shouted: “We’re going outside the unions”.

23 February 1979: since the 21st, the transmitter occupied by the Longwy steelworkers was making broadcasts about the crisis in Lorraine. The police took over the transmitter. Workers immediately assembled in the middle of the night and reoccupied the transmitter. The crowd swel­led with the arrival of more steelworkers called out by sirens and bells. Singing revolutionary songs, the workers spent the whole night attack­ing the police commissariat. There was talk of people being armed with rifles. The CP Mayor (Porcu) denounced the ‘uncontrolled elements’. The steelworkers blocked the access roads into Longwy, attacked the bosses’ offices and burned the files.

In the face of events like these, the unions tried to prevent any confrontation between police and workers in the North, where the steelworkers were ready to take up the torch. “Longwy shows the way” was a very popular slogan.

28 February 1979: ransacking of bosses’ offices in Valenciennes in the North. The unions try to prevent the workers from attacking the commissa­riat and public buildings. A CFDT spokesman declared: “The lads must have a chance to act. That’s why we’ve drawn up a catalogue of actions”. But the unions hadn’t taken into account the deliberate, brutal attacks on the Denain workers by the CRS and flying squads.

7/8 March 1979: the CGT tried to divert the wor­kers into commando actions to block ‘foreign’ iron and coal at the frontiers. But it didn’t foresee that brigades of the CRS would arrest busloads of steelworkers going back to work in Denain, frisking them and savagely truncheoning them. As soon as news of this got out, the USINOR workers at Denain came out on strike. They held a meeting and decided to attack the police commissariat guarded by the police. They armed themselves with iron bars, molotov cock­tails, catapults, and even a bulldozer. A whole day of confrontations. In the evening the ‘Intersyndicale’, regrouping the CGT and CFDT, called on the workers to “immediately go back to the factories and occupy them”. The workers refused to go back and screwed up the union leaflet without reading it, crying: “It’s no longer time for discussions. It’s time for action”. The battles didn’t stop. They lasted for several hours longer and workers armed with rifles were shooting at the CRS.

10 March 1979: Following these confrontations, the unions, the CP and SP, decided to hold a huge rally in Denain to bury the struggle under­neath a torrent of blah-blah about regional elections. Hundreds of workers walked out of the stadium where the rally was being held, shouting: “Action, not words!”.

The sabotage of the march on Paris

For some weeks, hundreds of strikes had broken out in local regions throughout France. The major centers, Paris (except for postal workers, hospital, insurance and television workers) and Lyon were relatively untouched by the wave of strikes which went from one factory to another, from one region to another. The union knew they had to prevent an extension of the increasingly explosive movement of workers’ discontent to Paris, the political center and largest prole­tarian concentration. The union decided on sectoral ‘days of action’, teachers, railway workers, each taking place after the other.

But in the course of the struggles, an idea had been germinating in the minds of the workers of Lorraine and the North: they should march on Paris which held a symbolic value for all the workers’ accumulated discontent. To prevent any risk of an explosion like in 1968, the unions went into action. The CGT called for a march on Paris for 23 March; and meanwhile the CGT, CFDT and all the other unions, sabotaged the movement of discontent in Paris. They applied themselves to getting the bank workers, SFP workers and postal workers back to work and just like the bourgeois press they lied by making out that each strike movement was isolated from the other. They hid the extent of the strikes and the discontent, and ‘bit by bit’ they got the workers back to work.

But the union strategy to derail and exhaust the workers’ combativity had to be much more delicate when it came to the workers from Lorraine and the North. The aim of the unions was to slowly but surely exhaust this combativity of the steel­workers from Lorraine and the North before the workers in Paris reacted which would risk spark­ing off an explosion. They couldn’t be sure that the march on Paris, chosen for a date when some sectors would have already gone back to work, wouldn’t bring back on strike thousands of work­ers who would join this march.

The unions’ policy towards the demonstration (above all the CGT’s) was a masterpiece of sabotage. Everything was done to prevent workers from the Paris region, from Lorraine, from the North, uniting in struggle. The CGT, which had called for a march on Paris as early as 10 Feb­ruary abandoned this idea some days later and spoke of regional marches. They threw doubt on the idea of holding a march, an idea which had spontaneously arisen in the minds of the workers of Lorraine and the North, who, in a confused way, felt that their strength could only develop in direct association with the main industrial center (Paris and its suburbs). A detailed division of labor (planned by the union general staff) was organized between the CGT and the CFDT in order to repel workers from the idea of marching on to Paris. The CFDT announced it would not participate in the march. The CGT, in turn, announced that it would not call for a general strike in the Paris region for 23 March. The CGT hoped this march would be proof of its ability to contain the working class and show in deeds that it merited being heavily subsidized by the bourgeoisie. More than 300 CP thugs of the CGT, plus the employees from the communist municipali­ties were mobilized to make up the ‘service d’ordre’ (demo stewards), in order to prevent any solidarity between workers from the North, from Lorraine and from Paris. Up to the last minute it wasn’t known exactly when or by what means (coaches, trains) the workers from Lorraine and the North would arrive in Paris. At the dead of night they were picked up by CP/CGT coaches and dropped at five different points in the Paris suburbs, at communist municipalities, where local deputies met them, decked out in tricolor ribbons, mouths full of nationalist slogans.

But that was not all. The CGT changed the itin­ery of the demonstration at the last moment in order to prevent workers coming in contact with the Paris workers returning from work. The demonstration was diverted from the Gare St Lazare, where hundreds of thousands of workers pass daily, towards the posh quarters of the Opera.

That’s how the gut anger of the most combative workers from Lorraine and the North was frustra­ted from a solidarity march with the workers of Paris. The demonstration was smaller than expected: 100,000 demonstrators, but of these 100,000 you have to deduct the thousands of union police, demo stewards, and all the functio­naries of the CP. Certainly in spite of the sabotage, there was a good number of workers: SFP (television) , EDF (electricians) , railway workers, some workers from Renault. The workers from Denain and Longwy were dispersed into union processions in order to avoid any contamination of the demonstration and to stop them appearing as a united body. Nevertheless the union police couldn’t stop the Longwy steelworkers from break­ing through the union cordon sanitaire and march­ing at the head of the demonstration.

A direct collaboration was established between the CRS, the mobile police and union police to prevent workers dispersing and holding meetings. The police were everywhere, the union stewards immediately dispersed the workers arriving at the end of the route, giving the excuse that autonomes were present in the procession, and the police ‘generously’ sprayed the workers with teargas while the CP/CGT thugs savagely thumped young demonstrators and handed some of them over to the police. Finally, the union cops protected the CRS, who were striking demonstrators, from the anger of the steelworkers. Never has the collaboration between the union police and the police been quite so clear.

But more disgusting for the fighters from Longwy and Denain than being bombarded by police tear-gas, was to hear the incessant nationalist slo­gans and litanies from the CP and CGT, like “Save our national independence”, “Protect us from German trusts”. The workers, forced back to the trains by teargas and the truncheons of the police, will remember the appeals to disperse, the denunciation of the fighters as ‘agents du pouvoir’ (government agents). This led to conflicts even within the union.

The lesson is bitter but necessary: to win, the union cordon sanitaire must be broken through. For the workers who have struggled for weeks against the bourgeoisie, the lesson is not a negative one. The bourgeoisie has been able to exult in denouncing the “violence of the auto­nomes” and complaisantly spread out in its news­papers photos of hundreds of the CRS charging demonstrators.

To all you gentlemen of the CP, SP, RPR and of the UDF, all tied up in your tricolor sashes, to all you gentlemen leftist touts in the pay of the left of the bourgeoisie, to all you anarchists who clamor for ‘liberty, equality and fraternity’ from capitalist class justice, whatever you all shout about, the workers, who by their hundreds have today confronted the police, are strengthened by an experience that, without your power and in spite of it, they will add to and integrate into all workers’ struggles2.

Although isolated, the workers of the North and Lorraine haven’t lost their combativity, their will to fight the bourgeoisie. Certainly, there weren’t many workers from Paris participating in the demonstration. Certainly, many workers were disgusted by the maneuvers of the CGT and CFDT. But this demo was a lesson for them, showing that they either have to retreat and accept lay-offs, or deepen their movement, organize themselves outside the trade unions. The workers have lost their taste for union-led promenades, sectoral and regional strikes. They felt their own strength and determination when they were going outside the unions and confronting the state.

Some lessons

When looking at this list of recent events in France -- events which have been accelerating since February -- it is necessary to guard against both:

-- underestimating the situation. The extent of the confrontations, the tendency of the struggles to go outside the unions, the class violence, are only just beginning. The demonstrations and street battles have a different tone from what happened in previous years. There is a mounting movement which is a long way from its culminating point;

-- overestimating the situation. Although there has been a tendency to go outside the unions, the unions have not lost control. They will only lose control when the class violence goes onto a qualitatively higher level: the organiza­tion of the workers in general assemblies outside the unions. These have appeared in embryonic form in the organization of workers’ violence against the police. The workers still have to take the enormous step of organizing their own demonstrations, of going en masse to appeal to the solidarity of other workers who are still hesitating to go into action. This will require a clear consciousness of the m-ans and ends of the struggle. This consciousness will not develop in an abstract way, but only in the heat of experience. The proletariat has only begun its struggle. It’s a long way from really declaring class war, as can be seen by the per­sistence of illusions in the Left and elections. (The recent cantonal elections saw a triumph for the CP and SP and a strong participation by the workers.)

However, despite the Left’s influence over the proletariat, a number of illusions are gradually fading:

-- the unions together with the CP and SP signed an agreement with the bosses and the state which accepts lay-offs due to the bankruptcy of a firm and also accepts that workers will be paid only 65% of their wages and not 90% as before (because there are too many of them to be paid the larger amount) and as well as that they accepted cuts in unemployment benefits. “A great victory!”, claims the CGT and CFDT.

-- the Barre government, despite the combativity of the workers, refuses to give way on its intended lay-offs. The bourgeoisie is prisoner of its economic calculations. It hopes to gain time and relies on arrogance and repression, having for some years got used to a working class controlled by the unions and chloroformed by the Programme Commun. From an economic point of view the bourgeoisie has no choice: the choices are imposed on it by the crisis, and far from permitting greater political flexibility it is driven to be more rigid.

When the bourgeoisie isn’t prepared to give an inch, when the SP through the mouth of Rocard, justifies the austerity measures, then the prole­tariat has no choice but to answer blow for blow and to go onto the offensive. 11,000 lay-offs in the telephone industry, unemployment planned in the car industry, 30,000 teaching posts eliminated, that’s the reality of the promises made to the steelworkers about job redistribution.

The proletariat in France is at a crossroads. It isn’t its combativity which has surprised the bourgeoisie since 1968, for it has learnt to tremble before at the ease with which the workers are able to massively struggle. What’s worrying it, is to not only see the workers resolutely confront the state, but above all to see it go outside the unions. That didn’t happen even in, 1968.

“There’s a political void” screams every faction of the bourgeoisie, “There’s a union void” reply the Trotskyists in chorus, who are concerned about a “disaffection with the union organiza­tions, seeing as 50 per cent of CGT members from the Moselle metal industry didn’t take up their union cards in March 1973, and likewise 20 per cent of the CFDT members”3.

This ‘void’ which worries the bourgeoisie is the erosion of illusions in the proletariat. This disillusionment is hope. And the proletariat has clearly shown that through its fierce energy in resisting the bourgeoisie’s offensive, through its joy at seeing in Denain and Longwy that it could push back the bourgeoisie. A proletariat that believes in its strength isn’t a class to admit defeat. It now knows that it must go further, that it’s impossible to retreat. To make a sacrifice for its national bourgeoisie’s economic war today, is quite simply to sacrifice itself for out and out war tomorrow.

Certainly, the path of the class struggle is slow, with sharp advances, followed by brutal relapses. But the proletariat learns through its experience, knowing no other school than the struggle itself! It learns that:

-- struggle pays

-- the more the struggle finds its own instruments and its own objectives, the more it pays.

The higher stage of the struggle won’t be found in the multiplying of well-timed, isolated actions by the unions, but in the extension of massive actions organized independently from all union and political apparatuses of the bourgeoisie.

Towards this, the workers must speak out in general assemblies, must themselves seek the solidarity of other workers who are struggling, including the unemployed. The working class must have confidence in itself, it must become conscious that “the emancipation of the workers will be the task of the workers themselves.”

The working class still hesitates, quite surpri­sed at its own audacity. What it needs now is more audacity.

Chardin

1 Caen, a Normandy town which heralded May 1968 with a whole day of confrontations with the CRS in January 1968.

2 After the 23 Marc demonstration there was a trial (to pass judgment on the ‘wreckers’) at which the anarchists, notably, denied responsibility for the acts of violence committed during the demonstration.

3 Imprecor (15.3.79), the theoretical journal of the Revolutionary Communist League, one of the largest Trotskyist groups in France.

Geographical: 

  • France [93]

Resolution on the Process of Regroupment

  • 3343 reads

International Review 17, 2nd Quarter 1979

1) Since the beginning of the workers’ movement, one of the most fundamental concerns of revolutionaries has been for unity in their own ranks. This need for unity among the most advanced elements of the class is an expression of the profound, historic and immediate unity of interests in the class itself, and is a decisive factor in the process leading to the world-wide unification of the proletariat, to the realisation of its own being. Whether we are talking about the attempt, in 1850, to constitute a ‘World League of Communist Revolutionaries’ regrouping the Communist League, the Blanquists, and the left-wing Chartists; or the foundation of the International Workingmen’s Association in 1864; of the Second International in 1889, or the Communist International in 1919, itself the result of the efforts towards regroupment at Zimmerwald and Kienthal in 1915-16, every important step in the evolution of the workers’ movement has been based on this quest for the worldwide regroupment of revolutionaries.

2) Although it corresponds to a fundamental necessity in the class struggle, this tendency towards the unification of revolutionaries, like the tendency towards the unification of the class as a whole, has constantly been held up by a whole series of factors, such as:

  • the effects of the framework in which capitalism itself has developed, with all its regional, national, cultural and economic variations. Although the system itself tends to overturn this framework, it can never really go beyond it and it is something that weighs heavily on the struggle and consciousness of the class. 
  • the political immaturity of revolutionaries themselves, their lack of understanding, the insufficiency of their analyses, their difficulties in breaking out of the spirit of sectarianism, of the shopkeeper mentality, and all the other influences of petty bourgeois and bourgeois ideology in their own ranks.

3) The capacity for this tendency towards the unity of revolutionaries to overcome these obstacles is, in general, a fairly faithful reflection of the balance of forces between the two major classes in society: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Periods of reflux in the class struggle generally correspond to a movement of dispersal and mutual isolation among revolutionary currents and elements; whereas periods of proletarian upsurge tend to see the concentration of this fundamental tendency towards the unification of revolutionaries. This phenomenon manifests itself in a particularly clear way at the time of the formation of proletarian parties. This has always taken place in the context of a qualitative development of the class struggle, and has in general been the result of the regroupment of the different political tendencies of the class. This was notably the case with:

  • the foundation of German Social Democracy at Gotha in 1875 (Lassalleans and marxists)
  • the constitution of the Communist Party in Russia in 1917-18 (Bolsheviks and other currents like Trotsky’s group and Bogdanov’s group)
  • the foundation of the Communist Party in Germany in 1919 (Spartacists, ‘Left Radicals’, etc)
  • the foundation of the Communist Party in Italy (the Bordiga current and the Gramsci current).

Whatever the weaknesses of certain of these currents, and although in general, unification has taken place around one current that is politically more solid than the others, the fact remains that the foundation of the party has never been the result of a unilateral proclamation, but is the product of a dynamic process of regroupment among the most advanced elements of the class.

4) The existence of this process of regroupment in moments of historic development in the class struggle can be explained by the fact that:

  • the unifying dynamic going on in the whole class has its repercussions on revolutionaries themselves, pushing them to go beyond artificial and sectarian divisions
  • the growing responsibility facing revolutionaries as active, influential factors in the immediate struggle obliges them to concentrate their forces and their means of intervention
  • the class struggle tends to clarify problems which had been at the basis of divergences and divisions among revolutionaries.

5) The present situation of the revolutionary milieu is characterised by an extreme degree of division, by the existence of important differences on fundamental questions, by the isolation of its different components, by the weight of sectarianism and the shopkeeper mentality, by the sclerosis of certain currents and the inexperience of certain others. All these are expressions of the terrible effects of a half-century of counter-revolution.

6) A static approach to this situation can lead to the idea, defended notably by Fomento Obrero Revolucionario, that there is no possibility, either in the present or the future, for a rapprochement between the different positions and analyses which exist at the present time, for the kind of rapprochement which alone can allow for the shared coherence and clarity indispensable to any platform for the constitution of a unified organisation.

Such an approach ignores two essential elements:

  • the ability of discussion, of confrontation between positions and analyses, to clarify questions, if only because they allow a better understanding of respective positions and the elimination of false divergences.
  • the importance of the practical experiences of the class as a factor in going beyond misunderstandings and divergences.

7) Today, capitalism’s dive into acute crisis and the worldwide resurgence of the proletariat has put the regroupment of revolutionary forces on the agenda in a most pressing way. All the problems that, along with the class as a whole, revolutionaries will have to draw out of its concrete experience

  • constitute a favourable terrain for such a process of regroupment
  • will allow for clarification of the essential questions which currently divide the vanguard of the proletariat – perspectives for the crisis of capitalism, the nature of the trade unions and communists’ attitude towards them, the nature of national struggles, the function of the proletarian party, etc.

But while the demand for unity and, in the first instance, the opening up of debates between revolutionaries are absolutely necessary, they will not be translated into reality in a mechanistic way. They must be accompanied by a real understanding of this necessity and a militant will to carry it through. Those groups who, at the present time, have not become aware of this necessity and refuse to participate in the process of discussion and regroupment are doomed, unless they revise their positions, to become obstacles to the movement and to disappear as expressions of the proletariat.

8) All these considerations animate the ICC’s participation in the debates that have developed in the framework of the Milan conference May ’77 and the Paris conference of November ’78. It is because the ICC analyses the present period as one of historical resurgence of the working class that it attaches so much importance to this effort, that it strongly condemns the attitude of groups who neglect or reject such efforts, and considers that this sectarian attitude is itself a political position, the implications of which hamper the communist movement. The ICC therefore considers that these discussions are a very important element in the process of regroupment of revolutionary forces, which will lead to their unification in the world party of the proletariat, that essential weapon in the revolutionary struggle of the class.

Deepen: 

  • 1970s and the International Conferences of the communist left [64]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Battaglia Comunista [70]
  • Communist Workers Organisation [18]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • International Communist Current [6]

Second International Conference

  • 2752 reads

At the end of 1978 an International Conference of groups of the communist left was held. This Conference, which had been called for by the Milan Conference of May 1977 organized by the Internationalist Communist Party (Battaglia Comunista) and attended by the International Communist Current, had the following agenda: 1. the crisis and perspectives; 2. the question of national liberation struggles; 3. the question of the party. Two pamphlets are being prepared, containing the correspondence between the groups, the preparatory texts for the Conference, and the proceedings of the debates. The most important step forward taken by this Conference was the fact that it had a broader participation. As well as the ICP (BC) and the ICC, the other groups involved were the Communist Workers’ Organization (Britain), Nucleo Comunista Internazionalista (Italy), the Marxist Work Group (For Kommunismen, Sweden). Two other groups agreed to participate but were unable to attend for various reasons -- Organisation Communiste Revolutionnaire Inter­nationaliste d’Algerie (Travailleurs Immigres en Lutte) and Il Leninista (Italy). The latter group wrote a contribution which will appear in the pamphlet. The Ferment Ouvriere Revolution­naire (France and Spain) left the Conference at the beginning and thus didn’t take part in the debates. Other groups invited refused to partici­pate (cf the article on this in International Review, no.12).

We’re publishing here an article following up the one in IR, no.16, which dealt mainly with the groups who rejected the invitation. This article is a response to certain points in articles on the Conference written by the CWO (Revolutionary Perspectives, no.12) and Battaglia Comunista (BC, no.16, 1978), and it introduces the ICC Resolutions which the Conference refused to adopt. We’re also publishing a Resolution on the Process of the Regroupment of Revolutionaries by the ICC, synthesizing our general orientation on this question.

********************

In the article on the second International Con­ference in International Review, no.16, we expl­ained our conception of discussion between revo­lutionary groups and refuted the arguments of those who refused to participate. We particularly insisted that these groups were showing a funda­mentally sectarian attitude. For the ICC, this attitude is itself an obstacle to the political clarification which is so indispensable in the workers’ movement; without a confrontation of positions, there is no possibility of clarifica­tion.

We are returning to this question in order to rectify certain of the positions expressed by Battaglia Comunista and the CWO on participation at the Conference. In these positions the ICC is glibly described as ‘opportunist’1 and it’s denied that there is any problem of sectarianism. It’s thus necessary to set the records straight on this. We will then briefly give our views on the content of the discussions in order to underline the importance we accord to political debate, against our detractors’ accusation that we relegate this to a secondary level.

Finally, we will explain why we proposed to the Conference the resolutions on the points of the agenda, published at the end of this article.

Where does sectarianism come from?

BC accuse us of having “the opportunist desire to cover up important divergences of principle in order to get together all sorts of groups which are quite distant from each other”. They claim that we hide behind our criticisms of the ‘chapel spirit’ in order to gloss over political divergences. Let’s say once again that we don’t hide political divergences. We insist on the need to fight against the refusal to discuss pre­cisely because this refusal is a refusal to dis­cuss divergences. It’s a fear of confronting political positions hiding behind grandiose claims to hold the truth. We don’t claim that we hold the truth; we defend a political platform which we confront as much as possible with the reality of the situation -- in our interventions and in discussion with groups and elements fight­ing for the communist revolution.

It’s a strange purism of BC to accuse us of hiding divergences for opportunist reasons. Let’s recall how BC called the first International Con­ference. Starting with an analysis of ‘Eurocommunism’, BC put forward three hypotheses for the perspectives of the international situation; faced with the gravity of the situation they called for an International Conference, putting forward three “effective weapons from the point of view of theory and political practice”:

“a. Leaving the state of impotence and infer­iority into which they have been led by a provincialism fostered by cultural factors, by a self-satisfaction which denies the prin­ciple of revolutionary modesty, and above all by the depreciation of the concept of being a militant, which is rejected as a form of sacrifice.

b. Establishing a historically valid program­matic base; for our party this is the theoret­ical and practical experience embodied in the October Revolution, and, internationally, a critical approach to the theses of the Second Congress of the Communist International.

c. Recognizing that it is impossible to arrive either at class positions, or at the creation of the world party of the revolution, or at a revolutionary strategy, without first res­olving the need to set in motion a permanent international centre of liaison and informa­tion, which will be the anticipation and the synthesis of what will be the future Inter­national, just as Zimmerwald and above all, Kienthal were prefigurations of the IIIrd International.” (Texts and Proceedings of the International Conference of Milan, May ‘77)

The three points BC put forward for the framework of the Conference were thus: 1. breaking out of isolation 2. political criteria 3. organizational implications. The ICC responded positively to the calling of this Conference, but it requested more precise political criteria and thought it was premature to immediately set up an Inter­national Center of liaison and information:

“Obviously we think that such a conference can only take place when a minimum basis for agree­ment has been found by the participating groups and that it must address itself to the most fundamental questions in the proletarian movement today, in order to avoid any misunder­standings and give a solid framework for the debates ...

We do not think that it is necessary at this stage to answer your second proposition to create a center for international liaison, since this could only come as a conclusion to the international conference.” (Ibid, p.7)

At the time BC was saying that it was necessary to go beyond ‘provincialism’; we were in agree­ment with this and still are.

This is why we are returning to this point and are replying to BC’s accusation of opportunism, and to the CWO’s criticisms, which are quite similar. They don’t understand the ICC’s deter­mination to condemn the refusal to engage in poli­tical confrontation as such -- quite apart from the political divergences which are used as a ‘noble’ excuse for this attitude. This lack of understanding shows the persistence of a reflex towards isolation and self-protection. This re­flex is an inheritance from the period of counter­revolution when it was so vital to remain firm on class positions, even when it meant being alone. But it’s something which can become an obstacle when the class struggle is on the upsurge, when it is possible to engage in much wider debate without in any way renouncing one’s poli­tical platform, one’s program.

This is the most fundamental point in the ICC’s attitude towards groups which refuse to discuss. It’s not a question of glossing over political divergences and regrouping with anyone in any old way. It is a question of analyzing the pres­ent period of rising class struggle, of growing revolutionary potential, and of understanding that this is a favorable situation for the con­frontation of political divergences. It is a question of pushing forward in the direction the class struggle is going -- towards the generaliza­tion of struggles and of the debates coming out of these struggles. The ICC’s attitude towards participating in discussion is based on a precise political position which we don’t hide: the end of the period of counter-revolution, the perspec­tives of generalized class confrontations. This change in period implies a change in the way revolutionaries see discussion. It is no longer a question of protecting oneself from contamina­tion, from the degeneration of other organiza­tions, or resisting the demoralization of the proletariat. Now that the proletariat has made a breech in the domination of the bourgeoisie, we must seek to elaborate communist positions in the clearest and most coherent way possible.

In order to do that, we must first of all be able to make a distinction between misunderstandings and real political divergences. It is inevitable that there will be misunderstandings about what each group means; they are the tribute revolu­tionaries must pay to fifty years of counter­revolution. During this period, revolutionary organizations were dislocated and turned in upon themselves, like the proletariat as a whole. This was the real triumph of the bourgeoisie. Revolutionaries became a tiny minority, isolated from each other. This created habits which still weigh on them in the new period of upsurge. Like the proletariat, that great sleeping giant, revolutionaries are still having to shake off the dust of fifty years of isolation and dispersion. Either old habits persist when the period has changed, or else the inexperience, the lack of knowledge about the history of the workers’ move­ment suffered by the new groups arising out of the upsurge of the class, lead these groups to disappear, fall into activism, or fragment into mini-fractions with the first temporary reflux of the struggle. Then arrogance and ignorance become an article of belief, and history is re­written to accord with one’s own fantasies. Iso­lation, dispersion, the inexperience of revolutionaries are real problems and no organization can ignore them. Not to see that there is a problem of sectarianism, that is, of theorizing dispersion, is to ignore these problems.

BC and the CWO do not see that there is a prob­lem of sectarianism, of the ‘chapel spirit’. It’s a problem invented by the ICC, out of opport­unism according to BC. It wasn’t long ago, however, that BC did seem to be aware of this problem. Today, BC claims that the attitude of groups like Programa Comunista, Pour Une Intervention Communiste (PIC), or FOR is simply a question of political divergences. But there are political divergences between the groups who did participate at the Conference, more profound on some points than with the groups who refused to participate. There is no direct and immediate connection which allows you to explain every attitude as being the result of political diver­gences. It is too simplistic and it means for­getting one of the most violent consequences of the counter-revolution: the atomization of the proletariat, the fragmentation of revolutionaries who were forced to develop their political posi­tions in a vacuum, without a permanent confrontation of ideas.

In the period of reflux, in the 1930s and 1950s, clarification could only take place if you were prepared to be isolated, to go against the tide. In a period of resurgence, clarification can only take place if you participate actively in all the debates that arise in the course of the struggle. Today the attitude of revolutionaries towards political clarification must be the same as in previous periods of resurgence.

When the Eisenachians made concessions to the Lassalleans, Marx made very severe criticisms of the Marxists, whose concessions he judged to be unnecessary. Nevertheless, taking the period into account, he insisted on one point: “Every advance made by the real movement is worth a dozen programs” (Marx, Letter to W. Bracke, 5 May 1875, Preface to the Critique of the Gotha Program). Was Marx an opportunist? No; sect­arianism exists and is a problem in itself, not directly linked to political questions. Lenin was fighting against sectarianism when he pushed for the formation of the Russian Social Democra­tic Labor Party, while firmly criticizing poli­tical positions and without making any concessions.

This attitude of pushing for discussion is no less valuable in periods of isolation, where the conditions make contact difficult. A constant concern for discussion has always been shown by the most consistent revolutionaries (for example, Bilan in the 1930s).

By a curious inversion, whose secret is known only to themselves, Battaglia is now giving us lessons in political intransigence; but it was only a few years ago that they were calling for meetings without clear political criteria, like the ones with Lotta Comunista and Programma Comunista, or in the early 60s with R. Dunayeskaya’s News and Letters and the FOR of Munis, or the contacts they had with the French Trotskyist group Lutte Ouvriere. Are we to believe that when BC init­iates meetings and contacts of this type, it is a correct position, but when the ICC defends the necessity for confrontation between genuinely revolutionary groups on the basis of clear poli­tical criteria, that’s just opportunism?

There is a similar curious inversion in the atti­tude of the CWO, who not long ago considered the ICC to be in the camp of the counter-revolution, but have now changed their minds. Are we to believe that it is because the political positions of the CWO have changed so profoundly that they now deign to participate actively in international conferences (the first Conference in Milan, the Oslo Conference, the second Conference in Paris)? Or isn’t it rather that there has been a change of attitude, a recognition that it’s no good proclaiming yourself the only guardian of truth, that it’s necessary to discuss political diver­gences and not to look for pretexts for avoiding debate: in other words, the implicit recognition that there is such a problem as the attitude of revolutionary groups?

To wind up on this last point, we simply want to point out the incoherence of inviting groups to come to the International Conference, of asking for contributions on the points on the agenda, and then saying that their refusal to participate is quite ‘normal’, because such groups ‘have no place in Conferences like these’ because of the positions they are developing. Then why invite them? Out of some concern for ‘democracy’? If such groups are right not to come, then we’ve got to be consistent and admit that we were wrong to invite them. We don’t think so. Whatever poli­tical aberrations such groups defend, they are still part of the proletarian camp; in our opin­ion, direct, public confrontation is the best way to sweep away the aberrations which still exist in the workers’ movement.

Revolutionary organizations worthy of their name must fight against erroneous, sclerotic, or con­fused positions. We don’t recognize any group’s ‘right to be wrong’, we don’t ‘respect’ political positions which serve only to throw a bit more garbage into a movement which already finds it extremely difficult to extricate itself from the consequences of the counter-revolution. We don’t ‘respect’ the refusal to discuss in the name of divergences, because that means implicitly recog­nizing that there is a political validity and coherence in the positions each group defends: each group defends its own positions, and every­thing is for the best in the best of all possible revolutionary worlds!. We, on the other hand, call on all groups in the proletarian camp, on the whole working class, to speak up, to engage in an open, public and international confrontation of ideas, to defend their positions in interventions and class actions.

The work of the Conference

It is in this spirit that the ICC defended the necessity of making clear pronouncements on the questions on the agenda -- questions which aren’t academic problems, but which have increasingly urgent implications for the class struggle. In order to stimulate the adoption of clear positions, the ICC put forward -- in addition to the preparatory texts -- short synthetic resolutions on the present crisis and the perspectives for the period, on the national questions, and on the organization of revolutionaries. The principle of putting forward these resolutions was rejected.

We will summarize the main points of our inter­ventions at the Conference.

1. On the first point – The Crisis and Perspectives for the Present Period -- the ICC insisted on the necessity to put forward a clear perspective, based on a solid analysis, concretized by the situation unfolding in front of our eyes. Are we heading towards generalized class confrontations or a generalized imperialist conflict? As revo­lutionary organizations intervening in the working class and claiming to defend a political orienta­tion -- a political direction -- we must be able to pronounce on the general sense of the class struggle today. Revolutionaries in the past may have been wrong on the period, but they always pronounced on it.

On this question, BC defended the following posi­tion:

“In 1976, we put forward three possible hypotheses:

1. that capitalism will temporarily get over its economic crisis;

2. that the eventual aggravation of the crisis will create a subjective situation of generalized fear, which will lead to a solu­tion of force and a third world war;

3. the weakest link in the chain will break, reopening a revolutionary period for the proletariat, in historic continuity with the Bolshevik October...

Two years later, we can affirm that the present situation has taken the contours of our second hypothesis.” (Texts and Proceedings of the International Conference of Paris (Nov.1978))

As for the CWO, it doesn’t make a clear pronounce­ment: the two possibilities are open, war or revolution. This answer of ‘maybe yes, maybe no’ was however weighted by the CWO’s stress on the passivity and reflux of the class struggle today.

For the ICC, after the capitalist system has been in open crisis for ten years, the internal contra­dictions of the system have once again reached the point where imperialist confrontations are tending to generalize. The main points in this evolution are as follows: once Europe and Japan were reconstructed they entered into direct com­petition with the US; the crisis has led to the reinforcement of the imperialist blocs; the west­ern bloc has imposed a ‘Pax Americana’ on the Middle East and has redeployed its strategy in South East Asia, definitively integrating China into its orbit, etc. From the standpoint of inter-imperialist antagonisms, from the economic, political and military strategic point of view, the question that should be asked isn’t “when is imperialist war going to be generalized?” but rather “why hasn’t war already been generalized?”.

For the CWO, the magical curve of the falling rate of profit has not descended far enough. Capita­lism still has a number of possibilities open -- like measures of austerity (?) – before the condi­tions for a generalized war have been established. “The proletariat still has time and opportunity to destroy capitalism before it can destroy civilization”(Ibid).

What is the meaning of the growing military inter­vention of the capitalist powers in Zaire, Angola, Vietnam/Cambodia, China/Vietnam? What is the mea­ning of the ‘human rights’ campaign and other ideological battles? What is the meaning of the accelerated, bloated growth of the war industry?

The CWO replies quite correctly that they are preparations for war. However, according to the CWO, it is not the class struggle which is hold­ing back a generalized war – that’s “the absurd scenario of the ICC”. For the CWO, the struggles of the working class are “sectional struggles with little possibility of generalization into class-wide battles” (Revolutionary Perspectives, no.12). The CWO’s logical conclusion: “the crisis is still not deep enough to make war a necessary step for the bourgeoisie” (Ibid). This is simply a tautology and is merely saying: if the war isn’t here it’s because the conditions for it aren’t here. We agree, but we come back to the original question: what conditions? Failing to grasp a theoretical argument is understandable, but it’s hard to see how one can fail to be worried when the facts themselves remain unexplained. Events like the assassination of an archduke at Sarajevo have been used as a pretext to unleash a world war; today, far more important events like the wars in the Middle East in 1967 and 1973, in Vietnam, Cyprus, China/Vietnam etc, have not led to such a conflict. Why? Why didn’t the USSR intervene directly in Vietnam? Why didn’t the US intervene directly in Angola or Ethiopia? The ‘dialecticians’ will no doubt reply that the objective conditions haven’t been laid down. We agree but for the ICC the main condition that’s lacking today is the mobilization of the popula­tion, and above all the proletariat, behind the interests of national capital.

As far the other preconditions for a generalized conflict are concerned -- the existence of consti­tuted imperialist blocs, the open crisis of the capitalist system – they’re already there. The CWO’s and BC’s thermometer of the falling rate of profit doesn’t allow them to contradict this: all they could say is that the blocs aren’t reinforced ‘enough’, or that the crisis isn’t deep ‘enough’. Perhaps the ICC’s scenario is ‘absurd’ as the CWO says, but they’ve got to prove it. On the other hand, the political implications of BC’s idea of a “subjective situation of generalized fear” or of the CWO’s view of a “proletariat con­fused, disorientated, and pessimistic about struggle” (RP, no.12) are hard to believe.

Are revolutionaries supposed to tell a combative proletariat that has been fighting for ten years, a proletariat which nowhere in the world is march­ing behind the bourgeois ideals of defending the ‘democratic’ or ‘socialist’ fatherland, or behind appeals for austerity -- are they supposed to say the die is already cast? We’re no longer in the 1930s. The conditions are not the same today. All this means little to the CWO who doesn’t see the resurgence of class struggle today -- all they see is the reflux. It’s the same with BC for whom the recent anti-union strikes in the Italian hos­pitals mean very little, or for whom practically nothing happened in 1969, just a vague movement without any profound meaning for the working class, simply because BC wasn’t there. The ICC wasn’t there either, but we think history existed before us! The analysis of the present period and its implications, the development of a clear orienta­tion isn’t an academic quarrel, even though the CWO and BC may want to divert the debate into a battle of the theory of the falling rate of profit ‘versus’ the theory of the saturation of the market. For us, the theory of the saturation of the world market constitutes a coherent framework which enables us to understand the whole period from World War I to the present crisis: a frame­work which includes the theory of the falling rate of profit and doesn’t exclude it. The most impor­tant thing about the debate on the crisis today is the implications it has for our intervention. There’s an enormous weakness in the economic analysis of the CWO and BC at the theoretical level, but the fundamental weakness is their underestimation of the level of class struggle today, their inability to analyze what’s going on in front of our eyes, to see the embryonic signs of a class confrontation which will inevitably take place before the contradictions of capital explode into a new world holocaust.

2. The second question dealt with at the Confer­ence was the national question. Here although all the groups present except the Nucleo Comunista Internazionalista (NCI) held that the proletariat can no longer support national liberation struggles, many nuances and divergences still separated the groups at the Conference.

The NCI sticks to the letter of the position defended by the Communist International, support­ing national liberation as a way of weakening imperialism, and thus as a positive aid to the struggle of the proletariat, which is supposed to put itself at the head of such movements. The fact that, over the last fifty years, this has never happened; the fact that, over the last ten years, every time the working class in any coun­try has entered into struggle it has come up against the political forces of ‘national libera­tion’ -- none of this bothers the NCI who can’t see ‘proof’ of the fact that their theory is invalid. The NCI is serving us a warmed-up vers­ion of the idea of a ‘welding’ of the social movement in the under-developed regions and the proletarian movement in the advanced countries. Not seeing that the only welding that can take place is among the ranks of the world proletariat, whether in the weak or strong areas of capitalism, the NCI has not yet cast off the distorting spect­acles of Bordigism. They still see a continuity between the dragooning of the masses into national struggles and proletarian mobilizations. On the contrary, the whole experience of this century shows that the proletariat can only make an uncompromising break with the national terrain -- wherever it is and whatever numerical strength it has within the national state that exploits it.

The ICC’s condemnation of all national struggles has nothing to do with indifference, abstraction, or contempt towards the popular revolts which the working class is also often involved in. It’s a denunciation of all those who manipulate these revolts for nationalist or imperialist ends, ie all those who claim that it’s possible to make a step forward at a national level. Only the wor­kers’ struggle can give a direction to these revolts; in its absence, they can only end up in misery, massacre, and war. And don’t tell us that this break is impossible without the party! Even without a party, the workers have already shown through their strikes that they can cool the ardors of nationalism. This has happened in Angola, Israel, Egypt, Algeria and Morocco. The break with ‘national liberation’ isn’t an abstrac­tion – it’s the reality of today.

More subtle than this is the ambiguity which still exists on this question with a group like BC. While qualifying ‘national liberation’ wars as moments of imperialist war, BC put forward the idea that the world proletariat -- and thus the proletariat of these countries -- has to “change ‘national liberation movements’ into proletarian revolution” by building the future Communist International. If the NCI’s position on this question has a coherence, BC’s falls between two stools. You’ve got to choose. Either “national liberation struggles have completely exhausted their historic function” (BC, emphasis by them) and you must draw the consequences: they can’t be used by the proletariat, which has its own histo­ric mission. The role of the class party isn’t to transform these struggles but to call on the proletariat to fight all the agencies which try to dragoon it into imperialist wars. Or else it is possible to “change them into proletarian revolutions”, and you must then recognize that they do have a historic function, as part of the historical tasks of the proletariat. You must then say that they are not simply imperialist conflicts.

It’s not a question of transforming national liberation into proletarian revolution, but of mobilizing the proletariat against all national movements, BC will probably reply once again that the ICC isn’t very ‘dialectical’. Again the ICC may be wrong, but you can’t take the discussion forward by appealing to an all-purpose ‘dialectic’, like the doctor who calls every illness an ‘aller­gy’. For BC the party is the answer to all unex­pected contradictions. But for the class party to act, it’s got to exist. And where is it going to come from? From national struggles? Certainly not. It will swell its ranks with those who have made a definitive break with nationalist politics of all kinds. And where will these elements come from? From class movements in all countries, including those which are now subjected to the blood and iron of world imperialism’s ‘national liberation struggles’.

A fundamental precondition for the capacity of the world proletariat to conduct its struggle is a clear, practical and theoretical understanding of the fact that it can only fight on its own terrain, the terrain of internationalism; that there is no possibility of using a movement which has arisen out of local and global imperialist antagonisms and which uses the masses as simple cannon-fodder.

Revolutionaries who still waver on this question are simply participating in the general confusion about nationalism which exists in the working class today. They are lending credit to the bourgeois idea that nationalism is just a little bit revolutionary. Only casuistry can explain to the workers, who are learning through their daily practice that the fight is the same in all coun­tries, that their struggle is the same and yet not the same; or that, by a clever use of strategy, the proletariat can enter the ranks of nationalism in order to turn them against nationalism. You might as well try entering the police to struggle against the police.

As for the CWO, who are very anxious to separate themselves from any support for national movements, who wanted to make this question a criterion for exclusion from the discussion, they didn’t argue at all against the positions of the Communist International as defended by the NCI. Their main concern was to insist on the idea that not all countries are imperialist, or rather not ‘really’ imperialist, that imperialism is the policy only of the principal capitalist powers.

We won’t enter into the details of this question, but will touch upon the way the CWO simplifies this question. In their article on the Confer­ence in RP no.12, the CWO asks: “how could it be argued that, for example, Israel was an indepen­dent imperialist power?”. There’s none so deaf as those that will not hear. The fact that no country today can escape from imperialism, that all countries in the world today are imperialist, means precisely that national independence is no longer possible. The most powerful countries have a wider margin of maneuver, not because they are imperialist and the weaker ones aren’t, but simply because they are more competitive on the world market and/or the most powerful on the international battle field. The fact that all countries are imperialist today means precisely that no national bourgeoisie can defend its inte­rests without coming up against the objective limits of a world market which has invaded the remotest corners of the planet. Our answer to the CWO’s question is: Israel is an imperialist state, but it’s not an independent state.

But the most important thing here is the political implications of the CWO’s view. If only the big powers have the means to conduct an imperialist policy, and the second order countries don’t, you have to be coherent and say that the national governments of the latter are simply ‘agents’ of the big imperialisms, or, to use the leftist terminology, ‘valets’ of the US, the superpowers, and of the USSR. This is true but it’s not sufficient. The condemnation of national strug­gles isn’t a moral question, a denunciation of nationalist factions for ‘selling out’ to imperialism. It’s based on a social reality: there is no possibility of defending the nation outside of the necessities of imperialism.

3. On the third point, during the discussion on the question of the Party, the ICC particularly insisted on one issue: does the party take power? The group For Kommunismen replied no, and the FOR, although absent from the Conference, con­tributed a text which clearly states what the ICC considers to be one of the essential lessons of the Russian Revolution. The role of the party isn’t to take power. Power is taken by the work­ers’ councils, which are the unitary organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat, inside of which parties constitute the communist vanguard of the class, regrouping the clearest and most conscious elements in the movement towards commu­nism -- the withering away of the state, the dis­appearance of classes, the total liberation of humanity.

The NCI defended the position that the party takes power, identifying with Lenin’s criticisms of the left communists in An Infantile Disorder. They don’t understand that the critique of the CI’s errors on this question has nothing to do with bourgeois democracy. It’s based on the experience of the proletariat in Russia, of the Bolsheviks, and of Lenin, who, despite the false theorizations that he did develop, was capable of a striking clarity when he was expressing the highest moments of the proletarian struggle.

Thus Lenin talked of “the necessity for all power to pass into the hands of revolutionary democracy guided by the revolutionary proletariat” (emphasis by Lenin).

If there was one question that really had to be debated after the defeat of the world revolution of 1917-23, it was the question of the forms of power that emerge in the revolution. The CI’s error on this question proved to be an accelera­ting factor in the counter-revolution from the moment when isolation led the power in Russia to describe each retreat imposed by the situation as a gain for the proletariat; in this situation the power became more and more autonomous from the general organizations of the class, culmina­ting in the tragedy of Kronstadt, which saw an armed confrontation between the workers and the state, with the Bolshevik Party at its head. The idea that the party takes power reflected the immaturity of revolutionaries at the beginning of the century, when they were still impregnated with a period when bourgeois schemas were still the reference point for understanding the revolutionary process.

The CWO recognizes that the workers’ councils are the foundations of proletarian power, but it has revived the old ideas of bourgeois parliamenta­rism and transposed them into the councils. For the CWO, the seizure of power means that the majority of councils have been won to revolutio­nary positions, and since these positions are held by the party, the party ‘in practice’ seizes power once it has a majority in the councils. The circle is complete. According to the CWO, when it takes power the proletariat simply apes bourg­eois parliamentarism with its majorities and minorities, and the proletarian struggle becomes a struggle between ‘parties’ in which each one tries to win a majority for its positions so that it can take power.

Neither the Paris Commune nor the 1917 revolution followed this numerical parliamentary schema. They resulted from a profound evolution of the balance of forces between social classes, and had nothing to do with the mere parliamentary sanct­ioning of an already existing class rule based on definite relations of production. This is how the bourgeoisie functions. For the proletariat, the taking of power is the conscious, organized action of a class whose domination has not yet been achieved.

In its preparatory text for the Conference, BC correctly affirms that “without a party there can be no proletarian revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat, just as there can be no proletarian dictatorship and workers’ state with­out the workers’ councils” (although we don’t accept the formulation ‘workers’ state’ to des­cribe the state that arises during the revolu­tion). Moreover BC claims that it distinguishes itself from the ‘superpartyism’ of the Bordigists, for whom the party is everything and the organiza­tion of the working class in councils a mere form to which only the party gives revolutionary con­tent. But on the question of taking power, in the last resort BC also says the party takes power! BC’s dearly beloved dialectic on the relationship between party and class is simplified considerably, and all their fine speeches about the workers’ councils and the dictatorship of the proletariat, all their fierce critiques of the ‘superpartyism’ of the Bordigists, fall to the ground. You’ve got to be clear. There are two essential organs in the revolution: councils and parties. If the party holds power, what is the role of the councils? What’s the difference between this conception and the idea that the power of the proletariat means the adhesion of the base (the councils) to a summit (the party) which in fact holds this power? The question of power is once again seen as the power of a part of the whole in the name of the whole. This isn’t possible for the proletariat. It’s only strength lies pre­cisely in its collective capacity to wield political power. Either the proletariat takes power collectively, or it can’t take power, and no-one can do it in its place. When the Bolshevik Party took power, it was with the slogan “all power to the soviets” and not “all power to the party”. It’s understandable that the distinction between the two was far from clear in the minds of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks were the first to be surprised by the audience they found in the working class, and it was the initiative of the masses which pushed the Bolshe­vik Party forward on the question of the insurrec­tion and the seizure of power, even though Lenin himself was reticent about becoming the President of the Council of People’s Commissars.

It was later on, with the reflux of the revolu­tion, that we saw the tragic proof of the impossibility of the party substituting itself for a class power that was declining under the blows of exhaustion and international isolation. When the working class is mobilized it can allow the greatest clarity to develop in its party, it can allow it to express the greatest revolutionary firmness. But the greatest revolutionary firmness of the best of all parties cannot maintain the proletarian power of a demobilized class. Why? Fundamentally, because the nature of the prole­tariat’s power derives from its nature as an exploited class whose only strength is its collective strength. The question of taking power is complex, and it cannot be resolved by the megalomania of political groups who elude the problem by claiming power for themselves. The power of the party can never be a guarantee. The only guarantee is in the working class itself and it’s the role of revolutionary parties to defend this guarantee against any demobilization -- a demobilization which can only be accentuated by those who say to the proletariat: “give us the power, we’ll carry out the revolution”.

Remarks on the conclusion

The most important step forward in this Conference was the broadening of the debate to new groups who didn’t participate at the first Conference in Milan: the direct confrontation of the posi­tions of different groups, the clarification of the divergences which separate them, making formulations more precise in the light of these confrontations -- all this is vital for organiza­tions that intervene in the class struggle.

This is why the IC C throughout and after the Conference insisted on this question of sectarian­ism. On the same point, there were two things which, in our opinion, are to be deplored in the conclusions. While the groups were able to agree to carry on this work, the Conference made no pronouncement as such and was unable to make an official common statement about the work. In this sense, the Conference as a body remained dumb and was unable to draw up collectively an outline of the agreements and disagreements between the groups on the questions on the agenda.

The very principle of resolutions coming out of such a Conference was rejected. By proposing the resolutions published in this IR, the ICC wasn’t acting for itself, or trying to force a political agreement on anyone, or to alter its own political positions. It’s a question of establishing whether we are blatherers or revolutionary militants. We don’t participate in international conferences for the sole satisfaction of seeing a joint publi­cation coming out of a meeting where everyone can just express their positions and then go back to work as though nothing had happened. The prepar­atory texts and the debates are moments which should allow us to clarify points of agreement and disagreement. This must be translated into an ability to put things down in black and white, in public: not simply a juxtaposition of statements from each one of us but also a joint statement if that is possible.

This wasn’t possible and it was a weakness of the conference. Paradoxically, this desire to remain dumb as a Conference by refusing any joint decla­rations was accompanied by a concern to add further criteria for invitations to future con­ferences -- criteria of “selection” for BC and “'exclusion” for the CWO. We have here a proposal which is heading towards some sort of minimum platform instead of a framework for discussion, and at the same time a refusal to make joint pronouncements on anything. Good luck to those who can understand this. Even the decisions taken like the preparation of the next conference remain ‘up in the air’. It’s up to the reader of the forthcoming pamphlet to interpret the practical implications of the work done.

MG

Resolution on the Crisis

1) Even for the less aware sectors of the ruling class, the world crisis of capitalism is today becoming incontrovertible. But even if the eco­nomists, those apologists for the capitalist mode of production, are gradually ceasing to ex­plain the present crisis of the economy in terms of the rise in oil prices or the breakdown in the International Monetary System set up in I944, they are still not completely able to understand the real significance of these problems, a fact due to their class prejudices.

2) Only a Marxist analysis can explain the sig­nificance of the crisis. It teaches us that, as the C.I. made evident after the Ist imperial­ist war, the capitalist system has entered its decadent period. The cyclical crises of last century were like the heart beat of a healthy body; these have now been succeeded by a perman­ent crisis which the system can no longer survive except by a hideous cycle -- really its death rattle -- of acute crises, wars, reconstruction, even more acute crises.

3) We must therefore reject all theories -- even those which make reference to Marxism -- which see the present crisis as no more than a ‘cyclical’ crisis, or one of ‘restructuration’ or of ‘adapta­tion’, or ‘modernization’. Capitalism is com­pletely incapable of surmounting its present crisis and all its plans, whether to control inflation or to increase production, can only end in failure. All that capitalism can achieve with­in the logic of its own laws is a new imperialist world war.

4) Although the only perspective that capitalism can offer humanity is generalized war, history has sham, particularly by the events in 1917 in Russia and I918 in Germany, that there is a force within society that is capable of resisting, of driving back and overturning such a perspective -- the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat. The inexorable aggravation of capitalism’s eco­nomic contradictions thus poses two alternatives: imperialist war or the revolutionary upsurge of the working class. What will decide the outcome is the balance of forces between the two main classes in society: the bourgeoisie and the prol­etariat.

5) The bourgeoisie has twice managed to impose its ‘solution’ to its economic contradictions. In 1914 it did so because of the gangrenous opportunism and betrayal of the main proletarian parties. In 1939 it was because of the terrible defeat inflicted upon the proletariat in the 20s, the betrayal of the communist parties, the weight of fascism and anti-fascist and democratic mysti­fications. But the present situation is quite different:

-- the containment of the proletariat by the left parties -- the CP and SP -- is much less effective than that of the social democratic parties of 1914;

-- democratic and antifascist myths (even if they are still frequently raised), the power of mys­tification of the so-called ‘workers state’ are more or less used up and exposed.

6) Therefore the perspective opened up by the intensification of capitalism’s contradictions at the end of the 60’s is not generalized imperialist war but generalized class war. Capitalism can only unleash a third world war after it has inflicted a crushing defeat upon the proletariat. This was shown in the proletarian response in France in 68, in Italy in 69, Poland in 70 and in many other countries during the same period. And although the bourgeoisie managed to cool down the struggle momentarily by means of a political/ideological counter-offensive carried out mainly by the left parties, the combative strength of the proletariat is far from exhausted. With the deep­ening of the crisis, austerity and unemployment, that combativity will erupt once more onto the surface. Contrary to the bourgeoisie’s hopes, this combativity will lead to major struggles against capitalism.

Resolution on the national question

1) Fundamental to the formation of the C.I. was the understanding that capitalism had entered its period of decadence, which put the proletarian revolution on the historical agenda. In the words of the C.I., with World War I “the epoch of im­perialist wars and revolutions was opened up”. Today, any coherent expression of the positions of the working class must be based upon the rec­ognition of this essential fact in the life of society.

2) Ever since the Communist Manifesto Marxism has always acknowledged the tendency for the cap­italist mode of production to unify the laws of the world economy, for the bourgeoisie “to create a world in its own image”. For this reason, Marx­ism has never considered it possible, once the proletarian revolution is on the agenda, for cer­tain geographical areas to escape the total development of capitalism, or that ‘bourgeois democratic revolutions’ or ‘national liberation struggles’ could be on the agenda at the same time as the proletarian revolution.

3) The experience of more than half a century has sham that bogus ‘national struggles’ are nothing more than moments in various inter-imperialist conflicts which lead ultimately to world wars, and that all the verbiage which attempts to lead the workers into participating in these struggles or into supporting them serves only to derail the real struggles of the proletariat, and are part of the preparation for imperialist world war.

Resolution on the organization of revolutionaries

1) From its beginning, the workers’ movement has recognized organization and consciousness as the two essential elements in the struggle of the working class. Like all human activity and particularly past revolutions, the communist rev­olution is a conscious act, but to a considerably heightened extent. The proletariat forges its consciousness of its being, of its goals and the means to achieve them through its total experience as a class. This process is difficult, uneven, heterogeneous, a process in which the class secretes political organizations which regroup the most conscious elements, those who “have the advantage over the rest of the proletariat of understanding the conditions, the line of march and the general tasks of the movement” (Communist Manifesto). The task of these organizations is to participate actively in this development of consciousness, and generalization and thus in the struggles of the class.

2) The organization of revolutionaries constitutes an essential organ of the proletariat’s struggle, before as well as after the insurrection and the seizure of power. The working class cannot acc­omplish its historic task, of destroying the cap­italist system and creating communism without the proletarian party, because its absence could only express an immaturity in the consciousness of the class.

3) Before the revolution and in preparation for it communists intervene actively in the class struggle and encourage and stimulate all expressions and all possibilities which emerge within the class and which express its tendency towards self-organization and the development of its consciousness (general assemblies, strike committees, unemployed committees, discussion circles or workers groups...). On the other hand, in order to avoid contributing to the confusion and mystification created by the bourgeoisie, communists must avoid all participation in the life of capitalist organs. Trade unions have definitively become such organs today.

4) During and after the revolution, the proletarian party actively participates in the life of the whole class regrouped in its unitary or­gans, the workers’ councils, in order to orientate them towards the destruction of the capitalist state, the seizure of political power, the de­struction of capitalist relations of production and the creation of communist social relations. However, and in spite of the indispensability of its activity, the communist party, in contrast to the pattern which prevailed in bourgeois rev­olutions, cannot substitute itself for the whole class in its seizure of power and the accomplishing of its historic task. In no circumstances can it become the proxy of the class; the nature of the goal for which the proletariat strives – communism -- is such that it can be achieved only through the seizure of power by the whole of the class, through the proletariat’s own activity and ex­perience.

5) After the deepest counter-revolution in the history of the workers’ movement one of the most important tasks which falls to revolutionaries is to contribute actively to the reconstruction of that organ which is so indispensable to the rev­olutionary struggle -- the proletarian party.

Although the emergence of the party is conditioned by the development and deepening of the class struggle, by the opening up of the movement to­wards communist revolution, it is not an auto­matic and mechanical product; it can by no means be extemporized.

Today’s preparations towards it demand:

-- the re-appropriation of the fundamental acquis­itions of the past experiences of the class

-- the actualization of these acquisitions in the light of new conditions in the life of capitalism and in the class struggle.

-- attempt at discussion between different communist groups, the confrontation and clarification of their respective positions. These are vital preconditions for the establishment of the clear and coherent programmatic base which is essential for the foundation of the world proletarian party.

Resolution on the process of regroupment

1) Since the beginning of the workers’ movement, one of the most fundamental concerns of revolut­ionaries has been for unity in their own ranks. This need for unity among the most advanced ele­ments of the class is an expression of the pro­found, historic and immediate unity of interests in the class itself, and is a decisive factor in the process leading to the worldwide unification of the proletariat, to the realization of its own being. Whether we are talking about the attempt, in 1850, to constitute a ‘World League of Comm­unist Revolutionaries’ regrouping the Communist League, the Blanquists, and the left-wing Chartists or the foundation of the International Workingmen’s Association in 1864; of the Second International in 1889, or the Communist International in 1919, itself the result of the efforts towards regroup­ment at Zimmerwald and Kienthal in 1915-16, every important step in the evolution of the workers’ movement has been based on this quest for the worldwide regroupment of revolutionaries.

2) Although it corresponds to a fundamental nec­essity in the class struggle, this tendency towards the unification of revolutionaries, like the tendency towards the unification of the class as a whole, has constantly been held up by a whole series of factors, such as:

-- the effects of the framework in which capital­ism itself has developed, with all its regional, national, cultural and economic variations. Al­though the system itself tends to overturn this framework, it can never really go beyond it and it is something which weighs heavily on the struggle and consciousness of the class.

-- the political immaturity of revolutionaries themselves, their lack of understanding, the insufficiency of their analyses, their diff­iculties in breaking out of the spirit of sec­tarianism, of the shopkeeper mentality, and all the other influences of petty bourgeois and bourgeois ideology in their own ranks.

3) The capacity for this tenancy towards the unity of revolutionaries to overcome these obstacles is, in general, a fairly faithful re­flection of the balance of forces between the two major classes in society: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Periods of reflux in the class struggle generally correspond to a movement of dispersal and mutual isolation among revolutionary currents and elements; whereas periods of prol­etarian upsurge tend to see the concentration of this fundamental tendency towards the unifi­cation of revolutionaries. This phenomenon man­ifests itself in a particularly clear way at the time of the formation of proletarian parties. This has always taken place in the context of a qualitative development of the class struggle, and has in general been the result of the regroupment of the different political tendencies of the class. This was notably the case with:

-- the foundation of German Social Democracy at Gotha in 1875 (Lassalleans and Marxists)

-- the constitution of the Communist Party in Russia in 1917-18 (Bolsheviks and other currents like Trotsky’s group and Bogdanov’s group)

-- the foundation of the Communist Party in Germany in 1919 (Spartacists, ‘Left Radicals’, etc)

-- the foundation of the Communist Party in Italy (the Bordiga current and the Gramsci current).

Whatever the weaknesses of certain of these curr­ents, and although in general, unification has taken place around one current that is politically more solid than the others, the fact remains that the foundation of the party has never been the result of a unilateral proclamation, but is the product of a dynamic process of regroupment among the most advanced elements of the class.

4) The existence of this process of regroupnent in moments of historic development in the class struggle can be explained by the fact that:

-- the unifying dynamic going on in the whole class has its repercussions on revolutionaries themselves , pushing them to go beyond artificial and sectarian divisions

-- the groving responsibility facing revolution­aries as active, influential factors in the immediate struggle obliges them to concentrate their forces and their means of intervention

-- the class struggle tends to clarify problems which had been at the basis of divergences and divisions among revolutionaries.

5) The present situation of the revolutionary milieu is characterized by an extreme degree of division, by the existence of important differ­ences on fundamental questions, by the isolation of its different components, by the weight of sectarianism and the shopkeeper mentality, by the sclerosis of certain currents and the inexperience of certain others. All these are expressions of the terrible effects of a half-century of counter-revolution.

6) A static approach to this situation can lead to the idea, defended notably by Fomento Obrero Revolucionario, that there is no possibility, either in the present or the future, for a rapprochement between the different positions and analyses which exist at the present time, for the kind of rapprochement which alone can allow for the shared coherence and clarity indispensable to any platform for the constitution of a unified organization.

Such an approach ignores two essential elements:

-- the ability of discussion, of confrontation between positions and analyses, to clarify questions, if only because they allow a better under­standing of respective positions and the eliminat­ion of false divergences

-- the importance of the practical experiences of the class as a factor in going beyond misunder­standings and divergences.

7) Today, capitalism’s dive into acute crisis and the worldwide resurgence of the proletariat has put the regroupment of revolutionary forces on the agenda in a most pressing way. All the prob­lems which, along with the class as a whole, rev­olutionaries will have to draw out of its con­crete experience

-- constitute a favorable terrain for such a process of regroupment

-- will allow for clarification of the essential questions which currently divide the vanguard of the proletariat -- perspectives for the crisis of capitalism, the nature of the trade unions and communists’ attitude towards them, the nature of national struggles, the function of the proletarian party, etc.

But while the demand for unity and, in the first instance, the opening up of debates between rev­olutionaries are absolutely necessary, they will not be translated into reality in a mechanistic way. They must be accompanied by a real under­standing of this necessity and a militant will to carry it through. Those groups who, at the present time, have not become aware of this necessity and refuse to participate in the process of discussion and regroupment are doomed, unless they revise their positions, to become obstacles to the move­ment and to disappear as expressions of the proletariat.

8) All these considerations animate the ICC’s participation in the debates that have developed in the framework of the Milan conference May ‘77 and the Paris conference of November ‘78. It is because the ICC analyses the present period as one of historical resurgence of the working class that it attaches so much importance to this effort, that it strongly condemns the attitude of groups who neglect or reject such efforts, and considers that this sectarian attitude is itself a political position, the implications of which hamper the communist movement. The ICC therefore considers that these discussions are a very important ele­ment in the process of regroupment of revolution­ary forces, which will lead to their unification in the world party of the proletariat, that essential weapon in the revolutionary struggle of the class.

1 Revolutionary Perspectives, no. 12 and Battaglia Comunista, 1978-16

Deepen: 

  • 1970s and the International Conferences of the communist left [64]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary organisation [5]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Battaglia Comunista [70]
  • Communist Workers Organisation [18]
  • Conferences of the Communist Left [69]

The evolution of the British situation since the Second World War

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An analysis of the current situation at any time -- whether at the international level or in any one country -- can never be a simple snapshot; conjunctural events are only moments in a dynamic interplay of forces which develops over a period of time. Our previous analyses of the situation in Britain have been located within a view of its development through the period since 1967 when the sterling devaluation heralded the opening-up of the present open crisis of the world capital­ist system1. This text attempts to gain a broader perspective on the situation in Britain by examining its evolution since the outbreak of the Second World War.

The general significance of the period for Britain

1. The general significance of this period can be summarized by the following:

-- Britain’s capacity to remain a global imper­ialist power was broken by the systematic efforts of the US during the Second World War and its aftermath. This was done in such a way as to bring Britain to a position of total economic and military subservience to the US in the constitu­tion of the western bloc after the war.

-- The mantle of the ‘natural party of govern­ment’ has been irreversibly transferred from the Conservative to the Labour Party. This corres­pondence of the Labour Party to the overall needs of British capital has not been a product merely of conjunctural circumstances in the past few years, but has been the true state of affairs during and since the last world war. Indeed, it is the periods in which government power has rested with the Conservatives that have been the product of specific conjunctural circumstances.

-- The balance of forces between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat has undergone a change of historic proportion. If the Second World War marked the bourgeoisie’s zenith and the prolet­ariat’s nadir, the proletariat has now streng­thened to the point where it not only stands as a barrier to a third global war, but is develop­ing to go further and pose its own revolutionary solution to the historical crisis of capitalism. Although this shift of forces is an international one, its manifestations in Britain have had a profound effect on the situation.

These are the main themes of this text.

Britain and the formation of the US bloc

2. The Second World War changed the physiognomy of the world imperialist system of capital. It transformed the pre-1939 pattern of several competing ‘mini-blocs’ into two great global blocs each under the unassailable hegemony of its major national bourgeoisie, the US and Russia. The war was pursued not only militarily between the Allied and Axis powers, but economically among the Allies themselves, or rather between the US and each of the others. For Britain, its ‘war’ with the US was the crucial determinant of its post-war position.

3. The lynchpin of the British economy in the thirties was still the Empire which included outright colonies (such as India) as well as semi-colonies (such as China or Argentina). Its increasing importance as a primary source of wealth to the economy was irreplaceable and can be easily illustrated. With a base of 100 in 1924, the index of total national income had risen to nearly 110 in 1934 while the index of national income earned abroad had risen to nearly 140. In 1930 its level of investment abroad was higher than any other country in the world and 18% of the national wealth was derived from it. And throughout the thirties Britain retained the greatest share of world trade -- in 1936 it was 15.4%

In absolute and relative terms Britain’s foreign investments greatly exceeded those of the US. For example, in 1930 (on the eve of the depress­ion) the UK’s foreign investment was between 50 and 55 billion marks while that of the US was between 60 and 65 billion marks. In 1929 Britain’s income from long-term investment abroad amounted to 1219 million gold dollars while for the US it was 876 million gold dollars. However, the giant US economy (whose national wealth in 1930 was 1760 billion marks compared to Britain’s 450 billion marks) had been expanding far faster than the British economy and its need for foreign markets was becoming more and more pressing, as can be seen for example in the relative growths of capital invested abroad. British capital invested abroad in 1902 was 62 billion francs (at pre-war parity) and this rose to 94 billion francs in 1930; the equivalent figures for the US were 2.6 billion francs in 1900 and 81 billion francs in 1930. With such an appetite for foreign markets the US could only lust for the Empire clutched so desperately by the British bourgeoisie for its markets and raw materials.

With increasing competition (especially from the US and Germany) the loss of the Empire would have been catastrophic. Yet, at the same time, the cost of maintaining it was enormous. Threats came from all sides: German and Japanese military expansion; colonial bourgeoisies fighting to enlarge their own position at Britain’s expense; pressure, particularly from the US, for ending Imperial Preferences and opening the markets up for their own economic expansion. Some sections of the British bourgeoisie had been arguing for years for a less onerous way of maintaining British advantages but they were fighting against very entrenched interests. Consequently, right up to the beginning of the war, and even well into its first year, the British bourgeoisie was markedly divided about what was the best course to follow.

The basic ‘choice’ was: to go to war or to avoid war. Of those who wished to go to war there was a small pro-German faction in the Conservative Party, but far larger factions of the bourgeoisie saw greater gains to be made by defeating Germany. These included the left wing of the Labour Party and the faction of the Conservative Party led by Churchill. However, other factions of the bourge­oisie saw that whichever side Britain chose, the war would certainly lead to the dismemberment of the Empire to the advantage either of Germany or the US. This latter view was the one held by the Chamberlain government and led to the policy of appeasement, epitomized by the action at Munich in 1938. Only by avoiding war could Britain escape becoming a dependency either of the US or Germany.

However, for global, historic reasons, war was inevitable and the only question was: who was Britain to be allied with and against whom? In trying to avoid the question Chamberlain took up the ridiculous role of a Canute, and the rest of the bourgeoisie has despised him for it ever since.

4. In the event, a combination of German inter­ventions into Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, combined with the non-aggression pact between Hitler and Stalin, meant that further German expansion would be towards the west. The threat to Britain’s own shores was clear, and Chamberlain declared war on Germany. However, a period of indecision followed during which the British bourgeoisie was led by those who had wanted to avoid war while, on the other hand, the German bourgeoisie hoped that the situation could quieten in the west so that they could expand to the east -- at the expense of Russia. This period was the ‘phoney war’ which ended with the advance of the German army through the Ardennes in May 1940 and the subsequent fall of France. These events pre­cipitated the fall of Chamberlain and the rise to power of a coalition of forces under Churchill which was totally committed to finding the solut­ion to British capital’s problems through the defeat of German expansionism. As it was clear that Britain’s productive capacity was not suff­icient to meet the requirements of the war the British bourgeoisie was forced to ask the US for help.

5. The objectives of the US bourgeoisie’s policy in regard to the war were:

-- to defeat Germany and Japan;

-- to prevent the rise of Russia in Europe;

-- to turn Britain and its Empire into depend­encies of the US.

In pursuit of these goals the US bourgeoisie’s policies were engineered to secure victory at the least possible cost. ‘Least possible cost’ meant: bleeding its allies as much as possible for repay­ments for war materiel without destroying their commitment to the war effort; using the massive market created by the war to stimulate the US economy and absorb the unemployed back into the process of production; minimizing domestic dis­content with the war by ensuring that the brunt of the slaughter on the battlefields would be sus­tained by the armies of its allies.

During the early stages of the war the application of these policies hit the British economy harder than the German bombers could. Through the cash-and-carry system, British financial reserves were steadily depleted to pay for war materiel, fuel and food, a substantial proportion of which never even reached Britain because of the shipping losses sustained by the North Atlantic convoys. The US bourgeoisie was thus able to systematically weaken the British bourgeoisie’s resistance to the cond­itions put on the economic and military arrangements which followed, and so, when in 1941 the Lend-Lease arrangements came to replace the cash-and-carry system (which had cost British capital nearly 3.6 billion dollars) Britain had only 12 million dollars in uncommitted reserves left. In the Lend-Lease Master Agreements the US began a whole program of schemes to force Britain to abolish Imperial Preference after the war, and to dismantle the Empire. And to ensure that Britain could not postpone all repayment until the end of the war, Reverse Lend-Lease was provided for in the summer of 1943. These were demands in kind placed by the US for raw materials, foodstuffs, military equipment and support for the US army in the European theatre of operations. On top of this, regular assessments of Britain’s reserves were made so that when the US government consid­ered they were ‘too large’, immediate cash pay­ments were demanded under the Lend-Lease arrange­ments.

The advantages gained by the US over Britain throughout the war were pressed home immediately the war ended. On VJ Day Trueman terminated all Lend-Lease, with the account standing at 6 billion dollars due to the US from Britain. Although the US wrote off a substantial proportion, the sum outstanding was left sufficiently high to ensure a continued US domination of Britain’s economic options. This residual sum was 650 million doll­ars which was greater than British foreign curr­ency reserves. In addition, the US refused to share the cost of amortizing the sterling balances (worth nearly 14 billion dollars) built up as part of the allied war debt.

By the end of the war the US was well on its way to achieving its wartime goals regarding Britain and the Empire, though they were not fully accom­plished for some years more. These goals became interwoven with the need to construct and consol­idate its bloc against that being built up by Russia, particularly since, in the second half of the 1940s, the possibility of a third world war was very real.

6. The US did not intend to repeat its post-World War I mistakes where it had bankrupted Europe by forcing repayment of war debts and rais­ing its tariff barriers. Its main objectives were to apply coordinated financial measures to the reconstruction of the countries in its bloc in such a way as to stimulate the US economy. The reconstruction of Europe and Japan would thus provide markets for US industry and agriculture, while making it possible for these countries to contribute to the military capacity of the bloc. These plans were set into motion even before the war finished -- mainly through the Bretton Woods systems (the IMF and World Bank).

However, in the context of this overall strategy, the US singled Britain out for special treatment. Since Churchill’s rearguard actions had resisted the US efforts to prise the Empire free from the grip of the British bourgeoisie, the US maintained the squeeze on the British economy. In return for the 3.75 billion dollar loan to offset the rigors of the end of Lend-Lease, the British government had to agree to help to impose the Bretton Woods plans on the rest of the bloc. It also had to make sterling convertible by mid-1947, which the US wanted in order to make Britain more vulnerable to calls on its reserves. (Indeed, this was too successful: when Britain lost 150 million dollars in gold and dollar reserves in one month, the US had to permit a suspension of convertibility.)

As the rivalry between the US and Russia became more intense, the US saw the need to accelerate the reconstruction process and to increase Euro­pean military spending. The Marshall Plan pro­vided the funds to do this between 1948-51 and in conjunction with this NATO was formed in 1949. Pressure was maintained on the British bourgeoisie throughout the 1940s to make a high contribution to this military force. So, while the US demob­ilized at a very high speed, Britain had to support substantial forces in Europe -- indeed, Britain still had one million men at arms as late as 1948. In 1950 the US committed first its own and then other allied (including British) troops to the Korean War; it also demanded an enormous increase in the British military budget -- to £4.7 billion that year. With German rearmament in 1950, the bill for the British army occupation was taken from the German bourgeoisie and pre­sented to the British bourgeoisie.

Several other measures were taken to keep up the economic pressures on British capital: for example, when the US gave the go-ahead to Japan­ese rearmament in 1951 it waived Japanese repar­ations to Britain; when Britain tried to waive its own debts to its colonies (created through non-payments for materials and services received during the war) the US blocked the move.

7. With greater or lesser degrees of success, successive British governments tried to defend the economy from the US bourgeoisie’s onslaughts on the home and colonial markets. They also tried to sustain Britain’s position as a global imperialist power.

But with the US cynically putting itself forward as the champion of anti-colonialism and national independence, war-drained Britain was completely unable to maintain its anachronistic colonial system. The war had given a huge impetus to national movements in the colonies -- movements supported by Russia and America, both of whom had a vested interest in the dismemberment of the British Empire. The British withdrawals from India and Palestine were the most spectacular moments in the breaking-up of the Empire, and the Suez fiasco in 1956 marked the end of any illus­ions that Britain was still a ‘first class power’. The US made it quite clear that it would not sanction any independent actions that did not correspond to its own requirements. The British government was helpless against this position and had to withdraw, and in doing so acknowledged that it was unable to defend its trade routes and colonies.

The dismantling of the British Empire gathered speed and the sixties saw a steady trail of colonies lining up for their ‘independence’. The final withdrawal by British forces from ‘East of Suez’ overseen by the 1964 Wilson government was only the last formality in a process which had begun decades previously.

8. The major conclusions we can draw from the process of the formation of the bloc regarding Britain can be summarized as follows:

-- The US bourgeoisie set out to reduce the British nation state to a secondary economic and military power. The main objective was to demolish the British Empire which was regarded as the main obstacle to American expansionism. By developing the appropriate policies and using its enormous economic and political power, it achieved this goal in the course of the war and the recon­struction which followed.

-- Cash-and-carry and Lend-Lease were used to generate claims on British concessions and access to raw materials. By these means control of deposits of strategic materials such as oil, minerals and rubber was transferred from the British to the US bourgeoisie. A state of permanent financial indebtedness was also created and maintained.

-- Post-war ‘aid’ was channeled into Europe in a manner which both stimulated the US economy and increased the military capacities of the western bloc. Thus Britain’s economic policies were dictated primarily by the needs of a permanent western war economy controlled by the US bourg­eoisie.

-- Although the reconstruction brought an appar­ent boom to the western economy, the benefits to the British economy were substantially tempered and carefully tailored by the US for its own interests. The loss of the Empire and the onset of the world economic crisis in the sixties thus found British capital in a very weak position, far less able than most other major economies (such as Germany, Japan or France) to face up to it.

-- The ‘special relationship’ which the British bourgeoisie has so often claimed it has with the US bourgeoisie is simply one of complete US hegemony. In the reinforcement of the bloc which has taken place in recent years as a result of the heightening inter-imperialist antagonisms, Britain has consequently been the most compliant of the US’ major allies.

Marlowe

(To be continued)

1 See ‘The Crisis in Britain’ in World Revolution number 1, and ‘Britain: Crisis and Class Struggle’ in World Revolution number 7.

Geographical: 

  • Britain [133]

Notes on the Dutch Left (part 2)

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In this part of the article, we will try to show that the Dutch Left was always preoccupied with the task of forming a proletarian vanguard based on communist positions and capable of actively defending these positions in the class struggle. We can only really understand the Dutch Left’s position on the party if we avoid playing word-games like today’s councilists and other history ‘experts’. We’ve got to make a real effort to understand the debate which took place among revolutionaries in the 1920s, 30s, 40s -- the long years of counter-revolution which followed the revolutionary wave of 1917-23.

The context of the debate on the Party

The revolutionary organizations which regrouped to form the Communist International, even though they may have had different approaches to the question, were all confronted with the problem of understanding how the consequences of the new period -- the “era of wars and revolutions”, the decadence of capitalism -- affected the question of the party.

In the ascendant period of capitalism, the party was a unitary organization of the class, which fought for parliamentary reforms and inside which revolutionaries could actively defend the pro­gram of the proletarian revolution. Alongside the political party, the trade unions were unitary organs at an economic level. These two types of unitary organization could exist in society in a permanent manner, because capitalism could still grant reforms to the working class; consequently, the class could struggle within capitalist society in a distinct and separate way, at the parlia­mentary-political and economic levels. But even before the First World War, Pannekoek, in agree­ment with Rosa Luxemburg, considered that the mass strike would involve political actions by the mass organs of the proletariat. In such action, the various goals of the political and trade union movements were mixed together and united into political goals. Mass strikes no longer simply demanded the expertise of represent­atives and spokesmen of the class, but the strength, discipline and class consciousness of the masses. Far from denying the necessity of the party, the Dutch Left shared the same concep­tion as the whole left-wing of the IInd Inter­national: the mass party (on the model of the German party) would be the instrument for the emancipation of the proletariat in the revolution. This idea was held by Lenin, Luxemburg, Gorter and Pannekoek. But the Dutch and German Lefts already differed with the Bolsheviks when they insisted on the need to develop the creative ‘spontaneous’ strength of the proletarian masses; without this the victory of the proletarian revolution would be impossible. The Bolsheviks’ main contribution was on another aspect of the question of the party. In the particular circumstances of Tsar­ist Russia, Lenin was forced to build an organi­zation of revolutionaries in order to prepare the way for a mass social democratic party. An organization like this, made up of the most conscious elements of the class, was much better equipped for the change in period which capitalism was going through. As the possibility of gaining reforms within the system came to an end, the unions and parliamentary parties were only able to maintain themselves as permanent organizations by leaving the camp of the working class and integrating themselves into the bourgeois state, a process culminating in 1914. On the other hand, revolutionary mass actions gave rise to new uni­tary organizations of the proletariat: general assemblies, strike committees, workers’ councils. As before 1914, revolutionaries were the most active elements inside these unitary organs. But these new organizations, by the very nature of the revolutionary goals they pursued, could only exist in periods of struggle. Revolutionaries could now only organize themselves as a minority whose task was to contribute to the clarification of the means and ends of the struggle. Such revolutionary organizations, while calling them­selves ‘parties’, were not the same as the par­ties of the ascendant period of capitalism, when the term ‘party’ was more or less identical to the working class, when it was firmly united on the basis of understanding the communist program.

It was above all the German and Dutch Lefts which understood the necessarily minoritarian character of the organization of revolutionaries, of the party, so that any identification between party and class could only lead to a form of substi­tutionism. It was their understanding of the necessity for mass spontaneity which allowed the German and Dutch Lefts to defend the idea of an organization of revolutionaries without falling into substitutionism. On the other hand, the German and Dutch Lefts also had weaknesses in their conception of the party. These resulted from a failure to understand that, in the new period of capitalist decadence, the unitary organs of the class could only exist in periods of struggle, and that the organization of revo­lutionaries could only have a real influence in the class -- could only be a party -- during a revolutionary wave. It was over this first problem that the KAPD split into various fractions as the revolutionary wave subsided. The Dutch Left made important contributions to this question and ultimately resolved it. On the second prob­lem (the party), although the Dutch Left didn’t reach the same clarity as the Italian Left in exile (Bilan and Internationalisme), it was able to take up the tasks which fall to revolutionaries in a period of reflux (the twenties and thirties): preparing for the future party in the perspective of a proletarian resurgence after World War II. On the question of the party, today’s councilists have regressed in comparison to the Dutch Left -- they defend the anti-party position of Ruhle, which was never shared by Gorter, Pannekoek, Hempel or Canne Meyer.

Although the Dutch KAP (Communist Workers’ Party) didn’t create an AAU (General Workers’ Union), it divided into two tendencies like the German party (the KAPD. Gorter represented the Essen tendency of the KAP; Pannekoek didn’t take a position but published texts on the debate. As we shall see, the positions of Pannekoek already contained the seeds of a solution to the problem, which was resolved after the death of Gorter in 1927.

The splits in the Dutch KAP on the question of the AAU

The debates which finally led to the break-up of the party were concerned mainly with the rela­tionship between the party and the AAU. The German AAU (AAUD) claimed to be the synthesis of the factory organizations born in the German revolution. The program of the KAPD saw the factory organizations as “purely proletarian organs of struggle” which had the dual task of contributing to the denunciation and destruction of the counter-revolutionary spirit of the trade unions, and of preparing the construction of the communist society. In the factory organizations, the masses would be able to unite, to develop their class consciousness and class solidarity. The AUUD defined this second task as follows:

“In the phase of the seizure of political power, the factory organization must itself become part of the proletarian dictatorship, which is carried out in the factories by the factory councils structured on the basis of the factory organization. The factory organiza­tion is a guarantee that political power will remain in the hands of the executive committee of the councils.” (Program of the AAUD, December, 1920)

According to the KAPD, the factory organization as a unitary organ of struggle was a guarantee for the conquest of power by the proletariat and not by “a clique of party chiefs” (KAPD Program). The task of the Party, of the KAPD, wasn’t to take power but to “regroup the most conscious elements of the working class on the basis of the party program … The KAP must intervene in the factory organizations and conduct a tireless propaganda within them”, but what was expected didn’t take place. The tasks ascribed to the factory organizations, which were supposed to unite in the AAUD and quickly regroup the whole German proletariat, were not carried out. Even at this early period -- in a letter dated 5 July 1920 -- Pannekoek said that it was incorrect to envisage two organiza­tions of the most conscious workers, that both of them would end up as “minorities within the broad masses, who were still not active and still inside the trade unions”. In the long term, this dual form of organization would be useless because they would actually be regrouping the same people. Proletarian democracy had to be based on all those who worked in the enterprise and “who, through their representatives, the factory councils, would assume political and social leadership”. Accor­ding to Pannekoek, the communists were a more conscious minority whose task was to disseminate class positions and to give an orientation and a goal to the struggle. A second form of organiza­tion, the Unions, was of no use to the revolution. According to him, therefore, it was necessary to abandon the AAUD in favor of the party, although he did say that organizing in Unions was perhaps necessary in the specific situation in Germany.

Otto Ruhle and the AAU

Otto Ruhle and his group split on the basis of ideas that were the exact opposite of Pannekoek’s. Ruhle abandoned the party in favor of the Union, which he saw as the real unitary organization which did away with any need for a party. Ruhle saw the party as an enormous apparatus which sought to direct the struggle from above, down to its last details. This is the conception of the party that Rosa Luxemburg reproached Lenin for holding.

But the KAPD saw its task as contributing to the “development of the self-awareness of the German proletariat” (KAPD Program). In his splitting document with the KAPD (Grundfragen der Organisation), Ruhle ignored this task of clari­fication which the party had given itself. But even in the Program of the AAU(E) (E stands for ‘Einheit’s organization’, or ‘Unitary Organiza­tion’ to distinguish Ruhle’s AAU from the KAPD’s AAUD, we can find propagandistic tasks – although the federalist AAU(E) was unable to carry out these tasks because of the multifarious mish-mash of positions within it. Since all these positions existed within the AAU(E) without being discussed, it contributed practically nothing to the “development of the self-awareness of the working class” even though this was one of the points in its program. And despite Ruhle’s anti-party conceptions, he was unable to prevent a political group emerging out of the ‘Unitary Organization’ in 1921: a group calling itself ‘Gruppe des Ratekommunisten’ (Group of Council Communists).

The KAPD majority defended centralism from below, as opposed to Ruhle’s federalism. “Federalism is sheer nonsense if it means separating enterprises or districts when they actually represent a whole” (Karl Shroder: Vorn Werden Einer Neuen Gesellschaft). In the pamphlet Die Klassenkampf-Organisation des Proletariats (The Organization of the Proletariat’s Class Struggle), Gorter defended the idea of the distinct existence of the KAPD in relation to the ‘Union’.

It’s clear that you can’t identify Gorter and P annekoeks’ positions with those of Ruhle. At the beginning of the 1920s, Gorter and Ruhle opposed each other on the question of the party, although both of them believed that the Unions could grow into genuinely unitary organs. At this time Pannekoek was already stressing the minoritarian character of the Union and suggested the suppression of the AAU. The tragic end of the KAPD, a direct consequence of the defeat of the world revolution, meant that it wasn’t in the party, but in what remained of the Unions, that the need was felt for the regroupment of the rare elements who had remained faithful to the revolu­tion. This regroupment gave birth to the Kommunistische Arbeiter-Union (Communist Workers’ Union), a result of the fusion between the vest­iges of the AAU(E) and the Berlin fraction of the AAUD in 1931. In a text written at the end of the 1940s, Henk Canne Meyer recalled:

“This new name (KAU) in fact expressed the awareness of a gradual evolution in the conceptions of the movement for factory organiza­tions. This evolution was particularly concerned with the concept of the ‘organized class’. Previously the AAU had thought that it would organize the working class and that millions of workers would all adhere to this organization. But over the years the AAU had always defended the idea that the workers themselves had to organize their own strikes and struggles by forming and linking up action committees. This is how they would act as an organized class even though they weren’t mem­bers of the AAU. In other words, the ‘organized’ class struggle was no longer to depend on an organization formed previously to the struggle ... The role of the AAU, and later the KAU, was to carry out communist propaganda inside the struggle of the masses, to contribute to the struggle by indicating the way forward and the goals to be pursued.” (Die Economische Grondslagen van de Radenmaatschappy)

From Party to Fraction: the GIC

Towards the end of the 1920s and the beginnings of the 1930s, it was clear that revolutionaries had lost any real influence on the class struggle. Consequently the party tended to divide into tendencies defending different positions on the defeat of the world revolution. Henk Canne Meyer, who had been a representative of the Berlin tendency in the Dutch KAP, left the party in 1924 with the following declaration:

“The KAP (throughout most of its existence) was nothing but a swamp always producing new kinds of muck. You are well aware of all the noxious types who have developed inside it. It’s no longer possible to do anything inside it -- new, fresh forces will have to preserve themselves from this quagmire.”

In 1927 there was a series of discussion meetings between members and ex-members of the Dutch KAP and German revolutionaries on the problems of the period of transition. Hempel had begun work on a plan for a text based on his journeys to Soviet Russia as a delegate of the KAPD, on Capital and on the Critique of the Gotha Program. During the first of these discussions, Pannekoek was present and opposed the plan, basing himself on Lenin’s State and Revolution. On 15 September 1927 Gorter died, and with him went the last force capable of holding the Dutch KAP together. These discussion meetings on the period of transition gave birth to the Groep van Internationale Communisten (Group of Inter­national Communists, GIC), without doubt the most fruitful of the Dutch council communist groups. Many ex-members of the KAPD were then in exile in Holland, having fled the onward march of the counter-revolution. The GIC published Persmat­eriaal van de GIC (Dutch), Ratekorrespondenz (German) and Klasbatalo (Esperanto). It was in close contact with Council Correspondence, magazine of the German émigré Paul Mattick in the US, and with the remainder of the KAPD in Germany. Apart from its propaganda work towards workers and the unemployed, the GIC attempted to analyze the experiences of the past revolutionary period. In this context, the GIC developed Hempel’s planned text in a collective way and in 1930-1 published De Grundbegrinselen des Kommunistche Produktie en Distributie (Ground Principles of Communist Production and Distribution). This text is an interesting contribution to the economic ques­tions of the period of transition, although one can criticize its weaknesses and gaps on the political aspects of the period of transition to communism -- aspects which must be clarified before resolving any economic problems. H. Wagner, an ex-member of the Essen Tendency of the KAPD, was at this point writing Theses on Bolshevism1, which developed the erroneous idea that the revolution in Russia had been simultaneously bourgeois and proletarian, an idea which had already appeared in the program of the Kommunistische Arbeiter-Internationale2 in the early twenties. Pannekoek, after some years of almost total passivity, was in close contact with the GIC. In 1938, he published Lenin as Philosopher, a philosophical critique of Bolshe­vism based on Wagner’s Theses.

On the question of the party, which is what we’re mainly concerned with here, Canne Meyer’s text ‘Naar een Nieuwe Arbeidersbewegung’ (‘For a New Workers’ Movement’) is an interesting contribu­tion, published at the time in Dutch, German and English. Faced with the advancing counter­revolution and the powerlessness of the working class, the GIC proposed a new “organizational synthesis of those relatively few workers for whom the struggle for the autonomy of our class has become a reason for existence”. This synthe­sis was to be carried out by ‘work groups’. Canne Meyer believed that a regroupment of these ‘work groups’ was impossible for the moment be­cause “the collapse of the old movement has not yet allowed a sufficient convergence of positions” (‘Naar een Nieuwe Arbeidersbewegung’, 1935).

The GIC definitively finished off the KAP’s con­fusions about unitary organizations. Although the GIC was for the creation of ‘revolutionary factory nuclei’ with the same orientation as the ‘work groups’ -- they were to be propaganda organizations in the factories -- it made a clear distinction between general factory organizations and the organization of revolutionaries:

“The factory organization, as the expression of the unity of the working class at a given moment, will always disappear before the revo­lution and will only be a permanent form of workers’ organization at decisive moments when the balance of class forces is being overturned.” (‘Nelbingen Omtrent Revolution­naire Bedrigjfshernen’, Amsterdam 1935)

Pannekoek’s position in the 30s and 40s

For the councilists of today, it is

“obvious that Pannekoek didn’t just think that the Bolshevik Party was the opposite of a proletarian organization, but any kind of party. His critique of Lenin’s conception of the party was also a critique of the conception of the party in general ...” (Cajo Brendel, Anton Pannekoek, Theoretikus von Ret Socialisme pp. 99-100)

A few lines further down, Brendel shows what sort of party he’s referring to: the KAP. Brendel quite correctly shows that Pannekoek’s position in 1920 was that a proletarian party was neces­sary before and after the revolution. But Brendel goes wrong when he uses a whole series of quotes from Pannekoek in order to prove that:

“… the practice of this kind of party and above all of the workers’ struggle proved to Pannekoek not that each type of revolution has its own type of party, but that the party in any form was a phenomenon restricted to bour­geois revolutions and bourgeois society. The frontier wasn’t between the bourgeois party and the proletarian party, but between the bourgeois party and the organization of the proletarian struggle.” (Ibid, p.100)

But all the quotations from Pannekoek which Brendel uses -- from Lenin as Philosopher, Workers’ Councils (1945), Five Theses on the Class Struggle (1946) -- simply underline the critique of the substitutionist conception of the Bolsheviks and the necessity for the clarifica­tory activity of the revolutionary organization. Brendel has completely forgotten that it was only the Pannekoek of the late 1920s who used the term ‘party’ to cover the social democratic, Bolshevik and old bourgeois parties. This isn’t surprising since the KAP had disappeared as a proletarian party with a real influence. But Brendel is forced to admit that Pannekoek had “a slightly different tone” (Ibid, p.105) in the theses of 1946. But this wasn’t really a diffe­rent tone. The point is that Brendel is deaf to terms like ‘political clarification’. According to Brendel, this ‘slightly different tone’ of Pannekoek’s can be explained by the Spartacusbond text ‘Taak en Wezen van de Nieuwe Partij’ (Tasks and Nature of the New Party), which Brendel sees as an opportunist compromise between the posi­tions of the GIC and those of the Sneevliet group3, who regrouped together at the end of World War II. Although the text contains many confusions, it was one of the last signs of life of the Dutch Left, who, after the war, hoped for a resurgence of the working class and were prepa­ring for the formation of the class party as an indispensable instrument of the world revolution. Alas, the Dutch Left had been weakened during the war and didn’t survive the period of reconstruc­tion which allowed capitalism to continue the counter-revolution. In 1947, Canne Meyer left the Spartacusbond, which was dominated by an activist tendency which wanted to rebuild a sort of AAU. The text Economische Grondslagen van de Radenmaatschappy was published by Canne Meyer in Radencommunisme after he and other ex-members of the GIC had left the Spartacusbond. This didn’t stop today’s Spartacusbond, in its response to the criticisms of the ICC (International Review, no.12), from hiding behind this text in order to avoid any discussion with the existing revolutionary milieu, particularly those who identify with the KAPD tradition. Canne Meyer, Hempel and other old GIC members, on the other hand, never broke off contact with International­isme in the 1940s, the direct antecedent of the ICC.

But why does Brendel suggest in his book on Pannekoek that the regroupment between Sneevliet and the GIC was opportunist? Because he himself didn’t join the Spartacusbond until after 1947? What was his attitude towards the GIC’s positions? In the 1930s, Brendel was a member of a council communist tendency of which the GIC said that “it sees the road to mass movements lying through the simple provocation of class conflicts” (GIC, no.19, 1932). The GIC on the other hand thought that “the simple provocation of class conflicts leads to the most revolutionary sector of the proletariat wasting its energy, leads to defeat after defeat without contributing to the formation of a real class front” (Ibid). And the GIC quite correctly put forward the alternative of “direct propaganda for the class front” (Ibid).

Brendel’s group criticized the GIC’s text on the ‘new workers’ movement’ because “the working class will do its apprenticeship in practice, completely independently of study groups” (Brendel, Jahrbuch Arbeiterbewegung). Today he’s trying to devise theoretical formulae for a new workers’ movement and thinks that “the GIC largely marked itself off from the old workers’ movement but was not the new workers’ movement and couldn’t be, because the formation of this new movement can only be under­stood as a long process” (Ibid). Poor Brendel, falling once again into the same trap as in the 1930s: he sees the class as a whole on one side, and revolutionaries on the other, completely separated. For the GIC, the class as a whole constituted the movement of the workers and the organization of revolutionaries was the (new) workers’ movement4. Whereas the GIC was for a new workers’ movement, Brendel’s present group, Daad en Gedachte, not only doesn’t see the movement of the workers, but is opposed to any ‘workers’ movement’ -- the old one as well as the new one which is now developing in the process of discussion and regroupment among revolution­aries. Such is the tragic end of the Dutch Left. Yesterday’s activists survive only to distort all the positive contributions of the council communists and turn them into councilist absurdities.

FK

1 These Theses are criticized in October ’17: Beginning of the World Revolution’ in IR, no. 12.

2 The KAI (Communist Workers’ International) was an attempt by the ‘Essen’ tendencies of the two KAPs to regroup the international communist left. Apart from the Dutch and German KAPs, it consisted mainly of the Bulgarian, English and Russian Lefts.

3 Sneevliet – A Dutch Trotskyist who broke with Trotskyism over its participation in World War II.

4 Daad en Gedachte was always confused in its definition of the movement of the workers and the workers’ movement. In Daad en Gedachte, no. 4, 1976, it says that Otto Ruhle was one of the pioneers of the new workers’ movement. In no. 10, 1978, it says that Marx and Gorter were members of the workers’ movement, which is distinct from the movement of the workers. It seems that in its sympathy for Ruhle’s AAU(E) Daad en Gendachte sometimes mixes up the new workers’ movement with the movement of the workers.

Political currents and reference: 

  • Council Communism [22]
  • Councilism [43]

Development of proletarian consciousness and organisation: 

  • German and Dutch Left [23]

People: 

  • Pannekoek [131]
  • Henk Canne Meyer [134]
  • Otto Ruhle [135]

Party, Councils, and Substitutionism

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In the young revolutionary movement engendered by the resurgence of class struggle at the end of the 1960s, the first and most persistent obstacle to the reconstruction of an international organiz­ation of revolutionaries was what can generally be described as councilism. Traumatized by the decay of the Bolshevik party and the insidious experience of Stalinism and Trotskyism, the majority of these new revolutionary currents proclaimed that the working class had no need of a revolutionary party, that the unitary organs of the class, the workers’ councils, were alone necessary for the accomplish­ment of the communist revolution. According to this viewpoint, revolutionaries should avoid organizing themselves and acting as a vanguard in the class struggle; some currents even went so far as to reject any form of revolutionary group as nothing but a ‘racket’ dictated by the needs of capital, not of the proletariat. From the beginning of its existence, our international current clearly rejected these aberrations, and intervened actively to combat them -- for example at the international conference called by the French group Informations Correspondence Ouvrieres in 1969. We always insisted that the repudiation of the counter-revolutionary heritage of Stalinism and Trotskyism and the necessary critique of the errors of previous proletarian parties should not lead to a rejection of the need for a unified organization of revolutionaries today, or to a failure to understand the indispensable role of the communist party in the proletarian revolution. If this intransigent defense of the need for rev­olutionary organization was denounced as ‘Leninism’ by the councilists and sundry libertarians, so much the worse for them. The ICC has always claimed the vital historical contribution of Lenin and the Bolshevik party as part of its own heritage.

Councilist ideology, which puts all its emphasis on its own particular interpretation of the ‘mass spontaneity’ of the working class, can sometimes flourish during periods of mounting class activity, when the creativity of the class is reaching a high level and is leaving the revolutionary minor­ities stranded in its wake. Thus May ‘68 in France was the heyday of innumerable councilist tend­encies from the Situationist International to the GLAT. But such tendencies did not fare so well when the outburst of class struggle entered into a reflux. After the subsidence of the 1968-72 wave of struggles in the advanced capitalisms, the vast majority of these tendencies, based as they were on an immediatist and activist conception of revolutionary work, crumbled away or became sterile academic sects. The list of casualties is long: the SI, Gauche Marxiste, Pouvoir Ouvrier, Noir et Rouge, the GLAT, Combate, and the various modernist anti-organizational tendencies: Invariance, Mouve­ment Communiste, Kommunismen, Internationell Arbeitarkampf, Negation, For Ourselves ... In the difficult and sometimes disheartening atmosphere of the last few years, in which the deepening of the crisis has not provoked a corresponding level of class struggle, almost the only communist groups to survive or grow have been those who, in one way or another, put a particular emphasis on the necessity for organization: the ICC, CWO, Battaglia Comunista and, despite its political degeneration, the Bord­igist PCI. Just as, on a greater historical scale, the clarity of the Italian Left on the question of organization allowed it to survive the period of counter-revolution more surely than other left communist fractions, so these latter groups have been better equipped to deal with the effects of today’s period of relative class quiet.

But if councilist and anti-organizational devia­tions may flourish during periods of increasing class activity, then the opposite deviations tend to come to the fore during periods of class defeat or quiescence, when revolutionaries often lose conviction in the proletariat’s capacity to struggle autonomously and realize its revolutionary nature. The substitutionist exaggerations which appear in Lenin’s What Is To Be Done? were to a large extent a product of the period of inter­national class peace of the last part of the 19th century. In the wake of 1905, and especially the 1917 revolutions, Lenin was able to criticize these exaggerations and link his own political positions to the mass self-activity of the class; the decline of the post-war revolutionary wave, however, led Lenin and the Bolsheviks to return to many of the old social democratic dist­ortions. Similarly, the price paid by the Italian Left for its achievement of hanging onto class positions during the long years of the counter­revolution was, particularly after World War II, an increasing over-emphasis on the role of the party, culminating in the party-megalomania of the Bordigists.

Thus in the present conjuncture, with the majority of the councilists in disarray, their bankruptcy proved by their own disintegration, the ICC has more and more been confronted with the opposite deviation: substitutionism, the underestimation of the importance of mass self-activity, and an over-estimation of the role of the party, to the extent that the party is ascribed with tasks that only the class as a whole can carry out, in part­icular the seizure and exercise of political power. Having been denounced as Leninists by the council­ists, the ICC is now being denounced as councilist by the Leninists ... Not only that but organizations which once had a clearer understanding of the rel­ationship between party and class, like the CWO, have begun to regress towards openly substitution­ist positions. Thus, in 1975, the platform of Revolutionary Perspectives stated that the revolutionary organization “cannot act 'on behalf of the class, but only as part of it, recognizing clearly that the main lesson of 1917 in Russia and Germany was that the exercise of political power during the dictatorship of the proletariat and the const­ruction of communism are the tasks of the class itself and its class-wide organizations (coun­cils, factory committees, armed militias).”

Today, the CWO argues that the party “leads and organizes” the struggle for power, (our emphasis; CWO text for the Paris Conference of revolutionary groups), and that

“At its victorious point, the insurrection will be transformed into a revolution, and majority support for communism will be manifested by the class -- via the party in the councils -- holding power.” (International Review, no.12, p.23)

Within the ICC itself, similar ideas have develop­ed, leading comrades in France and Italy into the reassuring dogmas of Bordigism. Tomorrow, when the proletariat decisively re-emerges onto the scene, we may well be faced with a second wave of councilists, ouvrierists and autonomists of all sorts. The resolution ‘The Role of the Party in the Proletarian Revolution’ which was adopted at the Third Congress of World Revolution is an attempt to counter both sets of deviations and provide a general framework for developing a more detailed and precise analysis of the role of the party -- an analysis which will necessarily remain incomplete until the future revolutionary struggle of the class answers as yet unsolved questions. If we concentrate in this accompanying contribut­ion on the question of substitutionism, it is because we think that the persistence of this ideology in the present workers’ movement is a major barrier to the development of a real under­standing of the positive tasks of the revolut­ionary party. Substitutionism is, for us, something that historical experience has already clarified. If the revolutionary vanguard is to assume its tasks in the class battles of tomorrow, it must ruthlessly cut away all the dead-wood from the past.

Substitutionism: Does it exist?

According to some, ‘substitutionism’ is a non-problem. Certain of these resort to philosophical profundities such as ‘how can the party, which represents the historic interests of the prolet­ariat, substitute itself for the class?’ Of course, the historic interests of the class can’t substitute themselves for the class, but the problem is that proletarian parties aren’t ideal metaphysical entities but products of the real world of class struggle: whatever level of theor­etical clarity they may have reached at a given time does not immunize them completely from the effects of bourgeois ideology, does not automat­ically exempt them from the very real pressures of the old world, from the dangers of conservat­ism, bureaucratization or outright betrayal. Enough parties have degenerated and betrayed for this are self-evident. And even when parties are very far from any definitive degeneration, they can still act against the historic interests of the class: we have only to look at the initial response of the Bolshevik party to the February revolution to understand that. There is no absolute guarantee that the actions or positions of a proletarian party will invariably coincide with the historic interests of the class, actions which revolutionaries believe to be carried out in the best interests of the class may often have the most disastrous consequences both for the party and for the class.

To be sure, a group like the CWO has a much more down-to-earth argument against the notion of substitutionism. They accept that substitutionism could mean “that a minority of the class attempts to carry out the tasks of the whole class” (‘Some Questions for the ICC’, International Review no12). For them this is a justifiable criticism of the Blanquist idea of a minority seizing power without the active support and participation of the majority of the class; or it’s merely a description of the objective situation the Bolsh­eviks found themselves in following the isolation of the Russian revolution. They could find noth­ing substitutionist in the party ‘taking power’ when it has won the support of the majority of the class, and sees no connection between the Bolsheviks’ conception of the role of the party in 1917 and its subsequent confrontations with the Russian working class. But this leaves too many questions unanswered. The point isn’t to reject the theories of Blanqui; Marxism has done that long ago, and even the Bordigists would agree that putsches and plots cannot lead us to communism. What we want to point out is that the very notion of the party taking power -- even when democratic­ally elected to do so -- is a variety of substit­utionism, since it means that “a minority of the class attempts to carry out the tasks of the whole class”. And, as we shall try to show, the Bolsh­eviks’ confusion on this question was a contrib­utory factor in their subsequent degeneration. For us, the problem of substitutionism is not a clever invention of the ICC, but a profound question rooted in the whole historical experience of the working class.

The historical context of substitutionist ideology

Contrary to those who imagine that the communist program and the class party exist in a sphere of invariant abstraction, the program and party of the class are nothing if not historical prod­ucts of working class experience. This exper­ience is bounded and shaped by the objective conditions of capitalist development at a given time, and by the general level of class struggle and activity that takes place within that devel­opment. Thus if Marx and Engels were able to have a clear general vision of the nature of the proletarian revolution and the tasks of commun­ists as early as 1848, it was objectively imp­ossible for them to have had a precise underst­anding of the way the proletariat would come to power, of the nature of the communist party and its role in the dictatorship of the proletariat. Their illusions in the possibility of the working class seizing hold of the existing bourgeois state could only be dispelled by the practical experience of the Commune (and then only in a partial sense). Similarly, their vagueness about the nature and role of the party could only be overcome by the development of the organized workers’ movement itself.

We should recall that Marxism emerged in a per­iod when even bourgeois political parties were only beginning to take on the unified and rel­atively coherent form they have today – a development determined by the movement towards univ­ersal suffrage, which made the old loose parliam­entary coalitions untenable. In this context, the proletarian movement didn’t even have a very clear conception of what it meant by the term party. Hence the extreme vagueness of Marx’s use of the word, which he used fairly indiscrim­inately to describe a few individuals united by a common viewpoint, or the entire class acting in a common political struggle, or a vanguard communist organization, or a looser association of different currents and tendencies. Thus the famous phrase in the Communist Manifesto, the “organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party” is both a profound statement of the political nature of the class struggle and of the necessity for a proletarian political party, and an expression of the immaturity of the movement, which had not yet arrived at a clear definition of the party as a part of the class.

The same lack of clarity inevitably affected Marxists’ understanding of the tasks of the party in the proletarian revolution.

“Although revolutionaries in the period before World War I took up the slogan of the 1st International ‘The emancipation of the working class is the task of the workers themselves’, they tended to see the seizure of power by the proletariat as the seizure of power by the proletarian party. The only examples of rev­olutions which they could analyze were bourg­eois revolutions, revolutions in which power could be delegated to a political party. As long as the working class had not had its own experience of the struggle for power, revol­utionaries could not be very clear about this question.” (‘The Present Tasks of Revolutionaries’, Revolution Internationale, no.27)

This ideological heritage of the bourgeois rev­olution was reinforced by the context in which the class struggle took place in the second half of the 19th century. Following the demise of the insurrectionary battles of the 1840s (which had allowed Marx to see the communist nature of the working class and the profound link between its ‘economic’ and its ‘political’ struggles) the workers’ movement entered the long period of fighting for reforms within the capitalist system. This period more or less institutional­ized the separation between the economic and political aspects of the class struggle. Part­icularly in the period of the Second Internat­ional, this separation was codified in the diff­erent mass organizations of the class: the unions were defined as the organs which waged the economic struggles of the class, and the party as the organ of political struggle.

Now, whether this political struggle was the immediate one to win democratic rights for the working class, or the longer term struggle for working class political power, it took place essentially on the parliamentary terrain, the terrain par excellence of bourgeois politics. The workers’ parties which fought on this terr­ain were inevitably impregnated with its assumptions and methods of operation.

Parliamentary democracy means the investing of authority in the hands of a body of specialists in government, of parties whose raison d’être is to seek power for themselves. In bourgeois society, the society of “egoistic man, of man separated from other men from the community” (Marx, On the Jewish Question) political power can only take the form of power over and above the individual and the community; just as “the state is the intermediary between man and man’s freedom” (ibid), so in such a society there must be an intermediary between the ‘people’ and their own governing power. The atomized mass, which goes to the polling booth in bourgeois elections can only find a semblance of collect­ive interest and direction through the medium of a political party which represents the masses precisely because they cannot represent themsel­ves. Though unable to draw all the consequences of this for its own practice, the International­ist Communist Party of Italy expressed this reality of bourgeois representation very well: the bourgeois state was based on

“that fictitious and deceitful characteristic of a delegation of power, of a representation through the intermediary of a deputy, an election ticket, or by a party. Delegation means in effect the renunciation of the poss­ibility of direct action. The pretended ‘sovereignty’ of the democratic right is but an abdication, and in most cases it is an abdication in favor of a scoundrel.” (‘Proletarian Dictatorship and Class Party’, Battaglia Comunista 3,4,5, 1951)

The proletarian revolution does away with this kind of representation, which is really a form of abdication. The revolution of a class which is organically united by indivisible class interests, poses the possibility of man recognizing and organizing “his own forces as social forces, so that social force is no longer sep­arated from him in the form of political force” (On the Jewish Question). The praxis of the proletarian struggle tends to do away with the separation between thought and action, directors and executors, social forces and political power. The proletarian revolution has, therefore, no need for a permanent specialized elite which ‘represents’ the amorphous masses and carries out their tasks for them. The Paris Commune, the first example of a proletarian dictatorship, began to illuminate this reality, by taking prac­tical measures to eliminate the separation between the masses and political power: abolish­ing the parliamentary separation of legislature and executive, ensuring that all deputies were elected and revocable at any time, liquidating the police and standing army, etc. But the experience of the Commune was too premature, too short-lived to eliminate entirely bourgeois democratic conceptions of the state and the role of the party from the program of the workers’ movement. What the Commune did show was that even without a communist party at its head, the working class can raise its struggle to the level of seizing political power; but the spineless vacillations of the proletarian and petty-bourgeois parties which found themselves leading the uprising also confirmed that, without the active presence of a real, communist party, the proletarian revolution is crippled from the beginning. Still, the exact relationship such a party should have to the Commune-state remained an unsolved problem.

Perhaps more important was the fact that the experience of the Commune did not put an end to revolutionaries’ illusions in the democratic republic. In 1917 Lenin could see that the Commune was the result of the revolution smashing the old bourgeois state from top to bottom. But in the latter part of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, Marxists tended to see it as a model for the workers in their strug­gle to seize control of the democratic republic, ‘lop off’ its worst features and convert it into an instrument of proletarian power.

“International socialism considers that the republic is the only possible form of social­ist emancipation -- with this condition, that the proletariat tears it from the hands of the bourgeoisie and transforms it from ‘a machine for the oppression of one class by another’ into a weapon for the socialist emancipation of humanity.” (Trotsky, ‘Thirty-five Years After: 1871-1906’ published in Leon Trotsky On the Paris Commune, Pathfinder Press).

And in many ways, the Commune, based as it was on territorial representative units, on universal suffrage did preserve many of the features of the bourgeois democratic state; as such it did not really allow the workers’ movement to go beyond the idea of proletarian power being mediated through a party. It was only with the emergence of the workers’ councils at the end of the period of capitalist ascendancy that this problem would begin to be resolved. In the councils the class was organized as a class; it was able to unify its economic, political and military tasks, to decide and act consciously without any intermediaries. The emergence of the councils allowed revolutionaries to make a final break from the idea that the democratic republic was a state form that could in some way be used by the proletariat; in fact it was the last and most insidious barrier against the proletarian revolution. But if in 1917 revolutionaries were able to rid themselves of all parliamentary illusions on the question of the state, the persistence of old habits of thou­ght still weighed heavily on their conception of the party.

We have seen that, in the social democratic world view, the economic struggles of the class were carried out by the unions, the political struggle, up to and including the struggle for power, by the party. Particularly because it was a quest­ion of ‘conquering’ bourgeois state power, the idea of mass political organs of working class revolution did not exist. The only political organ of the proletariat was the party. The state would only be given a proletarian function in so far as it was controlled by the proletarian party. Thus it was inevitable that the insurrection and the seizure of power should be organized by the party: no other organ could unify and mobilize the class on a political level. In theory, there­fore, the party had to become a mass party, a huge disciplined army, in order to carry out its revolutionary tasks. In reality, the mass basis of the party was a function of its struggle for reforms, not for revolution. The social demo­cratic model of revolution was never, and could never be, put into practice. But its importance lay in the ideological inheritance it passed on to the revolutionaries who were brought up in the schools of social democracy. And that herit­age could only be a substitutionist one: even though the revolution was to be carried out by a mass party, it was still a conception which ascribed to the party tasks which could only be carr­ied out by the whole class.

To be sure, these conceptions did not spring out of some moral weakness on the part of social democracy. The idea of a party acting on behalf of the class was the product of the practice of the workers’ movement in ascendant capitalism and was deeply entrenched within the whole class. In that period, the day-to-day struggle for reforms both on the economic and political levels, could to a large extent be trusted to permanent ‘representatives’, specialized trade union neg­otiators and parliamentary spokesmen. But prac­tices and conceptions that were possible during the ascendant epoch became impossible and react­ionary as the onset of capitalist decadence brought the period of reform struggles to a close. The revolutionary tasks now facing the proletariat implied very different methods of struggle.

At the beginning of the 20th century, revolution­aries like Lenin, Trotsky, Pannekoek and Luxem­burg attempted to clarify the relation between party and class in the light of changing historic conditions and the mass struggles these condit­ions provoked, particularly in Russia. If we take the most profound elements from their rich but often contradictory contributions, we can discern the development of an awareness that the mass social democratic party was suitable only for the period of reformist struggles. Lenin was the most capable of seeing that the revolut­ionary party could only be a tightly organized and severely selected communist vanguard; and Luxemburg in particular was able to appreciate that the task of the party was not to ‘organize’ the struggle of the class. Experience had shown that the struggle broke out spontaneously and compelled the class to go from partial to general struggle. The organization of the struggle came out of the struggle itself and embraced the entire class. The role of the communist vanguard within these mass struggles was not an organizational one in the sense of providing the class with a pre-existing structure for organizing the strug­gle.

“Instead of puzzling their heads with the technical side, with the mechanism of the mass strike, the social democrats are called upon to assume political leadership in the midst of the revolutionary period.” (Luxemburg, The Mass Strike)

In other words, the task of the party was to participate actively in these spontaneous movements in order to make them as conscious and as organized as possible; in order to indicate the tasks which the entire class, organized in its unitary organs, would be compelled to assume.

But it would have been impossible for all the implications of this to have been clear at once to the revolutionaries of that period. And here we return to the problem of substitutionism. The persistence of social democratic conceptions not only in the class as a whole but also in the minds of its best revolutionaries, the lack of any real experience of what it meant for the class to be in power, were to be a heavy burden on the class as it launched into the huge revolut­ionary confrontations of 1917-23.

The remnants of social democratic ideology can be seen, for example, in the Communist International’s official position on the trade unions. Unlike the German Left, who began to see that the trade union form of struggle was impossible in the epoch of decadence, the CI still remained tied to the idea of the party organizing the defensive struggles of the class, and the unions were seen as the necessary bridgeheads between party and class. Thus the CI failed to grasp the significance of the autonomous organs which the masses were creating in the course of their struggle outside of and against the trade unions.

More important in this context, however, is the way that the old patterns of thought dominated the CI’s understanding of the relation between party and councils. Although at its first Congress, Lenin’s ‘Theses on Bourgeois Democracy and the Proletarian Dictatorship’ had, like State and Revolution, put all the emphasis on the soviets as organs of direct proletarian rule, by the Second Congress the effects of the defeats the class had gone through in 1919 were already making themselves felt: the emphasis now shifted to the party and away from the soviets. The CI’s ‘Theses on the Role of the Communist Party in the Proletarian Revolution’ explicitly stated that “Political power can only be seized, organized and led by a political party, and in no other way.”

In one way or another, this view was shared by all the currents in the workers’ movement up to 1920. All of them, including Luxemburg who criticized the idea of ‘the dictatorship of the party’ retained a semi-parliamentary view of the soviets electing a party to power. Only the German Left began to break from this idea, but it only devel­oped a partial critique which quickly degenerated into a purely councilist position. But to say that political power of the proletariat can only be expressed through a party is to say that the soviets are not capable themselves of being that power. It is to substitute the party for the most essential tasks of the soviets, and thus to empty them of their real content.

In 1917 these questions had not been particularly urgent. When the class is in movement on a vast scale, the problem of substitutionism cannot be an explicit one. In such moments, it is imposs­ible for the party to concern itself with ‘organ­izing’ the struggle: the struggle is there, the organizations of the struggle are there. The problem for the party is how to establish a real presence within these organizations and have a direct influence upon them. Thus those who ask: “Did the Bolshevik party substitute for the class in October 1917?” are missing the point. No, there was no substitutionism in the October insur­rection. The insurrection was not organized or executed by the Bolshevik party, but by the mil­itary revolutionary committee of the Petrograd Soviet, under the political leadership of the Bolshevik party. Those who think this is a pure­ly formal distinction should refer to Trotsky’s History of the Russian Revolution, where he underlines the political importance the Bolsheviks attached to the fact that the insurrection was carried out in the name of the Soviet -- the mass organ of the class -- and not of the communist vanguard. It is true that when the class is marching forward the relationship between the party and the mass organs tends to be extremely close and harmonious, but that is no reason to blur the distinction between the party and the unitary organs; indeed such a confusion of roles can only have fatal consequences later, if the class movement enters into a period of reflux. Thus in the Russian Revolution, the problem of substitutionism emerged into its full stature after the seizure of power: in the organization of the Soviet State and during the difficulties posed by the civil war and the isolation of the revolution. But although the objective diffic­ulties faced by the Bolsheviks and by the Russian revolution provide the underlying explanation for why the Bolsheviks finally ‘substituted’ themselves for the workers’ councils and ended up on the side of the counter-revolution, it is not enough to leave the analysis there. Otherwise there are no lessons to be drawn from the Russian experience except the obvious fact that the counter-revolut­ion is caused by ... the counter-revolution. If revolutionaries are going to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, we must analyze how the political confusions of the Bolshevik party accel­erated the degeneration of the revolution and their own passage into the camp of capital. In particular, we must show why the Bolsheviks’ con­fusions on the relationship between party, class and state led to a situation where:

-- the Bolshevik party came into conflict with the unitary organs of the class almost immediately after it had become the party of government, and well before the mass of Russian workers had been dispersed and dec­imated in the civil war, or the international revolutionary wave had subsided.

-- it was the party, the most advanced express­ion of the Russian proletariat, which became the vanguard of the counter -revol­ution. This destroyed the party from within and led to the monstrous birth of Stalinism, a historical betrayal which has done more to disorientate the proletarian movement than any other treason by a prol­etarian organization.

If we are to avoid explaining these facts by resorting to the naive theories of the libertar­ians (‘the Bolsheviks did this because they were authoritarian’; ‘all parties seek power for themselves’; ‘power corrupts’, etc) we must look more closely at the problems of party, councils and state in the proletarian revolution.

Party and Councils

For some councilist currents, the contrast of interests between revolutionary political organizations and the unitary organs of the class is so great that they advocate the dissolution of all political groups as soon as the councils appear; or they are afraid to talk about the existence of a party or parties within the coun­cils, haunted as they are by the bourgeois vision of the party as nothing but a corps of special­ists whose sole function is to maneuver itself into power. For these currents, there is some Original Sin in political groups or parties which make them inevitably betray the class and try to manipulate or take over its organs of struggle. We hardly need to dwell on how childish this view is, and how much it actually strikes against the autonomy of the class. The tragic experience of the German revolution led the Communist Internat­ional to conclude quite correctly that

“... the existence of a powerful Communist Party is necessary in order to enable the soviets to do justice to their historic tasks, a party that does not simply ‘adapt itself’ to the soviets, but is in a position to make them renounce ‘adaptations’ of their own to the bourgeoisie and White Guard social democracy.” (‘Theses on the Role of the Communist Party’, Second Congress of the CI).

But the insistence on the necessity for the party to intervene in the councils and give a clear political orientation to all their actions should not lead us to ignore the experience of the past, particularly of the Russian revolution, and pretend that there is no problem in the relation­ship between party and councils, that the danger of the party substituting itself for the councils is just a councilist neurosis. In fact, the aberrations of councilism could only have had so much weight because they were a false solution to a real problem.

After all the heated debates that have taken place in the revolutionary movement over the past fifty years, it is rather sad to see a group like the CWO gloss over the whole problem with a purely sophistical argument. According to the CWO:

-- in order for there to be a revolutionary conquest of power, the party must have a majority of delegates to the workers’ coun­cils. Otherwise you must be saying that “the revolution could succeed while the major­ity of the class is not conscious of the need for communism, or while the majority of the delegates to the councils are not commun­ists.” (International Review, No 12, p.24)

-- since the party has a majority of delegates, it is effectively in power.

Voila! The logic is impeccable, but based on entirely false premises. To begin with, it rev­eals an absurdly formalistic and democratist view of class consciousness. Undoubtedly, the development of a decisive presence and influence of communist party militants within the councils is a necessary precondition for the success of the revolution. But to define this influence merely in terms of a statistical majority of delegates is absurd: a council could easily be won to revolutionary positions when only a minor­ity of its delegates were militants of the party. The CWO, however, seems to consider that only the members of the party are capable of revolut­ionary thought and action. The other delegates, whether members of other proletarian political currents or ‘independent’ workers, are presented as entirely unconscious, completely dominated by bourgeois ideology. In reality, class conscious­ness does not develop according to this sterile schema. The development of revolutionary consc­iousness in the class does not mean that a conscious party directs an unconscious class: it means that the whole class, through its struggle, through mass action, moves towards communist positions with the party pointing out the direct­ion that the whole class is already beginning to follow. In a revolutionary situation, conscious­ness develops at a very rapid pace, and the dynamic of the movement leads many workers to take up positions well in advance of their formal ‘party affiliations’. In fact, the very formation of councils, though not in itself sufficient for the carrying through of the revolution, already shows that a revolutionary level of activity is already being forced on the class. As the KAPD expressed it in its ‘Theses on the Role of the Party in the Proletarian Revolution’ (1921):

“The political workers’ councils (soviets) are the historically determined, all-embracing form of proletarian power and administration: at all times they pass the individual points of the class struggle and pose the question of complete power.”

In the proletarian movement, there can be no separation of consciousness and organization: a certain level of self-organization presupposes a certain level of class consciousness. The coun­cils are not mere forms into which a revolutionary content is injected by the party; they are them­selves products of an emerging revolutionary consciousness in the class. The party does not inject this consciousness: it develops and gener­alizes it to its utmost potential.

Recognizing the complexity and richness of the process by which the class becomes conscious, the revolutionary vanguard (whether we are talking about the party or the broader vanguard of delegates to the central soviet organs) can never measure the depth of the communist movement of the masses by purely statistical means, and it can certainly not limit its criteria for action on the mechanics of the formal vote. As Luxemburg said in her pamphlet on the Russian revolution:

“... the Bolsheviks solved the famous problem of ‘winning a majority of the people’, which problem has ever weighed on the German social democracy like a nightmare. As bred-in-the­bone disciples of parliamentary cretinism, these German social democrats have sought to apply to revolutions the homemade wisdom of the parliamentary nursery: in order to carry anything you must first have a majority. The same, they say, applies to revolution: first, let’s become a ‘majority’. The true dialectic of revolutions, however, stands this wisdom of parliamentary moles on its head: not through a majority to revolutionary tactics, but through revolutionary tactics to a major­ity -- that is the way the road runs.”

The second false premise of the CWO’s argument is that the party’s winning of a majority of deleg­ates to the councils is equivalent to the party being in power. This was the great confusion of the whole workers’ movement at the time of the Russian revolution and was to have the most pern­icious consequences. Today such a view is no longer excusable. As Revolution Internationale wrote in 1969 (Revolution Internationale 3, old series, ‘Sur l’Organization’):

“It is possible and even probable that at certain moments in the struggle, one or sever­al councils will be in full agreement with the positions of this or that revolutionary organ­ization. This simply means that, at a given moment, the group in question corresponds perfectly to the level of consciousness in the proletariat; in no way does it mean that the councils have to abandon their power to the ‘central committee’ of that group. It may even be that the delegates elected by that council are all members of that group. This is unimportant and does not imply that the council is in a relation of subordination to that group, as long as the council retains its power to revoke its delegates.”

This is not a democratic formalism, but a vital question of principle which is not answered by the neat schema of the CWO. The real question here is: who makes the decisions? Are council delegates revocable at all times or only until the ‘conquest of power by the party’? Is the election and recall of delegates only a means for the party to come to power -- after which it can be superseded -- or does it obey a deeper need in the proletariat? And another question, ignored by the CWO, but obvious to the Bordigists who make no pretence that they will abide by the democratic mechanisms of the councils: if the party is a world party, as it will be in the next revolutionary wave, then surely the assumption of power by the party even in one country means that power must be in the hands of the central organ of the world party? And how are the workers in one bastion to maintain their control of an organ which is organized on a world scale?

The truth of the matter is that you cannot be simultaneously for the power of the party and the power of the councils. As we saw earlier, deleg­ation of power to a party is inevitable in bourg­eois parliaments where the electors ‘choose’ an apparatus to rule over them throughout a given period. But such a schema is in total contradict­ion with the functioning of the councils, which seeks to break down the separation between the masses and their political power, between decision and execution, ‘government’ and governed. The class-based, collective structure of the councils, their mechanisms of election and recall, make it possible for the power to make and carry out dec­isions to remain in the hands of the masses at all times. Councils’ delegates who are party members will not hide their political affiliations: indeed they will actively defend the positions of their organization, but this does not alter the fact that they are elected by assemblies or coun­cils to carry out the decisions of those assemblies or councils, and will be recalled if they fail to do so. Even when there is close harmony between the positions of the party and the decisions of the councils, this does not mean that power has been delegated to the party. Delegating power, if it means anything at all, means delegating the capacity to make and enforce decisions to an apparatus which does not coincide with the appar­atus of the councils and can therefore not remain under their control. Once this has happened, election and revocability lose all their meaning: posts of the highest responsibility can be appoint­ed by the party, decisions of the most crucial kind can be made, with no reference to the counc­ils. Gradually, the councils cease to be the focus of the life of the revolution and are trans­formed into mere rubber stamps for the decisions of the party.

It is important to insist on this point, not because we are making a fetish out of democratic forms -- as we have said, class consciousness cannot be measured by votes alone. But this doesn’t alter the fact that unless the councils retain their ‘democratic’ mechanisms (election and recall, collective decision-making, etc) they will be un­able to carry out their essential political role as living centers of revolutionary clarification and action for the whole class. The democratic forms are indispensable because they enable the class to learn how to think, decide and act for itself. If socialism is the self-conscious control of the producers over their own destiny, then only a self-active and self-conscious working class can realize the socialist project.

Some people may object that the open democracy of the councils is no guarantee that they will act in a revolutionary manner. Of course this is true; indeed, this very openness leaves the councils ‘open’ to the influence of bourgeois organizations and bourgeois ideology. But such influences cannot be eliminated by party decree: the party can only counteract them by politically exposing them in front of the class, by demonstrating how they obstruct the real needs of the struggle. If the mass of workers are to fully understand the diff­erence between revolutionary and counter-revolut­ionary positions, they can only discover this for themselves, by practically understanding the con­sequences of their actions and decisions. The retention of decision-making power by the councils is a necessary, though not sufficient precondition for the development of communist consciousness. On the other hand, as the Russian experience con­firmed, the control over a passive, subdued soviet system by the best party in the world can only act against the development of such consciousness.

Now, contrary to what the councilists claim, the process whereby decision-making power passed from the councils to the Bolsheviks was not completed overnight and it was certainly not the result of a systematic effort by the Bolsheviks to undermine the power of the councils. The theor­ization of the ‘dictatorship of the party’ by elements like Zinoviev and Trotsky did not come till after the civil war and the ravages of the imperialist blockade had decimated the working class and sapped the material basis for the self-activity of the soviets. Before that (and in fact until the end of his life), Lenin was per­petually insisting on the need to regenerate the soviets, to restore them to the central place they had occupied at the beginning of the revol­ution. But it would be a mistake to think that the erroneous positions defended by the Bolsh­eviks played no part in the process whereby the party substituted itself for the councils; that the loss of power and influence by the councils was a purely automatic result of the isolation of the revolution. In reality, the transform­ation of the Bolshevik party into a government party, the delegation of power to the party, immediately began to weaken the effective power of the soviets. From 1917 onwards, more and more executive posts and commissions were instituted by the party with less and less reference to the soviet assemblies; soviet delegates were removed or appointed by the party ‘from above’ rather than by the soviet organs themselves; unitary organs like the factory committees were absorbed into the trade unions, organs of the party-state; the workers’ militias were dissolved into the Red Army in a similar way. And all this began to take place before the big concentrations of workers had been broken up by the civil war. The point is not to make a catalogue of Bolshevik errors on this question, but to show how their political positions, their conception of the party, accelerated the tendency for the unitary organs of the class to be subordinated to the administrative and repressive apparatus of the state. The political justification for this process can be seen in a statement by Trotsky in 1920:

“Today we received peace proposals from the Polish government. Who decided this question? We have Sovnarkom, but it must be subject to a certain control. What control? The control of the working class as a formless, chaotic mass? No. The central committee of the party has been called together to discuss the prop­osal and decide whether to answer it. The same is true of the agrarian question, the food question, and all other questions.” (Speech to the Second Congress of the CI).

Underlying this attitude is the old idea of social democracy that once the proletarian party has assumed state power, then the state will automatically be directed in the interests of the proletariat. The class ‘entrusts’ its power to the party, and the need for the soviets to actually make the decisions is done away with. In fact, this could only be an abdication of responsibility by the soviets, and make them much less able to resist the tendencies towards bureaucratization which developed so chronically during the civil war. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let us restate this point. We are in no way saying the party should not seek to win support for its positions. On the contr­ary it is essential for the party to try to win a decisive influence in the councils. But this influence can only be a political one: the party can only intervene in the decision-making process by politically convincing the councils of the correctness of its positions. Instead of arrog­ating decision-making responsibility to itself, it must insist again and again that all the major decisions affecting the course of the rev­olution are fully discussed, understood and acted upon in the councils. And this is why it is so erroneous to talk about the party ‘taking power’, with or without a formal majority in the councils. In the real world power is not a question of votes but a question of force. The party can only be ‘in power’ if it has the capac­ity to enforce its position on the class, on the council system. This implies that the party must have an apparatus of power which is separate from the councils. Parties of themselves, do not generally possess such an apparatus, and the Bolshevik party was no exception. In fact, the only way that the Bolshevik party could really be in power was to identify itself with the state. This is why it is impossible to understand the problem of substitutionism without a proper grasp of the problem of the post-revolutionary state.

Party and State

For various currents, including the CWO and various councilists, there is no real problem about the state in the period of transition. The state is the workers’ councils, and that’s that. Therefore any talk about possible conflicts between the unitary organs of the class and the transitional state is sheer nonsense. Unfortun­ately, this is an idealist view of revolution. As Marxists we have to base our conceptions of the revolution not on what we would like to see happen, but on what historical necessity has forced to happen in the past and will force to happen in the future. The only real example of the working class taking power at the level of an entire nation -- the Russian revolution -- forces us to admit that a society in revolution will inevitably give rise to forms of state organizat­ion which are not only distinct from the unitary organs of the class, but can indeed enter into profound and even violent conflict with them.

The unavoidable necessity to organize a Red Army, a state police, an administrative apparatus, a form of political representation for all the non-exploiting classes and strata: these material needs are what give birth to a state machine which -- whether or not you label it ‘proletarian’ cannot simply be assimilated to the workers’ councils. Contrary to what certain councilists say, the Bolsheviks did not create this machine ex nihilo to serve their Machiavellian ends. Although we must understand how the Bolsheviks’ conception of their role as a government party actively accel­erated the tendency for this machinery to escape the control of the workers’ soviets, they were only molding and adapting a state organ which had already begun to emerge before the October insur­rection. The Congresses of workers’, peasants’ and soldiers’ soviets were evolving into a new state form even before the overthrow of the Kerensky regime. The necessity to give the post-insurrectional society an organized form consol­idated this process into the Soviet State. As Marx wrote in Critical Notes on ‘The Kind of Prussia and Social Reform’: “From a political point of view the state and the organization of society are not two different things. The state is the organization of society.”

If the Russian revolution has anything to teach us about this state it is that the isolation of the revolution, the weakening of the workers’ councils, will tend to reinforce the state appar­atus at the expense of the proletariat; will begin to turn that state into an instrument of oppression and exploitation against the class. The state is the most vulnerable point for the forces of the counter-revolution. It is the org­anism through which the impersonal power of capi­tal will tend to reassert itself, perverting a proletarian revolution into the bureaucratic nightmare of state capitalism. Those who pretend that the danger does not exist are disarming the class in the face of its future battles.

Some tendencies, particularly those who have some familiarity with the immense contribution of the Italian Left on this question, do understand that there is a problem here. Thus Battaglia Comun­ista, while stating at the recent international conference in Paris that the party must indeed take power, say in their platform that the cadre of the party must “keep the state on the path of revolutionary continuity” but “must not in any way be confused with the state or integrated into it”. Like Bilan in the 1930s, these tendencies want the party to take power, exercise the prole­tarian dictatorship, and control the state appar­atus -- but not become fused with the state as the Bolshevik party did, since they recognize that the entanglement of the Bolsheviks with the app­aratus of the Soviet state contributed to the degeneration of the party and of the revolution. But this position is contradictory. With Bilan, this contradiction was a fertile one, in so far as they were engaged in a movement towards clar­ifying the correct relationship between party and class; a movement that was, in our opinion, most fruitfully carried on in the work of Gauche Comm­uniste de France after the war and by the ICC today. But to go back to the contradictory pos­itions of Bilan today can only be a regression.

The position is contradictory because the party cannot ‘control’ the state without having a means of enforcing this control. To do this, either the party must have its own organs of coercion to ensure that the state follows its directives; or, as is more likely and as happened in Russia, the party must more and more identify itself with the commanding heights of the state, with its machin­ery of administration and repression. In either case the party becomes a state organ. To argue that the party can avoid this either through its programmatic clarity alone, or through organiz­ational measures like setting up a special sub­committee to run the state, supervised by the central committee, is to fail to understand that what happened in Russia was the result of huge social forces and can only be prevented from repeating itself by the intervention of even greater social forces, not just through ideolog­ical or organizational safeguards.

The transitional state, though an absolute nec­essity for the defense of the revolution, cannot be the dynamic subject of the movement towards communism. It is, at best, an instrument which the class uses to safeguard and codify the advan­ces made by the communist social movement. But the movement itself is led by the unitary organs of the class, which intimately express the life and needs of the class, and by the communist party, which continually puts forward the overall goals of the movement. The unitary organs of the class cannot become weighed down with the day-to-day functioning of the state. They can only exist in a state of permanent insurrection, ceaselessly breaking out of the narrow limits of constitutions, laws and administrative routines which, however, are the very essence of the state. Only in this way can they respond creatively to the immense problems posed by the construction of communism and compel the state machine to obey the global needs of the revolution. It is the same with the party, which both before and after the conquest of power must root itself in the masses and in their organs of struggle, tirelessly pushing them forward and criticizing their hesitations and confusions. The fusion of the party and the state will, as it did with the Bolsheviks, undermine its dynamic role and turn the party into a con­servative force, concerned above all with the immediate needs of the economy and with purely administrative functions. The party would then lose its primordial function of providing a pol­itical direction to which all administrative tasks must be subordinated.

The party will certainly intervene in the repres­entative organs of the state, but organizationally it will retain a complete separation from the state machine. Whatever direction it is able to give to the state will depend on its ability to convince politically the delegates of the territorial soviets, the soldiers’ committees, masses of small peasants, landless peasants, etc of the validity of its positions. But it cannot ‘control’ the state without becoming a state organ itself. Only the workers’ councils can really control the state, since they remain armed throughout the revolutionary process and can enforce their directives to the state through mass action and pressure. And the primary field of intervention for the party will be the workers’ councils, where it will continually agitate to ensure that the councils’ vigilant control over all the state organs does not waver for a moment.

Party and Class

Sooner or later, all groups in the revolutionary camp will have to come to terms with the ambig­uities or contradictions of their position on the party. There is a certain logic in saying that the party must take power, and in our opinion, the most logical exponents of this position within the proletarian movement are the Bordigists.

“The proletarian state can only be ‘animated’ by a single party and it would be senseless to require that this party organize within its ranks a statistical majority and be supported by such a majority in ‘popular elections’ -- that old bourgeois trap ... the communist party will rule alone, and will never give up power without a physical struggle. This bold declaration of not yielding to the deception of figures and not making use of them will aid the struggle against revolutionary degenerat­ion.” (‘Proletarian Dictatorship and Class Party’, 1951)

Compared to the democratic formalism of the CWO this position is refreshingly clear. The comm­unist party, which invariably defends ‘the historic interests of the working class’, uses the democrat­ic mechanisms of the councils only to gain power: once it is in power, it uses the state to impose its decisions on the masses. If the masses act against what the party judges to be their own historic interests, it will use violence, the famous Red Terror, to compel the class to fall into line with ‘its own real interests’. Those who want the party to take power, but hesitate to follow this logic, are flying in the face of historical reality. But the remorseless way this logic imposes itself was graphically demonstrated by the CWO at the recent Paris conference, where they stated quite explicitly that once it is in power, the party should not hesitate to use viol­ence against ‘backward’ or ‘counter-revolutionary’ expressions of the class.

It is indeed ironic that the CWO, who have for so long insisted that the massacre of the Kronstadt uprising marked the passage of the Bolsheviks into the capitalist camp, who even denounced the ICC as ‘apologists’ for the massacre because it considers that 1921 was not the definitive end of the Bolsh­eviks as a proletarian party -- that the CWO should now be ideologically preparing the way for new Kronstadts. We must not forget that Kronstadt was only the culmination of a process in which the party had more and more been resorting to coercive measures against the class. The lesson of this whole process, tragically illuminated by the dis­aster of Kronstadt, is that a proletarian party with or without the support of the majority of the class cannot use physical repression against a section of the class without profoundly damaging the revolution and perverting its own essence. This was expressed very clearly by the Italian left in 1938:

“The question we are faced with is this. Circumstances could arise in which a sector of the proletariat -- and we will even concede that it may be the unconscious victim of the maneuvers of the enemy -- goes into struggle against the proletarian state. What is to be done in such a situation? We must begin from the principle that socialism cannot be imposed on the proletariat by violence and force. It would have been better to have lost Kronstadt if holding on to it from the geographical point of view could only have one result: distorting the very substance of the proletariat’s activ­ity. We know the objection to this: the loss of Kronstadt would have been a decisive loss for the revolution, perhaps even the loss of the revolution itself. Here we are getting to the nub of the question. What criteria are being used in this analysis? Those which derive from class principles, or others which simply derive from a given situation? Are we starting from the axiom that it is better for the work­ers to make their own mistakes, even fatal ones, or from the idea that we should suspend our principles, because afterwards the workers will be grateful to us for having defended them, even by violence?

Every situation gives rise to two opposing sets of criteria which lead to two opposing tactical conclusions. If we base our analysis on mere forms, then we will arrive at the conclusion which derives from the following proposition: such and such an organ are proletarian, and we must defend it as such, even if it means smash­ing a workers’ movement. If, however, we base our analysis on questions of substance, we will arrive at a very different conclusion: a proletarian movement that is being manipulated by the enemy contains within it an organic cont­radiction between the proletariat and their class enemy. In order to draw this contradiction to the surface it is necessary to use propaganda among the workers, who in the course of events themselves will recover their stren­gth as a class and will be able to foil the enemy’s schemes. But if by chance it was true that the outcome of this or that event could mean the loss of the revolution, then it’s certain that a victory would not only be a distortion of reality (historic events like the Russian revolution can never really depend on a single episode and only a superficial mind could believe that the crushing of Kronstadt could have saved the revolution) but would also provide the conditions for really losing the revolution. The undermining of principles would not remain localized but would inevitably extend to all the activities of the proletarian state.” (‘The Question of the State’, Octobre, 1938)

Although Octobre continued to argue in favor of the dictatorship of the party, for the Gauche Communiste de France and for us today, the only way of consistently applying these lucid insights is by affirming that the proletarian party does not seek power, does not seek to become a state organ.

Otherwise you are relying only on the ‘will’ or good intentions of the party being able to prevent it from coming into violent conflict with the class; but once it has become a state organ, the strongest will of the best communist party in the world is not enough to immunize it from the inex­orable pressures of the state. This is why the Gauche Communiste de France concluded in 1948 that

“During the insurrectionary period of the rev­olution, the role of the party is not to claim power for itself, nor to ask the masses to put their confidence in it. Its intervention and activity aim to stimulate the self-mobilization of the class struggle for the victory of revolutionary principles.

The mobilization of a class around a party in which it ‘confides’ or rather abandons leadership is a conception which reflects a state of immaturity in the class. Experience has shown that under such conditions the revolution will be unable to succeed and will finally lead to the degeneration of the party and a divorce between party and class. The party would soon be forced to resort more and more to methods of coercion to impose itself on the class and would thus become a formidable obstacle to the revolution.” (‘Sur la Nature et la Fonction du Parti Politique du Proletariat’; see RI Bulletin D’Etude et Discussion, no. 6, from Internationalisme no.38, October 1948)

Revolutionaries today are faced with a choice. On one hand, they can adopt positions which lead them towards Bordigism, towards an apology for and a theorization of the degeneration of the Bolshevik party, towards substitutionism in its fully devel­oped form. In this sense, they will discover that substitutionism is indeed ‘impossible’ for the proletarian movement, because it leads to practices and positions which are directly counter-revolutionary. Or they can take up the profoundly rev­olutionary spirit of Lenin and the Bolsheviks at the time of the October revolution, a spirit which led Lenin to say in his appeal ‘To the Population’ a few days after the insurrection:

“Comrade workers! Remember that you yourselves now administer the state. Nobody will help you if you do not unite and take all the affairs of the state into your own hands. Your soviets are henceforth the organs of state power, organs with full powers, organs of decision.”

It is in this spirit, sharpened by the insights on the relation between party, class and state afforded by the Russian experience, which has to guide us today. It is a spirit profoundly in accord with the aims and methods of the communist revolution, with the revolutionary nature of the working class. If we have to say it a thousand times we will do so: communism can only be created by the conscious self-activity of the entire proletariat, and the communist vanguard can never act in a way that runs counter to this fundamental reality. The revolutionary party can never use the lack of homogeneity in the class, the weight of bourgeois ideology, or the threat of counter­revolution, as a justification for using force to ‘compel’ the class to be revolutionary. This is a complete contradiction in terms and itself expresses the weight of bourgeois ideology on the party. The working class can only throw off the weight of bourgeois ideology through its own mass activity, through its own experience. At certain moments it may seem simpler to confer its most crucial tasks onto a revolutionary organization, but whatever short-term ‘gains’ this might appear to bring, the long-term effect could only be to weaken the class. There can be no stopping short in the proletarian revolution: “those who make a revolution half-way only dig their own graves” (St. Juste). For the working class, that means ceaselessly struggling to overcome all the passive conservative tendencies in its own ranks, tend­encies which are the bitter fruits of generations of bourgeois ideology; it means tirelessly devel­oping and expanding its own self-organization and self-consciousness before, during and after the seizure of political power. Pannekoek’s polemics against the parliamentary tactics of the CI can equally well be applied to those who see an essentially parliamentary role for the communist party in the soviets:

“Revolution also demands something more than the massive assault that topples a government and which, as we know, cannot be summoned by leaders, but can only spring from the profound impulse of the masses. Revolution requires social reconstruction to be undertaken, diff­icult decisions to be made, the whole prolet­ariat involved in creative action -- and this is only possible if first the vanguard, then a greater and greater number take matters in hand themselves, know their own responsibilities, investigate, agitate, wrestle, strive, reflect, assess, seize chances and act upon them. But all this is difficult and laborious: thus, so long as the working class thinks it sees an easier way out through others acting on its behalf -- leading agitation from a high platform, taking decisions, giving signals for action, making laws -- the old habits of thought and the old weaknesses will make it hesitate and remain passive.”(‘World Revolution and Communist Tactics’,1920)

There are many people who want to be ‘leaders’ of the working class. But most of them confuse the bourgeois concept of leadership with the way that the proletariat generates its own leadership. Those who, in the name of leadership, call on the class to abandon its most crucial task to a minor­ity are not leading the class towards communism, but strengthening the hold of bourgeois ideology in the class, the ideology which from cradle to grave tries to convince workers that they are incapable of organizing themselves, that they must entrust others with the task of organizing them. The revolutionary party will only contribute to the progress towards communism by stimulating and generalizing a consciousness which runs entirely counter to the ideology of the bourgeoisie: a consciousness of the inexhaustible capacity of the class to organize itself and become conscious of itself as the subject of history. Communists, secreted by a class which contains no new relations of exploitation within itself, are unique in the history of revolutionary parties in that they do everything they can to make their own function unnecessary as class consciousness and activity becomes a homogeneous reality throughout all of the class. The more the proletariat advances on the road to communism, the more the whole class will become the living expression of “man’s pos­itive self-awareness”, of a liberated and consci­ous human community.

C. D. Ward

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Revolutionary organisation [5]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Councilism [43]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Party and Fraction [50]

International Review no 18 -3rd quarter

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3rd Congress of the ICC

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The political organizations of the proletariat draw their life from the living, historic practice of their class. The ICC doesn’t escape this law and its Third Congress was, in all aspects, con­fronted with the problems that are now being posed in the struggles of the working class. The Congress began by drawing up a balance-sheet of two years of activity in the class struggle: after three and a half years of existence as a centralized international organization, the ICC has an experience which is limited but rich in a number of important lessons. The first lesson is that our organizational inexperience is accom­panied by a theoretical weakness, a difficulty in deepening the questions posed in the workers’ movement of the past. In the constant process of deepening our understanding of social reality, both contemporary and historical, the ICC is still groping its way forward, like all other revolu­tionary organizations and expressions of the wor­king class struggle. The second lesson is the difficulty -- but also the necessity and possibi­lity -- of living with political divergences. A better ability to pose the questions which come out of the class struggle presupposes a contin­uous debate, which inevitably gives rise to poli­tical divergences, to different appreciations which must be able to be resolved inside the same organization. The third lesson is the necessity to adapt and modulate one’s intervention to the period one is in. All these aspects of the activity of a revolutionary organization -- theor­etical and political formation, development of the organization and the regroupment of revolu­tionaries, active intervention in the struggles of the working class -- were more than ever examined as a totality, a coherent whole which is linked more and more directly to the practice of the working class itself. There was also a particular emphasis on the question of the publi­cations of the organization.

This is why the work of the Congress consisted mainly of a balance-sheet of the international situation. At the Second Congress we were able to confirm the analysis which we had already put forward before the official constitution of the ICC, viz: the end of the period of reconstruction and the opening up of a new phase of the perman­ent, historic crisis of the system. We were also able to point out and explain the slow develop­ment of the crisis and show the reasons for this slowness. Contrary to the apologists of the system or the confused elements who were inspired by the slow rhythm of the crisis to invent falla­cious theories and vain hopes about possible ways out of the crisis (restructuring of the productive apparatus, opening up the Chinese market, the eastern bloc, and various other fantasies), we applied a Marxist analysis and proclaimed the permanent, historic character of the crisis. We insisted that it wasn’t a purely contingent affair but would inevitably deepen, that because of the immanent laws of decadent capitalism the crisis could only have one outcome: the march towards generalized war.

This analysis, as is forcefully underlined by the report on the ‘Crisis and Inter-Imperialist Conflicts’, has been fully confirmed by the evolu­tion of the crisis over the last two years. Basing ourselves on this analysis of the evolution of the crisis and on a precise study of the condi­tion of the working class in the present period, we pointed out the inevitability of a resurgence of proletarian class struggle, the enormous, intact capacity of the class to confront the mea­sures of austerity which capitalism is attempting to impose on it. This perspective of a revival of proletarian struggle which was also put for­ward at the Second Congress has now also been fully confirmed and verified.

It’s true that we have sometimes made errors of appreciation and exaggerations about momentary, immediate struggles and that we didn’t always immediately see how the movement of the proleta­riat follows a jagged course. But these errors -- which we in any case corrected more or less quickly -- have never invalidated our basic pers­pective. In order to respond to all the pessi­mistic tendencies which have appeared, even in our own ranks, each time the workers’ struggle entered into one of the troughs of this up-and-down movement; in order to arm ourselves in advance against all tendencies towards skepticism, who can’t see the forest for the trees; in order to respond in detail to all the objections which we’ve already heard and which can always appear again; in order to base our perspectives on solid ground, it was considered necessary to present a report on the ‘Evolution of the Class Struggle’ – a report which is long and detailed, but which is essential if we are to understand this perspective and the orientation of our practical activity.

It’s the same thing with regard to the question of the historic course. It’s absolutely neces­sary to reject the absurd theory of two parallel courses, one towards war, the other towards revolution, which go on infinitely without ever meeting each other, without acting and reacting on each other. Such a ‘theory’ is a bit like the response of a Norman peasant: “Maybe yes, maybe no”. A revolutionary class can’t be content with a theory which simply affirms a fatality, a theory of “we’ll see when we see”.

It’s a thousand times better to investigate some­thing, with all the risks of error that this involves, than not to investigate at all. The investigation which the ICC has undertaken shows the validity of our approach and enables us to give an answer not to the question: what are the forces pushing us towards war?, but, in what way, by whom, are these forces of war being held back, so that they are unable to reach a culminating point? This is what our report on the ‘Historic Course’ is responding to -- a report which is an integral part of our general analysis of the period and evolution of the crisis.

However, it is not the same with our analysis of the political crisis of the bourgeoisie and of the necessity for the left to come to power, which for some years and notably at the Second Congress was the axis of our political conclu­sions about the short term. A specific contribution on this question completes the reports on this change in the situation and its implications for our intervention.

The Congress also adopted a ‘Resolution on the International Situation’, which makes a synthesis of the three general reports on the current situation.

Another part of the work of the Congress was the adoption of a ‘Resolution on the State in the Period of Transition’, a concretization of several years of discussion on the question, a question which will be the subject of a pamphlet publishing the debates that have gone on inside the ICC. An indispensable complement to our intervention and our analysis of the current situation, the theor­etical questions of the period of transition, the content of socialism, the ‘general goals of the movement’ remain a constant concern in the orientations of the ICC.

Finally, we were able to welcome to the Congress delegations from the Communist Workers’ Organiza­tion, Nucleo Comunista Internazionalista and Il Leninista, and a comrade who has been participa­ting in the communist conferences in Scandinavia. Debates in the ICC are debates in the workers’ movement and have nothing confidential about them; inviting these groups to the Congress can only contribute to a clearer, more direct knowledge of the positions of the ICC and thus to political clarification within the revolutionary milieu.

Life of the ICC: 

  • Congress Reports [41]

Crisis and Imperialist Conflicts

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The unfolding of the world situation is determined by the complex interactions between the course of the economic crisis and the course of the proletarian class struggle. The course of the economic crisis -- which has become permanent in the epoch of capitalist decadence -- is basica­lly determined by the blind laws which regulate the capitalist accumulation process, which condemn capitalism to survive in a cycle of depression - war - reconstruction, and which inexorably drives the bourgeoisie to imperialist world war as the only capitalist response to the open crisis of generalized over-production. The course of proletarian class struggle, while closely linked to the course of the economic crisis, is also the product of a series of super-structural elements and is not in any way mechanistically determined by the unfolding of the economic crisis. Thus, if the course of the economic crisis, when it erupts in a world-wide depression, is a powerful factor pushing the working class to struggle against a constant worsening of its living and working conditions, the capacity of the proletariat to generalize and politicize its struggles is in the final analysis determined by the development of its class consciousness, its autonomous organization, its revolutionary minorities and the relative weight of bourgeois ideology (nationalism, legalism, electoralism, anti-fascism, national ‘communism’, etc) in its ranks.

The course of the proletarian class struggle its­elf becomes an extremely important factor which affects the very course of the economic crisis. By preventing the operation of capitalist palliatives (deflation, incomes policies, social pacts, lay-offs, ‘rationalizations’, militarizat­ion of labor, etc) the combativity of the working class greatly intensifies the crisis and hurls the bourgeoisie into turmoil and disarray. And if in the midst of a world-wide depression a descendant course of class struggle opens the way for the capitalist ‘solution’ of world war, an ascendant course of class struggle, with its development of class consciousness and the growth of both the unitary and political organs of the class, can turn the economic crisis into a revolutionary crisis, the beginning of the communist transformation of society.

It is on the basis of understanding this very complex interaction between the economic crisis and the action of the proletariat -- which is the essence of Marxism -- that revolutionaries can determine whether the historic course is today towards imperialist world war or towards rising class struggle. And it is on this determination that the form of the intervention of the revolut­ionary organization in the struggle of its class depends.

In this report on the international situation we will first analyze the course of the economic crisis, as well as both the incredible sharpening of inter-imperialist antagonisms which a world­wide depression has brought in its wake, and the political crisis into which the growing economic catastrophe has thrown the bourgeoisie of each nation. We will then trace the course of the proletarian class struggle and its impact on the unfolding of the economic crisis and on the mount­ing tendencies which propel the bourgeoisie towards world war. Finally, on the basis of our study of the interaction between the course of the economic crisis and the course of the prolet­arian class struggle -- of the rapport de force between the bourgeoisie and the working class -- we will show the nature of the historic course today and the factors which could bring about a change in it.

The Economic Crisis

Twelve years after the countries ravaged by the second imperialist world war (Europe, Japan) had again achieved positive trade balances and were able to compete with the US on the world market, thus signaling the end of the post-war reconstruction; eight years after tale collapse of the international monetary system established at Bretton Woods inaugurated a period of unceasing monetary chaos; four years after the sharpest decline in world production and trade since the 1930s -- the world economy in 1979 stands poised on the brink of new and even more devastating economic cataclysms!

In the industrialized countries of the US bloc (the OECD) while industrial production rose over 60% between 1963-73, the rise was less than 13% between 1973-78, or two-fifths the rate achieved before. This drastic slowdown in the growth of industrial production -- now verging on stagnat­ion -- is the grim testimony to the saturation of the world market and to the open crisis of over­production which afflicts the globe’s industrial giants.

One of the most glaring manifestations of the crisis of overproduction is the underutilization of productive capacity, idle plants. The US, even at the cost of new destruct­ive galloping inflation (prices are rising at a yearly rate of over.19%), which if it is not quickly checked threatens economic ruin, has not been able to duplicate its feats of the booms of the 50s and 60s when industry ran almost flat out: in 1978 manufacturing industry ran at only 83% of capacity, and in a key industry like steel production had fallen 7% from the already low level of 1974. But it is America’s allies who are today most devastated by the plague of excess productive capacity, which in a number of vital industries has reached epidemic proportions and is spawning a series of emergency plans to try and eliminate surplus capacity in a coordinated fashion throughout the bloc so as to avert the danger of internecine trade wars.

The contraction in steel production has already reached monumental proportions: between 1974-78 output has dropped 9.4% in Britain, 12% in Japan, 18% in France, 20.5% in West Germany, 22%; in Holland, 26.2% in Belgium and 26.6% in Luxemburg. And there is no end in sight! In Belgium, the steel industry is working at only 57%; of capacity, while in Japan 20% of the country’s blast furnaces are in mothballs. The magnitude of the steel glut is strikingly manifested in the brand new 3 million tons a year blast furnace near Tokyo which its owner, Nippon Kokan, hesitates to even start up since it can only add to the existing overcapacity, and in a new mill in France’s Lorraine province which is being allowed to rust even before it produces any steel whatsoever.

The situation in shipbuilding is even more catastrophic. World orders which stand at 74 million gross registered tons in 1973 fell to only 11 million gross registered tons in 1977 (not even enough to keep Japan’s ship­yards busy, let alone the whole bloc); moreover, orders have declined by 30% since 1977! It is the countries of the American bloc which have been the hardest hit by this virtual collapse of the shipbuilding industry. In France, for instance, new orders will keep no more than a quarter of the present capacity at work. Japan -- which builds half the world’s ships -- is planning to eliminate at least 35% of its ship­building capacity, while the EEC plans to cut almost half its capacity.

In chemicals, the West German industry -- which dominates the world market, even as its giant companies dominate the German industrial scene -- is operating at just 70% of capacity. In petro­chemicals there is a 30% overcapacity in the EEC -- and it is growing. In synthetic fibers, plants in the EEC are now working at 66% capacity, and a 3-year plan of ‘disinvestment’ aimed at reducing capacity by 20% has been drawn up. Meanwhile, Japan’s Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) says that its fibers industry must permanently eliminate 25 of its bloated capacity.

In industries like shipping and automobiles the picture is equally bleak for capital. In countries where shipping is a mainstay of the economy much of the once busy fleets are now idle; in Greece 11%, in Norway 23%; in Sweden 27%. In the automobile industry, while production in the EEC is now running at around 10.6 million cars a year, factories are capable of turning out 12 million cars a year -- and on the basis of current projec­tions, the industry’s capacity will rise to over 13 million cars by 1982. A planned and coordinat­ed contraction (as in steel, shipbuilding and fibers), a spate of bankruptcies or protection­ism are the only alternatives for this key indus­try too.

The concomitant of a persistent and indeed growing excess capacity in key industries has been an alarming sluggishness in investment in new plant, or, to be more precise, the growing obstacles to the realization of surplus value have brought in their wake a slackening in the rate of accumulation. In a world burdened by the weight of idle capacity, investments in new plant cannot fail to stagnate and then decline. And this, as we shall see when we trace the economic perspectives for the 80s, is but the harbinger of a new and violent collapse of production!

The bankers and technocrats vainly seeking to coordinate the economies of the US bloc -- despite the impotence of their economic ‘science’ -- have at least been able to recognize the problem. Thus the savants of the OECD point to “... the slowness in the expansion of the fixed investments of enterprises observed in recent years in practica­lly all member countries ... Even in countries where the sum-total of capital expenditures has increased, until recently, at a relatively high rate, fixed investment of enterprises has remained weak relative to its previous highs.” (Perspect­ives Economiques de 1’ OCDE, July 1978) .

The Bank for International Settlements also points to “... the persistent weakness in expenditures on the fixed capital of enterprises ...” (Banque des Reglements Internationaux, 47 Rayport Annuels , Bale 1977) .

The magnitude of the problem can clearly be seen in the case of West Germany, where the average annual growth rate of manufacturing capacity declined from 6.1% during 1960-65 (the last phase of the post-war reconstruction) to 3.9% during 1966-70 (the onset of the open crisis) and then to 1.8% in 1975, 1.5% in 1976, and 1% in 1977. This catastrophic decline in the rate of accumula­tion in West Germany with its still fat trade sur­plus well illustrates the economic disaster thro­ugh which the world is going. While incapable of grasping either the fundamental or immediate causes of the world economic crisis, the bourgeoi­sie sometimes formulates its dilemmas of idle capital and the utter senselessness of new invest­ment in a perceptive way: “If the United States had to invest approximately 20%, of its GNP in new capacity, there would not be enough warehouses to store all the unsold merchandise, nor enough electronic calculators to make out the unemployment cheques.” (Business Week, Jan. 16, 1977).

The dimensions of the present economic crisis can also be seen in the huge and ever-growing mass of unemployed workers. There are now 18 million unemployed workers in the industrialized countries of the American bloc! This legion of the unemployed does not simply constitute an industr­ial reserve army which exercises a downward pressure on wages, as it did during the ascendant epoch of capitalism in the last century. Nor are the unemployed merely the by-product of the bourgeoisie’s offensive against the proletariat, the fruit of its effort to ‘rationalize’ product­ion and extract more surplus value from even fewer workers. While both of these tendencies are cert­ainly at work, the unemployed in their present massive numbers, far from being a boon to capital­ism have become an incredible burden on the profitability of global capital, which the bourgeoisie is helpless to control. Today, unemployed workers are one more manifestation of the insurmountable contradictions of the capitalist mode of production; they are first and foremost the materialization of the chronic overproduction of the commodity labor power.

To the overproduction of constant capital exemplified by surplus manufacturing capacity and idle plant, must be added the overproduction of variable capital exemplified by the living hell of unemployment on a mass scale. To the growing volume of idle money for which no productive investment is possible must be added an idle generation of young workers (in France, for example, 1 out of every 7 workers under twenty-five years of age is unemployed) whose labor power can no longer increase capital. The agony of a dying capitalism has confirmed the forecast of Marx and Engels of a capitalist mode of produc­tion which “... is incompetent to assure an existence to its slaves within their slavery, because it cannot help letting them sink into such a state that it has to feed them, instead of being fed by them.” (The Communist Manifesto).

The world economic crisis of capitalism, in total disregard of the Trotskyists’ insistence that the countries of the Russian bloc are ‘workers' states’ (sic), has not spared the 10 nations of COMECON1. The violent shockwaves of the open crisis of world overproduction have also convulsed the Russian bloc, and have brought about the same drastic slowdown in the growth of industrial production and fall in the rate of accumulation that afflict the rest of the capitalist world.

In Russia the annual rate of growth of industrial production which was around 10% in 1950-60, declined to around 7% between 1960-70, and for the last Five-Year Plan (1971-76) fell to an anemic 4.5% -- only slightly above the average annual rate of growth for the countries of the OECD during the same period. Moreover, the Russian planners have already had to concede that the objectives for industrial growth of their present Five-Year Plan (1976-80) will not be achieved. In every one of Russia’s satellites in Eastern Europe, the growth in industrial production in 1978 fell below planned targets. And in East Germany, where GNP grew at around 4% in 1978 instead of the planned for 5.2%, hopes for attaining the goals of the Five-Year Plan have been abandoned.

The countries of the Russian bloc are also suffering from a decline in the rate of accumulation. Thus, in Bulgaria, the growth of investment slackened from 6% in 1977 to only 4.4% in 1978. In Hungary, new investments will be practically frozen in 1979 (a rise of little more than 1% forecast), and not a single big investment project will be started this year.

A number of key industries in the Russian bloc are already directly plagued by overproduction and the limits of the saturated world market. Industries which produce largely for the world market, like Poland’s shipyards, the huge new auto plants in Poland and Russia which turn out Polski’s and Lada’s, and engineering factories like Poland’s RABA which sells a quarter of its 930 million annual production to the west, all face the bitter alternative of idle capacity or systematic dumping. This latter, to which these industries have turned, is merely another manifestation of the crisis of overproduction -- and one whose ramifications will be felt through­out the countries of the Russian bloc as the sale of commodities below their cost of production in one group of industries must be compensated for by higher costs in other sectors.

However, the bulk of the industry of the Russian bloc has not directly come up against the limits of a saturated world market. Indeed, Russia and her satellites are caught in the grip of chronic scarcity of capital, seemingly the very opposite of the crisis which is battering the metropoles of the US bloc. Yet both the idle capital in the US bloc and the dearth of capital in the Russian. bloc -- the excess productive capacity in the US bloc and the insufficient productive capacity of the Russian bloc -- are the different manifestations of the same global crisis of overproduction brought about by the saturation of the world market.

The specific manifestations of this crisis in the countries of the Russian bloc -- the lack of capital -- are the result of the relative backwardness of these economies. The GNP of all of Russia’s East European satellites does not equal the GNP of France alone; Russia’s own GNP does not match the combined GNP of Britain, France and Italy (which are certainly not the industrial giants of the US bloc), This backwardness is manifest in all the key areas which determine the competitiveness of an economy on the world market. Despite the almost complete statification of industry in COMECON , the concentration of capital in large-scale enterprises is much more advanced in the US bloc (the fifty largest companies account for nearly one third of America’s industrial production; in Russia, it takes the output of the 660 largest enterprises to reach a comparable figure) . The organic composition of capital is much higher in America than in the Russian bloc (Czechoslovak industry -- one of the most technically advanced in COMECON -- uses a quarter more workers than the average for the EEC2, therefore permitting the US to approp­riate a disproportionate share of global surplus value. The productivity of labor is also much greater in the US bloc than in the Russian bloc (Russian skilled workers are only three-quarters as productive as skilled workers in the US). Finally, the Russian bloc is burdened by a backward and labor-intensive agriculture (between 25-40% of the active population of the COMECON countries still works on the land, while in practically all of the industrialized countries of the US bloc the figure is under 10%).

The fact that Russian capitalism really only began its bid for world power when the capitalist mode of production was already in permanent crisis meant that it could not duplicate the feat of the already dominant economic -- and hence imperialist -- powers who had achieved a formidable accumulat­ion of capital on a still expanding world market. The saturation of the world market, the global crisis of overproduction, placed severe limitat­ions on the development of Russia’s export industries, on her capacity to realize surplus value beyond her frontiers (despite recourse to systematic dumping during the open crisis of the 30s and today), and thereby drastically restricted her capacity to import the advanced technology necessary to overcome her relative backwardness. Despite a forced capitalization, the attempt to compensate for her dearth of capital through an almost total statification (as well as the pillage of the capital stock of the countries conquered in World War II), imperialist Russia has not been able to close the economic gap which separates her from the rival US bloc. The deepen­ing of the present open crisis of world overprod­uction has only accentuated Russia’s economic backwardness, her inability to produce on the same scale as her competitors, and manifests itself east of the Elbe in the form of a chronic dearth of capital in the bulk of industry and agriculture, and in the dumping without which the output of certain key export industries would be un-saleable. Thus, the same global economic crisis brought about by the saturation of the world market, with different economic manifestations, has already led to a persistent and growing slowdown in the rise of industrial production and to a pronounced slackening in the rate of accumulation in both the American and Russian blocs.

In the under-developed countries, where most of the world’s population lives, the open crisis of world overproduction has greatly accentuated the dependence and backwardness to which these ‘independent’ nations are irredeemably condemned by the decadence of capitalism. The mere hand­ful of countries among the under-developed nations where industry has attained a consider­able weight in the national economy are convulsed by the same slowdown in the growth of industrial production, fall in the rate of accumulation and mass of unemployment on a rapidly growing scale which afflict the industrial giants -- despite the pervasive protectionism designed to stave off the competition of the industrial behemoths like the US, West Germany and Japan, as well as dumping by Russian industry. In Argentina, industrial production fell by 6% in 1978 and whole sectors of industry -- automobiles, (Gen­eral Motors has closed all its plants), agricult­ural machinery, steel, chemicals, petrochemicals have their backs to the wall. In Brazil, the anticipated growth in GNP of 5% this year (which has already become problematical in the face of a credit squeeze brought on by a skyrocketing annual inflation rate of over 60%) is only half the annual rate achieved during the economic ‘miracle’ a decade ago, and much too low to per­mit the creation of the l.5 million new jobs each year without which unemployment will soar. In Mexico, where real GNP rose 6-8% annually between 1958-73, the growth in GNP was only 2.5% in 1977. Investment, which grew at an annual rate of 23.1% between 1965-70, slowed to an annual rate of 17.8% between 1971-78; moreover, whereas the state acc­ounted for just one-third of this investment in 1965-70, the still high rate of investment between 1971-78 was only possible because the state, as a result of very heavy borrowing from foreign banks, provided about 90% of it -- producing not an accumulation of capital but an accumulation of debt. To all this must be added the fact that total or partial unemployment is already the lot of 52% of the active population! In South Africa, economic growth slowed last year to a weak 2.5%, far too low to prevent a rise in unemployment from an already staggering 2 million workers.

In the vast bulk of under-developed countries, the national economy revolves almost exclusively around the extraction of raw materials of agric­ultural production (usually one or two cash crops) The open crisis has exacerbated to an incredible degree the tendencies which have characterized these economies since the very onset of capitalist decadence more than seventy years ago: permanent agricultural crisis and absolute dependence on imported foodstuffs in what are predominantly agrarian economies; the enormous growth of a sub-proletariat cut off from the rural villages from which capital has separated it and condemned to a jobless existence in the vast shanty towns and bidonvilles which have grown up around the comm­ercial and political urban centers; in short, mass starvation and destitution.

The impossibility of the under-developed countries overcoming their backwardness and dependence is all too clear: assuming zero-growth in the indust­rialized countries of the western bloc, those under-developed countries which already have an industrial base (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, etc) would take sixty-five years of growth at their 1970-76 rate to catch up to the per capita GNP of the industrialized countries; for the bulk of the under-developed countries -- assum­ing the same conditions -- it would take 746 years! Yet while the crisis inexorably drives the indust­rialized countries towards stagnation and even decline in industrial output, it even more surely condemns the under-developed countries to economic collapse, thus making absolutely certain that the already enormous gap between the industrial giants and the under-developed countries will widen over the coming decade.

The global slowdown in the growth of production and in the rate of accumulation has brought in its wake a slowdown in the growth of world trade. After the sharp decline of around 10% in the trade of the OECD countries in the first half of 1975, these countries’ foreign trade jumped in 1976 only to virtually stagnate the next year; after another jump in 1978 -- though much weaker than in 1976 and largely due to America’s reflations -- their foreign trade is now again practically stagnant. The foll­owing table, which traces the growth of the value of imports and exports of the seven principal coun­tries of the OECD (USA, Japan, West Germany, UK, Canada, Italy) which account for the vast bulk of the world’s trade, clearly illustrates the stag­nation which characterizes the vital element in the health of the global capitalist economy which is international commerce.

GROWTH IN THE VOLUME OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS OF THE 7 PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES OF THE OECD (WITH RESPECT TO THE PRECEDING HALF YEAR)


1976

1977

1977

1978

1978

1979*

1979*


II

I

II

I

II

I

II

Imports

12.7

3.9

1.2

7.2

8.5

4.5

3.5

Exports

6.9

5.9

4.4

5.0

6.0

4.5

4.5

Source: Perspectives Economique de l’OCDE, 23/24

* estimates

However, the inability of world trade to develop is minimized and considerably obscured by the very statistics with which the OECD, the World Bank, the IMF and other capitalist agencies and instit­utions use to monitor the condition of internat­ional commerce3. The bourgeoisie fails to appreciate the significance of the fact that 70% of the foreign trade of the OECD countries is among themselves -- and that it is this intra-bloc trade that accounts for most of the growth that the stat­istics indicate4. When world trade dropped off so quickly and catastrophically in the open crisis of the 1930s, six of the seven of today’s principal trading countries (Canada was the exception) were then bitter imperialist rivals. Today, all seven of these countries find themselves firmly within the same imperialist bloc and the trade between them indicates as much the nature of the complex division of labor and economic interpenetration which the US has imposed on its bloc as a real growth in what has traditionally been international commerce. Much the same can be said about the fact that 50% of the trade of the Comecon countries is with each other, and that this too is the fastest growing component of each country’s trade.

Moreover, in tracing the very slow growth in world trade over the past five years, the bourgeoi­sie is incapable of grasping the significance which must be attached to the composition of this trade. Approximately 25% of the value of world trade in 1977 consisted of foreign travel, invest­ment income and other ‘services’ which represent paper or fictitious values and unproductive expenses which in no way constitute a real expan­sion of trade. Similarly, a considerable portion of both the value and volume of world trade con­sists directly of armaments (43.7 billion dollars between 1971-75, 76% of which is with the underdeveloped countries) which from the standpoint of global capital represents not a growth but a sterilization of value, not an expansion but a destruction of global capital5. The fantastic development of unproductive expenditures -- the hallmark of capitalist decadence -- one aspect of which is the growth of the arms trade, is obscured by the fact that a very considerable part of world trade which is actually for military purposes is hidden in the figures for the growth in trade in raw materials like crude oil, copper, nickel, tin, lead, zinc, molybdenum, etc of which around 10% at least is for armaments and the trade in electronic equipment and heavy machinery much of which (nuclear reactors for example) is for military production.

Finally, a huge part of the growth in world trade – particularly over the past five years – has its counterpart rapidly growing trade deficits and an astronomical rise in the foreign debt of the underdeveloped countries. The overall trade deficit of the underdeveloped countries rose from 7.5 billion dollars in 1973 to 34 billion dollars in 1978; the foreign debt of these same countries grew from 74.1 billion dollars in 1973 to 244 billion in 1978, and is the essential element in financing these mounting trade deficits. This huge debt indicates that the growth in trade which bourgeois economists have recorded hides the fact that there has been no real expansion of the world market. Indeed, as we shall see, effective demand on a world scale is shrinking at a rate which the expansion of world credit can no longer compensate for.

The stagnation of world capital over the past four years – which shattered the hopes that the bourgeoisie entertained of a recovery from the sharp downturn of 1974-75 -- now threatens to give way to another and much more devastating collapse of pro­duction, investment and world trade as the crisis of overproduction relentlessly deepens.

After the economic downturn which shook the countries of the US bloc in 1970-71, virtually all governments reflated (and the credit expansion fuelled the galloping inflation which followed). In the aftermath of the much more severe downturn of 1974-75 -- which convulsed both blocs simultan­eously -- only the US reflated and to it fell the burden of propping up the rest of its bloc for the next few years. Meanwhile, West Germany and Japan hurled themselves into an export offensive which fattened their trade surpluses and profits while their home markets stagnated. By 1978, however, the declining competitiveness of American goods of the world market, the US’s astronomical trade deficits and the collapse of the dollar, meant that Washington too would have to put on the economic brakes. The Bonn summit last July was intended to pressure West Germany and Japan to rein in their exports and to reflate their economies so as to relieve the pressure on the US while keeping the world economy from collapsing anew.

The months which followed the economic summit were to demonstrate that the US had succeeded to a considerable degree in imposing its diktat on its reluctant allies. Japan projected a budget defi­cit this fiscal year of 80 billion dollars equal to 40% of its total budget and larger than America’s), and Japan’s imports have been growing at a rate twice as fast as its exports, West Germany adopted a budget which would inject an additional 15.5 billion Deutsche Marks into its economy (equal to 1% of GNP). One result of more restrictive monetary police in the US, and German and Japanese reflation, was a dramatic rise of the dollar: between November 1978 and April 1979 the dollar rose more than 10% against the DM and 22% against the Japanese yen.

However, even the most optimistic forecasts of the bourgeoisie (the OECD for example) indicated that German and Japanese expansion in 1979 would not compensate for the slackening in the growth of America’s GNP. Therefore, a realistic appraisal of economic trends could only lead to the conclusion that the stagnation of the past few years would give way to a downturn in 1979. Rea­lity though has been even more brutal in the first months of 1979. GNP in the US grew at only 0.7% in the first quarter (less than half the rate forecast by the OECD last December) and is now actually declining. The galloping inflation which is today raging in the US precludes any significant stimulation by fiscal or monetary policy to halt the decline. Meanwhile the stimulative monetary policies and reflationary budgets in West Germany and Japan quickly ignited the fires of galloping inflation in those countries (the annual rate of inflation was 10% in West Germany in March and 11% in Japan in February); this has now provoked a credit squeeze and the aborting of reflationary policies, which has rudely shattered the hopes for substantial rises in GNP to even partially offset the decline in America. The nightmare that has haunted the technocrats and bankers of the OECD and the IMF is becoming a reality: virtually all of industrialized countries of the US bloc will be deflating their economies simultaneously!

Idle manufacturing capacity and deflation through­out the US bloc cannot be offset by a new expansion of trade with either the Russian bloc or the under­developed countries. The hard currency indebted­ness of the countries of the Russian bloc to the US bloc has risen from 32 to 36 billion dollars in 1976 to around 50 billion today. Poland -- which owes a staggering 15 billion dollars is already tottering on the brink of bankruptcy. Western bankers, trying to salvage their previous invest­ments, are in no position to grant the huge new credits that alone would make possible the financing of the mounting trade deficits of the Russian bloc with the west -- which rose from 4.9 billion dollars in 1977 to 6 billion dollars in 1978. Moreover, the preoccupation of the bureaucrats of the countries of the Russian bloc today is to limit their imports from the west -- even as they engage in massive dumping of their own commodities on western markets -- so as to reduce their spiraling trade deficits.

Turning to the underdeveloped countries, the countries of the US bloc face the same dilemma. With 244 billion dollars in foreign debt, the underdeveloped countries are virtually bankrupt and reduced to calling for debt moratoria. In countries like Algeria, Zambia, and Zaire the foreign debt is equal to more than half the annual GNP. The 5 billion dollar service on Brazil’s foreign debt in 1978 was equal to about 55% of the total value of its exports for the year. Mexico spent 6 billion dollars servicing its foreign debt in 1979, while its huge oil resources yielded only 1.7 billion dollars in exports. In the face of the sheer magnitude of such debts and the growing difficulty in servicing them, new loans -- which the west is increasingly hesitant to make -- far from expanding trade will be used primarily to assure the servicing of past debts and to avert the financial debacle for western banks which defaults would bring in their wake.

While the enormous expansion of credit within the US bloc, to the Russian bloc and to the under­developed countries over the past decade had to an extent masked the shrinking of effective demand on a global scale, the harvest of galloping inflation and un-payable debts -- a mass of paper values -- has virtually put an end to recourse to such a palliative today.

The Chinese market, which only a year ago aroused such hopes in business and financial circles throughout the US bloc, cannot provide sufficient outlets for the idle plant in major industries. China’s need for massive imports of technology and machinery is not matched by the resources with which to pay for these imports. After the ambitious plans announced in March 1978, China had to freeze thirty major plant import deals with Japan this February, when the Peking bureau­cracy thought twice about the consequences of its original ‘modernization’ plans. China will certainly grow as a market for the US bloc (part­icularly for armaments), but not as fast as the west thought a year ago; nor will China compensate for the stagnation and imminent downturn in world trade -- particularly as in the intense competition for the Chinese market between western countries there will be more losers than winners. Moreover, the Chinese will try to flood saturated western markets with textiles, shoes etc, thus compound­ing the global overproduction which already characterizes the consumer goods industries where Chinese capitalism is even now competitive.

For West Germany and Japan -- the countries of the US bloc whose economies are most competitive on the world market -- the end of reflation at home and the severe limits to extending credit abroad mean that an unrestrained export offensive at the expense of their trade rivals within the bloc looms as the most viable way to try to weather the growing economic storms. Such a move by the German and Japanese bourgeoisies cannot fail to fan the flames of protectionism smoldering just beneath the surface of the weaker economies of the US bloc (Britain, France, Italy) , and even in the US. The possible response in the form of competitive devaluations and import controls which would upset the European Monetary System and abort the just-concluded ‘Tokyo Round’ orchestrated by American imperialism, accelerating the collapse of world trade and producing a rush to autarchy, are issues we will take up when we discuss the political crisis of the bourgeoisie. For the moment it is sufficient to point out that a new German and Japanese foreign trade offensive can only deepen the world crisis.

The inexorable deepening of the global crisis of overproduction, and the failure of the several palliatives with which the bourgeoisie has vainly sought to stem the ravages of the blind laws which determine the course of the economic crisis, has brought world capital to the brink of another decline in industrial production, investment and trade -- sharper than the downturns of 1971 and 1974 -- as the 1980s begin6.

Inter-Imperialist Antagonisms

There is only one section of the world economy which will grow significantly over the next several years: the armaments industry, war production. The case of Syria where military expenditure con­stitutes 57.2 per cent of the state’s budget, while the productive sector of the economy coll­apses, is typical of the underdeveloped countries today. Those ex-colonies with any appreciable industrial sector, like South Africa, Israel, Argentina and Brazil, are spending billions of dollars to build nuclear bombs and delivery systems while galloping inflation and astronomical foreign debts ravage their economic base. Even countries whose industry remains confined to a few pitiful islands in an ocean of backward agricul­ture and cottage industries, like India and Pakistan, are exhausting dwindling exchange resources to expand and develop a capacity to wage nuclear war. In the imperialist metropoles, armaments production will zoom upwards while the rest of the economy contracts over the coming years. The Russian bloc is deploying its new SS-20 nuclear missiles which are capable of destroying every major city in Western Europe, and is augmenting its land armies so as to be able to reach the Atlantic coast in a few days march; to this must be added the prodigious development of the Russian navy, by which the Kremlin is determined to challenge America’s hegemony on the seas. The countries of the US bloc too are signi­ficantly increasing their military budgets, even as they slash other expenditures (France’s mili­tary budget increased 5 per cent this year while the Barre Plan calls for the scaling down of whole sectors of the economy). NATO is both planning to introduce a new system of nuclear missiles capable of hitting targets in Russia from Western Europe, and greatly expanding the whole infra­structure of ports, air fields, fuel depots, storage facilities etc, so as to facilitate the speedy transport of American troops and equipment to the European front in the event of war. Mean­while, the US is already re-examining its decision not to produce the neutron bomb, and is preparing to build a completely new intercontinental ball­istic missile system - the MX. Finally, the US bloc has enthusiastically joined Peking in its massive and costly program to modernize all branches of the Chinese armed forces.

The war economy, where the production of the means of destruction becomes the very axis of industrial production, is not a new phenomenon. The out­break of the first imperialist world war in 1914, which clearly marked the entrance of world capital into its decadent phase, had as its corollary the development of the war economy. Just as capita­lism’s historic crisis is a permanent one, so too is each national capital characterized by a permanent war economy in this decadent epoch of capitalism. However, just as the permanent crisis is marked by a cycle of depression-war-reconstruc­tion, a cycle in which there are passing respites from the ravages of open crisis and the devasta­tions of world war, so the permanent war economy is marked also by a zig-zag movement in which there are sometimes short periods when a decline in war production occurs (Europe and the US during the reconstruction of the 1920s; the US between the end of World War II and the outbreak of the Korean war, 1946-50). Nonetheless, like the historic crisis itself, the war economy has been a constant feature of capitalism since 1914. The present phase of world-wide depression, though, is bringing in its wake an incredible strengthen­ing of the war economy -- not simply on a national scale but dictated, coordinated and organized by the mammoth continental state capitalism, the US or Russia, which dominates each of the two contending imperialist blocs.

The present phase of monstrous growth of the war economy is neither a palliative for the rapidly deepening economic crisis nor a factor which can provide even a momentary facade of ‘prosperity’. Under all conditions, by its hyper-development of the unproductive sector of the economy, war pro­duction drains surplus value from the remaining islands of profitable activity. In all circum­stances, the war economy involves an assault on the proletariat: “... war is realized at the expense of the working masses, who are drained y the state (through various financial devices -- taxes, inflation, loans and other measures) of values with which it constitutes a supplementary and new purchasing power” (‘Report on the International Situation’, National Conference of the Gauche Communiste de France, July 1945). If the rearmament programs of Hitler, Blum and Roosevelt in the 1930s could temporarily stimulate their economies and even lead elements of the communist left to think that the war economy might open up an epoch of economic expansion and bring with it a rise in the living standards of the working class7, both the short-lived economic stimulant and the illusions it produced were due to the massive state debts incurred and the inflationary policies pursued by the capitalist governments. Today, however, the strengthening of the war economy in the midst of an already intolerable level of state debt and rampant inflation (themselves in large part the ransom capital has paid for some forty years of almost uninterrupted growth in arms production), and therefore recourse to debt and inflation as the specific way to make the working class pay for the war economy is impossible. Instead, the present phase of expanding war production will be accompanied by deflation, budget cuts in all non-military areas and draconian austerity programs, thereby precluding even a momentary stimulative effect on the economy as a whole. Indeed, because of the enormous waste represented by the surplus value crystallized in armaments, whose realization intensifies the inflationary spiral and which cannot re-enter the productive cycle, thereby becoming a dead-loss for global capital, the war economy can only exacerbate the economic decline and accelerate the fall in the living standards of the proletariat.

Nevertheless, war production will continue its dizzying growth at the expense of all other econo­mic activity, swallowing up whole sectors of industry (shipbuilding, electronics, construction etc) as their ‘civilian’ activities relentlessly shrink. The strengthening of the war economy is an absolute necessity for capital, though the “object of war production is not the solution of an economic problem” (ibid). The war economy is vital to capitalism only because of the inevitabi­lity of imperialist world war if the proletariat does not smash the bourgeoisie. War production as the axis of the economy is the bourgeoisie’s response to the blind laws which, in condemning capitalism to an inexorable deepening of the economic crisis, sharpen inter-imperialist antagonisms to the breaking point. The sole function of the war economy is ... imperialist world war!

In its decadent phase, imperialist world war has become the very condition for the survival of capitalism:

“The more the market contracts, the more bitter becomes the struggle for sources of raw materials, and for the mastery of the world market. The economic struggle between differ­ent capitalist groups concentrates more and more, taking on its most finished form in struggles between states. The aggravated economic struggle between states can only be finally resolved by military force. War be­comes the sole means, not of resolving the international crisis, but through which each national imperialism tries to overcome its problems at the expense of rival imperialist states.” (ibid)

While it is the economic crisis which creates the necessity for the bourgeoisie to unleash a world war, the capacity of the bourgeoisie to impose its ‘solution’ of imperialist war is strictly determined by the rapport de force between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. It is to this question that we will return in the discussion on the historical course.

Before discussing the actual strategies of the contending imperialist blocs today and surveying the zones of inter-imperialist confrontation, there are some general comments on the physiognomy of capitalism in the imperialist epoch which we think it is important to make. All the more so as confusion has existed and persists within the revolutionary movement on a number of characteristics in the epoch when it is permanently convulsed by latent or open imperialist war.

The process of concentration and centralization of capital, which is one of the hallmarks of the bourgeois mode of production, has been transposed by some revolutionaries onto the imperialist chessboard where it emerges as almost a teleologi­cal process bringing about an ultimate world unity of capital as the outcome of the concentra­tion process in the imperialist epoch:

“It is necessary ... to see in the wars of the imperialist epoch the decisive moments in the process of world concentration of capital and of power; not simply struggles for a new division of the world, but the advance towards the universal domination of one single exploiting group ... And the limit of this process is -- if the proletarian revolution doesn’t intervene -- the domination of the world by a single imperialist state ...” (Pierre Chaulieu, ‘Situation de 1’Imperialisme et Perspectives du Proletariat’, Socialisme ou Barbarie, no.14)

This view of imperialist wars as bringing about the world unity of capital, which is an updated version of Kautsky’s theory of ultra-imperialism, this time realized not peacefully but through imperialist butcheries, “... loses contact with the reality of the decadent capitalist world: despite the inter-imperialist antagonisms which make the capitalist world momentarily appear as two single fighting units, the tendency is for the decadent capitalist world to go towards disintegration, disorganization, the dislocation of units ... It is in the tendency of decadent capitalism to greater and greater division, to chaos, that the necessity for socialism bringing about the world as a unity resides” (Internatio­nalisme, no.37, 1948) . Through state capitalism, national liberation struggles and world wars, capital in its decadent phase tends to destroy the limited degree of unity which it had itself brought about in its ascendant phase with the formation of the world market and the internatio­nal division of labor. In their place, decadent capitalism imprisons the productive forces within the narrow limits of a veritable plethora of separate national states8. Together with the sterilization of value through war production and the enormous destruction of imperialist war, the formation of new national states is one of the manifestations of decadent capitalism’s complete inability to develop the productive forces.

The formation of two giant imperialist blocs, dominated by Russia and America, led some revolu­tionaries to see the ruling class in each national state as the simple pawn or fifth column of Moscow or Washington. Thus, for the French Bordigists of the late 1940s, the Stalinist par­ties then vying for power in Western Europe could only be the pure and simple instruments of the Russian ruling class: “In order to succinctly characterize the different Communist Parties, we would say that they are fifth columns of Russian imperialism in the enemy camp” (Chaze, ‘L’ Imper­ialisme Russe Contre-Attaque’, L’Internationaliste, November 1947). Such a view completely fails to grasp the fact that the constitution of the two great blocs is not simply a function of the imperialist interests of Moscow and Washington, but also of the necessity for each local bourgeoisie to advance and defend its own national interests and imperialist interests as best it can:

“In the epoch of imperialism, the defense of national interest can only take place within the enlarged framework of an imperialist bloc. It is not as a fifth column, as a foreign agent, but as a function of its immediate or long-term interests, properly understood that a national bourgeoisie opts for and adheres to one of the world blocs which exists. It is around this choice for one bloc or the other bloc that the division and internal struggle within the bourgeoisie takes place; but this division always takes place on the basis of a single concern and a single common goal: the national interest, the interest of the national bourgeoisie.” (L’Internationalisme, no.30, 1948)

Closely related to the inability to see the vital interests of each national bourgeoisie in the constitution of, and the choice between, contend­ing imperialist blocs, is the view of the Communist Workers’ Organization (CWO) that in the present epoch, while other countries may ‘aspire’ to become imperialist, only Russia and the US are imperialist states:

“... imperialism is a policy of the major capitalist powers ... the idea that all coun­tries are imperialist undermines the idea of imperialist blocs .., how could it be argued that, for example, Israel was an independent imperialist power?” (Revolutionary Perspectives, no. 12)

Certainly, Israel is not an ‘independent’ power, whatever such a term is intended to mean by the CWO. The Jewish state is forced by the realities of decadent capitalism to try and satisfy its very real and voracious imperialist appetites (Greater Israel -- all of the old Palestine mandate, Lebanon south of the Litani River, the Syrian Golan Heights, part of the Sinai, almost all of Jordan), and to defend its no less real -- though more modest – imperialist acquisitions, within the framework of an imperialist bloc. From Rosa Luxemburg’s grasp of the fact that during the first world war a state like little Serbia was “reaching out toward the Adriatic coast where it is fighting out a real imperialist conflict with Italy on the backs of the Albanians ...” (Junius Pamphlet), to the ICC’s recognition that the recent clashes between Vietnam and Cambodia turned into a full scale invasion by Hanoi as “ … the consequence of the imperialist interests of the two countries, and particularly of Vietnam whose crushing military superiority made it possible to realistically envisage an ‘Indo­chinese Federation’ placed under its domination.” (Internationalisme, no.29, February 1979), revolutionary Marxists have understood that in decadent capitalism every national state is imperialist. It is only by starting from this fact that the complex inter-relation between the national interests of a local bourgeoisie and the overall needs of the imperialist bloc to which it is bound can be grasped, and the real nature of localized inter-imperialist wars and national liberation struggles understood.

Some revolutionaries argue that the basis for antagonisms between states and therefore, the composition of an imperialist bloc is solely determined by the prevailing trade or commercial rivalries on the world market. This is the view of the PCI (Programma Comunista) which in its analysis of inter-imperialist antagonisms in Africa has fixated on the clashes between the US, West Germany, France, Britain, and Italy which are today the result of trade rivalries, almost to the exclusion of the titanic struggles between the US and Russian blocs in which geopolitical, military and strategic necessities -- strictly limited to the overall economic interests of each -- are the determining factors. But it is in the hands of Pour Une Intervention Communiste (PIC) that this view, which mistakenly reduces economic interests to only one single factor, the present source of a country’s imports and the destination of its exports, has become the basis of a ‘new’ theory which makes it absolutely impossible to understand the unfolding of inter-imperialist antagonisms today. Because West Germany and Japan are the biggest trade rivals of the US, the PIC for several years has insisted on a crumbling of the US bloc; because trade between West Germany and Russia’s East European satellites has grown so prodigiously, the PIC has insisted on a crumbling of the Russian bloc. This, together with the belief that the strictly commercial interests of the US and Russia are complementary (Russia needs American technology and capital, while the US wants Russia’s raw materials), has led the PIC to put forward the theory of the emergence of new blocs: the US and Russia as one bloc; a German-dominated Europe, Japan and China as the other!

Neither the constitution of imperialist blocs nor the outbreak of imperialist wars can be explained simply by reference to the trading interests of the various national states. Were narrow commer­cial interests the determining factor that the PIC thinks they are, then an imperialist war between Great Britain and the US (and not the struggle between Anglo-American and German imperialism) would have broken out in the 1930s; America was a far more dangerous commercial rival of Britain’s in the markets which were critical to the Empire’s trade and payments surpluses (India, China, Australasia, Canada, South America) than Germany, which challenged Britain only in the less important central and Eastern European markets. It was the geopolitical and strategico-military considerations that a German dominated Europe would condemn the British Empire -- dependent as it was on the Mediterranean life-line -- to economic extinction that determined the ultimate configuration of the imperia­list blocs. Similarly, were trades what most concerned American imperialism in the 1930s, Washington would have infinitely preferred Japan (which was an excellent trading partner) to China (where opportunities for trade were not nearly so good). However, not trade in the strict sense, but the geopolitical question of military -- and hence overall economic -- domination of the Pacific dictated the course of events which would explode in imperialist war between America and Japan.

Today, the crushing economic superiority of America over its bloc (the dollar as the dominant reserve currency, the role of the IMF, the ‘Tokyo Round’, etc), and the absolute strategic-­military dependence of Western Europe and Japan on American imperialism (oil, raw materials, pro­tection of sea lanes) on the one hand, and the overwhelming military superiority of Russian imperialism throughout its borderlands (Warsaw Pact) on the other, conclusively demonstrate that the dominant tendency is that of the consoli­dation and strengthening of the existing US and Russian blocs. The consolidation of the war economy on the inter-continental scale of each bloc and the lines of localized inter-imperialist wars all indicate that the blocs are already con­stituted for a third imperialist butchery. The third world war towards which the blind laws of capitalism and the course of the economic crisis relentlessly drive the ruling class -- and to which only the class struggle of the proletariat now bars the way -- can only be a titanic conflict between Russian and American imperialism for world dominion9.

The basic strategies of Russian and American imperialism are determined by their relative economic weight on the world market. Because of its competitive weakness and technical backward­ness, the fate of Russian imperialism is integra­lly linked to the acquisition of an advanced industrial infrastructure and technology, which in the present epoch is dependent on its capacity to militarily dominate the West European and/or Japanese heartlands. The GNP of Russia in 1976 was less than half the GNP of America. With the addition of Japan’s industrial base, the Russian bloc would match America’s productive output; with the addition of Western Europe’s industrial might, Russian imperialism would easily outstrip its American rival in productive capacity and effectively challenge her in war-making potential. It is for this reason that the real object of Russian imperialism is the giant industrial centers of Europe and the Far East, and why a direct challenge to either would immediately lead to the outbreak of hostilities between the US and Russia. However, the strategy of Russian imperialism is not one of frontal attack, but to cut Europe and Japan off from their sources of energy and vital raw materials in the Middle East and Africa, to sever the trade routes on which their economies depend, and thereby to put enormous pressure on their ruling classes to preserve their national and imperialist interests through a reorientation towards the Russian bloc. In this sense, Moscow’s sustained efforts to destabilize the Middle East and Africa through national libera­tion struggles, and to acquire secure military bases in these regions, has as its real objective the industrial potential of Europe and Japan; the underdeveloped countries of the southern hemisphe­re are the soft underbelly through which Russian imperialism seeks to gain its overall objective of decisively altering the balance of power between the blocs.

If one vital element in the strategy of US imper­ialism is the protection of the vast areas it gobbled up in the two preceding imperialist butcheries, this is not to say that the posture of America is purely defensive. The two-thirds of the world which American imperialism already dominates are no longer sufficient to preserve its economic equilibrium. The devastating blows of the economic crisis dictate that the US fight for an even bigger share of world production, of the global surplus value, and thus for control of even greater numbers of workers, and even more of the world’s resources of raw materials and industrial capacity. The depth of the crisis is such that only the unimpeded control of the whole world market can now afford America even the very short respite which is all that is possible in decadent capitalism. And yet, the very nature of capitalism in the imperialist epoch, with its dominant tendency towards divisions and disaggregation precludes even this.

The past several years have seen a considerable strengthening of American imperialism and weaken­ing of its Russian rival. The integration of China into the US bloc and the commitment to Peking’s massive rearmament mean that the Kremlin will face an increasingly powerful force on its eastern frontier -- and one which can firmly bar the way to the industrial riches of Japan. Not even Russian imperialism’s effort to outflank China through the Indo-Chinese peninsula can minimize this victory for US imperialism in the Far East. In the vast Islamic belt that stretches across Asia from India to Turkey, despite Russian domination of Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah in Iran, this vital area is far from having fallen to the Kremlin. The prospect of the disintegration of Iran and the growth of national liberation struggles among the Azarbaijanis, Kurds, Arabs and Turkomans, may benefit America and not Russia, while the American-backed Islamic resistance to the Kabul regime may yet spell defeat for Russia in Afghanistan. In the Middle East, while a Pax Americana is far from complete and the Palestine abscess continues to fester giving Russian imperialism ample scope to destabi­lize the region, the opposition of even hitherto pro-Russian Arab regimes like Iraq to the Russian-inspired invasion of North Yemen by South Yemen indicates the difficulties of Russian imperialism in this crucial area. Finally, in Africa, America’s economic weight and France’s (and soon Egypt’s) military intervention is and will con­tinue to be a formidable obstacle to new Russian initiatives. In Africa, the Kremlin’s foothold is far from secure anywhere. While the next few years will see new and bloody inter-imperialist confrontations in Asia, the Middle East and Africa, the response of American imperialism to the Russian onslaught has so far been generally crowned with success.

The Political Crisis of the Bourgeoisie

The economic collapse, in the face of which all palliatives have proven useless, the incredible sharpening of inter-imperialist antagonisms and the growing combativity of the proletariat have thrown the bourgeoisie into turmoil, and exacer­bated the divergences within its ranks. The bourgeoisie is incapable of achieving unity and coherence as a class; it is divided not only into a multiplicity of irreconcilable national factions but also into a number of different and competing factions within the frontiers of each national state. In the ascendant phase of capitalism, the divisions within each national bourgeoisie largely corresponded to the different types of capital engaged in the accumulation process (industrial capital, commercial capital, bank capital, land­lords etc), to the types of commodities produced (heavy industry, light industry, mining etc), or to the size of the capital (big, medium and small capitalists). In decadent capitalism, where state capitalism is a universal tendency, the bourgeois as an individual owner of a particular quantum of the global national capital is either expropriated by the state or through the gradual fusion of big capital and the state it merges and overlaps with the state bureaucracy. The result is that the individual bourgeois -- parti­cularly in its upper layers -- is no longer solely or even primarily interested in the profits of one particular company or the valorization of his personal capital; rather the interests of each bourgeois are increasingly bound up with the interests and profitability of the global national capital and its personification, the capitalist state.

However, the fact that the bourgeoisie of each national state undergoes an increasing homogeni­zation of its interests around the needs of the global national capital, expressed through the growing power of the totalitarian state apparatus, does not eliminate divergences and factions within the ruling class. Questions of how to interpret the needs of the national capital, the program or orientations which best express these needs, the precise way to assure the stability of the state, produce divisions within the bourgeoisie. Thus, at the present time, divisions occur in virtually every national faction of the bourgeoisie over:

-- the degree of statification (with the more anachronistic sectors of the bourgeoisie vainly trying to resist the advance of state capitalism);

-- the economic policies to pursue in the face of the crisis (inflation vs deflation, protectionism vs ‘free trade’) ;

-- which imperialist bloc provides the best framework for the defense of the national capital, or the degree of integration into the bloc to which a particular national state is bound;

-- which strata or classes of the population to support in order to try to constitute a mass base in support of the needs of the national capital, which mystifications are most appropriate (nationalist, religious, populist, ‘democratic’, racist, ‘socialist’).

While debates rage over each of these issues in the higher circles of the bureaucracy, the military and the great economic and financial entities in each national state, as we enter the 1980s in the beginning of a world-wide resurgence of class struggle, it is the containment of the proletariat that most preoccupies the bourgeoisie everywhere today. In the industrialized countries of the US bloc, while the left in power over the last several years has been the best vehicle for the state capitalist measures which the deepening of the economic crisis makes necessary and for the more thoroughgoing integration into the US bloc which the heightening of imperialist antagon­isms dictates, the right in power, too, is capable of implementing these policies. However, only the left has a real chance of containing an undefeated proletariat. This was the essential task of the left as it came to power, shared power or prepared to assume power in country after country on the crest of the wave of prole­tarian struggles that began in 1968 and lasted until 1972-74. In Portugal, Britain and Italy, for instance, where the violence of the working class shook the bourgeoisie to its very founda­tions, the left in power (or providing indispen­sable support for the government in the case of Italy) achieved remarkable success over the past few years in drastically reversing the balance between profits and wages to the benefit of capital, in imposing draconian austerity on the prole­tariat and in breaking the first violent response of the working class to the open crisis.

However, as this past winter’s wave of strikes which shattered the social contract in Britain clearly demonstrated, the left in power, or moderating its ‘proletarian’ rhetoric in quest of power, has by now alienated its worker base and lost the tenuous ideological hold over the prole­tariat which it briefly regained between 1972-78. A cure of opposition, during which time the left can ‘radicalize’ its language and once again appeal to combative workers in the name of ‘socialism’ and ‘proletarian revolution’ is now vital if the left is to even have a chance of fulfilling its indispensable role of containing and diverting the class struggle.

Today it is imperative for the bourgeoisie that the resurgence of class struggle find the left not in power but in opposition. It will be on the crest of this new wave of class struggle that a more ‘extreme’ left will come to power as the last rampart of capital. The eruption of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie’s preparations to meet it with the left in opposition irrefutably demonstrate the truth of Marxism’s understanding that the class struggle is the motor of history.

1 The so-called workers’ state, China is also groaning under the weight of this same economic crisis and it is the deepening of this crisis which constitutes the material basis for the incredible sharpening of the antagonisms which are pushing China and Russia towards war, and about which we have spoken in this text.

2 The need to compensate for the very low organic composition of capital by the state mobilization of all the reserves of human labor-power in order to try to match the output of the US bloc is the most important reason why the Russian bloc is not plagued also by mass unemployment.

3 The virtually all cases, the manner in which bourgeois economics statistically charts the course of the world economy, the very categories it uses, are at variance with the Marxist categories which alone make it possible to grasp the real laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production and the actual course of the economic crisis. As with all ideology, bourgeois economics distorts and veils the real conditions which it purports to study.

4 With the exception made for oil imports.

5 This is of course, also true of the vastly greater production of armaments by each country which is not traded.

6 While the American government will almost certainly stimulate the economy during the Presidential campaign in 1980, its effects will be extremely short-lived and will scarcely change the economic perspective we have traced.

7 This was the view of Vercesi tendency of the Gauche Communiste Internationale.

8 This disintegrative tendency is only partially counteracted by the formation of two mammoth imperialist blocs and the economic coordination imposed by the US and Russia on the industrialized countries of their blocs.

9 Though it must be remembered that the disintegrative, centrifugal tendencies which prevail in decadent capitalism make world unity of capital around pole of accumulation impossible.

Life of the ICC: 

  • Congress Reports [41]

The Historic Course

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The Second International Conference of groups of the Communist Left (November 1978) showed that there is today an extreme confusion in the ranks of the revolutionary movement about the present historical period, and more precisely about:

-- the existence of a historic alternative (proletarian revolution or generalized imperialist war) opened up by capitalism entering a new phase of acute crisis (the summit of this confusion obviously being reached by those groups who don’t even see that there is a crisis);

-- the possibility of making pronouncements about the nature of the historical course (war or revolution);

-- the nature of the present course;

-- the political and organizational implications of the analyses made about the course;

More generally, there are misunderstandings about:

-- the possibility and necessity for revolutio­naries to make predictions;

-- the existence of different periods in the course of the class struggle and in the nature of the balance of forces between bourgeoisie and proletariat.

This text aims to give answers to all these questions.

1. Can revolutionaries make predictions?

The very nature of all human activity presupposes foresight, prediction. For example, Marx wrote:

“The operations carried out by a spider resem­ble those of a weaver, and many a human architect is put to shame by the bee in the constr­uction of its wax cells. However, the poorest architect is categorically distinguished from the best of bees by the fact that before he builds a cell in wax, he has built it in his head.” (Marx, Capital, Vol. I)

Every human act works in this way. Man constantly uses foresight. Only by transforming hypotheses based on an initial series of experiences into predictions, and by confronting these predictions with new experiences, can the researcher verify (or invalidate) these hypotheses and advance his understanding.

Based as it is on a scientific approach to social reality, the revolutionary thought of the proletariat necessarily functions in this way. The only difference is that, in contrast with resear­chers, revolutionaries cannot create the condi­tions for new experiments in laboratories. Only social practice can confirm or refute the perspec­tives they put forward, verify or invalidate their theory. All aspects of the historical move­ment of the working class have been based on predictions. It is this which allows the forms of its struggle to adapt to each epoch in the life of capitalism; above all, the communist project is based on prediction, particularly on the perspective of the collapse of capitalism. Like an architect’s plan, communism is first conceived -- obviously in its broad outlines -- in the minds of men before it can be built in reality.

Thus, contrary to Paul Mattick for example, who considers that the study of economic phenomena can’t provide any predictions that can be useful in the activity of revolutionaries, the defini­tion of a perspective -- in other words, prediction -- is an integral and very important part of revolutionary activity.

Having established this, the question which must be asked is the following: what is the field of application of prediction for revolutionaries?

-- the long term? Certainly, the communist project can’t be based on anything else.

-- the short term? Obviously, it’s part of human activity so it must be part of the activity of revolutionaries.

-- the middle term? Because it can’t be res­tricted to generalities like long-term predic­tions, and because it has less elements at its disposal than short-term prediction, it’s undoubt­edly the hardest kind of prediction the proleta­riat can make, but it’s not something that can be neglected because it directly conditions its mode of struggle in each period in the life of capitalism.

The question can thus be posed more precisely: in the context of middle-term predictions, can and should we foresee the evolution of the balance of forces between bourgeoisie and proletariat? This presupposes that you admit that such an evolution can take place, and that you have answered the preliminary question.

2. Are there different periods in the course of the class struggle?

It may seem strange to pose such an elementary question. In the past, it seemed so obvious that revolutionaries hardly thought about posing it at all. The question they asked wasn’t “is there a course in the class struggle?”, or “is it possi­ble and necessary to analyze it?”, but simply “what is the nature of the course?”. It’s on this question that there have been debates between revolutionaries. In 1852, Marx described the particularly uneven course of the workers’ class struggle:

“Proletarian revolutions … constantly engage in self-criticism, and in repeated interrup­tions of their own course. They return to what has apparently already been accomplished in order to begin the task again ... they seem to throw their opponent to the ground only to see him draw new strength from the earth and rise again before them, more colossal than ever; they shrink back again and again before the indeterminate immensity of their own goals ...” (Marx, 18th Brumaire)

Over a century ago, the question appeared to be clear. But it has to be said that the terrible counter-revolution that we’re only just coming out of has left so much confusion in the revolu­tionary milieu (cf the letter from Ferment Ouvriere Revolutionnaire (FOR) to Revolution Internationale published in RI, nos 56-57) that we do have to pose questions like this all over again.

Confusions in this area are based on an ignorance of the history of the workers’ movement (but, as Marx said, ignorance is no excuse). Studying the workers’ movement allows us to confirm what Marx said about this alternation between forward thrusts in the proletarian struggle (some of them extremely powerful like the movements of 1848-49, 1864-71, 1917-23) and retreats (as in 1850, 1872, 1923) , which have led to the disappearance or degeneration of the political organizations which the class secreted in the period of rising struggle (the Communist League, created in 1847, dissolved in 1852; the International Workingmen’s Association (IWA) , founded in 1864, dissolved in 1876; the Communist International, founded in 1919, degenerated and died in the mid-1920s. The Socialist International followed a broadly similar course, but not in such a clear way). It’s prob­ably because of the extreme length of the counter­revolution (half a century) which followed the post-1917 revolutionary wave, during which the working class everywhere was in an extremely weak position, that we find revolutionaries today who are incapable of understanding that there is this alternation between periods of advance and retreat in the class struggle. An unprejudiced study of the workers’ movement and of Marxist analyzes (even though it’s much more comfortable not to study and not to ask questions!) would have allowed these revolutionaries to shake off the weight of the counter-revolution. It would also have allowed them to see that outbreaks of class struggle take place when capitalist society is in crisis (economic crisis as in 1848, or war, as in 1871, 1905, 1917). This is because of:

-- the weakening of the ruling class;

-- the necessity for the workers to resist the deterioration of their living standards;

-- the exposure of the contradictions of the system, which tends to elevate class consciousness.

3. Can we make predictions about the historic course of class struggle?

History shows that revolutionaries can commit major errors in this domain. For example:

-- the Willich-Schapper tendency in the Commu­nist League, who didn’t understand the reflux in the struggle after 1849 and were pushing the organization towards adventurist actions;

-- the Bakuninist current in the IWA, which was still expecting an imminent revolution after the crushing of the Commune of 1871, and turned its back on long-term preparation;

-- the KAPD, which was unaware of the retreat in the revolution in the early 1920s, and lost itself in voluntarism and even putschism;

-- Trotsky, who declared in 1936 that “the revolution had begun in France” and at the lowest ebb of the class struggle in 1938, founded the still-born ‘Fourth International’.

However, history has also shown that revolution­aries have had the means to analyze the course correctly and make accurate forecasts about the future of the class struggle:

-- Marx and Engels who understood the change of perspective after 1849 and 1871;

-- the Italian Left, which understood the reflux in the world revolution after 1921 and drew the correct conclusions about the tasks of the party and about the meaning of the events in Spain in 1936.

Experience has also shown that, as a general rule, these accurate forecasts weren’t a matter of chance but were based on a very serious study of social reality; on a general analysis of capitalism, especially the economic situation, but also of the social struggle, on the level of both combativity and consciousness. In this way:

-- Marx and Engels were able to see that there had been a reflux in the revolution in the early 1850s and that the crisis of 1847-48 was being followed by a period of economic recovery;

-- Lenin and the Bolsheviks foresaw a revolu­tionary upsurge during the First World War, based on the fact that the imperialist war was a mani­festation of the mortal crisis of capitalism, and would put the system in a situation of extreme weakness.

But although it is a necessary precondition for a proletarian upsurge, the crisis of capitalism isn’t a sufficient precondition, contrary to what Trotsky thought after the 1929 crisis. Similarly, workers’ combativity isn’t a sufficient indication of a real, durable upsurge if it’s not accompanied by a tendency to break with capitalist mystifications. This is what the minority of the Italian Fraction failed to understand when they saw the mobilization and arming of the Spanish workers in July 1936 as the beginning of the revolution, when in fact the Spanish workers had been politically disarmed by anti-fascism and were unable to mount a real attack on capitalism.

We can thus say that it is possible for revolut­ionaries to make forecasts about the evolution of the balance of forces between bourgeoisie and proletariat; and that, far from approaching this task as though they were taking part in a lottery, they can use criteria drawn from experience which, although not infallible, do enable them to avoid going forward blindly. But certain revolution­aries raise another objection: “even if it is possible to make forecasts about the historic course, it’s of no interest for the class struggle and in no way conditions the activity of commu­nists. All this is intellectual speculation with no impact on practice”. We must now deal with these arguments.

4. Is it necessary to make forecasts about the historic course?

In answering this question, we could almost say that the facts speak for themselves, but the counter-revolution has caused so much havoc among certain revolutionary groups that they’re either plainly ignorant of these facts or are incapable f interpreting them correctly. To convince ourselves of the necessity for a revolutionary organi­zation to have a correct analysis of the historical perspective, it’s enough to remind ourselves of the tragic fate of the German Left, which, despite the value of its programmatic positions, was completely disoriented, dislocated and ultimately destroyed by its errors on the course of the class struggle. We should also remember the sad end of the minority of the Italian Fraction who joined up with the anti-fascist militias, and the no less pitiful fate of the Union Communiste who carried out a policy of critical support for the left socialists of the POUM, hoping that it would give rise to a communist vanguard capable of putting itself at the head of the ‘Spanish Revolution’. We can see that a failure to understand the problem of the course have a disastrous impact on revolutionaries.

The analysis of the course of the class struggle directly conditions the organization and intervention of revolutionaries. When you’re swimming upriver you swim at the side of the stream; when you’re going downriver, you swim in the middle. Similarly, the relationship that revolutionaries have with their class differs according to the course of the struggle. When the class is moving towards revolution, they have to put themselves at the head of the movement; when the class is falling into the abyss of the counter-revolution, they have to struggle against the stream.

In the first case, their essential preoccupation is to avoid being cut off from the class, to follow attentively each of its steps, each of its struggles, in order to push forward the potentia­lity of the struggle as far as it will go. With­out any neglect of theoretical work, direct parti­cipation in the struggles of the class has a privileged place. On the organizational level, revolutionaries can have a confident and open attitude towards the other currents that arise in the class. While firmly standing by their principles, they can hope for a positive evolu­tion of these currents, for a convergence of their respective positions. The task of regroupment can thus be given maximum attention and effort.

It’s quite different for revolutionaries in a period of historic reflux. Then the main task is to ensure that the organization can resist this reflux and preserve its principles from the pernicious influence of bourgeois mystifications, which will tend to drown the whole class. Their task is also to prepare for the future resurgence of the class, by dedicating most of their weak forces to the theoretical work of drawing up a balance-sheet of past experience, notably the causes of the defeat. It is clear that this will tend to cut revolutionaries off from the rest of the class, but this is something they have to accept the moment they admit that the bourgeoisie has triumphed and the proletariat has been drag­ged off its class terrain. Otherwise they run the risk of being dragged in the same direction. Similarly, on the level of regroupment, without ever turning their back on this effort, it would be pointless for revolutionaries in such periods to hold out a very positive perspective; the tendency would be rather towards the organization turning in on itself and jealously guarding its own positions, towards the maintenance of dis­agreements which couldn’t be surpassed because of the absence of class experience.

We can thus see that the analysis of the course has a considerable impact on the mode of activity and organization of revolutionaries and that this has nothing to do with ‘academic speculations’. Just as an army needs to know at every moment the precise nature of the balance of forces with the opposing army, to see whether it should attack or retreat in good order, so the working class needs to have a correct appreciation of the balance of forces with its enemy, the bourgeoisie. And it’s up to revolutionaries, as the most advanced ele­ments of the class, to provide the class with the maximum amount of material for making this appreciation. This is one of the essential reasons for their existence.

In the past, revolutionaries have always assumed this responsibility with more or less success; but the analysis of the historical course takes on an even greater importance when capitalism enters into its period of decadence, since the stakes involved in the class struggle are that much higher.

5. The historic alternative in the period of capitalist decadence

In line with the Communist International, the ICC has always insisted that the decadence of capita­lism is “the epoch of imperialist wars and prole­tarian revolutions”. War isn’t specific to deca­dent capitalism, just as it isn’t specific to capitalism in general. But the form and function of war changes according to whether the system is progressive or whether it has become a barrier to the development of society’s productive forces.

“In the epoch of ascendant capitalism, wars (whether national, colonial, or of imperial conquest) represented the upward movement of ripening, strengthening and enlarging the capitalist economic system. Capitalist pro­duction used war as a continuation by other means of its political economy. Each war was justified and paid its way, by the opening up of a new field for greater expansion, assuring further capitalist development.

In the epoch of decadent capitalism, war, like peace, expresses this decadence and greatly accelerates it.

It would be wrong to see war as negative by definition, a destroyer and shackle on the development of society, as opposed to peace, which would appear as the normal and positive course of continued development of production and society. This would be to introduce a moral concept into an objective, economically determined course.

War was the indispensable means by which capi­tal opened up areas external to itself for development, at a time when such areas existed and could only be opened up through violence. In the same way, the capitalist world, having historically exhausted all possibility of development, finds in modern imperialist war the expression of its collapse, which can only engulf the productive forces in any abyss, and accumulate ruin upon ruin in an ever accelerating rhythm, without opening up any possibility of the outward development of production.

Under capitalism there exists no fundamental opposition between war and peace, but there is a difference between the ascendant and deca­dent phases of capitalist society, and thus a difference in the function of war (and in the relation of war to peace) in the respective phases. While in the first phase, war has the function of assuring an expansion of the market, and so of the production of the means of consumption, in the second phase production is essentially geared to the production of means of destruction, ie to war. The deca­dence of capitalist society is strikingly expressed by the fact that, whereas in the ascendant period wars served the process of economic development, in the decadent period economic activity is geared essentially to war.

This does not mean that war has become the aim of capitalist production, since this is always the production of surplus value, but that war becomes the permanent way of life in decadent capitalism.” (Report on the Inter­national Situation, July 1945 Conference of the Gauche Communiste de France)

We can draw three conclusions from this analysis of the relationship between decadent capitalism and imperialist war:

1. Left to its own dynamic, capitalism can’t escape imperialist war: all the bourgeoisie’s babbling about ‘peace’, all the Leagues of Nations and United Nations, all the goodwill of capital's’ ‘great men’ can’t change this, and per­iods of ‘peace’ (ie periods when war isn’t generalizing) are simply moments during which capital is reconstituting its forces for even more destructive and barbaric confrontations.

2. Imperialist war is the most significant expres­sion of the historic bankruptcy of the capitalist mode of production; it highlights the urgent necessity to supersede this mode of production before it drags humanity into the abyss of des­truction; this is the real meaning of the CI’s formula cited above.

3. In contrast to wars in the ascendant period, which only affected limited areas of the planet and didn’t condition the whole of social life in each country, imperialist war is extended onto a world scale and subordinates the whole of society to its needs, in particular the class which pro­duces the bulk of all social wealth: the prolet­ariat.

Because it’s the class which can put an end to all wars and which holds the only possible future for society -- socialism; because it’s the class which stands in the front line of the sacrifices imposed by imperialist war; because, excluded from any property, it’s the only class that really does have no fatherland, that is really internation­alist: for all these reasons, the proletariat holds in its hands the fate of the whole of human­ity.

In a more direct sense, the ability of the prol­etariat to react to the historic crisis of capit­alism on its own class terrain will determine whether or not this system will be able to impose its own solution to the crisis: imperialist war.

When capitalism entered its decadent phase, the implications of the question of the historic course could hardly be compared to what they had been in the previous century. In the twentieth century, the victory of capitalism means the name­less barbarism of imperialist war and the threat of the extinction of the human race. The victory of the proletariat means the possibility of the regeneration of society, the “end of human pre­history and the beginning of its real history”; “leaving the kingdom of necessity and reaching the kingdom of freedom”. These are the stakes revolutionaries must have in mind when they exam­ine the question of the historical course. But this isn’t the case with all revolutionaries, notably those who refuse to talk about the hist­oric alternative (or, if they do talk about it, don’t know what they are talking about) and those for whom imperialist war and proletarian upsurge are simultaneous or even complementary.

6. The opposition and mutual exclusion of the two terms of the historical alternative

On the eve of World War II there developed within the Italian Left the thesis that imperialist war would no longer be the product of the division of capitalism into antagonistic states and powers, each struggling for world hegemony. It was claim­ed that the system would only resort to this extreme measure in order to massacre the proletar­iat and hold back the upsurge of the revolution. The Gauche Communiste de France argued against this conception when it wrote:

“The ‘era of wars and revolution’ does not mean that the development of war corresponds to the development of revolution. These two courses, though their source is the same historic situation of capitalism’s permanent crisis, are nevertheless essentially different and the relationship between them is not directly reciproc­al. While the unfolding of war becomes a factor directly precipitating revolutionary convulsions it is never the case that revolution is a factor in imperialist war.

Imperialist war does not develop in response to rising revolution; quite the reverse, it is the reflux following the defeat of revolutionary struggle, the momentary ousting of the menace of revolution which allows capitalism to move towards the outbreak of a war engendered by the contradictions and internal tensions of the cap­italist system.” (ibid.)

Other theories have also arisen more recently, acc­ording to which “with the development of the crisis of capitalism, both terms of the contradiction are reinforced at the same time: war and revolution don’t exclude each other mutually but advance in a simultaneous and parallel manner, without it being possible for us to know which one will reach its culminating point before the other. The main error in this conception is that it totally neglects the factor of class struggle in the life of society, just as the conception developed by the Italian Left was based on an overestimation of the factor. Beginning from the phrase in the Communist Manif­esto which says that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle”, the Italian Left applied this mechanically to the analysis of imperialist war and saw imperialist war as a response to the class struggle; it failed to see that, on the contrary, imperialist war could only take place thanks to the absence or weakness of the class struggle. Although it was wrong, this conception began from correct premises; the mistake lay in the way these premises were applied. In contrast, the theory of parallelism and simultaneity of the course towards war and the course towards revolution plainly casts aside this basic Marxist premise, because it holds that the two principal antagonistic classes in society can go on preparing their respective responses to the crisis – imperialist war for one, revolution for another – completely independently of each other. If it can’t be applied to something which is going to determine the whole historic alternative for the life of society, the schema the Communist Manifesto has no reason for existing and we can consign Marxism to a museum alongside other outmoded products of human imagination.

In reality, history itself disproves this conception of ‘parallelism’. In contrast to the proletariat which doesn’t have any contradictory interests within itself, the bourgeoisie is a class profoundly divided by the antagonism between the economic interests of its various sectors. In an economy where the Commodity reigns supreme, competition between factions of the ruling class is, in general, insurmountable. Therein lays the underlying cause of the political crises which plague this class, as well as the tensions between countries and blocs, which can only sharpen as the crisis makes competition more intense. The highest degree of unity which capital can achieve is at the national level; it is one of the essential attributes of the capitalist state that it has to impose this discipline on the various sectors of national capital. Beyond this we can say that there is a certain ‘solidarity’ between nations of one imperialist bloc: this expresses the fact, that, alone against all the others, a national capital can do nothing and is obliged to give up a part of its independence in order to defend its overall interests. But this doesn’t eliminate:

-- rivalries between countries of the same bloc

-- the fact that capitalism can never unify itself on a world scale (contrary to Kautsky’s theory of ‘ultra-imperialism’). The blocs continue to exist and the antagonism between them can only worsen.

The only moment when the bourgeoisie can attain unity at a world level, when it can silence its imperialist rivalries, is when its very survival is threatened by its mortal enemy, the proletar­iat. History has shown that at such moments it’s capable of displaying a solidarity which it lacks at all other times. This was illustrated:

-- in 1871, in the collaboration between Prussia and the Versailles government (the freeing of French soldiers who were used during the ‘bloody week’).

-- in 1918, when the Entente showed its solidari­ty towards a German bourgeoisie threatened with proletarian revolution (the freeing of German soldiers who were then used to massacre the Spartacists).

Thus the historic tendencies towards war or revol­ution develop not in a parallel and independent way, but in an antagonistic and mutually determining manner. What’s more, as the responses of two historically antagonistic classes, imperialist war and revolution mutually exclude each other not only for the future of society, but also in the day-to-day manner that these two alternatives being prepared.

The preparation of an imperialist war means that capitalism has to develop a war economy, and it’s the proletariat which has to bear most of its weight. Already the workers’ struggle against austerity is holding back these preparations and shows that the class isn’t prepared to make the even more terrible sacrifices which the bourgeoisie will demand during an imperialist war. Thus, the class struggle, even when it’s for limited objectives, means that the proletariat is breaking the bonds of solidarity with ‘its’ national capital -- the very solidarity that the bourgeoisie demands so strongly during a war. It also expresses a tendency to break with bourgeois ideals like ‘democracy’, ‘legality’, ‘the country’ and phoney ‘socialism’: ideals in whose defense the workers will be called upon to massacre themselves and their class brothers. Finally, the class struggle allows the proletariat to forge its unity, an indispensable factor if the class is going to prevent -- on an international scale -- a showdown between the imperialist gangsters.

When capitalism entered into a phase of acute econ­omic crisis in the mid-1960s, the perspective out­lined by the CI was opened up again: “Imperialist war or proletarian revolution”, as the specific response to the crisis of each of the two principal classes of society. But this doesn’t mean that the two terms of this perspective can develop in a simultaneous manner. The two terms appear in the form of an alternative, ie they reciprocally exclude each other:

-- either capitalism imposes its response and that means that it has first defeated the resistance of the working class;

-- or the proletariat imposes its solution, and it goes without saying that this means stay­ing the murderous hands of imperialism.

The nature of the present course -- whether it’s towards imperialist war or class war -- is thus an expression of the evolution of the balance of forces between bourgeoisie and proletariat. It’s this balance of forces which we’ve got to study, as most revolutionaries before us have done, Marx in particular. But we’ve got to have the criteria in order to make such an evaluation, and these criteria are not necessarily identical to those used in the past. The definition of these crit­eria presupposes that we know what these criteria were in the past, that we can distinguish between those which are still valid and those which have become obsolete given the evolution of the histo­ric situation, and finally that we take into account possible new criteria which this evolution has brought out. We cannot mechanically apply the scenarios of the past -- although we must begin from a study of these scenarios. This is particularly true when we examine the conditions which permitted the outbreak of imperialist war in 1914 and 1939.

7. The conditions for imperialist war in 1914 and 1939

“... it is the cessation of class struggle, or more precisely the destruction of the prole­tariat’s class power and consciousness, the derailing of its struggles (which the bourgeoi­sie manages through the introduction of its agents into the class, gutting workers’ struggles of their revolutionary content and putting them on the road of reformism and nationalism) which is the ultimate and decisive condition for the outbreak of imperialist war. This must be understood not from the narrow, limited viewpoint of one nation alone, but internationally.

Thus the partial resurgence, the renewed growth of struggles and strike movements in Russia (1913) in no way conflicts with our assertion. If we look a little closer, we can see that the power of the international proletariat, on the eve of 1914 -- its electoral victories, the great Social Democratic parties, the mass union organizations, pride and glory of the IInd International -- were only a facade hiding a ruinous ideological condition under its veneer. The workers’ movement, undermined and rotten with an authoritative opportunism, could only topple like a house of cards at the first blast of war.

Reality cannot be understood in the chronologi­cal photography of events, but must be seized in its underlying, internal movement, in the profound modifications which occur before they appear on the surface and are registered as dates. It would be committing a serious mis­take to remain faithful to the chronological order of history, and see the 1914-18 war as the cause of the collapse of the IInd Inter­national, when in reality the outbreak of war was a direct result of the previous opportunist degeneration of the international workers’ movement. The fanfares of internationalism sounded louder on the outside, while within the nationalist tendency triumphed. The war only brought into the open the ‘embourgeoise­ment’ of the parties of the IInd International, the substitution of their original revolutio­nary program by the ideology of the class enemy, their attachment to the interests of the national bourgeoisie.

The internal process of the destruction of the class’ consciousness revealed its completion in the outbreak of war in 1914, which it had itself permitted.

World War II broke out under the same condi­tions. We can distinguish three necessary and successive phases between the two imperialist wars.

The first was completed with the exhaustion of the great revolutionary wave after 1917, and sealed by a string of defeats, with the defeat of the Left and its expulsion from the Comintern with the triumph of centrism, and with the USSR’s commitment to its evolution towards capitalism through the theory and practice of ‘socialism in one country’.

The second stage was that of international capitalism’s general offensive aimed at liquidating the social convulsions in Germany, the centre where the historical alternative between socialism and capitalism was decisively played out, through the physical crushing of the proletariat, and the installation of the Hitler regime as Europe’s gendarme. Corres­ponding to this stage came the definitive death of the Comintern and the collapse of Trotsky’s Left Opposition, which, incapable of regrouping revolutionary energies, engaged through coalition and fusion with opportunis­tic groups and currents of the socialist left, in an orientation towards the practice of bluff and adventurism in proclaiming the formation of the IVth International.

The third stage was that of the total derail­ment of the workers’ movement in the democra­tic countries. Under its mask of the defense of ‘liberties’ and workers’ ‘conquests’, threatened by fascism, the real aim was to join the proletariat to the defense of demo­cracy -- that is, its national bourgeoisie, its national capital. Anti-fascism was the plat­form, capital’s modern ideology which the proletariat’s traitor parties used as wrapping for their putrid merchandise of national defense.

In this third stage occurred the definitive passage of the so-called Communist Parties into the service of their respective capitals, the destruction of class consciousness through the poisoning of the masses, their adhesion to the future inter-imperialist war by means of the ideology of anti-fascism, their mobilization into the ‘Popular Front’, the derailment of the strikes of 1936, the ‘anti-fascist’ Spanish war; at the same time the final victory of state capitalism in Russia was revealed in its ferocious repression of the slightest impulse to revolutionary action, its adhesion to the League of Nations, its integration into an imperialist bloc and installation of the war economy in preparation for imperialist war. This period also saw the liquidation of numer­ous revolutionary groups and Left Communists thrown up by the crisis in the CI, who, through their adhesion to anti-fascist ideology and the defense of the ‘workers’ state’ in Russia, were snatched into the cogs of capitalism and lost forever as expressions of the life of the proletariat. Never before has history seen such a divorce between the class and the groups that express its interests and its mission. The vanguard found itself in a state of complete isolation and reduced quantita­tively to negligible little islands.

“The immense revolutionary wave, which burst out at the end of the first imperialist war, threw international capitalism into such terror that it had to dislocate the proletariat’s very foundations before unleashing another war.” (Ibid)

We can add the following elements to this luminous passage:

-- the opportunist evolution and treason of parties of the IInd International was made possi­ble by the characteristics of capitalism when it was at its zenith. Economic progress, the appa­rent absence of profound convulsions, the reforms that capitalism was able to grant to the working class -- all this nourished the idea of a gradual, peaceful, legal transformation of bourgeois society into socialism;

-- one of the essential elements in the disarray of the proletariat between the two wars was the existence and policies of the USSR, which either repelled the workers from any socialist perspec­tive; or led them into the clutches of social democracy; or, for those who still saw the USSR as the ‘socialist fatherland’, led them to subordinate their struggles to the defense of its imperialist interests.

8. The criteria for evaluating the historic course

By analyzing the conditions which made it possible for the two imperialist wars to break out, we can draw the following general lessons:

-- the balance of forces between bourgeoisie and proletariat can only be assessed on a world scale, and can’t be based on exceptions which may arise in secondary areas: it’s essentially by studying the situation in a few large countries that we can deduce the real nature of this balance of forces;

-- in order for an imperialist war to break out, capitalism needs first to inflict a profound defeat on the proletariat -- above all an ideological defeat, but also a physical one if the proletariat has shown a strong combativity (Italy, Germany and Spain between the wars);

-- this defeat must not just leave the class passive but must get the workers to adhere enthusiastically to bourgeois ideals (‘demo­cracy’, ‘anti-fascism’, ‘socialism in one country’); adhesion to these ideals presupposes:

a. that they have a semblance of reality (the possibility of an unlimited, problem-free development of capitalism and ‘democracy’, the proletarian origins of the regime in Russia);

b. that they are in one way or another associated with the defense of proletarian interests;

c. that this association is defended among workers by organizations which have the confidence of the workers, due to the fact that, in the past, they did defend their interests. In other words, those bourgeois ideals are propagated by former proletarian organizations which have betrayed the class.

In broad outline these are the conditions which, in the past, allowed imperialist wars to break out. That is not to say that, a priori, a future imperialist war would need to have identical conditions. But to the extent that the bourgeoisie has become conscious of the dangers involved in a premature outbreak of hostilities (despite all its preparations, even World War II gave rise to working class reactions in Italy in 1945 and Germany 1944-45), it would be a mistake to con­sider that it would launch itself into a confron­tation unless it knew it has the same degree of control as it had in 1939, or at least 1914. In other words, for a new imperialist war to be possible, then at least the criteria listed above must be present, and if not, some others which can compensate for them.

9. The comparison between today’s situation and the situation in 1914 and 1939

In the past, the principal terrain where the historic course was decided was in Europe, notably in its three most powerful countries, Germany, Britain and France, plus secondary countries like Spain and Italy. Today the situation is partially similar, to the extent that Europe is still at the heart of the confrontation between the two imperialist blocs. Any evaluation of the course must therefore include an examination of the situa­tion of the class struggle in this continent, but it wouldn’t be complete if it didn’t take into account the situation in Russia, the US and China.

If we look at all these countries, we can see that, for several decades, the proletariat has nowhere suffered a physical defeat; the most recent defeat of this kind took place in a country as marginal as Chile.

Similarly, in none of these countries has there been an ideological defeat comparable to what happened in 1914, leading the workers to adhere enthusiastically to the national capital:

-- old mystifications like ‘anti-fascism’ or ‘socialism in one country’ have been worn out, mainly because of the absence of a fascist bugbear and the exposure of the real nature of ‘socialism’ in Russia etc;

-- belief in a permanent, peaceful progress for capitalism has been seriously shaken by over half a century of convulsions and barbarism; the illu­sions which developed during the post-war recon­struction are now being undermined by the crisis;

-- chauvinism, even if it does maintain its hold over a certain number of workers, doesn’t have the same impact it had in the past:

a. its foundations have been shaken by the develop­ment of capitalism itself, which daily abolishes national differences and specificities a little bit more;

b. apart from the two main powers, Russia and USA, it comes up against the necessities of mobilizing the population not behind a country but behind a bloc;

c. to the extent that the workers are being asked to make sacrifices to get over the crisis in the name of the ‘national interest’, the workers will more and more be able to see this ‘national interest’ as the direct enemy of their own class interests.

At the present time, chauvinism, under the mask of national independence, can only find a real refuge in the most backward countries:

-- the defense of ‘democracy’ and ‘civilization’ which now takes the form of Carter’s campaigns about ‘human rights’, and which sets out to achieve an ideological unity for the whole western bloc, is not having a great deal of success today; it may affect the habitual petition-signers of the intellectual milieu, but it has little impact on the new generations of workers who can’t see the connection between their own interests and these ‘human rights’, which are in any case cynically flouted by the very people who promote them;

-- the former workers’ parties -- Social Demo­crats and ‘Communists’ -- betrayed the class too long ago to be able to have the same impact as in the past. For sixty years the Social Democrats have been loyal managers of capitalism. Their anti-proletarian function is clear and has been recognized by many workers. And it’s these par­ties which, in most West European countries, have today taken on the task of leading governments that are synonymous with austerity and anti-work­ing class measures. As for the Stalinist parties, it can hardly be said that the workers have con­fidence in them in countries where they are in power: the workers there hate them. In countries whose membership of the western bloc keeps the CPs in opposition -- and thus allows them to have a certain impact on the class -- this impact can’t be used directly to mobilize the class behind the US bloc, which the CPs portray as the ‘main enemy’ of the peoples of the world. In order to be really effective, the treason of the workers’ party must be fairly recent. Like a match it can only be used once for a massive mobilization behind imperialist war. This was the case with the Social Democrats, whose open treason took place in 1914, and to a lesser extent with the ‘Communist Parties’ who betrayed in the 1920s before playing the role of drum-majors for the war in the 1930s (the lapse between the two dates was partially compensated by the fact that the CPs were formed precisely as a reaction to the treason of Social Democracy). Today, the bour­geoisie no longer enjoys this decisive advantage. The leftists, especially the Trotskyists, have certainly done enough dirty work to pose as the successors to the Social Democrats and Stalinists, but they suffer from two fundamental handicaps: on the one hand, their impact is far less than that of their elders, and, on the other hand, before this impact could really grow, they would openly reveal their bourgeois nature as speciali­zed touts for the left parties.

As we can see, none of the conditions which made it possible for the proletariat to be dragooned into the imperialist conflicts of the past exist today, and it’s hard to see what new mystifica­tion could now take the place of those which have been used up. Such an analysis was already the basis for the position taken by Internacional­ismo comrades when, at the beginning of 1968, they said that the coming year would be rich in promise for the class struggle against the re-emerging crisis. It was this same analysis which allowed Revolution Internationale to write in 1968, before the Italian Hot Autumn of 1969, the insurrection of the Polish workers of 1970 and the whole wave of struggles which lasted until 1974:

“Capitalism has at its disposal less and less mystifications which it can use to mobilize the masses and hurl them into a massacre ... in these conditions, the crisis has, from its first manifestations, appeared to be what it really is: its initial symptoms are going to give rise to increasingly violent mass reac­tions in all countries … the whole signifi­cance of May ‘68 was that it was one of the first and one of the most important reactions by the mass of workers to a steadily deteriora­ting world economic situation.” (RI, Old Series, no.2)

It is this analysis, based on the classical posi­tions of Marxism (the ineluctable character of the crisis and the provocation of class confron­tations by the crisis), and on the experience of over half a century, which allowed our current -- while many other groups only talked about the counter-revolution and saw nothing coming -- to forecast the historic reawakening of the class after 1968, as well as the present resurgence after the reflux of 1974-78.

But there are still revolutionaries who, ten years after ‘68, have still not understood its significance, and prognosticate a course towards a third world war. Let’s look at their arguments.

10. Arguments in favor of the idea of a course towards World War II

a. The Present Existence of Local Inter-Imperialist Conflicts

Certain revolutionaries have clearly understood that so-called national liberation struggles are a mask for inter-imperialist conflicts (a mask that is wearing so thin that even a current as myopic as the Bordigists is sometimes forced to recognize this). The fact that these conflicts have been going on for decades hasn’t led them -- quite rightly -- to the conclusion that they are signs of a revolutionary upsurge, which is what the Trotskyists think. We agree with them on this point. But they go further and conclude that the mere existence of these conflicts and their recent intensification signify that the class is beaten on a world scale and cannot prevent a new imperialist war. The question they fail to pose reveals the error of this approach: why hasn’t the multiplication and aggravation of local con­flicts already degenerated into a generalized conflict? Some, like the CWO (cf the Second Conference of November 1978) reply because the crisis isn’t deep enough or that the military and strategic preparations haven’t been completed. History itself refutes such interpretations:

-- in 1914, the crisis and the scale of arma­ments were less advanced than today when the conflict over Serbia degenerated into world war;

-- in 1939, after the New Deal and Nazi econo­mic policies, which had partially re-established the situation of 1929, the crisis was no more violent than it is today; also, as this time, the blocs aren’t completely constituted since the USSR was virtually on the side of Germany, and the USA was still ‘neutral’.

In fact the conditions for a new imperialist war are more than ripe. The only missing ‘military’ element is the adhesion of the proletariat … but it’s by no means the least.

b. The New Arms Technology

For some people, following in the footsteps of those who once said war was impossible because of poison gas or aeroplanes, the existence of atomic weapons prevents any resort to a new generalized war, which would threaten society with total des­truction. We’ve already denounced the pacifist illusions contained in such a conception. On the other hand, some people consider that the develop­ment of technology makes it impossible for the proletariat to intervene in a modern war, since it would mainly use highly sophisticated arms handled by specialists, rather than masses of soldiers. The bourgeoisie would then have a free hand to wage atomic war without fear of the kind of mutinies which took place in 1917-18. This analysis ignores the fact that:

-- atomic weapons are a long way from being the only weapons at the bourgeoisie’s disposal. Expenditure on classical armaments is much higher than on nuclear weapons;

-- when the bourgeoisie goes to war, it doesn’t do so a priori to destroy as much as possible. It does so to seize markets, territories and wealth from its enemy. That’s why, even if it will use them in the last resort, it has no interest in using atomic weapons straight away. It still faces, therefore, the problem of mobili­zing men for the occupation of conquered terri­tory. As in the past, capital still has to mobilize tens of millions of workers if it’s going to wage imperialist war.

c. War by Accident

In the process of generalizing an imperialist conflict, there is an involuntary aspect which escapes the control of any government. This leads some people to say that, whatever the level of class struggle, capitalism could plunge humanity into generalized war ‘by accident’, after losing control of the situation. Obviously, there’s no absolute guarantee that capitalism won’t serve up a menu like this, but history shows that the system is much less likely to slide in this direction if it feels threatened by the proletariat.

d. The Insufficiency of the Proletariat’s Response

Some groups, like Battaglia Comunista, consider that the proletariat’s response to the crisis is insufficient to constitute an obstacle to the course towards imperialist war. They consider that the struggle must be of a ‘revolutionary nature’ if it’s really going to counteract this course, basing their argument on the fact that in 1917-18 only the revolution put an end to the imperialist war. Their error is to try to trans­pose a schema which was correct at the time to a different situation. A proletarian upsurge during and against a war straight away takes the form of a revolution:

-- because society is plunged into the most extreme form of its crisis, imposing the most terrible sacrifices on the workers;

-- because the workers in uniform are already armed;

-- because the exceptional measures (martial law etc) which are in force make any class confrontation frontal and violent;

-- because the struggle for war immediately takes on the political form of a confrontation with the state which is waging the war, without going through the stage of less head-ons economic struggles.

But the situation is quite different when war hasn’t yet been declared. In these circumstances, even a limited tendency towards struggle on a class terrain is enough to jam up the war machine, since:

-- it shows that the workers aren’t actively drawn into capitalist mystifications;

-- imposing even greater sacrifices on the workers than the ones which provoked their initial response runs the risk of provoking a proportionately stronger reaction.

Thus, at the beginning of the twentieth century there were many threats of imperialist war, many opportunities for unleashing a generalized war (the Russo-Japanese war, Franco-German conflicts over Morocco, Balkans conflicts, invasion of the Tripolitaine by Italy). The fact that these conflicts didn’t generalize was to no small extent linked to the fact that, up until 1912, the work­ing class (through mass demonstrations) and the International (special motions at the Congresses of 1901 and 1910, Extraordinary Congress on the question of war in 1912) mobilized themselves each time there was a local conflict. And it wasn’t until the working class, anaesthetized by the speeches of the opportunists, stopped mobilizing itself against the threat of war (between 1912 and 1914) that capitalism was able to unleash an imperialist war, starting with an incident (the Sarajevo assassination) which seemed much less serious than the previous ones.

Today the revolution doesn’t have to be knocking at the door for us to say that the course towards imperialist war is barred.

e. War as a Necessary Condition for Revolution

The fact that, up to now, the great revolutionary upsurges of the proletariat (1871 the Commune, 1905, and 1917) arose out of wars led certain currents, like the Gauche Communiste de France, to consider that a new revolution could only come out of a new war. Although wrong, such an argu­ment was more defensible in 1950; holding on to it today betrays a fetishistic attachment to the schemas of the past. The role of revolutionaries isn’t to recite catechisms learned from history books with the idea that history is going to repeat itself in an immutable way. In general history doesn’t repeat itself, and although we must know about it in order to understand the present, the study of this present with all its specificities is even more necessary. The scen­ario of revolution coming only out of imperialist war is doubly wrong today:

-- it ignores the possibility of a revolutio­nary upsurge coming out of economic crisis (this was the scenario envisaged by Marx, if that’s any comfort to the fetishists);

-- it’s based on a perspective which is by no means ineluctable (as the result of the 1939-45 war showed); and it presupposes a step -- a third generalized war -- which, because of the means of destruction that exist today, contains a strong risk that humanity will once and for all time be deprived of the possibility of building socia­lism, or even of safeguarding its own existence.

Finally such an analysis can have disastrous implications for the struggle.

11. The implications of an erroneous analysis of the course

As we have seen, an erroneous analysis of the course has always had grave consequences. But the degree of gravity depends on whether the course is towards class war or imperialist war.

To be in error when the class is in reflux can be catastrophic for revolutionaries themselves (the example of the KAPD), but it has little impact on the class itself since, in such periods revolut­ionaries only have a small audience in the class. On the other hand, to make a mistake when the class is on the move, when the influence of revolutionaries is growing, can have tragic consequences for the whole class. Instead of pushing the whole class to struggle, of encour­aging its initiatives, of developing the potential of its struggles, a Jeremiah-like attitude at such a moment will help to demoralize the class and will become an obstacle to the movement.

That’s why, in the absence of decisive criteria proving that they’re in a period of defeat, revolutionaries have always emphasized the positive side of the historic alternative, have based their activities on the perspective of rising class struggle, not of defeat. The error of a doctor who gives up on a patient when he’s still got a chance of living, no matter how small, is much worse than that of the doctor who keeps trying when the patient has no chance.

That’s why today, it’s not so much up to the revolutionaries who foresee a course towards class war to provide irrefutable proof of their analy­sis: rather that’s the task of those who propose a course towards war.

It’s quite impossible to say to the working class right now that -- although we’re not quite sure -- the perspective before it is one of new imperial­ist war, during which it might -- perhaps -- be able to fight back. If a chance exists, however small, for the struggle of the class to prevent the out­break of a new imperialist holocaust, the role of revolutionaries is to put all their strength behind this chance and encourage the struggles of the class as much as they can, pointing out what’s at stake in these struggles, for the working class and the whole of humanity.

Our perspective doesn’t foresee the inevitability of the revolution. We aren’t charlatans, and we know quite well -- in contrast to certain fatalist­ic revolutionaries -- that the revolution isn’t “as certain as if it had already taken place”. But, whatever the final issue of the struggle today -- which the bourgeoisie is trying to muzzle in order to inflict on the class a series of partial defeats which will be a prelude to a more definitive defeat -- capitalism, right here and now, is unable to impose its own response to the crisis of its relations of production without directly confronting the proletariat.

Whether these struggles are going to result in victory, in revolution and communism, depends in part on the ability of revolutionaries to be equal to their tasks, notably in defining a concrete perspective for the movement of the class.

F.M.

Life of the ICC: 

  • Congress Reports [41]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Proletarian struggle [136]

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Historic course [99]

In government or in opposition, the ‘Left’ against the working class

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It only needs a brief glance to show that while the political crisis of the bourgeoisie really is developing, the left’s coming to power hasn’t been verified, or rather, over the last year the left has been systematically pushed away from power in most European countries. We only have to look at the examples of Portugal, Italy, Spain, the Scandinavian countries, France, Belgium, Holland, Britain and Israel. There are practically only two countries in Europe where the left is still in power: Germany and Austria.

This immediately poses the question: was the ICC wrong for all those years in our analysis of the international situation and perspectives, notably the thesis of the left coming to power? We can reply categorically: no. As far as the general analysis is concerned, the present situation, as can be seen in all the reports, amply confirms our analysis. Regarding the question of the left in power, the answer is more complex, but it’s still no.

With the appearance of the crisis and the first signs of the workers’ struggle, the ‘left in power’ was capitalism’s most adequate response in those initial years. The left in government, and the left posing its candidature to govern, effectively fulfilled the task of containing, demobilizing and paralyzing the proletariat with all its mystifications about ‘change’ and about electoralism.

The left had to remain, and did remain, in this position, as long as it enabled it to fulfill its function. Thus, we weren’t committing any error in the past. Something different and more sub­stantial has taken place: a change in the align­ment of the political forces of the bourgeoisie. We would be committing a serious error if we didn’t recognize this change in time and contin­ued to repeat ourselves emptily about the danger of ‘the left in power’.

Before continuing the examination of why this change has taken place and what it means, we must particularly insist on the fact that we’re not talking about a circumstantial phenomenon, limited to this or that country, but a general pheno­menon, valid in the short and possibly the middle-term for all the countries of the western world. This initial recognition is necessary if we are to examine and understand the change that has taken place and the implications it has, notably concerning the necessary rectification of our political aim in the near future.

Having effectively carried out its task of immobilizing the working class during these initial years, the left, whether in power or moving towards power, can no longer perform this task except by putting itself in the opposition. There are many reasons for this change, to do with the specific conditions of various countries, but these are secondary reasons. The main reasons are the wearing-out of the mystifications of the left, of the left in power, and the slow disillu­sionment of the working masses which follows from this. The recent revival and radicalization of workers’ struggles bears witness to this.

Let’s remind ourselves of the three criteria for the left coming to power which are outlined in our previous analyses and discussions:

1. Necessity to strengthen state capitalist measures.

2. Closer integration into the western imperialist bloc under the domination of US capital.

3. Effective containment of the working class and immobilization of its struggles.

The left fulfils these three conditions most effectively, and the USA, leader of the bloc, clearly supported its coming to power, although it has reservations about the CPs. These reserva­tions gave rise to the policy of ‘Eurocommunism’ by the CPs of Spain, Italy and France, attempting to give guarantees of their loyalty to the western bloc. But while the USA remained suspicious about the CPs, it gave total support for the mainten­ance or arrival of the socialists in power, wherever that was possible.

It would be wrong to think that the reason for pushing the left away from power is based on this distrust for the CPs, even if this reason had some importance in certain countries like France and Italy. The fact that the socialists have also been pushed out of government -- as in Portugal, Israel, Britain and elsewhere -- shows that this is a phenomenon which goes beyond the simple distrust towards the CPs. The reasons for it must be sought elsewhere.

Let’s return to our criteria for the left being in power. When we examine them more closely, we can see that while the left fulfils them best, they aren’t all the exclusive patrimony of the left. The first two, state capitalist measures and integration into the bloc, can easily be accomplished, if the situation demands it, by other political forces of the bourgeoisie parties of the centre or even outright right-wing ones. Recent history is full of examples of this and we don’t have to elaborate on it. On the other hand, the third criterion, the containment of the working class, is the exclusive property of the left. It is it’s specific function, its raison d’être.

The left doesn’t accomplish this function only, or even generally, when it’s in power. Most of the time it accomplishes it when it’s in the opposition because it’s generally easier to do it when in the opposition than when in power. As a general rule, the left’s participation in power is only absolutely necessary in two precise situa­tions: in a Union Sacree to dragoon the workers into national defense in direct preparation for war and in a revolutionary situation to counteract the movement towards revolution1.

Outside of these two extreme situations, when the left can’t avoid openly exposing itself as an unconditional defender of the bourgeois regime by directly, violently confronting the working class, it must always try to avoid betraying its real identity, its capitalist function, and to maintain the mystification that its policies are aimed at the defense of working class interests.

Every bourgeois party is motivated by its own interests, its own clique-demands and electoral clientele, competing with other parties to get into power. But no party can escape from the imperatives of its class function, which must predominate over its immediate clique interests if that party is to stay alive. This is equally true for the parties of the left who must above all carry out the imperatives of their function. Thus, even if the left like any other bourgeois party aspires ‘legitimately’ to government office, we must note an important difference between these parties and other bourgeois parties con­cerning their participation in power. That is that these parties claim to be ‘workers’ parties’ and as such are forced to present themselves with ‘anti-capitalist’ masks and phrases, as wolves in sheep’s clothing. Being in power puts them in an ambivalent situation, more difficult than for more frankly bourgeois parties. An openly bourgeois party carries out in power what it says it’s going to do: the defense of capital and it in no way gets discredited by carrying out anti-working class policies. It’s exactly the same in opposition as it is in government. It’s quite the opposite with the ‘workers’ parties’. They must have a working class phraseology and a capitalist practice, one language in opposition and an absolutely opposed practice when in govern­ment. All the overtly bourgeois parties shame­lessly deceive the popular masses. The working masses are not, however, their clientele. The workers know who they are and don’t have many illusions in them. But the working masses are the main clientele of the left parties whose main function is to mystify, deceive, and derail the workers. In opposition the left parties say what they don’t do and will never do. Once in govern­ment they are forced to do what they have never said, have never dared to admit.

They can fulfill their bourgeois functions in contradictory conditions. In the ‘normal’ situations of capitalism, their presence in government makes them more vulnerable; being in power wears out their credibility more quickly. In a situa­tion of instability this tendency is even more accelerated. Then, their loss of credibility makes them less able to carry out their task of immobilizing the working class and this also makes their presence in government superfluous.

Their incommodious position can be summed up as follows: being in power while pretending not to be effected by being in power. That’s why their stays in office can’t last long. Like certain marine species who have to come constantly up to the surface in order to breathe, the left has an imperious need to go through constant rest cures in opposition. This has nothing to do with a Machiavellian plot on the part of the bourgeoisie.

It’s a necessity imposed on it as an exploiting class; this division of labor and function is indispensable to ensuring its rule over society. As an exploiting, ruling class, the bourgeoisie must occupy every inch of social space; it can’t allow any element in society, above all the work­ing class, to escape its control. If a ‘workers’ party’ for one reason or another slips up in its task of derailing working class struggle, the bourgeoisie has to quickly put forward a new party more capable of carrying out this job. In general, like a spider’s web which has several alternative strands, the bourgeoisie engenders several parties, each more to the left than the other (SPs, left socialists, CPs, leftists etc). This function is so important that it can’t allow any break in this chain. Thus, the advantage that the left parties have in being just as effec­tive in government as the right-wing parties in certain extreme situations, can become their Achilles heel in ‘normal’ situations. They then have to resume their place in the opposition, where they are infinitely more effective than the right wing parties.

Today we are in such a situation. After an explo­sion of social discontent and convulsions which caught the bourgeoisie by surprise, and which were only neutralized by bringing the left to power, the crisis deepened, illusions in the left began to weaken, the class struggle began to revive. It then became necessary for the left to be in opposition and to radicalize its phraseology, so as to be able to control the re-emerging struggle. Obviously this couldn’t be an absolute, but it is today and for the near future a general rule.

It’s characteristic that the countries where the left is still in power, like Germany and Austria, are precisely those countries where the class struggle has been weakest. Not only is the left moving away from power, it must also give the impression of becoming more radical. This is obvious with the CPs -- for example in Italy where they are breaking with the ‘historic compromise’ and in France where the CP provoked the break-up of the Union of the Left and the Programme Commun on the eve of the elections, and is now talking about a union at the base. It’s put away the slogan of the union of the French people and now prefers to talk about defending the workers and being the party of class struggle. At its Twenty-third Congress the French CP drew a “generally positive balance-sheet” of socialism in the east, after its Twenty-second Congress had abandoned the dictatorship of the proletariat and made a violent critique of the lack of demo­cracy in the ‘socialist’ countries, rejecting the Russian model2.

This hardening of the CPs is also forcing the SPs -- in countries with a strong CP in direct competi­tion with the SP -- to radicalize its phraseology so that it doesn’t lose its grip on the workers. This is the case for example in France where at the last Congress the Mitterand leadership broke with the Rocard current and moved towards the left-wing CERES group. We even saw the SP associating itself with the 23 March demo, in opposition to the CFDT. But the same thing is also happening in countries where there is no competition from a strong CP. It’s the case in Britain where the Labor Party has put an end to the Social Contract by calling the election; in Portugal where Soares has got rid of a tendency that was too right wing; or in Spain where the SP Congress got rid of the Gonzales leadership by a large majority, reproaching his ‘consensus’ politics and arguing for a party based on ‘Marxism’. Once we’ve noted the end of the phase of the left in power, we can ask what impact will its return to opposition have. The political and trade union left is going to try to restore its image and make us forget what it did yesterday; instead of its former policy of opposition to all struggles, it’s going to ‘radicalize’ struggles, multiplying them while at the same time dispersing them, in order to sabotage them from within: making itself seem more ‘left’ in order to keep things under control. In sum, instead of driving the train into a siding by being in the drivers’ seat, it’s going to try to derail it in a more pernicious way. The left will be even more dangerous as the ‘defenders’ of the class than when it was its accuser. This is the danger the working class will have to confront, and one that it’s going to be difficult to fight against. In this situation, the leftists will run the risk of losing their distinct identity as an extreme left. After being the champions of the CP/SP in power, they will now put more emphasis on the united front, on committees at the base initiated by the reunified left parties and unions.

We must have no illusions. The left and the leftists have an enormous capacity for recuperation and manipulation. We’ll have to fight them in new conditions. Yesterday when they were in government leading the workers’ train onto capi­talist lines we could only be on the side of the tracks, calling on workers to leave the train. Today, when the workers’ train is slowly moving along class lines we have to be in the train, participating actively in the struggle, strength­ening the way forward and warning against acts of sabotage by all capitalist agents. It’s inside the struggle, during the course of its develop­ment, that we must concretely denounce what the left is doing, tearing off its ‘radical’ mask. It’s a task which is all the more difficult because we have no experience of such a situation. It’s not a question of submitting to an excess of radicalism, but of knowing practically, concretely, on every occasion, what lies behind the ‘radicalism’ of the left. This vision fits perfectly into our general analysis of the inter­national situation and of the resurgence of class struggle. It’s a piece that was missing from the overall picture, especially with regard to the historic course. A course towards war doesn’t make it necessary for the left to radicalize itself in opposition. On the contrary, an atom­ized, apathetic working class gives the left a free hand and makes it both possible and necessary for it to associate itself with the government.

We must be able to adapt our intervention and activity to this new situation -- a situation full of pitfalls, but also full of promise.

1 Here we still have to note a difference in the behavior of the ‘workers’ parties’ in these two situations. In times of war they integrate themselves or support a government of national unity under the leadership of the official representatives of the bourgeoisie, whereas in a revolutionary period the big bourgeoisie generally takes cover behind a ‘left’ or ‘workers’ government. It’s the left which has the honor assassinating the proletarian revolution in the name of ‘democracy’, ‘socialism’ and the ‘defense of the revolution’, as can be seen with the Mensheviks in Russia and Social Democracy in Germany.

2 So ends the famous ‘Eurocommunism’ which caused so much concern to groups like Bataglia Comunista who saw it as some sort of fundamental, definitive change in the CPs and their Stalinist nature. What was no more than appearance, a tactical turn, became for these groups the ‘social democratization’ of the CPs. As we can now see, this wasn’t at all the case.

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Resolution on the International Situation (1979)

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1. Except for a few particularly short-sighted revolutionaries, no-one today would dream of denying the reality of the world crisis of capi­talism. Despite the differences in form with the 1929 crisis -- which are seized upon by those who try to minimize the gravity of today’s crisis -- the real depth of the crisis can be seen:

-- in the massive and growing under-utilization of means of production and labor power, notably in the main industrial countries of the US bloc, where significant sectors like steel, shipbuilding and chemicals are in complete disarray;

-- in the increasingly apparent inability of the eastern bloc countries to realize econo­mic plans which are in any case less and less ambitious, accentuating the lack of competitivity of their commodities on the world market;

-- in the catastrophes hitting the underdeveloped countries, where Brazil-type ‘miracles’ have long ago given way to unbridled inflation and colossal debts;

-- in the continuing fall in the growth of world trade.

While the official figures clearly reveal the current difficulties of the world economy and show that the causes of these difficulties reside in a general glut on the world market, they often mask the full gravity of the situation because they don’t show the enormous pure waste of the productive forces because armaments don’t enter into any further productive cycles either as variable or constant capital.

After more than ten years of the slow but ineluc­table deterioration of its economy and the failure of all its ‘salvage’ plans, capitalism is supplying the proof to what Marxists have said for a long time: this system has entered into a phase of historic decline and it is absolutely incapable of surmounting the economic contradictions which assail it.

In the coming period, we are going to see a fur­ther deepening of the world crisis of capitalism, notably in the form of a new burst of inflation and a marked slowdown in production, which threatens to go far beyond the 1974-5 recession and lead to a brutal increase in unemployment.

2. The disintegration of the economic infra­structure has its repercussions on the whole of society, in particular through an exacerbation of inter-imperialist tensions. As these conflicts are aggravated we can see clearly the absurdity of the theory of the ‘weakening of the imperialist blocs’. In reality, the corollary of the aggra­vation of these conflicts is the stronger and stronger integration of each country into one of the two blocs. This is illustrated, for example, by:

-- the fact that France is more and more taking on the tasks of the US bloc, particularly as its gendarme in Africa;

-- the complete insertion of Vietnam into the Russian bloc;

-- the growing integration of China into the US bloc.

Even more than on an economic level, the rein­forcement of the imperialist blocs on the military level is a reality entirely in line with the preparations for capitalism’s only ‘way out’ of the crisis: generalized imperialist war.

Similarly it would be wrong to think, as some people do, that we are heading towards a reorgani­zation of the basic alliances that exist today, and that this is an indispensable precondition for a generalized war to take place. To begin with, experience has shown that changes of alliance can take place even after war has broken out. Secondly, the breadth of the economic, political and military links which unite the main powers in each bloc would not permit a brutal reshuffle leading, for example, to the reconstitu­tion of the blocs which existed during World War II. Today such a reshuffle could only involve the peripheral countries, particularly in the third world -- countries which are precisely the principle arena for the settling of scores bet­ween imperialist bandits.

In 1978 the African continent was in the front line of these confrontations. The relative stabilization of the situation in this zone, linked essentially to Russia’s backing-off, has in no way meant an end or even a pause to these conflicts. As soon as they were contained in one area, the flames of imperialism burst up again in the Far East, exposing the myth of national liberation and ‘solidarity between socialist countries’. Because they directly involved the two main military powers in the region, because they hurled hundreds of thousands of men into the battlefield and in a few days left thousands dead, the confrontations between China and Vietnam constitute an important moment in the aggravation of imperialist tensions. They give the workers of the world a hideous foretaste of what lies in store for the whole of society if capitalism is left with a free hand.

3. The crisis of the economy not only leads to the aggravation of divisions between national factions of the bourgeoisie. It also has its repercussions within each country in the form of a political crisis. This affects every part of the world but takes on its most violent forms in the backward countries. The example of Iran is particularly significant. The departure of the Shah has not managed to stabilize the situation and the unanimity of the forces which stood against him has now given way to chaotic confrontations.

But the political crisis is also hitting the most developed countries, and in recent months has had important effects in Europe.

A political crisis is in general the result of the difficulties of the capitalist class in adapting to contradictory necessities arising out of contradictions in the economic infrastructure. In Europe in recent years the axis of this adapta­tion has been the strengthening of the left, in particular social democracy, as a governmental alternative. This orientation corresponded both to concerns about international policies (the social democrats’ loyalty to the US bloc) and about domestic policies (strengthening of state capitalist measures and derailing the working class discontent). But today we see a tendency for the forces of the left to be pushed into opposition. This doesn’t mean that these forces have lost their essential function of defending capitalism from the working class. It’s a way of better adapting themselves to this function in a situation where:

-- the left parties have largely discredited themselves in countries where they were running the government, as the situation in Britain illustrates so strikingly;

-- the mystification of a ‘left alternative’ has worn thin in countries where it hasn’t actually been put in office, as in France;

-- it has become necessary to sabotage ‘from inside’ the workers’ struggles which are now re-emerging after being contained and derailed by illusory alternatives.

Thus after several years in which its main enemy was the left in power or moving towards power, the working class will in the coming period generally find the same enemy in the opposition, radicalizing its language in order to sabotage the struggle even more effectively.

4. The main elements of the political crisis of the bourgeoisie illustrate the growing weight of the class struggle in the life of society. This expresses the fact that after a period of relative reflux during the mid-seventies the working class is once again tending to renew the combativity which it showed in a generalized and often spectacular manner after 1965. This wave of proletarian combativity, which an important num­ber of revolutionary currents (like FOR and Battaglia Comunista) were unable to recognize, was the first response of the working class to the capitalist crisis which came with the end of the reconstruction period. It showed that the terrible counter-revolution which descended on the working class after the 1920s was now over. After an initial period of surprise, the bourgeoi­sie responded with a counter-offensive spear­headed by the left. Taking advantage of the weaknesses which are inevitable in a movement which is only just beginning, the bourgeoisie managed to channel and stifle the struggle through:

-- the democratic mystification;

-- the perspective of the left in power;

-- ‘national solutions’ to the crisis.

This ideological stifling and containment of the workers was completed by a considerable reinforce­ment of state terror, especially at the time of the Baader affair in Germany and the Moro affair in Italy. This showed clearly that if certain revolutionaries were incapable of understanding the resurgence of the proletariat, the bourgeoisie was a lot more lucid about it!

The present tendency towards the development of struggles (US miners in the Appalachians, German steelworkers, Italian hospital workers, lorry drivers and public sector workers in Britain, workers in Spain, telephone workers in Portugal, steelworkers in France, etc) is a sign that the bourgeoisie’s counter-offensive is wearing out; far from being a flash in the pan, these struggles are harbingers of a general resurgence of the proletariat, a resurgence which will close the gap that has opened in recent years between the gravity of the crisis and the response of the working class, to the detriment of the latter. As it continues to force down the living standards of the proletariat, the crisis will oblige even the most hesitant workers to return to the path of struggle.

Even if it doesn’t appear immediately in a clear way, one of the essential characteristics of this new wave of struggles will be a tendency to take off from the highest qualitative level reached by the last wave. This will express itself in a more marked tendency to go beyond the unions, to extend struggles outside professional and sectional limits, to develop a clear awareness of the international character of the class struggle. Another element will tend to play a decisive role in the struggle: the development of unemployment. Although when it first appeared on a massive scale after 1974 this helped to paralyze the proletariat, today unemployment is becoming an explosive factor in the mobilization of the class, forcing workers to transcend straightaway the various sectional divisions. The European bourgeoisie has understood this quite well, which explains its present campaign about the 35-hour week.

5. Thus, although, on the one hand, the aggrava­tion of the crisis is pushing the system inexorably towards imperialist war, on the other hand, it’s pushing the working class into more and more bitter struggles against capital. Thus once again we are faced with the historic alternative defined by the Communist International for the period of capitalist decadence: imperialist war or proletarian revolution. The question posed to revolutionaries -- to which they are presently giving all kinds of contradictory answers -- is therefore: does capitalism have a free hand to impose its ‘solution’ to the crisis -- imperialist war; or, on the contrary, does the rise of the proletariat stand in the way of such a catastrophe for the moment?

A correct answer to this question presupposes that one poses the question correctly. In particular this means rejecting the idea of two simultaneous, parallel and independent courses towards imperia­list war and towards class war. In fact, as the responses of two irredeemably antagonistic clas­ses, these two ways out are themselves antagonis­tic and mutually exclude each other. History has shown that as a class divided into numerous factions with contradictory interests, the bour­geoisie is only capable of uniting when it’s faced with a working class offensive. This is why, since the beginning of the century, revolu­tionaries have affirmed that the class struggle is the only real obstacle to imperialist war.

The question which must be answered, therefore, is: is the present level of workers’ combativity enough to bar the way to world war? Some revolu­tionaries, basing themselves on the fact that only a revolution put an end to imperialist war in 1917 in Russia and in 1918 in Germany, consider that only revolutionary struggles can prevent a new conflict, and that since these don’t exist as yet, the way is open for capital. In reality, the problem is posed in different terms depending on whether a generalized war has already broken out or whether it’s only in a state of preparation. In the first case, history has effectively shown that struggles with a revolutionary character were needed to end the war. In the second case, it has shown, especially with the long prepara­tions for World War II that capitalism can only launch into such a venture when it has dragooned the working class behind the national capital. A comparison between the situations of 1914 or 1939 and today shows that capitalism has not brought together the conditions which would allow it to carry out its own solution to the crisis -- generalized imperialist war. Although on the level of the depth of the crisis, and of the military and strategic preparations, the conditions for a new holocaust have matured long ago, the present combativity of the working class constitutes a decisive obstacle to such a holocaust.

6. To the extent that capitalism can only impose its own solution to the crisis after breaking the combativity of the workers, the current perspective is not one of a generalized imperia­list confrontation but of a class confrontation. The present battles of the class are preparing the way for this decisive confrontation: decisive because the future of society depends on them. The role of revolutionaries is, therefore, to intervene in these struggles in order to show precisely what’s at stake in them. Any attitude they might have of underestimating what really is at stake, any conception which neglects the essential role of these struggles as an obstacle to imperialist war, or which demoralizes the workers by -- wrongly -- announcing that the war is inevitable, will serve only to weaken these struggles and facilitate the final victory of capitalism.

Today, only a determined attitude by revolution­aries, demonstrating the crucial importance of these struggles -- not in order to paralyze them but to stimulate them -- only such an attitude will contribute to a positive outcome in the confrontation we are heading for, to the victory of the proletarian revolution and the triumph of communism.

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Resolution on the State in the Transition Period

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During the period of transition the division of society into classes with antagonistic interests will give rise to a state. Such a state will have the task of guaranteeing the advances of this transitional society both against any exter­nal or internal attempt to restore the power of the old exploiting classes and maintaining the cohesion of society against any disintegration of the social fabric resulting from conflicts betw­een the non-exploiting classes which still subsist.

The state of the period of transition has a certain number of differences from previous states:

-- for the first time in history, it is not a state in the service of an exploiting minority for the oppression of the majority, but is on the contrary a state in the service of the majority of the exploited and non-exploiting classes and strata against the old ruling minority.

-- it is not the emanation of a stable society and relations of production, but on the contrary of a society whose permanent characteristic is a constant transformation on a greater scale than anything else in history.

-- it cannot identify itself with any economically dominant class because there is no such class in the society of the period of transition.

-- in contrast to states in past societies, the transitional state does not have a monopoly of arms

For all these reasons Marxists have talked about a “semi-state” when referring to the organ that will arise in the transition period.

On the other hand, this state still retains a number of the characteristics of past states.

In particular, it will still be the guardian of the status quo, the task of which will be to codify, legalize and sanction an already exist­ing economic order, to give it a legal force which has to be acknowledged by every member of society.

In the period of transition, the state will tend to conserve the existing state of affairs. Bec­ause of this, the state remains a fundamentally conservative organ that will tend:

-- not to favor social transformation but to act against it

-- to maintain the conditions on which its own life depends: the division of society into classes

-- to detach itself from society, to impose itself on society, to perpetuate its own existence and to develop its own prerogatives

-- to bind its existence to the coercion and viol­ence which it will of necessity use during the period of transition, and to try to maintain and reinforce this method of regulating social relations

-- to be a fertile soil for the formation of a bureaucracy, providing a rallying point for elements coming from the old classes and offices which have been destroyed by the revolution.

This is why from the beginning Marxists have always considered the state of the period of transition to be a “scourge”, a “necessary evil”, whose “worst sides” the proletariat will have to “lop off as much as possible” (Engels). For all these reasons, and in contrast to what has happ­ened in the past, the revolutionary class cannot identify itself with the state in the period of transition.

To begin with, the proletariat is not an econom­ically dominant class, either in capitalist society or the transitional society. During the transit­ion period it will possess neither an economy nor any property, not even collectively; it will struggle for the abolition of economy and prop­erty. Secondly, the proletariat, the communist class, the subject which transforms the economic and social conditions of the transitional society, will necessarily come up against an organ whose task is to perpetuate these conditions. This is why one cannot talk about a “socialist state”, a “workers’ state” or a “proletarian state” during the period of transition.

This antagonism between the proletariat and the state manifests itself both on the immediate and the historic level.

On the immediate level, the proletariat will have to oppose the encroachments and the pressure of a state which is the manifestation of a society divided into antagonistic classes. On the hist­oric level, the necessary disappearance of the state in communist society, which is a perspective which Marxism always defended, will not be the result of the state’s own dynamic, but the fruit of the pressure mounted on it by the prol­etariat in its own movement forward, which will progressively deprive it of all its attributes as the progress towards a classless society unfolds. For these reasons, while the proletariat will have to use the state during the transition period, it must retain a complete independence from it. In this sense the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be confused with the state. Between the two there is a constant relation of force which the proletariat will have to maintain in its favor: the dictatorship of the proletar­iat is exerted by the working class itself through its own independent armed unitary organs: the workers’ councils. The workers’ councils will participate in the territorial soviets (in which the whole non-exploiting population is represent­ed and from which the state structure will emanate) without confusing themselves with them, in order to ensure its class hegemony over all the structures of the society of the transitional period.

 

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The evolution of class struggle

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1. Introduction

No-one can deny that the present situation of the class struggle is very different from what it was in 1977-78. At this time apathy and disorientation reigned among the workers, espec­ially in the European countries. Dark clouds loomed over the horizon: austerity plans, massive lay-offs, a dangerous aggravation of imperialist wars ... Capitalism could impose all this with­out provoking much of a reaction by the working class. It’s not the same today: the whole of Europe has been hit by a wave of struggles which began with the strikes in the US and Germany in 1978 and culminated in the formidable battles of Longwy and Denain in the Spring of 1979. In the face of the capitalist crisis and its funereal march towards the holocaust, the proletarian giant is once again raising its head, threatening to transform the crisis into a revolutionary crisis which will open the door to the communist emancipation of humanity.

Of course, there is still much doubt, hesitation and mistrust in the proletariat’s ranks: the more combative workers are themselves not always aware of the scope and importance of the struggles they’ve been through. The workers have not yet rediscovered the enthusiasm and determination of the last revolutionary wave, and frequently dis­play a certain apathy and disorientation. This is quite understandable seeing that we are only at the very beginning of a new revolutionary wave. As Rosa Luxemburg said:

“The unconscious precedes the conscious and the logic of the objective historical process precedes the subjective logic of its protagonists.” (‘Marxism against Dictatorship’)

This report, which expresses the discussion which took place at our Third International Congress on the present state of the class struggle, has a clear, practical and militant objective: to make the combative workers conscious of the “logic of the historic process”, ie of the overall context -- economic, political, social -- of the struggles we are now seeing, of their effects and their perspectives. Only by grasping this “logic of the historic process”, or as the Communist Manifesto put it, “clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement”, will our class be able to strengthen its confidence in itself, redouble its determination and annihilate the power of its class enemy.

However, in the revolutionary movement today there are still too many blind men who don’t see this or don’t want to see it. This is the case with the FOR (Ferment Ouvrier Revolutionnaire), PCI (Battaglia Comunista) and the PCI (Programma Comunista). These groups refuse to see the essential, underlying aspects of the present struggles. And this isn’t new: these groups also have a low opinion of the huge workers’ struggles which shook the five continents in the 1960s, seeing them as somewhat unimportant skirmishes.

More precisely, this report will serve to reaffirm the essential axes of the present historical period, against the obvious blindness of these comrades:

1. The struggles of the sixties (May ‘68, Poland, Italy) represented the end of the period of counter-revolution which descended on the working class from the 1920s on, opening up the perspec­tive of a new revolutionary period.

2. The relative reflux which dominated the European proletariat after 1973-74 was due to the weaknesses which characterized the post-‘68 wave of struggle, and to the bourgeoisie’s counter attack.

3. This reflux was in no way a defeat, and did not overturn the course towards revolution which opened up in the sixties.

4. The struggles which have broken out since Autumn 1978 in a great number of countries, part­icularly the capitalist metropoles, announce the end of the period of calm and the maturation of a new proletarian offensive.

Programma Comunista and Battaglia Comunista are beginning to see that something is going on: even though their analyses are contradictory, they are beginning to see the importance of the present struggles. But the FOR continues unheedingly in its blindness, in its Olympian disdain for the present struggles: for them, all that happened in Iran was just a manipulation by the Ayatollah and the events in Longwy and Denain were completely recuperated by the unions.

The FOR pushes to its logical, caricatural extreme the attitude of all the revolutionary groups and militants who don’t understand the dynamic of the situation and the characteristics of the class struggle -- who don’t even attempt to find a con­crete perspective for the present historic course.

To fail to see the perspectives which are emerging out of today’s ‘poor little strikes’ amounts, comrades of the FOR, to denying the “logic of the historic process”, to leaving militant proleta­rians at an unconscious stage, to putting obsta­cles in front of the development of class cons­ciousness. The FOR defends the essential class positions, but at a time when it has to under­stand reality, understand the evolution of the class struggle, it doesn’t put them into practice. That’s because class positions aren’t something that have to be repeated parrot-fashion till they enter into people’s heads; they’re not a nice sermon aimed at converting people; they’re not a good news sheet for proselytes. They are above all a global framework for understanding the class struggle, for seeing where we are going and how, through what process and with what perspec­tives. They are an instrument for understanding the logic of the historic process and acting consciously towards its fruition. Defending class positions in a general way while at the same time failing to see the reality of the present struggles and lacking a concrete perspective for the period, as the FOR comrades do, amounts to throwing away a precious treasure, a priceless implement for understanding the reality of the class struggle, for participating in it and giving it a revolutionary direction. It amounts to reducing class positions to mere ideology.

The present text contains our conclusions on:

-- the conditions which determined the relative reflux of 1973-78;

-- the evolution of the crisis, of the deepening political crisis of the bourgeoisie, and of the balance of forces between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, which have determined the end of the reflux;

-- the balance-sheet and concrete perspectives of the struggles since November 1978.

It is a militant appeal for the whole revolutio­nary movement to make an effort to arrive at a global understanding of the proletarian movement, of the steps it has already made and the ones which lie before it; to be at all times conscious of where we are and where we’re going in the current proletarian movement.

2. Why the reflux?

After 1973-74, the huge wave of struggles which began in the 1960s virtually disappeared from the central countries of capital, giving way to a phase of social calm. Why this reflux?

In the report on the international situation which our organization elaborated in early 1978 (see International Review, no.13), there is a general explanation of why the movement of the working class has never followed a straight line but goes through a series of flux and reflux. This ‘saw-tooth’, uneven character is accentuated in the period of capitalist decadence, owing to:

-- the state totalitarianism which -- either by repression or integration, or a combination of both -- prevents the existence of any permanent mass organizations of the working class;

-- the impossibility of winning any lasting reforms and improvements, which prevents any stable, structured struggle.

We must understand the reflux which followed the struggles of the sixties within the context of the general characteristics of the proletarian struggle, to which must be added:

-- the weaknesses of the post-1968 wave of struggle;

-- the ideological and political counter­offensive of the bourgeoisie.

Concerning the first point, this is not the place to make a complete balance-sheet of these struggles: this has already been done in several texts of our organization (cf RI, Old Series; the texts ‘World Perspectives of the Class Struggle’ in Accion Proletaria, nos .12 & 13, trans­lated in English in World Revolution nos.15 & 16; ‘On the Present State of the Class Struggle’, AP no.18; ‘May ‘68’ in IR no.14). Here we will limit ourselves to:

-- a schematic reminder of the main weaknesses of the movement of the sixties: illusions about a radical form of economism; a frequent break with the trade union form, but not with its con­tent; the relative isolation of the struggles; their lack of perspectives;

-- looking at the general conditions in which the wave took place (a still limited level of the crisis; the slow, uneven rhythm of the crisis; the limited experience of the proletariat which was starting from scratch after fifty years of counter-revolution), in order to get to the roots of these weaknesses;

-- and finally, understanding these weaknesses as an integral part of the first stage in a new revolutionary epoch, which alongside its great revolutionary potential inevitably contains all sorts of immaturities and weak spots.

Concerning the second point, it is important to understand that the bourgeoisie consciously took advantage of these limitations and weak spots in order to mount a vast political and ideological counter-offensive which aimed at holding back and undoing the proletariat’s advance. Basing itself on the general conditions from which the struggles of the sixties arose, the bourgeoisie streng­thened its mystifications, its anti-working class offensive.

The struggles following May ‘68 took place in the first phase of the capitalist crisis (the recession of 1966-67 and 1970-71); this made it difficult to see how profoundly sick senile capi­talism was, especially with the mini-boom of 1972, when a number of countries achieved the highest levels of production in the post-war period. This boom was in many ways the swan song of capitalism’s famous period of ‘prosperity’.

The struggle unfolded then in the context of:

-- a slow development of the crisis;

-- its uneven development nationally, regionally and industrially;

-- the general, marked tendency toward increa­sing state capitalism which allowed the bourgeoi­sie to initially avoid a frontal assault on the workers. The effects of the crisis could be partially diverted away from the central sectors of the class to hit those at its margins or even weaker elements of the population. This inhibited the development of the struggle and became the soil that nurtured all manner of illusions in the workers’ ranks, thus allowing a counter-offensive to be effectively mounted by the bourgeoisie.

The slow development of the capitalist crisis took its toll on the consciousness of the class:

-- it had difficulty in understanding the nat­ure of the capitalist crisis;

-- trade union-style, reformist illusions caused the class to believe that it could protect itself from a degradation in its living standards by means of legal ‘guarantees’. Self-management and ‘workers’ power’ are the most radical expres­sions of such illusions;

-- the illusion persisted that, given social contracts and negotiations, workers could participate in the administration of capitalist society and benefit accordingly;

-- the workers over-estimated the stability and coherence of the capitalist system, continuing to believe that the ruling class could govern eternally.

The uneven development of the capitalist crisis between different firms, regions and countries facilitated:

-- the illusion that a national solution could be found for the crisis. This illusion entailed the acceptance of class collaboration and ‘sacrifices for all’;

-- trust in the effectiveness of defensive struggles waged at a sectoral level -- factory by factory, sector by sector, or category by category -- heightened the workers’ belief that solutions to the crisis could be found at the level of the individual factory, sector or region.

Finally, the acceleration of state capitalist measures at the first signs of the crisis strengthened various illusions held by the class:

-- the bourgeoisie identified state capitalism with socialism by presenting the intervention of the state in the economy and nationalizations as so many steps toward socialism;

-- measures taken by the bourgeoisie to indirectly concentrate capital, or divert the consequences of the crisis onto the middle classes or anachronistic sectors of the population, were presented to the working class as proof of the ‘just’ , ‘social’ and ‘progressive’ character of the capitalist state;

-- the left and the unions were given a ‘prole­tarian’ and ‘combative’ image by means of the bourgeois mystification that a ‘workers’ govern­ment’ and the ‘union of the left’ would provide a solution to the crisis, favorable to the working class’.

All of this provided the material basis for a general political and ideological strengthening of the bourgeoisie, which allowed it to assume a counter-offensive against the class. The principal positions governing this offensive, which ended up bridling and demobilizing the proletariat were:

1. The democratic mystification -- it was brought to bear in periods of intense social unrest in the form of ‘direct democracy’ and ‘popular power’. As the intensity of the struggle diminished, democratic mystifications assumed their ‘classical’ form.

2. the left in power -- was presented as the great legal, peaceful, though very radical ‘change’ which would provide a solution to all problems.

3. the national solution to the crisis -- required ‘the solidarity of all the classes in the nation’ so that social contracts, plains to restructure the economy, etc, could be implemented. This mystification was used to justify the sacrifice workers were being asked to make.

An active factor in the ideological and political rearming of the bourgeoisie was the re-adaptation of the union and left-wing machines at the end of the 1960s to the new climate of class struggle:

-- they ‘democratized’ and ‘de-bureaucratized’ themselves;

-- they ‘radicalized’ their own outlook, inte­grating all the components of the ‘modern struggle’, such as self-management and the need for radical ‘changes in daily life’, into their arsenal of attack against the class;

-- they proposed ‘new programs’ and ‘social change’, linking the class struggle to a ‘legal’ terrain.

The leftists were precisely those ‘anti-bodies’ secreted by the bourgeoisie which were needed, initially, to immobilize the struggle and give credibility to the ‘renovation’ of the unions and left parties.

The bourgeois state, rigidified by the years of social calm and too preoccupied with all the problems of the reconstruction period, also underwent a rapid re-adaptation in face of the new conditions of class struggle brought to life by the crisis. This re-adaptation allowed the state to present itself as a ‘neutral organ’ standing between the classes, which could provide the means for the participation of all citizens in the life of society because it was a ‘democratic instrument’ of the popular will.

The process by which the bourgeoisie mounted its ideological and political attack on the class can be seen in the following:

“In a great many countries, particularly in those where the working class had shown the greatest combativity in its struggle, the bourgeoisie launched a campaign of mystifica­tion which tried to demonstrate:

-- that class struggle didn’t pay;

-- instead, ‘changes’ were needed in order for the country to face up to the crisis;

Depending on the country, these ‘changes’ took the form:

-- in Great Britain, of the assumption of power by the Labor Party at the end of the wave of big strikes in the winter of 1972-73;

-- in Italy, of ‘the historic compromise’ and the participation in government of the PCI, designed to make political life ‘moral’;

-- in Spain, of the ‘democratic break’ with the Franco regime;

-- in Portugal, of ‘democracy’ initially, and later of ‘popular power’;

-- in France, of the ‘Common Program’ and the ‘Union of the Left’, which was supposed to bring to an end twenty years of ‘big capital’ politics.” (‘Report on the World Situation’, IR, no. 13)

The process by which the bourgeoisie rearmed itself allowed the bourgeois state initially to isolate the most dangerous struggles of the class in order to liquidate the general social unrest. Steps were taken to channel workers’ struggles into an impasse, on to a false terrain of struggle which would lead to their demoralization. This allowed the unions to redeploy themselves, to take the struggles in hand by mounting sham strikes that would end in demobilizing the working class.

Confidence in all sorts of ‘legal’ actions, inter-­classist campaigns and government programs took the place of the workers’ trust in their own strength. France is a good example of this. Hav­ing got through the most difficult phase repres­ented in May ‘68, the French bourgeoisie set about isolating the strongest struggles still taking place -- the SNCF railway strike waged in 1969 for example. It left the radical strikes of 1971 and 1972 to rot in isolation, while it staged itself, via the unions, the famous ‘new May’ of 1972, 1973 and 1974. The ‘new May’ was nothing but the means used by the bourgeoisie to prevent another May ‘68 from reoccurring. Since 1975, we have seen a period of maximum social calm during which all the perspectives of the struggle were turned around into support for the sinister ‘Common Program’ of the left.

Trade union and democratic mystifications were used to crush, like a steamroller, the first cycle of open struggle that came to life in the sixties. Thus, the immense deepening of the economic crisis in 1974-75, the first clear indication of the decisive, mortal nature of today’s economic depression, hit the demobilized workers hard, producing an aggravation in the reflux in the class struggle.

“The intensification of the crisis at the start of 1974, essentially marked by the explosion in unemployment, did not immediately provoke a response in the class. On the contrary, to the extent that the crisis hit the class hardest at a time of reflux in the preceding wave of struggle, it engendered a temporary tendency of great disarray and great apathy in the ranks of the class.” (‘Report on the World Situation’, IR, no.13)

1977 saw the deepest moment in the reflux of proletarian struggle. This capitalist offensive had important anti-working class consequences, both on the economic level and on the level of repression.

1. On the economic level, we can say that between 1975 and 1976, the bourgeoisie was extremely cautious, only gradually increasing its economic attack on the working class. But once the class had been relatively demobilized, the bourgeoisie attacked brutally, especially in 1977 and 1978. Today we can draw up a balance-sheet that shows a significant fall in the living conditions of the working class:

-- wages, which kept pace with inflation without much trouble until 1974, have now been slashed, and the phenomenon of an absolute cut in wages has become generalized;

-- unemployment has not only assumed monstrous quantitative proportions, it has also increased qualitatively, affecting more and more the large, concentrated units of production;

-- speed-ups in work rates have increased in an uninterrupted fashion throughout the last fifty years -- but even these rising norms have accelerated in the last three years;

-- the working day has increased in length in a constant fashion, but this increase has expressed itself in different forms: certain, holidays have been done away with, hours have been increa­sed, etc. Union demands for a 35-hour week represent a tactical, temporary maneuver by the bourgeoisie, which won’t alter the tendency towards a longer working day;

-- social services have been cut on both a quantitative and qualitative level;

-- retirement pensions have dwindled;

-- the famous promises about free education, public housing, etc have all disappeared.

2. On the level of repression, the sinister, anti­terrorist ideology employed to the hilt by the West German bourgeoisie in relation to the Baader gang; by the Italian bourgeoisie in relation to the Moro affair; and by the Spanish bourgeoisie in regard to ETA, has served to:

-- strengthen the police and juridical machinery of the capitalist state;

-- create a climate of terror and insecurity in the population.

The strengthening of the state apparatus was des­igned to prevent inevitable class confrontations by giving the state a gigantic arsenal of physical and military repression. The climate of fear created by the anti-terrorist campaign was meant to paralyze the class from within.

On a general level, this strengthening of the state apparatus on the basis of ‘anti-terrorism’ can be seen in the following:

“Even before the working class, with the excep­tion of a tiny minority, had understood the inevitability of violent class confrontations with the bourgeoisie, capitalism had already stationed itself for the fight.” (ibid)

3. Conditions for a proletarian revival

The struggles in Germany and in the United States at the start of 1978; the short, but nonetheless, violent succession of struggles that happened in May and June in France in 1978; the big class move­ment in Iran; the hospital strike in Italy; the struggles in the steel industry in Germany and the big struggles in Longwy and Denain; the strikes in Spain since the beginning of 1979; the telephone strike in Portugal -- taken together, can all of these class movements be interpreted as an effec­tive revival in the class struggle? Do they represent a new landmark in the revolutionary epoch opened by the strikes of 1968?

Prudence is necessary to avoid a premature evaluation of the situation. However, equivocation would leave us paralyzed, stuck between the ill-defined and the possible. It is necessary to take up a position and say clearly in what context these struggles have happened and what perspectives they have opened up. Better to have an erroneous position, than the security of a vague, eclectic, wait-and-see attitude. To take up a clear and decisive position carries risks, but that is nec­essary if revolutionaries are to accomplish their task of being an active factor in the class struggle.

The great fear than can assail us is: are these strike movements the last flares of proletarian resistance? It would be pessimism to give into such a theory. The weaknesses that have been manifested in these struggles -- their more or less general inability to extend themselves (except in Great Britain, France and Iran); the relatively effective control the unions appear to have over them; in general, the non-appearance of forms of self-organization by the class -- all of these things are used by every type of pessi­mist to justify their contention that ‘there hasn’t been a revival in the class struggle; these movements have simply been the last shocks from before’.

In order to answer this argument, it is necessary to recall clearly, a general theoretical point. The direction taken by the proletariat’s struggle cannot be measured by looking at the forms of struggle and organization created by the class in themselves. It is an erroneous argument that maintains that in relation to the extension of the struggle, today’s strikes have given rise to forms of struggle and organization which are less well-developed than those present in 1968. There­fore, we are witnessing a reflux in the struggle today.

It’s true that at both a quantitative and quali­tative level, today’s strikes are weaker than those of 1968, but it is wrong to conclude that this means a reflux in the struggle. Experience has shown that when a great avalanche of prole­tarian struggle unrolls, it takes a certain time for the class to take up again the highest forms of struggle, to maximize the content and organization, produced in its previous struggles.

For us, what is most important to see is the general social context in which the struggles are developing, to understand the unfolding of the crisis and the evolution of the balance of forces existing between the classes.

The mistake made by the ‘autonomes’ and other currents, which look at the workers’ struggles in themselves as if they took place independently from social reality, is that they forget that the proletariat doesn’t exist in capitalism by itself, but that the action of the class takes place in the midst of a number of social conditions engen­dered by the general movement of capitalism. The autonomy of the working class is not realized by the working class becoming a class which acts outside of the conditions imposed on it by capi­talism. The autonomous action of the class is expressed in its movement within the social conditions created by capitalism in its struggle to oppose such conditions and constitute itself as a revolutionary force capable of destroying them.

This is the reason why we must reply to the question posed at the beginning of this section as follows:

1. by saying that the reflux of 1973-78 was a relative reflux; not a decisive defeat for the proletariat but a phase of calm and retreat which still presaged new advances by the proletariat;

2. by analyzing the global conditions confronting the struggle (the development of the crisis, the impact of the bourgeoisie’s political and ideological weapons);

3. by drawing up a balance-sheet of the struggles which have gone on since November 1978 throughout Europe, and which have more and more clearly represented a resurgence of the proletariat;

Here we will develop the first and second points; the third will be dealt with in another section.

1. In Accion Proletaria, no.18 we explained why the period of social calm during the reflux could not be seen as a defeat for the class:

“What is the meaning of this reflux? Does it mark the definitive defeat of the proletariat? Has it changed the course of history, elimina­ting all hope of revolution? A global, world­wide analysis of the class struggle allows us to affirm that we find ourselves in a phase of momentary retreat in the class struggle, but the proletariat is not faced with a decisive defeat which would put an end to the revolu­tionary perspective opened up by the struggles of the 1960s:

1. The proletariat has not suffered a decisive defeat in any country. Where important, par­tial defeats of the class have happened -- as in Chile, Argentina or Portugal -- the working class wasn’t beaten into the ground because new, powerful struggles began to reappear, especially in Argentina.

2. The bourgeoisie couldn’t launch a total, definitive attack against the proletariat, in the first place because the economic crisis had not reached such an extreme level as to oblige the capitalists to impose an open war economy based on draconian austerity measures, and in the second place, because the bourgeoi­sie has been concentrating more during this time on preparing its future attack on the class rather than unleashing a decisive con­frontation. For these reasons, the bourgeoisie and proletariat have not confronted each other in a decisive way.

3. Despite the reflux in struggle in the major capitalist countries, the proletariat’s strug­gle has developed strongly in the periphery of the system. Despite the weaknesses of these struggles, they have a great importance for the world proletariat:

-- they have demonstrated that in countries where exploitation has reached extreme limits, the proletariat is far from accepting the self-sacrifice demanded by capitalism;

-- in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt or Israel, strikes have momentarily restrained imperialist war;

-- these strikes have contributed to the development of class consciousness, allowing the class to understand the objective basis of its unity as a world class.

4. Even in Europe, despite the reflux at a general level, hard struggles have surged up. And these struggles -- like those in Poland and Spain in 1976 -- are important, although they have been isolated and sporadic. The strikes which have begun in Germany, as well as the strike of the American miners, are equally of value.” (AP, no.18)

One thing which shows in a conclusive manner the relative nature of the passing reflux in the proletariat’s struggle is the limited result and weak impact of the left within the proletariat. If we compare today’s situation with the 1930s, the vast difference between the two is obvious. At that time, in a practically total fashion, the left and the unions could mobilize the enthusiasm and voluntary adhesion of enormous numbers of workers behind the criminal policies of anti-fascism, the Popular Front, the defense of demo­cracy etc ... Today such nightmares seem to be excluded from history. The left and the unions are able to impose themselves on the class only because the class lacks its own perspectives for its struggle, and suffers from momentary confusions. Workers don’t adhere to the politics of the left and the unions enthusiastically, as they did in the 1930s. This means that: a. the control of the left and the unions over the proletariat rests on a precarious basis; b. we are far from being in a period of defeat for the proletariat, the material basis of which is the atomization and rout of the class. This is what caused the workers to adhere in despera­tion to the program of the bourgeoisie in the past.

Generally speaking, to summarize the analysis made above, it is possible to say that the class follows the propositions put forward by the unions and the left today without having a great deal of confidence or illusions in them. These propositions seem to constitute the ‘lesser evil’ and are taken up by the class on that basis.

This represents a positive precondition for the development of class consciousness in the future. In this connection, we have seen, for example, how the great ‘brain-washing’ of the French elections of March 1978 did not intimidate the class, but rather acted to fire the explosions of class struggle which followed in May and June. Even while adopting a necessarily prudent attitude, it is possible to affirm that the myth of the ‘Union of the Left’ and the ‘Common Program’ has died its death even faster than we had forecast.

As a parallel development to this, we can note that in a period of reflux in the class struggle, the slow maturation of class consciousness con­tinues to follow its course. The workers’ nuclei, discussion circles and action groups have not disappeared and, although they are dispersed and fiddled with confusions, they express the effort within the class to come to consciousness. In the same manner, the relatively frequent ‘crises within the rank-and-file’ which have affected many leftist groups, and even the central unions, reveal the contradictory, but real, tendency for fractions of the proletariat to separate them­selves from the ideological control of the bourg­eoisie. In certain leftist groups, ideological crises have appeared, causing small fractions of these groups to split in a more or less clear attempt to find revolutionary positions.

Finally, revolutionary groups, the expression of the most advanced consciousness within the class, have developed, have strengthened themselves and their programmatic positions, and have extended the scope and impact of their intervention. Al­though these groups still manifest great weak­nesses, and although they remain a tiny minority within the class, their progress is a testimony to the advancement of consciousness within the class.

As Marx said, the consciousness of the class is like a mole, which slowly -- in the depths of society -- nibbles away at all the political and ideological foundations of the bourgeoisie. Already you can catch the sound of the mole nibbling, but it has yet to come up into the light, even though its existence is beyond dispute. In periods of social calm, a somber mood of passivity, apathy and hesitation seems to grip the workers. While in contrast, the bourgeoisie appears to be at once very active and a spectator watching its own activity, given the nature of this class as one based on exchange relationships. This gives rise to the impression that the bourgeoisie exer­cises a control and domination over society which does not, in fact, correspond to social reality.

At the base of society, among the exploited, doubts and a lack of confidence, mingled with intuition, are always present. Significant events, the most decisive workers’ struggles, and the activity of revolutionaries will transform the doubts into certainties, and the intuitions into conclusions and programs of action for the class.

Sooner or later, the monolithic edifice of bourg­eois order will reel under a new avalanche of proletarian struggle.

There you have in outline, the reply to the init­ial question we posed ourselves. The answer has taken shape: the reflux today is temporary. In response to it, in embryonic form, the struggle and class consciousness itself are developing, allowing us to conclude that the reflux will dis­appear in a new round of proletarian assaults on capitalism.

2. Now to reply to the second question. We have witnessed since 1974-75, an important worsening in the capitalist crisis. Illusions concerning the so-called recovery of 1975 have given way to an explosive increase in unemployment and a gene­ral degradation in the workers’ living standards. Unemployment has not only hit the major branches of production -- steel, shipbuilding, textiles, metallurgy, etc -- but also the principal capita­list countries, such as Germany, France and the US ... It has ceased to affect only the marginal or peripheral sectors of the working class -- some­thing which had prevented the class from becoming conscious of the gravity of the situation -- and now attacks even the biggest concentrations, the vital centers of the proletariat.

This further worsening in the crisis is one of the fundamental factors influencing the class struggle. It opens the workers’ eyes, causing them to become aware of the necessity of defending themselves, and ignoring the promises, programs and solu­tions emanating from the ruling class.

But is the crisis by itself enough to cause new explosions of class struggle? No! The crisis causes both a series of convulsions within the social order of the bourgeoisie, and the revolt of the working class, but it is necessary to under­stand on what level these convulsions are taking place and to what degree the proletariat has attained its own autonomy.

A second condition affecting the class struggle is the political crisis of the ruling class. As a general principle, the bourgeoisie has never had, and will never have, unified class interests. The overriding interest governing the bourgeoisie is its exploitation of the working class, but this gives rise to a constant struggle within the bourgeoisie for the distribution of surplus value. The bourgeoisie is thus divided; it has a thou­sand particular interests which hurl one faction against another.

The general tendency governing the development of state capitalism in the period of decadence neit­her unifies nor homogenizes the bourgeoisie. State capitalism doesn’t eliminate the internal conflicts within the bourgeoisie. On the cont­rary, it magnifies these conflicts, raising them to the level of the social activity of the state as a whole where they gain added resonance and a greater implication in social life.

In reality, the internal conflicts besetting the bourgeoisie could only be attenuated and limited when the capitalist system was expanding into non-capitalist areas of the world, developing its own tendency to socialize and universalize commodity production. But when this process had reached its objective limits at the beginning of this century with the onset of decadence, and when the internal conflicts within the bourgeoisie had themselves multiplied to an impossible degree, state capitalism appeared as a desperate last resort. Through state capitalist policies, the bourgeoisie attempted to regulate its own internal conflicts by means of the concentration of all the strength of capital at a national level. But if the bourgeoisie was successful, temporarily, in limiting the contradictions wracking it as a class, this only meant that these contradictions would reappear later in a sharper, more brutal fashion.

State capitalism has, thus, accentuated the inter­nal conflicts of the bourgeoisie, and these conflicts express themselves in constant political crises which convulse the bourgeois governmental machine. This means:

a. the weakening of the power and cohesion of the state, diminishing its authority, especially over the exploited;

b. the disunity and fragmentation of the bourgeoi­sie, which bring to light the divisions and con­tradictions which afflict it;

c. the viability and coherence of the various programs and alternative programs of the bourgeoisie are locked within a political frame­work of compromise and underhand deals, which try to reconcile the increasingly insurmountable div­ergences dividing the bourgeois class;

d. the impact of anti-proletarian mystifications weaken the more the conflicts, maneuverings, and dirty deals enacted in the bourgeois camp increase and become obvious. This undermines the credi­bility of these mystifications in the eyes of the workers. The political crisis of the bourgeoisie, flowing from the historical crisis of capitalism, facilitates the unfolding of the workers’ struggle since it:

i. demonstrates the incapacity of the bourgeoisie to ‘govern as before’;

ii. breaks the hold that fear and passivity exert over the workers;

iii. exposes the weakness and lack of authority of the bourgeoisie and by implication the possi­bility of a successful struggle against it.

The second precondition -- the political crisis of capital -- is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for class struggle. It requires another: the given relationship of strength between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

If the proletariat has previously been defeated, completely atomized and flattened, neither the development of the economic crisis nor the poli­tical crisis engulfing the bourgeoisie can aid the development of the class struggle. On the contrary, both are converted into the means by which the struggle is annihilated.

If the proletariat has been beaten and atomized already, the economic crisis is the vehicle which carries it further into demoralization and toward a total rout. The crisis is thus converted into an increasingly grave factor adding to the degradation and disintegration of the class. This is what happened after 1929.

But if the proletariat is undefeated, and has already experienced much in its recent struggles as the crisis unfolds, then the crisis adds to the proletariat’s indignation and its understan­ding of the poverty of the bourgeois social order; it can serve to provoke further struggle. The crisis is transformed into a factor acting to mobilize the class against capital, as happened after a certain point in the revolutionary crisis of 1917.

In the same way, if the proletariat finds itself defeated and atomized at a time of political crisis affecting the bourgeoisie, this situation won’t stir the consciousness of the proletariat, but will be used by the ruling class to mystify and mobilize the class behind one or other of the contending bourgeois factions. The 1930s are a good example of how the proletariat was transfor­med into cannon-fodder, caught up as it was in the internal struggles of the bourgeoisie in defense of the Popular Front, ‘socialism in a single country’, or democracy against fascism. It is precisely the pinning down of the proleta­riat in this way that allows the bourgeoisie to limit its internal class conflicts.

But today, the tendency of the proletariat to develop its own political independence and class unity (even in a period of retreat which can give the impression that both have disappeared) is accentuated in the face of the political crisis of the bourgeoisie. It becomes transformed into a factor that leads to disobedience and revolt in the ranks of the workers; the prestige of the ruling class diminishes, animating the struggle and the search for a proletarian alternative to capitalism.

We have said that three big mystifications have been used to immobilize and bridle the offensive of the working class struggle since 1968. These mystifications are:

-- the left in power;

-- the national solution to the crisis;

-- the democratic and anti-terrorist ideologies.

Today we can see that given the combination of the crisis, the political convulsions of the bourgeoisie, and the non-defeat of the proletariat, the weight of these mystifications has reduced and slowly the conditions are appearing for the proletariat to free itself from them.

In a number of countries, the solution of a ‘left government’, put forward by the bourgeoisie as a way to pin down and mystify the class, has -- at least temporarily -- been used up. We don’t doubt for a minute that the bourgeoisie will be able to revitalize this mystification under a different cover. In those countries where there has been little experience of the left in power (in Spain, for example), or in other countries where the left has undergone a restorative spell in opposi­tion (eg Portugal), the bourgeoisie can still resort to this lie with a certain success. But it is incontestable that the ‘Union of the Left’ has lost much of its credibility:

In France: the difficulties the Common Program came up against dealt a strong blow to electoral illusions held by the class, as well as its illu­sions concerning the ‘working class’ or ‘progres­sive’ character of the Common Program. We don’t believe, at least in the short term, that a spell in opposition will increase the abilities of the French Communist Party to mobilize the workers, since its policies rest for the present on an ultra-nationalist footing.

In England: two Labor Party governments in the last twelve years , both tied to tight wage freeze policies and other anti-working class measures, have caused the confidence of the proletariat in the Labor Party to dwindle. The alternative of the Labor Left won’t alter this situation, at least not in the short term.

In Germany: ten years of the Social Democracy in power have depreciated, slowly but effectively, the ‘alternative’ of the left. Its ‘anti­terrorist’ measures, its attacks on the workers’ conditions, and the impact of the workers’ strug­gles in 1978/9 have led to a weakening in the social influence of the left.

In an overall sense, two things undermine the credibility of the left vis-a-vis the working class:

-- the gradually developing lack of faith in electoralism;

-- the requirements imposed on the left by the general political crisis of the bourgeoisie.

Parliament and elections regained some of their previous attraction in the workers’ ranks, rela­tively speaking, between 1972 and 1978. In the face of the not as yet decisive development of the crisis, and the need for overall political alternatives, there was a certain renewal of confidence in electoralism in the working class. The clearest expression of this was the rise of the Common Program of the French left in that period. Its rapid falling apart and subsequent checkmate are the very signs of a changing ten­dency developing within the class -- the develop­ment of an understanding about the mystifying, anti-proletarian role of parliamentarism and electoralism. We can see a certain confirmation, as yet not absolute, of this same tendency in the increase in abstentions registered in the Spanish elections.

There is another factor that has undermined the prestige of the left among the workers: the poli­tics the left is obliged to adopt given the inter­nal conflicts of the bourgeoisie, at both a national and an international level.

At an international level, the inevitable align­ment of the major capitalist countries within the western bloc has prevented their Communist Parties from using a powerful mystification against the working class: the myth of the existence of ‘socialist countries’ and its offshoot that ‘socialism is possible in a single country’. Both of these lies have wrought havoc in the working class in the past.

The famous ‘Eurocommunism’ which took the place of other ideological screens covering Stalinism, like ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’ and ‘proletarian internationalism’, was adopted by the European Communist Parties (as the ICC has shown elsewhere) because they are the most faith­ful representatives of the national capital. Given the constant proof that the needs of the majority of these countries -- and the only option open to them in the middle term -- lay in remaining in the US bloc, the western CPs were forced, more or less strongly, to distance themselves from the Russian bloc.

All of this has obliged the CPs to change their language. But such a change has important reper­cussions on the CPs’ ability to control the proletariat. The new language lacks the concrete content and combative power of the old. ‘Socia­lism within Freedom’; ‘the consolidation and deepening of democracy’; or ‘national unity’ have a less mystifying weight and are distinctly inferior to the mystifications contained in slo­gans such as ‘socialism in a single country’, ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’, or ‘prole­tarian internationalism’, particularly when the crisis is deepening and the class struggle is developing.

At the level of the internal conflicts of the bourgeoisie in each country, the obligation to maintain at all costs the cohesion of the national capital restrains the left, causing it to make ‘concessions’ to backward sectors of the bourgeoi­sie, or those linked to particularistic interests within the national capital. Such concessions have meant that the left has been forced to adopt a more ‘conciliatory’ language, speaking less of ‘class struggle’. It has been forced to moderate its old mystifying slogans (‘state capitalism = socialism’; ‘the right = capitalism’) and has been led more and more to ameliorate its relations with the Church, the army, the fascists and all sorts of factions and institutions of capitalism which are very obviously counter-revolutionary. This deprives the left from using its ‘ringing’, ‘denunciatory’ language. The old mystifications fitted together like cogs in a wheel, but the new lack the same solidity and coherence.

Certainly, it is possible to see within the CPs (and the same tendency also exists within certain sectors of the Socialist Parties), that they seek a cure for their present problems by being in oppo­sition. This will allow them to furnish them­selves with a more combative, working class lan­guage, designed to give them the ability to corral and imprison the proletariat. However, we should not exaggerate the possibilities of their success in doing this despite the enormous enthusiasm this move has given rise to in the leftist milieu. The left finds itself torn between two requirements:

-- on the one side, the increasingly onerous demands of the national capital, on account of the development of the crisis and the tendency towards greater state capitalist measures. This extracts the greatest of compromise from the left. These compromises, whether direct or indirect, between the left and the national government push the left into a politics of ‘moderation’, ‘conciliation’, ‘Eurocommunism’ and ‘national solidarity’;

-- on the other side, the need to imprison and mystify the proletariat forces the left into opposition, and into using a more combative lan­guage -- all within the general context of a wearing away of the old mystifications inherited from the 1930s. The see-sawing of the left part­ies between these two requirements continually reduces their capacity to mystify the class, especially when the class struggle is developing.

It has been shown that mystifications don’t occur in a vacuum; they can’t be administered at will like a drug. On the contrary, in order for mystifications to gain a hold over the working class, they must be rooted in real problems and real necessities, which are then interpreted in a totally idealist fashion within the framework of bourgeois politics.

All the components of the analysis we’ve made above, allow us to see how -- little by little --the material basis of the mystifications of a ‘left government’ and ‘the unity of the workers’ parties’ are being eroded, thereby undermining these pillars of bourgeois order within the working class.

The huge myth of the possibility of a national solution to the crisis has been the strongest weapon for:

-- impeding the independent struggle of the proletariat;

-- inculcating into its ranks the necessity for sacrifice and austerity.

We have seen the material basis for such a mytho­logy in previous sections: the slow development of the crisis, its uneven development in different countries. However, this slow and unequal rhythm of the crisis is beginning to disappear. The important acceleration of 1974-75 has given way to a pure and simple collapse without visible perspective of recovery, while at the same time the conditions for a new acceleration of the crisis continue to develop.

In the first place, the acceleration of the crisis towards pure and simple collapse is sweeping away the possible hopes and illusions which many workers could harbor in the system. The horizon seems to be getting darker and darker, and workers are beginning to understand that the only pers­pective which capitalism offers is a re-run -- only worse -- of the world war and post-war period of our elders, who were told that the ills of that time were the promise of eternal prosperity.

In the second place, the workers of the most prosperous countries, regions and firms, are seeing their conditions of work fall to the same, or similar, levels as those of their less fortunate comrades. We are moving towards an equali­zation of misery for workers in all countries, firms and regions. This is a tendency which always can be seen and which denies any real basis for the mystification of national, regional, technical solutions, nationalizations etc. On the contrary, it encourages the general conditions for the unification and internationalization of struggles. For all its weaknesses and limitations, the objective internationalization of struggles is one of the most outstanding features of the recent wave of workers’ combativity in the central countries of capitalism; we will analyze this in Part Four.

The third great axis of capital’s ideological offensive against the proletariat -- the democratic and anti-terrorist mystification -- is losing its anti-proletarian impact.

It was in Germany in 1977 that we saw the most historic moments of capital’s anti-terrorist campaign and where it was transformed from an ideological intoxication to a concrete mobiliza­tion of the workers. Strikes were proposed as a sign of mourning for the death of the businessman Schleyer. Those strikes had to be reduced to symbolic actions of 1 to 5 minutes; as has been indicated by our German comrades, the workers used these breaks as an opportunity for chatting or smoking a cigarette.

Some months after these events, the strikes of January and April 1978 occurred, and revealed that the anti-terrorist poison had much less impact than was hoped for.

In Italy, the most intense moments of the anti­terrorist campaign occurred during the kidnap of Aldo Moro in April 1978. The Italian comrades reported the same phenomena; the passivity of the workers in the face of summonses to strike and demonstrate; the growth of class conscious­ness in the form of workers’ circles which dis­tanced themselves both from the anti-terrorist ideology and from the myth that a ‘combative worker is an armed worker’ etc, etc. As a matter of fact, the huge strike of hospital workers in October 1978 was a promising harbinger of a proletarian revival in Italy.

In Spain, the gigantic anti-terrorist campaign deployed by the Spanish bourgeoisie immediately after the exploits of the ETA, were a resounding political failure -- heralding the failure of the constitutional referendum and the legislative elections. Thus, the anti-terrorist demonstra­tions called for after a hysterical campaign by the CCOO, UGT, etc, achieved a poor attendance and there was no way of organizing strikes, assemblies or anything else.

The relative, and at the least momentary failure of the anti-terrorist and democratic mystifications is simply the fruit of the obvious decompo­sition of the whole of bourgeois ideology, and the patent gangsterism and racket-like character of all inter-bourgeois confrontations. Thus, these intestinal struggles cannot be presented as easily as before under the disguise of a great moral ideal capable of mobilizing the proletariat and the whole of the population.

Concerning this third point, the employment of new mystifications could have great importance, as we have just seen, by combining mystification and repression.

One of the most important problems confronting the bourgeoisie is the reappearance of clashes between the proletariat and the unions. Since recovered the initiative between 1972 and 1978, the bourgeoisie’s union bastion seems to be veering again into a period of erosion and of violent confrontations with the workers. The signs seen in the Italian hospital workers’ strike are beginning to be extended, although very weakly, to France, Britain, Spain etc. Do the unions have new bases for ideologically confronting the proletariat?

Like, in general, their mother parties, the unions are going through a rest-cure in opposition in a great many countries. Such opposition remedies allow them to recuperate their ‘combative’ and ‘proletarian’ image, which gives them, for a certain time, a capacity to lead strikes and to defuse them with more or less success. Although they will not be able to break up the more radical movements, they will at least try to keep up the idea that the unions may be tail-ending the struggles, but they are still with them. One myth which may become strong is that unions and assemblies or workers’ councils are not incompatible.

Another tendency which is beginning to show itself is that the unions are beginning to distance themselves from parties and politics. The cur­rents of ‘revolutionary’ syndicalism and an anarcho-syndicalism may be acquiring a certain prestige as the last effort of the union appara­tus to recuperate some of its old stature. The rebirth of the CNT or the USI in Italy is in no way a movement by syndicalism towards proletarian positions, but a rejuvenation of capital’s union bulwark in order to confront the proletariat more effectively.

Finally, the tendency towards a single, unified union machine is another element which, although very hackneyed, is beginning to be put forward as a ‘guarantee’ for an ‘effective’ and ‘combative’ trade unionism.

Thus we can say that we are witnessing the bank­ruptcy of the bourgeois mystifications which momentarily cut short the proletarian resurgence in the period 1965-72; what’s more, looking at things at a historical level, we are seeing the beginning of the collapse of all the myths of fifty years of counter-revolution. Obviously the weight of such deceits will not disappear over­night. On the contrary, their pernicious effects will still linger on in the ranks of the prolet­ariat.

Ideologies and mystifications are engendered by capitalist relations of production, but they then become an active factor in the conservation and defense of the existing order, in such a way that they acquire a degree of relative autonomy, which allows them to survive -- for a certain time, and at particular levels -- the collapse of the social conditions which created them and made them poss­ible.

And so the weight of the intense ‘brainwashing’ of the recent years of the bourgeoisie’s offensive, of all the theoretical and ideological effects of fifty years of counter-revolution, is still going to be very strong and is going to undermine the strength of many workers’ struggles.

“Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted. The tradition of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living. And, just when they appear to be engaged in the revolutionary transformation of themselves and their material surroundings, in the creation of something which does not yet exist, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they timidly conjure up the spirits of the past to help them; they borrow their names, slogans and costumes so as to stage the new world-historical scene in this venerable disguise and borrowed language.” (Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte)

The effects of these ‘dead generations’ is going to be considerable and is going to weigh very heavily on the proletarian revival:

First; there will continue to exist over a cer­tain time, a lack of correspondence between the gravity of the crisis and the strength of the prol­etarian response.

Second; there will be a considerable difference between the objective strength of the movement and the consciousness it has of its own strength.

Third; the gap between the size and strength of revolutionary organizations, and the maturation of the conditions for revolution, is greater than it was in the past.

But we must not lose sight of the fact that the counter-tendencies which have just been indicated do not cancel out the general course towards a new world proletarian revolutionary upsurge which opened in the 1960s. Indeed, the conscious and global recognition of all the dangers, risks and weaknesses which confront our class must be the material basis for confronting and eliminating them.

Another consequence of the weight of the ‘dead generations’ is that not only do we suffer from them to the hilt in the first steps of the prol­etarian revival which is now maturing; above all, they will be a powerful negative factor in a period of insurrection and revolution. This weight of the past generations will form the material basis for all the forces which will try to divert, divide, undermine and weaken the prol­etarian revolution. These forces will constitute capital’s fifth column against the revolutionary proletariat.

And so the slow decline of bourgeois ideology and mystifications which we are seeing today does not mean that the most patient, intransigent, tenacious and detailed denunciation of these mys­tifications is no longer needed. Today, as yest­erday, the weapons of critique will continue to be the necessary preparation for the critique by weapons of this criminal capitalist order.

4. Balance sheet of the recent struggles

Before defining the perspectives which we can draw out of all the conditions which we have analyzed, it is necessary to make a balance sheet of the proletarian upsurges of October/November 1978 to January/March 1979, to justify our consideration that they are indicators of a general revival of class struggle. This balance sheet must perforce be provisional and limited given that we lack distance from the period and that many of the struggles still have not finished.

The most important lessons to draw out are:

1. First and Foremost: The Objective Internation­alization of the Struggles.

Important strikes, relatively of course, but some as serious as those in Britain, have broken out simultaneously in the central countries of capit­alism: France, Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy, USA...

On the other hand, the re-emergence of the prol­etariat in the central countries has been accomp­anied by the continuation of the struggles in the peripheral countries: Iran, Morocco, Mexico, Saudi-Arabia, Zaire, Polynesia, Jamaica ... are the most recent examples.

Crystallizing the recognition by the class of this internationalization, we can see how, in Belgium and Luxembourg, there have been solidarity strikes with the workers in Lorraine. Without being the most adequate demonstration of the international solidarity of the proletariat, it is, at the very least, a very important step.

There is a general lesson in this international­ization; internationalist agitation, the defense of internationalism, is going to rest more and more on concrete and relatively immediate events and experiences. It will cease to be a ‘theoret­ical’ or distant question as it has appeared until now.

We said in our ‘Report on the World Situation’ of January 1978 that one of the characteristics of the next proletarian revival must be:

“A greater consciousness of the international character of struggle, which will express itself in practice through movements of inter­national solidarity, the sending of delegations of workers in struggle from one country to another (and not of union delegations).” (International Review No 13)

Up to a certain point, and still with very many limitations, this tendency is beginning to loom up on the horizon.

2. The Re-emergence of the Open Confrontations between the Proletariat and the Unions.

The union apparatus, hard hit by the blows of the first proletarian waves of the 1960s, has been able to refurbish its image, consciously taking advantage of the weaknesses of that proletarian wave, and restoring quite a strong control over the workers since 1972.

In the recent struggles we can see something small, but promising:

-- the appearance of extra-union strikes;

-- the autonomous initiative of the workers is reappearing, without waiting for union calls;

-- there are beginning to be frontal blows bet­ween the unions and the proletariat.

These three tendencies, clearly closely connected, are minor aspects of the totality of struggles, but, though the example which they give, the force which they have taken and the dynamic which they appear to open, their qualitative weight is far superior to their weak numerical weight.

The rupture and confrontation between the prolet­ariat and unions is going to be a very arduous process but for a whole period it will become a central axis of the class struggle.

We say that it is going to be arduous because the unions are, as is known, the principal bastion of bourgeois order against the working class, and their weapons of deceit and control tend to be the most refined. In many ways the unions which today confront the working class are not the same ones the workers confronted in the 1960s: their arsenal of mystification and their machinery of control are far superior and are much more complete.

As a result, the rupture will be more difficult and painful, but at the same time much more dec­isive, because it will have, without the ambiguit­ies and obstacles of the past, a completely polit­ical and revolutionary character. If in the struggles of the 1960s, the political potential of the break with unionism could be camouflaged and diverted by the myths of ‘debureaucratization’ or of union unity, today, those myths are beginn­ing to crumble and are much more difficult to use in stifling the class struggle.

Although in the more radical and advanced strugg­les, a total and absolute rupture, without any ambiguities, between the strikers and the unions is vital, we must not see the formal fact of this rupture as a thermometer to measure the strength and effect of each concrete struggle.

In the majority of cases, there will tend to be a balance of forces between the proletariat and the unions. Crystallizing in different ways at a formal level, this balance of forces will represent the future and the limitations of the strug­gle. In the worst cases, it will be the dominat­ion of the union organizations which will indicate the loss of all immediate perspectives for the struggle, in the best of cases it will be the triumph of anti-union strike committees which will open up a dynamic for the radicalization of the struggle.

Revolutionaries will have to fight from the very beginning for strikes to be organized in assembl­ies. They will have to show why the assemblies should be really sovereign and why there should not be the least ambiguity in the rupture and confrontation with the unions. This doesn’t mean that the dimensions, consequences and perspectives of a struggle will have to be measured exclusively by the concrete form in which, in a given moment, the balance of forces between the proletariat and the unions has crystallized.

The danger of the simple defense of forms, without sufficiently linking form to content, is that it can provide a basis for a new bourgeois deceit which we may see in the future: the creation of ‘anti-union committees’ based on ‘assemblies’ but with identical functions to the unions. In real­ity, with these myths, the attempt is not simply to oppose struggles, but, above all, to limit their scope, block their growth, divert their content by emphasizing extra-union forms in themselves.

In the ‘Report on the World Situation’ we foresaw a second aspect of the future proletarian revival:

“A much clearer break with the unions than in the past, and its corollary: the tendency towards a wider self-organization of the working class (sovereign general assemblies, elected and revocable strike committees, co-ordination of these between places of work and within the same city, region, etc).” (International Review No 13)

This is what we are now beginning to see, but there’s a long way to go and many mystifications to be confronted.

3. All the Struggles have Constituted a Confront­ation between the Proletariat and the Austerity Plans of Capital.

This is the material basis of their objective internationalization. Thus these struggles are a harbinger of proletarian resistance against the tendencies towards austerity and imperialist war which capitalism carries within itself. They establish the basis for the transformation of the sharpening capitalist crisis into a revolutionary crisis.

We have seen something that the years of social calm have covered up somewhat: that proletarian struggle against austerity is possible, that it can bear fruit, although temporarily. The proletarian remedy to the crisis is neither to accept sacrifices nor to limit its demands in order to ‘reduce unemployment’; it is on the contrary to deepen the class struggle.

4. A Point that Some of the Struggles of Recent Times have Shown is that the Proletariat is the Historical Candidate for the Emancipation of the Whole of Humanity.

Iran has shown that the proletarian struggle gives a completely distinct, uncontrollable impetus to the perspectiveless revolt of the marginal strata, poor peasants and impoverished petty bourgeoisie. Iran has posed a possibility, a potential which the proletariat contains irrespective of the fact that, in Iran, this potential hasn’t been completely realized.

That old principle of the workers’ movement -- the proletariat is the only class capable of emancipating itself and of emancipating the whole of humanity -- becomes a real, concrete problem in this recent period. After fifty years of counter-revolution that famous phrase by Lenin is once again becoming a reality:

“The strength of the proletariat in a capita­list country is infinitely more than its numerical proportion within the population. And this is so because the proletariat occu­pies a key position at the heart of the capi­talist economy and also because the proleta­riat expresses, in the economic and political domain, the real interests of the immense majority of the laboring population under capitalist domination.”

During the hospital workers’ strikes in Italy, the workers carried a placard which read: “WE ARE NOT ACTING AGAINST THE SICK; WE ARE ACTING AGAINST THE UNIONS, THE MANAGEMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT!”

This preoccupation of the proletariat with win­ning to its struggle all the oppressed and exploited strata is a promising sign of the general maturation of the consciousness of the class. But more than this, it’s the conscious­ness of a problem the class is going to be posed with again and again in the future; the bour­geoisie is aware that the intervention of the proletariat can give an uncontrollable character to the protests of the oppressed strata; it is definitely conscious that the working class can direct the unrest of the oppressed strata towards the revolution. That’s why one of the essential policies of the bourgeoisie is, and will be, to neutralize the marginal strata, to isolate them, to separate them politically from the proletariat and, if possible, to set them against the proletariat.

In Britain, the bourgeoisie has mounted a hyst­erical campaign against the strikes of the lorry drivers and the public service workers. It has mounted demonstrations of housewives and has organized ‘citizen’ pickets against the workers’ strike pickets. The whole axis of its campaign has been to arouse petty bourgeois sentiments, the paranoia of these strata, to use them against the proletariat.

The errors which have been made by some revolu­tionary groups of seeing these strata as enemies of the proletariat must be eliminated. In them­selves they are vacillating strata who tend towards decomposition and proletarianization; in themselves they have no will of their own. If the bourgeoisie succeeds in using the reactionary characteristics of their condition and winning them to utopian program for ‘non-monopoly capitalism’ etc, then they will be channeled against the proletariat. But if the proletariat, without yielding an inch to program which benefit the petty bourgeoisie, struggles autono­mously and makes them see that they have no al­ternative, no other future, then these strata can be won over to the struggle against capital.

This perspective does not in any way diminish the autonomy of the proletariat and is the concrete answer to the mystifications which the bourgeoi­sie will launch very frequently in the future:

-- the proletariat mustn’t ‘prejudice’ the people in its struggle;

-- the proletariat must sacrifice itself for the triumph of the people in general;

-- the movement of the proletariat and the movement of the people are identical.

Understanding the need for the proletariat to win over the marginal and oppressed strata doesn’t mean:

Mean

•

-- lowering the maximum program of the prole­tariat or any of its immediate demands;

-- supporting the reactionary and illusory programs which derive from the social position of the petty bourgeoisie;

-- dissolving the proletariat into the ‘popular movement’.

 

5. Class Violence and the Struggle against Repression.

 

As we saw earlier, bourgeois repression is going to be more and more open, massive and systematic. The problem of struggle against repression and of class violence will be posed in all its sharpness. On this point we can draw out two very clear lessons from the living experiences in the recent period:

1. The famous position of ‘workers’ terrorism, which some comrades within the ICC, the PCI (Programma Comunista) and people of the ‘Area de la Autonomia’ in Italy have seen as an effec­tive means for preparing the struggle or for triggering off workers’ consciousness, has dissol­ved like sugar in water in the face of recent experiences. In Iran, mass strikes and revolts have paralyzed the repression of one of the most powerful armies in the world, they have sharpened its internal convulsions, and have made a consid­erable part of their ultra-modern armaments fall into ‘uncontrollable hands’. In France, what was the main defense of the workers of an occupied factory faced with a police blockade and the management militia? It was precisely the huge demonstration of the workers of other factories surrounding the besiegers. Our theorists of ‘workers’ terrorism’ will have seen that their vaunted ‘combat groups’ have not appeared any­where and that class violence, which they called ‘an abstract and mystifying innovation’, has appeared in a clear and concrete form.

2. Contrary to the mystifications which the opposition factions of the bourgeoisie will, without a doubt, launch, the major defense against repression is not, and never will be, legal and juridical guarantees of the ‘right to strike’ etc, but the proletariat’s own struggle. It will not be a ‘democratic’, ‘national’, or ‘people’s’ police; as the PCF shouts to the four winds, but mass assaults of workers on the police stations to release arrested comrades from the police cells, it will not be a left government which supposedly will be ‘less repressive’ than one of the right, but the workers breaking out of all the union, legal, and leftist straitjackets.

 

6. The Proletariat as a Brake on Imperialist War.

 

Iran has confirmed a tendency which has manifested itself, although still in a weak and embryonic way, in the whole international proletariat; that it is the only world force capable of opposing the tendency to imperialist war. In Iran, a repository for ultra-sophisticated and modern armaments has found itself totally disorganized, faced with the impact of class confrontations. And it cannot be said that this repository, abandoned by the US bloc, has now passed into the USSR bloc; the latter at least for the moment, has kept its distance for fear of getting its hand bitten. In Egypt and Israel, one of the factors which has moved the bourgeoisie to search for peace at any price has been the prole­tarian struggles in both countries, The Morocco/Algeria skirmish has been held back not only by the turn taken by inter-imperialist maneuvers, but also by the bitter strikes which happened in Algeria in May and June 1978 and more recently in Morocco. Cuba hasn’t got such a free hand to be the pawn of Russian imperialism thanks to the strikes and social convulsions which took place in April last year. The strike of the French armaments workers in June 1978 directly hit the war industry, as has the recent strike of the British atomic submarine shipbuilders. It remains to be seen what will be the response of the proletarians of Russia, China and Vietnam against the preparations for war, but the road of proletarian resistance has begun to open up.

 

7. Perspectives and Intervention by Revolutionaries

 

The perspective opening up is one of a new offensive by the world proletariat. As we have been able to see throughout this report, we have some powerful indicators, but we must not lose sight of the fact that the perspective is not immediate and that the road in that direction is bristling with various grave difficulties. With­out forgetting the fragility of this new proletarian impulse, we must take into account that it has much greater repercussions than anything that a purely immediatist view could understand. We are at the beginning of the end of the epoch of counter-revolution. All the historical condi­tions which have allowed fifty years of counter­revolution are beginning to effectively dissolve before the impulse of the capitalist crisis and the slow revival of proletarian struggle. The struggles of the sixties were skirmishes which opened the first breach in the monolith of the counter-revolution and prepared its future downfall.

This means that revolutionaries must:

-- avoid false quarrels as the First Congress of the ICC indicated, and strengthen the effort towards discussion and regroupment, with the perspective of providing the revolutionary energies maturing in the class with the most unified framework possible;

-- reinforce the programmatic framework at all levels and thus the work of intervention;

-- become an active and positive factor in the class struggle, surpassing the previous stage of re-appropriating the positions of the class, of programmatic and organizational reconstruction.

5. Perspectives

The struggles which we have just mentioned are preparing a new worldwide proletarian offensive, for which we can draw out the following perspec­tives:

1. International Generalization of the Proletarian Struggle.

We want to underline this point which we raised previously, emphasizing that while the focus of the struggle has once again shifted to the big working class concentrations of Europe and the US, this doesn’t mean that there has been a reflux in the Third World. On the contrary, the struggle there has become more intense.

Brazil, one of the most important proletarian concentrations in the periphery, was hit by major strikes in May 1978, and particularly in March 1979, where a general solidarity strike broke out in Sao Paolo, with massive general assemblies of 50,000 and 70,000 workers against police repression. In Iran, the dockers’ strike in Korramanshar-Abadan as well as the movement of the unemployed show that Khomeini and his clique haven’t managed to put an end to the proletarian struggle. In South America, militant strikes have taken place in Mexico, Peru, E1 Salvador, Bolivia, Argentina, Colombia, as well as in Jamaica and Guyana. In Africa, the Moroccan proletariat has fought through a wave of strikes outside the unions and the bourgeoisie’s National Unity. We should also mention the workers’ strikes and revolts in Liberia, Zaire, the Central African Empire and Uganda before and after the fall of Amin. In Asia, there have been strikes in India, the big oil workers’ strike in Dehrram, Saudi Arabia, and revolts in China. In the Eastern bloc, despite the blocking of information by the Iron Curtain, news of strikes in East Germany, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia has filtered in.

The simultaneous response of the proletariat in the five continents provides the best conditions for the class to affirm its international unity and develop its revolutionary alternative.

2. The Slow Development of the Class Movement.

It’s possible to feel disappointed by the slow, difficult way the proletarian offensive is evolving. But this slowness isn’t necessarily a sign of weakness but evidence of the depth and breadth of the class confrontations that lie ahead. Unlike in the struggles of the sixties, the proletariat is no longer dealing with an enemy that has been somewhat surprised by the sudden reawakening of the proletariat after so many years of counter-revolution. It’s facing up to a capitalism armed to the teeth and prepared to meet workers’ struggles with all its ideological, political and repressive machinery. On the side of the proletariat, the spectacular but short-lived outbursts of the sixties have -- as the recent battles in Longwy and Denain have shown -- cleared the way for a more tenacious struggle, where the constant attempts of the unions, police and government to bury the move­ment have failed one after the other, leaving the field free for an intermittent agitation which is extremely difficult to discourage. It’s important that we make it clear that the slowness of the class movement in no way facilitates a gradualist, step-by-step approach. We will see a remorseless accumulation of struggles, blow-­for-blow confrontations, which will prepare the way for more profound and radical proletarian explosions.

 

3. The Capitalist Response to the Struggle.

 

Repression is more and more becoming the capita­list response to class struggle. Italy proves this, with the massive arrests of anti-union militants in the factories, organized by all the forces of the ‘historic compromise’: bosses, police, unions, Communist Party and Christian Democrats. In France, we’ve not only seen the brutal repression of struggles by the CRS, but also trials against the proletarian fighters arrested on the 23 March demo in Paris or after the battles in Longwy and Denain. But we shouldn’t forget that repression will go hand in hand with a strengthening of mystification, thanks to the ‘opposition rest cure’ of the left and unions, through which they’ll try to refur­bish a more combative, working class image. Their aim will be to destroy workers’ struggles from within, not simply holding back or side-tracking the proletarian train before it gets going, but derailing it at full speed. However, this ten­dency has objective limits, limits imposed by the deepening of the bourgeoisie’s internal conflicts and by the frenzied rhythm of the crisis. The fact that the left has to deal with these con­flicts, with the crisis, makes its task of mysti­fication much more difficult. As the crisis brings out all the contradictions of the bour­geoisie at all levels of society, the tendency will be for the state more and more to shed its ideological garb and strengthen out-and-out repression; and this will have to be supported by the ‘Fifth Column’ inside the workers’ movement: the left, the leftists and the unions.

4. The Clear Affirmation of the Proletarian Alternative to the Historic Crisis of Capital.

If 1979 has shown anything, it’s been the end­less spectacle of the inexorable barbarism of capital: nuclear power stations, the Indochinese refugees, Skylab, the horrible massacres in Nicaragua, the ‘instructive’ spectacle of the ‘Islamic revolution’ in Iran ... All this has underlined the irremediable decadence of the system, the collapse of capitalist civilization into a bloodbath. This means that the masks the bourgeoisie has been using for years to hide this barbarism and disorientate the proletariat are now falling to pieces: ‘Socialism in one country’, ‘national liberation’, ‘democracy’, ‘the rights of man’ ... In this putrid atmos­phere which is stifling and poisoning humanity, at the head of all the disinherited of the earth, the poor peasants, the marginal strata, the proletariat is beginning to affirm itself as the only revolutionary force, the only hope of liberation from the barbarism of capital:

-- because its ‘modest’ and ‘humble’ defensive struggles, so despised by everyone, including many revolutionary groups, show that it is possible to push back the attacks of capital, to respond to them blow for blow, to undermine the blind laws of the system;

-- because, with its practical struggles, its formidable examples of solidarity and class violence, the proletariat shows that it alone has an answer to repression, wars, and all the other effects of capitalist barbarism which plague humanity.

 

Conclusion

 

All the political and ideological weapons of the bourgeoisie (mass-media, parties of the left and right, unions ...) try to fill our heads with the image of the proletariat as an amorphous mass of hopelessly passive citizens. But the impetus of the crisis, the class consciousness reawakened by the struggles of the sixties, the weight of two centuries of heroic proletarian struggles, the very position of our class at the centre of society -- all this is pushing the proletariat to react against this tissue of passivity and impotence and open the door to the world revolution.

The road is going to be more difficult than ever; there are going to be bitter moments of hesita­tion and temporary defeat; but we must go down that road, because it’s a question of life or death, because it’s the only way out of the nightmare of capitalism.

COMMUNISM OR BARBARISM! WORKERS – IT’S YOUR TURN TO SPEAK!

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • Proletarian struggle [136]

International Review no.19 - 4th quarter 1979

  • 3233 reads
Contents of International Review 19.

The rise in oil prices: an effect not the cause of the crisis

  • 3670 reads

Since the end of 1973 western governments and economists have pointed to the rise in oil prices as their main explanation for the economic crisis and its consequences: unemployment and inflation. When companies close down, the work­ers thrown into the street are told: ‘oil is to blame’; when workers see their real wages shrink under the pressure of inflation, the mass media tells them ‘it’s because of the oil crisis’. The bourgeoisie is using the oil crisis as a pretext, an alibi, to make the exploited swallow the economic crisis. In the propaganda of the ruling class, the oil crisis is presented as a sort of natural disaster men can do nothing about, except passively submit to those calamities called unemployment and inflation.

But ‘nature’ has nothing to do with the fact that oil merchants are now selling their goods at a higher price to other merchants. The oil increase is not nature’s doing but the consequence of capitalist trade relations.

Like all exploiting classes in history, the capi­talist class attributes its privileges to the will of nature. The economic laws which make them the masters of society are, in their mind, as natural and unchangeable as the law of gravity. But with time these laws have become outmoded in terms of the productive forces; when their con­tinuation can only cause crises which plunge soc­iety into misery and desolation, the privileged class always sees this as ‘nature’s’ fault: nat­ure is not generous enough or there are too many human beings on earth, etc. Never in their wildest imagination would they want to conceive that the existing economic system is at fault, is anachronistic and obsolete.

At the end of the Middle Ages, in the decadence of the feudal system, monks announced the end of the world because the existing fertile lands had been exhausted. Today we are told ten times a day that if everything is going wrong, it is because existing oil sources have been exhausted.

Has nature really run out of oil?

In March 1979, the oil producing countries of OPEC met together to solemnly proclaim that they were going to reduce oil production once again. They are lowering production in order to maintain price levels, just as peasants may destroy their surplus fruit to avoid a collapse in prices.

Europe risks facing an oil scarcity in 1980 they tell us. Perhaps, but who still believes that it is because of a natural, physical scarcity?

The OPEC countries do not produce at capacity, far from it. For several years now new oil fields have been put to use in Alaska, the North Sea, and Mexico. Almost every week new oil depo­sits are discovered somewhere in the world. Furthermore it is said that oil deposits trapped in shale, in a form more costly to extract, are enormous in comparison to known oil deposits today. How then can we talk about a physical scarcity of oil?

It is perfectly logical to think that one day a certain ore or other raw material will be exhausted because of man’s unlimited use of it. But this has nothing to do with the fact that oil merchants decide to reduce capacity so as to maintain profits. In the first case it really is a question of the end of nature’s bounty; in the second it is simply the case of a vulgar speculative operation on the market.

If the world economic situation was otherwise ‘healthy’, if the only problem was simply the physical and unexpected exhaustion of oil in nature, then we would not be seeing a slowdown in the growth of trade and investment as we do today but a huge economic boom instead: the world’s adaptation to new forms of energy would set off a veritable industrial revolution. Certainly there would be restructuration crises here and there with factories closing down and lay-offs in some sectors, but these closures and lay-offs would find an immediate compensation in the creation of new jobs.

Today we are witnessing something completely different: countries producing oil the most pro­fitably are reducing production; the factories which close are not replaced by new ones; invest­ment in new forms of energy remains negligible in most major countries.

The idea of a physical lack of oil in nature is used by economists and the mass media to explain the dizzying rise of oil prices in 1974 and in 1979. But how can the spectacular rise in the world market prices of all basic materials in 1974 or in 1977 be explained? How can the fever­ish rise in basic metals like copper, lead, and tin since the beginning of the year be explained? If we follow the ‘experts’ of the bourgeoisie, we would have to believe that oil is not the only thing that is giving out in nature, but also most metals and even food products. Between 1972 and 1974 the price index of metals and ore exported in the world (aside from oil) has more than doub­led; food prices have almost tripled. In the second quarter of 1977 these food products cost three times more on the world market than in 1972. We would have to believe that nature is drying up all of a sudden not just in oil but in almost everything else; this is just absurd.

The theory of the physical exhaustion of nature hardly manages to explain the rise in oil prices, but it has even greater difficulty explaining why the real price of oil, as paid by the impor­ting, industrialized countries, (that is the price paid taking into account the growth of world inflation and the evolution of the value of the dollar1 decreased regularly before 1973-74 and afterwards, until 1978. Between 1960 and 1972 the real price of imported crude oil decreased 11% for Japan, 14% for France and 20% for Germany! In 1978 this same price dec­reased in relation to 1974 or 1975 levels by 14% for Japan, 6% for France and 11% for Germany.

How could the price of a raw material that is supposedly being physically exhausted be dimini­shing to the point of obliging its producers to artificially reduce their production so as to avoid a collapse of prices?

If we want to understand the present ups and downs in the prices of raw materials we cannot look to the greater or lesser generosity of Mother Nature, but to the decomposition of capitalist trade. We are faced with not the sudden discovery of a grotesque natural scarcity but a huge speculative operation on the raw materials market. This is not a new phenomenon: all major capitalist crises are accompanied by speculative fever in the raw materials market.

Speculation: a typical characteristic of capitalist economic crises

The real source of all capitalist profits resides in the exploitation of workers in the course of the production process. Profit, surplus value, is the surplus labor extracted from wage earners. When everything goes well, that is when what is produced gets sold at a sufficient rate of profit, capitalists reinvest these profits in the prod­uction process. The accumulation of capital is this process of transforming the surplus labor of the workers into capital: new machines, new raw materials, new wages, to exploit new quanti­ties of living labor. That is the way capita­lists ‘make money work’ as they call it.

But when things are going badly, when production does not give enough of a return because markets are lacking, this mass of capital in money form that is seeking investments, takes refuge in speculative operations. It is not that capita­lists prefer this sort of operation where risks are so great that you face ruin from one day to the next; on the contrary they would prefer the ‘peaceful’ road of exploitation through produc­tion. But when there is less and less profitable investment available in production, what can you do? Keeping your money in the vault means seeing its value diminish everyday due to mone­tary erosion. Speculation is a risky placement but it can bring fast and big returns. That is why every capitalist crisis is witness to an extraordinary degree of speculation. The law supposedly prohibits speculation but those who speculate are the very ones who make the laws.

Very often this speculation polarizes around raw materials. In the economic crisis of 1836, Beagle, the director of the US Bank, taking advantage of the fact that the demand for cotton in Great Britain was still strong, bought up the whole cotton crop to sell it at exorbitant prices to the British later. Unhappily for him, the demand for cotton collapsed in 1839 under the pressure of the crisis, and the cotton stocks carefully gathered in the heat of the speculative burst were worthless. Cotton prices collapsed on the world market, adding to the already large number of bankruptcies (1000 banks went bust in the US).

After provoking a speculative price rise in raw materials, the crisis has the effect of collapsing prices because of a lack of demand. These sudden bursts of rising raw material prices followed by a dizzying fall are typical of spec­ulation in a time of crisis. This phenomenon was particularly clear in the crises of 1825, 1836 and 1867 in cotton and wool; in the crises of 1847 and 1857 in wheat; in 1873, 1900 and 1912 in steel and cast-iron; in 1907 in copper; and in 1929 on almost all metals.

Speculation is not the work of isolated, shady individuals operating illegally, or of greedy little stockpilers, as the press likes to paint them. The speculators are governments, nation states, banks large and small, major industries, in short, those who hold most of the monetary mass seeking profits.

In times of crisis speculation is not just a 'temptation' capitalists are capable of avoiding. A banker who has the responsibility of paying interest to thousands of savings accounts has no choice. When profits are getting rare, you have to take them where you can get them. The hypocritical scruples of times of prosperity, when laws are made 'prohibiting speculation', disappear and the most respectable financial institutions throw themselves headlong into the speculative whirlpool. In the capitalist world the one who makes the profits survives. The others are eaten up. When speculation becomes the only way to make profits, the law becomes: he who does not speculate or speculates badly is destroyed.

What is being called the oil crisis is in fact a huge world speculative operation.

Why oil?

Oil has not been the only object of speculation in recent years. Since the devaluation of the pound sterling in 1967, speculation has been increasing in the entire world, attacking an over­growing list of products: currencies, construc­tion, raw materials (vegetable or mineral), gold, etc. But oil speculation is particularly impor­tant because of its financial repercussions. It has set off movements of capital of such size and rapidity as to be largely unprecedented in history. In a few months, a gigantic flow of dollars went from Europe and Japan towards the oil-producing countries. Why did speculation on oil bring such large profits?

First of all because modern industry relies on electricity and electricity relies essentially on oil. No country can produce without oil. Speculation based on the blackmail of an oil shortage is blackmail with economic clout.

But oil is not only indispensable for production and construction. It is also indispensable for destruction and war. Most of the modern arsenal of weapons, from tanks to bombers, from aircraft carriers to trucks and jeeps, works on oil. To arm yourself is not only to produce weapons but to control the means of making these weapons work as long as you need them. The armaments race is also the oil race.

Oil speculation therefore touches a product of primary economic and military importance. That is one of the reasons for its success -- at least for the moment. But it is not the only reason.

The blessing of American capital

One of the favorite themes of the new commenta­tors’ gibberish is the oil crisis as ‘the revenge of the under-developed countries against the rich ones’. By a simple decision to reduce their production and raise the price of oil, these countries, who are part of the victims of the third world, previously condemned to produce and sell raw materials cheaply to the industrialized countries, have got the great powers by the throat. A real David and Goliath story for our times!

Reality is quite another thing. Behind the oil crisis is US capital. Just consider two impor­tant and obvious facts:

1. The major powers of OPEC are very strongly under the domination of US imperialism. The governments of Saudi Arabia, the major oil expor­ter in the world, of Iran in the time of the Shah, or Venezuela, to take only a few examples, do not make any crucial decisions without the agreement of their powerful ‘protector’.

2. Almost all world trade in oil is under the control of the large American oil companies. The profits made by these companies, because of the variations in oil prices, are so enormous that the US government recently had to organize a parody of government hearings on the television to divert the anger of a population which is feeling the effects of austerity programs jus­tified by the ‘oil crisis’ onto the ‘Seven Sisters’ -- the major oil companies.

If this is not enough to prove the decisive role played by the US in the oil price rises, consider some of the advantages the strongest economic power drew from the ‘oil crisis’:

1. On the international market, oil is paid in US dollars. Concretely this means that the US can buy oil simply by printing more paper money, while other countries have to buy dollars.2

2. The US imports only 50% of the oil it needs. Their direct competitors on the world market -- Europe and Japan -- have to import almost all their oil; any price rise in oil therefore has a much greater effect on production costs of Euro­pean and Japanese goods. The competitiveness of US goods is thus automatically increased. It is not an accident that US exports have increased enormously after each oil price rise to the detri­ment of their competitors.

3. But it is surely on the military level that the US has benefited the most from the oil crisis.

As we have seen, oil remains a major instrument of war. The oil price rise allowed for the pro­fitable exploitation of new oil fields in or near the US (Mexico, Alaska and other US deposits). In this way US military potential is less depen­dent on oil deposits in the Middle East which are far from Washington, and close to Moscow. In addition, the huge oil revenues have financed the ‘Pax Americana’ in the Middle East through the intermediary of Saudi Arabia. In fact Egypt’s costly passage into the US bloc was partly paid for through aid from Saudi Arabia in the name of Arab brotherhood. Saudi Arabia directly influen­ced the policy of countries like Egypt, Iraq, Syria (during the Lebanon conflict) through their economic ‘aid’ financed out of oil revenues. Saudi Arabian financial aid to the PLO is not entirely foreign to the budding rapprochement between the PLO and the US bloc.

American imperialism has thus given itself the luxury of having its competitors and allies, Eur­ope and Japan, finance its international policy. Thus for economic and military reasons the US has an interest in letting oil prices rise and even encouraging this.

The attitude of the Carter government during the burst of speculation brought on by the interrup­tion of deliveries from Iran is very indicative. While Germany and France were trying to choke off the speculation developing on the ‘free market’ in Rotterdam in the first half of 1979, the US government cynically announced it was prepared to buy any amount of oil at a higher price than any reached at the Dutch port. Despite special envoys from Bonn and Paris, sent to Washington to protest against this ‘knife in the back’, the White House would not go back on its offer.

Whatever the different reasons for the price rise, one issue remains: what are the effects on the world economy? Is the official propaganda right in saying that the oil crisis is respon­sible for the economic crisis?

The effects of the oil price rise

There is no doubt that the rise in the price of raw materials is a handicap for the profitability of any capitalist enterprise. For industrial capital raw materials constitute an overhead expense. If expenses increase, the profit mar­gin proportionally decreases. Industrial capi­tal has only two ways of fighting against this decline in profits:

-- reducing overhead costs in other ways especially by reducing the price of labor;

-- compensating for overhead costs by increasing the sale price.

Capitalists usually use the two methods at the same time. They try to reduce their overheads by imposing austerity policies on the workers; they try to maintain profits by increasing prices and thus fuelling inflation. Thus it is certain that the oil price rise is a factor forcing each national capital to make new efforts towards maximizing profits: eliminating the least productive sectors, reducing wages, concen­trating capital further. It is thus true that oil prices are partly responsible for increased inflation.

The oil increase is indeed an exacerbating factor in the crisis. But contrary to what the propaganda of the media disseminates, it was only that -- an exacerbating factor and not the cause or even the major cause of the economic crisis.

The economic crisis did not begin with the oil increases. Oil speculation is merely one of the consequences of the economic disorders which have plagued capitalism since the end of the 1960s. To hear bourgeois ‘experts’ speak, one would think that before the fatal date of the second half of 1973 everything was rosy in the world economy. To justify their austerity policies, these gentlemen forget or pretend to forget that at the beginning of 1973, before the big oil price increases, the inflation rate had doubled in the US and tripled in Japan in less than a year. They pretend to forget that between 1967 and 1973 capitalism went through two serious recessions: one in 1967 (the annual growth rate of production fell by half in the US -- 1.8% in the first half of 1967 -- and fell to zero in Germany), and the other in 1970-71 when production declined absolutely in the US. They forget or hide the fact that the number of unemployed in the OECD countries (the twenty-four industriali­zed countries of the US bloc) had doubled in six years, from 6 million and a half in 1966 to more than 10 million in 1972. They ignore the fact that at the beginning of 1973, after six years of monetary instability that began with the dev­aluation of the pound in 1967, the international monetary system definitively collapsed with the second devaluation of the dollar in two years.

The speculation in oil did not burst in upon a serene and prosperous capitalist economy. On the contrary, it appeared as yet another convulsion of capitalism shaken for the past six years by the deepest crisis since World War II.

It is absurd to explain the difficulties of the 1967 to 1973 period by the oil price rises which followed it in 1974; it is just as absurd to consider the oil price increase as the cause of the economic crisis of capitalism.

*******************

Oil speculation dealt a blow to the world economy but it was neither the first nor the most serious one. The purely relative importance of the blow can be measured ‘negatively’ so to speak by considering the situation in an industrialized country which has managed to eliminate the oil problem by exploiting its own deposits. Such is the case of Great Britain which is less dependent on oil imports because of its fields in the North Sea. In 1979 the rate of unemployment was twice that of Germany and three times the rate in Japan -- two countries which nevertheless have to import almost all their oil. Inflation of consumer prices in Great Britain is double Ger­many’s and nine times greater than Japan’s. And finally, the growth rate of production is the weakest of the seven major western powers (in the first half of 1979 gross production had not increased but decreased by 1% in annual terms) .

The causes of the present crisis of capitalism are much more profound than the consequences of oil speculation. Since the beginning of the 1960s capitalism has been in a headlong race to escape the consequences of the end of the period of reconstruction. For more than ten years the industrial regions destroyed in World War II have not only been reconstructed -- thereby elimi­nating one of the major markets for US exports -- but have become powerful competitors of the US on the world market. The US has become a country which exports less than it imports and therefore must cover the world with its paper money to finance its deficit. For ten years, since the end of the reconstruction process, world growth has been resting essentially on credit sales to underdeveloped countries and on the US’ ability to finance its deficit. However, both the former and the latter are on the brink of financial bankruptcy.

The debt of the third world countries has reached unbearable proportions (the equivalent of the annual revenue of a thousand million men in these regions). The US is heading into a recess­ion as a way to reduce their imports and stop the growth of their debts. The recession beginning in the US is inevitably the sign of a world recession, a recession which according to the observable progression from 1967 onwards will be deeper than the three previous ones.

Speculation on the price of oil is only a second­ary aspect of a much more important reality: the fact that capitalist production relations are definitively out of step with the possibilities and needs of humanity.

After almost four centuries of world domination, capitalist laws have exhausted their validity. From being a progressive force, they have become an obstacle to the very survival of humanity.

It is not the ‘Arabs’ who have brought capitalist production to its knees. Capitalism is economic­ally collapsing because it is increasingly under­mined by its internal contradictions, and mainly by its inability to find enough markets to sell its production profitably. We are living at the end of a round in the cycle of crisis-war-reconstruc­tion which capitalism has imposed on humanity for more than sixty years.

For humanity the solution is not to be found in lowering the price of oil nor in lowering wages but in eliminating wage slavery, in eliminating the capitalist system east and west.

Only with a new form of organization for world society, following real communist principles, will we escape the endless barbarism of capitalism in crisis.

R. Victor

 

1 The fact that the price of oil increasing is not significant in itself because world inflation affects all products and revenues. For an oil-importing country the real question is whether or not the price of oil is increasing slower or faster than the price of other exports. For an oil-importing country the rise in oil prices has a negative effect only to the extent that it rises faster than that of prices of other commodities which it exports, that is to say, the source of its own revenues on the world market. What difference does it make to pay 20% more for oil if one’s own export prices can be raised by the same amount at the same time?

2 The danger of new pressures towards devalua­tion of the dollar because of the new volume of paper money put into circulation by the US is relatively limited by the increase in the demand for dollars provoked by the rise in oil prices.

 

Historic events: 

  • oil crises 1973 [139]

On Imperialism

  • 5664 reads
MARXISM AND IMPERIALISM

With the proliferation of ‘national liberation' struggles all over the planet; with the increasing number of local wars between capitalist states, with the accelerating preparations of the two great imperialist blocs for a final confrontation - all of these phenomena expressing the irreversible decomposition of the capitalist world economy - it becomes more and more important for revolutionaries to develop a clear understanding of the meaning of imperialism. For the last seven decades, marxists have recognised that we are living in the epoch of imperialist decay and have attempted to draw out all the consequences of the imperialist epoch of the class struggle of the proletariat. But - particularly with the onset of the counter-revolution which descended on the proletariat in the 1920's - the theoretical task of defining and understanding imperialism has been severely hampered by the almost unchallenged triumph of bourgeois ideology in all its forms. Thus the very meaning of the word imperialism has been distorted and undermined. This work of mystification has been carried out on several fronts: by the traditional bourgeois ideologues who declare that imperialism came to an end when Britain changed its ‘Empire' into a ‘Commonwealth', or when the great powers abandoned their colonies; by hosts of sociologists, economists, and other academics who vie with each other to produce ever-mounting piles of unreadable literature about the ‘Third World', ‘Development Studies', the nationalist awakening in the colonies, etc.; above all by the pseudo-marxists of the capitalist left, who loudly lambaste the crimes of US imperialism while pretending that Russia or China are non-imperialist and even anti-capitalist powers. This stultifying barrage has not left the revolutionary movement unscathed. Some revolutionaries, taken in by the ‘discoveries' of bourgeois academics, have abandoned all reference to capitalism's imperialist drives and see imperialism as an outmoded, superseded phenomenon in capitalism's history. Others, in their effort to resist the encroachments of bourgeois ideology, simply turn the writings of previous marxists into holy writ. This is the case with the Bordigists for example, who mechanically apply Lenin's ‘five distinguishing characteristics of imperialism' to the modern world, ignoring all the developments that have taken place over the last sixty years.

But marxists can neither ignore the theoretical tradition from which they come, nor turn it into a dogma. It's a question of critically assimilating the classics of marxism and applying the richest contributions to an analysis of present-day reality. The aim of this text is to draw out the real and contemporary meaning of the elementary formulation: imperialism dominates the entire planet in this epoch. We aim to give substance to the contention, expressed in the ICC's platform, that "imperialism... has become the means of survival for every nation no matter how large or small"; to show that, under modern capitalism, all wars have an imperialist nature, save one: the civil war of proletariat against the bourgeoisie. But to do this it is necessary first to refer back to the original debates on imperialism within the workers' movement.

MARXISM AGAINST REVISIONISM

In the period leading up to the First World War, the ‘theoretical' question of imperialism constituted a dividing line between the revolutionary, international wing of social democracy, and all the revisionist and reformist elements in the workers' movement. With the outbreak of the war your position on imperialism determined which side of the barricade you were on. It was an eminently practical question, because on it depended your whole attitude towards the imperialist war, and towards the revolutionary convulsions which the war provoked.

There were in this matter certain cardinal points upon which all revolutionary marxists agreed. These points remain the foundations of any marxist definition of imperialism today.

1) For marxists, imperialism was defined as a specific product of capitalist society; they vigorously attacked the more overtly reactionary bourgeois ideologies which portrayed imperialism as a biological urge, as an expression of man's innate desire for territory and conquest (the sort of theory which flourishes again today in the notion of the ‘territorial imperative' peddled by social zoologists like Robert Ardrey and Desmond Morris). The marxists fought with equal tenacity against racist theories about the White Man's Burden, and against all confusionist amalgams of all policies of conquest and annexation in all kinds of social formations. As Bukharin put it, this:

"...very widespread ‘theory' of imperialism defines it as the policy of conquest in general. From this point of view one can speak with equal right of Alexander the Macedonian's and the Spanish conqueror's imperialism, of the imperialism of Carthage and Ivan III, of ancient Rome and modern America, of Napoleon and Hindenburg.

"Simple as this theory may be, it is absolutely untrue. It is untrue because it ‘explains' everything, i.e. it explains absolutely nothing... the same can be said about war. War serves to reproduce those relations on a wider scale. Simply to define war, however, as conquest, is entirely insufficient, for the simple reason that in doing so we fail to indicate the main thing, namely, what production relations are strengthened and extended by the war, what basis is widened by a given ‘policy of conquest" (Imperialism and World Economy, Merlin Press, Chapter 9, p.112-113).

Although Lenin said that "colonial policy and imperialism existed before this latest stage of capitalism, and even before capitalism. Rome founded on slavery, pursued a colonial policy and practised imperialism", he concurs with Bukharin when he adds "general disquisitions on imperialism, which ignore, or put into the background, the fundamental differences between socio-economic systems, inevitably degenerate into the most vapid banality or bragging" "Imperialism, Highest Stage of Capitalism, Peking, Chapter VI, p.97).

2) Secondly, marxists defined imperialism as a necessity for capitalism, as a direct result of the accumulation process, of capital's innermost laws. At a given stage in the development of capital, it was the only way in which the system could prolong its life. It was thus irreversible. Although the explanation of imperialism as an expression of capital accumulation is clearer in some marxists than others (a point we shall be returning to), all marxists rejected the thesis of Hobson, Kautsky and others who saw imperialism as a mere ‘policy' chosen by capitalism or rather by particular factions of capitalism. This thesis was logically accompanied by the idea that you could prove that imperialism was a bad, short-sighted, expensive policy and that you could at least convince the more enlightened sections of the bourgeoisie that they would be better of f with a sensible, non-imperialist policy. This clearly paved the way for all kinds of reformist pacifist recipes aimed at rendering capitalism less brutal and less aggressive. Kautsky even developed the idea that capitalism was moving gradually and peacefully into a phase of ‘ultra-imperialism', fusing into one big non-antagonistic trust where wars would be a thing of the past. Against this utopian view (echoed during the post-World War Two boom by the likes of Paul Cardan) the marxists insisted that far from representing a transcendence of capitalism's antagonisms, imperialism expressed the sharpening of these antagonisms to their highest degree. The imperialist epoch was inevitably one of world crises, political despotism and world war; faced with this catastrophic perspective, the proletariat could only respond with the revolutionary destruction of capitalism.

3) Thus imperialism was seen as a specific phase of capital's existence: its highest and final phase. Although it is permissible to talk of, say, British and French imperialism in earlier parts of the century, the imperialist phase of capital as a world system does not truly begin until the 1870s, where several highly centralised and concentrated national capitals began to compete for colonial possessions, spheres of military influence and domination of the world market. As Lenin said, "an essential feature of imperialism is the rivalry between several Great Powers in the striving for hegemony" (Imperialism, Chapter 5, p.109). Imperialism is thus essentially a competitive relationship between capitalist states at a certain stage in the evolution of world capital. Furthermore, the development of this relationship can itself be seen to have two distinct phases, which are directly linked to changes in the global milieu in which imperialist competition takes place.

"The first period of imperialism was the last quarter of the 19th century and followed on from the epoch of national wars through which the constitution of the great national states was achieved, the terminal point of this epoch being the Franco-Prussian war. If the long period of economic depression following the crisis of 1873 already bore the seeds of the decadence of- capitalism, capital could still use the short recoveries which occurred during the depression to complete the exploitation of backward territories and peoples. Capitalism in its avid, feverish hunt for raw materials and buyers who are neither capitalists nor wage labourers, robbed, decimated and murdered the colonial populations. This was the epoch of the penetration and extension of Britain into Egypt and South Africa, France into Morocco, Tunis and Tonkin, Italy into East Africa and the frontiers of Abyssinia, Tsarist Russia into central Asia and Manchuria, Germany into Africa and Asia, the USA into the Philippines and Cuba, and Japan into the Asian continent.

"But once these great capitalist groupings had completed the division of all usable land, all the exploitable wealth, all spheres of influence, in short all the corners of the world where labour power could be pillaged, transformed into gold, and piled up in the national banks of the metropoles, then capitalism's progressive mission came to an end... it's then that the genera1 crisis of capitalism had to open up." (Le Problème de la Guerre, 1935, by Jehan, a militant of the Belgian Communist Left)

The initial phase of imperialism, while giving a foretaste of capitalism's decay and bringing blood and misery to the populations of the colonial regions, still had a progressive aspect to it, in that it was establishing the world wide dominion of capital - the precondition for the communist revolution. But once this world-wide domination was achieved, capitalism ceased to be a progressive system, and the catastrophes it had brought to the colonial peoples now rebounded to the heart of the system, as the outbreak of World War 1 confirmed:

"Modern imperialism is not the prelude to the expansion of capital... it is only the last chapter of its historical process of expansion; it is the period of universally sharpened world competition between the capitalist states for the last remaining non-capitalist areas on earth. In this final phase, economic and political catastrophe is just as much the intrinsic normal mode of existence for capital as it was in the ‘primitive accumulation' of its development stage... the economic expansion of capital in its imperialist final phase is inseparable from the series of colonial conquests and World Wars we are now experiencing. What distinguishes imperialism as the last struggle for capitalist world domination is not simply the remarkable energy and universality of expansion but - and this is the specific sign that the circle of development is beginning to close - the return of the decisive struggle for expansion from those areas which are being fought over back to its home countries. In this way, imperialism brings catastrophe as a mode of existence back from the periphery of capitalist development to its point of departure. The expansion of capital, which for four centuries had given the existence and civilisation of all non-capitalist peoples in Asia, Africa, America and Australia over to ceaseless convulsions and general and complete decline, is now plunging the civilised peoples of Europe into a series of catastrophes whose final result can only be the decline of civilization or the transition to the socialist mode of production." (Luxemburg, The Anti-critique).

Capitalism in its final imperialist phase was the "epoch of wars and revolution" recognised by the Communist International, an epoch in which humanity was faced with the stark choice between socialism or barbarism. For the working class the epoch meant the obliteration of all the reforms it had won in the 19th century and a mounting attack on its living standards through austerity and war. Politically it meant the destruction or recuperation of its previous organisations and the ruthless oppression of the leviathan imperialist state, compelled by the logic of imperialist competition and by the decomposition of the social fabric to take in hand every aspect of social, political and economic life. That is why, faced with the slaughter of World War 1, the revolutionary left concluded that capitalism had definitely outplayed its historic role, and that the immediate task of the international working class was to turn the imperialist war into civil war, to overthrow imperialism by striking at the root of the problem: the world capitalist system. Naturally this meant a complete rupture with the social democratic traitors who, like the Scheidemanns and Millerands, had become open, chauvinist advocates of imperialist war, or the ‘social-pacifists' like Kautsky, who continued to spread the illusion that capitalism could exist without imperialism, without dictatorship, terror and war.

THE DEBATE BETWEEN MARXISTS

Thus far there could be no disagreement among the marxists, and indeed these basic points of agreement were sufficient basis for the regroupment of the revolutionary vanguard in the Communist International. But the disagreements which existed then and still exist today in the revolutionary movement arose when marxists tried to make a more precise analysis of the driving force behind imperialism and of its concrete manifestations, and when they drew the political consequences from this analysis. These disagreements tended to correspond to different theories about the capitalist crisis and the historical decline of the system, since imperialism, as all agreed, was capital's attempt to offset its mortal contradictions. Thus Bukharin and Luxemburg, for example, emphasized different contradictions in their theories of the crisis, and thus gave differing accounts of the driving force behind imperialist expansion. This debate was further complicated by the fact that the bulk of Marx's work on economics had been written before imperialism had really established itself, and this gap in his work gave rise to different interpretations of the way Marx's writings should be applied to the analysis of imperialism. It is impossible in this text to go back over all these debates about the crisis and imperialism, most of which remain unresolved today. What we want to do is examine briefly the two main definitions of imperialism developed during the period - those of Lenin/Bukharin and Rosa Luxemburg - and to judge how adequate are these definitions both for that time and for the present period. In doing so we will attempt to make more concise our own conception of imperialism today.

LENIN'S CONCEPTION OF IMPERIALISM

For Lenin, the characteristic features of imperialism were:

"1) The concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life;

2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital and the creation, on the basis of this ‘finance capital', of a financial oligarchy;

3) the export of capital as distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance;

4) the formation of international monopolist capitalist combines which share the world among themselves;

5) the territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed."

(Imperialism, chap 7, p.106)

Although Lenin's definition of imperialism contains a number of important indicators, its main weakness is that it is more a description of some of imperialism's outward effects, than an analysis of the roots of imperialism in the accumulation process. The organic or intensive development of capital into more and more concentrated units, and the geographic or extensive development of capital's field of activity (the search for colonies, territorial division of the globe) are fundamentally expressions of the inner processes of accumulation. It is the growing organic composition of capital, with the corresponding fall in the rate of profit and shrinking of the domestic market, which compelled capital to seek new profitable outlets for capital investment and to extend continuously the market for its commodities. But while the underlying dynamic of imperialism does not change, the outward manifestations of this dynamic are subject to modification, so that many aspects of Lenin's definition of imperialism are inadequate today, and were even at the time he was elaborating it. Thus the period in which capital could be seen to be dominated by an oligarchy of "finance capital" and by "international monopolist combines" was already giving way to a new phase during World War 1 - the period of state capitalism, of the permanent war economy. In the epoch of chronic inter-imperialist rivalries on the world market, the entire national capital tends to be concentrated around the state apparatus, which subordinates and disciplines all particular factions of capital to the needs of military/economic survival. The recognition that capitalism had entered an epoch of violent struggles between national "state capitalist trusts" was much clearer to Bukharin than Lenin (see Imperialism and World Economy), though Bukharin was still constrained by the equation of imperialism with finance capital, so that his "state capitalist trust" is, to a large extent, presented as a ‘tool' of the financial oligarchy, whereas the state is actually the supreme directing organ of capital in this epoch. Furthermore, as Bilan pointed out,

"To define imperialism as a ‘product' of finance capital, as Bukharin has done, is to establish a false connection and above all is to lose sight of the common origin of these two aspects of the capitalist process: the production of surplus value." (Mitchell, ‘Crisis and Cycles in the Economy of Capitalism in Agony' Bilan no. 11, 1934)

Lenin's failure to understand the significance of state capitalism was to have grave political consequences in a number of areas: illusions in the progressive nature of certain aspects of state capitalism, applied with disastrous consequences by the Bolsheviks in the Russian Revolution; the inability to see the integration of the old worker's organisations into the state, and the evasive theory of the Labour Aristocracy and of ‘bourgeois workers parties' and ‘reactionary unions' which are somehow distinct from the state machine (the problem with these organisations wasn't simply that a large number had been bribed by ‘imperialist super profits', as Lenin argued, but that the entire apparatus had been incorporated into the colossus of the imperialist state). The tactical conclusions which were drawn from these erroneous theories are well known: the united front, trade union work, etc... Similarly Lenin's emphasis on colonial possessions as a distinguishing and even indispensable feature of imperialism has not stood the test of time. Despite his expectation that the loss of the colonies, precipitated by national revolts in these regions, would shake the imperialist system to its foundations, imperialism has adapted quite easily to ‘decolonisation'. Decolonisation simply expressed the decline of the older imperialist powers, and the triumph of imperialist giants who were not burdened with many colonies in the period around World War 1. Thus the USA and Russia were able to develop a cynical ‘anti-colonial' line to further their own imperialist ends, to batten onto national movements in the colonies and transform them immediately into inter-imperialist proxy-wars.

Lenin's theory of imperialism became the official position of the Bolsheviks and the Communist International, particularly in relation to the national and colonial question, and it is here that the defects of the theory were to have their most serious ramifications. When imperialism is characterised by essentially super-structural features, it becomes easy to divide the world into imperialist, oppressing nations and oppressed, non-imperialist nations, and even for certain imperialist powers to abruptly ‘cease' being imperialist when they shed one or more of these defining characteristics. Along with this went a tendency to obscure class differences in the ‘oppressed nations' and to argue that the proletariat - as the national champion of all the oppressed - had to rally these oppressed nations to its revolutionary banner. This position was applied mainly to the colonies, but in his critique of The Junius Pamphlet, Lenin argued that even developed capitalist countries in modern Europe could, under certain circumstances fight a legitimate war for national independence. During the First World War this ambiguous idea was inoperative because of Lenin's correct evaluation that the overall imperialist context of the war made it impossible for the proletariat to support a policy of national defence in any of the belligerents. But the weakness of the theory were starkly demonstrated after the war, above all with the decline of the revolutionary wave and the isolation of the Soviet State. The idea of the anti-imperialist, character of the ‘oppressed nations' was refuted by the events in Finland, Eastern Europe, Persia, Turkey and China, where the attempt to carry out the policies of ‘national self-determination' and the anti-imperialist united front' was powerless to prevent the bourgeoisies of these countries from allying themselves with the imperialist powers and crushing any initiative towards the communist revolution[1].

Perhaps the most grotesque application of the ideas that Lenin had advanced in his On the Junius Pamphlet was in Germany during the ‘National Bolshevik' experiment in 1923: according to this debased concept, Germany suddenly ceased to be an imperialist power because it had been deprived of its colonies and was being plundered by the Entente. An anti-imperialist alliance with sections of the German bourgeoisie was therefore on the agenda. Of course, there is no straight line from Lenin's theoretical weaknesses to these outright betrayals; a whole process of degeneration lay between them. Nevertheless it is important for communists to demonstrate that it is precisely the errors of past revolutionaries that can be used by degenerating or counter-revolutionary parties to justify their treason. It is not accidental that the counter-revolution, in its Stalinist, Maoist or Trotskyist forms, makes abundant use of Lenin's theories of imperialism and national liberation to ‘prove' that Russia or China are not imperialist (see the typical leftist trick: ‘where are the monopolies and financial oligarchies in Russia?'); or, equally to ‘prove' that numerous bourgeois gangs in the underdeveloped countries must be supported in their ‘anti-imperialist' struggle. It's true that they distort and corrupt many aspects of Lenin's theory, but communists should not be afraid to admit that there are numerous elements in Lenin's conception which can be taken more or less ‘straight' by these bourgeois forces. It is precisely these elements which we must be able to criticize and go beyond.

IMPERIALISM AND THE FALLING RATE OF PROFIT

With Lenin, it is merely implicit that imperialist expansion was rooted in the accumulation process - in the need to offset the falling rate of profit by seeking cheap labour and raw materials in the colonial regions. This element is more explicitly drawn out by Bukharin, and it is perhaps not accidental that Bukharin's more rigorous analysis of imperialism was, initially at least, accompanied by a clearer position on the national question (during World War I and the first years of the Russian Revolution Bukharin argued against Lenin's position on national self-determination. Later on he changed his position; it was Luxemburg's position on the national question - intimately linked to her theory of imperialism[2] - which proved to be the most consistent). Without doubt, the need to offset the falling rate of profit was a cardinal element in imperialism, because imperialism begins precisely at that stage when a number of national capitals with a high organic composition come to the foreground of the world market. But although we cannot deal with the question at any length here[3], we consider that explanations of imperialism which refer more or less exclusively to the falling rate of profit suffer from two major weaknesses:

1. Such explanations tend to portray imperialism as the unique expression of a few highly developed countries - countries with a high organic composition of capital, forced to export capital in order to offset the falling rate of profit. This view has reached a level of caricature with the CWO, who equate imperialism with economic and political independence and conclude that there are now only two imperialist powers in the world - the USA and Russia - since they alone are truly ‘independent' (other countries merely have ‘imperialist' tendencies' which can never be realized). This is the logical outcome of looking at the problem from the point of view of individual capitals, rather than of global capital. For, as Rosa Luxemburg stressed:

"Imperialism is not the creation of any one or any group of states. It is the product of a particular stage of ripeness in the world development of capital, an innately international condition, an indivisible whole, that is recognisable only in all it€ relations, and from which no nation can hold aloof at will." (The Junius Pamphlet)

This does not mean that the CWO's conclusion is the inevitable result of explaining Imperialism solely with reference to the falling rate of profit. If one begins from the standpoint of global capital, it becomes clear that, just as it is the rate of profit in the most developed capitals which determines the global rate of profit, so the consequent imperialist behaviour of the advanced capitals must also have its echo among the weaker capitals. But the minute you do regard the problem of imperialism from the standpoint of global capital, you become aware of another contradiction in the cycle of accumulation - the inability of global capital to realize all the surplus value within its own relations of production. This problem, posed by Luxemburg in The Accumulation of Capital was dismissed by Lenin, Bukharin and their followers as an abandonment of marxism, but it is not hard to show that Marx was preoccupied with the same problem[4]:

"The more capitalist production develops, the more it is forced to produce on a scale which has nothing to do with the immediate demand but depends on a constant expansion of the world market. He (i.e. Ricardo) has recourse to Say's trite assumption, that the capitalist produces not for the sake of profit, surplus value, but produces use-value directly for consumption - for his own consumption. He overlooks the fact that the commodity has to be converted into money. The demand of the workers does not suffice, since profit arises precisely from the fact that the demand of the workers is smaller than the value of their product, and that it (profit) is all the greater, the smaller, relatively, is this demand. The demand of the capitalists among themselves is equally insufficient." (Marx, ‘Ricardo's Theory of Profit", Theories of Surplus Value, Part 2, chap XVI, p.468)

2. Thus any serious analysis of imperialism must take into account this necessity for the "constant expansion of the world market". A theory which ignores the problem is unable to explain why it was precisely at the point that the world market was unable to continue expanding - with the integration of the most important sectors of pre-capitalist economy into the capitalist pre-capitalist economy into the capitalist world economy around the beginning of the 20th century - that capitalism plunged into the permanent crisis of its final imperialist period. Can the historical simultaneity of these two phenomena be dismissed as a mere coincidence? While all marxist analyses of imperialism saw that the hunt for cheap raw materials and labour power was a central aspect of colonial conquest, only Luxemburg understood the decisive importance of the pre-capitalist markets of the colonies and semi-colonies, since they provided the soil for the "constant expansion of the world market" until the early years of the twentieth century. And it is precisely this element which is the ‘variable' in the analysis. Capital can always find cheap labour power and raw material in the underdeveloped regions: this was true both before and after the incorporation of the colonies and semi-colonies into the capitalist world economy, both in the ascendant and decadent phases of capital. But once the solvent demand of the regions ceases to be ‘extra-capitalist', once the bulk of it is integrated into capitalist relations of production, global capital has no new outlets for the realisation of that fraction of the surplus value earmarked for accumulation. It has lost its capacity to continuously expand the world market. Now the ‘colonial regions' are themselves producers of surplus value, competitors with the metro- poles. Labour power and raw materials in these regions may still remain cheap, they may remain areas of profitable investment, but they no longer help world capital with its problems of realisation: they have become part of the problem. Moreover, this incapacity to expand the world market to anything like the degree required by the productivity of capital also deprives the bourgeoisie of one of the main counter-tendencies to the falling rate of profit: increasing the mass of profit by producing and selling an increased amount of commodities. Thus the predictions of the Communist Manifesto are borne out:

"The conditions of bourgeois society are too narrow to comprise the wealth created by them. And how does the bourgeoisie get over these crises? On the one hand by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones. That is to say, by paving the way for more extensive and destructive crises, and by diminishing the means whereby crises are prevented."

It is Rosa Luxemburg's theory of imperialism which most clearly continues Marx's thought on this question.

LUXEMBURG'S CONCEPTION OF IMPERIALISM - AND ITS CRITICS

"Imperialism is the political expression of the accumulation of capital in its competitive struggle for what remains still open of the non-capitalist environment. Still the largest part of the world in terms of geography, this remaining field for the expansion of capital is yet insignificant as against the high level of development already attained by the productive forces of capital; witness the immense masses of capital accumulated in the old countries which seek an outlet for their surplus product and strive to capitalize their surplus value, and the rapid change-over to capitalism of the pre-capitalist civilisations. On the international stage, then, capital must take appropriate measures. With the high development of the capitalist countries and their increasingly severe competition in acquiring non-capitalist areas, imperialism grows in lawlessness and violence, both in aggression against the non-capitalist world and in ever more serious conflicts among the competing capitalist countries. But the more violently, ruthlessly and thoroughly imperialism brings about the decline of non-capitalist civilisations, the more rapidly it cuts the very ground from under the feet of capitalist accumulation. Though imperialism is the historical method for prolonging the career of capitalism, it is also a sure means of bringing it to a sure conclusion. This is not to say that capitalist development must be actually driven to this extreme: the mere tendency towards imperialism of itself takes forms which make the final phase of capitalism a period of catastrophe." (Luxemburg, Accumulation of Capital, chap 31, p.446)

As can be seen from this passage, Luxemburg's definition of imperialism concentrates on the basic terms of the problem, viz, the accumulation process, and in particular the phase of the process concerned with realization, rather than on the super-structural ramifications of imperialism. Elsewhere, however, she shows that the political corollary of imperialist expansion is the militarization of society and the state: the exhaustion of bourgeois democracy and the development of openly despotic forms of capitalist rule; the brutal depression of workers' living standards in order to maintain the grossly inflated military sector of the economy. Although the Accumulation of Capital contains some contradictory ideas about militarism as a "province of accumulation", Luxemburg was basically correct in seeing the war economy as an indispensable characteristic of imperialistic, declining capitalism. But Luxemburg's basic analysis of the driving force behind imperialism has been the subject of numerous criticisms. The most important of these was written by Bukharin in his Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital (1924). The bulk of his arguments against Luxemburg's theory have been echoed recently by the CWO (see RP 6 ‘The Accumulation of Contradictions'.) We want to deal here with the two most important criticisms raised by Bukharin.

1) According to Bukharin, Luxemburg's theory that imperialism is motivated by the search for new markets makes the imperialist epoch indistinguishable from all previous epochs of capital:

"Trade capitalism and mercantilism, industrial capitalism and liberalism, finance capital and imperialism - all these phases of capitalist development disappear or dissolve into capitalism as such". (Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital, chap 4, p.253)

And for the CWO,

"...her rationale for imperialism based on ‘saturated markets' is extremely weak and inadequate. If, as Luxemburg admitted... the capitalist metropoles still contained pre-capitalist enclaves (e.g. serfs, peasants) why does capitalism have to expand overseas and away from the capitalist metropoles from the very beginning of its existence? Why doesn't it first bring all the areas closest at hand within the capital-wage labour relationship if it merely seeks for new markets? The explanation is to be found not in the need for new markets but in the search for raw materials and the maximisation of profit. Second, Luxemburg's theory implies that imperialism is a permanent characteristic of capitalism. As capitalism, for Luxemburg, has always sought to extend the market in order to accumulate, her theory cannot distinguish between the original expansion of trade and money economies at the dawn of capitalism in Europe and its later imperialist expansion... mercantile capital was necessary for the original accumulation of capital but this is a qualitatively different phenomenon from the capitalist drive to accumulate once it is established as the dominant mode of production." (RP 6 p.18-19)

In this passage the CWO's virulence against ‘Luxemburgism' outdoes even Bukharin's sharp polemic. A number of points should be made before we proceed any further. First, Luxemburg never said that imperialist expansion was aimed ‘merely' at finding new markets: she clearly portrayed its planetary quest for cheap labour and raw materials, as the CWO themselves note on the same page of RP 6. Secondly, it is astonishing to present capitalism's need to "extend the market in order to accumulate" as a discovery of Luxemburg, when it is a fundamental position defended by Marx against Say and Ricardo, as we have already seen. Bukharin himself in no way denied that imperialism was looking for new markets; in fact he identifies this as one of the three motive forces behind imperialist expansion:

"We have laid bare three fundamental motives for the conquest policies of modern capitalist states: increased competition in the sales markets, in the markets of raw materials, and for the sphere of capital investment. These three roots of the policy of finance capital, however, represent in substance only three facets of the same phenomenon, namely of the conflict between the growth of productive forces on the one hand and the ‘national' limits of the production organisation on the other." (Imperialism and World Economy, chap 8, p.104)

Nevertheless, the charge remains: for Lenin, Bukharin and others the ‘export of capital' rather than of ‘commodities' distinguishes the imperialist phase of capital from previous phases. Does Luxemburg's theory ignore this distinction and thus imply that imperialism was a feature of capitalism from the beginning?

If we refer back to the passages by Luxemburg quoted in this text, particularly the long citation from Anti-critique, we can see that Luxemburg herself clearly distinguished between the phase of primitive accumulation and the imperialist phase, which is unquestionably presented as a definite stage in the world development of capital. Are these just empty words or do they correspond to the substance of Luxemburg's theory?

In fact there is no contradiction in Luxemburg's analysis here. Imperialism properly speaking begins after the 1870's when world capitalism attains a significant new configuration: the period of the constitution of national states in Europe and North America is over, and instead of having a situation where Britain is the ‘workshop of the world' we have several highly developed national capitalist ‘workshops' competing for domination of the world market - competing not only for each others' home markets but also for the colonial market. It is this situation which provokes the depression of the 1870's - the "seeds of capitalist decadence" precisely because the decline of the system is synonymous with the division of the world market between competing capitals - with the transformation of capital into a ‘closed system' in which the problem of realization becomes insoluble. But of course in the 1870's, the possibility of breaking out of the closed circle still existed, and this largely explains the desperate haste of imperialist expansion in this period.

It is true, as the CWO point out, that capital always sought colonial markets, but there is no mystery in this. Capitalists will always look for areas of profitable exploitation and easy selling even when the markets available ‘at home' have not been completely saturated. It would be absurd to expect capitalism to follow an even course of development - as if the early capitalists got together and said to themselves: ‘first we'll exhaust all the pre-capitalist sectors in Europe, then we'll expand into Asia, then Africa, etc'. Nevertheless behind the chaotic growth of capitalism, a definite pattern can be seen: the colonial plunder of early capitalism; the use of this plunder to accelerate the industrial revolution in the metropoles; then, on the basis of industrial capital, a new thrust into the colonial regions. To be sure, the first period of colonial expansion was not a response to overproduction at home, but corresponded to the necessities of primitive accumulation. We can only begin to talk about imperialism when colonial expansion is a response to the contradictions of fully developed capitalist production.

To this extent we can see the beginnings of imperialism when the commercial crises of the mid-19th century act as a spur to the expansion of British capital towards the colonies and semi-colonies. But as we have said, imperialism in the full sense of the term implies a competitive relationship between capitalist states; and it was when the metropolitan market had been decisively carved up by several capitalist giants that imperialist expansion becomes an unavoidable necessity for capital. It is this which explains the rapid change in British colonial policy in the latter part of the 19th century. Prior to the depression of the 1870's, to the sharpening of competition from the US and Germany, British capitalists were questioning whether the existing colonies were worth the expense of their upkeep and were reluctant to take on new colonies; now they were convinced that Britain had to maintain and extend its colonial policy.

The scramble for colonies at the-end of the 19th century wasn't the result of a sudden fit of madness on the part of the bourgeoisie, or a vainglorious search for national prestige, but a response to a fundamental contradiction in the accumulation cycle: the growing concentration of capital and the carving up of the market in the metropoles, simultaneously aggravating the falling rate of profit and the gap between productivity and solvable markets, i.e. the problem of realization.

The idea that the need to open up new markets was a determining element in imperialist expansion is, contrary to the CWO's claim in RP6 (p.19), not contradicted by the fact that the bulk of world trade in this period was conducted between the capitalist metropoles themselves. This phenomenon was noted by Luxemburg herself:

"...with the international development of capitalism, the capitalization of surplus value becomes ever more urgent and precarious, and the substratum of constant and variable capital becomes an ever-growing mass - both absolutely and in relation to the surplus value. Hence the contradictory phenomena that the old capitalist countries provide ever larger markets for, and become increasingly dependent upon, one another, yet on the other hand compete ever more ruthlessly for trade relations with non-capitalist countries." (Accumulation, chap 27, p.367).

The ‘external' market for global capital was like a breathing space in a prison that was growing more and more crowded. The more the breathing space shrank relative to the overcrowded population of the prison, the more desperately the prisoners fought over it.

Neither does the fact that this period saw a great increase in the export of capital mean that imperialist expansion had nothing to do with a markets problem. The export of capital to the colonial regions was necessary not only because it allowed capitalism to produce in areas where labour power was cheap, and hence raise the rate of profit. It also extended the world market:

a) because capital exports include the export of producer goods which are themselves commodities which must be sold.

b) because exporting capital - whether in the form of money capital for investment, or producer goods - served to extend the entire market for capitalist production by implanting it into new regions and by bringing more and more solvent buyers into its orbit. The most obvious example of this is the building of railways, which served to extend the sale of capitalist commodities to millions and millions of new buyers.

The ‘problem of the market' can help to explain one of the most striking characteristics of the way imperialism extended capitalist production across the world: the ‘creation' of underdevelopment. For what the imperialists wanted was a captive market - a market of buyers who wouldn't become competitors with the metropoles by becoming capitalist producers themselves. Hence the contradictory phenomenon whereby imperialism exported the capitalist mode of production and systematically destroyed pre-capitalist economic formations - while simultaneously holding back the development of native capital by ruthlessly plundering the colonial economies, subordinating their industrial development to the specific needs of the metropolitan economy, and bolstering up the most reactionary and submissive elements in the native ruling classes. This is why, contrary to Marx's expectations, capitalism did not create a mirror image of itself in the colonial regions. In the colonies and the semi-colonies there were to be no fully formed, independent national capitals with their own bourgeois revolutions and healthy industrial bases, but rather, stunted caricatures of the metropolitan capitals, weighed down by the decomposing remnants of the previous mode of production, industrialised in pockets to serve foreign interests, with bourgeoisies that were weak, born senile, both at the economic and at the political levels. Imperialism thus created underdevelopment and will never be able to abolish it; at the sane time it ensured that there could be no national bourgeois revolutions in the backward zones. And, it is to no small extent that these profound repercussions of imperialist development - repercussions which are still only too apparent today, as the ‘Third World' sinks into barbarism - have their origins in imperialism's attempt to use the colonies and semi-colonies to solve its markets problem.

2) According to Bukharin, Luxemburg's definition of imperialism means that imperialism ceases to exist when there's no remnant of a non-capitalist milieu to be fought over:

"...it follows from this definition that a fight for territories that have already become capitalist is not imperialist, which is utterly wrong... it follows from the same definition that a fight for already ‘occupied' territories is not imperialism either. Again, this factor of the definition is utterly wrong... Here is a striking example to illuminate the untenability of Luxemburg's conception of imperialism. We mean the occupation of the Ruhr territory by the French (1923-24). From Rosa Luxemburg's point of view this is not imperialism since (1) the ‘remains' are missing, (2) there is no non-capitalist milieu, and (3) the Ruhr territory already had an imperialist owner before the occupation." (Imperialism and the Accumulation of Capital, chap 4, p.253).

This argument is reiterated in the naïve question posed by the CWO at the recent international conference in Paris, "Where are the markets pre-capitalist or otherwise, in the war Ethiopia and Somalia fought over the Ogaden Desert?" Such questions betray an extremely shallow understanding of what Luxemburg was saying, as well as a regrettable tendency to see imperialism not as "an innately international condition, an indivisible whole" but as "the creation of any one or any group of states": in other words, it looks at the problem from the fragmented point of view of individual national capitals.

If Bukharin had troubled to quote from more than the first sentence of the passage from Luxemburg's Accumulation, which we have cited in full, he would have shown that, for Luxemburg, the growing exhaustion of the non-capitalist milieu meant not the end of imperialism, but the intensification of imperialist antagonisms between the capitalist states themselves. This is what Luxemburg meant when she wrote that "imperialism brings catastrophe as a mode of existence back from the periphery of capitalist development to its point of departure" (Anti-critique). In the final phase of imperialism, capital is plunged into a horrendous series of wars where each capital or bloc of capitals, unable to expand ‘peacefully' into new areas, is forced to seize the markets and territories of its rivals. War becomes the mode of survival of the whole system.

Of course Luxemburg expected proletarian revolution to put an end to capitalism well before the non-capitalist milieu had shrunk to the insignificant factor that it is today. The explanation of how decadent capitalism has prolonged its existence in the virtual absence of this milieu belongs to another text. But as long as we continue to see imperialism as "a product of a particular stage of ripeness in the world development of capital, an innately international condition, an indivisible whole", we can still see the relevance of Luxemburg's definition. It only needs to be modified to the extent that today, imperialist policies of conquest and domination are brought about by the almost complete disappearance of an external market, rather than being a direct struggle for pre-capitalist remnants. The important thing to emphasise is that it is a global change in the evolution of world capital - the exhaustion of the external market - which compels each particular segment of capital to behave in an imperialist manner.

To return to Bukharin's objections: it is pointless to look for ‘non-capitalist milieus' in every imperialist conflict, because it's capital as a whole, global capital, which requires an external market to expand into. For the individual capitalist, capitalists and workers offer a perfectly good market for his goods; similarly , for an individual national capita), a rival capitalist nation can be used to absorb its surplus value. Not every market fought over by imperialist states ever was or is a pre-capitalist one, and this is less and less so the more these markets become incorporated into world capital. Neither is every inter-imperialist struggle a struggle directly for markets at all. In today's situation, the global rivalry between the US and Russia is conditioned by the impossibility of progressively expanding the world market. But many - perhaps most - of the specific aspects of the foreign policies of the US and Russia are aimed at securing strategic/military advantages over the other bloc. For example: Israel isn't much of a market for the US, or Cuba for Russia. The outposts are kept afloat mainly for their strategic/political value, at considerable expense to their backers. On a smaller scale; Vietnam's pillaging of Cambodia's rice fields is just that: pillage. Cambodia hardly constitutes a ‘market' for Vietnamese industry. But Vietnam is forced to pillage Cambodia's rice fields because its industrial stagnation leaved its agricultural sector incapable of producing sufficient food for the Vietnamese population. And its industrial stagnation is brought about by the fact that the world market can't expand, is already divided up, and won't permit any newcomers. Once again, it's only possible to make sense of these questions by beginning from a global standpoint.

POLITICAL CONCLUSIONS: IMPERIALISM AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF NATIONAL WARS

The practical issues in the theoretical debate on imperialism have always been centred round one question: does the epoch of imperialism make revolutionary national wars more likely, as Lenin argued, or does it make them impossible, as Luxemburg insisted? For us, history has indisputably verified Luxemburg's assertion that:

"The general tendency of present day capitalist policies determine the policies of the individual states as their supreme is blindly operating law, just as the laws of economic competition determine the conditions under which the individual manufacturer shall produce." and that consequently, "In the era of the unleashing of this imperialism, national wars are no longer possible. ‘National interests serve only as the pretext for putting the labouring masses of the people under the domination of their mortal class enemy, imperialism." (Junius Pamphlet)

The first citation has the following concrete applications in this epoch, both of which resoundingly confirm the second one.

a) Every nation, every aspiring bourgeoisie, is forced to align itself with one of the dominant imperialist blocs, and thus to conform to and carry out the needs of world imperialism.. Again in Luxemburg's words:

"The small nations, the ruling classes of which are the accomplices of their partners in the big states, constitute only the pawns on the imperialist chessboard of the great powers, and are used by them, just like their own working masses, in wartime, as instruments, to be sacrificed to capitalist interests after the war." (Junius Pamphlet)

Contrary to Lenin's hope that imperialism would be weakened by the revolt of the ‘oppressed nations', all national struggles in this epoch have been transformed into imperialist wars by the irreversible domination of the great powers; as Lenin himself recognised, imperialism means that the whole world is divided up by the great capitalist states, "So that in the future a re-division is possible, i.e. territories can only pass from one ‘owner' to another, instead of passing as ownerless territories to an ‘owner'." (Imperialism, Highest Stage...) The experience of the last sixty years has shown that what Lenin applied to ‘territories' can be applied to all nations as well. None can escape the stranglehold of imperialism. This is patently obvious today when the world has, since 1945, been divided into two permanently constituted imperialist blocs. As the crisis deepens and the blocs reinforce themselves, it becomes clear that even capitalist giants like Japan and China must humbly submit to the dictates of their US overlord. In such a situation, how can there be any illusions about national independence for the chronically weak countries of the ex-colonial regions?

b) Every nation[5] is compelled to act in an imperialist manner towards its rivals. Even while subordinating themselves to a dominant bloc, each nation is forced to try to subject other, smaller nations to its hegemony. Luxemburg noted this phenomenon during World War 1, in relation to Serbia:

"Serbia is formally engaged in a national war of defence. But its monarchy and its ruling class are filled with expansionist desires as are the ruling classes in all modern states... Thus Serbia is today reaching out towards the Adriatic Coast where it is fighting out a real imperialist conflict with Italy on the backs of the Albanians." (Junius Pamphlet)

The asphyxiated state of the world market makes decadence the epoch of war of each against all. Far from being able to escape this reality, small nations are forced to adapt themselves to it completely. The extreme militarization of the more backward capitals, the frequent outbreak of wars between local states in the underdeveloped regions, are chronic indicators of the fact that "no nation can hold aloof" from imperialist policies today.

According to the CWO, "the idea that all countries are imperialist undermines the idea of imperialist blocs." (RP 12, p.25), but this is only the case if you circumscribe the discussion in advance by insisting that only ‘independent' powers are imperialist. It's true that every nation has to insert itself into one or other of the imperialist blocs, but they do this because it is the only way they can defend their own imperialist interests. Conflicts and conflagrations within each bloc are not eliminated (and even take the form of open war, e.g. the Greek-Turkish war of 1974); they are simply subordinated to a more overriding conflict. The imperialist blocs, like all bourgeois alliances, can never be truly unified or harmonious. To present them as such, or at least to present the weaker nations of the bloc as nothing but puppets of the dominant power makes it impossible to understand the real contradictions and conflict that emerge within the bloc - not only between the weaker nations themselves, but also between the needs of the weaker nations and the dominant power. The fact that these conflicts are nearly always settled in favour of the dominant state doesn't make them any less real. Similarly, ignoring the imperialist drives of the smaller nations makes it impossible to clearly explain the outbreak of wars between these states. The fact that they are invariably used to further the interests of the blocs doesn't mean that they are the pure product of secret decisions in Washington or Moscow. They spring from real tensions and difficulties at the local level, difficulties which inevitably give rise to an imperialistic response from the local states. To say, as the CWO does, that the smaller nations merely have ‘imperialist tendencies' hardly makes sense when Vietnam, for example, invades the neighbouring state of Cambodia, topples its government, installs a pliable regime, plunders the economy and pushes for the formation of an ‘Indo-Chinese Federation' under the Vietnamese hegemony. Vietnam doesn't just have imperialist appetites: it greedily indulges these appetites by gobbling up its neighbours!

If we reject the idea that these policies are the expression of a worker's state fighting a revolutionary war; if we decline to see the Vietnamese ruling class waging a historically progressive bourgeois struggle for national independence, then there is only one word for policies and actions of this kind: imperialism.

IMPERIALIST WAR OR PROLETARIAN REVOLUTION

If all ‘national struggles' serve the interests of imperialist states large and small, then it is impossible to speak of wars of national defence, ‘national liberation', or ‘national revolutionary' movements in this epoch. It is therefore necessary to reject any attempt to reintroduce the CI's position on the national and colonial question. Thus, for example, the Nucleo Communista Internazionalista seems to suggest that it would be possible to apply the CI's theses in the underdeveloped regions, if a real communist party existed. For them "the constitution of an independent national state, economic and territorial unification, agrarian reform, nationalisation" can still be momentary tasks in the process of developing the international proletarian revolution in the extra-metropolitan zones. (‘Notes for an Orientation of the National and Colonial Question' Texts of the 2nd International Conference in Paris. Vol.1). The NCI's concern is that the proletariat and its vanguard cannot be indifferent to the social movements of the oppressed masses in these regions, but must provide leadership to their revolts, linking them to the world communist revolution. This is quite correct; but the proletariat must also recognize that the ‘national' element does not come from the oppressed and exploited masses, but from their oppressors and exploiters - the bourgeoisie. The minute these revolts are encompassed into a struggle for ‘national' tasks they are being pushed onto the terrain of the bourgeoisie. And in today's historical context national means imperialist:

"Today the nation is but a cloak that covers imperialistic desires, a battle cry for imperialistic rivalries, the last ideological measure with which the masses can be persuaded to play the role of cannon fodder in imperialistic war." (Junius Pamphlet)

This truth has been confirmed in all the so-called ‘national liberation' movements from Vietnam to Angola, from Lebanon to Nicaragua. Before and after their accession to power, bourgeois national liberation forces invariably function as the agents of one or the other of the great imperialist powers. The moment they seize the state, they begin to pursue their own petty imperialist aims. Therefore, it's not a question of leading the revolt of the oppressed masses through a ‘moment' of national, bourgeois-democratic struggle, but of leading them away from the bourgeois national terrain, onto the terrain of the proletarian class war. ‘Turn the imperialist war into a civil war' is the proletarian watchword in all parts of the world today.

The present imperialist character of all factions of the bourgeoisie and of all their political projects, is not something that can be reversed, even momentarily, not even by the best communist party in the world. It is a profound historical reality, based on an objectively determined social evolution. Thus:

"The epoch of imperialist wars and proletarian revolutions no longer pits reactionary states against progressive states in which, with the aid of the popular masses, the national unity of the bourgeoisie is forged, in which the geographic and political base is built to act as a springboard for the development of the productive forces.

"They no longer pit the bourgeoisie against the ruling classes in the colonies in colonial wars that provide air and space to capitalist productive forces that are already strongly developed.

"In this epoch imperialist states, economic entities which divide and re-divide the world, are pitted against each other, incapable as they are of containing class contrasts and economic contradictions in any way than by carrying out, through war, a gigantic destruction of inactive productive forces and innumerable proletarians who have been thrown out of production.

"From the point of view of historic experience we can say that the character of the wars that periodically convulse capitalist society as well as the corresponding proletarian policy, must be determined not by the particular - and often equivocal - aspects under which these wars may appear, but by their historical context, based on the level of economic development and the maturity of class antagonisms." (Jehan, op cit)

If we conclude that, in today's historical context all wars, all policies of conquest, all competitive relations between capitalist states, have an imperialist nature, we are not offending against Bukharin's justified stipulation that the character of wars and policies of conquest must be judged by looking at "what production relations are being strengthened or extended by war"; we are not undermining the precision of the term imperialism by overextending its use. For if marxists identified national wars as wars which served a progressive function by extending capitalist relations of production when they could still serve as a basis for the development of the productive forces, they contrasted wars of this kind with imperialist wars - wars that are historically regressive in that they serve to maintain capitalist relations when they have become a fetter on further development. Today, all the bourgeoisie's wars and foreign policies seek to preserve a rotten, decadent mode of production; all of them therefore can be justly defined as imperialist. Indeed, one of the most characteristic signs of the decadence of capitalism is that, whereas in its ascendant phase:

"war had the function of assuring an expansion of the market, and so of the production of the means of production, in the (decadent) phase production is essentially geared to the production of the means of destruction, i.e. to war. The decadence of capitalist society is strikingly expressed by the fact that instead of wars to serve economic development (as in the ascendant period) we now have economic activity geared essentially to war..." (Report on the International Situation., Gauche Communiste de France, 1945).

Although the aim of capitalist production remains the production of surplus value, the growing subordination of all economic activity to the needs of war represents a tendency for capital to negate itself. Imperialist war, born out of the bourgeoisie's lust for profit, takes on a dynamic in which the rule of profitability and exchange are more and more thrown to the wind. Calculations of profit and loss, the normal relations of sale and purchase, are left in the wake of capital's mad drive to self-destruction. Today humanity faces the logical consequences of the self-cannibalization of capital: a nuclear holocaust which could destroy the entire human race. This tendency towards capital's self-negation in war is accompanied by the universal militarization of society: a process which is horrifyingly apparent in the third world and in the Stalinist regimes, but which, if the bourgeoisie has its way, will soon be a reality for the workers in the western ‘democracies' as well. The total subordination of economic, social and political life to the needs of war: that is the hideous reality of imperialism in all countries today. More than ever before, the alternative posed by Rosa Luxemburg in 1915 confronts the world working class:

"Either the triumph of imperialism and the destruction of all culture as in ancient Rome, depopulation, desolation, degeneration, a vast cemetery; or, the victory of socialism, that is, the conscious struggle of the international proletariat against imperialism." (Junius Pamphlet)

CDW, October 1979.

 



[1] See the ICC pamphlet Nation or Class for a more detailed discussion.

[2] Here we should correct a misconception held by the CWO, viz. their rejection of the idea "that Luxemburg's economics lay at the base of her views on the national question: the latter preceded the former by over a decade" (RP 12, p. 25). Evidently the CWO are unfamiliar with the following passage written by Luxemburg in 1898 and published in the first edition of Social Reform or Revolution:

"When we examine the present economic situation we must certainly admit that we have not yet entered that phase of full capitalist maturity which is presupposed by Marx's theory of periodical crises. The world market is still in a stage of expansion. Thus, although on the one hand we have left behind those sudden impetuous openings up of the new areas to capitalist economy which took place from time to time up to the seventies, and with them the earlier, so to speak, youthful crises of capitalism, we have not yet advanced to that degree of development, including the full expansion of the world market, which would produce periodic collisions between the productive forces and the limits of the market, or, in other words, the real economic crises of fully developed capitalism. . .Once the world market is more or less fully expanded so that it can no longer be suddenly extended, then the ceaseless growth in the productivity of labour will sooner or later produce those periodic collisions between the productive forces and the limits of the market which will become more and more violent and acute by repetition." (cited in Sternberg, Capitalism and Socialism on Trial, p.72)

[3] ‘Economic Theories and the Struggle for Socialism', IR 16.

[4] For further discussion of this point, see ‘Marxism and Crisis Theory', IR 13.

[5] When we say ‘every nation is imperialist' it's clear we are making a generalization, and, as with all generalizations, exceptions can be found, examples of this or that state which never appears to have committed any imperialist crimes, but such exceptions don't invalidate the general point. Nor can the issue be avoided by posing trite questions like "Where is the imperialism of the Seychelles, or Monaco, or San Marino?" We are not concerned here with petty tax havens or jokes of history but with national capitals which - though not independent - have an identifiable existence and activity on the world market.

 

General and theoretical questions: 

  • Imperialism [86]

The Mexican Left, 1938: The reactionary character of nationalizations in the imperialist phase of capitalism

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In issue no. 10 of the International Review (June-August 1977) we introduced our readers to the ‘Mexican Workers Group’ of Mexico, a group which emerged in the darkest period of the workers’ movement. Its appearance in the years 1937 to 1939 was not a sign of a resurgence of the workers’ movement but a last gasp of communist class consciousness against the bloody cynicism of triumphant capitalism, ready to celebrate its victory in the unleashing of World War II.

The evolution towards state capitalism, accelerated by the criteria and the preparations for world war, found its main expression in the campaign for nationalizations. From De Man to Blum, from the CGT to Stalinist parties, from the British Labor Party to the Front Populaire, nationalization became the platform of the left of capital which presented this to the workers as path to socialism. The Trotkyists and Trotsky himself, as well as other extreme leftists, did not escape this ideology. They fell into the fray and all sang the same tune: although nationalizations weren’t yet exactly socialism, they were supposedly a very progressive step which the working class had to support with all its might.

Today, like in the thirties, nationalizations continue to serve as the economic program of the left, as we can see in the now deceased ‘Programme Commun’ in France; the extent of nationalizations called for serves as a sign of ‘radicalism’ and as a proletarian seal of approval to hide the capitalist nature of these leftist parties. Today just like yesterday, Trotksyists, Maoists, anarchists and other leftists hide the truth. They try to convince the workers that these measures will weaken capital; but in fact nationalizations only strengthen the capitalist state. Today just like yesterday revolutionaries must denounce the demagogy and demonstrate theoretically and concretely the capitalist, anti-working class content of nationalizations. We hope to contribute to this task by publishing this study of the Mexican Left printed in the first issue of their review, Comunismo in 1938.

By nationalizing industries the bourgeoisie protects itself from the proletarian revolution

Frederick Engels wrote in 1878:

“But..... conversion into state property (does not deprive) the productive forces of their character as capital…..the modern state, too, is only the organization with which bour­geois society provides itself in order to maintain the general external conditions of the capitalist mode of product­ion against encroachments either by the worke­rs or by individual capitalists. The modern state, whatever its form, is an essentially capitalist machine, the state of the capitali­sts, the ideal aggregate capitalist. The more productive forces it takes over into its possesses the more it becomes a real aggregate capitalist, the more citizens it exploits. The workers remain wage-workers, proletarians. The capitalist relationship is not abolished, rather it is pushed to the limit. But at this limit it changes into its opposite. State ownership of the productive forces is not the solution of the conflict, but it contains within itself the formal means, the handle to the solution…..The proletariat seizes state power…..” (F. Engels, Anti-Duhring, p. 360, Peking 1976.)

It seems as though these clear and simple words by Karl Marx’s comrade, uttered 60 years ago, refer expressly to the recent transformation of the oil industry and railways into the property of the Mexican capitalist state. it is of primordial importance for the Mexican proletariat to understand the fundamental truth contained in the passage:

“… the modern state, too, is only the organization with which the bourgeois society provides itself in order to maintain the general external conditions of the capitalist mode of production against encroachments either by the workers or by individual capitalists. The modern state, whatever its form, is an essentially capitalist machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal aggregate capitalist.”

How many are there today, among those who call themselves ‘Marxists’, who would recognize the truth of these affirmations of one of the foun­ders of Marxism? How many are there who would admit that these affirmations relate to all capitalist states, whatever their form, ie., including the capitalist states which assume a ‘workerist’ title? How many would dare to say that these ‘workerist’ states also exploit workers and that this exploitation grows more and more as these states incorporate as their property more productive forces? How many wou­ld dare to say that in each new ‘nationalizati­on’, the capitalist relations between owners and producers -- (in other words, between capi­talists and workers), far from being extingui­shed through such measures, are sharpened and brought to a pitch? Who today dares to say that these affirmations refer also to the recent ‘nationalizations’ of the oil industry and the railways?

Who in Mexico today dares to say that all these affirmations by Frederick Engels are relevant to the recent ‘nationalizations’ of oil and railways? Why don’t the ‘Marxists’ of Mexico apply the teachings of Marxism to the problems of today?

Why don’t they, to start with, clarify the fact that ‘nationalization’ can under no circumsta­nce mean the property of ‘the nation’, but only and exclusively the property of the state; in other words, the property of one part of ‘the nation’, namely, of the bourgeoisie, whose instrument is the state? To put it diff­erently, why don’t they explain that by becom­ing ‘nationalized’ property simply passes from the hands of the ‘collective capitalist’ (using Engels’ phrase), that is, the state of the capitalists.

The real meaning of the nationalization of the oil industry and the railways

What is then, according to Marxism, the extent and meaning of the ‘expropriation’ of the prop­erty of the oil companies? In simple words: this property has passed from the hands of one set of exploiters (the oil companies) to the hands of another (the Mexican state). Only that, no more, no less. The nature of this prop­erty has not changed at all: it remains capi­talist property as before. The workers remain in the same position as proletarians: they have to sell their labor power to the owner of the means of production; in other words, to the owner of the oilfields, of the machinery utilized, of the distribution network. And this owner (today the Mexican state) pockets the surplus value produced by the workers -- or, what is the same – exploits them. Put differently, the Mexican oil industry has become a single gigantic PETRO-MEX (the state oil corporation), with ‘national’ foremen and specialists instead of foreign ones, and the main task of this large petromex is exactly the same as the one of the previous small petromex: impede or break strikes, as it did with the protest strike of last year.

Just like before the expropriation, the two fundamental classes of capitalist society -- capitalists and proletarians, exploiters and exploited, confront each other in the present Mexican oil industry. The oil industry remains what it was before: the bastion of the capita­list system in Mexico -- only that this bastion is today politically stronger than before. Instead of confronting many foreign companies only protected by the Mexican state, workers today confront directly this state, with its workerist demagogy, with its ‘conciliation’ boards, its police, its prisons, and its army. The struggle of the oil workers is today a tho­usand times more difficult than before. The state continues protecting capitalist property; and therein resides its fundamental role. But nowadays this function has changed in form -- to make it more effective and safeguard the oil industry from workers’ attacks, the state has declared as its own that which it has to defend, namely, the property of the American and Engl­ish capitalists.

The ‘workerist’ state defends the capitalist system against the proletarian revolution

According to the system of Marxism, the state is an institution born from the division of society into classes with irreconcilable interests. Its function is to perpetuate this division and with it “the right that the owning class has of exploiting the class that owns nothing and the domination of the former over the latter.” (Frederick Engels)

The modern state is the organization that the bourgeoisie utilizes to defend its collective interests, its class interests, against the attacks of the workers on the one hand and the individual capitalists on the other (especially against those capitalists and companies which do not want to sacrifice part of their individ­ual interests in favor of the defense of the collective interests of the whole bourgeois class against the workers). All the activities of the capitalist state, even if it calls itse­lf ‘workerist’, serve this one goal: the strengthening of the capitalist system. In the expanding phase of capitalism, the streng­thening of capitalism had a progressive charac­ter, in spite of the growing oppression that resulted from it, because in those times hist­ory had not yet put the proletarian revolution on the order of the day. Capitalist progress was the only possible progress. Today, in its phase of decomposition, that is to say, in the imperialist phase in which we are living, the reinforcement or the ‘reform’ of capitalism has an extremely reactionary and counter-revolutionary character, because today only the destruction of capitalism can save humanity from barbarism. The present role of the state is to defend capitalism against the proletarian revolution. In the imperialist phase the capitalist state -- whatever its form -- is the true incarnation of reaction and counter-revolution. Today there doesn’t and can’t exist a progressive capitalist state. They are all reactionary and counter-revolutionary. To reinforce the state means to prolong the life of this barbarous capitalist system. Only those who struggle for the destruction of the capitalist state are on the side of the proletariat and all the exploited and oppressed, struggling with them for their emancipation via the proletarian revolution.

When are nationalizations progressive?

The above mentioned words by Engels regarding the meaning of the transformation of individual capitalist property into joint-stock companies and their conversion into property of the capitalist state referred to the ascendant phase of capitalism, to the phase of its expan­sion, when the capitalist system was progressi­ve. During that phase, the concentration of the productive forces in the hands of capitali­st groupings and in the capitalist state const­ituted an important step forward, in the sense of the growing socialization of production, which in turn posed for humanity the task of socializing the property of those productive forces. We quote Engels again:

“The period of industrial boom with its unlim­ited credit inflation no less than the crash itself operating through the collapse of large capitalist establishments, drives towards that form of the socialization of larger masses of means of production which we find in the various kinds of joint-stock companies. Many of these means of production and communi­cation are so colossal from the outset that, like the railways, they exclude all other forms of capitalist exploitation. At a cert­ain stage of development this form, too, no longer suffices; ... the state, the official re­presentative of capitalist society, is (fina­lly) constrained to take over the direction of production. This necessity for conversion in­to state property first appears in the big communication organizations: the postal ser­vice, telegraphs and railways.” (Frederick Engels, Anti-Duhring, p.358-59)

But, adds Engels, “...it is only when the means of production or communication have actually outgrown direction by joint-stock companies and therefore their nationalization has become economically inevitable -- it is only then that this nationalization, even when carried out by the state of today, represents an economic ad­vance, the attainment of another preliminary step towards the seizure of all the productive forces by society itself. But since Bismarck became keen on nationalizing, a certain spurious socialism has recently made its appearance -- here and there even degenerating into a kind of flunkeyism -- which without more ado declares all nationalization, even the Bismarckian kind, to be socialistic. To be sure, if the nationa­lization of the tobacco trade were socialistic, Napoleon and Metternich would rank among the founders of socialism. If the Belgian state, for quite ordinary political and financial re­asons, constructed its own main railway lines, if Bismarck, without any economic compulsion, nationalized the main Prussian railway lines simply in order to be better able to organize and use them in face of war, in order to train railway officials as the government’s voting cattle, and especially in order to secure a new source of revenue independent of parliamen­tary votes, such actions were in no sense socialistic measures, whether direct or indir­ect, conscious or unconscious. Otherwise, the Royal Maritime Company, the Royal Porcelain Manufacture, and even the regimental tailors in the army would be socialist institutions.” (Engels, ibid, p.359).

Nobody will say that the nationalization of the Mexican oil industry was economically inevitable due to the fact that its administering -- from the standpoint of production -- was over­whelming the control by private companies. And nobody predicts any economic progress res­ulting from the transformation of this industry, which belonged to companies a thousand times better organized and more powerful than the Mexican state which now owns it.

In reality, the only words from the cited Engel’s quote which are relevant to the recent nationalizations in Mexico are those which talk about ‘political and financial reasons’, and of the concern by the state in creating for itself a ‘new source of revenue’, and converting the railway officials into ‘government voting cattle’.

Such nationalization, says Engels, represents no progress.

The reactionary character of nationalizations in the imperialist phase of capitalism

Only by analyzing the recent nationalizations in Mexico as part of the process of decomposition of capitalism we can understand their true historic significance.

In the ascendant phase of capitalism there was the possibility of progressive nationalizations, although many of them, as we can see in the examples given by Engels, did not have such character. Today, in the phase of decomposit­ion of the capitalist system there isn’t even the possibility of nationalizations with a progressive character, just as there can be not a single progressive measure carried out by capitalist society in decomposition and by its official representative, the capitalist state.

In the ascendant phase of capitalism the initi­al framework for the expansion of production and the concentration of property was the unif­ied national state, whose formation was progressive in comparison with the dispersed feudal associations. But soon the expansion of prod­uction and the concentration of property bypas­sed the limits of the national states. The large joint stock companies took on a greater and greater international character, creating in their fashion an international division of labor, and this, -- in spite of its contradic­tory character -- constitutes in turn one of the most important contributions of capitalism to the progress of humanity.

The greater international character of production began then to clash with the division of the world into national states. ‘The national state’, asserted the First Congress of the Communist International in 1919, ‘after having given a strong push to capitalist development, has become too narrow for the expansion of the productive forces.’

During that phase in which the national state constituted a progressive factor, in other words, in the ascendant phase of capitalism (and the words of Engels cited above refer only to that phase when certain nationalizations could have a progressive character), the conversion of property into joint stock companies, and then into state property was progressive. This was so because, in general, joint stock companies had not yet bypassed the framework of the national state.

But when the joint stock companies became structures encompassing already various states, nationalizations began to change their meaning: they increasingly went against the growing international division of labor. Thus, instead of constituting progress, they meant regression. The only possible progress today is the conversion of the property of the great joint stock companies and that of the capitalist state into property of the proletarian state which will emerge from the communist revolution.

Above all, nationalization during and after the World War threw into sharp relief their reactionary character throughout the whole of the capitalist world. Their objective is no longer the expansion of production, but its restriction – with one significant exception: the war industries!

One of the fundamental goals of nationalizations during World War of 1914-18, and during the recent wars of El Chaco, Ethiopia, Spain and China, was the restriction of production of consumer goods, and the production of means with which to destroy not only what has been previously produced, but the producers themselves. And this is applicable not only to the countries which directly participated in the war, but to all, whether Fascist or democratic governments. The nationalizations by both sides during the Spanish Civil War, and the recent nationalization of the railways and the war industries by France are cases in point. Destruction, not construction, is the great goal of capitalist society in its hour of agony.

While nationalizations in the past were expressions of the growth and expansion of capitalism, in the present they are the opposite. They are the expression of regression and of the more and more violent decomposition of the capitalist system. Before disappearing from the historic scene, capitalism destroys great parts of what it itself has created: the superb machinery of production, and the international division of labor. Capitalism thus, increasingly, subjects the productive forces to the confines of the national states.

Against this, when the proletariat’s hour arrives, it will ‘free the productive forces of all countries from the chains of the national states, thereby unifying all peoples in close economic collaboration.’ (Manifesto of the First Congress of the Communist International)

These are clear words, in irreconcilable opposition to the ideas of those who want to combine the watchwords of the proletarian revolution, which already has an international character, with those of so-called ‘national emancipation.’

The only possibility of liberating the oppressed peoples resides in the destruction of all national states by the victorious proletarian revolution and the unification of the entire world through close fraternal cooperation.

The triumph of the ‘good neighbor’

What we have said in a general way regarding the meaning of nationalizations in the phase of the decomposition of capitalism, needs certain additions and modifications in the case of semi-colonial countries like Mexico.

If it could be possible to place a part of the property of large international companies under the effective control of a small national state, it is clear that such nationalization would not increase the international division of labor created by capitalism; on the contrary, it would undermine and destroy it, thereby revealing its reactionary character, even more than in the case of the large imperialist states.

But, in reality, an effective nationalization on the part of small states is impossible, especially regarding the property of the large international companies, because it is them and their imperialist governments who control completely the economic and political management of small states. Only the imperialist states can nationalize today, either within areas of their direct political control or in the small states controlled by them. The ‘nationalizations’ carried out by the latter are, consequently, nothing but a farce, a change of label. Who is really ‘nationalizing’ is not really the small ‘free and anti-imperialist’ state, but the actual imperialist proprietor.

The only possible change would be that the small state, in our case the Mexican, passes being under the control of some imperialist companies and their state, to being under the control of other companies and their state.

And this is precisely what has happened in the case of the recent oil ‘nationalizations’ in Mexico: the great North American companies (Huasteca-Standard Oil and Gulf) plus their state no longer have to share the control of the oil resources and the whole destiny of Mexico with the English company E1 Aguila (Royal Dutch-Shell), and with their English state. Through the so-called ‘nationalization’, the North American companies have become the exclusive proprietors of what the Mexican bourgeoisie calls ‘our Fatherland’.

What has happened in this case is the only thing that can happen in the imperialist phase of capitalism. All the supposed ‘national redemptions’ inevitably mean the triumph of one or another imperialism. In the case of Mexico the victor has been the famous ‘good neighbor’.

The international bourgeoisie admits this with all frankness, as we can see in the following viewpoint expressed in the Bulletin of the Service Archives of Geneva (we quote from the Ultimas Noticias of 7th June): “From now on the United States is the indisputable masters of all the aspects of Mexican life. The last English (in Latin America) has been razed to the ground. The bridge to South America is now open. The United States has utilized the only possibility of defeating the English presence in Mexico, and it has done so without firing a shot. Today as yesterday they receive Mexican oil, with the difference that now they buy it from the Mexican government, instead of buying it from the oil companies. The prices are the same, the oil is the same, and the future will shortly show how the companies remain the same regarding their North American origins.... “It was Cardenas, hints the Bulletin, who finally helped the United States expel the British. Apparently it was all so simple. Precisely as the naive English were rejoicing at their owning 60% of the Mexican oil, as against up to the 40% owned by the United States, Cardenas grabbed it all. And, while London was raising a storm over the exprop­riations, Washington received the news with extr­aordinary calm... What happened then? The Bulletin suggests that there was a deal, between Washington and Mexico, through which all the oil becomes, in effect, ‘American’, “thereby definitely demolishing the last British fortress in this hemisphere”. This is what a bourgeois newspaper in Switzerland tells us.

E1 Nacional, organ of the Mexican government, gave the same interpretation when it announced the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Eng­lish government. It carried these two headlines side by side: ‘Mexico breaks with England/Talks with the American companies on a good path’.

One doesn’t need a better illustration of the transformation of Mexico into an exclusively North American colony than the flattery yankee imperialism receives in each number of E1 Nacion­al and in all the speeches by high Mexican funct­ionaries. According to them, today North American imperialism is in reality ‘anti-imperial­ist’. Only English imperialism is imperialism.

And the great traitor Leon Trotsky helps them in this propaganda, with his open letters in which ‘imperialism’ also means ‘English imperialism’, and not a word is whistled by the author of these letters about American imperialism...

How ‘workers’ management should save capitalist property

The capitalist system is in a dead-end sit­uation. Its destruction by the revolutionary proletariat is historically inevitable.

But, in these moments, the proletariat, weak­ened and disoriented by so many defeats and betrayals, is protecting the capitalist system instead of fighting it with the aim of destroying it and building a new society on its ruins. Helped by all the ‘workers leaders’, the bourgeoisie managed to derail the workers from their own class path, tying them to the interests of capitalism via the state. Blinded by the ideas of democracy and the fatherland, workers are defend­ing what they should destroy. We see this in Spain, in China, in Mexico, all over the world.

Instead of taking advantage of the crisis of the capitalist system to destroy it, the workers -- by not believing in the triumph of their own cause -- have temporarily become the best defenders of the system. Just like during the (first) world war, they sacrifice their economic gains and their lives in a fratricidal struggle under the orders of their class enemies. Of course we must not insist that today, like then, the responsibility for this lies not on the workers but on those Marxists who have betrayed Marxism and the cause of the proletarian revolution by their capitulation to democratic and patriotic fetishism. And we also don’t have to insist on the fact that the present situation will not last fore­ver, and that sooner or later the proletariat will again reclaim the revolutionary road. Historically, the proletarian revolution remains inevitable and invincible.

In Spain, and above all in Catalonia, we have seen in these recent years how the bourgeoisie managed to avoid the danger of proletarian revolution through the arming of the proletariat and the ‘socialization’ of industries -- ie, with their ‘deliverance’ to the workers. The class, under the illusion that they were the owners of the country, desisted in attack­ing the capitalist institutions. They began to de­fend with incredible sacrifices that which, in spite of certain label changes, remains capitalist property, and this included the capitalist state. Through the daily massacres in the battlefields of Spain, capitalism is reinforcing itself politically, filling up its senile veins with the blood of the exploited, who come from both sides of the front.

Following the example of the Spanish bourgeoisie, the Mexican bourgeoisie and its good North American neighbor attempt to exorcise the threat of prole­tarian revolution in Mexico with the ‘delivery’ of industries to the workers. Once these are ‘in the hands’ of the workers, the mortal enemy of the capitalist system will become its best defender -- such are the plans of the bourgeoisie in Mexico and Washington.

The Mexican and American bourgeoisie know of the hatred felt by the working masses of Mexico and of the whole Latin America for the large foreign companies. A proletarian attack against them would mean a blow struck at the heart of the capitalist system. That would mark the end of the imperialist domination of Mexico and of all the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The bourgeoisie in those countries, primarily its Mexican variant, know quite well that the only thing that keeps it in power and protects it from ‘its’ workers and peasants is precisely this imperialist domination. No wonder the Mexican bourgeoisie considers the North American bourgeoisie as its ‘Good Neighbor’.

In face of the growing and daily wrath of the ma­sses against the imperialist companies, a way had to be found to avoid at all costs a frontal attack by the workers against these companies. This task was, of course, taken up by the Mexican government. As everybody knows quite well, when semi-colonial governments do not carry out this task, they are overthrown. This has happened to many Mexican govern­ments as it has in Cuba and in other Latin American countries, when they were incapable of deflecting workers’ attacks against the sacrosanct property of imperialism. The ‘Good Neighbor’ requires efficient servants, and experience shows that the most apt servant is a ‘workerist’ government!

For a capitalist ‘workerist’ government, it wasn’t difficult to find the answer to the problem. The false ‘Marxists’ of the Stalinist and Trotskyist type had long since proposed it: for the united front between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie! And against whom? But, believe it or not, against imperialism of course!

In Spain and China that united front between the exploiters and the exploited has already been put into effect, with splendid results for the exploiters, fascists or anti-fascists, imperialists or anti-imperialists, and with dismal results for the exploited on both sides.

In Mexico something very similar has been developing for a long time. At last it took on a definite shape when the farce of the so-called ‘national redemption’ began. Pretending to be waging an irreconcilable struggle against imperialism (in words), the Mexican bourgeoisie and its government (in fact) delivered the destinies of the so-called ‘Mexican fatherland’ to the more and more absolute control of imperialism.

At the same time, by pretending that they were delivering the oil industry and the railways to the workers, they were able to extract from them the most extraordinary sacrifices.

Total victory throughout the front! Under the cover of its ‘nationalizations’, the bourgeoisie and its government hand over the most important industry of the country to the exclusive control of imperialism. Through this deal, the government of the Mexican bourgeoisie acquires a debt of ‘honor’ with the North American and English bourgeoisies; a debt which of course workers will have to pay. These will not only have to accept this sacrifice (‘voluntari­ly’ as their treacherous leaders claim), but they already have had to give, to the fatherland’s altar, and again ‘voluntarily’ of course, the 50 million pesos that they were demanding two years ago from these companies! We read the following in a report of the Executive Committee of the Oil Workers Trade Union, published in the press of the capital city on 28 April 1938:

“(We have been) in perfect agreement with the Government in the hour in which this was most needed by the Nation, and since we continue to be so, we patriotically accept that the benefits suggested by the findings of the Boards of Conci­liation and Arbitration Group 7, should not be effective as long as the present situation prevails. (We accept this) in spite of the sacrifices which the long years of struggle for a better life in the oilfields entail for the oil workers (not for their leaders to be sure!) In addition, the workers in this industry contribute to it various sums (and get what in return?), a fact that even the President knows. All these sums add up to around 140 million pesos. Apart from that, our various sections -- conscious of their duties as Mexicans -- are contributing on a monthly basis one daily wage for an indefinite period, to help alleviate the economic situation of the nation. This is equiva­lent to a monthly sum of more than 150,000 pesos.”

Adding all these sums, the famous ‘national re­demption’ has costed the oil workers (not to men­tion the others!) the respectable sum of more than 190 million pesos, apart from the other millions they have lost during the last two years, when they trusted the conciliation boards instead of striking and forcing the companies to pay higher wages. Instead of managing to get at least the 26 million pesos (out of the initial 50 demanded) that the ‘favorable findings of the boards promised, they were forced to pay those very same imperialist companies -- via the ‘anti-imperialist’ Mexican government -- a sum five times as large. Instead of receiving 26 millions, they have to pay more than 190 millions as their contribution to the so-called ‘debt of honor’!

It would be difficult to find in the whole history of the world bourgeoisie a better example of a perfectly executed swindle. Under the deluge of patriotic verbiage regarding the ‘economic liberation of Mexico’, there lurks history’s most gigantic robbery. The workers instinctively feel that in reality the whole thing has been a swindle, but because they are blinded by the idea that ‘the fatherland is in danger’, they don’t see reality. Hopefully our limited voice will help some understand the real situation, so that they can sober up from their dreams and illusions!

 

The task of the proletariat in the face of the recent nationalizations

If the false ‘Marxists’ leaders of Mexico lack the courage to denounce the real meaning of the ‘nation­alizations’ of oil and railways, they even less risk talking about the task of the proletariat in the face of these nationalizations made by the bourgeoisie for the benefit of the bourgeoisie.

Engels, on the contrary, spoke with the greatest clarity and frankness about this task. Of course he knew nothing about the ‘support for the govern­ment’ advocated by traitors to the class. The opposite is the case.

The only road that Engels points out in regards to nationalizations made by the bourgeoisie is the taking of state power by the proletariat, and the transformation of capitalist property, including that belonging to the capitalist state, into property of the proletarian state.

He points out with the utmost clarity the only le­sson that workers must draw from the transformation of individualist capitalist property or companies’ property into the property of the capitalist state: “By increasingly driving towards the transformation of the vast socialized means of production into state property, it itself points the way to the accomplishment of this revolution. The proletariat seizes state power and to begin with transforms the means of production into state property.” (Anti-Duhring, p.362)

Of course, this is its state, the proletarian state, the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The task of the Mexican proletariat is not, there­fore, to sacrifice itself so that the oil industry and the railways become profitable for the imper­ialist and ‘national’ capitalists. It isn’t either to go along with the farce of the ‘deliverance’ of industries to a so-called ‘workers’ management’. The task of the proletariat is to seize the indus­tries, that is, to wrench them from bourgeois hands through the proletarian revolution!

That is the only lesson that we should draw from the recent nationalizations!

Historic events: 

  • nationalizations [140]

Heritage of the Communist Left: 

  • "Self-management" [40]

Political currents and reference: 

  • Communist Left [4]

The evolution of the British situation since World War 2 (part two)

  • 2370 reads

The
Labor Party: Government Team and Loyal Opposition

9.
The party of the bourgeoisie which corresponds most closely to the
overall needs of British national capital -- not just in the current
conjunctural crisis but in the whole epoch of decadence -- is the
Labor Party. Its specific structure and orientation are best suited
to deal with the requirements of British capital, particularly since
World War II, in relation to the needs for:

--
the statification of the economy

--
the support of the western bloc

--
the containment of the struggle of the working class.

While
it would be a mistake not to recognize the flexibility of the
Conservative Party, a product of the maturity developed as the most
experienced party of the oldest capitalist nation-state, the
experience of the recent period has only underlined the role of the
Labor Party -- for the last decade has produced a profound economic
crisis, an intensification of inter-imperialist rivalry and the
greatest upsurge of proletarian militancy since the last
revolutionary wave. At first sight this argument may not appear to be
clear-cut -since the two parties have been in power approximately 17
years apiece. But this statistic masks the two important factors:

--
the longest period of Tory rule, from 1951 to 1964, had the major
objective of trying to hold the Empire/Commonwealth together as
market preserves for British capital. This effort failed and such a
requirement for a corresponding government will not return;

--
since the onset of the open crisis, the two occasions in which the
Labor Party has been ousted from power have both been during upsurges
of class struggle and when the capacity of the Labor Party and trade
unions to contain the proletariat has been considerably eroded by
periods when the left party had been in government office holding
down their living standards. At these times the Labor Party and the
unions have gone through phases of ‘opposition’ in which they
tried to regroup their forces in a more effective way to meet the
conditions of proletarian militancy. But even in opposition, the task
of trying to derail the struggle of the working class remains
predominantly with this faction of the bourgeoisie.

Thus,
as we examine the evolution of the situation since 1945, we can see
that the most effective defender of the national capital is the Labor
Party. It is consequently the most dangerous enemy of the
proletariat’s struggle.

10.
When we examine the maneuvers of the parties in this period
and relate them to the issues facing the bourgeoisie, we have to
remember that:

--
if the differences between the Labor and Conservative Parties are not
as great as their propaganda tries to make out nonetheless they do
correspond to different visions of the program for British capital.

For
example the Labor Party is far more committed to state control over
the economy than the Tories who retain a greater loyalty to
particularistic interests in society; Labor has a far stronger
connection to the union apparatus which the Tories can’t replicate;

--
the program defended by each of the parties are not static, but
change in response to the pressure imposed on the national capital
and the options presented in a given period. This pressure comes from
immediate circumstances as well as from the long-term effects of the
permanent crisis of capitalism. For example, with regard to
increasing statification (which is now a historical necessity for all
national capitals) the Conservatives have shifted far to the left of
the position they had, say, ten years ago;

--
each party has several currents or factions within it, reflecting
different programs for dealing with the problems of the national
capital. No matter how monolithic a bourgeois party tries to make
itself out to be, internal faction fights go on all the time. Shifts
in party policies can therefore also be achieved through the
assertion of one faction at the expense of another;

--
both Labor and the Tories are constrained by the parliamentary
framework and the electoral system which require them to construct
‘appeals’ to different sections of the electorate. This is a
burden on the capacity of the bourgeoisie to get the governing
faction it wants, though in Britain’s case it has provided an
important source of mystification against the working class. However,
the bourgeoisie is willing and able to suspend the electoral charade
when the need is felt -- as it did, for example, between 1939-45,
with the formation of the national coalition.

11.
At the beginning; of World War II the British bourgeoisie had in
power the very faction of the Conservative Party which had tried to
avoid the war. It fell with the end of the ‘phoney war’ and was
replaced by an alliance of those sections of the bourgeoisie which
saw their primary task being to stop German expansionism. The
coalition government led by Churchill included a substantial
representation from the Labor Party for two main reasons:

--
the Labor Party had the necessary capacity to organize and impose the
domination of the state over all aspects of the economy, and to
subordinate the economy to the needs of war production;

--
only the Labor Party had the ability to mobilize the working class
for the austerity and high rates of exploitation demanded for war
production, and for conscription into the army.

Despite
the majority of Conservatives in the government, the real weight of
the organization of society for the war was borne by the Labor Party
and the trade union apparatus. And, indeed, even the fall of
Chamberlain and the Conservative’s choice of Churchill to replace
him were due, in considerable measure, to the efforts of the Labor
Party.

The
war was prosecuted with several objectives, most of which were shared
with the US: to defeat Germany and Japan and to contain the Russian
threat to Europe. However, the coalition government resisted the
threat represented by the US to the British economy and to its
colonies -- the British bourgeoisie did not want to become a
dependency of the US. A measure of this resistance is given by the
fact that, despite all
the efforts of the US bourgeoisie, it was not until the Suez crisis
of 1956 that Britain finally and openly collapsed as a world power.

With
the Labor Party playing such a strong role in the coalition, the
bourgeoisie was much more able to see the need for a program for the
aftermath of the war to defuse any potential working class
struggle; the bourgeoisie had drawn the lessons from the consequences
of the unplanned end to World War I. The Beveridge Report was thus
commissioned to continue and further statification while appearing to
offer palliatives aimed specifically at the working class.

12.
The Labor government under Atlee, elected in 1945, corresponded to
the situation immediately following the war. Faced with a profound
dislocation of the economy it maintained many of the war-time
measures to continue the supply of workers and raw materials between
industries. It implemented a massive nationalization program which
included the Bank of England, coal, gas, electricity, iron and steel
as well as sections of many other industries, Externally, the
government recognized that there would be no reversal of the
new world order -- the US was master of its bloc – and that the
days were numbered for the retention of the Empire, since the
economic and military cost of preserving it could not be sustained.
The granting of independence to India was therefore not
such a fundamental wrench as it would have been for sections of the
Conservative Party. Although it tried to minimize
the worst of American economic measures against Britain, Labor was
well suited to the implementation of the austerity measures demanded
by the US. By working together with the union apparatus it was able
to hold down the workers’ living standards for years. To the
workers it presented itself, first of all, as the party of ‘full
employment’.

The
Labor government was only just returned in 1950 and fell from power
in the election held the following year. This electoral turning to
the right was a result of several factors:

--
the reconstruction was helping to stipulate the economy and tended to
strengthen the resistance of sectors of the bourgeoisie to plans for
further nationalizations and for possible losses of other colonies;

--
the successful containment of the workers by the Labor government had
removed the fear of major social upheaval from the bourgeoisie as a
whole;

--
resistance to the US’ economic policies towards Britain was
growing. This acted against the Atlee administration which was
associated with their implementation.

13.
The next thirteen years in which the Conservative Party remained in
power corresponded
to the years of major economic benefit from the post-war
reconstruction -- although there was a need for a succession of
deflationary and inflationary measures to maintain economic
equilibrium. In addition, there was a general
quiescence of the proletariat: the class struggle was dampened by the
new-found capacity of the bourgeoisie to draw palliatives from the
relative health of the economy. The policies of the Conservatives
towards the economy had become more appropriate to the period because
of the shift in the party towards a more realistic acceptance
of a higher level of state capitalism, marked by the adoption of the
‘Industrial Charter’ in 1947. Sections of the party who had drawn
up this document were by
this time prominent in the party, first under Churchill, then under
Eden, and finally under Macmillan who had most clearly represented
the state capitalist tendency inside the party as far back as the
thirties.

Macmillan
also represented the tendency in the party which saw that the Empire
could not be maintained in the same old way, and had argued for a
reassessment of the measures needed to keep the former colonies under
British economic domination. This tendency was therefore brought to
power after Eden’s Suez intervention demonstra­ted the
impossibility of holding on to the colo­nies. One of the main
tasks was to draw up a program for colonial independence, and this
goal was underlined in Macmillan’s 1961 Cape Town speech on the
‘wind of change’ blowing through Africa.

On
the question of ‘Europe or the Commonwealth’, the bourgeoisie
still tried to have it both ways, attempting to get access to
the markets being built up in Europe while maintaining the system of
Commonwealth preferences. Though the Conser­vative government
favored staying outside the European Economic Community at the time
of its formation in 1957, by the sixties it was opening negotiations
to join since the benefits of the old Commonwealth trade were
disappearing before its eyes. But it was not until the seventies that
leading factions of the bourgeoisie felt that Britain’s economic
position had weakened to the extent that it had to join the EEC, an
essential tool for the organization of a substan­tial proportion
of the western bloc’s economic activity.

By
the early sixties, it was clear that the Tor­ies had no further
policy to stimulate the economy and make it more productive,
something which was becoming more urgent in the face of growing
German and Japanese competition. There was also, in the second half
of the 1950s, a growing resis­tance by workers to government
attempts to impose ‘wage restraints’ and increase exploitation.

Though
the level of class struggle was generally far lower than in the late
sixties/early seventies,
the bourgeoisie was becoming alarmed at the increase in wildcat
strikes.

14.
A Labor government under Wilson was brought to power in 1964 to deal
with these problems. It aimed to pursue a far more rigorous state
intervention towards the economy than the Cons­ervative
government. It had limited goals in regard to outright
nationalization (mainly a re-nationalization of the steel industry)
but a greater commitment towards overall state planning and direction
of economic resources to build up the productivity of British
capital. It also aimed to tighten control over the national wage bill
by pulling unions and employers’ organiza­tions under a state
planning umbrella, and to deal with the rising tide of wildcat
strikes through legislation on the trade unions.

To
take part of the burden of military expendi­ture off the economy,
Wilson ended the maintenance of most of the British military
capabilities east of Suez. Like the previous Attlee govern­ment,
Wilson had a positive orientation towards the US, shown in his
support for the US’ inter­vention in South-East Asia.

The
grandiose plans of this administration for the regeneration of the
British economy crashed in the face of two major problems:

--
the runs on sterling, which had been a regular feature of British
economic life since the war, culminated in a massive onslaught which
the bour­geoisie could not withstand. This resulted in the
sterling devaluation of 1967 which not only ended sterling’s role
as a major reserve currency, but in fact heralded the new period of
open crisis for world capital;

  • the
    eruption of a wave of proletarian militancy not seen for over forty
    years and which signified a qualitative change in the nature of the
    period.

The
years which followed saw a profound disruption inside the Labor
government, the Labor Party, between the government and the unions,
etc. Consequently, at the time when the bourgeoisie most needed this
apparatus to work together to contain the intensifying struggle of
the workers, they were in disarray. The Labor government fell in 1970
only to be replaced by the Heath administration which was even more
inept.

To
explain how this disarray came about, and how the Labor Party and the
unions regrouped their forces between 1970 and 1974 in order to again
confront the class, it is necessary to examine the major tendencies
inside the party and the union apparatus.

15.
Because of its historical origins the Labor Party ‘system’ is a
complex amalgam of institu­tions tied together at different
levels with links of various strengths. At the annual conferences the
main organizations represented are the constituency parties and the
trade unions, and they and the Parliamentary Labor Party (PIP) have
places on the National Executive Committee (NEC). Outside this
framework, in Parliament, the Labor MPs elect the leader and certain
others, with the composition of the cabi­net (or Shadow cabinet)
being determined by the leader. Direct links also exist between the
NEC and the PLP and, since the early 1970s, between the government
and the TUC through a liaison committee. (Of the Labor MPs a
significant proportion
are in fact sponsored by trade unions).

On
the ideological level we can broadly split the Labor Party into two
major groupings -- the left and the right - although in reality
neither of these is constant nor homogeneous. Though subject to
variation the major differences in orientation between the two can be
outlined as follows:

--
regarding the economy, the left has tended to push for the
acceleration of statification in the most direct ways -- through
outright nationaliza­tions and for more direct and physical
controls. The right on the other hand has put more emphasis on the
mixture of the state and individual com­ponents of the economy,
with overall state cont­rol being accomplished through less
direct means;

--
although the Labor Party as a whole accepts US domination of the
western bloc the right wing has always been more compliant than the
left which has stood for a more ‘independent’ line -- during the
immediate post-war period a section of the left vigorously fought US
policy and argued for the creation of a ‘third force’ to counter
Russia on the one hand and the dictator­ship of the US over
Britain on the other;

--
in front of the workers the left has tended to emphasize the class
nature of society far more than the right. For example, they argue
far more for ‘industrial democracy’ and workers’ control --
ideas from which the right has tended to shrink.

These
ideological currents distributed through the entire Labor Party and
trade union apparatus with their relative strengths and
concentra­tion being determined by a combination of factors.
These include:

--
in a general way, the objective situation reg­arding the economic
and military problems confron­ting British capital and the
pressure from the working class;

--
the relative proximities of different sections of this apparatus to
the centre of the state machine;

--
the specific functions served by different parts of the apparatus --
for example, while both the constituency Labor Parties and the trade
unions exist for the service of British capital, the tasks they have
to perform are not identical;

--
the vulnerability of different parts of the apparatus to electoral
pressures.

With
these differences between the major ideolo­gical currents
existing throughout this apparatus we can understand why different
factions have dom­inated the party and the unions at different
times and what the arguments between them have meant.

16.
The composition of the post-war Labor gov­ernment was determined
by the needs to comply with the severe economic and military dictates
of the US, to ensure that strong mechanisms of state control over the
economy were maintained, and to impose an austerity program on the
working class. The party and the unions were dominated by the right
wing, a coloring which had come about not least because of the fact
that the British bourgeoisie dominated a crushed working
class through the thirties and during the war. The Attlee
administration therefore corresponded well to the situation:

--
it consolidated the state control achieved in the war years in a way
which avoided too much resistance from the still-powerful sections of
the private bourgeoisie. In this respect the government also had to
restrict the nationaliza­tion program to an extent tolerable to
the US. The US bourgeoisie put restrictions on the natio­nalization
process through the conditions for the receipt of Marshall Aid, as
they perceived such British state moves as a possible source of
restraint on their own export program:

--
in a period of acute rivalry with Russia, the Attlee government
agreed to the maintenance of strong military capacities in Europe,
particularly in Germany;

--
although the balance of class forces was well in the favor of the
bourgeoisie the government still saw the need to mystify the workers
by sell­ing austerity with the idea that the country was being
rebuilt with a clear goal of raising work­ers’ living
standards. To manage the ‘welfare state’ a representative of the
left, Bevan, was chosen as Minister of Health. This use of the left
was strengthened further after a few years when one of its main
spokesmen, Bevan, was made Minister of Labor.

17.
In the period of opposition during the fifties and early sixties a
redistribution of forces took place within the Labor Party and the
union apparatus. In the early fifties there was a strengthening of
the left in the constit­uency parties, largely over the question
of foreign policy and rearmament. As the threat of the third world
war receded, the left had argued against the continuation of high
military expen­diture (exacerbated by Germany’s reduced support
to the British forces based there) and the con­sequences of US
military policy in the Far East. There, expenditures were too onerous
for the economy and the left’s resistance to the US’ strictures
on Britain was growing. However, in the leadership of the trade union
apparatus the strength of the right remained as the low level of
class struggle provided little basis for the left to develop.

In
the middle and late fifties the picture began to change. The gradual
improvement in the econo­mic situation produced a general
electoral swing to the right which put enormous pressures on the PLP
to shift in the same direction in order to maintain its electoral
appeal. The response to these pressures was best expressed through
the Gaitskell faction of the party, which by 1960 was arguing at the
party conference for a re­writing of the party program. The
Gaitskell faction wanted to discard Clause 4 -- ie the party’s
theoretical commitment to the nationaliza­tions of the whole
means of production. This, of course, met with intense opposition
from the left, not only in the constituency parties but also in the
unions, in which had been developing; a shift to the left throughout
the latter half of the fifties. In contrast to the early years of the
decade a higher level of class struggle was developing. This was
expressed through a substantial growth in unofficial strikes against
which the entrenched right wing of the union machine could not really
make the most effective stand.
The left therefore began to make more headway. The first major
landmark in its progress was with the election of Cousins in 1956 of
the TGWU (Transport and General Workers’ Union) after the death of
Deakin. This leftward movement in the leadership of the major unions
continued into the sixties as Scanlon, Jones and others came to
prominence, replacing those such as Deakin, Lowther and Williamson.

The
late fifties and early sixties was a period of intense turbulence
inside the Labor Party. The left in the party and the unions were
strong enough to defeat the efforts of Gaitskell to abandon Clause 4
at the 1960 conference. At the same conference the left also managed
to push through a resolution calling for British unilat­eral
nuclear disarmament, though this decision was reversed the following
year. Although the right still dominated the party, the left had
nonetheless strengthened its position substan­tially. It was with
this mixture of forces active in the party that Wilson (who took the
leadership after Gaitskell’s death) came to power in 1964.

18.
The general goals of the Wilson administra­tion have already been
outlined, including those which focused on the working class.
Economic difficulties, particularly relating to the strength of
sterling, confronted this government almost immediately, and
therefore made it feel the need to draw up a program to attack the
working class. This was to be achieved by the imposition of a
concerted policy to control wages and to deal with the unofficial
strikes through legislation. It was hoped that strikes could be
better controlled more closely by legally binding the unions to the
government. To this end, the Donovan Commission was set up in 1965 to
provide the justification for the proposals which appeared in In
Place of Strife
in 1969. This approach was a direct reflection of
the strong Gaitskellite presence in the govern­ment, and shows
just how out-of-tune this adminis­tration was with the needs of
the unions, which actually had to deal with the workers’ struggle.
Consequently, the Seamens’ strike of 1966, rather than being seen
as a warning about the need for a more flexible approach to the
unions, merely stiffened the government’s resolve to act in a more
rigid way towards the unions. Under the pressure of the workers’
militancy a break took place between the unions and the government
across the ideological ‘fault line’. In the event the government
had to back down and accept ‘voluntary’ restraint by the unions.
Unable to deal with the workers’ struggle and split by the whole
argument with the unions, the govern­ment fell in the 1970
General Election.

19.
The main concern of the whole bourgeoisie in the subsequent period of
the Heath government was the struggle of the workers. This
government’s ability to deal with the situation was no better than
that of the previous Labor team -- yet it was the best the Tories
could find as it followed policies of the left-wing of the party.
Making the same mistakes as the previous Labor govern­ment, it
passed an Industrial Relations Act which the unions fought.

In
opposition, the Labor Party and the union machine regrouped their
forces, with two major accomplishments:

--
a
significant strengthening of the left wing took place;

--
formal organizational links were made between the TUC and the Labor
Party through a Liaison Committee in an effort to avoid a repeat
perfor­mance of the previous years’ events where they did not
function in concert.

Heath’s
collapse in front of the unyielding mili­tancy of the miners in
1974 brought Labor back to power, albeit narrowly. But in the course
of the election the unions and the Labor Party were able to function
together and dragoon the workers to the ballot box.

20.
Under the new Labor government the consoli­dation of the previous
year’s work continued and produced:

--
a government with stronger representation for the left;

--
a ‘social contract’ which enabled the govern­ment and the
unions to face the workers together in order to impose the austerity
and discipline which the crisis-ridden economy demanded.

Because
of their inexperience at these levels of militancy, the workers’
perspectives for the struggle were very limited, and together with
the fact that the government and unions were again working together
against them, the workers’ struggle ebbed, as it had begun to ebb
in other advanced capitals. In the subsequent phase of quiescence of
class struggle austerity was imposed harder and harder.

Though
there was a shift to the left in the new Wilson government and even
more so under Callag­han, it was tempered by the need both to pay
attention to those interests among the British bourgeoisie who feared
too far a movement to the left and to allay fears of the US
bourgeoisie. In addition, the drive for a further move to the left
was rendered unnecessary by the reflux in the struggle of the
workers.

However,
in the context of the resurgence of class struggle since the end of
1978, the pressures have again built up for a leftward shift in the
policies and membership of the PLP. Thrown out of office in May 1979
because of their inability to maintain their austerity program on an
increasingly militant working class, Labor is once again in the role
of the opposition party and once again in the throes of a faction
fight to equip itself for the coming turmoil by contin­uing its
leftward shift.

21.
The major conclusions we can draw concerning the roles of the Labor
and Conservative Parties are:

--
the Labor Party is the most appropriate party for the overall defense
of the interests of British capital -- not only for the present
con­juncture, but for the historical period;

--
the maneuvers of the Labor Party in the face of the problems of
British capital must be considered in conjunction with those of the
trade unions. Over the past two decades we can see that the
indispensable ideological and organiza­tional links between the
different parts of the ‘Labor movement’ have been greatly
strengthened;

--
the manner in which the Labor Party and the unions carry out their
tasks is determined to a great extent by the parliamentary framework
which the British bourgeoisie has evolved over the years.
Consequently, they do not have a perman­ent position in
government and their attack on the proletariat is geared according to
whether they are in power or in opposition. Either way, this part of
the state apparatus is the most deadly for the workers because it has
evolved in the recognition of the proletariat as capital’s
gravedigger.

The
balance of class forces

22.
The change in the relative strengths of the two major classes in
society since World War II has been of historic proportions. That
event marked the apex of the bourgeoisie’s class power, and the
nadir of the proletariat’s. Yet today the proletariat does not
merely stand in the way of further world war but is showing through
its defiance and resistance to austerity that the historic course is
once more towards revolution.

The
fact that World War II was not followed almost immediately by a third
between Russia and the US was because the controlled reconstruction
of the world economy attenuated the inter-imperialist rivalries
sufficiently to create a pause in the ever-present tendency towards
war in the epoch of capitalist decadence. As the reconstruction of
the economy took place at such a global level it provided a far
longer period of economic stimulation than had been possible after
World War I. This extended period -- which lasted more than a
generation -- has allowed the working class to recover from the
prostrating effects of the long period of counter-revolution.

While
these assessments about the historical course come from a global
perspective on the balance of class forces, it is nonetheless
possi­ble, and necessary, to examine the actual experience of the
change of course in specific countries.

23.
During the whole period of counter-revolution the workers never
stopped struggling. For all the weakness of the class its militancy
never died, not even during the war. In Britain, despite the fact
that all strike action was declared illegal by Order 1305 there were
many wildcats, especially by miners and engineers who were among the
most brutally exploited during the war. Vicious propaganda was
leveled against them; on the eve of the apprentice engineers’
strike they were threatened with conscription if they didn’t go
back to work; the Betteshanger miners were imprisoned -- although the
strike was so militant the state bureaucrats had to contin­ue to
negotiate with the strikers in gaol. None­theless, the
overwhelming advantage was of course with the bourgeoisie, which
achieved a total mobilization of the population for the war effort,
especially at the point of production where the union apparatus and
the now-flourishing shop stewards’ movement attained levels of
exploita­tion which were the envy of the rest of the world’s
bourgeoisie.

In
the period following the war -- under the Labor government -- these
conditions of brutal austerity were maintained. (Rationing, for
example, did not end until the mid-fifties.) The workers’ response
was still fragmented but there were pockets of strong resistance such
as the miners and dockers whose strikes led to more failings and
prosecutions by the government using the
wartime laws. Still the weight of the bour­geoisie was enormously
strong.

During
the early fifties the class struggle tend­ed to remain at a low
intensity as the austerity measures were steadily relaxed and some
portion of the ‘benefits’ were won by the workers, inclu­ding
the maintenance of full employment. All the same, the trade unions
continued to support the Labor and Conservative governments’
policies of ‘wage restraint’, it was not until 1956 that the TUC
withdrew its formal support for such policies, thereby giving an
indication of the growing resistance developing among the workers.

24.
The latter half of the fifties brought a substantial rise in strikes
which particularly concerned the bourgeoisie because they tended to
be concentrated in key sectors with dockers, electricians and car
workers in the lead. The bourgeoisie used several tactics to deal
with the wage claims and strikes:

--
prolonging the ‘negotiations’ between the unions and the
employers to delay strikes for wage claims;

--
channeling these struggles into the inter-union rivalries over
demarcation which were endemic in the late fifties (and were related
to the process of concentration going on in the apparatus of the
unions at the time);

--
the granting of higher wages which the expansion of the economy still
permitted with only a slow erosion through the relatively low
inflation rate of the time.

Through
the sixties the pressure on the workers increased and palliatives
could only be found in return for more and more productivity,
heightening the rate of exploitation to levels which later became
explosive. At the same time, there were several, industries which
underwent enormous run­downs in manning levels caused by the
introduc­tion elf new technology. Where these factors were most
prominent, so were the highest levels of militancy to appear -- in
the mines, car plants, docks, railways, steel, etc.

Thus
by the mid-sixties, just prior to the onset of the open crisis, there
were certain conditions which were to affect the conduct of the
coming battles between the major classes. The working class had been
given time by the reconstruction to recover from its past horrendous
defeats but had experienced only low levels of class struggle which
could be contained within a framework of economic expansion. The
bourgeoisie too had little recent experience of high levels of class
struggle, and in addition, its primary apparatus for mystification
and control of the workers -- the
Labor Party and trade union apparatus were not fully synchronized,
and had pronounced ideological differences.

25.
With the onset of the crisis and its intensification of class
struggle, the economic, political and social equilibrium were all
destroyed. The first wave of proletarian militancy in Britain had
several noteworthy characteristics:

--
it lasted for a long time – from 1968-74 – with the phases of
rise and dissipation being quite slow;

--
it drew into itself, at one level or another, the whole of the class
and contrasted dramatically in this respect with the struggles of the
forties, fifties and early sixties;

--
despite the convulsions into which society was thrown by these
strikes, the struggle never expressed itself on the political level.

The
reaction of the bourgeoisie was first to retreat, to regroup its
strongest forces; and then, when the struggle was ebbing, to
counter­attack:

--
the ‘retreat’ was a stepping back from the direct confrontation
against the workers as their upsurge continued. Recognizing the
dangers, the bourgeoisie limited the use of the repressive arms of
the state against the workers. The trade union leaders had to back
off too, as in the early phase they became less and less able to hold
the workers at bay. The most dramatic example of this was the 1970
picketing of the NUM (National Union of Mineworkers) headquarters
(guarded by police) by furious miners against the union bosses who
were trying to break their wildcat. Such warnings were clear and the
unions were forced to allow the class to ‘let off steam’ for a
while. It was in this period that the Wilson government fell.

--
the Heath government recognized many of the dangers, but not as
clearly as the left of the bourgeoisie; it drifted down the path of
confron­tation and in so doing put itself forward as the
personification of the anti-working class move­ment in society,
to the benefit of the Labor Party and the unions which were thus able
to organize the biggest mobilization of workers since the twenties in
the fight against the Industrial Relations Act. During this period
there was the regroupment of forces in the Labor Party and the trade
unions that we described earlier. In the meantime the task was given
to the shop stewards to ‘go with the class’ so that they could
later grasp the reins and slow the struggle down. They concentrated
on keeping strikes isolated from each other, and from other sections
of the class not on strike -- a strategy epitomized by the wave of
factory occupations in 1971 and 1972. The use of the 3-day week and
the General. Election in February 1974 to break the miners’ strike
permitted a now-strengthened Labor Government to face the class
again;

--
the counter--attack began in earnest after the Election, against a
now-ebbing wave of militancy. Working far more closely together than
they had been able to do in the sixties, the Labor gov­ernment
and the unions built up to a crescendo the campaign for the social
contract, sealing it in July 1975. After conceding relatively high
percentage wage settlements for a time, the Labor government once
more returned to its natural role: covering itself with sanctimonious
concern for the national interest, it became again the party of
austerity.

26.
The austerity measures held fast in Britain and were a model for the
bourgeoisie of the west­ern world. As the reflux settled,
austerity became tougher. The repercussion at the ideological level
was that the formal rules no longer had to be agreed to -- in 1977,
after two years of the social contract, the pretence of the ending of
an agreement was put forward by the unions with great gusto. Instead,
‘guidelines’ were adhered to -- with the objective being to
maintain austerity and to reduce the association between the unions
and the measures of austerity.

However,
while this has been the intention, it is also true that the austerity
program has eroded the credibility of the unions and the left.
Consequently, the bourgeoisie is faced with the problem that the use
of its left face today undermines further shifts to the left in
future. This has already been seen throughout 1979 with stronger
challenges being made to the authority of the unions and shop
stewards, and with a widespread indifference to the maneuver­ings
of the Labor Party being exhibited by the workers.

27.
The current strike wave, which erupted during the 1978-79 winter,
shows that the working class is beginning to emerge from these past
years of reflux and reassert itself on its own class terrain. And if
the major left fac­tions of the bourgeoisie, the Labor Party, has
been removed to the position of ‘loyal opposit­ion’ the
better to refurbish itself then this is not because of a
strengthening but because of a weakening of the ruling class in the
face of an increasingly combative proletariat. Truly, the workers’
struggle exacerbates the political crisis of the ruling class.

Once
more the struggle of the proletariat has become the axis of the
entire social situation.

***********************

This
text has traced only the general lines of the evolution of the
situation in Britain since World War II. It has covered a period in
which the balance of class forces has been predominantly in favor of
the bourgeoisie, and has outlined the general context from which the
future, titanic movements of the proletariat will emerge. The
specific way in which the current, second wave of class struggle
since the onset of the open crisis in 1968 is developing is described
in ‘The Report of the British Situation’ in World Revolution,
no.26.

Marlowe

Geographical: 

  • Britain [133]

Source URL:https://en.internationalism.org/internationalreview/197001/5212/international-review-1970s-1-19#comment-0

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