The breakup of the bourgeoisie’s political apparatus is escalating

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Milei in Argentina, Kast in Chile, Keiko Fujimori in Peru, Noboa in Ecuador, De la Espriella in Colombia, Bukele in El Salvador, Nasry Asfura in Honduras and, perhaps tomorrow, Bolsonaro Junior in Brazil: populism is spreading like an epidemic across Latin America. Following on from Europe – with Brexit and the rise of Farage and Reform UK in Britain, Le Pen and Bardella’s National Rally in France, the AfD in Germany, and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands; and above all, following the United States with Trump’s two four-year terms, it is now Latin America’s turn to face a populist tidal wave that is bringing an end to the influence exerted since the start of the 21st century by the left of capital.

This rise of disruptive factions cannot be explained solely in terms of the left-right divide; it is the quintessential expression of the degree of putrefaction reached by this system of exploitation, which offers no perspectives accept further suffering, barbarism and chaos.

Admittedly, the process of decomposition within political and social structures, driven by the crisis of the capitalist mode of production, has been spreading throughout the region for several decades now. In countries such as Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, the cartels exercise territorial control over certain regions, mainly where key hubs for their criminal activities are located, always, of course, with the complicity of the authorities, as the state itself does not hesitate to take its share of this lucrative cake.[1]

This rot within state structures is irreversible under capitalism, particularly in its period of decomposition, and the mafias of Latin America are by no means a ‘cultural’ peculiarity of the region or a mere ‘criminal anomaly’. All over the world, staggering levels of corruption are growing and flourishing within the political apparatus, and scandals are multiplying in most countries. Crime, insecurity and urban violence are skyrocketing, with children increasingly caught up in them and, more and more, becoming victims of prostitution as well. Drugs are now becoming a mass phenomenon, playing a major role in the corruption of states and financial institutions: “All these manifestations of social decay, which today, on a scale unprecedented in history, are permeating every pore of human society, can only signify one thing: not only the disintegration of bourgeois society, but also the annihilation of every principle of collective life within a society that finds itself deprived of even the slightest plan, the slightest prospect, even in the short term, even the most illusory one.”[2]

For a number of years now, these gangs have also been meddling in the electoral process through financial corruption, undue favours and threats. Elections have now become a theatre for the assassination of candidates, blackmail and the partisan use of social media, whiles the state is infiltrated by these mafia-like groups. The rise of populism in Latin America will only further exacerbate the struggles between factions and destabilise the political structures of the various countries even more: “(…) the populist wave is forcing a growing number of states to confront bourgeois factions characterised by irrationality, volatility and unpredictability. Populism thus constitutes the most caricatured expression of a society increasingly marked by the decomposition of the capitalist mode of production.”[3]

The intensification of clashes between factions of the bourgeoisie

Through ‘Bolivarian Socialism’ in Venezuela to the ‘Movement Towards Socialism’ in Bolivia to the ‘progressive policies’ of Petro in Colombia and Lula in Brazil, the left of capital dominated the Latin American political landscape for two decades (2000–2020) and propagated the illusion of an improvement in social conditions. The impact of the 2008 international financial crisis, exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic and the wars in Ukraine and Iran — which have plunged the region into its worst recession in a century — has accelerated the deterioration in living standards (32 per cent of the population is at risk of falling into poverty; 25 per cent are already living in poverty today). Growing instability and insecurity, as well as rising corruption – particularly within left-wing administrations – have fuelled disillusionment with ‘progressive democratic’ projects in the region, without the ‘traditional’ right-wing parties really capitalising on this. The rise of populist candidates in many countries across the subcontinent highlights that the rejection of ‘traditional parties’ or ‘ruling elites’ stems from a sense of exasperation and discontent amongst certain factions of the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie at the inability of the bourgeoisie’s traditional political apparatus to tackle the crisis, but this boisterous and destructive reaction can only lead to the intensification of struggles between bourgeois factions and, consequently, to further fragmentation of the political system: “This historic upheaval is manifested in particular by a growing tendency towards indiscipline, divisions, every man for himself and, finally, the intensification of factional struggles within the political apparatus. This fertile ground has provided the ideal conditions for the emergence of bourgeois factions with increasingly irrational rhetoric, capable of capitalising on the most repugnant ideas and sentiments, acting like gangs, wreaking havoc on political relations, with the aim of advancing their own interests at any cost, to the detriment of the interests of national capital.” (‘How the Bourgeoisie Organises Itself’, International Review 172, 2024)

While Latin American populism takes many forms – from Milei’s libertarian populism to Bukele’s security-focused populism and his prison-state autocracy, or even the xenophobia of Keiko Fujimori or Kast, who is nostalgic for the Pinochet era – we nevertheless find, to a greater or lesser extent, a number of striking characteristics common to populist movements elsewhere:

  • Contempt for the political and social ‘elites’ is a key common denominator. The bourgeois factions that have run the state in recent decades are particularly targeted. Thus, Milei’s populism pits the ‘pure people’ against the ruling elite, which he has popularised under the derogatory term ‘the caste’ (la casta). In Peru, Keiko Fujimori is playing a similar tune by pitting the so-called ‘defenders of order’ and of the people against the intellectual elites, the radical left and the existing institutions.
  • The glorification of the iconic figure of the leader who portrays himself as a prophetic figure, dramatising his break with the outdated conventions of traditional bourgeois politics, represents another dimension of Latin American populism: there is, for example, Milei, the ‘chainsaw man’, or Bukele in El Salvador, who presents himself as the ‘coolest dictator in the world’. This exploitation of nostalgia for a ‘strong-arm leader’, capable of cutting through crises by unscrupulously shaking off institutional red tape, is also employed by Keiko Fujimori, who opportunistically capitalises on the memory of her father, Alberto Fujimori, who, according to propaganda, defeated the ‘Shining Path’ terrorist group, or by Kast in Chile, when he expresses his nostalgia for the Pinochet era.
  • Hatred towards a state, accused of ‘suppressing’ freedom of enterprise serves as a justification for a programme of massive economic and social deregulation. According to Milei, the state is nothing more than a criminal organisation. In response to this, he brandishes the misleading promise of dollarising the economy and ‘blowing up’ the Central Bank to eradicate inflation. This delusional rhetoric translates into a brutal austerity programme, in which the government apparatus is stripped down through massive privatisation measures and the abolition of most social ministries and even certain core government departments – measures presented as a decisive response to the crisis. In addition to dissolving dozens of government agencies and public institutions and sacking tens of thousands of civil servants to maintain a strict budget surplus, he has halved the number of ministries (from 18 to 9). This frenzy of destruction of the state apparatus is not an isolated phenomenon: for instance, Bukele abolished five ministries as soon as he came to power; in Ecuador, Noboa has also halved the number of his ministries (from 20 to 10); while in Colombia, De la Espriella is advocating a 40 per cent reduction in the state apparatus.
  • The search for scapegoats. In the face of the crisis, social breakdown and insecurity is a fundamental component of populist politics. The bourgeoisie shifts the blame for its own failure onto the most vulnerable sections of the working class, in particular Venezuelan, Cuban and Haitian migrants fleeing the abject poverty of their countries of origin. In Chile, during his election campaign, Kast directly blamed immigrants for unemployment, the deterioration of public services and the general decline in living standards, promising the mass deportation of 330,000 people. In Peru, Keiko Fujimori has made this conflation and promises of mass deportations the centrepiece of her campaign. In Ecuador, Daniel Noboa effectively criminalises migration flows from Colombia and Venezuela, portraying them as mere channels for infiltration by transnational gangs. In Colombia, De la Espriella draws on xenophobic nationalism under the slogan ‘Colombia for Colombians’, ordering large-scale police operations in Barranquilla and Medellín to track down and deport undocumented migrants. Automatically linking immigration to urban crime is a systematic feature of populist discourse.

Although these populist factions are fundamentally part of the bourgeoisie and their approach is fully in line with capitalism, their disruptive rhetoric, their incessant provocations and their irrational policies make the state’s management of capital and its control over the political arena even more unstable: “The agitation amongst the more ‘rational’ factions of the bourgeoisie in the face of the emergence of these organisations reflects genuine concern. Although the populists are fundamentally ‘one of their own’ and their xenophobic and reactionary rhetoric is, in truth, a nauseating distillation of bourgeois ideology (individualism, nationalism, domination through violence…), the rise of populist parties — and their utterly irrational and incompetent leaders — at the head of states can only further complicate the management of the interests of each national capital and exacerbate the chaos that is already spreading on across the world.”[4]

Proconsuls of neo-Monroeism

But what unites these populist leaders above all else is the fact that they are allies of Washington and, more specifically, of Trumpist populism and the MAGA movement. Indeed, Milei, Noboa and De la Espriella have personal ties to Trump and the movement surrounding him, with the latter two also holding US citizenship.

Latin America has long been regarded as America’s backyard, but China’s rise through the development of the ‘New Silk Roads’ (Belt and Road Initiative) has opened up a new scenario for the region, one which has managed to win over significant factions of the bourgeoisie in certain countries, particularly Peru, Brazil, Chile and Argentina. However, this expansion of trade relations with China has intensified internal confrontations between bourgeois factions and, above all, has sparked conflicts with the former dominant power, while the struggle for control of lithium, rare earths and other minerals is turning into an unprecedented plundering of the natural environment. The region is therefore torn between its ‘subordination’ to the United States and the pragmatic benefits of a partnership with China – a dilemma it had not previously encountered.

Faced with this situation, the Trump administration has implemented an extremely harsh policy: “After years of neglect, the United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American pre-eminence in the Western Hemisphere, and to protect our homeland and our access to key geographies throughout the region. We will deny non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities, or to own or control strategically vital assets, in our Hemisphere. This ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine is a common-sense and potent restoration of American power and priorities, consistent with American security interests” (National Security Strategy, November 2025).

The imposition of neo-Monroeism could not be more explicit: Latin America is the United States’ ‘private preserve’ under the guise of the hypocritical slogan ‘America for Americans’. Consequently, Trump has no qualms about imposing his populist candidates in elections across the various countries:

  • through technical and financial support for underhand political marketing campaigns, utilising audience targeting, bot networks comprising hundreds of thousands of accounts, misleading polls, covert investigations into the opposition, and manipulation via artificial intelligence, carried out by shadowy networks equipped and financially backed by the MAGA movement and the Trump administration;[5]
  • by means of explicit threats and blackmail concerning the continuation or withdrawal of US aid to countries and the granting, in the event of a victory for the ‘right’ candidate, of massive US loans – as was again the case recently in Honduras and Colombia to ensure the victory of the ‘right’ candidates, Asfura and De la Espriella.

Moreover, these populist leaders in Latin America – a direct result of Trump’s ‘support’ – were quick to join the “Shield of the Americas”, an alliance established by the Trump administration in March 2026. The signatories have committed to sharing intelligence and coordinating police and military operations to dismantle drug cartels and transnational gangs. In reality, it is essentially a tool for exerting geopolitical influence to reaffirm US hegemony (in the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine) and to curb China’s growing economic and political influence in the region.

A minefield for the region’s working class

The rise of populist cliques to power in numerous Latin American states has thus led to a policy of dismantling the state and denigrating the political elite, subservience to Trump, security measures involving mass deportations and tensions at the borders, and social bloodshed. But what marks the rise to power of these destructive factions even more clearly are the scandals of self-enrichment and corruption that have plagued them from the very first months of their rule. Whether it be the Milei clan mired in the embezzlement of public funds and speculative dealings, the Noboa dynasty linked to global drug-trafficking networks, or highly controversial figures such as De la Espriella and Fujimori, schooled in the ways of drug trafficking, paramilitarism, illegal financing and money laundering, their sordid greed — which is every bit as bad as that of the much-maligned ‘elites’ — illustrates the rot at the heart of a mode of production with no future. This can only make the clashes between bourgeois factions in these countries more abject and violent, and accelerate the descent into decay.

The fragmentation of the bourgeoisie’s political apparatus and the intensification of factional struggles within it do not in any way imply that an opportunity is opening up for the proletariat. On the contrary, the danger would be for workers to allow themselves to be drawn onto the terrain of their exploiters by taking sides with one or other faction of the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, the ‘liberal’ bourgeoisie and the left wing of capital’s political spectrum are already preparing to exploit the irrationality, brutality and corruption of populist governments to step up campaigns in defence of the ‘democratic gains trampled upon by the populists’. Furthermore, by waving the banner of the ‘anti-Yankee’ tradition, these left-wing factions seek to divert the working class onto the rotten ground of nationalism and ‘anti-imperialism’. Supporting one sector of the bourgeoisie against another, or defending the capitalist democratic state on the pretext that it is the ‘lesser evil’, amounts to political suicide for the proletariat.

In the face of the upheavals rocking the bourgeoisie in Latin American countries, the working class there must wage the struggle on its own class terrain by opposing the terrible attacks launched by governments – both populist and ‘progressive’ – against its living and working conditions. To this end, it must draw inspiration from the example of the struggles of the proletariat in the core countries, in particular the working class of Europe – the most experienced battalions of the world proletariat – where the memory of past battles is preserved, along with the lessons accumulated over the years. Faced with the global crisis of a moribund mode of production, the workers of Latin America do not form an isolated entity, but an inseparable component of the global army of the exploited. The proletarian revolution will be global or it will be nothing.

F - R (20.10.26)

 

[1] Two examples: to curb crime in El Salvador, President Bukele entered into secret agreements with the gangs that controlled the country, and the family business of Ecuador’s populist president Noboa, Noboa Trading, is linked to drug trafficking to Europe.

[4] Ibid

[5] See ‘La Derecha Diario’ by Negre and Cerimedo. Fernando Cerimedo was recently imprisoned in Bolivia; this shady character was the ‘MAGA operative’ in Latin America, a former adviser to Milei, Noboa and De la Espriella, and had recently been calling the shots in Bolivia, which led to his reckless behaviour (an attempt to murder his ex-girlfriend), which is the cause of his current predicament.

Rubric: 

Spread of populism in Latin America