This was a very good article that correctly points to the tension in capitalist development between the creative-deastructive tendencies of capital as a social relation and the political needs of the nation-state to legitimate the system. I am not sure that we can say the nation-state is obsolete in a strict sense though. What we can say is that there is a real contradiction between these two different, but inextricably intertwined logics that is expressing itself in a concerted way today, as a result of the continuing crisis. Decomposition is also a factor in that the bourgeoisie itself is now sharply divided over these questions, threatening the legitimacy of its system. While the main factions of the bourgeoisie are still united behind a neo-liberal consensus that has seen the nation-state weaken over the last several decades to the point where its ideological, political and social capacity to bind the populace together in a kind of national-communitarianism is weaking, there is is now a kind of anti-consensus, insurgent wing of the bourgeoisie that is trying to reverse this process, but with the cosnequence of threatening the other pillar of bourgeois state ideology--democracy.
Where this ends up can't be concluded right now, but it is worth asking if the nation-state is becomming obsolete are there other ways that the system can be legitmated? It seems like there may be another trend afoot today in which people are coming to see themselves less as citizens of particular nations and more as members of expressive moral communities (that sometimes even transcend national boundaries). But can this really legitimate a system that is predicated on the economic competition between national capitals? From a certain perspective, captialist society is starting to look more like it did during its infancy in the early modern period, during the wars of religion, with various moral communities fighting one another in the manner of a crusade over issues of virtue and moral and religious purity, the saved vs. the damned. But it was precsiely the disintegrating effects of such a state of affairs that the development of the national state (enshrined as the dominant political form of modernity with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648) had to overcome. In this sense, for all its nastiness and viciousness and whatever threat it poses to democratic ideology, populism today may be a kind of political defense mechanism of the state against the worst instincts of capital to create too much change, too fast. But this again raises the question of what is more important to the continued legitimacy of the system: the nation or democracy? Can the two be reconciled anymore?