6. The cycle of war-reconstruction

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The self-destruction of Europe during World War I was accompanied by a 15 per cent growth in American production. Amid the chaos of the old continent, the United States discovered an important outlet; Europe had to import masses of consumer goods, means of production and arms from America. Once the war ended, the reconstruction of Europe proved to be the new and important outlet. Through massive destruction with an eye to reconstruction, capitalism has discovered a way out, dangerous and temporary but effective, for its new problems of finding outlets.

During the first war, the amount of destruction was not 'sufficient'; military operations only directly affected an industrial sector representing less than one-tenth of world production (around 5-7 per cent) [1] [1]. In 1929, world capitalism again ran into a crisis situation.

As if the lesson had been well-learned the amount of destruction accomplished in World War 2 was far more intense and extensive. "All in all therefore during the second world war almost a third of the total industrial sector of the world was drawn into the direct arena of military action." [2] [2]

Russia, Germany, Japan, Great-Britain, France and Belgium violently suffered the effects of a war which for the first time had the conscious aim of systematically destroying the existing industrial potential. The 'prosperity' of Europe and Japan after the war seemed already foreseen by the end of the war, (Marshall Plan, etc...).

Contrary to common opinion, 'reconstruction' does not stop when the ruined nation regains its pre-war levels of production: reconstruction does not only involve the directly productive goods but also all the infra-structures and means of life destroyed during the war, even though their reconstruction is not immediately necessary in order to attain pre-war production levels. Reconstruction is never undertaken with pre-war technology; important progress in productivity and the concentration of capital has occurred during the war. Also, the fact that the former levels of production are regained does not necessarily mean that the same mass of value will again be tied up in productive capital. Finally, during their destruction those countries concerned became industrially backward in relation to the other powers. Their reconstruction cannot be considered completed until the moment when they regain not their former levels o production, but ones which make them again internationally competitive.

In this sense, reconstruction characterised the growth of the post-World War 2 period right up to the 1960s and not just to the 1950s as is often supposed.

[1] [3] Sternberg, p.477

[2] [4] Sternberg, p.478

Permanent armaments production

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Only in 1934-35 can we observe a definite recovery in the world economy after its collapse in 1929. This recovery has, however a peculiar feature unprecedented in the history of capitalism: it is not accompanied by a proportional rise in world trade. Between 1932 and 1936, the index of world economic activity (the USSR included) rose from 69 to 111 (1929 = 100). The index of world exports, by contrast, declined in value from 39 per cent to 37.8 per cent. This recovery is the result of production which is not commercialised: armaments. It resulted from the intensive rearmament of certain powers: Germany, Japan, Russia and, to a certain degree, England. In 1937, the Federation of British Industries declared that the expenditure on armaments gave a boost to economic activity between four to six times greater than that due to placements of British capital abroad [1] [5].In Germany, armaments expenditures reached 90 billion marks between 1933 and 1938. This figure which Hitler disclosed in 1940 was higher than all the estimates which had been made until then. The index of producer goods quadrupled between 1932 and 1934, that of automobile production, thanks to the motorised army, sextupled. The number of unemployed went from 5,331,000 in 1933 to 172,000 in November 1938 [2] [6]. There was an exceptional demand for the raw materials essential to arms production: a country like Sweden, whose iron was fought over by the European powers, saw its profit index go from 28 to 91.4 between 1932 and 1936.This recovery was manifested unequally. In 1937, Europe accounted for 65 per cent of the world's expenditure on arms. Its industrial production index was 11 points higher than its 1929 level. By contrast, in America, where military-oriented production remained feeble, the same index was still lower (by 7 points) than its 1929 level.In 1937-38, when a new crisis menaced the capitalist world, again an upsurge of armaments production in the powers not yet armed 'saved' the system. Production in the United States had fallen 37 per cent below the 1929 level. Other countries where peacetime economies remained predominant, violently experienced the backlash of the American crisis (Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Rumania)."Purchases related to armaments", the League of Nations bluntly wrote in a 1938 report, "were speeded up precisely between the middle of 1937 and 1938, that is to say, during a period when the recession in the United States and the demand for goods risked becoming a world-wide depression analogous to the one which had begun in 1929" [3] [7].There can be no possible doubt about the nature of the economic recovery after the crisis of 1929. It was due exclusively to the armaments economy, that is to the production of the means of destruction. This type of production finds an outlet only in war. War is the only way to make profits from military investments. War broke out. It opened up new possibilities for the powers which supplied the means of destruction. Thus Canada realised during the war years a growth of production equal to its total growth of production over the previous twenty-five years [4] [8]; the United States saw its industrial production grow by 50 per cent [5] [9].At the end of the war, despite the greatest destruction in the history of humanity, world production had not diminished. It had risen above its pre-war level, and the United States had attained one of the strongest growth rates in its history. But in order to accomplish that, the United States had to devote to military expenses, no longer a secondary part of its economy, (in 1929, military expenditures did not go above 1 per cent of the GNP), but the essential part of its productive capacities. "(...) the US military sector represented not a relatively small part of the whole economic system, but a very large part, and at its peak it was almost as great as the total production of the United States in the period before the outbreak of the war." [6] [10]But before we see how this new form of 'life' of the system is going to mould the period which followed World War 2, we must first pose the question: why did the armaments economy enable capitalism to resolve, at least momentarily, the contradictions which paralysed it? Is it because it acted as a brake on the tendency for the rate of profit to fall? Because it moderated the tendency of shrinking markets?Without opening up an in depth discussion of the theory of Rosa Luxemburg versus that of Grossman-Mattick regarding the primordial contradictions of the capitalist system, a few remarks can be made based on the events of this period.In general, it is impossible to consider the tendential fall in the rate of profit separately from the tendency of a shrinking market: the threat of the falling rate of profit forces capitalism to develop the means to constantly accumulate capital and thus to acquire new markets. Increasing the volume of production, which is only possible with the acquisition of new markets, constitutes the principal means of counteracting the falling rate of profit. Simultaneously, the constant rise in the technical components of capital (ie its organic composition), is the motor force behind the tendency for the rate of profit to fall. What makes this necessity to raise productivity inescapable is the deadly competition between the different factions of capital for control of the existing markets (the success of one capital over another in capturing a market is measured by its capacity to sell more cheaply, that is, to produce with a higher level of technology).The armaments economy acts simultaneously on these two levels of contradiction within capitalism. It acts on the contraction of markets by furnishing a new, even though temporary, outlet for production. This outlet is all the more important in that (in contrast to markets provided by public works programmes such as Hitlerian motorways, or city improvements carried out under the 'New Deal'), it involves a much larger sector of the economy since military needs concern almost all domains of production. Also, the necessity for increasingly powerful and sophisticated armaments especially stimulates the more advanced industries where the concentration of capital is the highest [7] [11]. Finally, military production has the immense advantage of not encumbering markets for which 'civilian' production is destined.Armaments production also acts directly on the tendential fall in the rate of profit in three ways. Firstly, outlets are expanded. Secondly, the rate of exploitation is increased [8] [12] since real wages are reduced by inflation (or in wartime by rationing and inflation [9] [13] and labour time is prolonged. During wars, overtime becomes obligatory and even work camps are instituted under the call for 'civilian duty'. All of these measures took place in the United States after 1933, as well as in Austria, Poland, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, and especially the USSR and Germany [10] [14]. And thirdly, armaments production imparts a strong acceleration to the process of concentration, and therefore of the profitability of capital. [11] [15]However, the history of this period shows that the most concentrated capital in the world, with the lowest paid workers, cannot in any way develop its production if it cannot find an outlet for the sale of its goods. During the great depression of 1929-34, wages fell to extraordinarily low levels and the concentration of capital (by the movement of selection which crises impose) received a big boost. Nevertheless, production and the rates of profit continued to stagnate or to fall.It is therefore because of its function as a 'new' outlet that armaments production has unburdened the capitalist economy. That is to say, that the inherent contradictions of capitalism are centred and manifested at the level of the market (ie, the realisation of surplus value). Thus in 1914, the rapid reduction of the possibilities of imperialist expansion dealt capitalism a mortal wound at its very heart, the market (the necessity to sell).The heads of state who had to deal with this depression were not mistaken about its origin when they declared, as did Roosevelt shortly before the United States entered the war: "We are not consuming all the food we can produce. We are not utilising all the oil we can extract; we are not using all the commodities we can manufacture". [12] [16] It was clear to the most important leader of the capitalist world that the problem appeared not at the point of production (the creation of surplus value): "we can produce,...we can extract,...we can manufacture..."; but at the level of the market: "We are not consuming,...we are not utilising,...we are not using..."Hitler was no less lucid when he proclaimed in February 1939, in what was to become his famous war cry, "Germany must export or perish!"We have seen how the growth of capitalism after World War 2 was really a continuation of the decline which preceded it from the fact that this growth was based on reconstruction. A second important manifestation of this continuing decline is capitalism's maintenance of armaments production large enough to effectively act as a stimulus to growth.In effect, the capitalist powers did not proceed with complete disarmament after World War 2. The constant exacerbation of inter-imperialist antagonisms no longer permitted them to do so. Through localised conflicts, in which the populations of under-developed countries served as cannon fodder, by exploiting any national liberation movement whatever, the great powers continued to tear the planet to pieces in order to divide and redivide it among themselves. The world, so to speak, has never known a period of total peace since Hiroshima. And war, even localised war, consumes an ever growing mass of arms.World War 2 also brought about the reintegration of the 9 million unemployed Americans of 1939 into capitalist exploitation. The end of hostilities caused in less than three years the reappearance of 3 million unemployed in the United States. [13] [17] But the uninterrupted growth of military needs after the war allowed capitalism to reabsorb potentially growing unemployment.During the fiscal year of 1965, nearly 6 million people were employed in one way or another in defence and during the fiscal year of 1968 this figure was nearly 8 million. [14] [18] The magnitude of this gigantic production of armaments can be illustrated by the fact that "the world has spent more on armaments over the last ten years than during the entire first half of the century, the two World Wars included." [15] [19]

If we remember that the percentage of the American national revenue destined for military purposes was less than 1 per cent in 1929 and that before 1913 the 4 per cent reached by Germany on the eve of the war represented an unprecedented maximum, we will understand the significance of the per centages maintained after 1945.

By relying increasingly on the crutch provided by armaments production and finding in the military outlet a stimulus for its growth, capitalism continues to survive. Thus throughout the period of reconstruction, we find the capitalists using the same medicine as that which has maintained the system since 1914. The state's skill in utilising these remedies has evolved; armaments production has permitted the state to intervene in the economy with greater intensity and effectiveness. But the content of these ‘remedies' remains the same, because the nature of the disease has not changed either: the irreversible shrinking of the system's field of expansion; the permanent threat of the falling rate of profit; the heightened competition among the different factions of world capital; the inexorable exacerbation of class antagonisms; the incomplete utilisation of capital; and the instability of the means of exchange.All these economic symptoms which emerged with World War I and developed during the crisis of 1929-38 remained and were constantly aggravated in subsequent periods. The period of post-World War 2 capitalism is only a moment in the unfolding of a cycle which has characterised the general life of the system since 1914, namely: crisis-war-reconstruction.Reconstruction is that least catastrophic moment of the cycle in which capital can best hide its senility. The second period of reconstruction following World War 2 was longer, more spectacular and came after a wave of destruction that was more intense than World War I. Capitalism developed a more refined means of survival. The prosperity of this period was sufficient, at least in the developed countries, to make one momentarily forget what had happened to capitalism since the first war. But as soon as this relative prosperity was threatened, the old wounds of decadence resurfaced more gaping than ever.The period of reconstruction following World War 2 is the logical continuation of the decline which preceded it. It is far from a revival of the ascendant phase of capitalism. The principal economic manifestation of this period naturally appears at the level of the development of the productive forces.

[1] [20]Henri Claude, De La Crise Economique A La Guerre Mondiale, Editions Sociales, 1947, p.65

[2] [21] Claude, p.70

[3] [22] League of Nations, ‘Apercu General Du Commerce Mondial' 1938, cited by Henri Claude, p.30

[4] [23] Claude, p.24

[5] [24] Sternberg, p.488

[6] [25] Sternberg, p.494

[7] [26] For example, in 1962 American military expenditure in planes, missiles, electronic and telecommunications equipment accounted for 75 per cent of the total military expenses of the country. Ships, artillery, vehicles and related equipment which were once the mainstay of the armed forces, made up the remaining 25 per cent.

[8] [27] The full importance of this factor can be seen if we express the general rate of profit in the following form: sv = sv¼v*c+v 1+ c¼v

*sv¼v is the definition of the rate of exploitation (or the rate of surplus value).

[9] [28] The fact that real wages rose in the United States during World War 2 (probably because American territory was not directly involved in the war) seems incontestable. But the American government nonetheless didn't miss the opportunity of offering workers Goering's famous "alternative", resolved of course in advance: "Either guns or butter". During the war, production of ‘durable' consumer goods was prohibited.

[10] [29] Claude, p.61

[11] [30] In 1945, there was so much progress in capital concentration in the United States that it has been estimated (Fritz Sternberg) that the 250 largest enterprises produced the equivalent of what some 75,000 industries produced before the conflict.

[12] [31] Speech of May 28, 1941

[13] [32] 9,480,000 unemployed in 1939, 670,000 in 1944, 3,395,000 in 1949 (President's Economic Report, 1950)

[14] [33] United Nations, 26th Session of the General Assembly, United States response to the UN questionnaire on ‘The Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race...' 1972, p.48

[15] [34] Perroux, La Guerre ou Partage du Pain, V. 3, p.495

The slowing down of the growth of the productive forces of capitalism since World War 2

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The accelerating of the rhythm of development of the productive forces after World War 2 was one of the factors which provoked the split in the '4th International' in 1952. According to the 'Lambertist' faction of the AJS-OCI (The Organisation Communiste Internationaliste is the French Trotskyist group headed by Lambert, formerly linked to the Healyite Socialist Labour League in the UK (now the Workers Revolutionary Party) and the Wolforthite Workers League in the US. The AJS (Alliance de Jeunesse Socialiste, is the youth section of the OCI), the economic premise underlying the possibility of, and necessity for, socialist revolution is the total cessation of the growth of the productive forces. The Lambertists are, in this respect, faithful to the letter to the transitional programme of Trotsky. We have seen at the beginning of this article, the inconsistency of this theory from the marxist point of view.Growth statistics for the period of reconstruction render this theory absurd. In order to bring the statistics into line with their views, the Lambertists insist on the unproductive nature of armaments production. But even if one is certain that arms production acts as a brake on real production, it is statistically impossible to pretend that it has paralysed or 'nullified' the growth of the productive forces since 1945.The stubborn, short-sighted dogmatism of this position is all the more ridiculous in that it violently clashes with another dogma (the transitional programme) so dear to the AJS-OCI: "The USSR is not capitalist, it is a degenerated workers‘ state." Productive forces could thus develop there much more rapidly than in the United States. But Russia devotes a much greater part of its production to armaments than have the greatest Western powers.For the Trotskyists of the official 4th International, (Ligue Communiste -Mandel, defunct), decadence is not defined by the 'clogging' of the growth of the productive forces, but by the slowing down of this growth under the weight of the relations of production. In that they are faithful 'to the letter' to Marx. But if one scratches just a little below the surface, one discovers a patchwork of dogmas as contradictory as those of the AJS.In a pamphlet entitled, "Qu'est-ce-que l'AJS?", Weber, the theoretician of the 4th International, tried to criticise the "absurd theories and grotesque contortions of the Lambertists" on this question [1] [35]. In order to resolve the contradictions apparent in the dogma of the 'degenerated workers' state', (Mandel and Co also believe that there are a lot of countries in the world which are non-capitalist), Weber attributes a productive character to armaments production. To answer the problem of Trotsky's formulation that the premises of socialism are dependent on the arrested growth of productive forces, Weber explains that Trotsky only 'described the reality which was before his eyes in 1938'.As for the problem of defining the characteristics or the content of the slow-down which defines the periods of decadence, the Trotskyists no longer give us anything very concrete to go on. They talk about 'neo-capitalism' which supposedly began right after World War 2 and which is characterised by an "unprecedented economic expansion". They tell us that "the general crisis of capitalism was brought about by the first war"; but they also tell us that it was in 1848, 120 years ago, that Marx denounced the capitalist production as fetters on the development of the productive forces; it was in 1848 that he declared the capitalist mode of production to be "regressive and reactionary" [2] [36]. And they remind us about the sentences in the Communist Manifesto:"For many a decade past the history of industry and commerce is but the history of the revolt of modern productive forces against modern conditions of production...And here it becomes evident, that the bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions of existence upon society as an over-riding law". This selection is cited by Weber in order to pose the question, "Is this to say that Marx and Engels were mistaken?" Weber argues that the reply to this question which every Lambertist must unhesitatingly agree to if he takes the Lambertist theses at all seriously, is the following. "If the contradiction between the development of productive forces and the continuation of the capitalist relations of production is expressed purely and simply in terms of the blockage of the productive forces, then Marx and Engels were wrong, not only in 1848 but all their lives, since according to the Lambertist position, the stagnation of the productive forces began in 1914!" More confusion follows: "But the Lambertists theory of a 'clogging' of the productive forces is foreign to marxism..."On the other hand, if you believe that Weber, Marx and Engels are not wrong, then after the infallibility of Trotsky, the infallibility of Marx and Engels is also saved, in Weber's head at least, and the dogma of these different infallibilities is respected. But suddenly you find yourself entangled in the following notions: the decadence of capitalism was under full sway in 1848; the beginning of "the general crisis of capitalism" only in 1914; and the height of the victorious expansion of "neo-capitalism" in 1960! Is the rupture in capitalist development to be situated in the "decades before 1848", "120 years ago" in 1848, or in 1914, or even in 1945 at the beginning of the so-called "neo-capitalism"? When does this famous "epoch of social revolution" of which Marx spoke begin?It would be difficult to piece together any coherent findings in this lamentable theoretical patchwork which was, in any case, elaborated only to salvage a few official Trotskyist dogmas and to justify the 'progressive character' of all bureaucratic movements in the third world, the 'anti-imperialist' nature of Peking and Moscow, and all sorts of opportunisms involving trade unions ('critical' support), elections ('pedagogical' benefits), and reforms ('transitional movements towards socialism'). But in the last analysis, for the Leninists of What Is To Be Done?, all these economic problems of characterising historical periods, etc... are unimportant because these 'scientists' are convinced that the only real problem is revolutionary leadership: "The present crisis in human culture is the crisis in the proletarian leadership." (Trotsky, 1938)There is little to be learned from this theoretical patchwork quilt (which actually serves only as a cloak with which to cover the various types of Trotskyist opportunism), except to realise the necessity of developing a serious definition of what is signified by the slackening in the growth of the productive forces.As we said at the beginning of this article, a period of decadence is expressed by a slackening or slowing down in the growth of the productive forces when:1) such a lack of growth specifically results from the constraints imposed by the relations of production;2) the process is inevitable and irreversible;3) an ever widening gap is created between the actual development of the productive forces and what would have been possible had the fetters constituted by the dominant relations of production been absent.When Marx and Engels wrote the Communist Manifesto, there were periodic slow-downs in growth caused by cyclical crises. During these crises, the fundamental contradictions of capitalism were clearly projected. But these "revolts of the modern forces of production against the modern relations of production" were only the revolts of capitalism's youth. The outcome of these regular explosions was only the strengthening of the system which, during the course of his dramatic ascension, had thrown off its infantile habits along with the last feudal constraints standing in its way. In 1850, only 10 per cent of the world population was integrated into the capitalist relations of production. The wage system had its whole future before it. Marx and Engels had the genius to extract from the crises of capitalism's ascendancy the essence of all crises to come. In so doing, they revealed to future generations the bases of capitalism's most profound convulsions. They were able to do so because from its beginning a social form carries inside itself the seeds of all the contradictions which will carry it to its death. But insofar as these contradictions are not developed to the point of permanently hindering the economic growth, they constitute the very motor of this growth. The slow-downs which the capitalist economy of the nineteenth century joltingly experienced have nothing to do with its permanent and growing fetters. On the contrary, the intensity of these crises was softened by their repetition. Marx and Engels were completely mistaken in their analysis of 1848. (Marx in Class struggles in France as well as Engels in his later introduction to this text, were moreover not afraid to recognise this). Much more lucid was Rosa Luxemburg's analysis in 1898: "If one looks more closely at the different causes of all previous great international crises, one will be convinced that they are all not the expression of the weakness of old age of the capitalist economy but rather of its childhood. We still have not progressed to that degree of development and exhaustion which would produce the fatal, periodic collision of the forces of production with the limits of the market, which is the actual capitalist crisis of old age....If the world market has now more or less filled out, and can no longer be enlarged by sudden extensions; and if, at the same time, the productivity of labour strides relentlessly forward, then in less or more time the periodic conflict of the forces of production with the limits of exchanges will begin, and will repeat itself more sharply and more stormily." (Rosa Luxemburg, Reform or revolution )When the period of post-World War 2 reconstruction opened, a long time had already elapsed since capitalism could "no longer be enlarged by sudden extensions". For decades, the productivity of labour had risen too quickly to be contained within the capitalist relations of production. For thirty years already, repeated and increasingly violent assaults of the forces of production against the barriers which block their development have brutally ravaged the entire society.Only the misery and the barbarism of these years of growing depression can account for the general bewilderment provoked by the economic development which began with reconstruction. For, however one envisages it, this 'development' constitutes in fact the greatest slackening in the growth of the productive forces that humanity has ever known. Never before has the contrast between what is possible and what is actually accomplished reached such proportions. Never "has the continuation of development appeared so much like a decline". (Marx).In order to appreciate the magnitude of this decline many questions might be asked. Should armaments production be included or not in the volume of production effectively realised in order to determine the development of the productive forces? How can we determine the level of production 'which would have been possible'? Must we compare the levels effectively realised with those which would have been reached if economic growth continued to follow the rates achieved during the system's ascendant phase? And, in that case, should we begin from 1913 or 1945? Or should we determine the rates which would have been possible given the existing technology of that time? Is it necessary to consider whether the productive forces 'left on their own' would have developed according to rates which were increasing or which remained constant?

In order to answer these questions we are going to compare the world's industrial production as it developed from 1913 to 1959 (including armaments production) with what would have taken place if industrial growth had continued after 1913 along the same rates attained during the decade 1880-1890. [3] [37] (We will assume a constant rate of development. In reality, this rate would tend to increase under the influence of rising productivity). We are particularly interested in the period which began right after World War 2. The comparison with the hypothetical growth defined in the first example (above) will be completed by a second comparison with another example of hypothetical growth based on new growth rates made possible by the development of technology at the time of World War 2. In order to get a more precise idea of the extent of the decline we will start this hypothetical growth from the end of the war in 1946. For this comparison we have chosen as the growth rate which would have been attainable following World War 2 (if the capitalist relations of production had not hindered development), the rate which was reached by the United States industrial production between 1939 and 1944. The war had opened up important outlets for the American economy and thus enabled the productive apparatus to operate at its maximum strength. However, this rate is limited by the fact that such an immense growth in output involved a type of production which could not be reintegrated into production in order to accelerate, in its turn, further growth; namely, armaments. Moreover, this rate was realised in the United States at the same time that the other powers were war-torn: American economic growth, therefore, could not profit from technological development furnished by international collaboration. We are keeping this rate of growth nevertheless, because it has the virtue of having been actually attained at a given time and thus gives us an appreciation of society's actual technological capacities. The index of United States industrial production went from 109 to 235 between 1939 and 1944 ( 100=1938 ) which is a rate of growth of 110 per cent in five years, (see graph).

On the graph we can see the divergences which, in both cases, widen with growing rapidity. We can see, even more clearly, the magnitude of these slow-downs by recording their progression on a separate graph. (The first graph is scaled in semi-logarithms so the progression of the divergences is poorly shown.)

These graphs are only very approximate and give a picture which is probably an under-estimation of the actual extent of the brake on the rate of growth. However, they do give a clear idea of the unprecedented effectiveness of this brake, of its irreversible and inevitable character, as well as its uninterrupted increase. The periods during which the gaps are narrowed correspond to the periods of rearmament or reconstruction. Here their function as temporary palliatives clearly stands out.After the slowing down of the growth of productive forces, it is necessary to see whether capitalism after 1914 and especially after 1945 has been condemned to deeper and more widespread crises (the second characteristic of a society's economic decadence). This will lead us to examine the problem of the nature of armaments productions and its limitations. We will first consider the period 1914-46, followed by the period extending from the end of World War 2 to the present.

[1] [38] ‘Qu' est-ce que l ‘AJS', Cahiers rouge, series ‘Marx ou creve' (sic), pp. 13-35

[2] [39] Ibid, p. 30

[3] [40] From 1880 to 1890, the index of industrial production multiplied by 1.6, Sternberg, p.21